Intuitionistic Mathematics Does Not Need
Ex Falso Quodlibet*
ABSTRACT. We define a system IR of first-order intuitionistic
relevant logic. We show that intuitionistic mathematics (on the
assumption that it is consistent) can be relevantized, by virtue of the
following metatheorem: any intuitionistic proof of A from a set X
of premisses can be converted into a proof in IR of either A or
absurdity from some subset of X. Thus IR establishes the same
inconsistencies and theorems as intuitionistic logic, and allows one
to prove every intuitionistic consequence of any consistent set of
premisses.
It has long been thought that the rule exfalso quodlibet
(or, as it is sometimes also known, the absurdity rule)
is adopted by logicians merely for systematic expedi-
ency. To relevantists, its use jars against intuition. No
working mathematician seems ever to use the rule, or
to need it; or so it seems. This paper pursues the
appearance to discover the reality. I shall define below
a notion of intuitionistic relevant natural deduction.
(I shall assume the reader is familiar with the termi-
nology of natural deduction as in Tennant, 1978.) The
main theorem is:
For the full language based on -, &, V, D, 3 and V,
any intuitionistic relevant natural deductions estab-
lishing A0, B 1. . . . . B n ~ A, A~ ~ B1. . . . . A, ~ Bn
can be converted into an intuitionistic relevant natural
deduction of A or of .1_ from some subset of UiA~.
Schematically we have
A1 An
1-I1, . . . , I-I.
B1 B. a (C Uiat)
--9 FI
Ao, B1. . . . . B. _L/A
Ho
A be a relevant proof of that fact;
This result suffices to show that intuitionistic mathe-
matics, based on relevant deductions, can do without
the Lewis paradox. The intuitionist need never apply
Topoi 13: 127-133, 1994.
© 1994 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin the Netherlands.
NeiI Tennant
ex falso quodlibet. Intuitionistic relevant proofs
"accumulate" to yield deductive progress; and when
they fail to do so, we thereby learn something stronger:
that the accumulated premisses are inconsistent (or that
the sought conclusion is a logical truth).
Some notions
Introductory sentence occurrences in a natural deduc-
tion are defined as follows: All conclusions of
introduction rules and the absurdity rule are introduc-
tory. If C is introductory as a subordinate conclusion
of VElimination or of 3Elimination then it is introduc-
tory as the main conclusion of the elimination. A natural
deduction is in normal form just in case no major
premiss for an elimination is introductory.
The natural deduction rules for intuitionistic relevant
proof are just the introduction and elimination rules for
the logical operators (modified for VElimination and
DIntroduction); subject to the requirements that some
of the discharge rules be so applied that there be no
"vacuous discharge" o f assumptions, and that major
premisses of elimination rules not be introductory. The
full list of rules is given below.
Our main theorem, in conjunction with the soundness
and completeness of intuitionistic logic, easily yields
the results that:
(i) if one's axioms (for intuitionistic set theory or for
Heyting arithmetic, say) are consistent, then any
intuitionistic logical consequence of those axioms
is relevantly provable from them;
(ii) if one's axioms form an inconsistent set, there will
(iii) all intuitionistic logical truths are relevantly
provable.
Our main theorem is proved via two other results:
128 NEIL TENNANT

Normalization theorem (cf. Prawitz 1965). Any in- Relevant -Elimination

tuitionistic natural deduction of A from A can be
A -.4 where -A is not introductory
converted into a normal intuitionistic natural deduction ±
of A from some subset of A; and
Ordinary and Relevant &Introduction
Extraction theorem (cf. Tennant 1980 for the case
A B
without D). Any normal intuitionistic natural deduc-
A&B
tion Fl of A from A can be converted into an intuition-
istic relevant natural deduction I-l' of A or of ± from Ordinary &Elimination
some subset of A. Moreover, if the conclusion of 1I' is
A&B A&B
A, then it is not introductory in I-I' if it is not introduc-
A B
tory in FI.
Here we need only prove the extraction theorem. Relevant &Elimination
For definiteness, an intuitionistic natural deduction
A&B A&B where A&B is not introductory
is one that can be built up in the usual way using the
A B
absurdity rule and the so-called "ordinary" intro-
duction and elimination rules from the list below. An Ordinary and Relevant vlntroduction
intuitionistic relevant natural deduction is one that can
A B
be built up using only the "relevant" versions of intro-
AVB AVB
duction and elimination rules from the list below.
Ordinary VElimination

List of rules (i) ~-- (i)

where there do not have

The Absurdity Rule to be assumptions A, B
± as indicated to be dis-
A AVB C C charged
(i)
C
Ordinary ~Introduction
Relevant VElimination
~-- (i)
(i) ~ (i)
where there need not be an assumption
of the form A to be discharged where there must be
assumptions A, B as
± indicated to be dis-
~-~ (i) AVB ±IC ±/C charged; and AVB is
(i)
C not introductory
Relevant -Introduction
Ordinary Dlntroduction
~-- (i)
-~- (i)
where there must be an assumption of
the form A to be discharged where there need not be an assumption
of the form A to be discharged
±
(i)
~A B
- - (i)
ADB
Ordinary -Elimination
A -A
 INTUITIONISTIC MATHEMATICS 129

Relevant DIntroduction Ordinary 3Elimination

(i) (i)
A(a)
where there must be an assumption of where there need not be an
the form A to be discharged assumption of the form A(a) to
be discharged; and a does not
_k 3xA(x) B occur in 3xA(x), B or any
- - (i) (i)
ADB B assumption other than A(a) on
which the upper occurrence of
B depends
--A--(i)
Relevant 3Elimination
where there need not be an assumption
of the form A to be discharged
(i)
A(a)
B
- - (i) where there must be an as-
ADB
sumption of the form A(a) to
(N.B.: These rules make D behave differently from the be discharged; 3xA(x) is not
weak and strong conditionals discussed in Tennant 3xA(x) B (i) introductory; and a does not
(1987a, b)) B occur in 3xA(x), B or any
assumption other than A(a) on
Ordinary DElimination
which the upper occurrence of
A ADB B depends
B
A word of explanation would be in order about
Relevant DElimination the special relevant forms of VElimination and
DIntroduction.
A ADB where ADB is not introductory
Example: Relevant VElimination allows one to prove
B
disjunctive syllogism relevantly:
Ordinary and Relevant Vlntroduction

A(a) where a does not occur in any -~-- (1) -A

(1)
VxA(x) assumption on which A(a) depends A VB _1_ B
(1)
B
Ordinary VElimination
Call this relevant proof AVB, -A. Let A be the one-step
VxA(x)
H0 1-I1
A(t)
B AVB
Relevant VElimination
A
VxA(x) where VxA(x) is not introductory relevant proof AVB "
A(t)
YIo and I-I~ provide an excellent illustration of our
Ordinary and Relevant 3Introduction main result above. ~ is {-.4 } ; A1 is {A }. We are seeking
a relevant deduction rI of _L or of B from (some subset
A(t)
A of) the set of accumulated undischarged assumptions
3xA(x)
UiAi = {A, -A}. First we graft A1 on top of the occur-
rence of AVB in ri 0. The resulting tree is not in normal
form; nor, strictly, is it an intuitionistic natural deduc-
tion, because of the non-standard form of VElimination
130 NEIL TENNANT
in FI0. But that can be remedied, by supplying an
application of the absurdity rule at the end of the first
subordinate deduction for VElimination:
~-- (1) -A
A 2_
AVB --B --B- (1)
(1)
B
so that we now have a non-normal but standard
intuitionistic deduction of B from {A, ~A}. Then we
normalize it by applying VReduction to get
A -A
2_
B
Finally we extract the application of the absurdity rule
to obtain as our desired relevant deduction 17 the
relevant deduction
A ~A
_k
of 2_ (rather than B) from the accumulated undischarged
assumptions A = {A, -A}.
Observation 1. Note that any application of the relevant
version of VElimination that has 2_ as one subordinate
conclusion and A as the other can always be turned into
a standard intuitionistic application of VElimination by
supplying one application of the absurdity rule to get A
from 2_ in the case that ends with 2_.
Observation 2. The same sort of remark applies in the
case of the extra relevantist portion of DIntroduction.
In the standard case one does not need to state the first
half of relevant DIntroduction separately:
~- (i)
where there must be an assumption of
the form A to be discharged
2_
(i)
ADB
since the presence of the absurdity rule allows one to
turn any application of it into an application of the
ordinary form o f Dlntroduction. But in the case of
intuitionistic relevant deduction, where we cannot use
the absurdity rule, it is vital to have that first half of
DIntroduction stated separately, if we are to be able to
prove the extraction theorem for the full language with
D.
Recall our statement of our main result above:
For the full language based on -, &, V, D, 3 and V,
any intuitionistic relevant natural deductions estab-
lishing A0, B 1. . . . . B. ~ A, A 1 ~ B 1. . . . . A. ~ B~
can be converted into an intuitionistic relevant natural
deduction of A or of 2- from some subset of UiAi.
Schematically we have
Al An
I'I1, . . . , I'I n
Bl Bn A (__ t_JiAi)
H
/~0, B 1 , - . . , Bn ±/A
1-10
A
The proof of the main result proceeds along the
following lines, already illustrated in the example
above. When the relevant deductions I ' I 1 . . . . , I-In are
grafted onto the respective assumptions B1. . . . . B n of
the relevant deduction H 0, one obtains a tree that can be
turned into an intuitionistic deduction (albeit possibly
an abnormal one) by supplying extra applications of the
absurdity rule wherever they are needed in order to turn
applications of relevant VElimination and Dlntroduction
into applications of the ordinary intuitionistic rules (by
Observations 1 and 2 above). By the normalization
theorem one then finds a normal intuitionistic deduc-
tion of A from A. By the extraction theorem one extracts
from it all applications of the absurdity rule in such a
way as to find a relevant deduction of 2- or of A from
(some subset A of) UiA i. In order to carry the extrac-
tion through, the liberalized versions of VElimination
and Dlntroduction are crucial.
The proof of extraction is by induction on the length
of intuitionistic deductions in normal form.
Basis. Obvious.
Inductive hypothesis. The result holds for all normal
intuitionistic deductions less complex than II.
Inductive step. By cases, according to the last rule
applied in the normal intuitionistic deduction Yl. The
only cases where care is required are VElimination and
Dlntroduction; but I shall also illustrate the ideas in
 INTUITIONISTIC MATHEMATICS 131

the more routine cases by dealing with the absurdity VElimination

rule, -Introduction and VElimination.
Some paradigmatic, noteworthy or non-trivial cases Suppose the normal intuitionistic deduction II is of the
in the inductive step of the proof of extraction (other form
cases are left to the reader):
A
£
VxA(x)
Absurdity rule
A(t)
Suppose the normal intuitionistic deduction I-I is of the Since I1 is normal, the indicated occurrence of VxA(x)
form is not introductory.
By inductive hypothesis applied to £ there is a
A
relevant intuitionistic deduction ~2 of Z or of VxA(x)
E
± for some subset F of A. If F ends with ±, take F as the
required relevant intuitionistic deduction corresponding
A
to H. If, on the other hand, f2 ends with VxA(x), then
By inductive hypothesis applied to E there is a relevant by inductive hypothesis applied to Z that final occur-
intuitionistic deduction of ± from some subset of A. rence of VxA(x) is not introductory. Thus we can apply
Take it as the required relevant intuitionistic deduction relevant VElimination to obtain
corresponding to H.
F
~2
VxA(x)
~Introduction
a(t)
Suppose the normal intuitionistic deduction H is of the as the required relevant intuitionistic deduction corre-
form sponding to Yi.

A,A- (i)
£ VElimination
_L
(i) The complication that may arise when rI ends with an
~A
application of VElimination with (non-introductory)
where A is not in A. By inductive hypothesis applied to major premiss AVB is that the relevant deductions
E there is a relevant intuitionistic deduction ~ of ± guaranteed by inductive hypothesis may not have the
from some subset F o f A U {A}. I f A is not in F, take same conclusions: one may end with ± (and involve the
g~ as the required relevant intuitionistic deduction case assumption A), the other may end with C (and
corresponding to H. If A is in F, then F = • U {A} involve the case assumption B); or the other way round.
where A is not in O, and we can construct In either case, the relevant form of VElimination is
specifically designed to cope: one may apply it to the
sub-deductions guaranteed by inductive hypothesis to
O,A- (i) obtain overall a relevant intuitionistic deduction of C
Y~ from some subset of the assumptions of Yl.
±
~/~ (i)

D lntroduction
as the required relevant intuitionistic deduction corre-
sponding to H.
Suppose the normal intuitionistic deduction II is of the
form
132 NEIL TENNANT
A,')-- (i)
Z ±
B (-A)VB
(i)
ADB
where A is not in A. By inductive hypothesis applied to
E there is a relevant intuitionistic deduction fl of I or
of B from some subset F o f A tJ {A}. I f A is not in F
and fl ends with _1_,then take tl as the required relevant
intuitionistic deduction corresponding to rI. If A is in
F (F = • U {A }, A not in O) and t-I ends with 3_, then
take
O, ~ (i)
f2
_L
(i)
ADB
as the required relevant intuitionistic deduction corre-
sponding to II. If, finally, fl ends with B, then take
I~{A}, ~ (i)
f~
3_
(i)
ADB
as the required relevant intuitionistic deduction corre-
sponding to H, and note that it does not matter whether
A is available as an assumption to be discharged.[~
Further remarks
(1) Since every rule of IR is either primitive or
derivable in intuitionistic logic, and the conditional D
is independent, within intuitionistic logic, of the other
connectives, it follows that D is independent of the
other connectives in IR. This holds despite the apparent
motivation, in formulating the rule of relevant
Dlntroduction, to make ADB behave.like (~A)VB. It
remains impossible in IR (since IR is contained in
intuitionistic logic) to prove that ADB logically implies
(-A)VB. The converse implication, however, holds in
IR:
(2) ~ -L--
X (1)
-~- (1)
A-DB (2) A--D-B
(1)
ADB
Note how in the second case proof DIntroduction is
applied without discharging any assumption of the form
A.
(2) Another property of D that changes in I R i s the
general validity of the deduction theorem. One direction
is still true:
If B is deducible in IR from A 1. . . . . An
then (An D B) is deducible in IR from
A1. . . . . An_l;
but the other direction needs qualification. For in IR
ADB is deducible from ~A, while yet B is not deducible
from A, ~A. The extraction theorem, however, has the
following corollary:
If (A. D B) is deducible in IR from Al . . . . . An_l
then either B or A_ is deducible in IR from
A1. . . . . An
(3) The statement of the generalized G6del-
Glivenko theorem for intuitionistic relevant logic (given
in Chapter 24 of Tennant, 1987b) can be strengthened
to: In the language based on ~, &, V, D, 3: every
classical proof of A [resp. _k] from A can be converted
into an intuitionistic relevant proof of ~~A or of _1_
[resp. 3_] from ~~A; and the result extends to V if we
insert - - immediately after every universal quantifier
prefix in -~A and in members of ~~A. As inspection of
the earlier proof (at p. 271) reveals, the schemata used
for DIntroduction are available in IR, since one can use
a single application of the first half of the new relevant
rule in place of any pair of steps consisting of an
application of the absurdity rule to get B, followed
immediately by a non-vacuous DIntroduction to get
ADB.
(4) It might be tempting to conjecture finally, for the
full language including D, that the intuitionistically
relevantly provable sequents of the form A ~ A are
precisely the substitution instances of those intuitionis-
tically valid sequents that have no intuitionistically valid
proper subsequents. This would be the intuitionistic
analogue of the result for the classical case without D
that was established in Tennant (1984). But the conjec-
ture is false. Milne (in press) points out the following
 I N T U I T I O N I S T I C MATHEMATICS 133

c o u n t e r e x a m p l e : the s e q u e n t A, B, AVB: A & B is References

p r o v a b l e in IR, b u t is not a s u b s t i t u t i o n i n s t a n c e o f a n y
i n t u i t i o n i s t i c a l l y v a l i d s e q u e n t that has n o i n t u i t i o n i s t i -
cally v a l i d proper s u b s e q u e n t s .
Note
* This paper grew out of discussion of a survey talk, on earlier work,
that I gave to the 5th A.N.U. Paraconsistency Conference in January
1988. I am greatly indebted to the suggestion by Michael MacRobbie
on that occasion that I investigate the so-called "non-Ketonen" form
of the sequent rule for D on the right. That suggestion inspired the
correspondingly modified rule of Dlntroduction in the system of
natural deduction given above.
Milne, P.: 1994, 'IntuitionisticRelevant Logic and Perfect Validity',
Analysis (in press).
Prawitz, D.: 1965, Natural Deduction: A Proof-Theoretical Study,
Almqvist and Wiksell, Stockholm.
Tennant, N.: 1978, Natural Logic, Edinburgh University Press,
Edinburgh.
Tennant, N.: 1980, 'A Proof-Theoretic Approach to Entailment',
Journal of Philosophical Logic 9, 185-209.
Tennant, N.: 1984, 'Perfect Validity,Entailment and Paraconsistency',
Studia Logica 43, 179-198.
Tennant, N.: 1987a, 'Natural Deduction and Sequent Calculus for
Intuitionistic Relevant Logic', Journal of Symbolic Logic 52,
665-680.
Tennant, N.: 1987b, Anti-Realism and Logic, Clarendon Press,
Oxford.

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Churchill College, Cambridge