Holocaust Angst : The Federal Republic

of Germany and American Holocaust

Memory Since the 1970s 1st Edition
Jacob S. Eder
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/holocaust-angst-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-
american-holocaust-memory-since-the-1970s-1st-edition-jacob-s-eder/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

The Germans and the Holocaust Popular Responses to the

Persecution and Murder of the Jews Vermont Studies on
Nazi Germany and the Holocaust 1st Edition Susanna
Schrafstetter (Editor)
https://textbookfull.com/product/the-germans-and-the-holocaust-
popular-responses-to-the-persecution-and-murder-of-the-jews-
vermont-studies-on-nazi-germany-and-the-holocaust-1st-edition-
susanna-schrafstetter-editor/

Antisemitism Before and Since the Holocaust: Altered

Contexts and Recent Perspectives 1st Edition Anthony
Mcelligott

https://textbookfull.com/product/antisemitism-before-and-since-
the-holocaust-altered-contexts-and-recent-perspectives-1st-
edition-anthony-mcelligott/

What Remains: The Post-Holocaust Archive In German

Memory Culture Dora Osborne

https://textbookfull.com/product/what-remains-the-post-holocaust-
archive-in-german-memory-culture-dora-osborne/

Holocaust Memory in the Digital Age Survivorsa Stories

and New Media Practices Jeffrey Shandler

https://textbookfull.com/product/holocaust-memory-in-the-digital-
age-survivorsa-stories-and-new-media-practices-jeffrey-shandler/
Child Survivors of the Holocaust The Youngest Remnant
and the American Experience Beth B. Cohen

https://textbookfull.com/product/child-survivors-of-the-
holocaust-the-youngest-remnant-and-the-american-experience-beth-
b-cohen/

Holocaust, genocide, and the law. A quest for justice

in a post-Holocaust world 1st Edition Bazyler

https://textbookfull.com/product/holocaust-genocide-and-the-law-
a-quest-for-justice-in-a-post-holocaust-world-1st-edition-
bazyler/

Memories of Resistance and the Holocaust on Film

Mercedes Camino

https://textbookfull.com/product/memories-of-resistance-and-the-
holocaust-on-film-mercedes-camino/

The broken voice. Reading post-Holocaust literature 1st

Edition Eaglestone

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-broken-voice-reading-post-
holocaust-literature-1st-edition-eaglestone/

Poland under German Occupation, 1939-1945: New

Perspectives (Vermont Studies on Nazi Germany and the
Holocaust, 9) 1st Edition Huener

https://textbookfull.com/product/poland-under-german-
occupation-1939-1945-new-perspectives-vermont-studies-on-nazi-
germany-and-the-holocaust-9-1st-edition-huener/
Holocaust Angst
Holocaust Angst
T HE F EDER AL REPUBL IC OF GER MAN Y
AND AMER IC AN HOLOC AUS T MEMORY
S INCE T HE 1970s

JACOB S. EDER

1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2016

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Eder, Jacob S., author.
Title: Holocaust angst : the Federal Republic of Germany and American
Holocaust memory since the 1970s / Jacob S. Eder.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2016] | ?2016 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015050164| ISBN 9780190237820 (hardcover : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9780190237844 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Holocaust, Jewish (1939–1945)—Foreign public opinion, German. |
Memorialization—United States—Foreign public opinion, German. |
Public opinion—Germany (West) | Holocaust (Television program)—Influence. |
Holocaust, Jewish (1939–1945)—Historiography. | Antisemitism—Germany (West). |
Memorialization—United States. | Germany (West)—Ethnic relations.
Classification: LCC DS134.26.E34 2016 | DDC 940.53/1843—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015050164

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
This book is dedicated to the memory of
Katharina Buchhorn (1918–​2011)
and
Michael Buchhorn (1949–​2011)
 Contents

Acknowledgments ix
Abbreviations xiii
Note on Terminology, Translations, and Sources xvii

Introduction 1

1. Holocaustomania: West German Diplomats and American

Holocaust Memorial Culture in the Late 1970s 16

2. A Holocaust Syndrome? Relations between the Federal Republic

and American Jewish Organizations in the 1980s 50

3. Confronting the Anti-​German Museum: (West) Germany and the

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 1979–​1993 84

4. Politicians and Professors: The Politics of German History in the

American Academy from the 1970s to 1990 130

5. After Unification: The Transformation of Holocaust Memory,

1990–1998 160

Epilogue: Holocaust Angst and the Universalization

of the Holocaust 197

Notes 211
Bibliography 255
Index 285

vii
 Acknowledgments

A few years have passed since I completed my dissertation at the University of

Pennsylvania, on which this book is based; even more years have passed since
I finished my M.A. thesis at the University of Nebraska-​Lincoln, where I spent
a year on a Fulbright scholarship and began thinking about the topic of this
book. It gives me great pleasure to thank the large number of people who have
so generously provided encouraging feedback and productive criticism over the
past years. I am above all indebted to Alan E. Steinweis, Susanna Schrafstet-
ter, Philipp Gassert, and Norbert Frei (in the order we met). I am particularly
grateful to Susanna Schrafstetter and Alan Steinweis, who have been a most
significant source of advice since my stay in Lincoln, and the many conversa-
tions we have had there, in Munich, Burlington, and elsewhere have had a deep
impact on my work. I wholeheartedly thank Philipp Gassert, the coadvisor of
my dissertation, for many instructive discussions about German history, his
indispensable advice and support, and for giving me numerous opportunities
to present my project in Germany and abroad. I thank Norbert Frei for his very
helpful advice at crucial stages of this project and for inviting me to join the
Doktorandenschule of the Jena Center 20th Century History and later the Leh-
rstuhl für Neuere und Neueste Geschichte at the Friedrich-​Schiller-​Universität
Jena. At Jena, I have very much benefitted from conversations and discussions
with my wonderful (current and former) colleagues Tobias Freimüller, Marcel
vom Lehn, Franka Maubach, Kristina Meyer, Dominik Rigoll, Tim Schanetzky,
Dietmar Süß, Annette Weinke, and especially Daniel Stahl.
I also thank my dissertation committee at the University of Pennsylvania,
particularly my advisor Thomas Childers, for helping me to navigate smoothly
through graduate school. I cannot express my gratitude enough to Beth
S. Wenger for expanding my knowledge of American Jewish history, but above
all to Benjamin Nathans for his generous advice, his challenging questions,
and especially for being a true mentor to me at Penn. I thank Kathy Peiss and
Ronald J. Granieri for their advice in the early stages of this project, as well as

ix
x  A c k n o wl e d g m e n t s

Frank Trommler for sharing his knowledge and expertise with me, both as a
scholar and as a Zeitzeuge.
Over the past years, several colleagues have become true friends. I am in-
credibly grateful to Christine Friederich (née Hikel) and Chase Richards for
their comments and feedback on the manuscript at its various stages of devel-
opment. Chase deserves my undying gratitude not only for proofreading this
book, but also for sharing all the burdens of being a doctoral student (and there
were many). I wholeheartedly thank Philipp Stelzel, who has been a true friend
for more than a decade and who has helped me with my work in more ways than
I can mention here. I thank Hubert Leber, Christian Mentel, Katrin Schreiter,
Fabian Schwanzar, and Mathew Turner, for their comments on various chap-
ters, and I am particularly grateful to Deborah Barton for proofreading the
final version of the manuscript in record time.
While working on this project, I had the privilege to receive suggestions
and feedback from a number of colleagues and friends to whom I would like
to express my gratitude. I thank Volker Berghahn, Elizabeth Borgwardt, Gregg
Brazinsky, Suzanne Brown-​Fleming, Martin Dean, Hasia R. Diner, Astrid M.
Eckert, Lily Gardner Feldman, Tim Geiger, Hope Harrison, Jan-​Holger Kirsch,
Martin Klimke, Reinhild Kreis, Harold Marcuse, Gilad Margalit (1959–​2014),
Michael Meng, Claudia Moisel, Tina Morina, Bill Niven, Anke Ortlepp (and her
Oberseminar in Munich), Jörg Osterloh, Nicole Phelps, Dieter Pohl, Thomas
Raithel, Mark Roseman, Miriam Rürup, Bernd Schaefer, Hanna Schissler, Syb-
ille Steinbacher, Corinna Unger, Richard Wetzell, Cornelia Wilhelm, and Meik
Woyke. I am particularly grateful to Jürgen Matthäus for his advice during
my two extended stays at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, and to
S. Jonathan Wiesen for his very helpful feedback during the revisions of the
manuscript.
Moreover, I am grateful to the scholars, diplomats, and politicians who
agreed to be interviewed for this project. A complete list of their names can
be found in the bibliography, but I would like to express special thanks to
Michael Mertes for granting me permission to access his files at the ACDP. As
this project deals with a very recent history, getting access to classified docu-
ments posed a major challenge. Without the help of a number of archivists, I
could have never navigated the pitfalls and challenges of this research. I thank
above all Claudia Zenker-​Oertel, Andrea Hänger, Beatrix Dietel (neé Kuchta),
and Elisabeth Thalhofer of the Bundesarchiv, Jeffrey Carter of the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum Institutional Archives, and Charlotte Bonelli of
the Archives of the American Jewish Committee.
The very generous financial support of a number of institutions made this
transatlantic project possible. I am greatly indebted to the German-​A meri-
can Fulbright Commission; the History Department and the Norman and
Bernice Harris Center for Judaic Studies of the University of Nebraska-​Lincoln;
 A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s   xi

the University of Pennsylvania, especially the Department of History and the

Jewish Studies Program; the Georg Eckert Institut für Internationale Schulbu-
chforschung (Braunschweig) and the German Historical Institute (Washing-
ton, DC) for doctoral fellowships; the Society for Historians of American For-
eign Relations for a Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grant and a Global Scholars
Grant; the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust
Studies of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (Washington, DC)
for a Dorot Foundation Summer Research Assistant Fellowship and a Charles
H. Revson Foundation Fellowship; and the Holocaust Educational Foundation
(Evanston, IL) for a research grant. I am most grateful to the Gerda Henkel
Foundation (Düsseldorf) for providing the funds for almost two years of unin-
terrupted research and writing. During my last year as a doctoral student, I was
very lucky to receive a generous Mellon predoctoral fellowship in Cold War/​
Post-​1945 International History from The George Washington University’s
Elliott School of International Affairs.
The dissertation on which this book is based won the Fraenkel Prize in Con-
temporary History (Category B) of the Wiener Library, the Marko Feingold
Dissertation Prize in Jewish Studies of University of Salzburg, and the Betty
M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize of the Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations, which all greatly helped me while revising the manuscript.
I also thank the Emerging Scholars Program of the Jack, Joseph and Morton
Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies and the Jena Center 20th
Century History for providing generous subsidies for the publication of this
book. At Oxford University Press, I wholeheartedly thank my editor Susan
Ferber for her incredibly helpful feedback on the manuscript as well as the
two anonymous readers for their insightful comments and probing questions.
Last but certainly not least, I am deeply grateful to my family and friends—​
above all my mother Claudia, my brother Simon, his wife Valeska, and their
son Leo—​for their unconditional love and support. I sincerely thank Johanna
Arnold, Jack Dwiggins, Julia Gunn, Matt Handelman, Sam Hirst, Jan Chris-
toph Jähne, Nicole Kling, Konstanze and Alexander Kunst, Andrea and Holger
Löwendorf, Christian Weilguny, Sven Ramones, and especially Josef Jaud and
Daniel Eymer for their friendship and companionship.
Most importantly, I thank my wife, my best friend, my constant companion
Amandine Barb for her love, her patience, and her support. Our journey has
taken us from Heidelberg to New York, Paris, Munich, Washington, Philadel-
phia, Jena, and to our current home in Berlin. Only Amandine knows how stren-
uous and occasionally exasperating of a task it was to write this book, which
I could have never finished without her loving and unwavering encouragement.
My grandmother Katharina Buchhorn and my uncle Michael Buchhorn did
not live to see the completion of this book, which owes so much to their encour-
agement and intellectual inspiration. It is dedicated to their memory.
 Abbreviations

AA Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office)

AAPD Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(Foreign Policy Records of the Federal Republic of Germany)
ACDP Archiv für Christlich-​Demokratische Politik (Archive for Christian
Democratic Policy)
ADL Anti-​Defamation League
AICGS American Institute for Contemporary German Studies
AJC American Jewish Committee
AV Auslandsvertretung (diplomatic representation)
BAarch Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archives)
BArchG Bundesarchivgesetz (Federal Archives Act)
Bd. Band (volume)
BK Bundeskanzler (German Chancellor)
BKAmt Bundeskanzleramt (German Chancellery)
BMBF Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (Federal Ministry
of Education and Research)
BM Bundesminister (Federal Minister; Secretary)
BMBW Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft (Federal
Ministry of Education and Science)
BMFT Bundesministerium für Forschung und Technologie (Federal
Ministry of Research and Technology)
BPA Presse-​und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung/​
Bundespresseamt (Press and Information Office of the Federal
Government)
CAHS Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies of the USHMM (since
2014: Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Center for Advanced
Holocaust Studies)
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian
Democratic Union of Germany)

xiii
xiv  A b b r e v i a t i o ns

CEO Chief Executive Officer

ChBK Chef des Bundeskanzleramts (Chief of the German Chancellery)
CSU Christlich-​Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union of
Bavaria)
DAAD Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic
Exchange Service)
DBT Deutscher Bundestag
DHI Deutsches Historisches Institut (German Historical Institute)
DM Deutschmark
EU European Union
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FES Friedrich-​Ebert-​Stiftung (Friedrich Ebert Foundation)
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GDR German Democratic Republic
GEI Georg Eckert Institut für international Schulbuchforschung (Georg
Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research)
GHI German Historical Institute
GI Member of the United States Army
GIC German Information Center, New York, NY
GK Generalkonsulat (consulate general)
GK NY Generalkonsulat (consulate general) in New York, NY
GMF German Marshall Fund of the United States
HMC Holocaust Memorial Center (Detroit)
IFG Informationsfreiheitsgesetz (German Freedom of Information Act)
IfZ Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Institute for Contemporary History)
IRC International Relations Committee of the USHMC
KAS Konrad-​Adenauer-​Stiftung e.V. (Konrad Adenauer Foundation)
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC National Broadcasting Company
n.d. No date
NGO Nongovernmental organization
NYPL New York Public Library
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development
OSI Office of Special Investigations of the US Department of Justice
PA AA Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (Political Archives of the
[West] German Foreign Office)
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
POW Prisoner of war
RTL Radio Télévisioun Lëtzebuerg
 A b b r e v i a t i o ns   xv

SA Sturmabteilung (Stormtroopers)
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic
Party of Germany)
SS Schutzstaffel (lit. Defence Corps)
St Staatssekretär (state secretary)
StM Staatsminister (state minister)
SZ Süddeutsche Zeitung
UC University of California
UCLA University of California, Los Angeles
US United States
USHMC United States Holocaust Memorial Council
USHMM United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
USIA United States Information Agency
UVM University of Vermont
WJC World Jewish Congress
WWF World Wide Fund For Nature
 Note on Terminology,
Translations, and Sources

All translations from German sources into English in this book are mine unless
otherwise noted. Wherever necessary, I have supplied short German quota-
tions in parentheses. While I have translated the names of the vast majority
of German government agencies, offices, institutions, and organizations in the
text, the endnotes contain the original German name or an abbreviation, if use
of the latter is common. For example, the Auswärtiges Amt is “Foreign Office”
in the text, but “AA” in the endnotes. The names of organizations are not trans-
lated, such as Atlantik-​Brücke (lit. “Atlantic Bridge”), unless they contain a ge-
neric term. For example, I refer to the “Konrad Adenauer Stiftung” as “Konrad
Adenauer Foundation.”
The vast majority of (West) German archival materials were made available
to me in response to requests I filed in accordance with the Federal Archives
Act (Bundesarchivgesetz) and the Freedom of Information Act (Informations-
freiheitsgesetz) before they had been properly processed, catalogued, and
paginated by the Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv). Thus, page numbers are not
available for these documents; in addition to the call numbers of the respec-
tive record groups and folders, I have included a precise description of each
document in the endnotes. The same applies to records from the Institutional
Archives of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, which were also
accessed before they had been paginated.
I gained access to many files from the (West) German Foreign Office, the
(West) German embassy in Washington, and various consulates general not
through the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office (PA AA), but
through the records of the Federal Chancellery in the Federal Archives (record
group B 136). This not only demonstrates a way to circumvent the restrictive
archival policies of the PA AA, but also—​and more importantly—​illustrates
how closely the Federal Chancellery was involved in the foreign policy and
diplomatic issues examined in this book.

xvii
Holocaust Angst
 Introduction

“It is high time,” German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wrote in 1990 to Rabbi
Marvin Hier, dean of the Los Angeles-​based Simon Wiesenthal Center (SWC),
“for the positive things that have happened in Germany since 1945 to be dis-
cussed more intensively in the United States. I feel that, in this respect, there is
an alarming lack of information.”1 At the time, Hier was heading up construc-
tion of the second-​largest Holocaust museum in the United States, the Museum
of Tolerance in Los Angeles. Government officials from the Federal Republic
of Germany, or West Germany, had been monitoring American Jewish indi-
viduals and organizations involved in this and similar projects for more than a
decade. Those monitored were held by the West German government to be the
primary agents of the establishment of a specifically American Holocaust me-
morial culture that was—​in their view—​characterized by a lack of attention to
the achievements of West German democracy after 1949.
Indeed, the Holocaust—​the murder of almost six million European Jews by
Nazi Germany and its allies—​has become a central reference point in Ameri-
can political and popular culture. Within a period of roughly two decades, from
the late 1970s to the mid-​1990s, Holocaust memory became fully integrated
into American life.2 How Germans have perceived and reacted to Americans’
public commemoration and remembrance of this horrific crime—​one commit-
ted, above all, by German perpetrators—​forms a key focus of this book. This
question will be considered against the backdrop of the specific dynamics of
West German–​A merican postwar relations.3 Since the end of the Second World
War—​and especially during the four decades of the “old” Federal Republic
(1949–​1990)—​( West) Germany depended on, and benefited from, its alliance
with the United States in a most significant way. The West German state sought
and received economic support and military protection as well as ideological
strength and political direction from its cooperation with America. Its funda-
mental transformation from the murderous Nazi dictatorship into a liberal
democracy, firmly integrated into the Western alliance, would not have been
possible without the United States. America played crucial roles in defeating

1
2  H olocaust A ngst

the Third Reich as an enemy and, even more so, in establishing the Federal Re-
public as an ally. After 1949 this close partnership and military alliance, espe-
cially at times of extreme tension during the Cold War, counted among the top
priorities of West Germany’s political leaders, from Konrad Adenauer (1949–​
1963) to Helmut Kohl (1982–​1998). The former communist dictatorship in East
Germany, the German Democratic Republic or GDR, does not receive significant
attention in this book, as it had a divergent modus of engagement with the Nazi
past, a virtually absent pluralistic and diverse public sphere, and fundamentally
different premises of East German–​A merican relations. In the context of the
Cold War, these factors resulted in a dearth of significant ties between both
countries.4
This book examines how West German political leaders, diplomats, ci-
vilians, and nongovernmental organizations reacted to the emergence of a
highly visible Holocaust memorial culture in the United States between the
late 1970s and the late 1990s. This development was marked by such cru-
cial landmark events and turning points as the airing of the NBC miniseries
Holocaust (1978/1979), the Bitburg controversy (1985), the establishment
of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM, 1978–​1993),
the arrival of Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List (1993/1994) in movie the-
atres, and the publication of Daniel J. Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners
(1996). Specifically, this book argues that a network of predominantly con-
servative West German politicians and government officials—​some of whom
were former Nazis or World War II veterans—​a nd their associates in private
organizations and foundations, centered around Chancellor Kohl, perceived
themselves as “victims” of Holocaust remembrance and representation in
America.
In most cases, they were members of or closely associated with the center-​
right party CDU (Christian Democratic Union). While Helmut Kohl, CDU
chairman from 1973 to 1998, held centrist views on economic or social policies
and fashioned himself as a “man of the middle,” he pursued—​opposing the po-
litical Left, the Social Democrats, the Greens, and left-​leaning Liberals—​a con-
servative rhetoric and policies toward German history and identity.5 He was
certainly not an apologist or revisionist, and he did not share the point of view
of the national-​conservative right wing of the CDU, represented for example
by the long-​term chairman of the CDU/​CSU (Christian Social Union) group in
the Bundestag, the nationalist and vehemently anticommunist Alfred Dreg-
ger.6 Kohl’s politics of history, however, corresponded to the views of many
conservatives, who maintained that the Federal Republic needed to escape the
“shadow of the Nazi past” and the “fixation on the Holocaust”; according to
this position, history should serve as a source of “reassurance” for the nation-​
state, not as a burden.7 In this context, Kohl acknowledged the “lessons” of the
Nazi past for the Federal Republic but wanted to diminish its actual impact on
 In t r o d u c t i o n   3

the conduct of domestic and foreign policy; to his mind, the Federal Republic
should be recognized as an equal by its Western partners.8
With regard to the United States, these politicians and officials were con-
cerned that public manifestations of Holocaust memory—​such as museums,
monuments, movies, educational programs, and commemoration ceremo-
nies—​could severely damage the Federal Republic’s reputation in the United
States and even cause Americans to question the Federal Republic’s status as a
partner in the Western alliance.9 This fear was not a ubiquitous phenomenon nor
did it characterize all of Germany’s political, diplomatic, or intellectual elites.
In comparison to conservative positions toward history and identity, Social
Democrats and left-​leaning Liberals considered, broadly speaking, the German
past a “warning and a burden for the nation state.”10 The government of Kohl’s
predecessor, the Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt (1974–​1982), for instance,
was made aware of the concerns held by German diplomats in the United States
of the potential for American Holocaust memory to negatively influence West
Germany’s reputation abroad over an extended period. While Schmidt’s gov-
ernment took notice of these developments and was certainly mindful of po-
litical and social tensions in German–​A merican relations, it did not judge that
the issue of American Holocaust memory required significant political action.
Although Schmidt was the first chancellor to visit the Auschwitz concentra-
tion camp memorial, he did not make the German past a major priority of his
government.11
In contrast, the German leadership around Kohl perceived the increasing
interest of Americans in the history of the destruction of European Jewry and
the growing public presence of Holocaust memory in the United States from the
late 1970s on as a political threat to the Federal Republic.12 From their perspec-
tive, American Holocaust memorial culture, as promoted and implemented by
American Jewish organizations and individuals, constituted a stumbling block
for West German–​A merican relations. This book refers to their fears, catalyzed
by these perceptions, as “Holocaust angst.”13 Representing the first compre-
hensive archival study of German efforts to cope with the Nazi past vis-​à-​v is its
superpower ally, from the late 1970s to the 1990s, it focuses on various fields
of interaction, including diplomatic, scholarly, and public spheres. In doing so,
it unearths the complicated and often contradictory process of managing the
legacies of genocide on an international stage.14
Yet why were the perceptions and reactions of the Kohl government during
the 1980s distinctly different from those of its predecessors during earlier de-
cades? Of course, the Nazi past had affected the image of the Federal Repub-
lic abroad as well its interactions with foreign countries since its existence.15
In the 1950s, for example, both the West German and the US governments
were keenly interested in showing the American public an image of Germans
as “dedicated democrats” and reliable Cold War allies, not as Nazis.16 Well into
4  H olocaust A ngst

the 1960s, the Federal Republic’s image in the United States was that of an
economically successful country, yet one still characterized by the “residues of
National Socialism.”17 For example, German diplomats feared that media and
press coverage of the Eichmann Trial (1961) could reveal not only the extent of
the Foreign Office’s involvement in the Holocaust, but also damage the Federal
Republic’s reputation in the United States more generally.18 Moreover, German
politicians struggled to explain that major turning points in a confrontation
with the Nazi past—​such as the Auschwitz Trial of 1963–​1965 and the leg-
islative debates on the abolition of the statute of limitations for Nazi crimes
since 1965—​were not just reactions to political expectations or pressure from
abroad.19 In the course of the 1970s, however, a “relative indifference towards
Nazism” characterized the political agenda of the Social Democratic govern-
ments, which faced more acute political challenges, such as the 1973 oil crisis
and domestic terrorism.20 In fact, political responses to German terrorists, es-
pecially the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction), overshadowed the Federal
Republic’s image abroad: some European observers feared that counterterror-
ism could turn West Germany into a police state.21 Vis-​à-​v is the United States,
the Schmidt government initiated an overhaul of the Federal Republic’s public
diplomacy, which aimed at a more forceful, “imaginative” promotion of the
achievements of German culture abroad.22 It hoped to renew ties and to estab-
lish new political and societal connections between the two Cold War allies, but
the Nazi past played only a minor role in this context.23
In the 1980s, however, the question of West Germany’s broader image re-
turned with pressing urgency. It was a central goal of the Kohl government to
readjust the meaning of the Nazi past for West Germany’s self-​image at a time
when the Federal Republic began to bid farewell to its status as a “provisional”
entity and to redefine itself as a nation-​state with its own tradition and his-
tory.24 In this context Kohl pursued a specific politics of history, relying on his-
tory as a resource for domestic and foreign policy goals while simultaneously
attempting to shape the general public’s conception, consciousness, and under-
standing of German history.25 Kohl maintained that the Nazi past rendered
the conduct of foreign policy and the pursuit of national interests “extraordi-
narily difficult.”26 Yet compared to his predecessors, he wanted to orchestrate
domestic and foreign policy mindful of this past, while recognizing the politi-
cal potential of, and opportunities associated with, an active, state-​directed
politics of history.27
At this historical juncture, however, representatives of the American Jewish
community, including several prominent Holocaust survivors, as well as other
interest groups, were in the process of transplanting the perspective of Holo-
caust victims into the popular, academic, and political culture of the United
States. American Jewish organizations, some of which had opposed the Fed-
eral Republic’s rehabilitation in the 1950s, were by the 1980s spearheading a
 In t r o d u c t i o n   5

fundamental transformation of America’s engagement with the history of the

Holocaust.28 This was a disturbing and distressing development for representa-
tives of the West German state. Fear of an image abroad of the “ugly German”
became deeply engrained in the minds of German politicians and diplomats.29
Some American observers have even argued that this led to an “obsession with
its international image” in the Federal Republic.30 Kohl’s biographer Hans-​
Peter Schwarz—​g ranted, a leading conservative historian—​expressed in hind-
sight his sympathy with the chancellor, who had opposed the “irresistible urge”
of “the media, the lobbies of the victims, and leading politicians” in the West to
“recycle the memory of German atrocities during the Second World War and to
commemorate their own heroism at the same time” in the 1980s.31
More specifically, three developments overlapped since the late 1970s that
forced West Germans to face a heightened level of international engagement
with the crimes of Nazi Germany, and propelled them to take concrete political
actions. The developments include the conservative discourses about German
identity and the pursuit of a “usable past” against the backdrop of the Holocaust
in the Federal Republic, the specific dynamics of German–​A merican relations
during the Cold War, and changes in American Holocaust memorial culture.32
By insisting on the need for Germans in the Federal Republic to develop a sense
of national identity, German conservative politicians as well as intellectuals
aimed to “destigmatize the national past.”33 According to this view, as historian
A. Dirk Moses has suggested, the Third Reich and the Holocaust constituted
aberrations “in an otherwise healthy German past.”34 Such policies were par-
tially a response to a growing critical engagement of West German society with
the Nazi past and its aftermath. These resulted from generational change, the
specific politics of history of the governments of the Social Democrats Willy
Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, and a growing interest in the “history from below”
and the “forgotten” victims of National Socialism.35 The government of Helmut
Kohl specifically devoted much energy to promoting, as historian Andreas
Wirsching has remarked, a “balanced” interpretation of German history (Ge­
schichtsbalance), which did not reject the “continuing relevance” of the Nazi past,
but wanted to complement it with “positive aspects” of German history.36 The
1980s thus saw numerous governmental initiatives to support a uniquely West
German identity, intended to be based on the legacies of the Nazi past, the Fed-
eral Republic’s “success story,” and the long history of Germany’s many positive
achievements.37 As a means of empowering West Germans to identify affirma-
tively with their history, there was to be a reduced public presence of the Nazi
past—​to be, in turn, contrasted with examples of German heroism, suffering,
and sacrifice during the war, or integrated into a narrative according to which
the democratic achievements after 1949 had redeemed Germans for the crimes
of Nazi Germany.38 As Kohl put it in a speech commemorating the fortieth an-
niversary of the liberation of the Bergen-​Belsen Concentration Camp: “We have
6  H olocaust A ngst

learned the lessons of history, especially the history of this century.”39 In the
United States, the Kohl government attempted to disseminate an image of the
Federal Republic based on the interpretation of West German history as a suc-
cess story, heavily emphasizing the fundamental transformation it had expe-
rienced since the end of the war.40 In this context, concern about the lack of
knowledge of postwar German history in the United States was a crucial aspect
of the West German government’s Holocaust angst.41
The pursuit of equality and “normality” in international relations—​while si-
multaneously contending with the stigma imposed by the Nazi past on the Fed-
eral Republic’s reputation abroad—​was a key characteristic of West German
foreign policymaking.42 Since its founding in 1949, the Federal Republic imple-
mented a number of political, economic, and diplomatic measures to seek rec-
onciliation with former enemies of its predecessor state, the Third Reich, and
to compensate its victims for their suffering.43 The legacies of the Nazi past,
however, also burdened the sphere of public diplomacy, that is, that part of
diplomacy that aims to create a positive image of one’s own country abroad.44
In this context, the Nazi past imposed limits on the scope of German policies.
Given its history of imperialism, cultural chauvinism, and violent occupation,
representatives of the post-​Nazi state, West Germany, presented themselves
and their country abroad with caution and self-​restraint.45 Debates in West
Germany and among expatriates in the United States about how they thought
they were seen abroad and how they wanted to be seen abroad are thus key to
this analysis.46
While scholars have primarily been concerned with the various forms of West
German self-​representation abroad—​such as trade fairs, exhibitions, sporting
events, and the architecture of embassies—​and German conversations about
these representations, this book focuses instead on what West Germans per­
ceived as representations of Germany in the United States. Elements of Ameri-
can Holocaust memorial culture became screens on to which Germans’ Holo-
caust angst could be projected. By looking at these manifestations of Holocaust
memory in America, and the German conversations about them, the intercon-
nection between foreign and domestic policies becomes strikingly obvious.47 For
this reason, this book will rarely examine the daily business of West German
public diplomacy in the United States, for example the work of the Goethe In-
stitutes, a global network of centers promoting German culture and the study
of the German language abroad, or the German Academic Exchange Service
(DAAD), roughly the German equivalent of the Fulbright Commission.48 Rather,
it focuses on German government reactions to the development of an American
Holocaust memorial culture and examines the ways these reactions reflected, as
well as caused, changes in the discourses about the Nazi past in Germany.
The impact of Holocaust memory on German–​A merican relations cannot
be fully understood without taking the specific dynamics of the Cold War
 In t r o d u c t i o n   7

into consideration. The Federal Republic benefited from the alliance with the
United States after World War II in a multitude of ways, and this relationship
paved the way for the evolution of a civil and democratic society in a part
of the former territory of the Third Reich.49 Additionally, West Germany de-
pended on the military protection offered by the Western alliance, and was—​
as the Iron Curtain divided East from West—​permanently confronted unlike
any other country, except perhaps Korea, with the realities of the Cold War.
Since the late 1940s, the United States had heavily invested not only in the
military alliance and West Germany’s economic recovery, but also in build-
ing close societal ties between the two countries through the establishment
of exchange programs, cultural centers, and various other initiatives in the
field of public diplomacy. 50 In the 1970s and 1980s, however, observers on
either side of the Atlantic noticed fundamental changes in both societies. The
achievements of the founding generation of German–​A merican friendship in
the 1950s slowly eroded, and the so-​called successor generation exhibited less
commitment to the alliance. 51 From the German perspective, the declining
interest of young Americans—​illustrated, among other ways, by decreasing
enrollments in exchange programs—​in the language, culture, and history of
Germany was particularly alarming. The dedication of future generations of
Americans to the alliance—​and hence to the Federal Republic—​was the sine
qua non of West German security, freedom, and prosperity. Moreover, many
(young) Germans began to exhibit distinctly anti-​A merican sentiments, par-
ticularly those associated with the Peace Movement against the moderniza-
tion of American nuclear forces on German soil. This also became a source of
concern for both countries.52
As a result, the 1980s saw a number of joint projects designed to strengthen
German–​A merican friendship and to build networks between future gen-
erations of leaders.53 On the diplomatic level, both governments appointed
“coordinators” for German–​A merican cooperation. The celebration of the tri-
centennial of German immigration to the United States in 1983, the designa-
tion of October 6, 1987, as the first German-​A merican Day by the US Congress,
and the establishment of a German-​A merican Friendship Garden between the
Washington Monument and the White House in 1988 were intended to create
powerful symbols of the close partnership between both countries. In order to
generate the engagement and interest of young Americans in Germany, and
vice versa, both countries established a number of educational programs, such
as the joint student exchange program of the US Congress and the German par-
liament, the Bundestag. The German government further initiated a number
of measures to spread a positive message about Germany and its history with
respect to the United States. These initiatives aimed to reinforce ties between
the two societies. For the Federal Republic, however, fear provided a decisive
rationale. Should future generations of Americans remain uninformed about
8  H olocaust A ngst

present-​day Germany, their image of Germany would be dominated—​and

tainted—​by those of the recent past: Hitler, World War II, and the Holocaust.

Despite the impact of Holocaust angst on German–​A merican relations, as well

as the formation of Holocaust memory in the Federal Republic, scholarly atten-
tion to this phenomenon remains cursory. While previous decades have seen a
large and diverse body of scholarship on West Germany’s success and failure in
coping with the Nazi past and on American Holocaust memorial culture, stud-
ies taking a comparative or a transnational angle, based on archival sources,
are rare.54
Indeed, the works of numerous historians, in Germany and abroad, have
rendered the study of Germany’s engagement with the Nazi past (Vergangen­
heitsbewältigung) a highly fruitful subfield of inquiry in the study of German
contemporary history.55 The events, debates, and developments investigated
by scholars are multifarious. They range from the judicial, legal, and politi-
cal consequences of the Third Reich (Vergangenheitspolitik), to the reparation
efforts aimed at financially compensating the victims of National Socialism
(“Wiedergutmachung”). A further area of examination is the private and public
remembrance and commemoration of the Third Reich and the Holocaust in the
Federal Republic. How the Nazi past impacted the political discourse surround-
ing memorial days, monuments, and museums forms a key question.56 Histo-
rians have demonstrated in recent years that the history of West German en-
gagement with the Nazi past, for example in the fields of Vergangenheitspolitik
and “Wiedergutmachung,” needs to be written using an international or trans-
national frame of reference.57
Historians of postwar American engagement with the Holocaust have also
created a sizeable body of scholarship. Peter Novick—​if one ignores the bestsell-
ing, controversial, though rather unscholarly diatribe on the Holocaust Industry
by Norman Finkelstein—​set the benchmark for the historiographical debate.58
While many of Novick’s findings were not new, nor have they remained uncon-
tested, he established a master narrative that even his most serious critics have
not been able to radically revise. Novick contends that while there was little
public engagement with the Holocaust outside of Jewish communities in the
postwar decades, discourse about the Holocaust has changed significantly in the
United States since the 1970s.59 It has become an “American memory,” a moral
point of reference in a variety of contexts, and provides alleged “universal les-
sons” for diverse groups, causes, and beliefs.60 The American process of coming
to terms with their withdrawal and failure to win the Vietnam War in the 1970s,
and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, accelerated the “Americanization
of the Holocaust.”61 These events overlapped with the impact of the NBC minise-
ries Holocaust in 1978, as well as the opening of the USHMM in 1993 and reac-
tions to Steven Spielberg’s acclaimed blockbuster Schindler’s List the same year.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
back
back
back
back
back
back
back
back
back
back
back
back
back
back
back