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Logical Pluralism, Meaning-

Variance, and VerbalDisputes
a
Ole Thomassen Hjortland
a
Munich Centre for Mathematical Philosophy (MCMP),
Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich
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Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
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 Australasian Journal of Philosophy
2012; pp. 1–19, iFirst article

LOGICAL PLURALISM,
MEANING-VARIANCE, AND
VERBAL DISPUTES
Ole Thomassen Hjortland

Logical pluralism has been in vogue since JC Beall and Greg Restall [2006]
articulated and defended a new pluralist thesis. Recent criticisms such as Priest
[2006a] and Field [2009] have suggested that there is a relationship between
their type of logical pluralism and the meaning-variance thesis for logic. This is
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the claim, often associated with Quine [1970], that a change of logic entails a
change of meaning. Here we explore the connection between logical pluralism
and meaning-variance, both in general and for Beall and Restall’s theory
specifically. We argue that contrary to what Beall and Restall claim, their type
of pluralism is wedded to meaning-variance. We then develop an alternative
form of logical pluralism that circumvents at least some forms of meaning-
variance.

Keywords: Logical pluralism, Logical Consequence, Meaning-Variance,

Verbal Dispute, Proof Theory, Sequent Calculus

1. Introduction

Philosophers disagree about many things, and logic is no exception. But

when two philosophers, say Timothy Williamson and Hartry Field, disagree
about whether or not the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), A _ ØA, is valid,
what exactly are they disagreeing about?
In an influential answer to the question, Quine [1970: 80] rhetorically said
that ‘change of logic is change of subject’. Roughly, this is the meaning-
variance thesis about logical disputes. The idea is simple: the meaning of a
logical connective, e.g. negation, is determined by its logic. Thus, when the
classical logician (Williamson) and the non-classical logician (Field) argue
about the validity of the Law of Excluded Middle, the disagreement rests
on a variation in the meaning of negation (or, alternatively, the meaning of
disjunction). Put provocatively, there is no genuine disagreement at all, but
merely a verbal dispute. The two interlocutors are speaking past each other.
Or so argues Quine.
An interesting upshot of the meaning-variance argument is a type of
logical pluralism that simply embraces Quine’s conclusion. If there is no
genuine disagreement between the proponent and opponent of LEM, then
we are free to accept both logics. After all, it was a mistake in the first place

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

ISSN 0004-8402 print/ISSN 1471-6828 online Ó 2012 Australasian Association of Philosophy
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.648945
 2 Ole Thomassen Hjortland

to think of the object in dispute, LEM, as a single logical law. Rather, one
philosopher accepts LEM1 and the other rejects LEM2.
Below we will look closer at some of the defenders of such a logical
pluralism (e.g. Haack [1978]; Carnap [1937]), and then compare them with a
more recent development of logical pluralism in Beall and Restall [2006].
Beall and Restall claim that their type of logical pluralism is one for which
the Quinean meaning-variance thesis does not apply. In what follows, I will
argue that there is reason to think that Beall and Restall do not succeed in
divorcing their type of pluralism from meaning-variance. That does not
mean, however, that there is no interesting notion of logical pluralism that is
independent of meaning-variance. The main part of the paper develops a
new notion of logical pluralism with the aim of showing precisely this. The
overarching idea is to think of logical pluralism not as a plurality of logical
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theories, but as a plurality of consequence relations (and derivability

relations) within one and the same logical theory. I call this intra-theoretic
pluralism. I give an example of how such a theory can be formally achieved
using a generalization of sequent calculus with n-sided sequents.
In xx2 and 3 I quickly outline some of the background on logical
pluralism and the connection to the meaning-variance thesis; in x4 I offer a
short summary of Beall and Restall’s pluralist view; in x5 I discuss how their
thesis relates to the types of meaning-variance identified in the earlier
sections; finally, in x6, I introduce intra-theoretic pluralism and conclude by
discussing both its merits and possible objections.

2. Logical Pluralism

Different logics serve different purposes. But the fact that we might use one
formal logic for mereology and another for managing databases does not
commit us to logical pluralism. For although we can be methodological
pluralists, and hold that logical systems can be used for a number of
theoretical purposes, many of the phenomena that we model or characterize
with these systems have little to do with the traditional concern of logic:
deductive reasoning. Logical pluralism, on the other hand, is precisely a
thesis about logics as applied to reasoning.
A first type of logical pluralism can be identified by employing a helpful
terminology from Haack [1978]:

LP Local Pluralism: There are at least two discourse domains for which
correct deductive reasoning requires distinct logics.

For example, the local pluralist might think that quantum logic is correct for
reasoning about quantum frameworks, intuitionistic logic for reasoning
about smooth infinitesimals, and a supervaluationist logic for reasoning
with vague expressions.1

1
In the terminology of Cook [2010], the local pluralist is a logical relativist; the correctness of a logic is
relative to a discourse domain. See also Batens [1990] and Varzi [2002].
 Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes 3

However, local pluralism is not the thesis that will concern us in the
present paper. Instead, the logical pluralism that will come under scrutiny in
what follows is global pluralism. What we are after is a more precise
formulation of the following thesis:

GP Global pluralism: There are at least two all-purpose logics which are both
correct (or equally good with no better option).2

By ‘all-purpose’ I simply mean a logic applicable to reasoning in all

discourse domains. Philosophers who deny GP we will call logical monists.
They believe that there is a unique, correct logic, sometimes glossed
ironically as the One True Logic.
The GP thesis raises a number of difficult questions about the nature of
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logic. First, it is not entirely clear how to individuate logics, that is, when
two logics are distinct. Second, what it is for a logic to be correct—or two
logics to be equally good—is a notoriously hard question in the philosophy
of logic. It is fairly obvious that a pure logical system is neither correct nor
incorrect; that is simply not the right currency.3 A logical theory applied to
reasoning, however, can be correct or incorrect, or at least better or worse, as
a theory.4 But the correctness depends on the purpose of the theory: a
logical theory might be designed to model or describe actual reasoning
correctly. That is, it can be correct or incorrect according to some descriptive
standard. Alternatively, a logical theory might be designed to be a correct
(prescriptive) theory of how we ought to reason. That is, it can be correct or
incorrect according to some normative standard.

3. Meaning-Variance

Common to both types of logical theory is the worry that the logical
connectives of distinct theories have different meanings. If that is the case,
there is a sense in which the theories may not disagree about anything.
Hartry Field [2009: 343], for example, says that ‘[a] quite exciting form of
pluralism would be the claim that alternative logics (or any meeting minimal
conditions) never genuinely conflict’.5 Haack suggests that this conclusion
leads to a variant of global pluralism:

[W]hile the [logical] monist takes it that the classical and the deviant logician
disagree about the validity/logical truth in the same sense, of one and the same
argument/statement, the global pluralist denies either that the classical and
deviant logician are really using ‘valid’/’ logically true’ in the same sense, or
else that they are really disagreeing about one and the same argument/
statement . . . Roughly, the thought in the second version of global pluralism is
2
The term ‘all-purpose logic’ is from Field [2009]. This is more or less what Priest [2006a: 196] calls the
canonical application of logic, ‘the application of a logic in the analysis of reasoning’. Haack [1974: 223]
prefers saying that the global pluralist thinks that logic ‘should apply irrespective of subject matter’.
3
A logical system can be consistent, sound, and complete, but these formal properties are not what we are
after.
4
See also Priest [2006a: ch. 12] for the distinction between pure and applied logics.
5
Field goes on to reject this sort of logical pluralism for reasons we will not discuss here.
 4 Ole Thomassen Hjortland

this: typographically identical wffs/arguments in classical and deviant logics

don’t have the same meaning, and hence can’t both represent the very same
informal statements/arguments. One argument for this view is that the
meaning of the logical constants depends wholly upon the axioms/rules of the
system in which they occur.
[Haack 1978: 223]

In other words, according to Haack, global pluralism is supported by

meaning-variance. The thought is that if there is no genuine disagreement
between two logical theories, there is no obstacle to arguing that they are
both correct. Indeed, Haack identifies two different ways in which logical
theories can display meaning-variance: logical theories that on the surface
concern the question of validity for the same class of arguments, in reality
differ with respect to the semantic content attributed either to ‘valid’ or to
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the logical connectives involved in some of the arguments.

We thus have the following two meaning-variance theses:
(A) The meaning of ‘valid’ varies across logical theories;
(B) the meaning of some logical connective  varies across logical theories.

In either case, for any argument h, Ai where either a premise or the
conclusion involves , the meaning of the validity-attributing sentence
‘h, Ai is valid’ varies across logical theories. The result is allegedly that for
two logical theories with the same formal language, say classical and
intuitionistic logic, there is no genuine conflict between validity-attributions.
In the case of (A) because what is being attributed, i.e. validity, is not the
same in the two theories. In the case of (B) because that to which validity is
being attributed, i.e. the argument, is not the same in the two theories.6
Recall the example of LEM. According to the above diagnosis, our two
philosophers would have a prima facie disagreement about the proposition
that LEM is valid. For Haack’s global pluralist there are two options: they
mean different things by ‘valid’, i.e. (A), or they mean different things by
Ø or _, i.e. (B). Either way, since there are two propositions in play, the
global pluralist wants to accept one and reject the other, and hold that both
resulting logics are correct.
In order for the global pluralism to get off the ground, however, some
story about the meaning of logical connectives is required. Haack’s semantic
argument is reminiscent of Carnap’s The Logical Syntax of Language. This
is perhaps the first attempt to combine the idea that formal systems
determine the meaning of logical connectives with global pluralism:

[W]e have in every respect complete liberty with regard to the forms of
language; that both the forms of construction for sentences and the rules of
[inference] may be chosen quite arbitrarily . . . [T]hen this choice, whatever it
may be, will determine what meaning is to be assigned to the fundamental
logical symbols.
[Carnap 1937: xv]

6
Beware that not everyone agrees that meaning-variance underpins a type of logical pluralism. In fact,
Stephen Read says that in the case of meaning-variance ‘[t]here is no real disagreement, and nothing the
logical monist might object to’ [Read 2006: 197].
 Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes 5

Importantly, Carnap goes on to conclude that ‘[b]y this method, also, the
conflict between the divergent points of view on the problem of foundations
of mathematics disappears’ [loc. cit.]. The divergent points of view Carnap
has in mind are the early attempts to formulate non-classical theories of
mathematics. However, such theories were ‘hampered by the striving after
correctness’ [loc. cit.], whereas on Carnap’s conventionalist approach to
logic the question of correctness simply does not arise at all. A logic can
have useful applications, and pluralism arises when two logics are ‘equally
good’ for some purpose.

4. Truth-Preservation and Meaning-Variance

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Beall and Restall [2000, 2001, 2006] recently rejuvenated the debate about
logical pluralism with a new formulation of the position. Their thesis is
interesting not only because it is significantly more detailed than its rivals,
but because they subscribe to (A)-style meaning-variance while denying (B).
Specifically, they say that ‘there is more than one sense in which arguments
may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally
deserving of the name deductive validity’ [2001: 1].
On the other hand, they take care to separate their (A)-style pluralism
from what they call Carnap’s pluralism, that ‘resulting logics are different
because the languages are different’ [Beall and Restall 2006: 78], saying, in
contrast, that their pluralism can arise within one language, even when the
meanings of logical expressions are kept fixed.
In order to motivate their pluralism they draw an analogy between logical
consequence and vagueness. They consider locutions such as ‘deductively
valid’ and, more colloquially, ‘follows from’ as unsettled [Beall and Restall
2006: 27–8]. As with vague expressions, the unsettledness carries with it a
susceptibility to precisification. The reason, they suggest, is that our
pre-theoretic notion of deductive consequence is not sharp. It has certain
core inviolable features, however, which Beall and Restall want to capture in
a schema—the so-called Generalized Tarski Thesis.

GTT An argument is validx if and only if, in every casex in which the
premises are true, so is the conclusion.

The GTT thesis is truth-preservational. Anything that counts as a

consequence relation preserves truth from premises to conclusion. In fact,
Beall and Restall take this to be ‘the heart of logical consequence’ [2000:
477].7 The thesis is non-modal, in the sense that it does not rely on modal
notions such as necessity, impossibility or apriority. Instead, it is truth-
preserving across cases. More, different precisifications of validityx are
delineated by different types of cases x. So it is a plurality of admissible types
of cases that underwrites the logical plurality: ‘Logical pluralism is the claim
7
Beall and Restall acknowledge that not all consequence relations in the literature are intended to be truth-
preserving. I am indebted to a referee for pointing me to a concrete example in the form of Schotch et al.
[2009].
 6 Ole Thomassen Hjortland

that at least two different instances of GTT provide admissible precisifica-

tions of logical consequence’ [Beall and Restall 2006: 29].
What is a case? ‘Cases, whatever else they are, are ‘‘things’’ in which
claims may be true. By specifying ‘‘truth-conditions’’ for claims, you thereby
specify cases’ [ibid.: 89]. In particular, Beall and Restall suggest classical
models, possible worlds, constructions, and situations as different types of
cases. Accordingly, for a sentence A there is, for each case, a question of
whether A is true with respect to the case. The question may not have an
answer: some cases, e.g. constructions, are incomplete. Other cases, e.g.
situations, are inconsistent, and thus allow no single answer.
The characteristic claim in Beall and Restall’s pluralism is that each of the
above-mentioned types of cases leads to admissible precisifications of the
GTT schema. Classical models yield classical logic; constructions, intuit-
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ionistic logic; situations, relevant logic; and so on. Correspondingly, Beall

and Restall understand the monist position to be that there is One True
Precisification.8 I will call their position GTT pluralism.
What separates admissible from non-admissible precisifications? Not any
class of cases can be legitimately plugged into the GTT schema. In a word,
Beall and Restall demand that any sharp concept of consequence satisfies
a list of desiderata. These desiderata correspond to the settled part of the
pre-theoretic notion of consequence. Three such desiderata, not said to be
exhaustive, are:

(1) necessity: valid arguments with true premises necessitate the truth of the
conclusion;
(2) formality: valid arguments are valid in virtue of their logical form;
(3) normativity: rejecting a valid argument is irrational (see [ibid.: 14–23]).

The first two are fairly innocuous given that the GTT schema is supposed to
be a generalization of Tarskian insights. The third, on the other hand, places
Beall and Restall’s pluralism in the normative camp. It is not only that they
consider the GTT analysis a good theory for our pre-theoretic notion of
logical consequence, they expressly tie GTT to rationality and belief
management. In other words, it seems a fair assumption that GTT pluralism
is a normative rather than a descriptive claim.
Although a precisification can be admissible or non-admissible, Beall and
Restall [ibid.: 29] take a more Carnapean line on the issue of correctness:
‘[T]he question is ultimately one of utility. Provided that the various GTT
accounts of consequence are admissible, there is no sense in asking which is
the correct account.’
It is important to appreciate, however, that their view about correctness
does not follow from the GTT formulation of logical pluralism. The GTT
pluralist may of course insist that not only are some admissible precisifica-
tions equally good, they are all correct. Such a GTT pluralist is committed to
there being a fact of the matter, or at least that admissibility is more than
a question about utility, but nothing said so far rules that option out.

8
For general criticisms of Beall and Restall’s view, see Goddu [2002], Wyatt [2004], and Russell [2008].
 Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes 7

Finally, what is the sense in which Beall and Restall are committed to
(A)-type meaning-variance? Their preferred way of characterizing the
saturation of the GTT thesis is that it is a disambiguation of the expression
‘follows from’ or perhaps ‘deductive consequence’.9 This disambiguation is
a result of the unsettled features of our pre-theoretic notion of logical
consequence. Importantly, they add that there are a number of such
disambiguations (or precisifications) which are equally good.
Beall and Restall do not discuss the issue at any length, but there do seem
to be ways in which their pluralism may be formulated without the
accompanying meaning-variance thesis. The official line is that ‘deductive
consequence’, or ‘follows from’, has multiple senses. But why not say that
although the extension of the expressions vary, there is only one sense or
intension? Crudely put, the meaning of the expression is a function from a
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type of cases (say, classical models) to an extension, i.e. a class of valid

arguments (the classically valid arguments).
The picture is roughly Kaplanean: a form of non-indexical contextualism
for logical consequence. The GTT thesis is the character of logical
consequence, which is a function from the class of cases to a content (the
extension). Is there still meaning-variance at play? That depends on the
details. You may think of the meaning-variance as an intensional thesis,
as an extensional thesis, or both. If you insist that the meaning of ‘valid’ or
‘follows from’ is exhausted by the character, then a logical dispute about
consequence will not be ‘verbal’ unless it concerns the content of the GTT
schema itself. Alternatively, if you think that meaning, broadly speaking, is
bifurcated into intension and extension, then the logical dispute will have a
measure of meaning-variance either way.

5. Truth-Conditions and Meaning-Variance

For GTT pluralism there is another question about meaning-variance

remaining. Recall that the position is supposed to avoid Carnap’s (B)-type
logical pluralism. What they are after is a pluralism within one language.
There is, however, an argument to the effect that GTT pluralism entails a
corresponding (B)-type pluralism. The idea is as follows: different
(admissible) precisifications have different classes of cases. But if the
meaning of a logical connective is specified truth-conditionally, it is natural
to assume that the corresponding truth-conditions are given by the class of
cases in question. Thus, for the signature classical precisification, i.e. where
the cases are classical models, the truth-conditions are truth-in-a-model-
conditions. Similarly, for Beall and Restall’s preferred relevant system, since
truth-preservation is truth-in-a-situation-preservation, truth-conditions are
truth-in-a-situation-conditions.10

9
Stewart Shapiro has suggested in discussion that it would be better to say that ‘follows from’ is polysemous
rather than ambiguous.
10
A separate issue is whether the plurality of truth-conditions can really be maintained without an
accompanying alethic pluralism (see Lynch [2009: ch. 5]). The Beall and Restall line is that the cases are just
different things in which a sentence can be true simpliciter, but it is not clear that all the notions of holding in a
 8 Ole Thomassen Hjortland

An argument along these lines was first formulated by Priest [2006a: 204]:

If we give different truth conditions for the connectives, we are giving the
formal connectives different meanings. When we apply the logics to vernacular
reasoning we are, therefore, giving different theories of the meanings of the
vernacular connectives. We have a case of theoretical pluralism; and the
theories cannot both be right—or if they are, we simply have a case of
ambiguity, as we have already seen.

Priest’s assumption that a change of truth-conditions entails a change of

meaning is a plausible one. It is not clear, therefore, if Beall and Restall can
maintain that GTT pluralism—unlike Carnap’s pluralism—does not involve
(B)-type meaning variance. The claim that there is sameness of meaning
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across the logics comes under pressure: why should we accept that different
instantiations of the truth-in-case-x-conditions yield sameness of meaning?
Indeed, why not maintain that once the GTT schema is instantiated with
a particular type of cases, these cases also settle the semantic content of the
logical connectives? In a word, meaning-variance at the level of the
consequence relation has carried over to the logical connectives.
Although it is not Beall and Restall’s preferred reply, one strategy worth
outlining is to bifurcate the notion of meaning for logical connectives in a
way similar to what we did above for the notion of ‘deductive consequence’
or ‘follows from’. Roughly, the idea is to associate with each logical
connective a truth-in-case-x schema, reminiscent of the GTT schema for
logical consequence. In analogy with GTT and consequence, the schema for
a logical connective will determine the core logical features of the connective,
whereas unsettled features may be specified by instantiating x with a
particular class of cases.
Thus, for example, let the schema for the logical connective ‘^’ be a
function from a class of cases to an extension (i.e. truth values for
conjunctions). The meaning of ‘^’ is then given by a schematic thesis, not
unlike the GTT thesis:

(Conj) A ^ B is true in a case x if and only if A is true in x and B is true in x.

The crucial claim is that although any conjunction ^ will obey the same core
schema (Conj) irrespective of the class of cases, the resulting logic will vary
according to which class of cases we instantiate with.
Perhaps Beall and Restall can insist that there is sameness of meaning
between any two connectives that obey (Conj). Such a move mimics their
position on logical consequence by holding that conjunction-hood has some
settled features (namely, a conjunction is true in a case if and only if both
conjuncts are true) while it also lends itself to precisification by specifying
what the class of cases is. Importantly, different precisifications might yield
different logics for the conjunction.

case x are candidates for a truth property, let alone that the plurality of truth-conditions allows for a
monolithic concept of truth.
 Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes 9

Conjunction, however, is a simple and, for the most part, uncontroversial

example. The most entrenched conflicts in philosophical logic typically
involve other connectives whose logic is frequently disputed.11 An obvious
test case is negation. Holding on to a schematic characterization of the
settled features of a logical connective quickly becomes harder when we turn
to negation. A first shot along the lines of (Conj) is the following schematic
truth-in-case-x-condition:

(Neg1) ØA is true in a case x if and only if A is not true in x.

Beall and Restall are the first to admit that (Neg1) is not an exhaustive
analysis of the concept of negation. Their intuitionist, for example, requires
an intensional negation using constructions:
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(Neg2) ØA is true in a construction c if and only if, for every construction c0

extending c, A is not true in c0 .

The problem is that (Neg2) is not in any obvious sense a precisification of

(Neg1), and so the truth-condition in (Neg2) does not comply with the
settled features of negation specified in (Neg1). In other words, there is not
even sameness of meaning for the pluralist who insists that the meaning of
a connective is stable under different instantiations of cases. More
polemically, that is just to say that Beall and Restall must abandon their
claim that GTT pluralism does not entail (B)-style meaning-variance.
Can this conclusion be resisted? One option is to hold on to sameness of
meaning by insisting that their is another truth-in-case-x-condition schema
that succeeds in capturing the settled features of both (Neg1) and (Neg2).
The GTT pluralist may for example propose the following modified schema:

(Neg3) ØA is true in a case x if and only if, for every case x0 such that x is R-
related to x0 , A is not true in x0 .

The simple idea is that in (Neg3) classical negation can be recaptured in the
S5-like precisification where every case is R-related to every case. This is
simply a limit case in which (Neg3) is (Neg1).12 Thus, if we allow ourselves
the added resource of varying the R-relation, there is an intuitionistic and a
classical negation which are precisifications of the same schema (Neg3).
Moreover, on the assumption that variations in the R-relation do not lead
to variations in meaning, it is open to the GTT pluralist to claim that there is
no (B)-style meaning-variance. The meanings of the negations are stable
through instantiations of (Neg3).
It should be clear, however, that this is a limited strategy. There is no
obvious limitation on how abstract a truth-in-case-x-condition schema we

11
That is not to say that conjunction is entirely free from controversy. Some relevant logics argue that the
correct account of the English language ‘and’ is an intensional conjunction , sometimes called fusion. See
for example Read [1988].
12
Where the relation R has the heredity property: for every valuation v and world w: if vw(p) ¼ 1, then
vw0 (p) ¼ 1, for every w0 such that wRw0 .
 10 Ole Thomassen Hjortland

can formulate for negation (or any other connective), and there is no reason
to think that (Neg3), or (Neg1) for that matter, constitutes a non-arbitrary
delineation of negation-hood, i.e. the core features of any negation. After
all, very few laws or inference rules of negation have been left unquestioned:
classical reductio, double negation elimination, LEM, the law of contra-
position, intuitionistic reductio, ex falso quodlibet (EFQ, or explosion) are
all up for grabs in some philosophical dispute or other.
Even if a principle like (Neg3) can instantiate negations that validate or
invalidate any part of this list, it is not clear that such an abstract-sounding
schema is a good guide to what is and what is not a negation. Quite the
contrary, one of the reasons why the above-mentioned inference rules and
laws are so hotly disputed is precisely that they are frequently associated
with intuitions about negation-hood.
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Moreover, the point is not that the schema, suitably generalized, cannot
be used to capture a wide variety of logics for negation. Rather, in order for
GTT pluralism to avoid (B)-style meaning-variance, we need a reason to
suppose that the schema captures the full semantic content of the various
negations.
Ultimately, this question of individuating meanings (or more specifically,
truth-conditions) is an issue we cannot satisfactorily resolve here. It is also a
question that Beall and Restall have no intention of resolving. Rather, they
opt for a different strategy to block Priest’s argument. They do not accept
that their GTT pluralism leads to (B)-style meaning-variance, but their
preferred reply is that different instantiations of a truth-in-case-x-condition
articulate distinct but compatible features of a logical connective:

The clauses can both be equally accurate in exactly the same way as different
claims about a thing can be equally true: they can be equally true of one and
the same object simply in virtue of being incomplete claims about the object.
What is required is that such incomplete claims do not conflict, but the clauses
governing negation do not conflict. The classical clause gives an account of
when a negation is true in a world, and the constructive clause of when a
negation is true in a construction. Each clause picks out a different feature of
negation.
[Beall and Restall 2006: 98]

It is not clear whether Beall and Restall have in mind different features of
the semantics of negation, or different features of the logic of negation.
Only the former offers any prospects for blocking Priest’s argument and
(B)-style meaning-variance. On such a view it would be impertinent to
say that there is meaning-variation between different instantiations of a
truth-in-case-x-conditions, since neither of these instantiations is a
complete semantic story about a connective. Instead, we should think
of the set of conditions as only jointly determining the semantics of a
connective.
This leads to an uncomfortable gap between the semantics of a connective
and its underlying logic. One motivation for the model-theoretic semantics
for a connective is that it induces the logic of a connective by determining
a class of arguments sound with respect to it. For instance, when we
 Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes 11

instantiate a truth-conditional schema for negation with classical models,

it is supposed to validate all and only classical laws. Thus, the logic of the
resulting negation is classical. But if we take Beall and Restall’s proposal
seriously, the induced logic of the negation is only its partial logic. For,
other features of its semantics (i.e. other types of cases) are ‘equally
accurate’ for negation. Only after the semantics, and thus the logic, has been
supplemented with other instantiations of the schema do we have a full
account of negation.

6. Consequence and Pluralism

So where does this lead us to with respect to meaning-variance? I have

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argued that for GTT pluralism (A)-style meaning-variance entails

(B)-style meaning-variance under plausible assumptions about meaning-
individuation. However, there is still an interesting question left about
the possibility of a variation of pluralism which does not entail meaning-
variance. In what follows, I will articulate an alternative type of logical
pluralism that—unlike GTT pluralism—does not entail (B)-style meaning-
variance.
This argument rests on a claim about the individuation of connective
meaning, but one which is at least no more problematic than the one
assumed by GTT pluralism. Crucially, it is a pluralism not of logical
theories but of logical consequence relations within one and the same
theory. Let us call it intra-theoretic pluralism.
We saw above that Beall and Restall introduced a helpful idea, namely
that logical pluralism is pluralism about logical consequence. But rather than
simply the claim that there is more than one admissible consequence
relation, intra-theoretic pluralism combines more than one consequence
relation in a single logical theory. In general, of course, there is no guarantee
that two consequence relations can cohabit in one logical theory. Never-
theless, there are interesting examples where it is worthwhile and possible to
develop such a theory. Let us look at some examples of what this might
mean.
First, by a single logical theory we might mean a proof system S.
Normally there is a corresponding notion of S-provability, but it is perfectly
possible to devise systems where two or more definitions of provability
cohabit, say ‘S1-provability and ‘S2-provability. Second, by the logical
theory we might mean the formal semantics and an associated model-
theoretic consequence relation . Again, we could instead have two non-
equivalent model-theoretic consequence relations 1 and 2.13 Since the
formal semantics has only one class of models (type of cases), there is only
one truth-condition for each connective.
The idea of intra-theoretic pluralism owes a lot to work by Greg Restall,
and in particular Restall [2002, forthcoming]. He gives an example of a sort

13
Think for example of the notion of local and global consequence in a Kripke semantics.
 12 Ole Thomassen Hjortland

of proof-theoretic plurality where one system incorporates several prova-

bility relations. Consider the following sequent-rules for negation:

 ) A; D ðL:Þ
; A ) D ðR:Þ
; :A ) D  ) :A; D

In a standard sequent calculus for classical logic, (LØ) and (RØ) are the
operational rules for negation. By restricting the succedent (right-hand side)
of the sequents to sets with at most one formula we get intuitionistic
negation.14 Similarly, restricting the antecedent (left-hand side) to singleton
or the empty set we get dual-intuitionistic negation.15 Normally, we
encounter these negations in distinct proof systems, but there is nothing
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wrong with having a single proof system with different definitions of a

derivation. A derivation in the system would be intuitionistic just in case the
succedent side is restricted throughout, dual-intuitionistic just in case the
antecedent side is restricted, and classical if no restriction is imposed.
Restall’s point is that the resulting proof system only has one negation,
but there are three provability relations differentiated by how contexts (side-
formulae) are managed. This is a first step towards intra-theoretic pluralism:
one language, one proof system, but three provability relations.
According to Restall, such a system avoids meaning-variance in Carnap’s
sense. If one accepts Carnap’s idea that the meaning of a logical connective
is determined by its inference rules, one could insist that tinkering with the
side-formulae restriction in sequents simply changes the operational rules
and thus the inferential meaning of the connective. But, alternatively, we
could think of the inferential meaning as stable across structural changes
such as side-formulae restrictions. After all, despite this structural variation,
the sequent rules for negation are in some sense essentially the same.
Although hard to pin down, the idea that there is a ‘core meaning’ to
logical connectives, unaffected by structural change, is frequently suggested.
Here is Restall [2002: 11]:

If any set of rules is sufficient to pick out a single meaning for the connective,
take that set of rules and accept those as meaning determining. The other rules
are important when it comes to giving an account of a kind of logical
consequence, but they are not used to determine meaning.

A similar observation is also made by Haack. She addresses the example of

side-formulae restrictions for classical and intuitionistic sequent rules for
negation: ‘Since this restriction involves no essential reference to any
connectives, it is hard to see how it could be explicable as arising from
divergence of meaning of connectives’ [1974: 10].16

14
Depending on the type of sequent calculus, the relata of the sequents might be multisets or lists rather than
sets, but we bracket this issue here.
15
For details see for instance Urbas [1996].
16
For others who express similar views about logical connectives, see Putnam [1957, 1976] and Paoli [2003,
2007]. Read [2008] defends a similar thesis for modalities in normal modal logic.
 Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes 13

If Haack and Restall are right that there is such a thing as core
(inferential) meaning, we should conclude that classical, intuitionistic,
dual-intuitionistic, and a range of substructural negations all share the same
semantic content. True, these negations are logically different, but only with
respect to structural properties of the consequence relation. The bottom line
is that, although a change in truth-conditions entails a change in meaning, a
change in logic does not necessarily lead to a change in meaning. It is still the
case that the meaning of logical connectives supervenes on the (inferential)
use, but not any variation of use will produce a corresponding variation in
meaning.
Of course, for the philosopher who thinks that it is ultimately truth-
conditions that fix connective meaning, the above proof-theoretic con-
siderations may not carry much weight. Nevertheless, in at least a limited
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number of cases we can improve on this by looking at proof system and

model theory simultaneously. Let us turn to another example to illustrate.
The Kleene 3-valued logic, K3, has the truth values V ¼ {0, i, 1}, where the
only designated value is 1, D ¼ {1}. The connectives have the following
truth-functional interpretations:

In an obvious generalization of classical logic, we say that an argument is

valid ( K3 A) just in case, for every valuation v, whenever v(B) ¼ 1, for
every b 2 , v(A) ¼ 1. The proof-theoretic details of the system are not
particularly important. It is well known that K3 has no theorems
(no formula takes value 1 in every valuation), so, in particular, the Law
of Excluded Middle (LEM) is invalid. In recent terminology, we can say that
the logic is paracomplete.
In contrast, the Logic of Paradox, LP, is a paraconsistent logic.17 It has
the same truth-values V ¼ {0, i, 1}, but both 1 and i are designated values,
D ¼ {1, i}. Accordingly, we say that an argument is valid ( LP A) just
in case, for every valuation v, whenever v(B) 2 {1, i}, for every b 2 ,
v(A) ¼ {1, i}. As opposed to K3, LEM holds in LP. However, whereas
ex falso quodlibet (EFQ) holds in K3, it fails in LP. Summed up, the two
logics have distinct consequence relations. Even though they share the same
interpretations of the connectives, they treat the truth-values differently with
respect to validity.
What about the proof-theory? In standard formulations, the connectives
of LP and K3 have distinct proof rules. After all, sound and complete
proof systems for the logics require distinct provability relations. More
specifically, we expect the fact that LEM is LP-provable but not

17
See for instance Priest [2006b].
 14 Ole Thomassen Hjortland

K3-provable to be reflected in the proof rules for negation or disjunction.

What are the prospects, then, for a proof system where both these
provability-relations can cohabit?
In order to give a proof system which contains both provability relations
but only one set of operational rules for the connectives, we can use a
generalization of sequent calculus: n-sided sequent calculus.18 Such calculi
can be given for any (finite) many-valued logic by letting the truth-table for
a connective determine its operational rules. More precisely, for an n-valued
logic, we get an n-sided sequent system where each value i 2 V has a
corresponding location in a sequent. A sequent then takes the following
shape
1 j . . . jn
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and we say that an n-sided sequent is satisfied by a valuation v just in case,

for some i, v(A) ¼ i for some A 2 i. Thus we read the sequent informally as
a disjunction of disjunctions

ðg11 or . . . or g1m1 Þ or . . . or ðgn1 or . . . or gnmn Þ

with the superscript indicating the truth value. Thus, in particular, a K3

sequent would be a 3-sided sequent with the values 0, i, 1:

1 ji jn

As before, sequent rules move from a finite set of sequents to a sequent.

Each connective  has a single sequent rule for each position the -formula
can be introduced (e.g. three rules for each connective in K3). These rules
simply reflect which combinations of values the immediate subformula must
have in order for the expression to take a particular value in V. Note that
the premise-sequents are read conjunctively, as each of the (disjunctive)
premises must hold in order for the conclusion-sequent to follow.
Initial sequents are generalized identity axioms of the form A j . . . j A.
In addition, the sequent calculus has the obvious generalizations of
weakening:19

0 ji j1 0 ji j1 0 ji j1

ðK0 Þ ðKi Þ ðK1 Þ
0 ; Aji j1 0 ji ; Aj1 0 ji j1 ; A

Similarly, there are now three cut rules:

0 ; Aji j1 0 ji j1 ; A 0 ; Aji j1 0 ji ; Aj1

ðCut0;1 Þ ðCut0;i Þ
0 ji j1 0 ji j1
0 ji ; Aj1 0 ji j1 ; A
ðCuti;1 Þ
0 ji j1

18
See Rousseau [1967] and Baaz et al. [1993] for further details and the origins of such systems.
19
For details about cut elimination and completeness, see Baaz et al. [1993].
 Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes 15

It is straightforward to see that standard classical sequent calculus is a special

case where n ¼ 2. Of course, normally we then write ‘)’ instead of ‘j’, but that
is merely notational; we can still think of the satisfaction of a classical two-
sided sequent in disjunctive terms. A boolean valuation v satisfies 0 j 1 just
in case, either v(A) ¼ 0 for some A 2 0, or v(B) ¼ 1 for some B 2 0.
The operational sequent rules for ^ will be as follows:

; A; BjD jA; D jB; D

; A ^ BjD jA ^ B; D

The left-rule witnesses the fact A ^ B is false if either A is false or B is false,

or both; the right-rule that A ^ B is true if A is true and B is true.
What about K3 and LP? Both systems will have a sound and complete
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three-sided sequent calculus. In fact, and crucially, since they have the same
truth tables, they have the same sequent rules for each connective. Here, for
example, are the rules for disjunction:

0 ; Aji j1 0 ; Bji j1 0 ji j1 ; A; B

0 ; A _ Bji j1 j0 ji j1 ; A _ B
0 ji ; A; Bj1 0 ; Aji ; Aj1 0; Bji ; Bj1
0 ji ; A _ Bj1

And here are the rules for negation:

0 ji j1 ; A 0 ji ; Aj1 0 ; Aji j1

0 ; :Aji j1 0 ji ; :Aj1 0 ji j1 ; :A

As is evident, there is an introduction rule for each of the locations in the

sequent, or, correspondingly, for each of the truth values in the semantics.
Even though the systems share the operational rules for connectives, they do
come apart with respect to the definition of provability. In particular, we
have for K3:

 ‘K3 D just in case the sequent  j  j D is derivable.

Whereas for LP:

 ‘LP D just in case the sequent  j D j D is derivable.

We can then observe that there is a derivation in the n-sided sequent system
that shows LEM to be LP-provable:
AjA; :AjA
jA; :AjA; :A AjAjA; :A :Aj:AjA; :A
jA; :AjA _ :A AjAjA _ :A :Aj:AjA _ :A
jA _ :AjA _ :A
In contrast, there is no derivation which is a K3-proof of LEM.
 16 Ole Thomassen Hjortland

Thus, in analogy to Restall’s example with classical, intuitionistic, and

subintuitionistic negation above, we have a single proof system that
accommodates more than one notion of provability. And we do not have to
stop there: the same system can have a classical provability relation as well.

 ‘CL D just in case the sequent j, DjD is derivable.

What is more, we can use four-sided sequents to give a sequent calculus for
first-degree entailment, FDE, in which both K3- and LP-provability are
preserved. The details are unimportant here.
Finally, what happens to the meaning-variance theses in intra-theoretic
pluralism? First, there is no (B)-style meaning-variance in the sense suggested
by Carnap. There is only one set of operational rules for each connective,
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and, in the n-sided sequent calculus, there is not even a difference in the
structural rules or contexts in the sequents. Thus, we do not even require
the assumption that there is such a thing as core meanings for logical
connectives. Second, there is only a single (model-theoretic) interpretation of
the connectives in the formal semantics, i.e. the truth-functions given above.
So, in neither case is there an argument for (B)-style meaning-variance.
Maybe there is no (B)-style meaning-variance, but what about (A)? There
is an undeniable ambiguity in what it is for an argument to be valid in a
system with more than one consequence relation. Granted, each of them will
preserve designated values, but what we count as designated is precisely the
variable. We could of course formulate a single consequence relation for
both logics in more general terms:

An argument is v (both K3 and LP) (  A) just in case, for every valuation v,

whenever v(B) 2 D, for every B 2 , v(A) 2 D.

Whether a change in the set of designated values engenders a change in the

meaning of ‘valid’ appears to be as unclear as the corresponding question
about Beall and Restall’s GTT. Here I will not attempt to answer the
question of whether or not intra-theoretic pluralism gives rise to more than
one sense of ‘valid’. For it is the absence of (B) type meaning-variance that is
the important aspect: we now have an example of a global pluralism that
does not collapse into a variant of Carnap’s tolerance pluralism.
Admittedly, the outlined intra-theoretic pluralism works only for very
limited cases. K3 and LP are special cases because of the truth-functional
affinity between the systems. More concretely, the simple picture does not
naturally extend to the differences between classical and intuitionistic logic.
For although these systems share operational rules in a sequent calculus
(side-formulae notwithstanding), having their connectives share model-
theoretic truth-conditions may appear a distant hope.
There are two sensible replies to this concern. First, a unification of the
semantics of intuitionistic and classical logic is not such a far-fetched
prospect. Granted, there is no unification in a many-valued matrix setting
since we know that intuitionistic logic (even the propositional fragment) is
not truth table decidable. Yet, that does not mean we should be content with
 Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes 17

semantics as different as say BHK-semantics and Tarski models. As is well

known, Kripke semantics offers a powerful framework in which the
commonalities and differences between truth-conditional clauses for
intuitionistic and classical connectives can be identified. In particular, as
was observed with (Neg3) above, both intuitionistic and classical negation
can be given the same truth-condition if we disregard the properties of the
accessibility relation R. This line will not be pursued further here, but see
Restall [forthcoming] for a valuable attempt at formulating a pluralism
along such lines.
Second, and more to the point, it is not a requirement for a successful
notion of logical pluralism that it accommodates the intuitionistic versus
classical logic debate in particular. Rather, the standard we should use to
judge a formulation of pluralism is whether it offers an interesting
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philosophical position. And indeed, classical logic, K3 and LP are systems

with interesting applications in philosophy, e.g. for reasoning with semantic
paradoxes, vagueness, and presuppositions.20 Philosophers who think that
these systems contain useful consequence relations for modelling different
reasoning phenomena can use intra-theoretic pluralism as a way to think
about logical theories that combine the consequence relations in a unified
theory. There are at least two advantages: first, one can be a pluralist in this
sense without relying on an underdetermination argument for logical
theories, i.e. that there are two equally good theories; second, one is free to
consider classical logic as a default limit case in the absence of special
phenomena (e.g. paradoxical sentences, presupposition failure). That is just
to say that the theory encodes reasoning patterns that are triggered only
under special circumstances, while unproblematic cases are still governed by
classical logic.
Finally, one might want to object to the assumption that changing the
set of designated values does not affect the meaning of the logical
connectives. More specifically, one could argue that even though the truth
tables for K3 and LP are the same, that is a mere superficial similarity:
the two logics still treat the middle value differently. It follows, one
might continue, that the meaning of K3 negation is different from LP
negation.
However, it seems equally cogent to maintain that we change only what is
preserved in valid arguments, and not the antecedently given meanings of
logical connectives. It is at any rate not clear that there are any principled
reasons for individuating truth-conditions one way or the other. That is,
unless you follow Carnap in taking the meaning as determined by proof-
theoretic rules rather than truth-conditions. But since our example even has
the same inference rules for the connectives, that perspective adds no further
problem. Thus, in conclusion, it is at least reasonable to claim that the
individuation proposed here is no more contentious than the one assumed
in GTT pluralism, i.e. that connective meanings are stable under change of
cases.

20
Some examples: Kripke [1975], Field [2008], Priest [2006b], Beaver and Krahmer [2001], and Ripley [2005].
 18 Ole Thomassen Hjortland

Conclusion

Let us return to logical pluralism in its nascent form. I have argued that
there are many ways of articulating the rough and ready thesis of global
pluralism: there are at least two all-purpose logics which are both correct (or
equally good with no better option). We have seen that forms of logical
pluralism which take the plurality to be one of logical theories typically
come supplemented with a meaning-variance thesis. It may be, as in
Carnap’s pluralism, because one thinks that the proof rules determine the
meaning of a connective, and the proof rules vary between rival logics. Or it
may be, as in Beall and Restall, because there is ultimately a difference in the
truth-conditions between connectives of rival logics.
In contrast, the sort of logical pluralism I have outlined here does not
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come with a plurality of logical theories. Rather, it is intra-theoretical. It

comes with a plurality of consequence relations, and a corresponding
plurality of provability relations, but the proliferation happens within one
and the same theory. Thus, as required by Beall and Restall, there is
plurality within the same formal language. Moreover, the formal language
has only one interpretation. The result is a pluralism for which there is no
meaning-variance for connectives, and therefore also no corresponding
argument for mere verbal disagreement.21

Munich Centre for Mathematical

Philosophy (MCMP), Received: June 2011
Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich Revised: December 2011

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21
This research is supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. I am grateful for comments by Pål
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