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Ideology and Identity
The Changing Party Systems of India
Pradeep K. Chhibber and Rahul Verma
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Chhibber, Pradeep K., 1956– author. | Verma, Rahul, 1986– author.
Title: Ideology and identity : the changing party systems of India /
Pradeep K. Chhibber and Rahul Verma.
Description: New York, NY, United States of America : Oxford University Press, 2018. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018001733 (print) | LCCN 2018017062 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190623890 (updf) | ISBN 9780190623906 (epub) |
ISBN 9780190623883 (pbk.) | ISBN 9780190623876 (hardcover)
Subjects: LCSH: Political parties—India. | Party affiliation—India. |
Elections—India. | Political culture—India. | India—Politics and government—1947–
Classification: LCC JQ298.A1 (ebook) | LCC JQ298.A1 C484 2018 (print) | DDC 324.254—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018001733
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CONTENTS
List of Tables vii

List of Figures ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction: Ideology in India’s Electoral Politics 1
1. State Formation and Ideological Conflict in Multiethnic Countries 8
2. Ideology, Identity, and the 2014 National Elections 35
3. Intellectual Lineages of the Politics of Statism and Recognition 54
4. Who Opposes Reservations and Why? 85
5. The Myth of Vote Buying in India 103
6. Transformational Leaders and Ideological Shifts 131
7. Transmitting Ideology 151
8. Statism, Recognition, and Party System Change in India 169
9. Ideological Challenges and the Decline of the Congress Party 207

viContents
10. The BJP and an Ideological Consolidation of the Right? 234
Conclusion: Ideas, Leaders, and Party Systems 256
Appendix 267
Bibliography 287
Index 315
TABLES
4.1 Experimental Research on Prejudice and Discrimination from India 91

4.2 Neighborhood Discrimination and Support for Reservations 93
4.3 Experimental Design of the UP Survey Experiment 97
5.1 Do Citizens Receive Gifts at Election Time? 114
5.2 What Drives Voters’ Choice in India? 115
5.3 Do Freebies Influence Vote Choice? Experimental Evidence
from Chennai 117
5.4 Whom Do Voters Credit for Welfare Schemes? (in %) 118
5.5 Can Politicians Monitor the Vote? 120
6.1 Does Ideology Make Vote Mobilizers? 148
7.1 Ideological Transmission in India 157
7.2 Who Influences a Respondents’ Vote Choice? 159
7.3 Extent of Religious Practice in India (in %) 163
8.1 Party Loyalty and Switching among Candidates 181
8.2 Party Loyalty among Voters in 2009 182
8.3 Party Loyalty among Voters in 2014 183
9.1 The Congress’s Performance in National Elections since 1977 209
9.2 The Congress Decline post-2014 210
9.3 The Extent of Congress’s Decline 211
10.1 The BJP’s Performance in the Hindi Heartland 247
10.2 Consolidation of Social Forces in Favor of the BJP in
2014 247
10.3 The Rise of BJP since the 2014 Elections 248
A1 Datasets Used in the Book 267
B1 Questions from Surveys to Measure Ideological Stability 269
B2 Distribution of the Achieved Sample of NES 2014 Surveys 277
B3 Profile of the Achieved Sample of NES 2014 Surveys 279
C1a Prompts in Leadership Experiment 280
viiiTables
C1b Summary Profile of Leadership Experiment 280

C2a Sample Size of Neighborhood Experiment 281
C2b Sample Profile of Neighborhood Experiment 281
C3a Sample Size of Symbolic versus Policy Experiment 281
C3b Sample Profile of Symbolic versus Policy Experiment 282
C4a Prompts and Sample Size of UP Experiment 282
C4b Sample Profile of UP Experiment 283
C4c Prompts of UP Experiment in Detail 283
C4d UP Experiment -Difference of Means Test 284
D1 Party Systems by State 285
FIGURES
2.1 Ideological Polarization among Social Groups in 2014 38

2.2 Ideological Polarization among Party Members and Voters in 2014 39
2.3 The BJP in 2014: An Ideological Consolidation of the Right? 43
2.4 The Making of Anti-Congress Sentiments (in %) 45
2.5 Preference for Narendra Modi as India’s Next Prime Minister 46
2.6 Economic Liberalizers (Antistatist) and Support for Modi in 2014 48
2.7 Ideological Positions and Vote for the BJP in 2014 50
2.8 Ideological Polarization and Participation in Political Activities 51
4.1 Support for Reservation: Symbolic Prejudice or Policy Conflict? 95
4.2 Support for Dalit Reservations (in %) 98
4.3 Support for Muslim Reservations (in %) 98
4.4 Support for OBC Reservations (in %) 99
5.1 Public Sector Employment in India 1961–2012 112
5.2 Voters Receiving Benefits in 2014 and 2009 113
5.3 Beneficiary Status and Vote for the Congress—2014 and 2009 117
5.4 Benefits and Vote Share: Congress and Non-Congress-Ruled States 119
5.5 Mixed Evidence of Vote Buying 126
5.6 Mixed Evidence on Turnout Buying 128
5.7 The Relation between Voters and Parties: Ideology or Patronage? 129
6.1 Influence of Religious Leaders on Vote Choice 137
6.2 Follow the Leader: Leadership as Cue for Party and Ideology 141
6.3 Leadership, Ideology and Vote for BJP in 2014 143
6.4 The Modi Effect on Vote Mobilizers and Turnout in 2014 145
6.5 Leadership, Ideology, and Voter Mobilization 146
6.6 Thin Party Penetration in India 149
7.1 Ideological Polarization and Increased Canvassing during Elections 158
7.2 Media Exposure in India 160
7.3 The Liberal Elite and the Politics of Statism 166
xFigures
7.4 Channels of Ideological Transmission 167

8.1 Ideological Positions of Party Activists in 1971 and 1993 173
8.2 The Ideological Divide in 1967 174
8.4 Distribution of Voters on the Two Ideological Scales in 2004
and 2009 177
8.5 The Ideological Divide in 2004 and 2009 178
8.7 Ideological Polarization and Decline in the Number
of Late Deciders 183
8.8 Party System Change in India: A Stylized Representation 186
8.9 Shrinking of Congress’s Umbrella Coalition 199
8.10 Who Opposes the Distribution of Freebies? 203
8.11 Increasing Corruption and its Impact on the Legitimacy of Statism 204
9.1 The Great Decline—Congress’s Vote Share since 1952 209
9.2 Number of Congress MLAs and BJP MLAs 1980–2017 211
9.3 Difference between Hindu Nationalists and Hindu Traditionalists 215
9.4 Support of Hindu Traditionalists for the Congress in 2004 216
9.5 Types of Party Competition and the Weakening of Congress 219
9.6 Ideological Divide in Tamil Nadu in 2016 225
9.7 Types of Party Competition and Congress’s Shrinking Social Base 231
9.8 Types of Party Competition and Decline in Identification with
Congress 232
10.1 The BJP’s Worry: Delinking of Ideological Coalitions 251
10.2 Liberal Attitude among Indian Youth on Social Norms 252
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Indian party politics is ideological. Deep divisions on the appropriate role of the
state have influenced the changes in the Indian party system since independence.
The different ideas on whether the state should intervene in social norms and
whether it should single out disadvantaged groups for special treatment have
long historic lineages. These have had a lasting influence on the transitions in
the Indian party system from the one-party-dominant system to the more frag-
mented system, to the rise of the right in 2014.
We have accumulated multiple debts while writing this book. This is a data-
intensive book, and our largest debt is to Lokniti—the finest collection of dedi-
cated social scientists working in India and elsewhere without whom the data
that forms the basis of this book would never have been collected. We specifically
acknowledge Sanjay Kumar for generously sharing the Lokniti-CSDS datasets
and Himanhsu Bhattacharya for entertaining data requests. The experimental
data that informs key elements of this book was provided to us by Dhananjai
Joshi of Cicero Associates. Not only did he incorporate experimental questions
in his surveys but also offered sage intellectual advice on appropriate question
wording for understanding how ideology informs electoral politics in India.
The second debt is to our colleagues at Berkeley and elsewhere, many of
whom had to suffer through the various incarnations of the argument. Anustubh
Agnihotri, Astitva Chopra, and Pranav Gupta went well beyond the call of duty.
They read the full manuscript and provided detailed comments that have defi-
nitely made this book better. Francesca Jensenius and Susan Ostermann heard
various presentations about the book and helped sharpen the claims we were
making. Susan coauthored a paper with us on conservative political theory in
India, parts of which are central to the claims we make in this book. Harsh Shah
has listened patiently about this book since the day we started thinking about it
and offered quiet but excellent advice.
xiiAcknowledgments
Our third debt is to Pratap Bhanu Mehta and Hilal Ahmed for pointing out
intellectual traditions that we were not aware of. Their suggestions have grounded
our arguments more deeply in Indian intellectual history. The fourth debt is to
many of our friends and colleagues who have encouraged us or provided criti-
cal feedback at particular points: Amit Ahuja, Leo Arriola, Ankita Barthwal,
Pranab Bardhan, Matt Baxter, Kanchan Chandra, Abhishek Choudhary,
Anirvan Choudhary, Poulomi Chakrabarti, Aaditya Dar, Christophe Jaffrelot,
Nirvikar Jassal, K. K. Kailash, Ken Kollman, Tanu Kumar, Tarun Kumar, Adnan
Naseemulah, Irfan Nooruddin, Suhas Palshikar, Rajkamal Singh, Shakti Sinha,
K. C. Suri, Pavithra Suryanarayan, Louise Tillin, Anshuman Tiwari, Ashutosh
Varshney, Gilles Verniers, and Yogendra Yadav.
As we were completing the book, Pranav Gupta’s help with bibliography was
critical. The graphs in this book are cleaner thanks to Aaditya Dar. We owe special
gratitude to him. Shakti Sinha, Director of the Nehru Memorial Museum and
Library (NMML), Delhi, helped us in locating the cover image from the archives.
The argument and data in the book were sharpened by the many presenta-
tions we made across the world and invitations from colleagues at various think
tanks and universities provided good venues for us to test our arguments. We
have presented this work at the Center for the Study of Developing Societies
(Sanjay Kumar), Jain University (Sandeep Shastri), Jindal Global University
(Satya Prateek), the London School of Economics (Mukulika Banerjee), Oxford
University (Maya Tudor), the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (Ashwani Kumar),
and the University of California at Santa Barbara (Amit Ahuja). The comments
and feedback during these presentations were very helpful. Finally, we thank the
opinion page editors at The Hindu and The Indian Express for publishing op-eds
that gave us the chance to test our initial ideas in print.
The work has benefited enormously from the editorial work by Xavier Callahan
and Karen Fien. The comments of reviewers at Oxford University Press have defi-
nitely made this book better. The encouragement and stewardship of our editor,
David McBride, were most helpful.
Kaja, Anuka, and Neela provided Pradeep with daily joie de vivre while this
book was being written. Meenakshi and Meenu’s love and support carried Rahul
through this period. This is for all of them—with love.
Introduction
Ideology in India’s Electoral Politics
India’s first cabinet, seen in the cover photo of this book, seems ideologically
arrayed. Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister is flanked at one end by Dr. Bhimrao
Ambedkar, the architect of India’s constitution and a fervent advocate for the state
taking a leading role in addressing social inequities. Ambedkar argued in favor of
a modified form of state socialism in industry, and warned against the dangers of
Hindu majoritarianism and Muslim communalism. Seated at the opposite end is
Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, who went on to form the Bharatiya Jana Sangh—
the precursor of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—a right-wing nationalist party
that advocated for Hindu interests and a less interventionist state. Seated between
Dr. Ambedkar and Nehru are Rafi Ahmed Kidwai (an Islamic socialist), Sardar
Baldev Singh (representing the Sikhs), and Maulana Kalam Azad (a Muslim
leader who advocated secularism and socialism). The cabinet members seated
between Nehru and Mukherjee are Dr. Rajendra Prasad (India’s first President
and a Hindu traditionalist), Sardar Patel (an ardent nationalist), Dr. John Mathai
(who resigned from the cabinet because of the power delegated by Nehru to
an unelected planning commission), Jagjivan Ram (a dalit leader from Bihar),
and Rajkumari Amrit Kaur (a consistent voice for classic liberal ideas who did
2 I deology and I dentity
not want special recognition for any community in the Constituent Assembly
debates).
Contemporary Indian party politics is, however, commonly viewed as chaotic,
centered around leaders, corrupt, volatile, and nonideological in nature. What
accounts for this perception, and for the corollary view that elections in India are
rarely if ever genuine contests of ideas, policies, and visions? For one thing, the
institutions of the state have become subjugated to individual interests, as Indian
politicians have made and unmade coalitions, seemingly without regard to the
partners with whom they have aligned. For another, the notion that strong, stable
commitments to sets of ideas are absent from Indian party politics has been rein-
forced by the fragmentation of India’s party system over the past two decades, and
by the subsequent decline of the once dominant Indian National Congress (INC,
also known as the Congress Party and often simply called the Congress). And
yet this perception is also based in no small part on the standard paradigm for
what constitutes ideological debate, and on the somewhat uncritical application
of that paradigm to Indian party politics. That paradigm, memorably established
in western Europe over half a century ago, identifies the dimensions of ideologi-
cal space as those associated with party politics in western Europe, where the
rise of nation-states coincided with conflict between labor and capital, between
the center and the periphery, between cities and rural areas, and between church
and state.
In this book, we claim that what constitutes the standard paradigm of state for-
mation is not entirely applicable to many multiethnic countries in the twentieth
century, a period when the process of state formation has been setting up very
different axes of conflict. In much more diverse countries, the most important
debates center on the extent to which the state should dominate society, regulate
social norms, and redistribute private property (in what we call the politics of stat-
ism) as well as on whether and how the state should accommodate the needs of
various marginalized groups and protect minority rights from assertive majori-
tarian tendencies (in what we call the politics of recognition). These two issues—
the state’s role in transforming social traditions, and its role as accommodator of
various social groups—we argue, constitute the dimensions of ideological space
as it exists in Indian party politics today.
In delineating the parameters of this ideological space, we challenge the domi-
nant view that party politics and elections in India are far removed from ideas.
Indeed, we see our identification of this ideological space as the book’s major
theoretical contribution, as we offer a new way to examine ideological conflict
in multiethnic societies. This innovation also affords insights into the changing
party systems of India, the rise of regional parties, the precipitous decline of the
Congress, and the success of the right-wing BJP. In addition, our perspective illu-
minates the question of why leadership is so important in Indian politics. Using
Ideology in India’s Electoral Politics 3
survey data from the Indian National Election Studies (NES) and from smaller
but more focused surveys in addition to historical data from the Constituent
Assembly debates, we show that Indian electoral politics, as represented by politi-
cal parties, their members, and their voters, taking distinct positions on the two
themes—statism and recognition—that we identify as constituting the ideologi-
cal space of party politics in India.
OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

In c hapter 1, we develop our argument that ideological divisions exist in India
around whether the state should regulate social norms and redistribute prop-
erty, and around whether and how the state should accommodate marginalized
groups and protect them from the majoritarian impulse among sections of the
Indian population. We argue that these divisions have their roots in the process of
state formation that occurred in India during the years around Independence. We
also claim that state formation in India took place in very different circumstances
from those that governed state formation in western Europe in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. We show that debates around class conflict, along
with debates around divisions between church and state, cities and rural areas,
and the center and the periphery, were less central to the formation of the Indian
state than were the state’s role in development (especially with respect to chang-
ing social norms) and its efforts to accommodate marginalized groups. Engaging
with the literature on party systems as well as with the literature on state for-
mation, we develop the theoretical and historical basis for what we have already
described as the ideological conflict in Indian party politics on the politics of
statism and the politics of recognition. In addition, we claim that an ideologi-
cal divide should not merely be the province of a political elite and should also
be stable over time, which is to say that the ideological divide must be found in
partisan differences across decades and that there must be a mechanism by which
the ideas associated with this divide are transmitted from the elite to the voters.
In chapter 2, we present empirical evidence, drawn from the 2014 NES, show-
ing a clear ideological divide in India regarding the role of the state; that is, politi-
cal parties and their supporters can be distinguished by the positions they take
on the politics of statism and the politics of recognition, and the major social
groups in India also display a deep ideological cleavage along these two dimen-
sions. Nevertheless, in the 2014 national elections, the BJP registered a historic
victory by creating an unprecedented coalition of social groups. In other words,
the BJP, in addition to energizing its traditional base of voters (who oppose
the politics of recognition), built its 2014 winning coalition by also mobilizing
voters who wanted to limit the politics of statism, as we show on the basis of a
series of public opinion polls. How did the BJP manage to do that? The BJP was
able to assemble this coalition at least in part because the Congress-led United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) not only lacked a distinct ideological vision in the
years leading up to 2014 but also relied too much on the politics of patronage
as an electoral strategy. Another finding, consistent with our theoretical expec-
tations, is that voters who are ideologically engaged are more likely to partici-
pate in political activity around election time and are able to distinguish among
parties and coalitions when it comes to issues of governance and governmental
performance in general. Indian society and Indian voters have distinct ideas on
the role of the state regarding social issues, and this divide has direct and measur-
able consequences for electoral politics in India and for the assessment of the
government’s performance. Accordingly, we conclude that ideology is central to
the Indian party system.
In chapter 3, we make extensive use of political theory in the Indian subconti-
nent, and we refer to Constituent Assembly debates showing that the ideological
dimensions we have identified were reflected in the concerns of those who framed
the constitution of the Indian Republic. Using texts such as the Arthashastra and
many other sources, we show that the intellectual lineage of the debates around
the politics of statism is long and precedes party politics in India. We also show
that in Indian political thinking the dominant position has been for a limited state,
one that does not intervene in social norms and redistribute wealth (although,
this position was challenged by some of the leaders of the Indian independence
movement and the framers of the Indian constitution, most notably Ambedkar
and Jawaharlal Nehru). Further we also show that the politics of recognition, too,
has roots in the debates that took place among the founding fathers of modern
India (and Pakistan). There was a major divide in pre-Independence India, and
the debates in the Constituent Assembly were over how different groups, espe-
cially historically marginalized groups like Dalits (the Scheduled Castes), the
Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Muslims, were to be incorporated into the Indian
state as full citizens. The consensus was that all citizens should be treated equally,
but there was much disagreement over how this goal was to be reached. The
Indian constitution settled on quotas for the SCs and the STs as the best way to
redress historic social inequities, and it expressly rejected quotas on the basis of
religion. Finally, we link the debate on quotas to majoritarian nationalism—that
is, the demand from elements of the Hindu majority that in a democracy the will
of “the majority” (meaning, in this case, Hindus) should prevail. We show that
opposition to quotas came from two groups of people: opponents who believed
in liberal values, and who saw the nation-state as obliged to treat everyone simi-
larly and not make special provisions for any group, and opponents who stressed
Hindu nationalism as central to the Indian state.
In chapter 4, we discuss whether opposition to the politics of recognition rep-
resents an actual ideological dimension of Indian politics or is instead largely a
reflection of upper-caste Hindus’ prejudices against Muslims, Dalits, and India’s

tribal population. Using election surveys conducted in Delhi and a large survey
experiment conducted in Uttar Pradesh, we show that prejudice does play a
role in the attitudes of the upper castes toward reservations (that is, guaranteed
access to education, employment, and legislative representation for historically
marginalized groups) but that the upper castes also have specifically ideologi-
cal objections to the politics of recognition. Moreover, although we found that
upper-caste attitudes toward reservations may be attributable to the fact that res-
ervations can influence the life chances of upper-caste individuals, we also found
that support for reservations dropped among the members of other castes, too,
when they were prompted to consider that the life chances of others might be
hurt by reservations for SCs, Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and Muslims.
When it comes to contemporary Indian politics, a common refrain is that
India is a patronage-based democracy where voters, middlemen, and politicians
conduct a lively exchange of votes for jobs, cash, or favors. This is the clientelism
thesis, and it has acquired such iconic status among political scientists that many
of them all but ignore the role of ideas in India’s competitive electoral politics. By
contrast, we show in chapter 5 that the claim of widespread clientelistic behavior
in Indian politics has very little empirical basis, and we conclude the chapter by
arguing that ideology, not patronage, is what influences Indian voters’ choices in
elections.
An extension of patronage and clientelism thesis argument has been to focus
on the role of transactional leaders, those who win support by helping citizens
to navigate the Indian state or by promising access to private or club goods. In
chapter 6, we show that although such transactional leaders may continue to
retain their importance as a bridge between citizens and the state, major shifts
in Indian party politics have been largely driven by leaders who have succeded
in projecting themselves as transformational. Leaders such as Nehru, Indira
Gandhi, Jayalalitha, Mayawati, Lalu Prasad Yadav, Narendra Modi, and many
others who have offered clear and distinct ideological visions with respect to
the politics of statism and the politics of recognition have had great influence on
Indian politics. The presence of such leaders has acted as a heuristic device for
voters, a short cut to understand the ideological position of the party they rep-
resent. Using a survey experiment from Delhi, we show how ideology influences
Indian citizens’ perceptions of their leaders, who motivate the vote mobilizers to
work for their respective parties and in turn help increase turnout and a party’s
vote share.
The assertion that India’s political and intellectual elites have had distinct ideo-
logical visions is not enough to form the basis of a claim that the country’s party
politics has been shaped primarily by ideas. Therefore, in c hapter 7, we discuss
how the ideas carried by these elites are transmitted to voters. In absence of a
well-established theory on how ideological messages are transmitted to Indian

citizens, we test for multiple pathways that provide heuristic cues to ordinary
voters. Political scientists—despite the avid religiosity that can be seen all over
India—have generally shied away from understanding how citizens’ engagement
in religion affects the dissemination of political ideas. We explore the role of par-
ticipation in religious activities, both Hindu and Muslim, in creating ideological
divisions within the Indian population, and we show that voters who are more
active in religious associations have well-articulated views concerning the role of
the state. Similarly, there has been little empirical work on the role of media as an
influence on the ideas that underpin Indian politics. In this chapter we show that
the impact of media, along with exposure to the political elite and participation
in associational activities (both civic and ethnic associations), has been crucial to
the dissemination of ideological messages to voters.
In chapter 8, we use NES data going back to 1967, in addition to two surveys
of political elites conducted in 1971 and the 1993, to show that active supporters
of the main political parties—the BJP, the Congress, the leftist parties, and the
regional parties—hold clearly distinct ideas on intercaste and interreligious mar-
riage, inheritance rights, and private property, among many other dimensions
of statism. We also show that the political right has always opposed quotas and
displayed a majoritarian impulse, whereas the left and the Congress have favored
quotas. In addition, we show that the ideological dimensions identified in this
book are independent of each other (that is, the serial correlation among them
is very low). Having shown that these ideological divisions are stable, we detail
changes in India that we attribute to the dilemmas faced by the Congress, which
has sought the center on the politics of statism and the politics of recognition. In
the 1960s, the party faced its first serious electoral challenges and responded by
seeking a more active role for the state under Indira Gandhi, alienating a segment
of party leaders who were not in favor of such a move and they left the party.
In the 1980s, the party prevaricated in the face of a challenge from those who
wanted greater recognition for certain marginalized groups, thus inviting opposi-
tion from regional parties that favored greater recognition for some castes. By the
early 1990s, the Congress had lost the support of two groups of people—those
who wanted a less active role for the state, and those who sought greater recogni-
tion for some groups (especially the backward castes)—mostly to regional par-
ties and some to the BJP. We show that, together, these developments brought
the rise of regional parties in many parts of the country, the electoral decline of
the Congress, and India’s transition from a one-party-dominant system to a sys-
tem with an electorally powerful right-wing party.
The weakness of patronage as a political strategy, coupled with the Congress’s
failure to offer a distinct ideological vision, led the party to end up with less
than 20 percent of the vote in the 2014 elections and only forty-four seats in
Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. It was the party’s worst electoral
performance ever. The BJP won the 2014 national elections by a wide margin,
but regional parties nevertheless retained their position as the second most
powerful electoral force. As we show in c hapter 9, the regional parties that
have emerged in a majority of Indian states often have ideological underpin-
nings not very different from those of the Congress; indeed, regional parties
now populate the centrist space once occupied by the Congress. Further, in
states where there are two regional parties with activists who share the ideo-
logical leanings of the Congress, the latter has virtually no presence, and the
only states where the Congress retains a significant electoral presence are
those in which its main opponent is the ideologically distinct BJP. Why has
the Congress declined, and why have regional parties come to occupy such
an important position in the Indian political landscape? We approach that
question by rereading the history of the Congress in the post-Independence
era. In the process, we present an empirical challenge to the idea that repre-
sentational blockage and organizational reversals (of the Congress) suffice to
account for the Congress Party’s decline and for the rise of regional parties.
In c hapter 10, we discuss how the right-w ing BJP became the principal car-
rier of conservatism in India. We begin with a historical overview of the rise
of Hindu majoritarianism as an idea, and we show how the BJP succeeded in
accommodating conservative elements not only from the Congress but also
from the right-w ing parties such as the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram Rajya
Parishad, and the Swatantra Party, among many smaller outfits (including, for
example, Praja Parishad in Jammu and Kashmir and Ganatantra Parishad in
Orissa). We also discuss the rise of the second dominant-party system, this
one led by the BJP, and how rapid changes in class composition of Indian
society might produce contradictions within the ideological coalitions that
brought the ascent of the BJP.
In the final chapter, we summarize the book’s argument and make the case
that a distinct ideological vision is important to any political party’s survival.
Elections may be won or lost on the basis of short-term factors, but a party
that hopes to survive must have a distinct ideology—and in India, that means
a distinct and defining vision regarding the politics of statism and the politics
of recognition.
1
State Formation and Ideological Conflict

in Multiethnic Countries
Contemporary political images of India depict a vibrant, cacophonous electoral

democracy in which multiple groups based on caste, language, tribe, and socio-
economic class make demands on the Indian state. Indian politicians, often the
instigators of such demands, are characterized as self-seeking, corrupt, or, at best,
focused on the narrow interests of their particular ethnic groups. In addition,
over the past two decades the Indian party system has fragmented to the point
where the Congress Party, which led India’s single-party-dominant system for
half a century, has been replaced by dozens of regional parties in addition to the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the right-wing Hindu party that now governs India.
Accompanying these images of diversity and fragmentation are dizzying images
of poverty and deep income inequality, with more people in India living on less
than $1 a day than anywhere else in the world but still turning out to vote, even
though they receive no real benefits from the state.1
The story told by these images has another side, of course—namely, that elec-
toral democracy has left a deep imprint on Indian politics. More specifically, demo-
cratic politics has made an appreciable dent in the caste system, the longest-lasting
1. Yadav (2000), Varshney (2000), Banerjee (2014), and Ahuja and Chhibber (2012) discuss why
the poor in India turn out to vote in large numbers. For cross-country evidence regarding on pov-
erty and the vote, see Kasara and Suryanarayan (2014).
State Formation and Ideological Conflict 9
regime of social discrimination the world has ever known.2 Electoral democracy
and the institutions of federalism have not been able to thwart the emergence
of serious challenges to the sovereign authority of the Indian state in many of
the country’s border regions, but these mechanisms have successfully addressed
issues related to India’s deep linguistic diversity.3 Moreover, Indian elections are
fiercely competitive, with turnout figures among the highest in the world, and
rates of incumbency among the lowest.4
Both sides of this story, fragmentation on the one side and democratic
expansion on the other, tend to be viewed from the perspective of a common-
place idea that is no less erroneous for being so pervasive—the notion, wide-
spread within India as well as outside the country, that Indian politics, for all its
competitive diversity, is not ideological in nature. It is true that coalitions and
political parties in India, whether of the center, the right, or the left, do tend
to pursue broadly similar economic strategies.5 And because different politi-
cal parties can be observed not to take distinct policy positions, many schol-
ars have concluded that party politics in India is nonideological (Suri 2013;
2. On the continued persistence of social discrimination against Dalits, see Shah (2001, 2006),
Deshpande (2011), and Thorat and Newman (2010). Jaffrelot (2003), Pai (2002), Chandra
(2004), and Jaffrelot and Kumar (2012) discuss the rise of the lower castes in Indian politics.
Jensenius (2017) and Chauchard (2017) show how reservations have changed attitudes toward
Dalits. Also see the discussion on this aspect in chapter 4.
3. According to the 2001 Indian census, India has 122 major languages (that is, languages spoken
by more than 10,000 people) as well as 1,599 other languages, with 30 languages spoken by more
than 1 million native speakers and 8 spoken by more than 50 million native speakers. Stepan et al.
(2011) write about this in some detail. See also Dasgupta (1970) and Sarangi (2010) on language
and politics in India, Lacina (2017) and Barauah (1999, 2005) on India’s challenge with the north-
eastern states, and Ganguly (1999) and Ahuja and Varshney (2005) on the situation in Jammu and
Kashmir.
4. In the 2014 elections to Lok Sabha, 6 national parties, 39 state parties, and 421 registered and
unrecognized parties contested along with 3,234 independent candidates. There are currently 35
political parties represented in Lok Sabha, which also has 3 independent members. Only 13 parties
have more than 5 members in the lower house. The average victory margin in Lok Sabha elec-
tions has been smaller than 7 percentage points. The index of volatility (that is, the net change in a
party’s vote share from one election to the next) is much higher in India than in most of the western
European countries for which we have consistent long-term data. For example, the average electoral
volatility score in India is 26 percent, whereas in western Europe it is around 14 percent. Moreover,
reelection rates are low in India, with estimates ranging from about 25 percent to just under 50 per-
cent (incumbents are less likely to be reelected to the state assemblies than to Parliament).
5. For a dissenting view, see Huber and Inglehart (1995). According to their assessment of expert
opinion on India, partisan politics is structured by class and economic conflict.
deSouza and Sridharan 2006; Kothari 1964; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987;
Yadav and Palshikar 2003).6
Notwithstanding the consensus that Indian political parties are nonideo-
logical, in this book we show that electoral politics in India is in fact deeply
ideological. Voters and parties can be clearly differentiated on the ideological
worldview of the state’s proper role in society, and this question in turn gives
rise to two debates, one over whether the state should be ontologically prior to
society (that is, whether the state can remake social norms and practices and
regulate private property), and the other over whether the Indian state should
or should not make special provisions for marginalized social groups (with a
related debate over the extent to which the state should hew to a majoritarian
impulse).
Our characterization of Indian politics as deeply ideological raises a series of
questions that are of general interest to political scientists. These questions come
in three forms.
First, what defines ideological conflict in contemporary multiethnic states?
Can we use ideas of class conflict, rural–urban divisions, and church–state ten-
sions to define ideological conflict in countries outside western Europe (and
perhaps outside North America)? How do we distinguish issue-based politics,
which can vary from election to election, from deeply held beliefs about the
proper role of the state?
Second, if there is actually an axis of ideological conflict in multiethnic coun-
tries, does it influence party politics and shape the party system? More spe-
cifically with respect to India, has the country’s transformation from a catchall
single-dominant-party system to a multiparty system been associated with ideo-
logical conflict?
Third, how can the argument for ideological division be reconciled with the
fact that political leaders in these countries play an outsize role during elections,
and often there is hardly any distinction between leaders and the parties they
6. In our view, the conventional distinction regarding economic ideology—those who favor free
markets on the right, and those who look for greater state intervention on the left—has limited
resonance in India. Recent survey data suggests that voters and party elites in India do take differ-
ent and stable positions on economic issues. These differences have not been very pronounced for
two reasons. First, a large number of Indian voters depend on the state for their well-being. Hence,
those who favor unfettered free markets are too few to constitute a significant catchment for politi-
cal parties. Second, the ideological distance between the economic “right” and “left” is still very
small. With the burgeoning of the middle class in India over the last two decades or so, economic
ideology may come to play a larger role in the coming years. Survey data reveals hints of such a
development, a topic we discuss in more detail in chapter 10, where we examine the rise of the
BJP. Also see Chhibber and Verma, “Ideology and India’s Party Politics,” in Shastri and Deshpande
(forthcoming).
represent. What role, then, does ideology play in giving leaders such a central role
in many postcolonial multiethnic states?
This book places these questions in the political context of India.7 The modern
Indian state, created in the aftermath of independence from British colonialism,
was expected to transform society, remake the economy, and create a nation-state
of citizens who shared the same rights (Kaviraj 2000, 2010; Khilnani 1997). At
the same time, the transformational role adopted by the state created deep divi-
sions regarding the state’s appropriate role, a role that had been clearly demar-
cated in India by a long intellectual tradition, oral and written, to the effect that
the state was not expected to remake society or rework social norms and prac-
tices. As a result, those who held this traditional view challenged the expansive
role adopted by the postcolonial Indian state. However, because most citizens
in poorer countries benefit when the state takes the lead in economic develop-
ment (and provides public and club goods for citizens), there was much less dis-
agreement over the question of the state’s intervention in the economy. But there
was no similar consensus on whether the Indian state should redistribute private
property, and the state’s efforts to make its multiethnic citizens equal faced oppo-
sition, especially when the state used its power to redress historic inequalities
through reservations (quotas) for particular groups. The opposition came from
those who believed the state should treat everyone equally but also from others,
who stood to lose political power if reservations were imposed.
In this chapter, we first examine in detail the question of why Indian party
politics is widely perceived as nonideological in nature, and we discuss at some
length the role of the Indian state in creating the conditions for the ideological
conflict that underpins contemporary Indian politics. We then move on to a
brief discussion of what we mean by political ideology and its relationship to
the party system, and we also explain why ideological categories first developed
in western Europe have not structured party conflicts in many multiethnic soci-
eties, including India. Finally, we provide evidence for our assertion that the
issues structuring the ideological dimensions of party conflict in India center
on what we have called the politics of statism and the politics of recognition.8 We
conclude with a recapitulation of the theory that informs the remainder of
the book.
7. While the focus of this book is the ideological basis of Indian politics, our argument can also
apply to other, similarly situated states, such as Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Malaysia.
8. The debate on these two dimensions has served as the basis of an ideological division because
their constituent ideas and attitudes are “bound together by some form of constraint or functional
interdependence” (Converse 1964). The fact that these ideas and attitudes have been stable, coher-
ent, and consistent (Converse 2000; Feldman 1988, 2003; Kinder 1998) also speaks to their ideo-
logical nature.
WHY DOES INDIAN POLITICS SEEM NONIDEOLOGICAL?

Ideological divisions have been shown to structure party systems and party pol-
itics in many parts of the world (Hanson 2010; Bartels 2013a). But there has
long been a general consensus that political parties in India are not grounded
in ideology (Suri 2013; deSouza and Sridharan 2006; Kothari 1964; Rudolph
and Rudolph 1987; Yadav and Palshikar 2003). For example, Palmer (1967,
290) explaining India’s fourth general election, wrote:
In the present context the terms “left” and “right” are misleading and almost
meaningless. There can be no hesitation in classifying the Swatantra as
rightist and the two Communist parties as leftist (although one of these
is called “right”); but how would one classify the Jana Sangh (rightist on
certain issues of religious, social, and foreign policy, but more leftist on eco-
nomic matters), [the] DMK [Dravida Munnetra Khazagam], [the] Muslim
League, or for that matter even the Congress itself? For electoral purposes,
at least, the left-right divide can be and has been bridged.
This apparent lack of ideological grounding appears to obtain especially with

respect to what concerns class politics and economic policy (that is, the standard
narrative regarding the left-right distinction on economic policies). No matter
what coalition or party comes to power—the BJP, the Congress, or the Third
Front (a coalition of various state level parties)—the policy and strategies are
broadly the same (Suri 2004, 2009; Kumar 2008; Nooruddin 2011).9 Yadav and
Palshikar (2003), in a review of the party system in India, argue that the multi-
plicity of political parties has created more options for Indian electorates over
the last few decades, but that the range of available choices has remained lim-
ited because of overlapping consensus among political parties on various issues,
and that parties in India increasingly show signs of convergence, or a tendency
to become like one another. Similarly, Palshikar (2003), describing the rise of
regional parties, notes that “whether a party will be only anti-Congress or also
anti-BJP [will] depend upon the state-level configuration of forces rather than on
national-level exigencies or ideological positions” (330). To be fair to Yadav and
Palshikar (2003, 15), they make a much more nuanced claim, and we somewhat
agree with the position they take:
9. An oft-mentioned exception to this rule is the Indian left (consisting primarily of two communist
parties), whose position on the economy differs from the more centrist or center-right policies
adopted by the Congress Party and the BJP (Kohli 1987; Rodrigues 2006). Another exception is
the BJP, whose electoral success is often tied to the rise of Hindu nationalism, or to a more right-
leaning social vision of Indian society that hews closely to the interests of the “Hindus” ( Jaffrelot
1996; Malik and Singh 1995).
The problem is not, contra what many political analysts in India assert, that
ideology plays no role in Indian politics. It does, except that ideological
differences are not to be found in conventional language of “high” ideol-
ogy; understanding ideological differences require[s]‌that we reconstruct
these from day-to-day “operative” ideological positions. A focus on formal
ideologies can be utterly deceptive in indicating the substance of politics.
A much deeper difficulty arises because these ideological differences can-
not be arranged very meaningfully along a single dimension like the left-
right axis. Post[- I]ndependence India, particularly the post- Congress
polity, is characterized by simultaneous operation of multiple and compet-
ing ideological axes.
Similarly, Suri (2013), after presenting a masterful survey of the study of

Indian political parties, notes, “the boundaries between parties in terms of broad
economic policies are becoming blurred” (233). He does offer a dissenting view
with respect to questions of social identity, however, and we concur with his
statement that ideology does have a major presence in Indian politics, if appeals
based in caste, ethnic, religious, and regional concerns are seen as ideological
(235). But he concludes, “we should not overemphasize the role of ideology in
India’s party politics” (239)
And so, because parties do not take distinct positions on matters of macro-
economic policy, the general conclusion is that party politics in India is nonideo-
logical in nature.10 But that view is mistaken, as we show in this book. The classic
conceptualizations of ideological divisions in the electoral space come from the
study of western European party politics, where the links between ideology and
party politics were first expressed, and where the rise of nation-states coincided
with the conflict between labor and capital, between the center and the periph-
ery, between church and state, and between cities and rural areas.11 In western
Europe, social divisions became bound to the party system because of the par-
ticular role of the state in the national and industrial revolutions of the nineteenth
10. In “Big Election, Teeny, Tiny (if Any) Ideas,” an op-ed in the New York Times on India’s 2009
general election, Anand Girihardas writes, “India’s election must rank with the least ideological
elections in the world.” He states that India’s election was distinguished by “no ideology, no larger-
than-life leaders, no causes, no principles at stake” and notes that “instead [there were] just alpha-
bets, this lot siding with that lot and these people with them—a process resembling a children’s
game show, not the solemn selection of leaders for 1.2 billion human beings.”
11. Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) “freezing hypothesis” has been questioned (Wolinetz 1979;
Maguire 1983; Pedersen 1983; Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Shamir 1984; Ersson and Lane
1987), but it is still one of the most powerful theories for explaining the stability of electoral and
party systems in Western democracies (Bartolini and Mair 1990).
and early twentieth centuries. What we argue here is that the western European
model of state formation is not applicable to contemporary multiethnic countries
where intellectual lineages have limited the role of the state, and where the pro-
cess of state formation has set up very different axes of conflict. In India specifi-
cally, the most important debates center on whether and how the state should act
to dominate society and regulate social norms and practices, and on whether the
state should accommodate the needs of various marginalized groups. Therefore,
to identify the left-right paradigm as constituting the entire field of ideological
conflict and debate in India is to be mistaken about the nature of Indian party
politics, which is marked by clear ideological differences, but along dimensions
very different from those of the conventional left-right paradigm.
The ideological dimensions that underpin the Indian party system originated
in the same challenges of state formation and nation-building that have con-
fronted many other multiethnic countries. The Indian state began as a politi-
cal idea (Khilnani 1997), and the locus of political conflict has consequently
been over the role and organization of the state (Bardhan 1984; Rudolph and
Rudolph 1987; Weiner 1967; Kaviraj 2000; Chatterjee 2004; Khilnani 1997;
Austin 1966; Mehta 2003). The state and control over its institutions have
become the locus of conflict because politics and political power have been the
agents of social transformation and economic change. The constitution of India,
and the debates in the Constituent Assembly and during the independence
movement, make it clear not only that the state is to ensure political equality
but also that the state and its institutions are to act as agents of India’s economic
and social transformation. Therefore, the ideological debate in India has been
over how the state will ensure social equality and transformation. But what is a
political ideology?
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND PARTY SYSTEMS

For Gerring (1997, 1998), an ideology must be based on an intellectual tradition
that includes a somewhat coherent set of ideas about the state—ideas “that are
bound together, that belong to one another in a non-random fashion”—and to
this basic definition Gerring adds two corollaries: that there should be compet-
ing ideas about the state, and that those ideas should be relatively stable over a
period of time. We too define a political ideology as a set of expectations that
citizens have for the role of the state.12 But to Gerring’s basic definition we add
12. This view of ideology differs from the critical tradition associated with Marx (1932), Mannheim
(1937), and Habermas (1987), among others, who find that ideology distorts patterns of domina-
tion and hierarchy. The ideology of caste hides the hierarchy and discrimination that characterize
the actual caste system.
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be severely injured, and until all hopes of her ever becoming a
mother are at an end.
158. The quiet retirement of her own home ought then to be her
greatest pleasure and her most precious privilege. Home is, or ought
to be, the kingdom of woman, and she should be the reigning
potentate. England is the only place in the world that truly knows
what home really means. The French have actually no word in their
language to express its meaning:
“That home, the sound we English love so well,
Has been as strange to me as to those nations
That have no word, they tell me, to express it.”[33]
159. Cheerfulness, contentment, occupation, and healthy activity

of mind cannot be too strongly recommended. A cheerful, happy
temper is one of the most valuable attributes a wife can have. The
possession of such a virtue not only makes herself, but every one
around her, happy. It gilds with sunshine the humblest dwelling, and
often converts an indifferent husband into a good one. Contentment
is the finest medicine in the world; it not only frequently prevents
disease, but, if disease be present, it assists in curing it. Happy is the
man who has a contented wife! A peevish, discontented helpmate
(helpmate, save the mark!) is always ailing, is never satisfied, and
does not know, and does not deserve to know, what real happiness is.
She is “a thorn in the flesh.”
160. One of the greatest requisites, then, for a happy home is a
cheerful, contented, bright, and merry wife; her face is a perpetual
sunshine, her presence is that of an angel; she is happy in herself,
and she imparts happiness to all around her. A gentle, loving,
confiding, placid, hopeful, and trusting disposition has a great charm
for a husband, and ought, by a young wife, to be assiduously
cultivated—
“For gentleness, and love, and trust
Prevail o’er angry wave and gust.”[34]
161. Every young wife, let her station be ever so exalted, ought to
attend to her household duties. Her health, and consequently her
happiness, demand the exertion. The want of occupation—healthy,
useful occupation—is a fruitful source of discontent, of sin,[35] of
disease, and barrenness. If a young married lady did but know the
importance of occupation—how much misery might be averted, and
how much happiness might, by attending to her household duties, be
insured—she would appreciate the importance of the advice.
Occupation improves the health, drives away ennui, cheers the
hearth and home, and, what is most important, if household duties
be well looked after, her house becomes a paradise, and she the
ministering angel to her husband. But she might say—I cannot
always be occupied; it bores me; it is like a common person: I am a
lady; I was not made to work; I have neither the strength nor the
inclination for it; I feel weak and tired, nervous and spiritless, and
must have rest. I reply, in the expressive words of the poet, that—
“Absence of occupation is not rest,—
A mind quite vacant is a mind distress’d.”[36]
“If time be heavy on your hands,” are there no household duties to

look after, no servants to instruct, no flower-beds to arrange, no
school children to teach, no sick-room to visit, no aged people to
comfort, no widow nor orphan to relieve?—
“Nor any poor about your lands?
Oh! teach the orphan boy to read,
Or teach the orphan girl to sew—
Pray Heaven for a human heart.”[37]
162. To have nothing to do is most wretched, wearisome, and

destructive to the mind. The words of Martin Luther on this subject
should be written in letters of gold, and ought to be kept in constant
remembrance by every man and woman, be they rich or poor,
lettered or unlettered, gentle or simple. “The mind,” said he, “is like a
mill that cannot stop working; give it something to grind, and it will
grind that. If it has nothing to grind, it grinds on yet, but it is itself it
grinds and wears away.”
163. A lady in this enlightened age of ours considers it to be
horribly low and vulgar to strengthen her loins with exercise and her
arms with occupation, although such a plan of procedure is
recommended in the Bible by the wisest of men,—“She girdeth her
loins with strength, and strengthened her arms.”[38]
164. A husband soon becomes tired of grand performances on the
piano, of crotchet and worsted work, and of other fiddle-faddle
employments; but he can always appreciate a comfortable, clean,
well-ordered, bright, cheerful, happy home, and a good dinner. It
might be said that a wife is not the proper person to cook her
husband’s dinner. True; but a wife should see and know that the cook
does her duty; and if she did, perchance, understand how the dinner
ought to be cooked, I have yet to learn that the husband would for
such knowledge think any the worse of her.
165. A grazing farmer is three or four years in bringing a beast to
perfection, fit for human food. Is it not a sin, after so much time and
pains, for an idiot of a cook, in the course of one short hour or two, to
ruin, by vile cookery, a joint of such meat? Is it not time, then, that a
wife herself should know how a joint of meat ought to be cooked, and
thus to be able to give instructions accordingly?
166. A boy is brought up to his profession, and is expected to know
it thoroughly; how is it that a girl is not brought up to her profession
of a wife; and why is it that she is not taught to thoroughly
understand all household duties? The daughters of a gentleman’s
family in olden time spent an hour or two every morning in the
kitchen and in the laundry, and were initiated into the mysteries of
pastry and pudding-making, of preserving fruit, of ironing, etc. Their
mothers’ and their grandmothers’ receipt-books were at their finger-
ends. But now look at the picture; the daughters of a gentleman’s
family of the present day consider it very low and horridly vulgar to
understand any such matters. It is just as absurd to ask a lady to play
on the piano who has never been taught music as to ask a wife to
direct her servants to perform duties which she herself knows
nothing about. The duties of a wife cannot come either by intuition
or by instinct more than music can. Again I say, every lady, before
she be married, ought to be thoroughly taught her profession—the
duties of a wife; she then would not be at the tender mercies of her
servants, many of whom are either unprincipled or inefficient.
167. Do not think that I am overstating the importance of the
subject. A good dinner—I mean a well-cooked dinner (which, be it
ever so plain, is really a good dinner)—is absolutely essential to the
health, to the very existence of yourself and your husband; and how,
if it be left to the tender mercies of the present race of cooks, can you
have it? High time it is that every wife, let her station be either high
or low, should look into the matter herself, and remedy the crying
evil of the day. They manage these things better in Sweden. There the
young ladies of wealthy families cook—actually themselves cook—the
dinners; and instead of their considering it a disgrace, and to be
horridly low and vulgar, they look upon it as one of their greatest
privileges! And what is the consequence? A badly-cooked dinner is
rare, and not, as it frequently is in this country, of frequent
occurrence; and “peace and happiness” reign triumphant. It is a pity,
too, that we do not take a leaf out of the book of our neighbors the
French. Every woman in France is a good cook; good cookery with
them is the rule—with us it is the exception. A well-cooked dinner is
a blessing to all who partake of it; it promotes digestion, it sweetens
the temper, it cheers the hearth and home. There is nothing tries the
temper more than an ill-cooked dinner; it makes people dyspeptic,
and for a dyspeptic to be sweet-tempered is an utter impossibility.
Let me, therefore, advise my fair reader to look well into the matter;
either the gloom or the sunshine of a house much depends upon
herself and upon her household management. It might be said—
What a poor creature a man must be to require so much attention.
Truly, if his health be not looked after, if his comforts be not
attended to, he is indeed a poor creature!
168. Every young wife should be able—ought to be instructed by
her mother or by some competent person—it should be a part of her
education—to teach and to train her own servants aright.
Unfortunately, in the present day there is too much cant and
humbug about the instruction of the lower orders, and domestic
servants among the rest. They are instructed in many things that are
perfectly useless to them, the knowledge of which only makes them
dissatisfied with their lot and tends to make them bad servants.
Among other useless subjects taught them are the “ologies.” It would
be much more to the purpose if they were thoroughly instructed in
all household duties, and “in the three R’s—reading, ’riting, and
’rithmetic,”—in obedience to their mistresses, and in simplicity of
demeanor and dress. The servants themselves would be immensely
benefited by such lessons.
169. A “blue-stocking” makes, as a rule, a wretched wife; it would
be far better for the health of her husband, of herself, and her family,
if, instead of cultivating Latin and Greek, she would cultivate her
household duties, more especially a thorough knowledge of the
culinary department. “A man is, in general, better pleased when he
has a good dinner upon his table than when his wife speaks
Greek.”[39]
170. As soon as a lady marries, the romantic nonsense of school-
girls will rapidly vanish, and the stern realities of life will take their
place, and she will then know, and sometimes to her grievous cost,
that a useful wife will be thought much more of than either an
ornamental or a learned one.
171. It is better for a young wife, and for every one else, to have too
much than too little occupation. The misfortune of the present day is,
that servants are made to do all the work, while the mistress of the
house remains idle. Remains idle! Yes; and by remaining idle,
remains out of health! Idleness is a curse, and brings misery in its
train! How slow the hours crawl on when a person has nothing to do;
but how rapidly they fly when she is fully occupied! Besides, idleness
is a frequent cause of barrenness. Hard-worked, industrious women
are prolific; while idle ladies are frequently childless, or, if they do
have a family, their children are puny, and their labors are usually
both hard and lingering. We doctors know full well the difference
there often is between the labor of a poor hard-worked woman and of
a rich, idle lady: in the one case the labor is usually quick and easy; in
the other, it is often hard and lingering. Oh, if wives would consider
betimes the importance of an abundance of exercise and of
occupation, what an immense amount of misery, of pain, of anxiety,
and anguish they might avert! Work is a blessed thing; if we do not
work we pay the penalty—we suffer “in mind, body, and estate.” An
idle man or an idle woman is an object of the deepest pity and
commiseration.
172. Longfellow, in his Song of the Blacksmith, beautifully and
graphically describes the importance and the value of occupation;
and as occupation is as necessary to a woman as to a man, I cannot
resist transcribing it:
“Toiling—rejoicing—sorrowing,
Onward through life he goes;
Each morning sees some task begin,
Each evening sees its close;
Something attempted, something done,
Has earned a night’s repose.”
173. Truly may it be said that “occupation earns a night’s repose.”

It is the finest composing medicine in the world, and, unlike an
opiate, it never gives a headache; it never produces costiveness; and
never, by repetition, loses its effect. Sloth and restlessness, even on
down, are generally bed-fellows:
“Weariness
Can snore upon the flint, when rusty sloth
Finds the down pillow hard.”
174. The mind, it is well known, exerts great influence over the
body in promoting health, and in causing and in curing disease. A
delicate woman is always nervous; she is apt to make mountains of
molehills; she is usually too prone to fancy herself worse than she
really is. I should recommend my gentle reader not to fall into this
error, and not to magnify every slight ache or pain. Let her, instead
of whining and repining, use the means which are within the reach of
all to strengthen her frame; let her give battle to the enemy; let her
fight him with the simple weapons indicated in these pages, and the
chances are she will come off victorious.
175. There is nothing like occupation, active occupation, to cure
slight pains—“constant occupation physics pain”—to drive away little
ailments, and the dread of sickness. “The dread of sickness,” says Dr.
Grosvenor, “is a distemper of itself, and the next disposition to a
many more. What a bondage does this keep some people in! ’Tis an
easy transition from the fear and fancy of being sick to sickness
indeed. In many cases there is but little difference between those
two. There is one so afraid of being ill that he would not stir out of
doors, and for want of air and exercise he contracts a distemper that
kills him.”
176. What a blessed thing is work! What a precious privilege for a
girl to have a mother who is both able and anxious to instruct her
daughter, from her girlhood upwards, in all household management
and duties! Unfortunately, in this our age girls are not either
educated or prepared to be made wives—useful, domesticated wives.
Accomplishments they have without number, but of knowledge of
the management of an establishment they are as ignorant as the babe
unborn. Verily, they and their unfortunate husbands and offspring
will in due time pay the penalty of their ignorance and folly! It is,
forsooth, unladylike for a girl to eat much; it is unladylike for her to
work at all; it is unladylike for her to take a long walk; it is unladylike
for her to go into the kitchen; it is unladylike for her to make her own
bed; it is unladylike for her to be useful; it is unladylike for her to
have a bloom upon her cheek like unto a milkmaid![40] All these are
said to be horridly low and vulgar, and to be only fit for the common
people! Away with such folly! The system of the bringing up of the
young ladies of the present day is “rotten to the core.”
177. If a young married lady, without having any actual disease
about her, be delicate and nervous, there is no remedy equal in value
to change of air—more especially to the sea-coast. The sea breezes,
and, if she be not pregnant, sea-bathing, frequently act like magic
upon her in restoring her to perfect health. I say, if she be not
pregnant; if she be, it would, without first obtaining the express
permission of a medical man, be highly improper for her to bathe.
178. A walk on the mountains is delightful to the feelings and
beneficial to the health. In selecting a sea-side resort, it is always,
where it be practicable, to have mountain-air as well as the sea
breeze. The mounting of high hills, if a lady be pregnant, would not
be desirable, as the exertion would be too great, and, if she be
predisposed, might bring on a miscarriage; but the climbing of hills
and mountains, if she be not enceinte, is most advantageous to
health, strengthening the frame, and exhilarating to the spirits.
Indeed, we may compare the exhilaration it produces to the drinking
of champagne, with this difference,—it is much more beneficial to
health than champagne, and does not leave, the next morning, as
champagne sometimes does, either a disagreeable taste in the mouth
or headache behind,—
“Oh, there is a sweetness in the mountain-air,
And life, that bloated ease can never hope to share!”[41]
179. Bugs and fleas.—This is a very commonplace subject, but like

most commonplace subjects is one necessary to be known, as these
pests of society sometimes destroy the peace, comfort, and
enjoyment of a person when away from home. Many ladies who
travel from home are made miserable and wretched by having to
sleep in strange beds—in beds infested either with bugs or with fleas.
Now, it will be well for such ladies never to go any distance from
home without having four things in their trunks with them, namely:
(1) A box of matches, in order, at any moment of the night, to strike a
light, both to discover and frighten the enemies away. (2) A box of
night-lights. Bugs never bite when there is a light in the room. It
would therefore be well, in an infested room, and until fresh lodgings
can be procured, to keep a night-light burning all night. (3) A packet
of “La Poudre Insecticide,” manufactured in France, but which may
be procured in England: a preparation which, although perfectly
harmless to the human economy, is utterly destructive to fleas. (4) A
4 oz. bottle of oil of turpentine, a little of which, in case of a discovery
of bugs in the bed, should be sprinkled between the sheets and on the
pillow. The oil of turpentine will, until fresh lodgings can be
procured, keep the bugs at a respectful distance. Care should be
observed while sprinkling the sheets with the turpentine not to have
(on account of its inflammability) a lighted candle too near the bed. I
know, from experience, that bugs and fleas are, when ladies are away
from home, a source of torment and annoyance, and am therefore
fully persuaded of the value and importance of the above advice.
180. If it be not practicable for her to visit the sea-coast, let her be
in the fresh air—in the country air. Let her mornings be spent out of
doors; and if she cannot inhale the sea breezes, let her inhale the
morning breezes—
“The skies, the air, the morning’s breezy call
Alike are free, and full of health to all.”[42]
181. Cheerfulness and evenness of temper ought, by a young wife,

to be especially cultivated. There is nothing that promotes digestion,
and thus good health, more than a cheerful, placid temper. We know
that the converse is very detrimental to that process; that violent
passion takes away the appetite, deranges the stomach, and
frequently disorders the bowels. Hence it is that those who attain
great ages are usually of an even, cheerful temper. “Our passions are
compared to the winds in the air, which, when gentle and moderate,
let them fill the sail, and they will carry the ship on smoothly to the
desired port; but when violent, unmanageable, and boisterous, it
grows to a storm, and threatens the ruin and destruction of all.”[43]
182. A young wife is apt to take too much opening medicine; the
more she takes, the more she requires. Hence she irritates the nerves
of the stomach and bowels, and injures herself beyond measure. If
the bowels are costive, and variety of food, and of fruit, and of other
articles of diet, which I either have or will recommend in these pages,
together with an abundance of air, and of exercise, and of
occupation, will not open, then let her give herself an enema; which
she can, without the slightest pain or annoyance, and with very little
trouble, readily do, provided she has a proper apparatus for the
purpose, namely, a “self-injecting enema apparatus,”—one made
purposely for the patient, either to administer it to herself, or to be
administered to her by another person. A pint of cold water is as
good an enema as can be used, and which, if the first should not
operate, ought in a few minutes to be repeated. The clyster does
nothing more than wash the bowels out, removing any offending
matter, and any depression of spirits arising therefrom, and neither
interfering with the stomach nor with the digestion.
183. Until she become accustomed to the cold, she might for the
first few mornings slightly warm the water; but gradually she should
reduce the temperature of it until she use it quite cold. A cold water
is more bracing and strengthening to the bowels, and more
efficacious in action, than a warm water enema.
184. It will, during pregnancy and after a confinement, be safer to
use a tepid than a cold water enema.
185. No family ought to be without a good enema apparatus, to fly
to in any emergency. Many valuable lives have been saved by means
of it, and having it always in good order and at hand.
186. By adopting the dictates of reason and of common sense,
many of the nervous, useless, lackadaisical, fine ladies will be
unknown; and we shall have instead blooming wives, who will in due
time become the mothers of hardy, healthy, happy children.
187. In the foregoing pages the burden of my song has been health
—the preservation of health—the most precious of God’s gifts, and
one that is frittered and fooled away as though it were but of little
value. Health ought to be the first consideration of all, and of every
young wife especially, as, when she is married, her life, her health is
not altogether her own, but her husband’s and her family’s. Oh! it is a
glorious gift, a precious boon, to be in the enjoyment of perfect
health, and is worth a little care and striving for.
188. In concluding the first division of my subject, let me entreat
my fair reader to ponder well on what I have already said; let her
remember that she has a glorious mission; let her thoroughly
understand that if good habits and good rules be not formed and
followed during the first year of her wifehood, they are not at all
likely to be instituted afterwards. The first year, then, is the golden
opportunity to sow the seeds of usefulness; to make herself healthy
and strong, and to cause her to be a blessing, a solace, and a comfort
to her husband, her children, and all around her.
189. Menstruation, during a period of about thirty years, plays a
momentous part in the female economy; indeed, unless it be in every
way properly and duly performed, it is neither possible that such a
lady can be well, nor is it at all probable that she will conceive. I
therefore purpose devoting an especial chapter to its due and careful
consideration.
PART I.
MENSTRUATION.
190. There are two most important epochs in the life of a woman—
namely (1) the commencement, and (2) the close of menstruation.
Each is apt, unless carefully watched and prevented, to bring in its
train many serious diseases. Moreover, unless menstruation be
healthfully and properly performed, conception, as a rule, is not
likely to take place: hence the importance of our subject.
191. Menstruation—the appearance of the catamenia or the menses
—is then one of the most important epochs in a girl’s life. It is the
boundary line, the landmark, between childhood and womanhood; it
is the threshold, so to speak, of a woman’s life. Her body now
develops and expands, and her mental capacity enlarges and
improves. She then ceases to be a child, and she becomes a woman.
She is now for the first time, as a rule, able to conceive.
192. Although puberty has at this time commenced, it cannot be
said that she is at her full perfection; it takes eight or ten years more
to complete her organization, which will bring her to the age of
twenty-three or twenty-five years; which perhaps are the best ages
for a woman, if she have both the chance and the inclination, to
marry.
193. If she marry when very young, marriage weakens her system,
and prevents a full development of the body. Besides, if she marry
when she be only eighteen or nineteen, the bones of the pelvis—the
bones of the lower part of the belly—are not at that time sufficiently
developed; are not properly shaped for the purpose of labor; do not
allow of sufficient space for the head of the child to readily pass, as
though she were of the riper age of twenty-three or twenty-five. She
might have in consequence a severe and dangerous confinement. If
she marry late in life, say after she be thirty, the soft parts engaged in
parturition are more rigid and more tense, and thus become less
capable of dilatation, which might cause, for the first time, a hard
and tedious labor. Again, when she marries late in life, she might not
live to see her children grow up to be men and women. Moreover, as
a rule, “the offspring of those that are very young or very old lasts
not.” Everything, therefore, points out that the age above indicated—
namely, somewhere between twenty and thirty—is the most safe and
suitable time for a woman to marry.
194. Menstruation generally comes on once every month—that is
to say, every twenty-eight days; usually to the very day, and
frequently to the hour. Some ladies, instead of being “regular” every
month, are “regular” every three weeks.
195. Each menstruation continues from three to five days; in some
for a week; and in others for a longer period. It is estimated that,
during each menstruation, from four to six ounces is, on an average,
the quantity discharged.
196. A lady seldom conceives unless she be “regular,” although
there are cases on record where women have conceived who have
never been “unwell;” but such cases are extremely rare.
197. Menstruation in this country usually commences at the ages
of from thirteen to sixteen, sometimes earlier; occasionally as early
as eleven or twelve; at other times later, and not until a girl be
seventeen or eighteen years of age. Menstruation in large towns is
supposed to commence at an earlier period than in the country, and
earlier in luxurious than in simple life.[44]
198. Menstruation continues for thirty, and sometimes even for
thirty-five years; and, while it lasts, is a sign that a lady is liable to
become pregnant—unless, indeed, menstruation should be
protracted much beyond the usual period of time. As a rule, then,
when a woman “ceases to be unwell,” she ceases to have a family;
therefore, as menstruation usually leaves her at forty-five, it is
seldom, after that age, that she has a child.
199. I have known ladies become mothers when they have been
upwards of fifty years of age. I myself delivered a woman in her fifty-
first year of a fine healthy child. She had a kind and easy labor, and
was the mother of a large family, the youngest being at the time
twelve years old.[45] “Dr. Carpenter, of Durham, tells us that he has
attended in their confinements several women whose ages were fifty.
‘I well recollect a case occurring in my father’s practice in 1839,
where a woman became a widow at forty-nine years of age. Shortly
afterwards she married her second husband, and within twelve
months of this time gave birth to her first child. These cases belong
to the working classes. But I know of two others, where gentlewomen
became mothers at fifty-one with her first child, the other with her
eighth. I can say nothing of how they menstruated, but I know of a
virgin in whom the catamenia appeared regularly and undiminished
up to and at the end of sixty.’ Dr. Powell says that he last year
attended a woman in her fifty-second year; and Mr. Heckford, that
he attended a woman who stated her age to be at least fifty. Mr.
Clarke, of Mold, states that he has attended several women whose
ages were upwards of forty-four, and that he lately delivered a
woman of her first child at forty-eight. Mr. Bloxham, of Portsmouth,
delivered at fifty-two, in her first confinement, a woman who had
been married thirty-five years.”[46]
200. In very warm climates, such as in Abyssinia and in India, girls
menstruate when very young—at ten or eleven years old; indeed,
they are sometimes mothers at those ages.[47] But when it commences
early, it leaves early; so that they are old women at thirty. “Physically,
we know that there is a very large latitude of difference in the periods
of human maturity, not merely between individual and individual,
but also between nation and nation—differences so great that in
some southern regions of Asia we hear of matrons at the age of
twelve.”[48] Dr. Montgomery[49] brings forward some interesting cases
of early maturity. He says: “Bruce mentions that in Abyssinia he has
frequently seen mothers of eleven years of age; and Dunlop
witnessed the same in Bengal. Dr. Goodeve, Professor of Midwifery
at Calcutta, in reply to a query on the subject, said: ‘The earliest age
at which I have known a Hindu woman bear a child is ten years, but I
have heard of one at nine.’”
201. In cold climates, such as Russia, women begin to menstruate
late in life, frequently not until they are between twenty and thirty
years old; and, as it lasts on them thirty or thirty-five years, it is not
an unusual occurrence for them to bear children at a very advanced
age—even so late as sixty. They are frequently not “regular” oftener
than three or four times a year, and when it does occur the menstrual
discharge is generally sparing in quantity.
202. The menstrual fluid is not exactly blood, although, both in
appearance and in properties, it much resembles it; yet it never in
the healthy state clots as blood does. It is a secretion from the womb,
and, when healthy, ought to be of a bright-red color, in appearance
very much like blood from a recently cut finger.[50]
203. The menstrual fluid ought not, as before observed, to clot. If
it does, a lady, during menstruation, suffers intense pain; moreover,
she seldom conceives until the clotting has ceased. Application must
therefore, in such a case, be made to a medical man, who will soon
relieve the above painful symptoms, and, by doing so, will probably
pave the way to her becoming pregnant.
204. Menstruation ceases entirely in pregnancy, during suckling,
and usually both in diseased and in disordered states of the womb. It
also ceases in cases of extreme debility, and in severe illness,
especially in consumption; indeed, in the latter disease—
consumption—it is one of the most unfavorable of the symptoms.
205. It has been asserted, and by men of great experience, that
sometimes a woman menstruates during pregnancy. In this assertion
I cannot agree; it appears utterly impossible that she should be able
to do so. The moment she conceives, the neck of the womb becomes
plugged up by means of mucus; it is, in fact, hermetically sealed.
There certainly is sometimes a slight red discharge, looking very
much like menstrual fluid, and coming on at her monthly periods;
but being usually very sparing in quantity, and lasting only a day or
so, and sometimes only for an hour or two; but this discharge does
not come from the cavity of, but from some small vessels at, the
mouth of the womb, and is not menstrual fluid at all, but a few drops
of real blood. If this discharge came from the cavity of the womb, it
would probably lead to a miscarriage. My old respected and talented
teacher, the late Dr. D. D. Davis,[51] declared that it would be quite
impossible during pregnancy for menstruation to occur. He
considered that the discharge which was taken for menstruation
arose from the rupture of some small vessels about the mouth of the
womb.
206. Some ladies, though comparatively few, menstruate during
suckling; when they do, it may be considered not the rule, but the
exception. It is said, in such instances, that they are more likely to
conceive. Many persons have an idea that when a woman, during
lactation, menstruates, the milk is both sweeter and purer. Such is an
error. Menstruation during suckling is more likely to weaken the
mother, and consequently to deteriorate the milk. It therefore
behooves a parent never to take a wet nurse who menstruates during
the period of suckling.
207. A lady sometimes suffers severe pains both just before and
during her “poorly” times. When such be the case, she seldom
conceives until the pain be removed. She ought therefore to apply to
a medical man, as relief may soon be obtained. When she is freed
from the pain, she will, in all probability, in due time become
enceinte.
208. If a married woman have painful menstruation, even if she
become pregnant, she is more likely, in the early stage, to miscarry.
This is an important consideration, and requires the attention of a
doctor.
209. If a single lady, who is about to be married, have painful
menstruation, it is incumbent on either her mother or a female
friend to consult, two or three months before the marriage takes
place, an experienced medical man, on her case; if this be not done,
she will most likely, after marriage, either labor under ill health, or
be afflicted with barrenness, or, if she do conceive, be prone to
miscarry.
210. The menstrual discharge, as before remarked, ought, if
healthy, to be of the color of blood—of fresh, unclotted blood. If it be
either too pale (and it sometimes is almost colorless), or, on the
other hand, if it be both dark and thick (it is occasionally as dark, and
sometimes nearly as thick, as treacle), there will be but scant hopes
of a lady conceiving. A medical man ought, therefore, at once to be
consulted, who will in the generality of cases, be able to remedy the
defect. The chances are, that as soon as the defect be remedied, she
will become pregnant.
211. Menstruation at another time is too sparing; this is a frequent
cause of a want of family. Luckily a doctor is, in the majority of cases,
able to remedy the defect, and by doing so will probably be the
means of bringing the womb into a healthy state, and thus
predispose her to become a mother.
212. A married lady is very subject to the “whites;” the more there
will be of the “whites” the less there will usually be of the menstrual
discharge;—so that in a bad case of the “whites” menstruation might
entirely cease, until proper means be used both to restrain the one
and to bring back the other. Indeed, as a rule, if the menstrual
discharge, by proper treatment, be healthily established and
restored, the “whites” will often cease of themselves. Deficient
menstruation is a frequent cause of the “whites,” and the consequent
failure of a family; and as deficient menstruation is usually curable, a
medical man ought, in all such cases, to be consulted.
213. Menstruation at other times is either too profuse or too long
continued. Either the one or the other is a frequent source of
barrenness, and is also weakening to the constitution, and thus tends
to bring a lady into a bad state of health. This, like the former cases,
by judicious management may generally be rectified; and being
rectified, will in all probability result in the wife becoming a mother.
214. When a lady is neither pregnant nor “regular,” she ought
immediately to apply to a doctor, as she may depend upon it there is
something wrong about her, and that she is not likely to become
enceinte[52] until menstruation be properly established. As soon as
menstruation be duly and healthily established, pregnancy will most
likely, in due time, ensue.
215. When a lady is said to be “regular,” it is understood that she is
“regular” as to quality, and quantity, and time. If she be only
“regular” as to the time, and the quantity be either deficient or in
excess, or if she be “regular” as to the time, and the quality be bad,
either too pale or too dark; or if she be “regular” as to the quality and
quantity, and be irregular as to the time, she cannot be well; and the
sooner means are adopted to rectify the evil, the better it will be for
her health and happiness.
216. There is among young wives, of the higher ranks, of the
present time, an immense deal of hysteria; indeed it is, among them,
in one form or another, the most frequent complaint of the day. Can
it be wondered at? Certainly not. The fashionable system of spending
married life, such as late hours, close rooms, excitement, rounds of
visiting, luxurious living, is quite enough to account for its
prevalence. The menstrual functions in a case of this kind are not
duly performed; she is either too much or too little “unwell;”
menstruation occurs either too soon, or too late, or at irregular
periods. I need scarcely say that such a one, until a different order of
things be instituted, and until proper and efficient means be used to
restore healthy menstruation, is not likely to conceive; or, if she did
conceive, she would most likely either miscarry, or, if she did go her
time, bring forth a puny, delicate child. A fashionable wife and happy
mother are incompatibilities! Oh, it is sad to contemplate the
numerous victims that are sacrificed yearly on the shrine of fashion!
The grievous part of the business is, that fashion is not usually
amenable to reason and common sense; argument, entreaty, ridicule,
are each and all alike in turn powerless in the matter. Be that as it
might, I am determined boldly to proclaim the truth, and to make
plain the awful danger of a wife becoming a votary of fashion.
217. Many a lady, either from suppressed or from deficient
menstruation, who is now chlorotic, hysterical, and dyspeptic, weak
and nervous, looking wretchedly, and whose very life is a burden,
may, by applying to a medical man, be restored to health and
strength.
218. As soon as a lady “ceases to be after the manner of women”—
that is to say, as soon as she ceases to menstruate—it is said that she
has “a change of life;” and if she does not take care, she will soon
have “a change of health” to boot, which, in all probability, will be for
the worse.
219. After a period of about thirty years’ continuation of
menstruation, a woman ceases to menstruate; that is to say, when
she is about forty-four or forty-five years of age, and, occasionally, as
late in life as when she is forty-eight years of age, she has “change of
life,” or, as it is sometimes called, a “turn of years.” Now, before this
takes place, she oftentimes becomes very “irregular;” at one time she
is “regular” before her proper period; at another time either before or
after; so that it becomes a dodging time with her, as it is so styled. In
a case of this kind menstruation is sometimes very profuse; at
another it is very sparing; occasionally it is light colored, almost
colorless; sometimes it is as red as from a cut finger; while now and
then it is as black as ink.
220. When “change of life” is about, and during the time, and for
some time afterwards, a lady labors under, at times, great flushings
of heat; she, as it were, blushes all over; she goes very hot and red,
almost scarlet; then perspires; and afterwards becomes cold and
chilly. These flushings occur at very irregular periods; they might
come on once or twice a day, at other times only once or twice a
week, and occasionally only at what would have been her “poorly
times.” These flushings might be looked upon as rather favorable
symptoms, and as an effort of nature to relieve itself through the
skin. These flushings are occasionally, although rarely, attended with
hysterical symptoms. A little appropriate medicine is for these
flushings desirable. A lady while laboring under these heats is
generally both very much annoyed and distressed; but she ought to
comfort herself with the knowledge that they are in all probability
doing her good service, and that they might be warding off, from
some internal organ of her body, serious mischief.
221. “Change of life” is one of the most important periods of a
lady’s existence, and generally determines whether, for the rest of
her days, she shall either be healthy or otherwise; it therefore
imperatively behooves her to pay attention to the subject, and in all
cases when it is about taking place to consult a medical man, who
will, in the majority of cases, be of great benefit to her, as he will be
able to ward off many important and serious diseases to which she
would otherwise be liable. When “change of life” ends favorably,
which, if properly managed, it most likely will do, she may improve
in constitution, and may really enjoy better health and spirits, and
more comfort, then she has done for many previous years. A lady
who has during the whole of her wifehood eschewed fashionable
society, and who has lived simply, plainly, and sensibly, and who has
taken plenty of out-door exercise, will, during the autumn and winter
of life, reap her reward by enjoying what is the greatest earthly
blessing—health!
PART II.
PREGNANCY.
SIGNS OF PREGNANCY.
222. The first sign that leads a lady to suspect that she is pregnant
is her ceasing to be unwell. This, provided she has just before been in
good health, is a strong symptom of pregnancy; but still there must
be others to corroborate it.
223. The next symptom is morning sickness. This is one of the
earliest symptoms of pregnancy; as it sometimes occurs a few days,
and indeed generally not later than a fortnight or three weeks, after
conception. Morning sickness is frequently distressing, oftentimes
amounting to vomiting, and causing a loathing of breakfast. This sign
usually disappears after the first three or four months. Morning
sickness is not always present in pregnancy; but, nevertheless, it is a
frequent accompaniment; and many who have had families place
more reliance on this than on any other symptom.
224. A third symptom is shooting, throbbing, and lancinating
pains, and enlargement of the breasts, with soreness of the nipples,
occurring about the second month; and in some instances, after the
first few months, a small quantity of watery fluid, or a little milk, may
be squeezed out of them. This latter symptom, in a first pregnancy, is
valuable, and can generally be relied on as conclusive that the female
is pregnant. It is not so valuable in an after pregnancy, as a little milk
might, even should she not be pregnant, remain in the breasts for
some months after she has weaned her child.
225. The veins of the breast look more blue, and are consequently
more conspicuous than usual, giving the bosom a mottled
appearance. The breasts themselves are firmer and more knotty to
the touch. The nipples, in the majority of cases, look more healthy
than customary, and are somewhat elevated and enlarged; there is

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Ideology and Identity: The Changing

Party Systems of India Pradeep K.

Pradeep K. Chhibber and Rahul Verma

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

List of Tables vii

Introduction: Ideology in India’s Electoral Politics 1

1. State Formation and Ideological Conflict in Multiethnic Countries 8

2. Ideology, Identity, and the 2014 National Elections 35

3. Intellectual Lineages of the Politics of Statism and Recognition 54

4. Who Opposes Reservations and Why? 85

5. The Myth of Vote Buying in India 103

6. Transformational Leaders and Ideological Shifts 131

7. Transmitting Ideology 151

8. Statism, Recognition, and Party System Change in India 169

9. Ideological Challenges and the Decline of the Congress Party 207

10. The BJP and an Ideological Consolidation of the Right? 234

Conclusion: Ideas, Leaders, and Party Systems 256

4.1 Experimental Research on Prejudice and Discrimination from India 91

C1b Summary Profile of Leadership Experiment 280

2.1 Ideological Polarization among Social Groups in 2014 38

7.4 Channels of Ideological Transmission 167

OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK

reflection of upper-​caste Hindus’ prejudices against Muslims, Dalits, and India’s

well-​established theory on how ideological messages are transmitted to Indian

State Formation and Ideological Conflict

Contemporary political images of India depict a vibrant, cacophonous electoral

WHY DOES INDIAN POLITICS SEEM NONIDEOLOGICAL?

This apparent lack of ideological grounding appears to obtain especially with

Similarly, Suri (2013), after presenting a masterful survey of the study of

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND PARTY SYSTEMS

159. Cheerfulness, contentment, occupation, and healthy activity

“If time be heavy on your hands,” are there no household duties to

162. To have nothing to do is most wretched, wearisome, and

173. Truly may it be said that “occupation earns a night’s repose.”

179. Bugs and fleas.—This is a very commonplace subject, but like

181. Cheerfulness and evenness of temper ought, by a young wife,

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

reflection of upper-caste Hindus’ prejudices against Muslims, Dalits, and India’s

well-established theory on how ideological messages are transmitted to Indian