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Consequences of conspiracy theories on political efficacy and political

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 15
Consequences of conspiracy
theories on political efficacy
and political participation
Marika Rullo
Giovanni Telesca

This chapter is aimed at exploring the role of conspiracy beliefs on perceived political efficacy
and consequently on political participation. Indeed, recent findings suggest that conspiracy
beliefs are indirectly and negatively related to conventional participation through external
efficacy. However, some research suggests that not all the conspiracy claims are conspiracy
theories and not all have the same potential for societal harm. Following the proposal by Wu-
Ming 1, we propose to differentiate conspiracy beliefs in conspiracy fantasies (i.e., unrealistic,
and universalistic conspiracy) and conspiracy hypotheses (i.e., plausible, and limited conspiracy),
and to explore their effects on internal and external political efficacy and consequently on
political participation. We predict that conspiracy fantasies and conspiracy hypotheses are two
operationally differentiable constructs, that conspiracy fantasies can reduce perceived internal
political efficacy and consequently political participation, whereas both conspiracy fantasies and
conspiracy hypotheses can negatively predict external political efficacy and political
participation. Results from one cross-sectional survey conducted in Italy partially supported our
predictions showing that conspiracy fantasies (but not conspiracy hypotheses) are associated
with lower internal and external efficacy, but only internal political efficacy mediates the effect
on political participation. The implications of these findings are considered to better understand
the psychology of conspiracy hypotheses and their social consequences and impact on political
efficacy and political participation.

Key Words: Conspiracy Theories; Political Efficacy; Political Participation; Education

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15.1 Introduction

With the recent COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an increase in the
diffusion, especially online, of a wide range of conspiracy theories, several
of which have sometimes ‘justified’ extremely violent protest actions such
as the anti-vax protests throughout Europe (Schraer, 2021; Broderick,
2021). In fact, the spread of conspiracy theories is today a particularly
crucial problem given the impact that such beliefs have on individual and
therefore collective behaviour.
Literature defines a conspiracy as any belief capable of explaining the
ultimate cause of an event or significant event as the result of a powerful
group’s secret plot (Bale, 2007; Douglas, et al., 2015; 2019; 2021; Swami et
al., 2011). Psychological literature has amply shown how adherence to
conspiratorial visions of reality increases during critical events, such as
environmental tragedies, economic crises, or healthcare emergencies (van
Prooijen & Douglas, 2017), which can represent a form of existential threat
(see Terror Management Theory, Greenberg & Arndt, 2011). This threat
fuels strong states of uncertainty about the future and increases ‘the
demands for answers’.
For this reason, the COVID-19 pandemic and the uncertainty that this event
has produced, not only from a healthcare perspective but also from an
economic, social, and psychological perspective (Barua, 2020; Goodell,
2020; Nicola et al., 2020), has probably exacerbated the diffusion of these
theories and their impact on democracies around the world, due to the
massive use of social networks (Censis, 2021), which proved themselves to
be powerful means of diffusion of fake news. Therefore, recently the
renewed interest in the study of conspiracy theories has concerned not
only the psycho-social origins of the diffusion of these theories but also the
consequences of conspiracy theories in relation to their role in inducing
feelings of alienation, powerlessness, and hostility towards society,
increasing acceptance of the use of violence and reducing support for
democratic actions (Lamberty & Leiser, 2019), thereby making such
theories genuine ‘radicalization multipliers’ (Byington, 2019).
Nonetheless, in order to better understand how adherence to these
theories influences collective behavior and can be a key factor in the
development of radicalization processes, especially those related to forms
of violent, non-normative political participation (Horgan & Braddock, 2010,
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p. 279; Antonelli, 2021), it is useful to reflect on what these conspiracy

theories are and what distinguishes them from suspicions about power and
authorities. In this scenario, the aim of the present study is therefore to
identify the beliefs, related to potential conspiracies, capable of having an
impact on the political behavior of citizens by reducing feelings of political
efficacy.

15.1.1 Definition of ‘conspiracy theories’ and its consequences

The assumption that unites widespread conspiracy theories is that several

groups of power are hiding important information to advance their own
interests, for the most part malicious (Douglas et al., 2017). Conspiracy
beliefs identify an enemy (Bilewicz & S dek, 2015) and may consequently
trigger defence mechanisms supporting forms of discrimination. This
definition of conspiracy theories has an implicit intergroup dimension (elite
vs. victims), which is considered the central element that distinguishes
them from other ‘suspicious’ beliefs (Cichocka et al., 2016; van Prooijen &
van Lange, 2014). The identification of an enemy is a way in which these
theories offer the illusion of being in control of an unknown and often
threatening reality, simplifying it, and bringing its operation to light (e.g.,
Lewandowsky et al., 2012). However, the construct of the conspiracy
theory as treated in socio-psychological literature sometimes seems broad
and generic. There is often a tendency to tag every -more or less- legitimate
suspicion about political decisions as a conspiracy theory too easily, with
the risk of polarizing public debate around matters of social relevance.
Nonetheless, socio-psychological literature still seems far from finding a
clear, shared operative definition of the conspiracy theory, although
several authors have raised a promising debate about the need to at least
distinguish absurd theories from legitimate suspicions. Recently, several
authors (e.g., Stojanov, & Halberstadt, 2019) have turned their attention to
the content analysis of conspiracy theories in order to propose a more
narrow definition of conspiracy theory. Stojanov, & Halberstadt (2019)
have proposed, for example, distinguishing between a rational skepticism
characterized by plausible suspicions (e.g., accusations of corruptions
amongst public officials) from a tendency towards conspiracy characterized
by unrealistic beliefs that are often the production of explanations of social
or political events that contradict official explanations and anticipate a
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secret collaboration between ‘powers with malevolent goals’ (e.g., Byford,

2011; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). This differentiation is fundamental,
considering that, although it is true that some beliefs seem unrealistic and
impossible to consider accurate, it is also true that plots may exist and may
reflect all the situations in which groups of people work in secret to harm
others for their own self-interest. For this reason, knowing how to
distinguish when citizens are identifying valid reasons to doubt and suspect
the operation of political power, even while attributing malicious intent to
such power, and when instead some claims about power reflect an
adherence to conspiracy, it is important to understand which actions of
intervention and prevention to put forward and adopt.
For this reason, we propose to adopt a potential definition of the
‘conspiracy’ phenomenon that can distinguish false beliefs from plausible
suspicions. This proposal does not come from scientific literature but rather
from historical-fictional literature; nonetheless it can be used as an
operative definition that should be empirically explored. The distinction
between false beliefs and plausible suspicions in conspiracy is in fact
advanced by WuMing 1, a member of the WuMing writers’ collective , in 1

his book ‘La Q di Qomplotto: come le fantasie di complotto difendono il

sistema’ (The Q in Qonspiracy: QAnon and Its Surroundings. How
Conspiracy Fantasies Defend the System; Edizioni Alegre, 2021). The author
differentiates conspiracy beliefs into two categories: conspiracy
hypotheses and conspiracy fantasies. He argues that the first are useful for
investigating plausible plots and possess typical characteristics including:
(a) a specific goal, (b) a limited number of players, (c) imperfect
implementation because reality is imperfect, (d) they end once uncovered
and reported, (e) and they are considered in the light of the historical
context in which they appear and are inseparably linked to it; while
conspiracy fantasies investigate unrealistic plots that have very different
characteristics from real ones such as: (a) a much more expansive goal such
as dominating, conquering, or destroying the world, (b) a potentially
unlimited number of players, (c) extremely consistent and perfect
implementation, (d) they persist although described and reported in
countless books, articles, and documentaries, (e) and they last indefinitely.

1
https://www.wumingfoundation.com/giap/what-is-the-wu-ming-foundation/
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15.1.2 Impact of conspiracy theories on political participation

Based on the differentiation above, WuMing 1 proposes a reading of the

impact of conspiracy fantasies on the political behavior of citizens,
hypothesizing, also based on empirical evidence (Jolley et al., 2018), that
believing in conspiracy fantasies reduces the attention that people pay to
real problems. Therefore, conspiracy fantasies become diversionary
narratives (e.g., the chemtrail conspiracy theory) that seek the causes of
social problems in small groups of ‘powerful and corrupt people’ and
distract attention from real problems that have systemic causes and that
may appear more complex and difficult to resolve (e.g., climate crisis), and
therefore less motivating from a perspective of political engagement in
public life. In this sense, conspiracy fantasies might drastically reduce the
willingness to active political participation.
Other authors have already identified the effect that conspiratorial beliefs
have in reducing feelings of political power (e.g., Jolley and Douglas, 2014)
and convictions about political efficacy (Ardevol-Abreu et al., 2020)
understood as ‘the feeling that individual political action has, or may have,
an impact on the political process’ (Campbell et al., 1954).
Hence, paradoxically, despite research that has shown how adherence to
conspiratorial beliefs is related to the desire to belong to a socially
prestigious group, thereby satisfying needs of affiliation and self-worth
(Douglas et al., 2017), it would be the illusion of being in possession of a
special form of knowledge that makes those who believe in conspiracy
fantasies more in control of reality than those who ‘live in ignorance’.
Conspiracy fantasies may feed feelings of uncertainty that have
repercussions for the perception of being capable of understanding social
and political matters. In fact, those who believe in conspiracy fantasies
would tend to be less convinced of their effective power to intervene in
political life, or to develop a minor sense of political efficacy.
Political efficacy refers to the perceptions that individuals have about their
abilities to influence political reality, both through political representations
and through individual actions (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991; Wolak, 2018).
Political efficacy can be distinguished into internal political efficacy and
external political efficacy. The first concerns the convictions related to the
ability to understand, inquire about, and intervene in political life (Niemi et
al., 1991). External political efficacy, instead, concerns the perceptions that
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individuals have about the ability of the political system to respond

effectively to citizens’ needs and requests (Craig, 1982; Watts, 1973).
This construct, derived from political science, is very important for
understanding citizens’ political participation. Political efficacy, along with
other variables such as trust in the government, is one of the most
important factors in predicting adherence to forms of conventional political
participation like exercising the right to vote or activist and associative
participation (Craig, 1980; Jung, Kim, & Gil de Zuniga, 2011). In fact, the
feeling of being able to have an impact on the political process through
one’s own elected representatives or through one’s own actions plays a
strong and positive role in encouraging participation in political life.
Therefore, considering that conspiracy fantasies undermine trust in
political power (Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac,
2013), it is possible that people who believe in conspiracy fantasies may
report lower external political efficacy. This conclusion was recently
supported by a study of Ardevol-Abreu and colleagues (2020), who
identified a negative correlation between conspiratorial beliefs and
external political efficacy, regardless of the effect of other variables such as
general political interest or trust in the government, in a sample of more
than 5000 people in different countries around the world. Moreover, the
authors demonstrated that this relationship can also explain the reduced
propensity of such individuals to participate in political life in a
conventional way, instead engaging in sometimes violent forms of political
protest and participation. The authors of this study have also investigated
the role of conspiracy theorism in internal political efficacy and
consequently in forms of unconventional participation, but without
managing to define a clear framework of the relationship between these
variables. Indeed, if, on the one hand, believing in conspiracy narratives can
give the illusion of being in possession of knowledge essential for
understanding the social and political system and, thereby, have a positive
impact on internal political efficacy, on the other, being persuaded that
social phenomena and political power are the product of very sophisticated
and complex conspiracy plots can reduce the perception of truly managing
to understand what is happening in political life and induce lower
perception of internal political efficacy. Therefore, the relationship
between conspiracy theorism and internal political efficacy remains an
open discussion of great interest. One of the goals of this study is to
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investigate whether and how conspiracy theorism can impact participation

in the democratic by reducing perceptions of internal as well as external
political efficacy. Moreover, no empirical evidence so far has shed light on
the role that adherence to conspiracy fantasies, and not necessarily to
conspiracy hypotheses, can have on feelings of internal and external
political efficacy and, in turn, on conventional political participation. For
this reason, the research presented in this chapter proposes a first step to
bridge this gap and put forward a proposal to develop research aimed at
deepening the knowledge on less investigated elements of conspiracy.

15.2 Research

15.2.1 Objectives and Hypotheses

This study aims to address different objectives and research questions. The
first objective of the research was to verify the possibility of distinguishing
between conspiracy hypotheses and fantasies, based on a revised and
adapted scale used to measure the general trend towards conspiracy
(Leone et al., 2018). The second objective was to investigate the
relationship between conspiracy fantasies, conspiracy hypotheses and
internal and external political efficacy, and, consequently, their role in
conventional political participation. The research questions of the present
study can be summarised as follows:
Q1) What role do conspiracy fantasies and conspiracy hypotheses have in
influencing the perception of internal political efficacy?
Q2) What role do conspiracy fantasies and conspiracy hypotheses have in
influencing political participation?
Starting from these questions, we propose to verify the following
hypotheses:
H1) Conspiracy fantasies and conspiracy hypotheses are two operationally
differentiable constructs.
H2) Conspiracy fantasies reduce perceptions of internal political efficacy.
H3) Conspiracy fantasies reduce political participation, and this effect is
mediated by reduced internal political efficacy.
H4) Conspiracy fantasies and conspiracy hypotheses have a negative effect
on perceptions of external political efficacy.
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H5) Conspiracy fantasies and conspiracy hypotheses reduce political

participation, and this effect is mediated by reduced external political
efficacy.

15.2.2 Methods

Participants. A convenience sample, intercepted via sponsored posts on

Facebook, took part in the research and completed the questionnaire. The
conditions for participation in the research were being resident in Italy and
being over 18 years old. The group of participants subject to analysis
consisted of 233 participants (89% women; Mage = 23.88; SDage = 9.75),
of whom 83.3% had high school diplomas. The 89.3% reported a low-to
middle socio-economic status.

Procedure. Participants responded to an online questionnaire created with

Google Forms. The ad used to find potential participants asked them to
answer a brief questionnaire about their confidence in politics and other
social themes. After providing informed consent to the conditions of the
study and the treatment of personal data, the participants filled out the
measurement scales (see Materials). Then they provided some
demographic information (i.e., age, gender, level of education, socio-
economic status) and reported their political orientation (from 1 ‘extreme
left’ to 7 ‘extreme right’). At the end of the questionnaire, participants were
given a written debriefing to explain to them the goals of the research and
remind them of the possibility to withdraw from the study after recording
their responses. The research protocol was approved by the social science
ethics committee of the University of Siena. The order of presentation of
the measurement scales seen by the participants reflects the order of
presentation of the scales described below.

Measures.
Political Cynicism. Confidence in the government and in the government’s
management of the current pandemic situation was measured through 4
ad hoc items with the 5-point Likert-scale (from 1, ‘Strongly disagree’, to 5,
‘Strongly agree’). The items are: ‘Money is the most important factor in
influencing public policies’, ‘Politicians represent the general interest more
than their own’, ‘Nobody can hope to remain honest once they get into
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politics’, and ‘If a politician keeps their ideals and principles, they are
unlikely to reach the top of their profession’. The scale showed a low
reliability index ( = .42).

Conspiracy Beliefs. Conspiracy beliefs were measured using the

truthfulness scale associated with 10 affirmations about conspiratorial
explanations of different events. Several items were drawn from Leone et
al. (2018) while others were created ad hoc for this study. Participants
indicated how truthful they believed the affirmations in the scale (fully
listed in Table 15.1) to be, on a response scale from 1, ‘Completely false’,
to 4, ‘Completely true’. The scale showed a high reliability index ( = .70).

External Political Efficacy. External political efficacy was measured by

asking participants to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with the
following statements: ‘The Italian political system responds to citizens’
opinions effectively’, ‘Public officials and politicians in Italy don't care much
about what people like me think’ and ‘Italian politicians do not consider
what people think when they have to decide what to do’ (1 = Strongly
disagree, 7 = Strongly agree; = .60)

Internal Political Efficacy. To measure participants’ sense of internal

political efficacy, we adapted three items from Niemi et al. (1991): ‘I have
sufficient ability to talk about and participate in political decisions’, ‘I can
understand many political issues easily’ and ‘I have sufficient ability to
understand political decisions’ (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree;
= .87).

Political Participation. To measure the degree of political participation we

asked the likelihood (from 1, ‘Very unlikely’ to 5, ‘Very likely’) that the
individuals would participate in the following activities in the future: ‘Sign
a petition’, ‘Attend political gatherings’, ‘Participate in a public
demonstration’, and ‘Vote in the next elections’. The scale showed a low
reliability coefficient ( = .50).

Table 15.1 Items for Conspiracy Beliefs partially adapted from Leone et al. (2018)

Items for Conspiracy Hypotheses

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1 The financial crises of recent years have been caused by risky choices by financial groups at the
expense of citizens
2 The US government used the 9/11 attacks as a pretext for the war in Iraq
3 The multinationals that produce carbonated soft drinks enrich them with addictive substances
4 Some vaccines have side effects that sometimes outweigh the benefits
Items for Conspiracy Fantasies
1 The so-called ISIS (Islamic State) does not exist, but it is only a creation of the Western secret services
2 The gay lobby has a plan to increase the number of homosexuals by spreading the ‘gender theory’
3 Vaccines are a tool with which powerful groups would like to manipulate people's health
4 Some groups of a few powerful manipulate the destinies of the world
5 Coronavirus is a virus create by powerful groups to make an experiment on population control
6 For years, a plan has been in progress wanted by an elite of powerful that would provide for the ethnic
replacement of white Europeans (Kalergi Plan)

15.2.3 Results

Factorial analysis. A principal components analysis with oblimin rotation

for 10 items from the Conspiracy Beliefs scale (N = 233) showed a two-
factor solution accounting for 45% of the variance. The first factor
contained 4 items that referred to conspiracy hypotheses (eigenvalue 6.44,
13.9% of the variance accounted for). The second factor contained 6 items
that referred to conspiracy fantasies (eigenvalue 5.65, 28.3% of the
variance accounted for). Items for each factor are reported in Table 1.

Descriptive statistics and correlations. Descriptive statistics and

correlations among variables are reported in Table 15.2. Correlations
showed that whereas conspiracy fantasies were negatively and significantly
related to both internal and external political efficacy, conspiracy
hypotheses were significantly and negatively related to external political
efficacy and positively related to political cynicism but were not
significantly related to internal political efficacy. Moreover, in the present
study, political participation was significantly and positively related to
conspiracy hypotheses, negatively related to conspiracy fantasies, and
positively related to internal political efficacy but not significantly related
to external political efficacy. However, consistent with past research,
political orientation (from 1 ‘extreme left’ to 7 ‘extreme right’) was
positively and significantly related to conspiracy fantasies and negatively
related to political participation.
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Conspiracy fantasies, political efficacy, and political participation. To

examine our prediction about the relationship between conspiracy
fantasies and political participation and to investigate whether this
relationship is mediated by decreased level of internal political efficacy, we
used the PROCESS macro developed by Preacher (2008) (Model 4; 5,000
Bootstrap samples). In this mediation analysis we used age, gender,
educational qualification, and political orientation as well as external
political efficacy and political cynicism as covariates.
The results showed a significant model predicting political participation [F
(7, 225) = 5.28, p <.001, R2 = .14]. Conspiracy fantasies predict significantly
lower political internal efficacy [B = -.36 (SE = .09), p <.001]. Also, internal
political efficacy predicts more political participation [B = .29 (SE = .07), p
<.001]. The total effect of conspiracy fantasies on political participation is
significant [B = -.36 (SE = .11), p = .003]. However, when checking in relation
to the effect of internal political efficacy, the effect of conspiracy fantasies
is significantly reduced [B = -.25 (SE = .11), p = .02]. The estimated
bootstrapped mediation confirms the indirect effect of conspiracy fantasies
on political participation via the effect of internal political efficacy [IE =- .10
(SE = .04), confidence interval [CI] 95% between -.2063 and -.0302]. The
results of the mediation analysis did not change when covariates were not
included.
Concerning the mediation role of external political efficacy (by using
external political efficacy as covariate), the results of the mediation analysis
showed that conspiracy fantasies were not related to external political
efficacy when controlling for the covariates [F (5,227) = 9.05, p <.001, R2 =
.16; B = -.06 (SE = .06), p. 36]. As a matter of fact, only political cynicism [B
= -.31 (SE = .06), p< .001], gender [B = .29 (SE = .10) , p .004] and education
[B = .16 (SE = .07) , p .03] had a significant role in predicting political
participation.

Conspiracy hypotheses, political efficacy, and political participation. As

far as concerns the results of the analysis conducted for testing the effect
of conspiracy hypotheses on political participation via internal political
efficacy, we found no effect of conspiracy hypotheses on internal political
efficacy [F (7, 225) = 2.35, p =.03, R2 = .05; B = .16 (SE = .12), p .16] but a
positive and marginally significant effect on political participation [B = .24
(SE = .13) , p .06].
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The results concerning the role of conspiracy hypotheses on political

participation via external political efficacy showed that conspiracy
hypotheses had a significant effect on external political efficacy [B = -.37
(SE = .07), p <.001] However, external political efficacy did not have any
effect on political participation [B = -.01 (SE = .11), p .91].

Table 15.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables

M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Age 23.88 9.75 -

Gender 1.16 0.39 .35c -

Education 3.20 3.20 .58c .30c -

Political
orientation 3.46 1.05 .02 -.06 -.03 -
Socio-econ.
status 4.42 1.03 .07 -.02 -.04 .09 -
Political
cynicism 2.76 0.61 .27c .16a .08 .00 .04 -
Conspiracy
hyphotheses 2.74 0.48 .07 -.11 .04 -.06 -.04 .20b -
Conspiracy
c c
fantasies 1.71 0.55 -.11 -.30 -.07 .23 .06 .07 .23c -
External
pol. efficacy 1.80 0.59 -.02 .17b .14a -.05 -.08 -.31c -.39c -.14a -
Internal
c b c c
pol. efficacy 2.81 0.86 .35 .20 .28 -.12 -.12 .03 -.09 -.27 -.02 -
Political
participation 3.35 0.93 .13a -.01 -.02 -.25c -.07 .09 .18b -.19b -.11 .30c -
a
p < .05, b p < .01, c p < .001

Gender: 1 = female, 2 = male, 3 = other/nonbinary.

Education: 1 = elementary school, 2 = middle school, 3 = high school, 4 = bachelor, 5 = master, 6 = PhD or other 3rd level.
Socio-Economic Status: from 1 = lowest status to 8 = highest status.

15.3 Discussion

This cross-sectional study proposed a model that could highlight the

relationships between conspiracy fantasies, conspiracy hypotheses, and
conventional political participation through the mediation of internal and
external political efficacy. In general, the results explain how conspiracy
fantasies, beliefs about unrealistic and universal conspiracies, are a
construct that is empirically distinguishable from conspiracy hypotheses,
plausible suspicions about the operation of power. Consequently, their
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respective influence on motivation to participate in political life by

following conventional paths differs. In fact, there is clear evidence that
conspiracy fantasies have a negative impact on conventional political
participation; this can be explained by their role in reducing feelings of
external and internal political efficacy. The proposed mediation model
describes the relationship between these constructs, bringing to light how
the effect of conspiracy fantasies in reducing conventional political
participation is mediated by reduced internal political efficacy (i.e., the
perception of being able to understand and intervene in social and political
matters), but not by external political efficacy (i.e., the ability of the political
system to effectively respond to citizens’ demands). Thus, the results
related to the role that conspiracy fantasies can have in feelings of internal
political efficacy and consequently in political participation show that, in
our sample, this relationship is negative and very strong. Indeed, although
conspiracy fantasies can induce people to believe they are privy to
important truths and special knowledge that can somehow increase their
perception and understanding of social and political matters better than
others, it is also true that being exposed to such disabling narratives of
power and intricate explanations of social events can actually reduce
perception of being able to truly understand political reality and even
actively intervene in it. For this reason, despite the fact that the results of
the present study indicate a negative effect on internal political efficacy,
the role of conspiracy fantasies on feelings of political efficacy related to
the dimensions of individual action still remains an important matter to
explore and disambiguate, keeping in mind the conditions that can
moderate this relationship (e.g., socio-demographic and culture factors,
etc.). Findings about the role of conspiracy fantasies in reducing external
political efficacy are in line with recent empirical evidence about the
relationship between conspiracy theories and lack of trust in the activity of
the political system, perceived as less able to respond effectively to the
needs of citizens, which can lead to a reduced propensity to adhere to
conventional forms of political participation. However, our results did not
find an indirect effect of conspiracy fantasies on political participation via
the reduced sense of external political efficacy. In relation to the research
questions posed about the role of conspiracy hypotheses both on feelings
of internal and external political efficacy, and on political participation, our
results confirm a previously undefined framework that deserves more
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exploration. In fact, if the hypothesis that conspiracy hypotheses can still

act as a deterrent to external political efficacy because they bear narratives
of power as an enemy element that cannot be trusted without
reservations, the research questions about their role in feelings of internal
political efficacy remains open. Our results seem not to show any
relationship between conspiracy hypotheses and internal political efficacy,
just as with different forms of political participation. Nevertheless, the
results concerning the partial but positive role of conspiracy hypotheses on
political participation may open new and intriguing lines of enquiry. Having
legitimate and plausible suspicions about how economic and political
authorities operate may, in fact, motivate people to question power by
actively using forms of participation such as peaceful protest, petitions or
participation in political elections. However, the results about the
relationships between feelings of political efficacy and participation show
how internal political efficacy is the main predictor of conventional political
participation, as already widely established in the literature (Craig et al.,
1980; Wolak, 2018).

15.4 Limitations and future research

Although the results appear to be an important empirical basis for the

development of a new line of research that considers the difference
between conspiracy fantasies and conspiracy hypotheses in light of their
role in influencing the democratic life and political participation of a
country, the current study is preliminary and not without limitations that
future research will need to take into consideration and overcome. For this
reason, the evidence found in this study must be interpreted with caution
and in a preliminary fashion, as a pretext to advance a systematic
reflection.
A very relevant limitation concerns both the sample and how it was
selected. Indeed, our sample, which is mainly composed of women with a
university education, may clearly have influenced the possibility of
generalizing the results of our research. In fact, even considering the effect
of gender in statistical analyses as a covariate and despite this effect not
seeming to have interfered with the findings, it seems clear that a study
that attempts to investigate the role of conspiracy theorism in individual
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political participation behavior should look at a sample that can better

represent the entire population potentially targeted by this phenomenon.
The collection of data should follow a systematic sampling that is possibly
remunerated, rather than a convenience sampling that thereby generates
bias tied to individual interest in participating (e.g., a lower tendency
towards suspicion, a greater propensity towards active participation,
interest in politics and political participation, etc.).
There is a limitation related to the use of cross-sectional rather than
longitudinal or experimental research. Indeed, having measured all the
variables of interest and then explored the relationship between them, in
a discretionary manner with statistical analysis, this may not be a
completely suitable method for verifying the causal role of conspiracy
theorism in the variables of interest. A longitudinal design would allow us
to verify whether conspiracy fantasies are what reduce perceptions of
political efficacy and participation, and not vice versa. Experimental
manipulation (e.g., exposure to conspiracy fantasies) could also be a valid
tool for ascertaining the causal relationships of the model we have
proposed. Therefore, future studies should use research designs capable of
overcoming the limitations of cross-sectional studies with the objective of
establishing the existence of causal relationships that can account for
theorizations in light of the observed phenomena.
Another limitation concerns both the measures related to political
participation and control measures. Although it is true that voting and
activism are two important criteria for establishing a certain level of
political participation, it is nonetheless true that they refer to
circumscribed, limited activities that may involve certain groups of the
population and not others. In fact, participation may also include behaviors
that are not always so explicit and standardized such as, for example, online
activism and/or everyday commitment to non-formalized social causes
(e.g., neighborhood committees) that may involve people, regardless of
their age, with different but still intense gradients of involvement. As far as
control measures are concerned, it is important for future studies to keep
in mind also the general level of interest in politics and of other
sociodemographic variables that may impact the variables that are the
subject of the investigation, such as professional roles and living conditions
(e.g., big cities vs. small towns, centre vs. periphery, etc.).
274 Chapter
16 Chapter 15 15

Finally, future studies should also explore the differences between

different countries and cultural contexts, to be able to establish not only
the generalization of their effects, but also which conditions make the
negative relationship between conspiracy theorism and political
participation via political efficacy less clear and explore which factors can
act as moderators of such relationships.
Despite these considerations, this article contributes to studies that
investigate the social consequences of exposure to conspiracy theorism
and endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. In fact, the study empirically
considers a factor that until now was not explored in this form, namely the
differences between conspiracy fantasies and conspiracy hypotheses, and
puts forward the idea that not all forms of conspiracy can be defined as
such, and that consequently they do not all have the same impact on
society and individuals.
Consequences of conspiracy
Consequences theories on
of conspiracy political
theories on efficacy and political
political efficacy participation275
participation
and politica 17

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