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Intercorporeality
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN INTERACTION
Relationship Thinking
N. J. Enfield
Talking About Troubles in Conversation
Gail Jefferson
Edited by Paul Drew, John Heritage, Gene Lerner, and Anita Pomerantz
The Instruction of Imagination
Daniel Dor
How Traditions Live and Die
Olivier Morin
The Origins of Fairness
Nicolas Baumard
Requesting Responsibility
Jörg Zinken
Accountability in Social Interaction
Jeffrey Robinson
Distributed Agency
N. J. Enfield
Intercorporeality
Emerging Socialities in Interaction
z
Edited by
CHRISTIAN MEYER
JÜRGEN STREECK
J. SCOT T JORDAN
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
For Charles Goodwin
who inspires us
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
List of Contributors xi
Index 379
Acknowledgments
The ideas for this book were first seeded in 2005–2006 when Jürgen Streeck
and J. Scott Jordan met as Fellows of the Center for Interdisciplinary Research
(ZiF) at Bielefeld University where they were co-members of the research group
Embodied Communication in Humans and Machines, directed by Ipke Wachsmuth
and Günther Knoblich. They soon discovered their shared interest in the abil-
ity of humans and other animals to anticipate one another’s actions, an ability
that forms an essential foundation for intersubjectivity, and they agreed that this
ability is not amenable to individualistic accounts of mind and action that con-
tinue to inform much research and theorizing in social and cognitive psychol-
ogy, neuroscience, linguistics, and other disciplines. This shared interest and
dissatisfaction led us to organize a series of symposia: Projection and Anticipation
in Social Interaction (2006) and The Enculturated Body: Time-Scales of Meaning
in Embodied Communication (2007), both at ZiF, and, joined by Christian Meyer,
The Body Shop—A Symposium about the Senses in Human Interaction (2011) at the
Moody College of Communication, The University of Texas at Austin. The phe-
nomena and conception of intercorporeality, as proposed by Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, played an increasingly important role in the discussions at these symposia,
and we became increasingly confident that intercorporeality could indeed serve to
integrate otherwise disconnected attempts to work out how embodied minds/
mindful bodies managed to make common sense with one another in social
interaction. The 2007 and 2011 symposia received additional support from the
Mind Science Foundation of San Antonio, Texas. The editors wish to express
their gratitude to all of the institutions and individuals that have made these sym-
posia and conversations, and thus this book, possible. Charles Goodwin, to whom
it is dedicated, is the visionary who first imagined the synthesis of knowledge
that Intercorpeality reaches for, and the synthesis of our proliferating insights into
the actual processes by which human beings make and understand their worlds
together in moment-by-moment interaction. He models how to let this knowl-
edge grow through the incessant and rigorous practice of a seeing and feeling
mind fully open to the world and the knowledge and souls of others.
Contributors
Mats Andrén works as associate lecturer at the Child Studies unit at the
Department of Thematic Research at Linköping University, Sweden. His main
research interests are bodily expression, social interaction, and children’s
development. He is member of the board of the International Society for Gesture
Studies.
Thomas Fuchs is a psychiatrist and philosopher who holds the Karl Jaspers
Professorship of Philosophy and Psychiatry and is Head of the Section
“Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychotherapy” at the Psychiatric
Department at the University of Heidelberg. His major research areas lie in the
xii Contributors
Christian Meyer has received training in sociology and anthropology and is now
a professor of general and cultural sociology at the University of Constance.
His research interests focus on culture and interaction, practice theory, and
qualitative methods.
Thomas Pille works at the Carl von Ossietzky University in Oldenburg, Germany,
and is affiliated with the Institute of Sport Science and the Working Group
“Sociology and Sociology of Sport.”
J. Scott Jordan received his PhD in cognitive psychology and the neurophysiological
basis of perception at Northern Illinois University in Dekalb, Illinois. He is
currently the Chair of the Department of Psychology at Illinois State University
in Normal, Illinois. His research interests include the relationship between event-
related brain potentials, memory, and attention; and the relationship between
action planning and spatial perception, as well as embodied communication in
humans and machines.
Anja Stukenbrock received her PhD at the University of Heidelberg and finished
her habilitation at the University of Freiburg. She has held professorships at
the Universities of Duisburg-Essen and Jena and is currently a professor of
German linguistics at the University of Lausanne. Her research areas include
conversation analysis, grammar and interaction, multimodality, mobile eye-
tracking, linguistic nationalism, language, and trauma.
Introduction
Christian Meyer, Jürgen Streeck, and J. Scott Jordan
The tr aditional view of the human body as a signaling device by which cogni-
tive states, intentions, and mental imagery are expressed, with verbal and “nonver-
bal” communication as distinct channels, has been giving way to a multitude of
holistic and multimodal approaches to communication and social action. Common
to these new approaches is the conviction that meaning is grounded in embodied
experience, that individual action emerges as the product of interaction between
organisms and their others, and that embodied understandings are often precon-
ceptual, cannot be encoded in language, yet are nevertheless real. Thus we have
witnessed the detection of a “neuronal mirror mechanism” in rhesus monkeys
by neuroscientists (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004), the formulation of “social
intelligence” (Goody 1996) and “cooperative foraging” (Sterelny 2012) theorems
in philosophy and evolutionary anthropology, research on “distributed cognition”
in anthropology and cognitive science (Hutchins 1995, 2006), the positing of
“shared intentionality” in evolutionary psychology and anthropology (Tomasello
2008, 2014) and philosophy (Gilbert 1990; Bratman 1992), and the postulation of a
“human interaction engine” (Levinson 2006).
However, beginning as early as the late 1930s, but especially since the 1950s,
anthropologists and behavior researchers from other disciplines had already
relied on film and, later, video technology to identify, observe, and describe the
numerous behavioral processes in which an interacting human body resonates,
entrains, or even merges with another. Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead
(1942) used film to show what they perceived as the distinct Balinese pattern of
anticlimactic interaction in teasing sequences between mothers and infant sons.
The collaborative project The Natural History of an Interview, which took place at
Palo Alto in 1955–1956 and involved Bateson, the anthropologist Ray Birdwhistell,
the psychiatrist Frida Fromm-Reichman, and the linguist Norman McQuown
among others (McQuown 1971; see Leeds-Hurwitz 1987) revealed the microcoor-
dination of movement that is in play, e.g., when interaction participants change
posture together. This research on a few minutes of quasi-psychotherapeutic
interaction led to the development of the methods of context analysis by Albert
xvi Introduction
Scheflen (1973), Adam Kendon (Kendon 1990), Fred Erickson (Erickson and
Shultz 1977), and Ray McDermott (McDermott and Roth 1978). In the 1970s,
conversation analysts, notably Charles Goodwin (1979), showed how verbal
utterances, including their syntactic format, hitherto seen as paradigmatic pro-
ductions by individual speakers, when spoken in the presence of others are in
fact the result of ongoing interaction in which the parties’ eyes and their track-
ing of each other’s eye-movements are central components. These are exam-
ples of intercorporeal processes—that is, activities in which the single body’s
agency is subsumed by the production of a We, and would be pointless with-
out the simultaneous participation of an other. This kind of “we- relation”
(Schutz and Luckmann 1973, 61 et seq.) has been addressed in the past, partly in
relation to child development, partly to face- to-
face interaction, and called
alternatively “bi-personality” (Christian and Haas 1949), “great-we” (Vygotsky
1998, 235 et seq.), and “primordial sharing situation” (Werner and Kaplan 1963,
42 et seq.).
included in the diagram, are issues of some consequence for research. Saussure’s
talking heads are connected by wire, and communication is construed as transfer
of mental content. This vision extended not only to talk, but to action more gener-
ally: many theories of action start from individual intention and take interaction,
coordination, and similar phenomena as its product. But how do we describe, talk
about, and explain the overt and covert actions and the tacit practices of a We in
situations as the one described above?
A New Paradigm
The alternative view offered is one that starts from “people waltzing, paddling a
canoe, playing a piano duet, or making love,” as Clark (1996, 3) put it, and if we
were to draw the underlying model of much contemporary research, the result
would look much more lively, fleshy, and dynamic than Saussure’s diagrammatic
figures. As Behnke (1997, 198) puts it, “my body is something I do” and “I do
not do it alone.” I do not perform my body alone, but within an encompassing
“inter-kinesthetic field” (Behnke 2008). This field includes not only the pres-
ences, movements, and micromovements of other (inanimate or animate) bod-
ies in my peripersonal space, but also the sedimented traces of such presences
and movements in the architectures and the artifacts around my body. My I is
entangled right from the beginning in a corporeal culture that is not necessar-
ily of my own making, even though I may perpetuate it through my own way of
making a body, the way(s) in which I have learned to make a body, with varying
degrees of consciousness or self-awareness of what it is that I do. As a matter of
fact, the human species evolved as an apprentice in environments that have been
shaped by appropriative action, objectivations, and forms of cognitive extension
(cf. Sterelny 2012; Jordan and Mays, this volume).
Intercorporeality, as we view it, is a useful and indispensable concept for the
study of embodied interaction. It fills a gap in the current nomenclature of inter-
action studies. This gap has become apparent especially in the study of forms
of interaction in which several individuals take turns with one another or even
coalesce in using their bodies as agents, media, or objects of action—often sup-
ported and sustained by media and other artifacts—as well as of particularly
complex and fast-paced forms of social interaction—sports, manual cooperation
(e.g., in music-making, blacksmithing, and milling [see Meyer, this volume]),
and other sorts of everyday activity. Established terms like “coordination,” “align-
ment,” and “intersubjectivity,” as well as “routine” and “joint intention,” are
unable to grasp the shared, embodied and, at the same time, spontaneous and
creative (that is, situationally adjusted) character of these activities.
In the eyes of the editors, a completed diagram of interacting, communicat-
ing bodies to replace Saussure’s wired heads would look more like a Baroque
xviii Introduction
painting—t hink Rubens, with people’s limbs and flesh entangled and pushing
and pulling one another, or the Roman sculpture of Laocoon and his sons, des-
perately battling the lethal entanglement of snakes. Or, to take a more modern
example, like Paul Himmel’s photography series “Ballet Serenade” of 1951–1952.
Close observation of the kind that these artists cultivated reveals vast differ-
ences in the control humans may have over their bodies—d ifferences in agency
and patiency, as well as differences in states of awareness concerning the body’s
doings. Yet much contemporary research on embodied interaction that works
on the basis of video footage continues to use language that figures the body
as a tool or instrument, and the intentional mind as its master. Ironically, in
attempts to explain more exalted forms of sociality (e.g., movement synchrony
and other forms of microcoordination) many researchers continue to invoke
models in which fundamentally autonomous individuals control their separate
bodies and move them in order to achieve coordination, synchrony, understand-
ing (notable exceptions are Zlatev et al. 2008 and Foolen et al. 2012). In this
fashion, the social character and qualities of the bodies are treated as unlikely
outcomes of the parties’ incessant efforts to overcome their isolation. Among
other problems, this model raises the question of who, and what, the implied
subject or agent controlling and using each body is. If the body is an instru-
ment that can be put to social uses, then who is the user who controls it? It is
difficult to avoid dualist language in accounts of intelligent human action, but
it is essential if we ever want to fully understand how embodied human beings
communicate.
the sense-makings that begin in infancy and that ground our ongoing sense
of ourselves and others as animate forms are the foundation of what is
commonly called an intersubjective world, but what, given its anchorage in
tactile-kinesthetic life, is more properly termed an intercorporeal world. This
world is rich in affective, cognitive, and moral implications precisely because
it is anchored for all of us in bodily being. (Sheets-Johnstone 2002, 139)
Introduction xix
The reason why I have evidence of the other man’s being there when
I shake his hand is that his hand is substituted for my left hand, and
my body annexes the body of another person in that “sort of reflection”
it is paradoxically the seat of. My two hands “coexist” or are “compre-
sent” because they are one single body’s hands. The other person appears
through an extension of that compresence; he and I are like organs of one
single intercorporeality. (Merlau-Ponty 1964, 168)
why I am able to understand the other person’s body and existence “begin-
ning with” the body proper, the reason why the compresence of my “con-
sciousness” and my “body” is prolonged into the compresence of my self
and the other person. (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 175)
share the same sensory and corporeal space. Examples of this kind of intercorpo-
reality are ubiquitous and include, along with the hands shaking or dapping one
another, people waltzing, paddling a canoe, playing a piano duet, or making love,
as well as the most basic forms of human interaction including eyes meeting
(Meyer, this volume), bodies embracing (Goodwin, this volume), lips kissing, or
voices uttering and being heard in turn.
The aim of the concept of intercorporeality is thus to enlarge ego’s reflexive
circle so as to include alter ego (just as well as the environment that is populated
by things), so that, say, two shaking hands are compresent or coexistent as one and
the same interbody belonging to both co-participants in interaction (see Stuart,
this volume). As alter ego does (and experiences) the same, the two hands shaken
and shaking in a greeting constitute an “interbody” at the crossing of two reflexive
circles; and for a moment, both hands belong to both egos at the same time. The
result, according to Merleau-Ponty, is a co-perception at the interface of two (or more)
interacting bodies. This co-perception is constitutive for all kinds of intercorporeal
encounters—not only in regard to the sense of touching, but equally to all the other
modalities, as for example in the experience of seeing someone seeing (looking): “I
see that this man over there sees, as I touch my left hand while it is touching my
right” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 170).
Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical point to start from self-perception to explain—as
its extension—t he perception of (and intercorporeality with) the other has been
criticized (notably by Joas 1996). Joas suggests to instead adopt a position inspired
by George H. Mead who insisted that the organism is already “tied into the struc-
ture of social interaction, even if at that point it does not yet have an awareness of
the boundaries between itself and the social or physical world” (Joas 1996, 183).
In other words, the individual and its perceptions is only a function of intercor-
poreality, and by no means its starting point, since “the relation of the actor to his
body is itself already shaped by intersubjective structures” (1996, 184). However,
since within the phenomenological movement, Merleau-Ponty was the first to
address questions of child development, individuation and socialization (from
1933 on—see Merleau-Ponty [1934] 1996; cf. Lefort 2010, 38), we think that this
critique—justified as it might be in regard to other phenomenologists—misses
the point in the case of Merleau-Ponty.
Intercorporeality in Infants
Findings in developmental psychology (e.g., Condon 1971; Stern 1977; Nadel 1986;
and Trevarthen 1998) support such a position. In infant interaction “dances”
(Stern) we find what we might consider to be the most “outspoken,” the least
inhibited intercorporeal dialogues. When we watch infants interacting with oth-
ers, we observe what Trevarthen has called primary intersubjectivity: forms of
xxii Introduction
resonance, motor mimicry, and entrainment that precede self-other and subject-
object differentiations. These moments show how we— as human beings—
move from a stage of undifferentiation to cognizing the world as separate from
us. Through the experience of the animate, acting other, we gain a sense of a
living self. Trevarthen’s influential work on primary, secondary, and tertiary
intersubjectivity (Trevarthen 1979; Trevarthen and Hubley 1978)2 is grounded
in the frame-by-frame, close-up analysis of recordings in which infants, includ-
ing neonates, interact with adults. Assuming that children are born with “innate
intersubjectivity” (Nagy 2008)—that is, preadapted to social interaction by their
“innate sensitivity to kinematic, energetic, and physiognomic parameters of oth-
ers’ movements” (Trevarthen 1998, 23), Trevarthen articulates a theory of pri-
mary intersubjectivity as “intersubjective control by rhythmic expression” (23).
Primordial intercorporeality occurs through the dimensions of time, form, and
intensity of motor behavior, and changes in emotional and motivational states are
conveyed by
fine and rapid … glides and leaps of pitch or volume of voice, eyebrow
flashes, prebeat syllables, suffix morphemes, rhythmic details and embel-
lishments, rapid hand gestures, quick head moves, shifts of gaze … that
appear in abundance in all spontaneous conversational communication.
(Trevarthen 1993, 151)
the product of a shift from mutual to joint attention and begins when the parties
mutually recognize their orientation to objects and the world and understand one
another in terms of their actions with objects. It is, in brief, mediated by things.
Only tertiary intersubjectivity, eventually, is mediated by language and symbolic
systems.
Intercorporeality in Adults
However, forms of primary intersubjectivity, acquired at the beginning of life,
remain functional throughout the life-span, as several chapters of this book
demonstrate (Stuart, Goodwin, Stukenbrock), even though in later years human
beings become capable of more easily withdrawing and shutting themselves
away from others. This individual solipsism, as we argue in this book, is an
achievement or inhibition (Kinsbourne and Jordan, 2009), not the natural state
of human existence. This position is not new, and it has been supported by a
great deal of empirical research. Studies in this vein illustrate the specificity
and heterogeneity of the processes involved, which accordingly speak to the
scattered interests of diverse disciplines. Intercorporeality was a core feature of
some of the first interactional phenomena and processes that were subjected
to close, film-based scrutiny during the 1950s (Condon 1971; McQuown 1956;
Scheflen 1964): all of them involved coordination between bodies. Scheflen
studied how participants in psychotherapy form postural configurations which
frame (Bateson 1972) phases of activity and embody the parties’ working consensus
(Goffman 1959, 9–10) as well as alliances between pairs of participants (“withs”;
see Goffman 1971) or antagonisms of the moment. The key to how a posture
signifies is its relatedness to the simultaneous postures of others. Postures
are elements of interpersonal, relational, co-embodied systems (Bateson 1972).
This is most apparent when postures are shifted: they are shifted together. In
other words, through individual repositionings, the shared interactional system
adjusts or recalibrates itself. While such shifts at first always look like unpredict-
able happenings in which two people reveal that they are really one, connected
by some supraindividual force, close inspection of these moments usually shows
that they involve sequential interaction in which one party proposes or preen-
acts a shift and is then, in a second step, joined by the other when he completes
the change in posture (Kendon 1990). One upshot of this perspective has been
greater appreciation of the degree to which anticipation is involved in social inter-
action. Simultaneity of behavior in social interaction is often the result of small-
scale anticipations and projections, leaving us with the task of explaining what it
is that allows some units of action to have their course be anticipated so that an
organized We can arise from unnoticed interactions at the boundary of self and
other. Socialized bodies are good at intuitively anticipating each other’s moves.
xxiv Introduction
Our lived and living bodies can become extended such that they are essen-
tially intertwined with those of others in a way that prevents any concep-
tual or ontological reduction to the isolated individual bodies. (Froese and
Fuchs 2012, 214)
Introduction xxv
not merely strive to literally understand speakers, but are instead caught up in
dense fields of concomitant associations and implications as well as their own
bodily responses. Within a framework informed by Merleau-Ponty’s point of
view, social relations are, first and foremost, created through processes of inter-
corporeal resonance, which form the basis for any further personal exchange of
stances, representations, ideas, and opinions.
2012, 2015; Tulbert and Goodwin 2011; Goodwin this volume). What comes into
view in these studies is the normative cultural patterning of forms of intercor-
poreal engagement and experience. Hugs are subjected to precise interactional
management in which the voice is as relevant as the hands and arms, and they
serve as a standard or currency to measure degrees of social and affective com-
mitment. Accordingly, bodies develop society-specific sensory abilities to gauge
(and respond to) affect in others.
Another field of interaction has only recently come into the focus of close-up,
naturalistic research: sports. Team sports and dyadic competitive sports in par-
ticular offer rich sites for the study of fast-paced and yet meticulously coordinated
bodily activities under conditions of mental stress, physical strain, environmental
noise, pressure for action, and high risk, while making the complexities of these
processes easily accessible for study in comparison to other fields such as war
or disaster management. As the collection of studies in Meyer and Wedelstaedt
(2017) shows, the meticulous ways of intercorporeality in sports include differ-
ent responsive forms of retrospection, prospection, and anticipation, as well as
temporal mergings and decouplings of bodies with objects and/or other bodies
in space. Furthermore, in sports individual participants, as in acrobatics, some-
times have to place their bodies as objects at the disposal of their teammates.
Interaction in sports is not only distinguished from other fields by the special
role that the body plays, but also by conditions for communication that are far
from ideal if we insist on a communication model that starts from Saussurian
talking heads who take turns in exchanging encoded meaning. But if we conceive
communication as intercorporeality the reality of sports becomes translucent at
once. In addition, sports also bring the role to light that material artifacts and
environments play in intercorporeal activities. An interesting phenomenon that
transcends the animate–nonanimate (or subject-object, agent-patient) divide and
that still awaits further exploration is surfing: When we ride on sea waves, due to
our intercorporeal competences, we are able to bodily adjust to a moving natural
environment, exploit its powers, and anticipate its course.
constraints that we share with others in our society provide us with a measure
of common embodied sense, a shared world to which we belong. The structur-
ing by artifacts that intervene between us and others, and the habituation of our
bodies’ motions through their use, is an essential level of participatory sense-
making, while our constant contact with animate counterparts (human persons
or animals in graded animation) provides the basis for intercorporeal sense-mak-
ing. In other words, our fine-t uned interactional abilities are the product of both
“muscle memory” (Noland 2009) and interactional “muscular bonding” McNeill
1995), or better, of “inter-body memory” and reverberations of an “intrabodily”
and “interbodily resonance” (Froese and Fuchs 2012) within one “space of mus-
cular sensation” (Wittgenstein 1975, 102). Thus the picture that emerges when we
think of interaction in terms of intercorporeality is one of human bodies in joint
and mutually anticipated motion (that Husserl called protention); of bodies that
co-perform actions in which they voluntarily and reflexively switch their parts as
subject and object; and of bodies that co-perceive not only the situation at hand,
but also the embodied experiences of one another and the surrounding world
that they presently inhabit together.
The spatio-temporal embeddedness of situations influences the social actions
conducted and a specific, shared sense of the here and now is created in social
interaction among co-participants. Essentially, three different dimensions have
been addressed, but never systematically integrated: the interactional creation of
a joint sense (1) of time, (2) of space, and (3) of agency (person).
"On the 22nd Sir Robert Hart received a despatch from the
Tsung-li-Yamên. They naïvely remarked that it was now one
month since they had heard from him, and his silence gave them
concern for his welfare. Moreover, a report had just reached them
that his house had been burned, but they expressed the hope
that he and al his staff were well. Another despatch requested
his advice upon a Customs question that had arisen in
Shanghai. Sir Robert Hart wrote a dignified reply. For more
than a month, he said, he had been a refugee in the British
Legation with all his staff, having had to flee from his house
without warning; that all Customs records and papers, and
every paper and letter of value that he had accumulated during
a lifetime, had been destroyed; that not only his house, but
some 19 other buildings in the occupation of his staff had
been burned with all their contents; that the acting postal
secretary had been killed by a shell, and two other members of
his staff—Mr. Richardson and Mr. Macoun—had been wounded by
bullets. …
London Times,
October 13 and 15, 1900.
"On the 26th of June Major Gen. Adna R Chaffee, U. S. V., was
appointed to the command of the American forces in China. He
embarked from San Francisco on the 1st of July, reached
Nagasaki on the 24th, and Taku, China, on the 28th. … On
reaching Nagasaki he received the following instructions,
dated, … July 19: 'Secretary War directs that you proceed at
once with transport Grant, Sixth Cavalry, and Marines to Taku,
China, and take command of American land forces, which will be
an independent command known as the China relief expedition.
You will find there the Ninth and Fourteenth Infantry, one
battery of the Fifth Artillery, and one battalion of Marines.
Sumner sailed from San Francisco July 17 with Second Battalion
of Fifteenth Infantry and recruits to capacity of vessel.
{129}
Reinforcements will follow to make your force in the immediate
future up to 5,000, and very soon to 10,000. … Reports now
indicate that American Minister with all the legation have
been destroyed in Pekin. Chinese representative here, however,
insists to the contrary, and there is, therefore, a hope which
you will not lose sight of until certainty is absolute. It is
the desire of this Government to maintain its relations of
friendship with the part of Chinese people and Chinese
officials not concerned in outrages on Americans. Among these
we consider Li Hung Chang, just appointed viceroy of Chili.
You will to the extent of your power aid the Government of
China, or any part thereof, in repressing such outrages and in
rescuing Americans, and in protecting American citizens and
interests, and wherever Chinese Government fails to render
such protection you will do all in your power to supply it.
Confer freely with commanders of other national forces, act
concurrently with them, and seek entire harmony of action
along the lines of similar purpose and interest. There
should be full and free conference as to operations before
they are entered upon. You are at liberty to agree with them
from time to time as to a common official direction of the
various forces in their combined operations, preserving,
however, the integrity of your own American division, ready to
be used as a separate and complete organization. Much must be
left to your wise discretion and that of the admiral. At all
times report fully and freely to this Department your wants
and views. The President has to-day appointed you
major-general of volunteers.' …
"In the meantime the Ninth Infantry, from Manila, reached Taku
on the 6th of July. Two battalions of that regiment, under
Colonel Liscum, pressed forward to Tientsin, reaching that
point on the 11th, and on the 13th took part with the British,
French, and Japanese forces in an attack upon the southwest
part of the walled city of Tientsin, which had been rendered
necessary by the persistent shelling of the foreign quarters,
outside of the walls, on the part of the Chinese troops
occupying the city. Colonel Liscum's command formed part of a
brigade under General Dorward, of the British army, and was
assigned to the duty of protecting the flank of the allied
forces. In the performance of that duty it maintained a
position under heavy fire for fifteen hours, with a loss of 18
killed and 77 wounded. Among the killed was the gallant
Colonel Liscum, who thus ended an honorable service of nearly
forty years, commencing in the ranks of the First Vermont
Infantry at the outbreak of the civil war, and distinguished
by unvarying courage, fidelity, and high character. The
regiment was withdrawn from its position on the night of the
13th, and on the morning of the 14th the native city was
captured, and the southeast quarter was assigned to the
American forces for police and protection. …
"At the time of the capture of Tientsin the most positive and
circumstantial accounts of the massacre of all the ministers
and members of the legations in Pekin, coming apparently from
Chinese sources, had been published, and were almost
universally believed. The general view taken by the civilized
world of the duty to be performed in China was not that the
living representatives of the Western powers in Pekin were to
be rescued, but that their murder was to be avenged and their
murderers punished. In the performance of that duty time and
rapidity of movement were not especially important. The
resolution of the commanders of the allied forces,
communicated by Admiral Kempff on the 8th of July, to the
effect that 80,000 men would be required—20,000 to hold the
position from Taku to Tientsin and 60,000 to march to Pekin,
while not more than 40,800 troops were expected to have
arrived by the middle of August, practically abandoned all
expectation of rescuing the ministers and members of the
legations alive, for it proposed that after the middle of
August any forward movement should be still deferred until
40,000 more troops had arrived. On the 11th of July, however,
the American Secretary of State secured, through the Chinese
minister at Washington, the forwarding of a dispatch in the
State Department cipher to the American minister at Pekin, and
on the 20th of July, pursuant to the same arrangement, an
answer in cipher was received from Minister Conger, as
follows: 'For one month we have been besieged in British
legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops.
Quick relief only can prevent general massacre.' This dispatch
from Mr. Conger was the first communication received by any
Western power from any representative in Pekin for about a
month, and although it was at first received in Europe with
some incredulity, it presented a situation which plainly
called for the urgency of a relief expedition rather than for
perfection of preparation. It was made the basis of urgent
pressure for an immediate movement upon Pekin, without waiting
for the accumulation of the large force previously proposed."
{130}
{131}
"The 14th being the day decided upon for the concentration on
the line 7 miles from Tong-Chow, I made no preparations for
carrying on any operations beyond a small reconnaissance by a
troop of cavalry to my front, which duty I assigned to Captain
Cabell. … My cavalry had been absent not more than an hour,
when Mr. Lowry, the interpreter who had accompanied it, raced
back and informed me that Captain Cabell was surrounded by
Chinese cavalry. I immediately ordered a battalion of the
Fourteenth Infantry to fall in, and we went forward about a
mile and a half and found Captain Cabell occupying some
houses, firing from the roofs on a village in his front. I
insisted on the French troops giving me the road, which they
reluctantly did. Having joined Cabell, I continued the
reconnaissance to my front, wishing to get as near the wall of
the city as I could, but not expecting to move my whole force,
which was contrary to the agreement at Tong-Chow on the
evening of August 12. Without serious opposition we arrived at
the northeast corner of the Chinese city, having brushed away
some Chinese troops or 'Boxers' that fired from villages to
our left and front. About 10 o'clock I saw the advantage of
holding the ground that I had obtained, and directed all my
force to move forward, as I had then become aware of Russian
troops being in action on my right, and could also hear the
Japanese artillery farther to the right. My left flank at this
time was uncovered, except by a small force of British
cavalry. The British troops did not advance from Tong-Chow
until the 14th, owing to the agreement previously referred to.
On that day they marched for the line of concentration and
found my force advancing on Pekin. At noon a British battery
was at work a mile to my left and rear.
{132}
"During the 15th and the attack upon the gates referred to our
losses were 2 enlisted men killed and 4 wounded, Ninth
Infantry; 3 enlisted men killed and 14 wounded, Fourteenth
Infantry; 1 enlisted man, Battery F, Fifth Artillery, wounded.
At 8.50 o'clock a. m. of this date Captain Henry J. Reilly,
Fifth Artillery, was struck in the mouth and almost instantly
killed when standing at my left elbow observing the effect of
a shot from one of his guns by his side.