India-Pakistan Relations Since 2022

Pakistan is the northwestern neighbor of India which shares border with Jammu and Kashmir,
Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. The relationship among two nations has been bitter since the
independence. For the same reason, India and Pakistan are also referred as “Conjugal twins”.
They are often known as “Brother Enemy”.

Statements

1. PM Modi, “the onus is on Pakistan to create a conducive environment free from terrorism
and hostilities for normal and neighbourly relations with India.”
2. PM Modi, “As a neighbouring country, India desires cordial relations with the people of
Pakistan. For this, an environment of trust, devoid of terror and hostility is imperative.”
3. C Raja Mohan, “In the past, it kept India off-balance on Kashmir. It is now Pakistan’s turn to
face an ‘unpredictable’ India.”
4. FM S. Jaishankar, “a lot of India's problems with Pakistan are directly attributable to the
support that the United States gave to Pakistan.”

India-Pakistan Joint Protocol on Religious Pilgrimages 1974

Context
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) announced that India is “positive” and “willing to
engage” in talks with Pakistan on upgrading the “1974 Joint Protocol on Religious Pilgrimages.”
It will allow air travel as well as increase the number of shrines pilgrims from both countries
could visit.

Kartarpur Corridor
1. The government also reopened the Kartarpur Sahib Gurudwara Corridor to Pakistan to
allow Sikh pilgrims to cross over, more than 20 months after it was shut down due to
the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. The Kartarpur corridor connects the Darbar Sahib Gurdwara in Narowal district of
Pakistan with the Dera Baba Nanak shrine in Gurdaspur district in India’s Punjab
province. €
 3. The corridor was built to commemorate 550th birth anniversary celebrations of Guru
Nanak Dev, founder of Sikhism on 12th November 2019.
Important Points
1. Under the protocol both the countries agreed on the following principles for facilitating
visits to such shrines:
a. Pilgrimage visits from one country to the other shall be allowed without
discrimination as to religion or sect.
b. The list of shrines to be visited shall be finalised shortly through correspondence.
c. The agreed list may be enlarged from time to time by mutual agreement.
2. The protocol currently includes five Muslim shrines on the Indian side and 15 shrines
on the Pakistani side, a majority of them gurdwaras.
3. Up to 20 parties may be allowed to visit from one country to the other every year. This
number can be revised from time to time.
4. Every effort should continue to be made to ensure that places of religious worship
mentioned in the agreed list are properly maintained and their sanctity preserved.
5. Such visitors will be given “Visitor Category” visas.

Provincial Status to Gilgit-Baltistan by Pakistan

Context
It has been reported that Pakistani authorities have finalised a law (26th Constitutional
Amendment Bill), to award provisional provincial status to strategically located Gilgit-
Baltistan.
Important Points
1. Gilgit-Baltistan
a. Gilgit-Baltistan is one of the disputed territories of India. It is a chunk of high-
altitude territory located on the north-western corner of the Union Territory of
Ladakh.
b. It is located strategically as it borders Pakistan, Afghanistan and China.
2. Background of Dispute€
a. The region is claimed by India as part of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu &
Kashmir as it existed in 1947 at its accession to India.
 b. Maharaja Hari Singh, the last Dogra ruler of J&K, had signed the Instrument of
Accession with India on 26th October 1947. However, it has been under
Pakistan’s control since 4th November, 1947, following the invasion of Kashmir by
tribal militias and the Pakistan army. €
c. Following this invasion, on 1st January 1948, India moved to the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) to raise the issue of Pakistan’s invasion.
d. The UNSC passed a resolution, calling for Pakistan to withdraw from all of Jammu
and Kashmir and then India had to reduce its forces to the minimum level
following which a plebiscite would be held to ascertain people’s wishes. However,
no withdrawal was ever carried out and it remains a point of contention between
two countries.
3. Present Status
a. Gilgit-Baltistan is an autonomous region now and after the bill is passed, it will
become the 5th province of the country.
b. Currently, Pakistan has four provinces namely Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
Punjab, and Sindh. Presently, it has been ruled mostly by executive orders. €
c. Until 2009, the region was simply called Northern Areas. It got its present name
only with the Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009,
which replaced the Northern Areas Legislative Council with the Legislative
Assembly.
4. India’s Stand on Gilgit-Baltistan
a. India maintains the Government of Pakistan or its judiciary has no locus standi on
territories illegally and forcibly occupied by it. €
b. India has clearly conveyed to Pakistan that the entire Union Territories of Jammu
and Kashmir and Ladakh, including the areas of Gilgit and Baltistan, are an integral
part of the country by virtue of its fully legal and irrevocable accession. €
c. India has protested to China over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) as
it is being laid through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
Protests in Balochistan
Context
In the recent years, there have been continuous protests in Gwadar, Balochistan against mega
development plans of the port city as part of the CPEC. The protesters have sought to draw
attention to the marginalization of the local people in the development of the port. Pakistan
claims that India has been supporting these protests.
Balochistan
1. Balochistan is one of the four provinces of Pakistan. It is least populated even though it
is the largest province in terms of land size.
2. It is populated by ethnic Baloch people who can be found in modern day Iran and
Afghanistan though the majority of Baloch can be found in Balochistan. €
3. Balochistan is rich in natural gas and oil and is one of the most important regions of
Pakistan.
What Should be India’s Approach towards Balochistan?
1. Balochistan is important for India due to its strategic location, strategic minerals and
energy resources.
2. Abhinav Pandya, an international research scholar, terms Balochistan as “Pakistan’s soft
underbelly,” where Pakistan’s nukes are hidden. As an important regional power, it is
India’s obligation to internationally expose Pakistan for its grim Human Rights record in
the region.
3. India also has to carefully examine the implications of a “disintegrated Pakistan” versus a
“unified Pakistan” for peace and stability in South Asia because if Balochistan secedes
Sindh will follow soon followed by the Pashtoons. The likelihood of its nuclear arsenal
being misused is another issue that would bother Indian planners.
4. India also has to take into account the sensitivities of other stakeholders in the region
namely Iran, Afghanistan, China and the US. India has to ensure that it does not become
the epicenter of a new “great game” in the region.
5. A confluence of interests between India, Afghanistan and the US is likely. While China will
vehemently oppose any move to liberate Balochistan due to the fear of losing Gwadar, a
serious blow to its economic and military ambitions.
6. Iran’s fear of Baloch national movement spilling over to its Sistan province needs to be
discussed with the former and taken on board.
7. India’s involvement in Balochistan should be graduated. To begin with, Indian media has
to play a major role in exposing Pakistan’s atrocities on the hapless Balochis through a
sustained media campaign to build a favourable international opinion against Pakistan
and isolate Pakistan not only as an “epicenter of jihadi” terror but also as a perpetrator of
inhuman atrocities on its people and gross violator of human rights.
8. India must forcefully raise the issue in forthcoming UN General Assembly (UNGA) meet to
draw international attention to the genocide in Balochistan and the ongoing freedom
movement therein. Last but not the least India must provide unequivocal moral and
 political support to the Baloch freedom movement while seeking a peaceful resolution of
the problem.
Indus Water Treaty (IWT)
The IWT has been an essential mechanism for India and Pakistan to share water resources
amicably. However, over the years, certain issues have arisen that call for a relook at the treaty.
Issues Related to IWT
1. Lack of Flexibility in Water Allocation: The IWT provides a certain level of predictability
and certainty in water supplies to both riparian states. However, it lacks mechanisms to
account for changes in water availability due to factors like climate change. Climate
change can alter precipitation patterns and river runoff, affecting the quantity of water
available for allocation. The IWT must incorporate provisions that allow for flexibility in
water sharing in response to changing conditions.
2. Vulnerability to Climate Change: Bilateral water agreements like the IWT are based on
the assumption that future water availability will remain similar to the present. However,
climate change poses a significant challenge to this assumption. Changes in weather
patterns can impact water availability for agricultural and industrial purposes, making the
current allocations less sustainable. The IWT needs to be reviewed to address the
implications of climate change on water resources.

Way Forward
1. Equitable and Reasonable Utilization (ERU): The ERU principle, as enshrined in the
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses
1997, can be instrumental in resolving disputes between India and Pakistan. ERU
requires both states to consider various factors, including climate change, when utilizing
shared water resources. By incorporating ERU in the IWT, the parties can make more
informed and equitable decisions regarding water allocation.
2. No Harm Rule (NHR): The NHR principle complements the ERU principle by emphasizing
the need to avoid significant harm to other riparian states when planning water
projects. Any project with the potential to impact neighboring states must undergo a
trans-boundary environmental impact assessment as a precautionary measure.
 Including the NHR principle in the IWT will promote responsible water resource
management and foster cooperation between India and Pakistan.
3. Leaning on “Vital Human Needs”: In situations where conflicting uses of water arise,
Article 10 of the 1997 Convention suggests considering “vital human needs” as a guiding
principle within the context of ERU and NHR. While the definition of “vital human
needs” may be debatable, incorporating this concept into the IWT can provide a basis
for finding common ground in water allocation decisions.
4. Role of the World Bank (WB): The WB played a pivotal role in brokering the IWT in the
past, can continue to facilitate dialogue between India and Pakistan. By bringing
together transnational epistemic communities, the WB can foster convergent state
policies based on ERU and NHR principles. This alliance can contribute to the inclusion of
these principles in the revised IWT, leading to more sustainable and collaborative water
management.
“Why Pakistan-China “all weather ally” relationship may hit shaky ground?”
- Akshobh Giridharadas

1. Pakistan’s former PM Nawaz Sharif remarked that “the relations between the two
countries are higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the deepest sea and sweeter than
the sweetest honey.” Pakistan describes China as their “all weather ally”.
2. Many geopolitical analysts and historians alike, however, have been bemused with this
rather unconventional friendship. After all, geopolitical relations aren’t based on
quantitative economic theorems but based on “realpolitik”.
3. The Pakistan-China collusiveness is as old as the founding of Pakistan. Pakistan was the
first to recognize the communist party in Beijing as the rightful government while
ceasing ties with Chinese government in Taipei.
4. Since then, Pakistan has played the conduit role when former military dictator Yahya
Khan was instrumental in opening the gateway for President Nixon’s talks with Mao’s
China. The two have followed a mutual, “you scratch my back and I will scratch your
back” policy with China backing Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir while Pakistan backs China’s
claims over Tibet and Taiwan.
5. There is an interesting role that Pakistan fulfills for China i.e. as a key link to the rest of
the Islamic World. In some ways, Pakistan plays the “Saudi Arabia to the US” role for
China, sans the oil reserves of course.
6. It may seem naive in the complicated realm of geopolitics, but an enemy of an enemy is
a friend. China and India have had lukewarm relations since the Sino-India war of 1962
and followed by the frequent territorial border dispute. For Pakistan, a stronger, larger,
belligerent China is what it desires to keep India in check.
7. Pakistan may be myopically forgetting that Chinese investments aren’t the same as
American aid or grants. They may come in fancy red envelopes; however, the red sign is
a caveat. Hambantotat port of Sri Lanka is a good example in this case.
8. Pakistan could very well fall into the same debt trap as Sri Lanka, being enticed by easy
loans in exchange for equity. Given Pakistan’s rather moribund economy, failure to pay
back the loans, could see a form a Chinese colonization.
9. The Pakistan and the US faux alliance began to crumble as they found they had
divergent interests and priorities. Similarly, China and Pakistan are very different states
at their core DNA. While Pakistan is one of the few nations created on the basis of a
single religion, China by nature preaches state atheism. Pakistan sees itself through an
Islamic lens while China has been recognized as the most atheist country.
10. This would be a problem with regards to Xinjiang province of China, home to the
Uighurs, a distinct Muslim minority. It is highly unlikely that the Islamists of Pakistan,
that are known to routinely call for Jihad against India, the US and other Western
powers for what they describe as enemies of Islam, to stand by quietly while China
enforces its Marxist Atheist leanings on the community.
11. Geopolitically, Pakistan was able to brazenly adopt its “bleed India with a thousand
cuts” policy with regards to cross border terrorism in Kashmir, knowing that the US
would continue to provide the regular supply of arms and aid to Islamabad, given
Pakistan was indispensable for the American’s Afghan interests. Pakistan, feels China
now provide the superpower umbrella protective layer.
12. While China has invested in Pakistan economically, militarily and politically. However, it
is only one part of China’s larger geopolitical dossier. China has its own agenda and is
maneuvering other diplomatic hurdles, be it in the South China Sea (SCS) with the US
and ASEAN nations. It is constantly trying to mediate between North Korea and the
West. It has a long-standing imbroglio with Taiwan and is in a diplomatic spat with Japan
over the “Senkaku-Diaoyu” islands. China’s global ambitions on the world stage reflect
its expansionist economic agenda with its “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative. Above
all, taking the US’ place as the linchpin of global economic stability as the Trump
administration adopted a more insular and protectionist agenda.
13. So, Islamabad may be putting all its eggs in Beijing’s basket, but China has larger and
more global ambitions and Pakistan is only one part of that. Pakistan may find itself in
China’s moral debt, and perhaps literally in financial debt with the CPEC investments.
“India Needs a Forward-Looking Strategy on Pakistan” - C. Raja Mohan
Context
Pakistan’s hand today is much weaker, while India’s room for manoeuvre has grown.

1. One of the major changes in Indian diplomacy in the last eight years has been the way
Delhi deals or does not deal with Pakistan. India’s approach today is very different from
the framework that emerged at the dawn of the 1990s.
2. For nearly three decades, it was Pakistan that had the political initiative. Under PM
Modi, India has begun to reset the terms of the engagement agenda.
3. Meanwhile, the regional and international context has also altered in many ways since
the early 1990s essentially in India’s favour. Even more important, realists say, is the
changing balance of power between India and Pakistan that was bound to alter the
nature of their bilateral relations.
4. After the Cold War, Pakistan loomed large, very large, over Indian foreign policy. The
turmoil in Kashmir, the international focus on nuclear proliferation, and the relentless
external pressure for a sustained dialogue with Pakistan put India in a difficult situation.
If Pakistan was on the political offensive, a series of weak coalition governments in Delhi
were forced onto the back foot.
5. At the heart of Pakistan’s ambition was to change the status quo in Jammu and Kashmir
with a three-pronged strategy — violent destabilisation of Kashmir while raising human
rights concerns in global forums; reopen the Kashmir question that India believed was
settled after the 1971 war; and leverage global nuclear concerns to force Indian
concessions on Kashmir.
6. India’s transformed relations with the US, the resolution of Delhi’s dispute with the
global nuclear order, and getting the West to discard its temptation to mediate on
Kashmir enormously improved India’s diplomatic position. But the most consequential
change has been in the economic domain.
7. As Indian governments kept their heads down while laying the foundations for robust
economic growth, Pakistan trapped itself in a grand geopolitical obsession to expand its
strategic depth into Afghanistan and redefine the nature of its relations with India. The
persistent neglect of economic challenges left Pakistan in an increasingly weaker
position in relation to India. If India has inched its way into the top six global economies,
Pakistan today is broke.
 8. C. Raja Mohan suggested “three pronged-strategy” for PM Modi in dealing with
Pakistan:
a. First, Modi bet that the heavens won’t fall if Delhi stops talking to Islamabad or
negotiating with Pakistan-backed militant groups in Kashmir. Modi insists that he
will talk on his own terms and when he wants to. Difficult conditions compelled
Modi’s predecessors to negotiate under pressure. The conditions are now in
India’s favour.
b. Second, Delhi has been unafraid of staring at nuclear escalation in responding to
Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism. Sceptics will question if Modi’s cross-border
raids on the sources of terror have enhanced India’s deterrence. But it is Delhi that
now leverages international fears about nuclear escalation to compel Pakistan to
rein in terror groups. India’s campaign has also resulted in greater international
scrutiny of Pakistan’s support for terrorism.
c. Third, by changing the constitutional status of Kashmir in 2019, Modi has reduced
the scope of India’s future negotiations with Pakistan on Kashmir.
9. The parlous state of Pakistan’s economy and a weakened diplomatic position might
encourage Pakistan to rethink its India policies. While India waits for things to settle
down in Islamabad, it could consider taking a fresh look at its Pakistan strategy.
10. Undoubtedly, Pakistan’s hand today is much weaker than in the 1990s and Delhi’s room
for manoeuvring has grown, notwithstanding the challenges it confronts on the China
border. This opens some room for new Indian initiatives toward Pakistan.
11. Moreover, getting Pakistan’s army and its political class to be more practical in engaging
India is certainly a tall order; but Delhi can afford to make a move.
12. While there can be much disagreement on Pakistan’s capacity to respond, Delhi’s new
initiatives can reinforce the positive evolution of Indian foreign policy, and expand the
space for Indian diplomacy in the region and beyond.

“A diplomat’s memoir of how close India-Pak Peace was — and why it failed?”
- C. Raja Mohan

Context

If the Kashmir talks that almost came to fruition were Satinder Lambah’s last hurrah in a
diplomatic life devoted to negotiating peace with Islamabad, the political failure to conclude
them marked the end of an era in India-Pakistan relations.

1. As Pakistan’s multi-faceted crisis deepens by the day, India seems utterly detached. There
has been little visible engagement between the governments of India and Pakistan for
some years now.
 2. Must we then just give up on Pakistan? The story of one Indian diplomat, the late Satinder
Lambah who spent most of his long diplomatic career in Pakistan, says India should not. In
his book published posthumously, “In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations under
Six Prime Ministers”, Lambah insists that it is unwise for India not to engage a large and
significant neighbour like Pakistan. This certainly is not a view widely shared today within
the Indian strategic community.
3. The reluctance to turn even successful negotiations into formal compacts is rooted in the
massive public emotion attached to the relationship in both countries. The multitude of
grievances on both sides accumulated in the run-up to the Partition and since, hangs
heavily over the bilateral engagement.
4. The period from 2004 to 2007 was a moment of extraordinary effort to transform bilateral
relations with Pakistan. PM Manmohan Singh built on the foundation built by Vajpayee’s
visit to Pakistan in January 2004. The good news from the Manmohan era is that the two
sides made noteworthy progress on a range of disputes.
5. Besides Kashmir, Delhi and Islamabad came close to agreements on Siachen and Sir Creek
disputes, liberalising trade ties, cross-border energy and power trading, expanding
tourism and people-to-people contact. The bad news, however, is that the two sides
failed to convert them into concrete outcomes. The situation since then has turned
bleaker.
6. When India and Pakistan do return to the negotiating table, there might be no going back
to the old formulae. Delhi now wants to decisively change the terms of engagement with
Islamabad. This is unsurprising since the balance of power between India and Pakistan
continues to shift in favour of Delhi. The Indian economy today is 10 times larger than
Pakistan’s.
7. The inability of Pakistan’s elite to get its economic act together, restore a measure of
internal political cohesion, and reorient its foreign policy towards regional cooperation
will only deepen the imbalance. For Pakistan’s elite obsessed with “strategic parity”, the
much-needed compromises with India are likely to become even harder.
8. If the Kashmir talks that almost came to fruition were Lambah’s last hurrah in a diplomatic
life devoted to negotiating peace with Islamabad, the political failure to conclude them
marked the end of an era in India-Pakistan relations. The current Indian disinterest in
Pakistan’s internal troubles reflects, in part, that transition.

India-Pakistan Border Dispute – Way Forward

A light of hope is offered by occasions like the opening of the Kartarpur Corridor, where
political issues are put on the back burner and widespread feeling is prioritized on both sides,
despite the bilateral ties being at an all-time low.
The only way out now, when the Indian government maintains that talks and terrorism cannot
coexist, appears to be through non-political measures, such as trade concessions, people-to-
people contact, confidence-building measures, and international mediation. Pakistan’s political
policies with India are complete isolation, disruption of bilateral and diplomatic talks, and
complete isolation of India.

1. Normalcy in Kashmir: India should focus on bringing Jammu & Kashmir back to normal
by integrating the population, particularly the young, and promoting regional
investment. By addressing matters like the National Register of Citizens (NRC),
Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) with knowledge and calming minority concerns in
India would disarm Pakistan in international forums.
2. Trade Facilitation: Pakistan is in a grave economic situation and is about to face further
international sanctions (FATF grey list). At this point, lowering trade barriers on a
bilateral basis and facilitating cross-border trade could help bridge the trust gap
between the two nations.
3. International Mediation: The required momentum might be provided by indirect
mediation efforts through nations like the US, China, and Russia that have called for
bilateral talks following the abrogation of Article 370. Annual summits of the SCO,
SAARC and other organisations may be helpful in launching a constructive bilateral
discussion between the two.
4. Wait for the Right Time: India should wait for Pakistan to reset itself before trying to
find any shortcuts to achieving peace and serenity. Even though Pakistan’s internal
political processes are largely out of India’s control, Pakistan shouldn’t be allowed to
dictate how the India-Pakistan relationship is shaped.
5. India should undertake a “containment and negotiation-focused” policy. The best case
scenario for India and Pakistan is that diplomatic ties are fully restored, trade is allowed
to resume, and some travel restrictions are relaxed.

“Pakistan Spring vs. Army’s Shadow”

IPS Anju Gupta, (Source IE)

Context

The recent arrest of former Pakistani PM Imran Khan led to massive protests across the
country. For the first time, violent mobs, including the supporter of former PM, attacked army
and paramilitary installations across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, Balochistan and major cities
of Pakistan. The army was not targeted even in the wake of 1971 liberation of Bangladesh,
military coups or even after the assassination of popular leaders such as Benazir Bhutto.
The instability in Afghanistan has further added fuel to the fire and the instability in Pakistan
could in turn further destabilise Afghanistan. The growing instability in the Pakistan could spill
over in no time and can affect the stability of the region.
Present Scenario of Pakistan
1. Political Rollercoaster

a. Pakistan is facing a political crisis since April 2022, when the former PM Imran
Khan was ousted from his position in a vote of no confidence. He refused to accept the
result and launched a series of protests and rallies, demanding an early election. He
also faced many legal charges, including terrorism, corruption and contempt of court.
b. The current Pakistani government has accused him of destabilizing the country and
undermining democracy. They have accused Imran Khan of becoming opportunistic and
destructive by tapping into the anti-army sentiment among the public.
c. The turmoil in Pakistan’s political discourse could result into a Pakistan Spring like the
Arab Spring. There are many similarities between the situations in Pakistan and those in
the Arab Spring countries. Some of the similarities include political instability, economic
grievances, corruption, youth bulge, civil society activism and media freedom.

2. Army Under Seize

a. Street mobilisations after the ouster of Imran Khan have made the army vulnerable.
The army today is politically much weaker which may provide a fostering ground for
non-state actors like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
b. The army’s diminished stature became visible, when protesters could access even
General Headquarters with some persuasion. Violent mobs targeted the Corp
Commander’s house in Lahore, the Pakistan Military Academy, the air force base, and
army patrols in cities.

3. Economic Crisis

a. The inflation rate in Pakistan is currently over 30%, which is the highest in this decade.
This is making it difficult for people to afford basic necessities, such as food and fuel.
The Pakistani rupee has lost over 30% of its value against the US dollar in the past year.
b. For example, recently, a video circulated over social media showed that Pakistanis in
some regions are stockpiling LPG in plastic bags as dealers are curtailing supplies due to
 a lack of cooking gas cylinders. Moving bombs’: Pakistan’s LNG crisis sparks dangerous
“bag gas” trade.
c. The country’s public debt has grown to a staggering USD 250 billion, and the
government has failed to secure a bailout from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) due to its inability to implement the required reforms.
d. The country is facing a severe shortage of foreign exchange reserves, which have fallen
to a 9-year low of less than USD 3 billion meaning that the country does not have
enough foreign currency to import essential goods and services.
e. The recent climate and natural disasters like floods have further added the fuel to the
fire, making their economy more vulnerable.

4. Rise of Taliban

a. Since the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan, the Pakistani army has been
under siege and the Taliban supported TTP is expanding its footprint across
Balochistan and Punjab.
b. The emboldened TTP and Baloch groups mounted several attacks against the armed
forces.
c. The Pakistani army is practically fighting a two-front war (internally with TTP &
externally with Taliban) and keeping a tight watch on the Iran border.
d. The Pakistani army used to be seen as a strong and capable force that could play a
smart game of proxy wars has been exposed to be invincible by Taliban.
e. The Taliban is now a major threat to Pakistan, and the army is struggling to contain it.
This has led to a loss of confidence in the army, and its aura of invincibility has faded.

5. Resentment Against China

a. The two provinces (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan) crucial for CPEC have
become battle grounds for security forces. The army’s steadfast backing of CPEC has
brought it to the centre of rising public resentment against Chinese investments.
b. The sentiment is so perceptible that following his recent visit to Pakistan, the Chinese
foreign minister stressed that some forces had fabricated the rumour that China
created a “debt trap” in Pakistan.

Implications for India

1. Negative

a. Escalation of Cross-Border Tensions: Pakistan’s political crisis may lead to rise in

cross-border tensions, particularly along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir.
 Pakistan may resort to provoking India by supporting militant groups or violating
the ceasefire agreement to divert attention from its domestic problems or to rally
public support behind the government or the military.
b. Refugee Crisis: The economic crisis in Pakistan could lead to a refugee crisis, with
millions of Pakistanis fleeing the country. This could put a strain on India’s
resources and could also lead to an increase in crime and social unrest.
c. Compromised Regional Security: The current crisis in Pakistan could lead to
regional instability, as Pakistan becomes more dependent on its neighbours for
support. This could lead to increased tensions between Pakistan and its
neighbours, including India.
d. Nuclear Proliferation: Any political or economic instability in Pakistan that
weakens its control over its nuclear arsenal could potentially lead to concerns
about the security and safety of those weapons. This could raise tensions and
pose a threat to regional stability.

2. Positive

a. Counter-terrorism Cooperation: Pakistan’s political and economic situation can

provide an opportunity for India to engage with the international community in
addressing the issue of cross-border terrorism. By highlighting Pakistan’s support
for terrorism, India can strengthen its case for global cooperation in combating
terrorism and isolating state-sponsored terror networks.
b. Regional Power Projection: India can demonstrate its ability to maintain stability
and handle regional challenges effectively, contrasting with the internal strife faced
by Pakistan. Strengthening regional alliances and partnerships particularly with
countries in South Asia and West Asia could enhance India’s position as a
responsible regional power.
c. Strengthening Regional Connectivity: India can capitalize on Pakistan’s current
challenges by promoting regional connectivity initiatives, such as the Chabahar Port
in Iran or the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). These projects
can bolster India’s access to Central Asia, Afghanistan, and beyond, enabling trade
diversification and enhancing India’s regional influence.
d. Economic Cooperation with Other Countries: India can position itself as a stable
and attractive investment destination in the region. With Pakistan facing economic
challenges, India can leverage its economic growth and stability to attract Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) and foster closer economic ties with other nations. This can
lead to increased trade partnerships and collaborations, further enhancing India’s
economic standing.
Way Forward

1. “Victims of terrorism do not sit together with perpetrators of terrorism to discuss

terrorism”. But India can give a chance to desperate Pakistan of formal talks if it agrees
to stop terrorism, resolve Kashmir issue Pakistan needs the talks desperately.
2. India can use its diplomatic leverage to isolate Pakistan internationally and expose its
alleged support for terrorism and human rights violations.
3. The crises in Pakistan have shown that the country is unable to effectively govern itself.
India can use this to its advantage by pressuring Pakistan to change its behaviour on
issues such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation.
4. Amidst such a crisis, India must prioritize its border security and enhance its military
preparedness to contain insurgencies, cross-border aggression, or provocation from
Pakistan.
5. India could strengthen its economic and strategic ties with Iran, and other Central Asian
countries to counter Pakistan’s influence in the region.