Electoral Studies 28 (2008) 240–247

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Electoral Studies
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud

Democratization of party leadership selection: Do wider selectorates

produce more competitive contests?
Ofer Kenig*
Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Buchanan C425, 1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada, V6T 1Z1

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The last two decades saw a significant shift in party leaders’ selection methods. As part of
Received 9 October 2007 a wider phenomenon of intra-party democratization, many parties opened their leader-
Received in revised form 7 July 2008 ship selection procedure to wider selection bodies (selectorates). Such a step was expected
Accepted 6 November 2008
to reduce the parties’ elitist and oligarchic tendencies by attracting more leadership
aspirants and producing more competitive contests. This study aims to evaluate whether
Keywords:
these expectations materialized – do wider selectorates produce more competitive lead-
Leadership election
ership contests? Using the selectorate’s level of inclusiveness as the explanatory variable,
Party leaders
Competitiveness this paper explores 143 leadership contests to see whether these expectations material-
Democratization ized. Several operative indicators are used to evaluate the level of competitiveness. The
Candidates main conclusion is that larger selectorates tend to attract more leadership candidates, but
also tend to produce less competitive contests.
Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The post of party leader is one of the most prominent
positions in modern parliamentary democracies. Therefore,
the methods through which party leaders achieve their
position are important political institutions. The last two
decades saw a significant shift in party leaders selection
methods: as part of a wider phenomenon of intra-party
democratization, many parties opened their leadership
selection procedure to wider selection bodies (selec-
torates). Such a step was perceived by many as a means of
bypassing the party machine and as an expression of direct
democracy practice. Furthermore, it was expected to
reduce the parties’ elitist and oligarchic tendencies by
attracting more leadership aspirants and producing more
competitive contests.
This study aims to evaluate whether these expectations
materialized. In other words, do wider selectorates produce
more competitive leadership contests? Using the selector-
ate’s level of inclusiveness as the explanatory variable, I
* Tel.: þ1 604 822 4922; fax: þ1 604 822 5540.
E-mail address: ofer.kenig@gmail.com
explore 143 leadership contests and leadership successions
that were held in eleven parliamentary democracies
between 1964 and September 2007.1 Several operative
indicators are used to evaluate the level of competitive-
ness: Incumbents’ success rate, the likelihood of contests,
the number of candidates, and the distribution of votes
index. The conclusion is that more inclusive selectorates do
not necessarily enhance competitiveness. On the contrary,
contests held in inclusive selectorates (party primaries or
one-member-one-vote systems) are more likely to produce
a distinct early front-runner who receives a considerable
share of the votes.
1
Case studies include leadership contests and successions in the
following parties: Labor Party (Australia); People’s Party and Social-
Democrats (Austria); Bloc Québécois, Canadian Alliance, Conservatives,
Liberals, New Democrats and Progressive Conservatives (Canada); Chris-
tian-Democrats and Social-Democrats (Germany); Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael
and Labour (Ireland); Labour and Likud (Israel); l’Unione (Italy); Demo-
crats and Liberal-Democrats (Japan); Labour and Liberals (Netherlands);
People’s Party and Socialists (Spain); Conservatives, Labour, Liberals and
Liberal-Democrats (United Kingdom).

0261-3794/$ – see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2008.11.001
 O. Kenig / Electoral Studies 28 (2008) 240–247 241

1. The importance of party leaders selection methods Table 1

Party leaders’ selectorates, 1976 and 2007.

Party leaders are among the most important political Party Selectorate, Selectorate, Trend
figures in modern representative democracies. Today, 1976 2007
general elections in parliamentary democracies are often AUS Labor (ALP) PPG PPG w
decided by the nature – or at least the image – of the party Liberals PPG PPG w
leaders (McAlister, 1996: 281; Arian, 2005: 171). This AUT People’s Party (ÖVP) Party Agency Party Agency w
phenomenon has been termed the ‘presidentialization’ or Social-Democrats Party Agency Party Agency w
‘personalization’ of politics (Poguntke and Webb, 2005; (SPÖ)

Mughan, 2000; Rahat and Sheafer, 2007). In most cases, Canada Bloc Québécois – Party Members
a person seeking to become prime minister must first Conservatives Party Agency Party Members þ
Liberals Party Agency Party Agency w
assume the position of party leader. In this way, the office of
New Democrats Party Agency Party Members þ
party leader often serves as gatekeeper to the highest (NDP)
political position in the country. The methods through
Germany Christian-Democrats Party Agency Party Agency w
which party leaders achieve their position are, therefore,
(CDU)
important political institutions. Liberals (FDP) Party Agency Party Agency w
These methods become especially important when the Social-Democrats Party Agency Party Agency w
prime minister retires or dies during the parliamentary (SPD)
term. Since general elections are not required by law in Ireland Fianna Fail PPG PPG w
such cases, a new prime minister may be selected or Fine Gael PPG PPG w
nominated by the ruling party.2 In these circumstances, the Labour PPG Party Members þ
decision concerning the highest office in the country is not Israel Labour (ILP) Party Agency Party Members þ
even in the hands of the entire electorate. Instead a more Likud Party Agency Party Members þ
exclusive selectorate makes that choice – be they party Meretz – Party Members

members, party activists, party legislators or even an Japan Democrats (DPJ) – Electoral College
informal party elite group. Only four of the last ten British Liberal-Democrats PPG or party Electoral College þ
(LDP) elite
prime ministers initially assumed their office following
general elections. The others (Eden, MacMillan, Home, Nether Christian-Democrats PPG PPG w
Callaghan, Major and Brown) assumed the premiership (CDA)
Labour (PvdA) PPG Party Members þ
following an intra-party procedure. This pattern is common
Liberals (VVD) PPG Party Members þ
in other countries as well. In Japan, for instance, each of
the last six prime ministers first assumed office following NZ Labour PPG PPG w
National PPG PPG w
an internal contest within the ruling Liberal-Democrats
(LDP). Spain People’s Party (PP) Party Agency Party Agency w
Socialists (PSOE) Party Agency Party Agency w
The selection of a party leader must, therefore, not be
seen as just an intra-party matter, but rather as a procedure UK Conservatives PPG Party Members þ
that may decide the top executive in a country. The selec- Labour PPG Electoral College þ
Liberal-Democrats Party Members Party Members w
tion methods of party leaders have gone through a consid-
Scottish Nationalists Party Members þ
erable shift during the last 30 years, especially in Canada, (SNP)
the UK, Japan and Israel (See Table 1). Reacting and
PPG, Parliamentary Party Group; AUS, Australia; AUT, Austria; NZ, New
adapting to social changes, an increasing number of parties Zealand; UK, United Kingdom; Nether, The Netherlands.
have changed their internal distribution of power to give
their members a role in candidate selection, policy-making
and leadership selection (Scarrow et al., 2000; LeDuc,
2001). These measures were designed to overcome an At this point I focus on the value of competitive-
intra-party democratic deficit and to bring the citizens back ness. Although other values are significant, I believe
into the political process. The reforms reflected the desire that competitiveness stands at the forefront. While
to reduce the oligarchic tendencies of parties by creating representation may well be important in contests
a participatory revolution and by providing the rank-and- comprising a list of candidates, where there are multi-
file members a chance to make a difference. A more seats available and therefore many winners (Hazan and
inclusive participation was expected to enhance demo- Rahat, 2006), it is not of great significance for leader-
cratic values as responsiveness, transparency, representa- ship selection, where there is only one winner. The
tion and competitiveness (Cross, 1996).3 same can be said about responsiveness – party leaders,
as opposed to members of parliament, are expected to
stand above their constituents, especially if they are
vying for the position of prime minister. Competitive-
2
In most cases, prime ministers are members of the largest party in ness, on the other hand, is most relevant for party
parliament (with or without parliamentary majority) or the largest party
leaders’ selection. It reflects not only the accessibility
in the ruling coalition. Only in rare cases do they belong to other parties.
3
Others suggested a more skeptical view in which party elites
of the selection process (how ‘open’ it is) but also how
maneuvered these reforms as a measure to reduce the power of party close it is in terms of results. True, there is no reason
activists (Mair, 1994: 16; Marsh, 1993: 230). to assume that a contest that is not close is less
242 O. Kenig / Electoral Studies 28 (2008) 240–247
democratic, but open procedure with close results does
reflect a viable intra-party democracy.
2. Participation and competitiveness
Given the fact that many parties have democratized
their methods for selecting their leaders, we must ask
whether this change really made a difference. From this
question we may derive several directions of investiga-
tion. For example: do inclusive procedures tend to
produce different types of leaders? Do they provide the
elected leaders with a more solid position? Do they bear
any negative side-effects? This study is concerned with
one question: Is there a positive relation between
participation and competitiveness? In other words, do
more inclusive selectorates culminate in more competi-
tive contests?
Political science research is rich in studies that explore
the relation between various democratic values. A great
deal has been written on relations as representation and
governance or freedom and equality, but almost none has
explored the relation between participation and competi-
tiveness. True, many political theorists stated these values
as two critical dimensions for democracy, but did not
outline a relationship between the two (Schumpeter, 1943:
269; Dahl, 1971: 8; Vanhanen, 2000: 253). This is most
likely due to the fact that participation (at least since the
spread of universal suffrage during the 20th century) is
perceived as a constant factor. Elections at the national,
regional or local level are open to the participation of the
entire adult population. But elections in an intra-party
arena are of a different nature. Parties, as autonomous
entities, may restrict the voting procedure to distinct and
more exclusive populations. In other words, intra-party
elections, including the selection of party leaders, vary in
the degree of participation. It is possible, therefore, to
explore the connection between participation and
competitiveness.
As mentioned earlier, the opening of the process to
more inclusive selectorates was expected to produce more
competitive contests. Here, however, I argue for a negative
connection between the inclusiveness of the selectorate
and the level of competitiveness, at least when it is
perceived by the tightness of the contests. In other words,
the more inclusive the selectorate, the less competitive the
selecting procedure is.
This hypothesis rests on the assumption that selec-
torates operate different calculations and judgments in
their action. Voters in inclusive selectorates (party prima-
ries) are more exposed to the influence of opinion polls that
reflect the support for candidates. If such polls indicate an
early front-runner, undecided voters tend to ‘get on board
the winning wagon’ and transfer their support to the likely
winner. This ‘front-runner effect’ enhances the probability
of a candidate to gather considerable support, and there-
fore reduces competitiveness. Such effect may also
persuade potential candidates not to run and thus reduce
the number of candidates in the contest. Alternatively, polls
that establish a clear front-runner may also persuade his or
her rival’s supporters to abstain, for their act of voting is
perceived as ineffective. This abstention gives further
advantage to the front-runner and may also culminate in
reduced competitiveness.4
On the other hand, voters in more exclusive selectorates
(party activists or the party parliamentary group) are less
likely to be effected of such circumstances. First, the con-
ducting of opinion polls in exclusive selectorates is less
reliable and sometimes not possible at all. Furthermore,
these voters’ decisions regarding what candidate to
support are more complex. While shaped by the popularity
of one candidate or another, they are also affected by
factors such as personal relationships, loyalties, partisan
factions and ideology. These factors may reduce the likeli-
hood of a front-runner effect and therefore culminate in
tighter contests.
In this stage it is important to acknowledge that the
level of participation (selectorate’s inclusiveness) is not the
only factor that determines competitiveness. Indeed, there
are other dimensions of leadership selection methods that
affect the incentives of candidates to compete or shape
voting patterns. For instance, rigid candidacy requirements
(contest fee or signature requirements) may deter or even
prevent potential candidates from stepping forward.5
Voting methods are also important. In American primaries,
there is evidence that runoff elections have enticed more
candidates into elections compared to plurality (FPP)
elections. This is due to the fact that a runoff election makes
it possible for different candidates to compete in the first
round without the concern of splitting the vote and elect-
ing an unpalatable plurality candidate (Glaser, 2006: 779;
Berry and Canon, 1993). If this applies to runoff elections, it
is even truer for other voting methods such as preferential
vote or exhaustive ballots.6 These voting methods may not
only lure more candidates to compete, but may also create
a chance for a candidate to ‘come from behind’ and win the
4
Arguably, opinion polls that show a front-runner with a wide margin
may also persuade front-runner’s supporters that their votes are not
really necessary for the win, and therefore they might abstain as well.
However, this effect is not as strong as it is for the trailing candidates’
supporters. Casting vote for the winner is more pleasant (even if it is not
vital, voters feel part of the triumph) than doing so for a likely loser.
5
Candidates for the leadership election of the Liberal Party of Canada
in 2003 had to pay 75,000 Canadian Dollars as a contest fee. Several
potential candidates proclaimed that this sum was the main reason for
them no to enter the contest. The British Labour Party requires a candi-
date to present the support of at least 12.5% of the party MPs. This strict
requirement has twice (1992, 1994) prevented Ken Livingstone from
competing for the post of party leader, and also ensured the coronation of
Gordon Brown in 2007, after no other candidate surpassed this threshold.
In both examples we see a reduction in the field of candidates due to
candidacy requirements.
6
In preferential vote (alternative vote) voters rank each of the candi-
dates from the most to the least preferable. In the first count, the first
preferences (most preferable) are counted. If no candidate meets the
majority requirement, the candidate who received the least number of
first preferences is dropped from the contest and his supporters’ second
preferences are re-allocated to the other candidates. This procedure is
repeated until one of the candidates meets the majority requirement and
is declared a winner. In exhaustive (or eliminative) ballots voters vote for
one candidate. If no candidate meets the majority requirement, the
candidate who received the least number of the votes is dropped from the
contest and an additional ballot is held. This procedure is repeated until
one of the candidates meets the majority requirement and is declared
winner. In multi-candidate contests, several ballots may be needed to
select a winning candidate.
 O. Kenig / Electoral Studies 28 (2008) 240–247
contest, thus increasing competitiveness. Stéphane Dion,
current leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, was ranked
third in the first ballot of the leadership contest of 2006. He
eventually won the contest on the fourth ballot.
Competitiveness may also be increased if potential
candidates believe they will benefit by competing, even if
their chance of winning is slim. For instance, a candidate
may decide to enter a contest with the aim of promoting
a particular issue. Neil Fraser joined the leadership contest
of the Progressive Conservatives in Canada in 1983 with the
sole aim of promoting his anti Metric system campaign.
More seriously, by stepping forward as candidates, politi-
cians can upgrade their status within the party and mark
themselves as future leaders (Alderman and Carter, 2002:
571). Having said that, I will now focus on the selecting
body, which should be considered the most important
dimension of leadership selection methods.
3. The independent variable – selectorate’s
inclusiveness
The selectorate is the body that selects the party leader.
It can be composed of only one person, or several or many
selectors – up to the entire electorate (Marsh, 1993; LeDuc,
2001; Rahat and Hazan, 2001). Fig. 1 presents a continuum
concerning the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the
selectorates that are included in this study. The most
exclusive selectorate concerned here are the members of
the parliamentary party group (PPG). The selection of the
party leader by the party’s elected representatives in the
legislature was the dominant method in the United
Kingdom and other Westminster-model democracies until
the mid 1970s (Punnett, 1992; Stark, 1996). Since then, the
three major British parties have abolished this system in
favour of more inclusive selectorates.7 The major parties in
Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, however, still grant
their representatives in parliament the prerogative to
choose their party leader.8
One step towards the inclusive pole, we find the selec-
tion of leaders by a selected party agency. This selectorate is
very common in parties within continental Europe. Here,
the leader is selected by the members of a selected party
agency – a convention, conference, congress or assembly.
These are regular party agencies that command various
functions and tasks, including the selection of the party
leader. The size of these agencies varies, but generally it
ranges between a few hundred to one thousand members.
For much of the last century the dominant Canadian parties
have employed a similar type of party convention selec-
torate. However, their conventions differ from the cases
presented above since they are not regular party agencies
7
The first to introduce a more inclusive selectorate were the Liberals in
1976. They were followed by the Labour Party in 1981 and by the
Conservatives in 1998.
8
There are slight variations regarding what kind of parliamentarian is
entitled to participate in the vote. Some parties restrict the vote to their
representatives in the lower (or single) house, while other parties, like
the Australian Labor Party, allow their representatives in the upper house
to participate in the selection of the leader. Still other parties, such as the
Irish Fine Gael, allow their representatives in the European Parliament to
participate as well.
243
but rather special, ad-hoc entities with the prime task of
selecting a leader (Courtney, 1995; MacIvor, 1994; Perlin,
1988). Another difference is that rank-and-file members
participate in the earlier stages of the process. Given these
distinctions, and also the fact that the Canadian leadership
conventions are much larger than other selected agencies,
it might be argued that this sub-type of selectorate, unique
to Canadian parties, is slightly more inclusive than other
selected party agencies.
Next in line we find a selectorate that is composed of the
party members. In this selectorate, also known as ‘closed
primaries’, ‘party primaries’ or ‘one-member-one-vote’
system (OMOV), the entire party membership participates
in the selection of the leader and every vote is counted
equally. Until thirty years ago this kind of selectorate was
rare indeed, but since then many parties expanded the
right to select the leader to the party members. Finally, the
most inclusive selectorate is the entire Electorate of
a nation; here parties allow anyone, regardless of party
affiliation, to vote. This kind of selectorate, also known as
‘open primary’, is quite rare in parliamentary democracies
(Carty and Blake, 1999). In 2005, Romano Prodi was
selected as the leader of left coalition bloc (l’Unione) in Italy
in such a selectorate. This primary election was open to all
Italian citizens at least 18 years old and to any immigrant
who had lived in Italy for at least three years. Nearly 4.5
million voters participated in the process.
The four types of selectorates presented above may be
regarded as ‘pure’ selectorates. Some parties, however, use
a more complex system, which involves more than one
selectorate for selecting their leaders. For example, some
parties have opened up the process to the entire member-
ship, but have not gone ‘all the way’ in terms of granting each
member an equal vote. Instead, they weight the votes. The
British Labour Party and the Japanese Liberal-Democrats
(LDP) both select their leaders according to an Electoral
College formula, which grants the PPG votes a proportion-
ally heavier weight. Such selectorate presents a violation of
the ‘every vote is equal’ principle and therefore should not
be treated as a pure type of selectorate. In terms of inclu-
siveness, weighted selectorates should be considered more
exclusive than the pure party members type.
Another example of the blending of selectorate types is
the method used by the British Conservative party since
1998. While the entire party membership has the final say in
the selection of its leader, they may only choose between
two candidates. If more than two candidates compete for the
position, the PPG, through a series of eliminative ballots,
produces a short list of two names, from which the members
may choose (Alderman, 1999; Quinn, 2005). The PPG,
therefore, still yields considerable power in the process.
Hence, a system of this kind should be considered less
inclusive than the pure party members’ type.
4. The dependent variable – indicators of
competitiveness
Measuring competitiveness, especially for leadership
selection, is a challenging task. While in candidate selec-
tion, where we have multiple winners, we can rely on
measures as incumbents winning indices (Rahat and
244 O. Kenig / Electoral Studies 28 (2008) 240–247
Parliamentary Selected Party
Party Group
Exclusiveness
Fig. 1. Inclusiveness and exclusiveness of party leaders’ selectorates.
Hazan, 2006: 377–378), here we are more constrained, for
we have a maximum of one incumbent for each contest.
Therefore, we have to think of additional measures as well.
Each of the four measurements suggested below reflects
a slightly different expression of competitiveness. Each has
its advantages and weaknesses.
4.1. Incumbents’ success rate
The first indicator for competitiveness is the incum-
bents’ rate of success. When the incumbent leader is
defeated by a challenger we may speak of a high level of
competitiveness. The literature is rich with studies that
claim that incumbency is an advantage in all kinds of
electoral systems and voting methods, but is more signifi-
cant in inclusive procedures (Engstrom and Engstrom,
2008; Boll and Rommele, 1994; Sorauf, 1988). Small
(exclusive) selectorates allow challengers a chance to have
a personal contact with each of the selectors and conduct
a face-to-face persuasion. On the other hand, in large
(inclusive) selectorates contenders cannot reach every
voter and must rely on the media and have an effective
campaign machine. Naturally, the incumbent has easier
access to media exposure and often benefits from financial
and organizational resources.
From this we may conclude that incumbents are more
successful in inclusive selectorates. The findings, presented
in Table 2, are not conclusive, but we may at least say that
incumbents do not seem to enjoy higher level of success in
inclusive selectorates. The successful challenges (when the
incumbent was defeated) are divided rather evenly
between the various selectorates. Additionally, six of the
ten challenges in inclusive selectorates were successful,
culminating in the ousting of the leader. It seems that
incumbents are most likely to defeat challengers when
contests occur in selected party agencies. This sort of
selectorate – with a medium-size level of inclusiveness – is
the most loyal to the incumbent.
Not only is the evidence inconclusive, this measurement
has two major weaknesses. First, it fails to reflect properly
the position of the incumbent leader as he faces intra-party
Table 2
Incumbents success in three levels of selectorate inclusiveness (N ¼ 36).
Exclusive Medium
(PPG) (Party agency
and electoral
college)
Unsuccessful challenge 6 11
(Incumbent wins)
Successful challenge 4 5
(Incumbent loses)
Total 10 16
Party
Agency Members Electorate
Inclusivenes
opposition. Not all the challenges mature into a formal
contest, and sometimes the incumbent chooses to retire
voluntarily and spare the taste of defeat. Second, it reduces
the population only to contests in which incumbents
competed. These cases constitute a minority of the pop-
ulation (36 out of 143). The following measurements avoid
this weakness and look upon broader population.
4.2. Contests vs. ‘Coronations’ (likelihood of contests)
Leadership change may take the form of a contest if
more than one aspirant steps forward. It also may take the
form of a nomination or ‘coronation’ if only a single
contender emerges. Coronations may, of course, occur in
any sort of selectorate. For instance, Gordon Brown (in
2007) and Angela Merkel (2000) were installed as leaders
of the British Labour Party and the German Christian-
Democrats respectively by selectorates of medium-size of
inclusiveness; Kim Beazley (2005) was selected to the
leadership of the Australian Labor Party without opposition
in the exclusive selectorate of the Parliamentary Party
Group. Eamon Gilmore (2007) was installed as the leader of
the Irish Labour Party by the inclusive selectorate of party
members.9 But, are coronations more common under
exclusive or inclusive selectorates?
‘Coronations’ constitute a minority of the case studies –
there are 45 coronations (31%) in general. These 45 cases
are divided unevenly: 15 occurred in exclusive selectorates,
28 in medium-size selectorates while only two in inclusive
selectorates. The scarcity of coronations in inclusive selec-
torates may be due to the attraction candidates find in
competing in such broad organs. Some candidates will
compete even if their chances are slim, because of the high
media exposure and the chance to establish themselves as
serious force within the party.
The most striking finding, however, is that the best
predictor for likelihood of a coronation is the country. Party
leaders in Germany, Austria or Spain (and in other parties in
continental Europe) are seldom selected following
a contest. Rather, the party elite announce its agreed-upon
candidate and rarely an alternative candidate steps
forward. The reluctance of an open and public contest is
rooted in the political culture and organizational values of
these parties. A contest may damage the party’s image and
cohesiveness and ‘ruins the good life’ (Strøm, 1993). In
Inclusive
(Party
other countries, such as Canada, Japan and the United
members) Kingdom, a contest is almost a certainty. Even when the
successor is obvious, many encourage at least one more
4
6 9
Naturally, if only one person steps forward, there is no need to
conduct a formal vote of approval. The party members did not actually
vote for Gilmore, because he was the sole candidate, but we may still
10
regard it as case of coronation occurred in inclusive selectorate.
 O. Kenig / Electoral Studies 28 (2008) 240–247 245

candidate to compete, in order to have a proper contest Table 3

rather than a coronation.10 Number of candidates in three levels of selectorate inclusiveness: ranges
and averages (N ¼ 143).
So here we find moderate evidence that refutes the
hypothesis. It seems that in inclusive selectorates, the Exclusive Medium Inclusive
likelihood of coronations is low and therefore competition (PPG) (party agency (party members
and electoral college) and electorate)
is higher. But, one may argue, the likelihood of coronations
is, in any case, a very limited indicator for competitiveness. N 41 73 29
Range 1–6 1–11 1–7
Its main weakness lies in the fact that it only differentiates
between single-candidate and multi-candidate cases. In Average 2.1 2.8 3.6
order to reflect competitiveness more successfully we need
to take into consideration the number of candidates.
(Laakso and Taagepera, 1979). Its strength lies in the fact
4.3. Number of candidates (N) that it takes into consideration not only the absolute
number of parties but also their relative size. By this it
This may serve as a decent indicator to the competi- supplies a better reflection of the nature of a party system.
tiveness of a contest. One may argue that a higher numbers The principle of the effective number of parties may also be
of candidates imply greater competitiveness. As demon- used on presidential contests (Cox, 1997: 216; Jones, 1999)
strated in Table 3, the average of number of candidates and on leadership selection contests. Instead of counting
increases as we move towards more inclusive selectorates. the number of candidates, it measures the relative support
This finding can be explained by the fact that primary each candidate received.
elections enjoy high media exposure, and therefore set The index is calculated as follows:
a high level of motivation for people to present candidacy.
1
Some of the candidates do not necessarily vie for a win, but ENC ¼ P 2
rather run in order to attract media attention for them- Vi
selves or for a specific issue. Vi is the share of votes of the candidate i.
Still, this finding stands against the hypothesis elabo- Table 4 demonstrates the operation of the index for
rated above. But taking the absolute number of candidates four leadership contests. In each of the cases presented,
as an indicator for competitiveness may be misleading, four candidates competed, but the distribution of votes
because it does not take into account the relative strength was quite different. The contest in the Conservative Party
of the candidates. In other words, the absolute number of was the tightest, as only 12 points separated the first and
candidates may testify to the ‘openness’ or ‘accessibility’ of last candidates. This tight contest is expressed by the
a contest, but not much on its level of competitiveness. For value (3.85), only slightly lower than the maximal value of
instance, no less than seven candidates competed for the (4). The contests for the leadership of the Spanish
leadership of l’Unione in Italy in 2005. Apparently a highly Socialists (PSOE) and the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) were
competed contest, but looking at the results we find that less tight, with two obvious front-runners. The 1983
the front-runner, Romano Prodi, secured about 75 per cent Labour leadership contest was the least tight. Neil Kin-
of all votes. This paints a very different picture of the nock gathered more than 70% support and two candidates
contest. received very few votes. This is reflected in the low value
Therefore, in order to evaluate competitiveness more of ENC.
accurately one must also take into consideration the Using the ENC as an indicator for competitiveness is an
distribution of votes between the candidates. In other important step, but we must acknowledge that it has one
words, we must also look at the results. critical drawback: it works to its best when the (absolute)
number of candidates is equal. But in this study, in oppose
4.4. Distribution of votes index (ENC/N) to the demonstration on Table 4, the number of candidates
in the population varies from 1 to 11. An ENC value of 2.7
All three measurements for competitiveness that were may reflect a high level of competitiveness if there are
presented so far lacked one basic feature – they ignored the three candidates, but a low level of competitiveness if
results, or the share of support each candidate received. seven candidates competed. We therefore need an index
This presents a substantive weakness, because the
measurement of competitiveness should take into consid-
eration the electoral performance of the candidates, or in Table 4
other words – their relative strength. The effective number Share of votes and the effective number of candidates in four contests.
of candidates may be useful for this cause. Conservatives Socialists Labour Labour
The effective number of candidates (ENC) is based on (UK) 2005 (Spain) 2000 (Netherlands) (UK) 1983
a similar index called the effective number of parties 2002
Candidate A 31.3 41.8 60.6 71.3
Candidate B 28.3 40.9 31.8 19.3
10
Former Tory leader Michael Howard (in 2003) and Labour leader Candidate C 21.2 10.5 4.7 6.2
Gordon Brown (in 2007) were both selected unopposed, but this is far Candidate D 19.2 6.8 2.9 3.2
from being the norm. This is the first time coronations occurred in the
ENC 3.85 2.79 2.12 1.82
two main UK parties for over 50 years.
246 O. Kenig / Electoral Studies 28 (2008) 240–247
1.00
0.80
ENC/N
0.60
0.40
0.20
R2 = 0.1965
0.00
PPG Selected Party Party Electorate
Agency Members
Selectorate's Inclusiveness
n = 96;
significant at p < 0.05.
Fig. 2. Selectorate’s inclusiveness and distribution of votes index. N ¼ 96;
Significant at p < 0.05.
that will reflect the distribution of votes and will neutralize
the absolute number of candidates.
The basic solution is to apply the ENC on a 0–1 scale. In
order to do that we will conduct the following trans-
formation: ENC/N (dividing of the ENC in the absolute
number of candidates). The resulting value reflects the
extent to which the number of candidates had shrunk.
A maximal value of (1) means an equal distribution of votes
and reflects a maximum level of competitiveness. The
lower the value, the unequal the distribution of votes is,
and the less competitive the contest is.
I examined the relationship between the inclusiveness
of the selectorate and the distribution of votes index
according to the following criteria:
1 Cases with a single candidate were omitted;
2 Results refer to first ballot only;
3 In cases of mixed selectorates (Electoral College and the
sort) I measured the results separately for each segment.
This resulted in 97 observations. As shown in Fig. 2,
there is a distinct correlation between the two variables.
The probability for lower values of distribution of votes
index is higher in inclusive selectorates. The most evident
finding is the difference of the ranges. We can find high
values (competitive contests) in all kind of selectorates,
but lower values (uncompetitive contests) are quite rare
in exclusive selectorates and more common in inclusive
selectorates. The lowest value in the PPG category is 0.51
and most observations have values higher than 0.8. The
lowest value in the selected party agency category is 0.44
and except for three observations, all others are higher
than 0.6. The lowest value in the party members’ category
is 0.3.
5. Conclusion
This study explored the relationship between partici-
pation and competitiveness in contests for party leader-
ship. I claimed that in oppose to expectations, the opening
of the selection process to broader populations did not
bring with it more competitive contests.
In order to validate or refute the claim, four different
measures for competitiveness were suggested. Admittedly,
measuring competitiveness is a challenging task. There is
not a single index that can reflect it in an optimal manner.
Each of the measurements may be critiqued on different
grounds. Some reduce the number of cases significantly.
Others ignore the results while others yet may be only used
for multi-candidate cases and ignore the results beyond the
first round of voting. Still, I believe that the last index
(distribution of votes) is the best measurement available for
assessing the level of competitiveness in single-winner
contests.
The four measurements produced different findings in
regard to the main question. The first showed that
incumbents are not secured in their position and may be
ousted by challengers regardless of the selectorate’s level of
inclusiveness. We also saw that ‘coronations’ are most
common in selected party agencies, a selectorate with
a medium level of inclusiveness, and are rather rare in
inclusive selectorates. The most striking findings, however,
is that while the correlation between the selectorate’s
inclusiveness and the absolute number of candidates is
positive, its correlation with the distribution of votes’ index
is negative. In other words, larger selectorates tend to
attract more candidates, but also tend to produce less
competitive contests.
The adoption of more inclusive measures for selecting
party leaders perhaps increased transparency (a direct and
clear translation of the voters’ preferences), participation
(every member is entitled to vote) and accessibility (more
candidates stand), but not competitiveness, at least not as
reflected by the tightness of contests.
In light of the findings, is it possible to conclude and say
that the democratization in the selection methods of party
leaders did not meet its expectations? The answer for this
question is rather normative. If indeed the expectation was
for the increasing of competitiveness, it has not material-
ized. But, it is possible that from the point of view of a party
the democratization had succeeded well. There are more
candidates and more attention of the media for the party’s
affairs. On the other hand, the likelihood of a distinct front-
runner diminishes the chances for a hard-fought race that
might risk the party’s cohesiveness and public image.
Furthermore, it may consolidate the position of the elected
leaders, for they passed a double legitimating process –
they were elected by a broad selectorate and with
a substantial majority.
Finally, although the findings are derived from a large
population, we need further cases of leadership selection in
inclusive selectorates for producing more solid conclusions.
Leadership selections in inclusive selectorates are
becoming more common in parties worldwide. Future
studies will be able to rely on larger populations for
assessing the political consequences of this democratiza-
tion process. In addition, the field is in need of scholars who
will investigate other factors which affect competitiveness.
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