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Cambridge University Press
978-1-108-41678-8 — Data Analysis Techniques for Physical Scientists
Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
More Information
Data Analysis Techniques for Physical Scientists
Data Analysis Techniques for Physical Scientists is a comprehensive guide to data analysis
techniques for physical scientists, providing a valuable resource for advanced undergrad-
uate and graduate students, as well as seasoned researchers. The book begins with an ex-
tensive discussion of the foundational concepts and methods of probability and statistics
under both the frequentist and Bayesian interpretations of probability. It next presents ba-
sic concepts and techniques used for measurements of particle production cross sections,
correlation functions, and particle identification. Much attention is devoted to notions of
statistical and systematic errors, beginning with intuitive discussions and progressively in-
troducing the more formal concepts of confidence intervals, credible range, and hypothesis
testing. The book also includes an in-depth discussion of the methods used to unfold or
correct data for instrumental effects associated with measurement and process noise as
well as particle and event losses, before ending with a presentation of elementary Monte
Carlo techniques.
Claude A. Pruneau is a Professor of Physics at Wayne State University, from where he
received the 2006 Excellence in Teaching Presidential award. He is also a member of the
ALICE collaboration, and conducts an active research program in the study of the Quark
Gluon Plasma produced in relativistic heavy ion collisions at the CERN Large Hadron
Collider. He has worked as a Research Fellow at both Atomic Energy for Canada Lim-
ited and McGill University, and is a member of the American Physical Society, Canadian
Association of Physicists and the Union of Concerned Scientists.
© in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
More Information
Data Analysis Techniques for

Physical Scientists
CLAUDE A. PRUNEAU
Wayne State University, Michigan

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
More Information
University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

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education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108416788
DOI: 10.1017/9781108241922
© Cambridge University Press 2017
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2017
Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd. Padstow Cornwall
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
ISBN 978-1-108-41678-8 Hardback
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and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
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To my son Blake

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
More Information
Contents
Preface page xi
How to Read This Book xiii
1 The Scientiic Method 1

1.1 What the Brain Does 1
1.2 Critics of the Scientific Method 2
1.3 Falsifiability and Predictive Power 4
1.4 A Flawed but Effective Process! 5
1.5 Science as an Empirical Study of Nature 5
1.6 Defining Scientific Models 7
1.7 Challenges of the Scientific Method: Paradigm Shifts and Occam’s Razor 10
1.8 To Err Is Human, to Control Errors, Science! 12
1.9 Goals, Structure, and Layout of This Book 13
Part I Foundation in Probability and Statistics
2 Probability 17
2.1 Modeling Measurements: A Need for Probability 17
2.2 Foundation and Definitions 19
2.3 Frequentist and Bayesian Interpretations of Probabilities 29
2.4 Bayes’ Theorem and Inference 33
2.5 Definition of Probability Distribution and Probability Density 35
2.6 Functions of Random Variables 39
2.7 PDF Characterization 41
2.8 Multivariate Systems 49
2.9 Moments of Multivariate PDFs 60
2.10 Characteristic and Moment-Generating Functions 66
2.11 Measurement Errors 73
2.12 Random Walk Processes 78
2.13 Cumulants 81
Exercises 84
3 Probability Models 88
3.1 Bernoulli and Binomial Distributions 88
3.2 Multinomial Distribution 96
3.3 Poisson Distribution 99
vii

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
More Information
viii Contents
3.4 Uniform Distribution 106

3.5 Exponential Distribution 110
3.6 Gamma Distribution 113
3.7 Beta Distribution 115
3.8 Dirichlet Distributions 117
3.9 Gaussian Distribution 118
3.10 Multidimensional Gaussian Distribution 122
3.11 Log-Normal Distribution 124
3.12 Student’s t-Distribution 126
3.13 Chi-Square Distribution 128
3.14 F-Distribution 131
3.15 Breit–Wigner (Cauchy) Distribution 132
3.16 Maxwell–Boltzmann Distribution 134
Exercises 136
4 Classical Inference I: Estimators 139

4.1 Goals of Frequentist Inference 140
4.2 Population, Sample, and Sampling 140
4.3 Statistics and Estimators 144
4.4 Properties of Estimators 147
4.5 Basic Estimators 152
4.6 Histograms 159
4.7 Fisher Information 167
Exercises 176
5 Classical Inference II: Optimization 178

5.1 The Method of Maximum Likelihood 179
5.2 The Method of Least-Squares 190
5.3 Determination of the Goodness-of-Fit 205
5.4 Extrapolation 206
5.5 Weighted Averages 207
5.6 Kalman Filtering 209
Exercises 225
6 Classical Inference III: Conidence Intervals and Statistical Tests 227

6.1 Error Interval Estimation 227
6.2 Confidence Intervals with the Unified Approach 245
6.3 Confidence Intervals from ML and LS Fits 251
6.4 Hypothesis Testing, Errors, Significance Level, and Power 253
6.5 Test Properties 257
6.6 Commonly Used Tests 263
6.7 Test Optimization and the Neyman–Pearson Test 276
6.8 Appendix 1: Derivation of Student’s t-Distribution 280
Exercises 281

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
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ix Contents
7 Bayesian Inference 284

7.1 Introduction 284
7.2 Basic Structure of the Bayesian Inference Process 286
7.3 Choosing a Prior 298
7.4 Bayesian Inference with Gaussian Noise 321
7.5 Bayesian Inference with Nonlinear Models and Non-Gaussian Processes 341
7.6 Optimization Techniques for Nonlinear Models 347
7.7 Model Comparison and Entity Classification 365
Exercises 385
Part II Measurement Techniques
8 Basic Measurements 389

8.1 Basic Concepts and Notations 389
8.2 Particle Decays and Cross Sections 402
8.3 Measurements of Elementary Observables 409
8.4 Particle Identification 425
8.5 Detection of Short-Lived Particles 440
8.6 Searches, Discovery, and Production Limits 455
Exercises 458
9 Event Reconstruction 460

9.1 Event Reconstruction Overview 460
9.2 Track Reconstruction Techniques 471
9.3 Primary Vertex Reconstruction Techniques 490
9.4 Appendix 1: DCA Calculations 498
9.5 Appendix 2: Multiple Coulomb Scattering 501
Exercises 501
10 Correlation Functions 502

10.1 Extension of the Notion of Covariance 503
10.2 Correlation Function Cumulants 505
10.3 Semi-inclusive Correlation Functions 513
10.4 Factorial and Cumulant Moment-Generating Functions 515
10.5 Multivariate Factorial Moments 518
10.6 Correlation Functions of Nonidentical Particles 518
10.7 Charge-Dependent and Charge-Independent Correlation Functions 521
10.8 Generalized (Weighted) Correlation Functions 523
10.9 Autocorrelations and Time-Based Correlation Functions 524
Exercises 525
11 The Multiple Facets of Correlation Functions 526

11.1 Two-Particle Correlation Functions 526
11.2 Three-Particle Differential Correlation Functions 544

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
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x Contents
11.3 Integral Correlators 547

11.4 Flow Measurements 558
11.5 Appendix 1: Numerical Techniques Used in the Study
of Correlation Functions 573
Exercises 575
12 Data Correction Methods 577

12.1 Experimental Errors 577
12.2 Experimental Considerations 582
12.3 Signal Correction and Unfolding 587
12.4 Correcting Measurements of Correlation Functions 611
12.5 Systematic Errors 633
Exercises 640
Part III Simulation Techniques
13 Monte Carlo Methods 643

13.1 Basic Principle of Monte Carlo Methods 643
13.2 Monte Carlo Integration 644
13.3 Pseudorandom Number Generation 646
13.4 Selected Examples 657
Exercises 661
14 Collision and Detector Modeling 663

14.1 Event Generators 663
14.2 Detector Simulation 678
Exercises 686
References 687
Index 698

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
More Information
Preface
Physics students typically take a wide range of advanced classes in mechanics, electromag-
netism, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, and statistical mechanics, but sadly, receive
only limited formal training in data analysis techniques. Most students in experimental
physics indeed end up gleaning the required material by reading parts of a plurality of
books and scientific articles. They typically end up knowing a lot about one particular
analysis technique but relatively little about others. Paradoxically, modern experiments in
particle and nuclear physics enable an amazingly wide range of very sophisticated mea-
surements based on diverse analytical techniques. The end result is that beginning students
may have a rather limited understanding of the many papers they become coauthors of by
virtue of being members of a large scientific collaboration. After twenty years of teaching
“physics” and carrying out research in heavy-ion physics, I figured I should make an effort
to remedy this situation by creating a book that covers all the basic tools required in the
data analysis of experiments at RHIC, the LHC, and other large experimental facilities.
This was a fairly ambitious project given that the range of techniques employed in today’s
experiments is actually quite large and rather sophisticated. In the interest of full disclosure,
I should state that the scope of the project changed several times, at times growing and at
others shrinking. Eventually, I decided for a book in three parts covering (I) foundational
concepts in probability and statistics, (II) basic and commonly used advanced measurement
techniques, and (III) introductory techniques in Monte Carlo simulations targeted, mostly,
toward the analysis and interpretation of experimental data. As such, it became impossible
to present detailed descriptions of detector technologies or the physical principles they are
based on. But as it turns out, high-quality data analyses are possible even if one is not
familiar with the many technical details involved in the design or construction of detectors.
Detector attributes relevant for data analyses can in general be reduced to a statement of
a few essential properties, and it is thus possible to carry out quality analyses without a
full knowledge of all aspects of a detector’s design and operation. I have thus opted to
leave out detailed descriptions of detector technologies as well as particle interactions with
matter and focus the discussion on some representative and illustrative examples of data
calibration and analyses. Detailed discussions of detector technologies used in high-energy
nuclear and particle physics may, however, be found in a plurality of graduate textbooks
and technical texts. Additionally, I have also omitted few big and important topics such as
interferometry (HBT), jet reconstruction, and neutral networks, for which very nice and
comprehensive books or scientific reviews already exist.
Overall, this book essentially covers all basic techniques necessary for sound analyses
and interpretation of experimental data. And, although it cannot cover all analysis tech-
niques used by modern physicists, it lays a solid foundation in probability and statistics,
xi

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
More Information
xii Preface
simulation techniques, and basic measurement methods, which should equip conscientious
and dedicated students with the skill set they require for a successful career in experimental
nuclear or particle physics, and such that they can explore more advanced techniques on
their own.
I should note, in closing, that although this book targets primarily students in nuclear and
particle physicists, it should, I believe, prove to be a useful introduction to data analysis for
students working in other fields, including astronomy and basically all other areas of the
physical sciences. It should also, I hope, provide a useful reference for more advanced and
seasoned scientists.
I would like to express my sincere acknowledgments to the many people who, through
discussions and advices, have helped shape this book. These include Monika Sharma,
Rosie Reed, Robert Harr, Paul Karchin, and Sergei Voloshin, who through questions and
comments have helped me plan or contributed various improvements to the book. I also
wish to acknowledge the important contributions of several undergraduate and graduate
students, most particularly Nick Elsey, Derek Everett, Derek Hazard, Ed Kramkowski, Jin-
jin Pan, Jon Troyer, and Chris Zin, who served as guinea-pigs for some fractions of the ma-
terial. I am grateful to my colleagues Giovanni Bonvicini, from the CLEO Collaboration,
for providing a Dalitz plot; Yuri Fisyak and Zhangbu Xu, from the STAR (Solenoidal De-
tector at Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider [RHIC]) Collaboration, for their contribution of a
dE/dx plot; and my former postdoctoral student, Sidharth Prasad, for producing exemplars
of unfolding. I also acknowledge use of several sets of results from the STAR collaboration,
publicly available from the collaboration’s website, for the generation of figures presenting
examples of flow measurements and correlation functions. I am particularly indebted to
colleagues Drs. Jean Barrette, Ron Belmont, Jana Bielcikova, Panos Christakoglou, Kolja
Kauder, William Llope, Prabhat Pujahari, Sidharth Prasad, Joern Putschke, and William
Zajc for their detailed reading and feedback on various sections of the book corresponding
to their respective areas of expertise and interest. I also wish to acknowledge Ms. Heidi
Kenaga and Ms. Theresa Kornak for their meticulous proofreading of the manuscript and
for being so nice in correcting my Frenglish.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge that a large fraction of the graphs and figures featured in
this book were created with ROOT, Keynote, and Graphic Converter. Several of the ROOT
macros I wrote for the generation of figures will be made available at the book website.
Claude A. Pruneau

Claude A. Pruneau
Frontmatter
More Information
How to Read This Book
Not all students, instructors, and practitioners of the field of experimental physics may
have the inclination, the time, or the need to study this book in its entirety. Indeed, only a
selected few may have the opportunity to read the book from cover to cover. This should
not be a problem, however, because the material is organized in large blocks that are rea-
sonably self-sufficient, and ample references to earlier or upcoming chapters, as the case
may be, are included in the narrative. The book also includes a number of specialized or
in-depth topics that may be skipped in a first reading. Such topics include, for instance, the
formal definition of probability in §2.2, the notion of Fisher information discussed in §4.7,
the technique of Kalman filtering introduced in §5.6 and for which a detailed example of
application is presented in §9.2.3, as well as discussions of track and vertex reconstruc-
tion presented in §§ 9.2 and 9.3. This said, the book is designed to progressively develop
and approach topics, and it should then be possible to study the material in a variety of
ways, adapting the depth and breadth of coverage. The following are recommended lists of
chapters and sections that should be covered given specific and targeted needs.
r Introductory course in probability and statistics:
Chapters 2 (§§2.1, 2.3–2.11), 3 (§§3.1–3.13), 4 (§§4.1–4.6), 5 (§§5.1–5.5), 6 (§§6.1–6.6),
7 (§§7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.7), 13
r Advanced course in probability and statistics:
Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13
r Introductory course in data analysis techniques (one semester):
Chapters 1, 2 (§§2.1, 2.3–2.11), 3 (§§3.1–3.13), 4 (§§4.1–4.6), 5 (§§5.1–5.5), 6 (§§6.1–
6.6), 8 (§§8.1–8.6), 9 (§§9.1, 9.2), 13
r Advanced course in data analysis techniques (two semesters):
Chapters 1, 2 (§§2.1, 2.3–2.11), 3 (§§3.1–3.13), 4 (§§4.1–4.6), 5 (§§5.1–5.6), 6 (§§6.1–
6.7), 7, 8 (§§81–8.6), 9 (§§9.1, 9.2), 12, 13, 14
r Course on correlation functions (one semester):
Chapters 2 (§§2.5–2.13), 4 (§§4.3, 4.5, 4.6), 10, 11, 12, 13
Of course, instructors using this book should feel free to select and change the order of
topics to suit their specific needs. For instance, Monte Carlo methods are formally intro-
duced in Chapter 13 but it is often useful and inconvenient to use and discuss some of these
concepts along with materials of the early chapters (e.g., Chapters 2–7).
xiii

Preface
Physics students typically take a wide range of advanced classes in mechanics, electromag-
netism, quantum mechanics, thermodynamics, and statistical mechanics, but sadly, receive
only limited formal training in data analysis techniques. Most students in experimental
physics indeed end up gleaning the required material by reading parts of a plurality of
books and scientific articles. They typically end up knowing a lot about one particular
analysis technique but relatively little about others. Paradoxically, modern experiments in
particle and nuclear physics enable an amazingly wide range of very sophisticated mea-
surements based on diverse analytical techniques. The end result is that beginning students
may have a rather limited understanding of the many papers they become coauthors of by
virtue of being members of a large scientific collaboration. After twenty years of teaching
“physics” and carrying out research in heavy-ion physics, I figured I should make an effort
to remedy this situation by creating a book that covers all the basic tools required in the
data analysis of experiments at RHIC, the LHC, and other large experimental facilities.
This was a fairly ambitious project given that the range of techniques employed in today’s
experiments is actually quite large and rather sophisticated. In the interest of full disclosure,
I should state that the scope of the project changed several times, at times growing and at
others shrinking. Eventually, I decided for a book in three parts covering (I) foundational
concepts in probability and statistics, (II) basic and commonly used advanced measurement
techniques, and (III) introductory techniques in Monte Carlo simulations targeted, mostly,
toward the analysis and interpretation of experimental data. As such, it became impossible
to present detailed descriptions of detector technologies or the physical principles they are
based on. But as it turns out, high-quality data analyses are possible even if one is not
familiar with the many technical details involved in the design or construction of detectors.
Detector attributes relevant for data analyses can in general be reduced to a statement of
a few essential properties, and it is thus possible to carry out quality analyses without a
full knowledge of all aspects of a detector’s design and operation. I have thus opted to
leave out detailed descriptions of detector technologies as well as particle interactions with
matter and focus the discussion on some representative and illustrative examples of data
calibration and analyses. Detailed discussions of detector technologies used in high-energy
nuclear and particle physics may, however, be found in a plurality of graduate textbooks
and technical texts. Additionally, I have also omitted few big and important topics such as
interferometry (HBT), jet reconstruction, and neutral networks, for which very nice and
comprehensive books or scientific reviews already exist.
Overall, this book essentially covers all basic techniques necessary for sound analyses
and interpretation of experimental data. And, although it cannot cover all analysis tech-
niques used by modern physicists, it lays a solid foundation in probability and statistics,
xi
12:39:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,

.001
xii Preface
simulation techniques, and basic measurement methods, which should equip conscientious
and dedicated students with the skill set they require for a successful career in experimental
nuclear or particle physics, and such that they can explore more advanced techniques on
their own.
I should note, in closing, that although this book targets primarily students in nuclear and
particle physicists, it should, I believe, prove to be a useful introduction to data analysis for
students working in other fields, including astronomy and basically all other areas of the
physical sciences. It should also, I hope, provide a useful reference for more advanced and
seasoned scientists.
I would like to express my sincere acknowledgments to the many people who, through
discussions and advices, have helped shape this book. These include Monika Sharma,
Rosie Reed, Robert Harr, Paul Karchin, and Sergei Voloshin, who through questions and
comments have helped me plan or contributed various improvements to the book. I also
wish to acknowledge the important contributions of several undergraduate and graduate
students, most particularly Nick Elsey, Derek Everett, Derek Hazard, Ed Kramkowski, Jin-
jin Pan, Jon Troyer, and Chris Zin, who served as guinea-pigs for some fractions of the ma-
terial. I am grateful to my colleagues Giovanni Bonvicini, from the CLEO Collaboration,
for providing a Dalitz plot; Yuri Fisyak and Zhangbu Xu, from the STAR (Solenoidal De-
tector at Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider [RHIC]) Collaboration, for their contribution of a
dE/dx plot; and my former postdoctoral student, Sidharth Prasad, for producing exemplars
of unfolding. I also acknowledge use of several sets of results from the STAR collaboration,
publicly available from the collaboration’s website, for the generation of figures presenting
examples of flow measurements and correlation functions. I am particularly indebted to
colleagues Drs. Jean Barrette, Ron Belmont, Jana Bielcikova, Panos Christakoglou, Kolja
Kauder, William Llope, Prabhat Pujahari, Sidharth Prasad, Joern Putschke, and William
Zajc for their detailed reading and feedback on various sections of the book corresponding
to their respective areas of expertise and interest. I also wish to acknowledge Ms. Heidi
Kenaga and Ms. Theresa Kornak for their meticulous proofreading of the manuscript and
for being so nice in correcting my Frenglish.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge that a large fraction of the graphs and figures featured in
this book were created with ROOT, Keynote, and Graphic Converter. Several of the ROOT
macros I wrote for the generation of figures will be made available at the book website.
Claude A. Pruneau

.001
How to Read This Book
Not all students, instructors, and practitioners of the field of experimental physics may
have the inclination, the time, or the need to study this book in its entirety. Indeed, only a
selected few may have the opportunity to read the book from cover to cover. This should
not be a problem, however, because the material is organized in large blocks that are rea-
sonably self-sufficient, and ample references to earlier or upcoming chapters, as the case
may be, are included in the narrative. The book also includes a number of specialized or
in-depth topics that may be skipped in a first reading. Such topics include, for instance, the
formal definition of probability in §2.2, the notion of Fisher information discussed in §4.7,
the technique of Kalman filtering introduced in §5.6 and for which a detailed example of
application is presented in §9.2.3, as well as discussions of track and vertex reconstruc-
tion presented in §§ 9.2 and 9.3. This said, the book is designed to progressively develop
and approach topics, and it should then be possible to study the material in a variety of
ways, adapting the depth and breadth of coverage. The following are recommended lists of
chapters and sections that should be covered given specific and targeted needs.
r Introductory course in probability and statistics:
Chapters 2 (§§2.1, 2.3–2.11), 3 (§§3.1–3.13), 4 (§§4.1–4.6), 5 (§§5.1–5.5), 6 (§§6.1–6.6),
7 (§§7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.7), 13
r Advanced course in probability and statistics:
Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13
r Introductory course in data analysis techniques (one semester):
Chapters 1, 2 (§§2.1, 2.3–2.11), 3 (§§3.1–3.13), 4 (§§4.1–4.6), 5 (§§5.1–5.5), 6 (§§6.1–
6.6), 8 (§§8.1–8.6), 9 (§§9.1, 9.2), 13
r Advanced course in data analysis techniques (two semesters):
Chapters 1, 2 (§§2.1, 2.3–2.11), 3 (§§3.1–3.13), 4 (§§4.1–4.6), 5 (§§5.1–5.6), 6 (§§6.1–
6.7), 7, 8 (§§81–8.6), 9 (§§9.1, 9.2), 12, 13, 14
r Course on correlation functions (one semester):
Chapters 2 (§§2.5–2.13), 4 (§§4.3, 4.5, 4.6), 10, 11, 12, 13
Of course, instructors using this book should feel free to select and change the order of
topics to suit their specific needs. For instance, Monte Carlo methods are formally intro-
duced in Chapter 13 but it is often useful and inconvenient to use and discuss some of these
concepts along with materials of the early chapters (e.g., Chapters 2–7).
xiii

.002
.002
1 The Scientific Method
1.1 What the Brain Does
From the moment a child is born, her brain is flooded with signals generated by her senses,
including smells, sounds, images, touches, and tastes, as well as various other messages
produced by her internal organs. Her brain readily engages in processes of pattern recog-
nition and classification to “organize” all these data. This pattern recognition forms the
basic elements of perception or views of reality the child will gather from this moment on.
Slowly but surely, her brain will start to organize the data into mental models of the world
that surrounds her: If I cry, somebody comes, feeds me, holds me, and it feels good.
At first, her perceptions are crude and simple, but with time, they progressively become
more and more sophisticated. And soon, with the emergence of language abilities, her
modeling of the world acquires tags and labels. She communicates the things she likes
and dislikes, her wants, and what she doesn’t want. And, as her senses and motor skills
develop, she becomes an avid explorer of her immediate environment, discovering and
adding to the categories, that is, the models already partially in place. The process is slow,
sometimes laborious, but ineluctably, her brain engages in increasingly sophisticated pat-
tern recognition and progressively forms complex and subtle representations of the world.
This process eventually explodes in a rich and intense search for meaning, through her ado-
lescence and early adulthood, as her brain nears full maturity. In time, her brain becomes
a sophisticated pattern recognition engine that excels at detecting, sometimes inventing,
patterns of all kinds, and making connections between the various entities that inhabit her
world. Quite naturally, and with perhaps relatively limited awareness of her mental pro-
cesses, she becomes an intuitive model builder, arguably some form of prescientific state
of mind endowed with curiosity, a vast capacity for inquiry, and extensive intellectual re-
sources that enable her not only to witness the world, but also become one of its actors, to
experiment, and even to shape reality.
Though the storyline of the development of a human from infant to adulthood is fasci-
nating, the reader might ask why it is relevant as an introduction to a book on data analysis
techniques?
The answer is rather simple: much like a growing child, modeling the world and exper-
imenting is in fact what scientists do. Indeed, the raison d’être of scientists is to discover,
observe, and formulate models of the world and reality. Could it be then that we humans are
scientists by our very nature, that is, by simple virtue of the inner workings of our minds?
Surely, the evolution of a child’s brain and mental processes just briefly depicted seems a

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rather universal process, and this does suggest that all humans are endowed with a natural
and innate ability to become scientists. The fact that only relatively few among us end up
making science their primary occupation and profession may not diminish this capacity
in the least, but we need to acknowledge that as each of us emerges into adulthood, we
develop varied interests and skill sets and engage in diverse activities, each accompanied
by distinct and at times seemingly incompatible forms of discourse. Our capacity to detect
or make up patterns does not vanish, however, and we continue through adulthood to seek
understanding and meaning in the people and events that surround us. Evidently, given that
our models of the world are based on our individual experiences and circumstances (in-
cluding formal and informal education), we collectively end up having a plurality of views
and interpretations of reality, some of which may clash drastically, or even violently.
Can all these views and forms of discourse be true simultaneously, or are there models
that constitute a closer representation of reality? And if so, is there a privileged form of
discourse and method that can enable us to reach, progressively perhaps, a more robust and
truthful model of reality? Is there, in fact, such a thing as reality? These are both powerful
and complex questions that many great thinkers have reflected upon through time. Indeed,
ideas on such matters abound and many philosophers, through history, have claimed own-
ership of the truth. Amid all these ideas, one particular form of discourse and inquiry has
risen and developed. It is both humble and powerful: it admits its innate incapacity to reach
a perfect truth, but provides the means to progressively and systematically identify better
views of reality. We call it the scientific method.
1.2 Critics of the Scientific Method
Science, as an empirical form of inquiry, finds its roots in the work of Copernicus, Galileo,
and Newton. In Europe, before and around their times, the dominant philosophical view
was that human perceptions and reasonings are intrinsically fallible and cannot be trusted,
and that we should consequently rely on the word of God embodied in the Bible to guide
our views and interpretation of reality. Copernicus, who had an interest in the motion of
heavenly bodies, most particularly the planets, came to the realization that the Ptolemaic
tables that had been used to describe the motion of the planets for several centuries were
quite inaccurate and developed the notion that better observations of their positions through
time would reveal the geocentric Ptolemaic model is wrong and that the planets, Earth
included, all revolve around the Sun. Galileo and Newton, much like Copernicus, would
champion the notion that the heavens are not perfect, and that careful observations can
reveal much about the nature of things.
Arguably, it was Galileo who made the greatest breakthrough. Equipped with the tele-
scopes he had built, he proceeded to discover mountains on the Moon, spots on the surface
of the Sun, the Sun’s rotation, phases of Venus, and satellites orbiting Jupiter. He would
then conclude that the heavens are not immutable or perfect, and demonstrably show that
empirical observations are not only possible but also powerful in their capacity to reveal
new phenomena and new worlds.

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3 1.2 Critics of the Scientific Method
Newton would later use precise observations of Mars, in particular, to demonstrate that
the planets follow elliptical orbits with the Sun at one foci, and formulate a theory postu-
lating the existence of a force acting at a distance between the Sun and the planets: gravity.
Together, the work of Galileo and of Newton would exemplify the notion that empirical
knowledge is possible, particularly when the senses are enhanced (e.g., with a telescope)
and reasonings framed into a powerful mathematical language (e.g., calculus). Together,
these works would provide the impetus for a new view of the world and a new approach
to scholarly works: empirical observations coupled with detailed mathematical represen-
tations of world entities and their relations can lead to great advances in our ability to
understand and shape the world. Science, or the Scientific Method, as we now think of it,
was born.
In spite of these great early successes, several philosophers would argue that while
empirical methods have merits and do enable the formulation of models or theories of
the world that work, such models could never be proven absolutely correct. David Hume
(1711–1776), in particular, argued that it is factually impossible to deduce universal gen-
eralizations (i.e., models that always apply) from series of finitely many observations, and
consequently, that inductive reasoning, and therefore causality, cannot, ultimately, be justi-
fied rationally. The notion has obvious merits. For instance, to use a rather trivial example,
consider whether the fact that all zebras you might have so far seen in your life featured
a black and white striped mane implies that all zebras are necessarily striped black and
white? Obviously not: you have not seen all zebras in existence on our planet and thus
cannot conclude all zebras feature black and white stripes. In fact, golden zebras, featuring
a pigmentation abnormality characterized by the lack of melanin color pigments, do exist.
A less trivial example of Hume’s point involves Newton’s three laws of mechanics and
his Law of Universal Gravitation. Following the initial successes of the theory in explain-
ing the observations of Mars’ orbit, Newton’s laws of mechanics and gravity were tested
repeatedly throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and found to be exquisitely
accurate. Universal Gravitation also featured great predictive power best exemplified by
the discovery of the planet Neptune based on calculations by the French astronomer Ur-
bain Le Verrier, that accounted for observed anomalies in the orbit of Uranus. It seemed
fitting, indeed, to qualify the law as universal. Yet, neither the three laws of mechanics nor
the law of gravity would indefinitely survive the test of time. Indeed, with the publication
of a paper, in 1907, by Albert Einstein, it emerged that the laws of Newton were in fact
incorrect, or as many physicists prefer to say, incomplete. Evidently, demonstrating the in-
adequacy of Newton’s laws (or more properly stated, the underlying principle of Galilean
transformations) would require observations involving light and objects moving at large
velocities. A few years later, in 1915, with the publication of a paper on general relativ-
ity, Einstein would also put into question Newton’s amazingly successful theory of gravity.
General relativity would eventually find confirmation in observations of the precession of
the orbit of Mercury and the deflection of light by the Sun’s gravity measured by Sir Arthur
Eddington in 1919 [78]. No matter how many observations could be successfully explained
by Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation, its failure to successfully explain the magnitude
of Mercury’s precession and the proper deflection of light by the Sun would provide tangi-
ble evidence of its inaccuracy as a model of reality. Hume was certainly right. Yet, he also

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obviously overstated the case. Though not perfect, Newton’s laws proved to be immensely
useful in explaining the world as well as building devices and artifacts that would ease
humans’ lives. Indeed, effective empirical knowledge is possible, even though it is bound
to forever be tentative.
1.3 Falsifiability and Predictive Power
The notion of empirical knowledge as tentative was properly clarified by Sir Karl Popper,
who argued that although a scientific theory cannot be proven correct by any finite number
of experiments, it can be falsified; that is, it may be proven false (wrong) in the appro-
priate context. Indeed, it suffices to observe a single non-black and white striped zebra to
conclude that the theory that all zebras are black and white striped is incorrect. Likewise,
measurements of the precession of Mercury and the deflection of light would demonstrate
the inadequacy of Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation. The theory could not be proven
right, but it could be proven wrong. Limited empirical knowledge is thus possible, insofar
as it can be falsified, that is, demonstrated false in an appropriate context. We will see in
Chapter 6 that falsifiability has led to the notion of null hypothesis and (scientific) hy-
pothesis testing. A null hypothesis typically champions the accepted theory (e.g., Law of
Universal Gravitation). Experiments are then conducted to test the null hypothesis and the
theory remains unchallenged as long as it is deemed acceptable based on measured data.
An accumulation of observations that support the null hypothesis increases its plausibil-
ity (degree of belief) without ever proving it is universally correct. However, if (reliably)
measured data are observed to deviate sizably from the null hypothesis (i.e., data values
predicted based on the null hypothesis), the null hypothesis is considered rejected (false)
and the theory challenged. And if the number of observations that challenge the null hy-
potheses becomes large, or the observed deviations can be considered irreconcilably large,
the theory is eventually abandoned.
Alas, nothing is that simple. An experiment can go wrong and produce results that im-
properly reject the null hypothesis. The rejection is then considered an error of the first
kind (type I). Alternatively, experimental results can also falsely support the null hypoth-
esis, and the unwarranted acceptance of the hypothesis is known as an error of the second
kind (type II). Regrettably, pushing this argument to its absurd limit, postmodern philoso-
phers have formulated the notion that even falsification is impossible. Is the golden zebra
actually a zebra or something else? Can one be sure of anything at all; can one reliably
say anything at all? This absurd line of argument has led to the postmodern notion that all
theories are equally valid; that all forms of discourse and inquiries are equally valid; and
science, most particularly the scientific method, does not constitute a privileged vehicle to
acquire and validate (or falsify) knowledge. This view, however, is considered far too ex-
treme by most modern scientists given that it blindly neglects the tangible and significant
advances made by science in the last three centuries. The post-postmodernistic view, as one
might call it, accepted by most modern scientists, is that Popper was in fact essentially cor-
rect but the notion of predictive power must augment basic falsification. In other words,

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5 1.5 Science as an Empirical Study of Nature
scientific models must be capable of making predictions that can be tested against careful
and reproducible observations or measurements.
Indeed, much like a child’s brain evolves to become a model builder and learn to learn,
philosophers and scientists have, over time, examined and pondered how to learn from Na-
ture and eventually formulated what is now known as the scientific method. This said, the
scientific method is not fundamentally different today than it was, say, fifty or one hun-
dred years ago. Although certainly more articulated, debated, and written about, it remains
rather simple at its very core: observe a phenomenon of interest, formulate a mathematical
model, verify how the model accounts for past observations, and use it to predict variants of
the phenomenon and future observations. And, following Popper, models shall be readily
abandoned if falsified by observed data. However, falsifiability is often largely insufficient:
models based on distinct and perhaps incompatible assumptions may often be concomi-
tantly supported by a specific dataset. It is thus necessary to identify extensions to existing
measurements and examine where conflicting models may deviate appreciably from each
other, and thereby provide grounds for additional testing and falsification.
1.4 A Flawed but Effective Process!
At this point, it is important to stress that perceptions and experimental measurements do

not in fact need to be perfect for science to progress. As we will discuss at length in Chap-
ter 12, no perception or measurement is in fact ever perfect: there are invariably resolution
effects that smear the values of measured (physical) quantities; there are signal recognition
or reconstruction issues that lead to signal losses and biases; and there may be background
signals that may interfere with a measurement. But it is in the very nature of the scien-
tific method to base measurements on techniques and processes that are well established
and can be modeled with a high degree of reliability, and as such, can be corrected for
experimental or instrumental effects. Indeed, a detailed understanding of the measurement
process enables the formulation of (measurement) models that enable precise and reliable
corrections of measured data. Although our sensory perceptions may not provide an objec-
tive view of reality, our technology-based measurements can. And if and when corrections
applied to data are deemed questionable, the correction procedures can usually be studied
and improved through better design of the measurement apparatus and protocol.
1.5 Science as an Empirical Study of Nature
The first model assumption to be made is perhaps that a particular phenomenon might
be interesting or useful to study. Although such a statement may seem trivial, particu-
larly in modern scientific cultures, it amounts to a relatively new idea, which dates back
to the times of Copernicus and Galileo. Before the Copernican revolution,1 the prevalent
1 And sadly still today in some conservative religious cultures.

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attitude, among learned individuals and scholars, was that wisdom cannot be gained by ob-
servations of the world but must rather be based on sacred texts, such as the Bible, and the
writings of ancient Greek philosophers, most particularly those of Aristotle and Plato. But
the tremendous discoveries Galileo achieved with his small telescope made it abundantly
clear that new knowledge and wisdom can in fact be gained by observing Nature with our
own senses, or with “machines” that enhance them.
Early scientific observations mostly involved direct sensory inputs. But in time it be-
came clear that our senses suffer from several limitations. Indeed, there is great variance
as to what might be considered a loud sound or a bright light intensity by different in-
dividuals. There is also great variability or lack of reproducibility in the observations of
a single observer. Our eyes and ears, in particular, dynamically adapt to the environment
and thus do not provide reliable measurements of luminosity and loudness, among several
other observables. Our senses are also limited in their sensitivity. For instance, our eyes
and ears cannot perceive very weak light and sound signals, and they may easily be dam-
aged by excessively bright or loud sources. They also have rather crude abilities to detect
the difference between two distinct sensory inputs (e.g., just noticeable loudness differ-
ence, pitch difference, etc.). In stark contrast, technologies based on previously acquired
scientific knowledge alleviate most, if not all, of our senses’ shortcomings.
In the course of time, scientists and engineers have learned to design and build devices
that vastly surpass human sensory capabilities in sensitivity, precision, and accuracy, as
well as dynamic range. Consider that Galileo’s first telescope, with an aperture of 26 mm,
could collect roughly four times the light his unaided eyes could and provided modest
magnification (14×). So equipped, Galileo was able to “see” phenomena and features of
Nature that were otherwise impossible to detect with human eyes alone, such as the phases
of Venus, mountains on the Moon, and so forth. But modern telescopes have far surpassed
the reach and prowess of Galileo’s first telescope. The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) in
Earth’s orbit and the Keck telescopes atop Mauna Kea, Hawaii, have effective apertures
90,000 and 1,600,000 times larger than those of the human eye, respectively, thereby en-
abling astronomers to “see” objects at distances that Galileo himself could perhaps not even
comprehend. Other orbital telescopes, such as the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe,
the Spitzer Space Telescope, the Chandra X-ray Observatory, and the Fermi Gamma-ray
Space Telescope have extended the range of the human eye so it is now essentially pos-
sible to exploit the entire electromagnetic spectrum in our study of the Universe. Recent
technological advances have also made it possible to detect and study gravitational waves
produced by large objects in rapid motion, thereby also extending humans’ very crude and
primitive ability to sense gravity.
Technology not only amplifies, extends, or improves human perceptions; it also enables
scientists to select, prepare, and repeat the conditions of particular observations. It is then
possible to bring specific phenomena into focus while eliminating others, or at the very
least suppress uninteresting and spurious effects. This is perhaps best epitomized by exper-
iments at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), such as ATLAS, CMS, and ALICE, that study
collisions of specific beams of well-defined energy with vast arrays of high-granularity
and high-sensitivity sensors that enable precise detection of particles produced by colli-
sions. Much like the Keck and HST telescopes, the LHC detectors provide observational

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7 1.6 Defining Scientific Models
capabilities that far surpass any individual human ability, and thereby enable detailed ex-
ploration of the structure of elementary particles and the forces that govern them.
Obtaining such fantastic capabilities evidently involves many challenges. The cost of
these facilities is extremely large, and their complexity is commensurate with their cost.
The design, construction, and operation of these very complex machines require large in-
ternational collaborations with scientists and engineers of varied and advanced skill sets.
Complexity also brings challenges in the areas of student training, detector maintenance
and operation, as well as data analysis, and thus often necessitates narrow training and
specialization. It also brings about the need for elaborate detector calibration and data cor-
rection procedures. Fortunately, these large experimental facilities stand on the shoulders
of prior facilities and experiments. They were indeed not designed totally from scratch and
scientists involved in these organizations have inherited and perfected clear and precise
protocols to handle all matters of data calibration and reconstruction, some of which are
briefly discussed in Chapters 12 and 14.
1.6 Defining Scientific Models
While the notion that humans are natural-born modelers is enticing, it tells us very little
about the requirements for scientific modeling, that is, the elaboration of scientific models
or theories of the world that are falsifiable and endowed with predictive power. Surely, the
plurality of religions and philosophies humans adopt or inherit from their parents should be
a clear sign that reaching an objective view of reality is anything but a simple process. Yet,
the fact that we all share a common predicament is a good indicator that we partake in the
same reality and that although it may be difficult to reach an objective and comprehensive
view of this reality, the task nonetheless remains feasible, if only by small increments.
What then should be the defining elements of a scientific model of reality?
Broadly speaking, a model may consist of any constructs used to represent, describe,
or predict observations. In this context, quantum mechanics, the theory of evolution, and
creationism may then qualify as models of reality, at least to the extent that they provide
a means to represent and interpret reality. These models, however, differ greatly in their
capacity for falsification as well as in their predictive power. To be scientific, and thus
used reliably or in a credible authoritative fashion, a model must satisfy a few minimal
requirements that, alas, are not met by all models elaborated, shared, or inherited by humans
in their daily lives. To be scientific, a model must reasonably circumscribe its range or scope
of applicability; it must identify and clearly define observables or quantities of interest to
the model; it must be internally consistent and logical; and it must be capable, following
Popper’s argument, of falsification as well as genuine and meaningful predictive power.
To be clear, Popper’s notion of models as tentative implies models are not reality but
at best fragmentary representations or images of reality. But three hundred years of mod-
ern science have taught us that although all models remain tentative, one can nonetheless
have very high expectations from scientific models, and that in fact it is possible to reach
increasingly sophisticated and powerful insights into the inner workings of our universe.

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Parenthetically, it should be stressed that a person or organization presenting a model or

set of ideas as the ultimate and final view of reality (i.e., reality itself) should most likely
not be trusted...
Scientific models are built on the basis of well-defined entities and designed to describe
these and the relations between them. Although a mathematical formulation of these rela-
tions is not absolutely required, it is typically useful because it enables, in most cases, a
clear path to falsifiability and model predictability.
Roadmaps constitute an interesting basic example of a model of reality. Typically pre-
sented on a flat surface, they depict the position of entities of interest (e.g., roads, land-
marks, and various artifacts) relative to a reference position, and are designed to provide
guidance to travelers. Representation as flat surfaces is of course not meant to imply the
world is flat but merely a necessity imposed by the media used to present maps. Roads,
landmarks, and artifacts are labeled and coded to help users find their location and a path
to their destination. Although somewhat simplistic as a model of reality, a map provides a
good example of a basic scientific model. It is based on well-defined entities, has a clear
purpose (representation of the human environment), provides predictive power (i.e., how
to reach one’s destination), and is falsifiable. The reliability of a map is particularly im-
portant. If roads are improperly represented or labeled, users of the map may experience
delays and frustrations in reaching their destination. The map is thus easily falsified: if you
reach an intersection and the road names posted at the section do not match those shown on
the map, suggests that the map may not be accurate. There might be a typo on the map. It
could be dated and not representative of recent changes in the road structure, and so forth.
But it is also conceivable that postings are missing or improperly placed. The user could
also be confused about his or her actual location. In essence, both the data (observed street
names) and the model (road names shown on the map) can be wrong. The map remains
nonetheless useful insofar as the number of typos or mistakes is relatively modest. A prac-
tical user would thus not dispose of the map simply because it features a few mistakes or
inaccuracies. In fact, a savvy road traveler would figure out how to use her location to up-
date and correct the map. The model could then be salvaged and thus reusable in the future
without a repeat of the same frustrations. But then again, if whole regions of a city have
been remodeled, an old map has lost its utility and should be disposed of, unless perhaps
its uniqueness justifies keeping it as a museum piece.
While somewhat trivial, the roadmap example illustrates many of the facets and proper-
ties of a scientific model. It models well-defined entities of the real world, it indicates their
relations (e.g., the Empire State building is south of the Chrysler building), it is falsifiable,
and has some predictive power (i.e., how to get to one’s destination). But as a model of
reality, it is rather primitive and limited. It does not tell us why the streets were built the
way they were, who named them, why the given names were chosen, and so forth. It is
descriptive and useful but features no dynamics, evolution, or causal relationships.
Scientific models formulated in the physical and biological sciences typically seek
to provide not only a descriptive account of reality but also the dynamics, that is, the
causal and evolutionary interrelationships connecting the entities of a model. Classical
mechanics (Newton’s laws) is a prime example of a scientific model featuring descriptive

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9 1.6 Defining Scientific Models
components (kinematics: representation of motion) and causal components (dynamics:

forces and causes of the motion). Likewise, the theory of evolution involves a descrip-
tive component, the taxonomy of species, and a dynamic component that describes how
species are connected through time, how they evolve. In both cases, it is the dynamical
component of the theory that is of greatest interest because it tells us how systems change,
and indeed how they evolve. Dynamical models feature great predictive power and capacity
for falsifiability. For instance, not only does classical mechanics provide for a description
of the motion of objects, called kinematics; it also features dynamics, which enables pre-
dictions of where objects will be in the future based on their current location and models
of the forces through which they interact. If these force models are wrong, so will be the
predictions. Likewise, the theory of evolution, first formulated by Darwin, empowers us
to understand the relations and connections between species and how environmental con-
straints shaped them over long periods of time to become what they are today.
By stark contrast, creationism, as well as intelligent design, are models of reality that are
totally devoid of content, falsifiability, and predictive power. To be sure, one is obviously at
a liberty to posit that God created the Universe on a Sunday, exactly 6,000 years ago. That
includes, of course, photons traveling through space as if they came from galaxies located
hundreds of millions of light years away. And given there are billions of galaxies in the
visible universe (e.g., a simple extrapolation from the Ultra Deep Field survey completed
by the Hubble Space Telescope), that makes God an amazing being indeed. But why are
some stars red and others blue? Why are some galaxies shaped like spirals and others like
footballs? Why does Earth have an atmosphere rich in oxygen and capable of sustaining
life, while the other planets do not? Because God made it that way? But why did God make
these things that way? The faithful respond: Don’t ask. It is the mystery of the creation.
But how does this inform us about the world we live in? Are you sure the Universe was
created on a Monday, not a Tuesday, or was it a Saturday? Did the wise men who wrote the
Bible know about other galaxies, dinosaurs, and stellar nucleo-synthesis? Does the Bible
provide a path to such discoveries and for a falsifiable representation of reality? Sadly, it
does not. For sure, it tells an evocative story. But the story has no reliable markers, no real
capacity for cross-checks and thus no falsifiability. And more importantly, it has no factual
predictive power. It is thus of little use as a basis to model reality. Change the religion,
change the book (e.g., the Koran, the Torah, the Bhagavad Gita, the Vedas, the Avestan,
etc.), and the actors change names, the narrative changes, the commandments also change
a little, but the conclusion remains the same: sadly, as models of reality these books have
no trustworthy content, no falsifiability, no predictive power, and thus no real usefulness.
No reliable model of reality means no trustworthy path to knowledge, no tangible and
reliable source of meaning and ethics. It means chaos. And chaos it is across our beautiful
blue planet. Witness cultural and religious factions claiming they own their lands as well
as the truth, and worst, readily conducting genocides, in the name of God, to eliminate
whatever groups disagree with them and stand in their path. But it does not have to be that
way. The scientific method does work. It is slow but robust and the models (knowledge)
of reality it provides, while innately tentative and incomplete, are steadily bringing our
scientific civilization to a greater and clearer vision of our Universe, our origins, and our

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nature. To quip, I would suggest that those who wish to get a true spiritual experience
should pick up a physics or biology textbook, because there is sure no better way to embrace
reality than science. But brace yourself, it takes work!
1.7 Challenges of the Scientific Method: Paradigm Shifts

and Occam’s Razor
Though science works, scientific modeling of reality is not without challenges of its own.
One such challenge was clearly put to light by Thomas Kuhn in his book, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions [132]. To understand the issue, let us briefly consider the transition
between the geocentric and heliocentric views of the world that occurred at the eve of the
scientific revolution following the works and writings of Nicolaus Copernicus.
Born in 1473 in the town of Torun, Poland, Copernicus was orphaned at an early age
and taken under the tutelage of his maternal uncle, Lucas Watzenrode the Younger (1447–
1512), a very influential bishop of Poland, who provided for his education. Copernicus
studied law and medicine, but his true passion was astronomy. Noticing that the positions
of the planets were considerably off compared to predictions provided by the Alfonsine
tables,2 he became convinced that Ptolemy’s geocentric view of the world was incorrect and
he proposed a heliocentric model in which all the planets revolve around the Sun, except
the Moon, which revolves around the Earth. Much time would pass before Copernicus’s
heliocentric model became widely accepted, but it eventually did, thanks in part to the work
of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton. In time, astronomers would successively also dethrone the
Sun and our galaxy as the center of the Universe.
The central point of this story is the geocentric model with its deferents and epicycles.
The fact of the matter is that an arbitrary number of nested epicycles could be added to
the geocentric model to fix it and provide a very accurate model of the apparent motion
of the planets. With sufficiently many epicycles, the model could be made reliable for sev-
eral decades, perhaps centuries. Kuhn’s point is that based on observations of the apparent
motion of the planets alone, it would not have been possible to readily falsify the geocen-
tric model augmented with an arbitrary number of nested epicycles. Thankfully, several
other observations, including the fact that Venus has phases incompatible with Ptolemy’s
geocentric model, the aberration of light, and Foucault’s pendulum, would provide incon-
trovertible falsification power to reject the geocentric model in favor of the heliocentric
model.
The capacity to mathematically represent the apparent motion of the planets with the
wrong model, however, remains a serious issue. Thomas Kuhn realized the same type of
issue could arise within models discussing various other aspects of reality. In essence,
Kuhn understood that mathematical models describing a portion of reality (e.g., geocentric
motion of the planets, classical description of particle motion, etc.) may be artificially
2 Astronomical tables prepared on the request of thirteenth century King Alfonso X of Castile, based on Claudius
Ptolemy’s geocentric model of the motion of planets.

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11 1.7 Challenges of the Scientific Method: Paradigm Shifts and Occam’s Razor
augmented with fixes and artifices until drastically different types of observations render a
model untenable and requires what he called a paradigm shift.
Figuratively speaking, the need for the addition of epicycles may in part arise because of
the limited quality of the data or poorly understood features of the measurement process. It
could also amount to an attempt to temporarily fix the model while waiting for additional
and better quality data, or a new model capable of providing a more encompassing view of
the phenomenon or system of interest, and so on. One could obviously expound further on
this topic, but the main point of interest, as far as this book is concerned, is that mathemat-
ical models used for the representation of natural phenomena can always be made more
complicated to account for unusual features of the data. How then can scientists judge
whether a scientific model and its mathematical realization provide a proper and sufficient
representation of a phenomenon of interest (i.e., reality)? Why is Newton’s model of orbital
motion better than Ptolemy’s? Why was it necessary to invent quantum mechanics?
An answer to such questions is often provided in the form of Occam’s razor,3 a principle
stating that among competing hypotheses, the simplest, that is, the one with the fewest
assumptions, should be selected. In mathematical terms, this translates into selecting the
(fit) model with the least number of free parameters that is consistent with the data. Indeed,
why use a cubic or quartic polynomial to fit a set of data if the precision of the data does
not warrant it? A straight line or parabola might be sufficient, unless perhaps one has
prior reasons to believe a higher degree polynomial must be used. An important aspect of
data analysis then involves the evaluation of errors and of the techniques to assess or test
whether a model or hypothesis constitutes an appropriate and sufficient representation of
the data.
Understanding experimental errors and how they propagate to model properties derived
from the data is thus a central aspect of the scientific method. We thus devote several
sections, throughout the book, on this very important topic. An intuitive notion of error
and techniques of error propagation are first discussed in Chapter 2 after the introduction of
the concept of probability. A more precise definition of the concept of errors is introduced
in Chapter 4 on the basis of estimators and statistics. A full characterization of errors,
however, requires the notions of confidence level and confidence intervals discussed in
Chapter 6. The notion of confidence interval is slightly modified in Bayesian inference and
renamed credible interval in Chapter 7. Equipped with the notions of confidence intervals
and data probability models, it then becomes possible, in Chapter 6, to fully address the
notion of (scientific) hypothesis tests. A mathematical implementation of Occam’s razor,
based on the Bayesian interpretation is finally discussed in Chapter 7.
Occam’s razor alone, however, is usually insufficient to abandon a particular model. A
more convincing line of arguments is generally needed. Indeed, and to get back to our
example, it is not Occam’s razor that made scientists reject Ptolemy’s model, but the ob-
servation of phenomena completely inconsistent with a geocentric universe, including the
existence of Venus phases, the aberration of light, and Foucault’s pendulum, and just as
importantly the immense predictive power of Newton’s mechanics and Law of Univer-
sal Gravitation. Newton’s model is not better than Ptolemy’s merely because it has fewer
3 A problem-solving principle attributed to William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347).

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parameters (in fact, it has quite a few as well, the mass of the planets, the size and eccen-
tricity of their orbits, etc.) but because its higher level of abstraction provides a unifying
principle (e.g., the force of gravity) that enables falsifiable predictions of the motion of
objects on Earth as well as in the heavens. Likewise, the nonclassical concepts of wave
function and quantization enabled accurate quantitative descriptions of large classes of
phenomena that were otherwise intractable within the classical physics paradigm.
Kuhn argued that competing paradigms are frequently incommensurable, as competing
and irreconcilable accounts of reality, and that scientists cannot rely on objectivity alone.
Accordingly, the necessity for paradigm shifts may then involve a certain degree of sub-
jectivity. It remains nonetheless that it would have been completely impossible to realize
a flyby of Pluto (NASA Horizon spacecraft, summer 2015) based on Ptolemy’s geocentric
model but the exploit was readily achievable based on Newton mechanics. Likewise, de-
signing microtransistors and computer chips would be inconceivable within the framework
of classical mechanics but became a tremendously successful outcome of the develop-
ment of quantum mechanics. Similar conclusions may also be stated for the tremendous
progress achieved in biology, most particularly in genetics. It is rather clear that such ad-
vances could not have been possible without the guiding principles of Darwin’s theory of
evolution. There is little or no subjectivity associated with these facts. Falsifiability may be
temporarily compromised by the addition of epicycles but the overarching predictive power
and technical prowess of scientific theories developed after successive paradigm shifts are
objective indications that although our models of reality remain tentative, science as a
whole has made tremendous progress in formulating meaningful and powerful theories of
reality. There is indeed little doubt that science is closer to the true nature of reality today
than it was 50, 100, or 2,000 years ago.
1.8 To Err Is Human, to Control Errors, Science!
One of the very first things science students learn in the laboratory is that making mistakes
in the execution of an experimental procedure and the acquisition of data is terribly easy.
Committed students usually figure out how to improve their lab work and reduce or even
eliminate the number of mistakes made in their execution of experimental protocols. But
students must also learn that although the capacity to conduct reliable experiments is a
skill one can hone through training and repetition, the risk of errors, and the need to under-
stand them, never goes away. There are many types and sources of errors, of course, but at
the end of the day, even if an experimental procedure is executed flawlessly, there remain
irreducible sources of errors and uncertainties determined by the measurement process it-
self, known as process noise, and the instrument read-out, known as measurement noise.
And although improvements in the design of an experimental apparatus or procedure may
reduce these errors, they can never eliminate them completely.
But, as we have argued earlier, the true power of the scientific method resides in its
capacity to falsify models and its ability to make accurate predictions. This implies it is
absolutely necessary to understand the errors of a measurement, identify their sources and

.003
13 1.9 Goals, Structure, and Layout of This Book
types, and make the best efforts to reduce their amplitude. Indeed, the capacity to reject a
model (falsification of the null hypothesis), and adopt another one (adoption of an alterna-
tive hypothesis), based on a specific measurement is chiefly determined by the measure-
ment’s precision.
Evidently, having an estimate of the error involved in a measurement does not mean one
knows the value of the error (unless perhaps, the value being measured is already known).
If one did, it would suffice to subtract the error from the measured value and one would
achieve an error-free measurement. Having an estimate of the error of measurement instead
means that one can assess the likelihood of deviations of any given size from the true value
of the observable. In this context, measured values are viewed as random variables, that is,
observables that may deviate uncontrollably from their true value due either to their intrin-
sic nature (e.g., the exact decay time of a radioactive nuclei cannot be predicted, only the
average lifetime is known) or variability associated with a macroscopic process involving
a large number of elementary subprocesses (e.g., fluctuations of the number of collisions
experienced by a high-energy particle traversing a large chunk of material). One is thus
constrained to model measurements according to the language of probability and statis-
tics. Assessing experimental errors thus requires a probabilistic model of the measurement
process, and extraction of meaningful scientific results necessitates statistical analysis and
inference. This is largely what this book is about.
1.9 Goals, Structure, and Layout of This Book
Traditionally, scientists, most particularly physicists, have made use of probability and sta-
tistical techniques rooted in the so-called frequentist interpretation of probabilities, which
basically regards probabilities as relative frequencies observed in the limit of an infinite
number of trials or measurements. However, a growing number of scientists, including
physicists, now make use of techniques based on the Bayesian interpretation of probabili-
ties, which assigns hypotheses a certain degree of belief or plausibility. This rapid increase
in the adoption of Baysian probabilities and inference techniques stems in part from the
relatively recent developments of the theory of probability as logic by Jaynes and others,
the elegance and power of the interpretation, as well as the development and articulation
of numerous tools to deal with practical scientific problems. The majority of works and
scientific publications, however, are still based on the traditional methods of the frequentist
interpretation. This book thus attempts to cover data analysis techniques commonly used
in astro-, nuclear, and particle physics based on both approaches.
This book targets graduate students and young scientists. It is not intended as a text for
mathematicians or statisticians. So, while we spend a fair amount of time introducing the
foundations of the theory of probability, and discuss, among other topics, properties of
estimators and statistical inference in great detail, we leave out detailed proofs of many of
the theorems and results presented in the book, and rather concentrate on the interpretation
and applications of the concepts. Note that at variance with more elementary books on
probability and statistics, we assume the reader to be reasonably proficient in elementary

.003
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Rachel Dyer
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Title: Rachel Dyer

A North American story
Author: John Neal
Release date: September 30, 2023 [eBook #71766]
Language: English
Original publication: US:
Credits: Alan, Steve Mattern and the Online Distributed Proofreading

Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This book was produced
from images made available by the HathiTrust Digital
Library.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK RACHEL

DYER ***
RACHEL DYER:
A NORTH AMERICAN STORY.
BY JOHN NEAL.
PORTLAND:
PUBLISHED BY SHIRLEY AND HYDE.
1828.
DISTRICT OF MAINE.... TO WIT:
DISTRICT CLERK’S OFFICE.
B E IT REMEMBERED, That on the eighth day of October, A.D. 1828, and in

the fifty-third year of the Independence of the United States of America,
Shirley & Hyde of said District, have deposited in this office, the title of a book, the
right whereof they claim as proprietors, in the words following, to wit.
“Rachel Dyer: A North American Story. By John Neal. Portland.”
In conformity to the act of the Congress of the United States, entitled “An Act for
the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts and books,
to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned;”
and also, to an act, entitled “An Act supplementary to an act, entitled An Art for the
encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts and books, to
the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned;
and for extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving and
etching historical and other prints.”
J. MUSSEY, Clerk of the District of Maine.
A true copy as of record,
Attest, J. MUSSEY, Clerk D. C. Maine.
PREFACE.
I have long entertained a suspicion, all that has been said by the
novel-writers and dramatists and poets of our age to the contrary
notwithstanding, that personal beauty and intellectual beauty, or
personal beauty and moral beauty, are not inseparably connected
with, nor apportioned to each other. In Errata, a work of which as a
work, I am heartily ashamed now, I labored long and earnestly to
prove this. I made my dwarf a creature of great moral beauty and
strength.
Godwin, the powerful energetic and philosophizing Godwin, saw a
shadow of this truth; but he saw nothing more—the substance
escaped him. He taught, and he has been followed by others, among
whom are Brown, Scott and Byron, (I observe the chronological
order) that a towering intellect may inhabit a miserable body; that
heroes are not of necessity six feet high, nor of a godlike shape, and
that we may be deceived, if we venture to judge of the inward by the
outward man. But they stopped here. They did not perceive, or
perceiving, would not acknowledge the whole truth; for if we consider
a moment, we find that all their great men are scoundrels. Without
one exception I believe, their heroes are hypocrites or misanthropes,
banditti or worse; while their good men are altogether subordinate
and pitiable destitute of energy and wholly without character.
Now believing as I do, in spite of such overwhelming authority, that a
man may have a club-foot, or a hump-back, or even red hair and yet
be a good man—peradventure a great man; that a dwarf with a
distorted shape may be a giant in goodness of heart and greatness
of temper; and that moral beauty may exist where it appears not to
have been suspected by the chief critics of our age, and of past ages
—namely, in a deformed body (like that of Æsop,) I have written this
book.
Let me add however that although such was my principal, it was not
my only object. I would call the attention of our novel-writers and our
novel-readers to what is undoubtedly native and peculiar, in the early
history of our Fathers; I would urge them to believe that though there
is much to lament in that history, there is nothing to conceal; that if
they went astray, as they most assuredly did in their judgments, they
went astray conscientiously, with what they understood to be the law
of God in their right hands. The “Salem Tragedie” is in proof—that is
the ground-work of my story; and I pray the reader to have patience
with the author, if he should find this tale rather more serious in
parts, and rather more argumentative in parts, than stories, novels
and romances generally are.
I do not pretend to say that the book I now offer to my countrymen, is
altogether such a book as I would write now, if I had more leisure,
nor altogether such a book as I hope to write before I die; but as I
cannot afford to throw it entirely away, and as I believe it to be much
better, because more evidently prepared for a healthy good purpose,
than any other I have written, I have concluded to publish it—hoping
it may be regarded by the wise and virtuous of our country as some
sort of atonement for the folly and extravagance of my earlier writing.
The skeleton of this tale was originally prepared for Blackwood, as
the first of a series of North-American Stories: He accepted it, paid
for it, printed it, and sent me the proofs. A misunderstanding
however occurred between us, about other matters, and I withdrew
the story and repaid him for it. It was never published therefore; but
was put aside by me, as the frame-work for a novel—which novel is
now before the reader.
JOHN NEAL.
Portland, October 1, 1828.
P.S. After some consideration, I have concluded to publish a preface,
originally intended for the North American Stories alluded to
above. It was never published, nor has it ever been read by any
body but myself. Among those who are interested for the
encouragement of our native literature, there may be some who will
not be sorry to see what my ideas were on the subject of novel-
writing, as well as what they are. Changes have been foretold in my
views—and I owe it to our people to acknowledge, that in a good
degree, the prediction has been accomplished I do not feel now as I
did, when I wrote Seventy-Six, Randolph, and the rest of the works
published in America; nor even as I did, when I wrote those that
were published over seas. The mere novel-reader had better skip
the following pages and go directly to the story. The introductory
chapter in all human probability will be too much for him.
J. N.
UNPUBLISHED PREFACE
TO THE NORTH-AMERICAN STORIES, ALLUDED TO IN PAGE V.
The author of this work is now under the necessity of bidding the novel-
readers of the day, on both sides of the water, farewell, and in all
probability, forever. By them it may be considered a trivial affair—a time
for pleasantry, or peradventure for a formal expression of what are called
good wishes. But by him, who does not feel like other men—or does not
understand their language, when they talk in this way, it will ever be
regarded as a very serious thing. He would neither conceal nor deny the
truth—he would not so affront the feeling within him—and he says
therefore without affectation or ceremony, that it goes to his heart even to
bid the novel-readers of the age, the few that have read his novels, it
were better to say—farewell.
These volumes are the last of a series which even from his youth up, he
had been accustomed to meditate upon as a worthy and affectionate
offering to his family and to those who have made many a long winter day
in a dreary climate, very cheerful and pleasant to him—the daughters of a
dear friend—of one who, if his eye should ever fall upon this page, will
understand immediately more than a chapter could tell, of the deep
wayward strange motives that have influenced the author to say thus
much and no more, while recurring for the last time to the bright vision of
his youth. And the little that he does say now, is not said for the world;—
for what care they about the humble and innocent creatures, whose
gentleness and sincerity about their own fire-side, were for a long time all
that kept a man, who was weary and sick of the great world, from leaving
it in despair? No, it is not said for them; but for any one of that large family
who may happen to be alive now, and in the way of remembering “the
stranger that was within their gates”—when to the world he may be as if
he never had been. Let them not be amazed when they discover the truth;
nor afraid nor ashamed to see that the man whom they knew only as the
stranger from a far country, was also an author.
In other days, angels were entertained in the shape of travellers and way-
faring men; but ye—had ye known every stranger that knocked at your
door to be an angel, or a messenger of the Most High, could not have
treated him more like an immortal creature than ye did that unknown man,
who now bears witness to your simplicity and great goodness of heart.
With you it was enough that a fellow-creature was unhappy—you strove
to make him happy; and having done this, you sent him away, ignorant
alike of his people, his country and his name.
* * * * *
This work is the last of the sort I believe—the very last I shall ever write.
Reader—stop!—lay down the book for a moment and answer me. Do you
feel no emotion at the sight of that word? You are surprised at the
question. Why should you feel any, you ask. Why should you?—let us
reason together for a moment. Can it be that you are able to bear of the
final consummation of a hope which had been the chief stay of a fellow-
creature for many—many years?—Can it be that you feel no sort of
emotion at hearing him say, Lo! I have finished the work—it is the last—no
sensation of inquietude? Perhaps you now begin to see differently;
perhaps you would now try to exculpate yourself. You are willing to admit
now that the affair is one of a graver aspect than you first imagined. You
are half ready to deny now that you ever considered it otherwise. But
mark me—out of your own mouth you are condemned. Twice have I said
already—three times have I said already, that this was the last work of the
sort I should ever write, and you have read the declaration as you would,
the passing motto of a title-page. You neither cared for it, nor thought of it;
and had I not alarmed you by my abruptness, compelled you to stop and
think, and awed you by steadfastly rebuking your inhumanity, you would
not have known by to-morrow whether I had spoken of it as my last work
or not. Consider what I say—is it not the truth?—can you deny it? And yet
you—you are one of the multitude who dare to sit in judgment upon the
doings of your fellow men. It is on what you and such as you say, that
authors are to depend for that which is of more value to them than the
breath of life—character. How dare you!—You read without reflection, and
you hear without understanding. Yet upon the judgment of such as you—
so made up, it is that the patient and the profound, the thoughtful and the
gifted, are to rely for immortality.
To return to what I was about saying—the work now before you, reader, is
the last of a series, meditated as I have already told you, from my youth. It
was but a dream at first—a dream of my boyhood, indefinite, vague and
shadowy; but as I grew up, it grew stronger and braver and more
substantial. For years it did not deserve the name of a plan—it was
merely a breathing after I hardly knew what, a hope that I should live to do
something in a literary way worthy of my people—accompanied however
with an inappeasable yearning for the time and opportunity to arrive. But
so it was, that, notwithstanding all my anxiety and resolution, I could not
bring myself to make the attempt—even the attempt—until it appeared no
longer possible for me to do what for years I had been very anxious to do.
The engagement was of too sacred a nature to be trifled with—perhaps
the more sacred in my view for being made only with myself, and without
a witness; for engagements having no other authority than our moral
sense of duty to ourselves, would never be performed, after they grew
irksome or heavy, unless we were scrupulous in proportion to the facility
with which we might escape if we would.
This indeterminate, haunting desire to do what I had so engaged to do, at
last however began to give way before the serious and necessary
business of life, and the continually augmenting pressure of duties too
solemn to be slighted for any—I had almost said for any earthly
consideration. Yea more, to confess the whole truth, I had begun to
regard the enterprise itself—so prone are we to self-deception, so ready
at finding excuses where we have a duty to perform—as hardly worthy of
much power, and as altogether beneath an exalted ambition. But here I
was greatly mistaken; for I have an idea now, that a great novel—such a
novel as might be made—if all the powers that could be employed upon it
were found in one man, would be the greatest production of human
genius. It is a law and a history of itself—to every people—and throughout
all time—in literature and morals—in character and passion—yea—in
what may be called the fire-side biography of nations. It would be, if rightly
managed, a picture of the present for futurity—a picture of human nature,
not only here but every where—a portrait of man—a history of the human
heart—a book therefore, written not only in a universal, but in what may
be considered as an everlasting language—the language of immortal,
indistructable spirits. Such are the parables of Him who spoke that
language best.
Again however, the subject was revived. Sleeping and waking, by night
and by day, it was before me; and at last I began to perceive that if the
attempt were ever to be made, it must be made by one desperate,
convulsive, instantaneous effort. I determined to deliberate no longer—or
rather to stand no longer, shivering like a coward, upon the brink of
adventure, under pretence of deliberation; and therefore, having first
carefully stopped my ears and shut my eyes, I threw myself headlong
over the precipice. Behold the result! If I have not brought up the pearls, I
can say at least that I have been to the bottom—and I might have added
—of the human heart sometimes—but for the perverse and foolish
insincerity of the world, which if I had so finished the sentence, would
have set their faces forever against my book; although that same world,
had I been wise enough—no, not wise enough but cunning enough, to
hold my peace, might have been ready to acknowledge that I had been
sometimes, even where I say—to the very bottom of the human heart.
I plunged. But when I did, it was rather to relieve my own soul from the
intolerable weight of her own reproach, than with any hope of living to
complete the design, except at a sacrifice next in degree to that of self-
immolation. Would you know what more than any other thing—more than
all other things determined me at last? I was an American. I had heard the
insolent question of a Scotch Reviewer, repeated on every side of me by
native Americans—“Who reads an American Book?” I could not bear this
—I could neither eat nor sleep till my mind was made up. I reasoned with
myself—I strove hard—but the spirit within me would not be rebuked.
Shall I go forth said I, in the solitude of my own thought, and make war
alone against the foe—for alone it must be made, or there will be no hope
of success. There must be but one head, one heart in the plan—the
secret must not even be guessed at by another—it must be single and
simple, one that like the wedge in mechanics, or in the ancient military art,
must have but one point, and that point must be of adamant. Being so it
may be turned aside: A thousand more like itself, may be blunted or
shivered; but if at last, any one of the whole should make any impression
whatever upon the foe, or effect any entrance whatever into the sanctity
and strength of his tremendous phalanx, then, from that moment, the day
is our own. Our literature will begin to wake up, and our pride of country
will wake up with it. Those who follow will have nothing to do but keep
what the forlorn hope, who goes to irretrievable martyrdom if he fail, has
gained.
Moreover—who was there to stand by the native American that should go
out, haply with a sling and a stone, against a tower of strength and the
everlasting entrenchments of prejudice? Could he hope to find so much
as one of his countrymen, to go with him or even to bear his shield?
Would the Reviewers of America befriend him? No—they have not
courage enough to fight their own battles manfully.[1] No—they would
rather flatter than strike. They negociate altogether too much—where
blows are wanted, they give words. And the best of our literary
champions, would they? No; they would only bewail his temerity, if he
were the bold headlong creature he should be to accomplish the work;
and pity his folly and presumption, if he were any thing else.
[1] Or had not before this was written. Look to the North-American
Review before 1825, for proof.
After all however, why should they be reproached for this? They have
gained their little reputation hardly. “It were too much to spend that little”—
so grudgingly acquiesced in by their beloved countrymen—“rashly.” No
wonder they fight shy. It is their duty—considering what they have at stake
—their little all. There is Washington Irving now; he has obtained the
reputation of being—what?—why at the best, of being only the American
Addison, in the view of Englishmen. And is this a title to care much for?
Would such a name, though Addison stood far higher in the opinion of the
English themselves, than he now does, or ever again will, be enough to
satisfy the ambition of a lofty minded, original thinker? Would such a man
falter and reef his plumage midway up the altitude of his blinding and
brave ascent, to be called the American Addison, or even what in my view
were ten thousand times better, the American Goldsmith.[2] No—up to the
very key stone of the broad blue firmament! he would say, or back to the
vile earth again: ay, lower than the earth first! Understand me however. I
do not say this lightly nor disparagingly. I love and admire Washington
Irving. I wish him all the reputation he covets, and of the very kind he
covets. Our paths never did, never will cross each other. And so with Mr.
Cooper; and a multitude more, of whom we may rightfully be proud. They
have gained just enough popular favor to make them afraid of hazarding
one jot or tittle of it, by stepping aside into a new path. No one of these
could avail me in my design. They would have everything to lose, and
nothing to gain by embarking in it. While I—what had I to lose—nay what
have I to lose? I am not now, I never have been, I never shall be an
author by trade. The opinion of the public is not the breath of life to me;
for if the truth must be told, I have to this hour very little respect for it—so
long as it is indeed the opinion of the public—of the mere multitude, the
careless, unthinking judgment of the mob, unregulated by the wise and
thoughtful.
[2] I speak here of Goldsmith’s prose, not of his poetry. Heaven forbid!
To succeed as I hoped, I must put everything at hazard. It would not do
for me to imitate anybody. Nor would it do for my country. Who would care
for the American Addison where he could have the English by asking for
it? Who would languish, a twelvemonth after they appeared, for Mr.
Cooper’s imitations of Sir Walter Scott, or Charles Brockden Brown’s
imitations of Godwin? Those, and those only, who after having seen the
transfiguration of Raphael, (or that of Talma,) or Dominichino’s St.
Jerome, would walk away to a village painting room, or a provincial
theatre, to pick their teeth and play the critic over an imitation of the one
or a copy of the other. At the best, all such things are but imitations. And
what are imitations? Sheer mimicry—more or less exalted to be sure; but
still mimicry—wherever the copies of life are copied and not life itself: a
sort of high-handed, noon-day plagiarism—nothing more. People are
never amazed, nor carried away, nor uplifted by imitations. They are
pleased with the ingenuity of the artist—they are delighted with the
closeness of the imitation—but that is all. The better the work is done, the
worse they think of the workman. He who can paint a great picture,
cannot copy—David Teniers to the contrary notwithstanding; for David
never painted a great picture in his life, though he has painted small ones,
not more than three feet square, which would sell for twenty-five thousand
dollars to day.
Yes—to succeed, I must imitate nobody—I must resemble nobody; for
with your critic, resemblance in the unknown to the known, is never
anything but adroit imitation. To succeed therefore, I must be unlike all
that have gone before me. That were no easy matter; nor would be it so
difficult as men are apt to believe. Nor is it necessary that I should do
better than all who have gone before me. I should be more likely to
prosper, in the long run, by worse original productions—with a poor story
told in poor language, (if it were original in spirit and character) than by a
much better story told in much better language, if after the transports of
the public were over, they should be able to trace a resemblance between
it and Walter Scott, or Oliver Goldsmith, or Mr. Addison.
So far so good. There was, beyond a doubt, a fair chance in the great
commonwealth of literature, even though I should not achieve a miracle,
nor prove myself both wiser and better than all the authors who had gone
before me. And moreover, might it not be possible—possible I say—for
the mob are a jealous guardian of sepulchres and ashes, and high-
sounding names, particularly where a name will save them the trouble of
judging for themselves, or do their arguments for them in the shape of a
perpetual demonstration, whatever may be the nature of the controversy
in which they are involved—might it not be possible then, I say, that, as
the whole body of mankind have been growing wiser and wiser, and
better and better, since the day when these great writers flourished, who
are now ruling “our spirits from their urns,” that authors may have
improved with them?—that they alone of the whole human race, by some
possibility, may not have remained altogether stationary age after age—
while the least enquiring and the most indolent of human beings—the
very multitude—have been steadily advancing both in knowledge and
power? And if so, might it not be possible for some improvements to be
made, some discoveries, even yet in style and composition, by lanching
forth into space. True, we might not be certain of finding a new world, like
Columbus, nor a new heaven, like Tycho Brahe; but we should probably
encounter some phenomena in the great unvisited moral sky and ocean;
we should at least find out, after a while—which would of itself be the next
greatest consolation for our trouble and anxiety, after that of discovering a
new world or a new system,—that there remained no new world nor
system to be discovered; that they who should adventure after us, would
have so much the less to do for all that we had done; that they must
follow in our steps; that if our health and strength had been wasted in a
prodigious dream, it would have the good effect of preventing any future
waste of health and strength on the part of others in any similar
enterprize.
Islands and planets may still be found, we should say, and they that find
them, are welcome to them; but continents and systems cannot be
beyond where we have been; and if there be any within it, why—they are
neither continents nor systems.
But then, after all, there was one plain question to be asked, which no
honest man would like to evade, however much a mere dreamer might
wish to do so. It was this. After all my fine theory—what are my chances
of success? And if successful, what have I to gain? I chose to answer the
last question first. Gain!—of a truth, it were no easy matter to say. Nothing
here, nothing now—certainly nothing in America, till my bones have been
canonized; for my countrymen are a thrifty, calculating people—they give
nothing for the reputation of a man, till they are sure of selling it for more
than they give. Were they visited by saints and prophets instead of gifted
men, they would never believe that they were either saints or prophets, till
they had been starved to death—or lived by a miracle—by no visible
means; or until their cast-off clothes, bones, hair and teeth, or the furniture
of the houses wherein they were starved, or the trees under which they
had been chilled to death, carved into snuff-boxes or walking-sticks,
would sell for as much as that sympathy had cost them, or as much as it
would come to, to build a monument over—I do not say over their
unsheltered remains, for by that time there would be but little or no
remains of them to be found, unmingled with the sky and water, earth and
air about them, save perhaps in here and there a museum or college
where they might always be bought up, however, immortality and all—for
something more than compound interest added to the original cost—but
to build a monument or a shed over the unappropriated stock, with certain
privileges to the manufacturer of the walking-sticks and snuff-boxes
aforesaid, so long as any of the material remained; taking care to provide
with all due solemnity, perhaps by an act of the legislature, for securing
the monopoly to the sovereign state itself.
Thus much perhaps I might hope for from my own people. But what from
the British? They were magnanimous, or at least they would bear to be
told so; and telling them so in a simple, off-hand, ingenuous way, with a
great appearance of sincerity, and as if one had been carried away by a
sudden impulse, to speak a forbidden truth, or surprised into a prohibited
expression of feeling by some spectacle of generosity, in spite of his
constitutional reserve and timidity and caution, would be likely to pay well.
But I would do no such thing. I would flatter nobody—no people—no
nation. I would be to nobody—neither to my own countrymen, nor to the
British—unless I were better paid for it, than any of my countrymen were
ever yet paid either at home or abroad.
No—I choose to see for myself, by putting the proof touch like a hot iron
to their foreheads, whether the British are indeed a magnanimous people.
But then, if I do all this, what are my chances of reward, even with the
British themselves? That was a fearful question to be sure. The British are
a nation of writers. Their novel-writers are as a cloud. True—true—but
they still want something which they have not. They want a real American
writer—one with courage enough to write in his native tongue. That they
have not, even at this day. That they never had. Our best writers are
English writers, not American writers. They are English in every thing they
do, and in every thing they say, as authors—in the structure and moral of
their stories, in their dialogue, speech and pronunciation, yea in the very
characters they draw. Not so much as one true Yankee is to be found in
any of our native books: hardly so much as one true Yankee phrase. Not
so much as one true Indian, though you hardly take up a story on either
side of the water now, without finding a red-man stowed away in it; and
what sort of a red-man? Why one that uniformly talks the best English the
author is capable of—more than half the time perhaps out-Ossianing
Ossian.
I have the modesty to believe that in some things I am unlike all the other
writers of my country—both living and dead; although there are not a few,
I dare say who would be glad to hear of my bearing a great resemblance
to the latter. For my own part I do not pretend to write English—that is, I
do not pretend to write what the English themselves call English—I do
not, and I hope to God—I say this reverently, although one of their
Reviewers may be again puzzled to determine “whether I am swearing or
praying” when I say so—that I never shall write what is now worshipped
under the name of classical English. It is no natural language—it never
was—it never will be spoken alive on this earth: and therefore, ought
never to be written. We have dead languages enough now; but the
deadest language I ever met with or heard of, was that in use among the
writers of Queen Anne’s day.
At last I came to the conclusion—that the chances were at least a
thousand to one against me. A thousand to one said I, to myself, that I
perish outright in my headlong enterprise. But then, if I do not perish—if I
triumph, what a triumph it will be! If I succeed, I shall be rewarded well—if
the British are what they are believed to be—in fair proportion to the toil
and peril I have encountered. At any rate, whether I fail or not, I shall be,
and am willing to be, one of the first hundred to carry the war into the very
camp, yea among the very household gods of the enemy. And if I die, I
will die with my right arm consuming in the blaze of their altars—like
Mutius Scævola.
But enough on this head. The plan took shape, and you have the
commencement now before you, reader. I have had several objects in
view at the same time, all subordinate however to that which I first
mentioned, in the prosecution of my wayward enterprise. One was to
show to my countrymen that there are abundant and hidden sources of
fertility in their own beautiful brave earth, waiting only to be broken up;
and barren places to all outward appearance, in the northern, as well as
the southern Americas—yet teeming below with bright sail—where the
plough-share that is driven through them with a strong arm, will come out
laden with rich mineral and followed by running water: places where—if
you but lay your ear to the scented ground, you may hear the perpetual
gush of innumerable fountains pouring their subterranean melody night
and day among the minerals and rocks, the iron and the gold: places
where the way-faring man, the pilgrim or the wanderer through what he
may deem the very deserts of literature, the barren-places of knowledge,
will find the very roots of the withered and blasted shrubbery, which like
the traveller in Peru, he may have accidentally uptorn in his weary and
discouraging ascent, and the very bowels of the earth into which he has
torn his way, heavy with a brightness that may be coined, like the soil
about the favorite hiding places of the sunny-haired Apollo.
Another, was to teach my countrymen, that these very Englishmen, to
whom as the barbarians of ancient story did by their gods when they
would conciliate them, we are accustomed to offer up our own offspring,
with our own hands, whenever we see the sky darkening over the water—
the sky inhabited of them; ay, that these very Englishmen, to whom we
are so in the habit of immolating all that is beautiful and grand among us
—the first born of our youth—our creatures of immortality—our men of
genius, while in the fever and flush of their vanity, innocence and passion
—ere they have had time to put out their first plumage to the sky and the
wind, all above and about them—that they, these very Englishmen, would
not love us the less, nor revere us the less, if we loved and revered
ourselves, and the issue of our blood and breath, and vitality and power, a
little more. No—the men of England are men. They love manhood. They
may smile at our national vanity, but their smile would be one of
compassionate benevolence and encouragement, if we were wise
enough to keep our young at home, till their first molting season were well
over—and then, offer to pair them, even though there would be a little
presumption in it, high up in the skies, and the strong wind—with their
bravest and best: not, as we do now, upon the altars of the earth—upon
the tables of our money-changers—half fledged and untrained—with their
legs tied, and wings clipped; or, peradventure, with necks turned, and
heads all skewered under their tails—a heap of carrion and garbage that
the braver birds, even among their enemies, would disdain to stoop at.
Such would be their behavior, if we dealt as we ought with our own; there
would be no pity nor disdain with them. They would cheer us to the
conflict—pour their red wine down our throats if we were beaten; and if
their birds were beaten, they would bear it with temper—knowing that
their reputation could well afford an occasional trumph, to the young of
their favorite brood. The men of England are waiting to do us justice: but
there is a certain formality to be gone through with, before they will do it.
We must claim it. And why should we not? I do not mean that we should
claim it upon our knees as the condemned of their courts of justice are
compelled to claim that mercy, which the very law itself, has
predetermined to grant to him—but will not, unless that idle and unworthy
formality has been submitted to; no—I mean no such thing. We do not
want mercy: and I would have my countrymen, when they are arraigned
before any mere English tribunal—not acting under the law of nations in
the world of literature, to go at once, with a calm front and untroubled eye,
and plead to their jurisdiction, with a loud clear voice, and with their right
hand upon the great book of English law, and set them at defiance. This,
they have the right, and the power to do; and why should they not, when
some of the inferior courts, of mere English criticism, have the audacity at
every little interval, to call upon a sovereign people, to plead before them
—without counsel—and be tried for some infringement of some paltry
municipal provision of their statute book—some provincialism of language
—or some heresy in politics—or some plagiarism of manner or style; and
abide the penalty of forgery—or of ecclesiastical censure—or the reward
of petit-larceny; re-transportation—or re-banishment to America.
It is high time now, that we should begin to do each other justice. Let us
profit by their good qualities; and let them, by ours. And in time, we shall
assuredly come to feel like brothers of the same parentage—an elder and
a younger—different in temper—but alike in family resemblance—and
alike proud of our great ancestry, the English giants of olden time. We
shall revere our brother; and he will love his. But when shall this be?—
not, I am sorely afraid—till we have called home all our children, from the
four corners of the earth; from the east and from the west; from the north
and from the south—and held a congress of the dead—of their fathers,
and of our fathers—and published to the world, and to posterity—
appealing again to Jehovah for the rectitude of our intentions—another
Declaration of Independence, in the great Republic of Letters. And,
yet this may soon be. The time is even now at hand. Our representatives
are assembling: the dead Greek, and the Roman; the ancient English,
and the fathers of literature, from all the buried nations of all the earth,
and holding counsel together, and choosing their delegates. And the
generation is already born, that shall yet hear the heavens ringing with
acclamations to their decree—that another state has been added to the
everlasting confederacy of literature!
And now the author repeats to the people of America, one and all,
farewell; assuring them that there is very little probability of his ever
appearing before them again as a novel-writer. His object has been, if not
wholly, at least in a great degree accomplished. He has demonstrated that
a bold and direct appeal to the manhood of any people will never be
made in vain. Others may have been already, or may hereafter be incited
to a more intrepid movement; and to a more confident reliance upon

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Data Analysis Techniques for Physical

Scientists 1st Edition Claude A.

Feature engineering for machine learning principles and

Analysis Techniques for Racecar Data Acquisition 2nd

Practical Bayesian Inference A Primer for Physical

Introduction to Data Analysis with R for Forensic

SAS for R users : a book for budding data scientists

Smart Water Technologies and Techniques Data Capture

Quantitative Data Analysis for Language Assessment

Essential Methods for Planning Practitioners : Skills

Data Analysis Techniques for Physical Scientists

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Data Analysis Techniques for

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University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

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1 The Scientiic Method 1

Part I Foundation in Probability and Statistics

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3.4 Uniform Distribution 106

4 Classical Inference I: Estimators 139

5 Classical Inference II: Optimization 178

6 Classical Inference III: Conidence Intervals and Statistical Tests 227

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7 Bayesian Inference 284

Part II Measurement Techniques

8 Basic Measurements 389

9 Event Reconstruction 460

10 Correlation Functions 502

11 The Multiple Facets of Correlation Functions 526

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11.3 Integral Correlators 547

12 Data Correction Methods 577

Part III Simulation Techniques

13 Monte Carlo Methods 643

14 Collision and Detector Modeling 663

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How to Read This Book

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12:39:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,

12:39:51, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,

22:01:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,

1.1 What the Brain Does

12:41:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,

1.2 Critics of the Scientific Method

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12:41:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,

1.3 Falsifiability and Predictive Power

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1.4 A Flawed but Effective Process!

At this point, it is important to stress that perceptions and experimental measurements do

1.5 Science as an Empirical Study of Nature

1 And sadly still today in some conservative religious cultures.

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12:41:06, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,

1.6 Defining Scientific Models

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Parenthetically, it should be stressed that a person or organization presenting a model or

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components (kinematics: representation of motion) and causal components (dynamics: