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 IFIP AICT 491
Arthur Tatnall
Christopher Leslie
(Eds.)

International
Communities
of Invention
and Innovation
IFIP WG 9.7 International Conference
on the History of Computing, HC 2016
Brooklyn, NY, USA, May 25–29, 2016
Revised Selected Papers

123
IFIP Advances in Information
and Communication Technology 491

Editor-in-Chief

Kai Rannenberg, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany

Editorial Board
TC 1 – Foundations of Computer Science
Jacques Sakarovitch, Télécom ParisTech, France
TC 2 – Software: Theory and Practice
Michael Goedicke, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany
TC 3 – Education
Arthur Tatnall, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia
TC 5 – Information Technology Applications
Erich J. Neuhold, University of Vienna, Austria
TC 6 – Communication Systems
Aiko Pras, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
TC 7 – System Modeling and Optimization
Fredi Tröltzsch, TU Berlin, Germany
TC 8 – Information Systems
Jan Pries-Heje, Roskilde University, Denmark
TC 9 – ICT and Society
Diane Whitehouse, The Castlegate Consultancy, Malton, UK
TC 10 – Computer Systems Technology
Ricardo Reis, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil
TC 11 – Security and Privacy Protection in Information Processing Systems
Steven Furnell, Plymouth University, UK
TC 12 – Artificial Intelligence
Ulrich Furbach, University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany
TC 13 – Human-Computer Interaction
Jan Gulliksen, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
TC 14 – Entertainment Computing
Matthias Rauterberg, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands
IFIP – The International Federation for Information Processing
IFIP was founded in 1960 under the auspices of UNESCO, following the first World
Computer Congress held in Paris the previous year. A federation for societies working
in information processing, IFIP’s aim is two-fold: to support information processing in
the countries of its members and to encourage technology transfer to developing na-
tions. As its mission statement clearly states:

IFIP is the global non-profit federation of societies of ICT professionals that aims
at achieving a worldwide professional and socially responsible development and
application of information and communication technologies.

IFIP is a non-profit-making organization, run almost solely by 2500 volunteers. It

operates through a number of technical committees and working groups, which organize
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to working conferences and local seminars.
The flagship event is the IFIP World Computer Congress, at which both invited and
contributed papers are presented. Contributed papers are rigorously refereed and the
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As with the Congress, participation in the open conferences is open to all and papers
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The working conferences are structured differently. They are usually run by a work-
ing group and attendance is generally smaller and occasionally by invitation only. Their
purpose is to create an atmosphere conducive to innovation and development. Referee-
ing is also rigorous and papers are subjected to extensive group discussion.
Publications arising from IFIP events vary. The papers presented at the IFIP World
Computer Congress and at open conferences are published as conference proceedings,
while the results of the working conferences are often published as collections of se-
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IFIP distinguishes three types of institutional membership: Country Representative
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panies, national or international associations or federations of companies.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6102

Arthur Tatnall Christopher Leslie (Eds.)
•

International Communities
of Invention and Innovation
IFIP WG 9.7 International Conference
on the History of Computing, HC 2016
Brooklyn, NY, USA, May 25–29, 2016
Revised Selected Papers

123
Editors
Arthur Tatnall Christopher Leslie
Victoria University New York University
Melbourne, VIC Brooklyn, NY
Australia USA

ISSN 1868-4238 ISSN 1868-422X (electronic)

IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology
ISBN 978-3-319-49462-3 ISBN 978-3-319-49463-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-49463-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016957379

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 Preface

Analog and digital computers were developed by individuals aware of an international

scientific community. Likewise, although sometimes thought of as solely national
projects, the first computer networks were built in an age of growing interconnectivity
among nations.
The chapters of this book are drawn from papers presented at an International
Federation for Information Processing (IFIP) conference on the History of Computing
at the New York University Tandon School of Engineering in May 2016. The con-
ference was run by IFIP Working Group 9.7 (History of Computing). All papers
submitted for the conference were peer reviewed before acceptance, and those selected
for this book were reviewed again after the authors had the opportunity to make
improvements following discussions at the conference.
In concept, the conference aimed to show that, far from a deterministic view that
computers and computer networks were developed in isolation and according to their
own technical imperatives, the history of pre-existing relationships and communities
led to the triumphs (and dead-ends) in the history of computing. This broad perspective
aimed to help us tell a more accurate story of important developments like the Internet
and also to provide us with a better understanding of how to sponsor future invention
and innovation. The conference gathered historians, computer scientists, and other
professionals to reflect on histories that foreground the international community.
Themes for the conference focused on: invention, policy, infrastructure, and social
history.
In the first chapter, “The Route Less Taken: The Homegrown Los Alamos Inte-
grated Computer Network,” Nicholas Lewis from the University of Minnesota and the
Charles Babbage Institute discusses the Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network. He
notes that between the 1970s and 1990s the Los Alamos National Laboratory built and
utilized a largely custom computer network for the lab’s supercomputers, designed to
support the unusual performance, storage, and security requirements of an American
weapons lab.
In a chapter titled “MONET – Monash University’s Campus LAN in the 1980s – A
Bridge to Better Networking,” Barbara Ainsworth (Monash University), Neil Clarke
(Deakin University), Chris Avram (Monash University), and Judy Sheard (Monash
University) outline how Monash University, Australia, developed an in-house local
area network called MONET during the 1980s to meet the needs of the university’s
computer users. The Monash University Computer Centre team created and installed an
early implementation of a local area network at a time when such concepts were
evolving and specific hardware and software for the purpose did not yet exist.
Frank Dittmann from the Deutsches Museum, Munich, writes on: “Technology vs.
Political Conflict – How Networks Penetrate the Iron Curtain.” He explains how, in
July 1977, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) near
Vienna organized an experimental data transmission line. His paper investigates this,
VI Preface

focusing on three aspects: IIASA was an important location for Eastern and Western
scientists to work with each other, the team of computer specialists creating the net-
work was remarkable, and the concept of combining computer technology with science
cooperation and information transfer was very advanced in the 1970s.
“There and Back Again – Andrew Booth, a British Computer Pioneer, and His
Interactions with U.S. and Other Contemporaries” by Roger Johnson from Birkbeck
College, London University, explores the interchanges between Andrew Booth, an
early British computer pioneer, and contemporary U.S. and other pioneers. The paper
describes Booth’s construction of an electronic drum, the world’s first successful
demonstration of a rotating storage device connected to a computer, his pioneering
work on natural language processing, and finally and most notably his invention of the
Booth hardware multiplier, which is the basis of the multiplier used in billions of chips
each year.
The next chapter, “Machines à Comparer les Idées’ of Semen Korsakov: First Step
Towards AI,” written by Valery Shilov and Sergey Silantiev from the National
Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, relates to the forgotten
Russian scholar Semen Korsakov. The paper describes his life and scientific activity
and particularly to Korsakov’s main achievement – invention of five “intellectual
machines” that could be considered as the very first attempt to design a mechanical
device capable of performing such intellectual operations as data analysis, comparison,
and selection.
“Towards Machine Independence: From Mechanically Programmed Devices to the
Internet of Things,” by Arthur Tatnall (Victoria University) and Bill Davey (RMIT
University), Melbourne, Australia, provides a historical account of the development of
one aspect of technology and of machines, leading to information technologies, the
Internet, and the Internet of Things. It points to an increasing trend toward these
machines and devices becoming more and more independent of human intervention
and control. A clear trend can be observed from mechanically controlled machines to
modern smart kitchen and household appliances that really could be said to have a
degree of independence.
Giovanni Cignoni and Giovanni Cossu from Pisa, Italy, present “The Global Virtual
Museum of Information Science and Technology, a Project Idea.” They point out that
information science and technology (IST) has pervasively affected our everyday lives
and become part of the cultural heritage of humanity. The growing curiosity about IST
history has led to the creation of important collections devoted to the conservation of
IST relics, but physical relics are naturally located close to their origins. Their paper
proposes a global virtual museum of IST based on a knowledge base able to manage all
the information of the domain, created and updated by museum keepers and other
experts, and capable of offering new enjoyment opportunities to a wider public
audience.
“Why Not OSI?” by Bill Davey (RMIT University, Australia) and Robert Houghton
(Idaho State University, USA) argues that the OSI proposed standard is technically
superior to the TCP/IP standard for network communications and presents an analysis
of the historical record surrounding the adoption of TCP/IP rather than OSI. The paper
does not seek to create a new history of TCP/IP but to suggest this is a case where
 Preface VII

traditional explanations of adoption based on the nature of the technology do not

explain the demise of the OSI model.
“Flame Wars on Worldnet: Early Constructions of the International User” was
contributed by Christopher Leslie from NYU Tandon School of Engineering, New
York. He notes that some of the earliest users of the Internet described their activities as
predicting a widespread communication medium that would cross national boundaries
even before the technical capability was possible. However, analysis of conversations
on Human-Nets, an early ARPANet mailing list, shows how users were concerned
about providing a forum for open discussion and hoped that the network would spread
to provide communication throughout the world.
“The Code of Banking: Software as the Digitalization of German Savings Banks” is
written by Martin Schmitt from the Centre for Contemporary History, Potsdam, Ger-
many, and describes the history of banking software. He notes that although some
literature exists on the use of computers in the banking industry, most of it focuses only
on the hardware and its restrictions. This paper analyzes how German savings banks
used software to digitalize their business during the Cold War period.
Evangelos Kotsioris from Princeton University, New Jersey, then offers: “Electronic
‘Ambassador’: The Diplomatic Missions of IBM’s RAMAC 305.” His paper describes
how the RAMAC 305 developed by IBM during the late 1950s was instrumental as an
“animate” ambassador of American computing technology abroad. He examines the
impact of IBM’s exhibit at the American National Exhibition in Moscow (July 1959)
and Nikita Khrushchev’s tour to the IBM manufacturing plant in California (September
1959) to argue that the RAMAC 305 was envisioned and designed as a modular system
of combinable units and peripherals that could be easily and quite literally transferred
around the world.
Herbert Bruderer, from ETH Zurich, Switzerland, writes on “The Birth of Artificial
Intelligence: First Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Paris in 1951?” He notes that
although the 1956 Dartmouth conference is often considered as the cradle of artificial
intelligence, there is a debate about this. Other suggestions about its origin are offered
including a large and important (but forgotten) European conference on computing and
human thinking in Paris in 1951.
“The World’s Smallest Mechanical Parallel Calculator: Discovery of Original
Drawings and Patent Documents from the 1950s in Switzerland” is also by Herbert
Bruderer from ETH Zurich, Switzerland. This paper describes how Austrian engineer
Curt Herzstark invented the world-renowned mechanical pocket calculator Curta,
mentioned as consisting of two models, Curta 1 and Curta 2. He notes that original
drawings and patent documents on a multiple Curta, the world’s smallest mechanical
parallel calculator, were discovered in Switzerland in 2015.
Contributions to the book have thus come from authors from the USA, Australia,
Germany, UK, Russia, Italy, and Switzerland. We hope you enjoy the book and find it
informative.

October 2016 Arthur Tatnall

Christopher Leslie
 Organization

Program Committee
Arthur Tatnall (Chair) Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia
Janet Abbate Virginia Tech, USA
Gerard Alberts University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Corrado Bonfanti Italian Computer Society, Italy
Tilly Blyth Science Museum, London, UK
David Burger IEEE History Committee, Sydney, Australia
Paul Ceruzzi National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution,
USA
Bill Davey Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Melbourne,
Australia
Michael Geselowitz IEEE History Center, Stevens Institute of Technology,
USA
Lisa Gitelman NYU Steinhardt and College of Arts and Science, USA
Marie Hicks Illinois Institute of Technology, USA
John Impagliazzo Hofstra University, USA
Roger Johnson Birkbeck College, University of London, UK
Christopher Leslie NYU Tandon School of Engineering, New York, USA
Petri Paju University of Turku, Finland
Rebecca Slayton Cornell University, USA
Janet Toland Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

Organizing Committee
Christopher Leslie NYU Tandon School of Engineering, USA
(Chair)
Krysta Battersby NYU Tandon School of Engineering, USA
Randy Sofia NYU Tandon School of Engineering, USA
Barbara Tatnall Heidelberg Press, Australia
 Contents

The Route Less Taken: The Homegrown Los Alamos Integrated

Computer Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Nicholas Lewis

MONET – Monash University’s Campus LAN in the 1980s – A Bridge

to Better Networking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Barbara Ainsworth, Neil Clarke, Chris Avram, and Judy Sheard

Technology vs. Political Conflict – How Networks Penetrate

the Iron Curtain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Frank Dittmann

There and Back Again – Andrew Booth, a British Computer Pioneer,

and his Interactions with US and Other Contemporaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Roger G. Johnson

‘Machines à Comparer les Idées’ of Semen Korsakov: First

Step Towards AI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Valery V. Shilov and Sergey A. Silantiev

Towards Machine Independence: From Mechanically Programmed

Devices to the Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Arthur Tatnall and Bill Davey

The Global Virtual Museum of Information Science & Technology,

a Project Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Giovanni A. Cignoni and Giovanni A. Cossu

Why not OSI? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Bill Davey and Robert F. Houghton

Flame Wars on Worldnet: Early Constructions of the International User . . . . 122

Christopher Leslie

The Code of Banking: Software as the Digitalization of

German Savings Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Martin Schmitt

Electronic “Ambassador”: The Diplomatic Missions of IBM’s

RAMAC 305 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Evangelos Kotsioris
XII Contents

The Birth of Artificial Intelligence: First Conference on Artificial

Intelligence in Paris in 1951? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Herbert Bruderer

The World’s Smallest Mechanical Parallel Calculator: Discovery

of Original Drawings and Patent Documents from the 1950s
in Switzerland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Herbert Bruderer

Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

 The Route Less Taken: The Homegrown Los Alamos
Integrated Computer Network

Nicholas Lewis ✉
( )

History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Program, Charles Babbage Institute,

University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA
lewi0740@umn.edu

Abstract. Between the 1970s and 1990s, Los Alamos National Laboratory built
and utilized a largely custom computer network for the Lab’s supercomputers.
Designed to support the unusual performance, storage, and security requirements
of an American weapons lab, the Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network, as
the focus of historical study, complicates and enriches the history of computer
networking development, exploring the approaches and contributions to
computer networking of an institution outside the better-known worlds of
industry, academia, and the military. For example, the Lab’s reticence to adopt
TCP/IP due to performance and security concerns further complicates the narra‐
tive of the ARPANET/Internet protocol suite’s adoption among advanced
networking sites in the 1980s and 90s.

Keywords: Los Alamos National Laboratory · Supercomputing · Computer

networking · Network standardization · ANSI · TCP/IP · History of computing

1 Introduction

Since the Second World War, the Laboratory at Los Alamos has engaged in advanced
scientific computing as part of its primary mission as a nuclear weapons lab, and
increasingly for other fields of computing-intensive scientific research, such as climate
modelling. Because of its unusual computational demands, Los Alamos, during and after
the Cold War, often sought levels of computing performance, and hardware and software
capabilities, before high-tech vendors were capable or interested in meeting those
requirements. As a consequence, Los Alamos had a history of developing custom solu‐
tions to computing-related problems, particularly where new technologies were not yet
available on the market, or existing systems lacked key features or capabilities Lab
supercomputer users desired. Homegrown solutions were costlier in terms of develop‐
ment and maintenance, but were typically well-tailored to the Lab’s technical and
security requirements. The custom approach also provided in-house knowledge and

LA-UR-16-20103

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2016

Published by Springer International Publishing AG 2016. All Rights Reserved
A. Tatnall and C. Leslie (Eds.): HC 2016, IFIP AICT 491, pp. 1–22, 2016.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-49463-0_1
2 N. Lewis

expertise for technologies important to the Lab. The Los Alamos Integrated Computer
Network of the 1970s and 80s was a prime example of the Lab’s homegrown computing
solutions.1
The Lab’s custom approach toward computer networking, followed by its adoption
of outside networking technologies, such as TCP/IP, from the late 1980s through the
mid-1990s, offers a window onto several important facets of networking history. First,
it traces the maturation of computer networking over the course of two decades from
the perspective of an American weapons laboratory, with its unusual networking
requirements interacting with the capabilities and business interests of an emerging
industry. Second, it highlights the alternative approaches and contributions toward
computer networking of an institution outside academia, industry, or the Department of
Defense. Finally, it builds upon historiographical works, such as Janet Abbate’s
Inventing the Internet and Andrew Russell’s Open Standards and the Digital Age, which
argue against previous common conceptions of how and why TCP/IP spread as a
networking standard, demonstrating that the DoD’s protocol suite was not always
adopted readily at computer networking sites. Indeed, Los Alamos considered TCP/IP
to be a technical step backward, in terms of security and performance, over the custom
Lab protocols, and initially rejected using the DoD suite in the early 1980s. Networking
development at Los Alamos followed a largely unique path during its first two decades,
attempting to integrate slowly with outside standards and technologies as the high-
performance computer networking market and industry evolved appreciably in the
1980s and 90s. However, various internal, but primarily external pressures, brought a
far more rapid end to the homegrown integrated computer network than Los Alamos
had anticipated.2

2 Early Lab Computing

Founded in 1943 as the primary R&D site of the Manhattan Project, the Laboratory at
Los Alamos emerged from World War II as a major center of scientific computing in
the United States. Using, building, and buying some of the earliest digital computers,

1
For an overview of Los Alamos and its computing history, see Donald MacKenzie, “The
Influence of the Los Alamos and Livermore National Laboratories on the Development of
Supercomputing,” Annals of the History of Computing 13, No. 2 (1991).
2
For detailed discussions of how and why the TCP/IP suite developed and became the standard
set of networking protocols in use today, see Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1999), Andrew L. Russell, Open Standards and the Digital Age: History,
Ideology, and Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), and Laura DeNardis,
The Global War for Internet Governance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014). These
works challenge previous depictions of the history of ARPANET and the Internet that depicted
the development and spread of TCP/IP as open and uncontested processes, when, in fact, the
opposite was true. The protocol suite resulted from closed-door planning and implementation
decisions, and entered widespread usage largely as a result of the US Department of Defense
exerting financial and other forms of coercion on networked institutions and vendors to adopt
the suite.
 The Homegrown Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network 3

Los Alamos played a role in the maturation of computer hardware and software in the
first decades of the Cold War, going back to its use of ENIAC on that computer’s very
first calculation. As part of its collaboration with IBM on the design of the IBM 7030
“Stretch,” Los Alamos helped to create and define the concept of supercomputing.
Research and development on operating systems, programming languages, and
compilers also accompanied the Lab’s work on hardware, creating the software tools
which vendors like IBM, Control Data Corporation, and Cray Research either could not,
or would not, provide for the small (but growing) niche of high-performance scientific
computing.3
Beginning in the early 1950s, when digital computing was still in its infancy, Los
Alamos actively engaged with the broader, though still small, scientific computing
community, exchanging correspondence and software with sites like the RAND Corpo‐
ration, and with other researchers, taking part in conferences and user groups, like IBM
SHARE, of which Los Alamos was a founding member. The purpose was to share in
the community’s pool of knowledge and experience concerning a new technological
field. These exchanges continued and became more elaborate and important over time,
with Los Alamos directly funding R&D at universities and among vendors, including
IBM, RCA, and Burroughs, on computing technologies, such as high-speed storage and
memory, which weren’t feasible or cost-effective to research at the Lab. Participating
in the scientific computing community and encouraging R&D activities outside the Lab
were considered to be investments that would reduce the need for costlier in-house
development. However, in-house development was a common practice in Los Alamos
computing, particularly along new technological branches, like high-performance and
high-security networking in the 1970s.4

3
MacKenzie, “The Influence of the Los Alamos and Livermore National Laboratories,” 186;
Memorandum from Walter H. Brummet, Jr., Chief Contracts and Procurement Branch, to
George Udell, Director, Supply Division, Nov. 17, 1955, “Report of Conferences in Wash‐
ington, D. C. Regarding Proposed Purchase of Computing Machine for LASL,” Edward A.
Voorhees Papers, Box 16, Folder 6 Stretch Solicitation and Selection, LANL Archives; Charles
J. Bashe, et al., IBM’s Early Computers (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 430, 432; For a
detailed assessment of the intersection between computing and the development of nuclear
weapons at Los Alamos, see Anne Fitzpatrick’s Ph.D. dissertation, “Igniting the Light
Elements: The Los Alamos Thermonuclear Weapon Project, 1942-1952” (The George
Washington University, 1999); Thomas Haigh, Mark Priestley, and Crispin Rope, “Los
Alamos Bets on ENIAC: Nuclear Monte Carlo Simulations, 1947-1948,” IEEE Annals of the
History of Computing 36, No. 3 (July-Sept. 2014) examines specifically Los Alamos’ use of
ENIAC for the first simulations of nuclear weapons on a digital computer.
4
Correspondence from Bengt Carlson to Carson Mark, May 23, 1960, “UHS Computer Study
Contracts,” Edward A. Voorhees Papers, Box 32, Folder 1, Series 25, SPARC Correspondence,
LANL Archives; Correspondence from Edward A. Voorhees to Paul Armer, Head, Computer
Sciences Department, The RAND Corporation, March 17, 1960, Edward A. Voorhees Papers,
Box 4, Folder 10, Series 9, File 1, Voorhees Correspondence 1960, LANL Archives; Corre‐
spondence between T. L. Jordan and Donald C. Cashman, SHARE Distribution Agent, January
13, 1961 through June 27, 1961, Edward A. Voorhees Papers, Box 4, Folder 18, Series 9, File
2, Jordan Correspondence 1960-61, LANL Archives; MacKenzie, “The Influence of the Los
Alamos and Livermore National Laboratories,” 189-193.
4 N. Lewis

3 C Division and Custom Lab Networking

In 1968, Los Alamos formed its first dedicated Computing or “C” Division, its personnel
drawn from the three computing-related groups within the Theoretical Physics or “T”
Division. T Division had led the original Los Alamos hydrogen-bomb project, and was
still the most computing-intensive division in the 1960s, occupying 40% of the Lab’s
available computing time. Transferring oversight of the Lab’s supercomputers to a
dedicated computing division was intended to unify the Lab’s computing efforts, as
multiple science divisions were purchasing their own machines, and were pursuing
differing technical paths from one another. A dedicated computing division was also
intended to mitigate the potential conflict of interest found with the most computer-
dependent division allocating access to all other divisions.5
Between the mid-1960s and the formation of the new C Division, T Division faced a
rapidly growing demand from users on Lab computing resources. The actual computing
power at the Lab’s Central Computing Facility (CCF) quadrupled every two years between
1966 and 1974, but this increase still did not meet the user demand. With the mission-
critical nature of Lab computing resources, particularly amid the escalating demands from
users, T Division was reluctant to adopt new technologies that had the potential to disrupt
vital services or security, at least until those technologies had undergone extensive testing
before entering widespread use at the Lab. Computer users from other divisions who were
dissatisfied with T Division’s conservative approach did not find significant change with
the formation of C Division under its first leader, Roger Lazarus. A physicist and Los
Alamos veteran since 1951, Lazarus was an expert on the application of digital computing
for nuclear weapons development. Lazarus likewise resisted the adoption of technologies
that, among other factors, might impinge on the efficiency or availability of the Lab’s
supercomputers for weapons work.6
For example, Lazarus resisted the development or adoption of time-sharing operating
systems at Los Alamos, believing that time sharing, in its early stages in the late 1960s

5
“Use of Computing Time by Division,” Edward A. Voorhees Papers, Box 67, Folder 3, Series
48, Monthly Summary Sheets 1961-1964, LANL Archives; “New Division Formed at LASL,”
The Atom 5, no. 5 (May 1968), 17-18.
6
The increasing user demand upon computer resources at Los Alamos between the mid-1960s and
mid-70s was due to a variety of factors: First, the Partial Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 moved all
nuclear testing underground, which made weapons tests more expensive, and increased the reli‐
ance upon computer simulation. Second, after having diversified in their research, the US weapons
labs experienced a reducing budget year-over-year beginning in 1960, spurring Los Alamos to
transfer large numbers of personnel back toward its core mission, which increased the number of
heavy computer users, despite the Lab population remaining stable. Third, the weapons them‐
selves became more sophisticated and design tolerances became tighter starting in the mid-1960s,
as US nuclear strategic policy shifted toward a counter-force (targeting military assets) strategy.
A mix of more complex weapons designs and more complex codes used for development and
simulation also markedly increased the processing and storage demands of the heaviest users of
Lab computing resources between the 1960s and 70s. Part of T and then C Division's conserva‐
tism with new technologies was the need to prevent disruptions in the already overbooked CCF's
production schedules.
 The Homegrown Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network 5

and early 1970s, posed security risks, and wasted clock cycles at a time when the Lab
still could not keep up with the growing demand for computing power. Computer users
from heavily computer-dependent divisions, such as P (Physics), MP (Material Physics),
and W (Weapons), found this approach to time sharing to be too cautious, and success‐
fully petitioned for Lazarus to be replaced in 1973. His successor, Frank McGirt, quickly
entered into collaboration with the Lawrence Livermore Lab to utilize its LTSS (Liver‐
more Time-Sharing System) operating system on the CDC (Control Data Corporation)
7600 supercomputers at Los Alamos. Livermore’s Computation Division, under Sidney
Fernbach from 1955 to 1982, typically approached new technical solutions more readily
than did Los Alamos’ C Division under Lazarus. Curiously, Fernbach was less open
than Los Alamos to the potential of smaller computer systems in the 1970s, as he
remained focused on large machines. He usually delegated responsibility for smaller
systems to others in the Computation Division.7
Cautious toward the new arena of computer networking, Roger Lazarus oversaw the
construction of an experimental remote-access system initiated under T Division. Called
“MUX,” the Multiple User eXperiment was meant to determine the utility and viability
of remote computer connections at Los Alamos. MUX provided up to 75 users the ability
to run batch jobs on one of the Lab’s CDC 6600 supercomputers via remote terminals
at 300bits/s. Its specifications completed in 1967, and the system entering use in 1968,
MUX consisted of about $50,000 worth of hand-built hardware and custom application
software, using 8,000 integrated circuits and two miles of twisted-pair cable. The custom
MUX application software resided on the 6600 and one of its Peripheral Processing
Units (PPU), which handled I/O operations for the CPU. The application placed remotely
submitted jobs into the 6600’s job queue, then returned completed jobs to users via the
terminal interface built by the MUX team. MUX was not a time-sharing system, as users
could not interact with their jobs as they ran on the 6600, but it offered a platform for
introducing and testing time-sharing-like capabilities in the Lab setting. Ron Christman,
one of MUX’s three original developers, recalled that the system was reliable to the
point that, when it did fail on rare occasions, its maintenance staff had to “re-learn” how
MUX worked in order to repair it. The experience with MUX, as a tentative first step

7
H. Butler, MP-1, and T. Gardiner, P-1, to Edward Voorhees, CADP, 11-29-66, “Delay in
Procurement of Time-Share Service,” Edward A. Voorhees Papers, Box 35, Folder 2, Series
27, LASL Computer Needs, LANL Archives; Bill Collins, interview by Nicholas Lewis,
Minneapolis, MN, February 19, 2015; Michael, George, and Marilyn Ghausi. "An Interview
with Sidney Fernbach." An Interview with Sidney Fernbach. Accessed March 20, 2016. http://
www.computer-history.info/Page1.dir/pages/Fernbach.html. Information regarding Sidney
Fernbach's potential blindspot for smaller computer systems is derived from George Michael's
introduction to Marilyn Ghausi's February 1989 interview with Fernbach. Fernbach stepped
down as the Livermore Computation Division leader in 1982, with Fernbach arguing that he
had been removed. Fernbach at Livermore had heavily backed the development of the Control
Data STAR-100 supercomputer in the early 1970s, but the poor performance of that system
(of which Livermore purchased two, while Los Alamos backed out of its contract to purchase
a single STAR) had consequences for Fernbach’s position, and for the relative freedom of the
two labs in their selection of new computing systems.
6 N. Lewis

into networking technology, characterized C Division’s cautious approach to

networking development between the 1960s and 70s.8
MUX was enormously popular with users, and remained in use for over a decade.
While quite limited in its capabilities, MUX indicated to Lazarus and C Division that a
demand for computer networking existed at Los Alamos, and that the technology could
be implemented securely and reliably in the Lab setting. While Lab supercomputer users
were, indeed, enthusiastic over the potential of larger-scale networking at Los Alamos,
MUX itself did not fully prepare C Division, despite its usual caution, for the technical
challenges of building a computer network. Even with inside knowledge of a similar
networking effort at another American weapons lab, Los Alamos wrestled with many
of the same problems facing other early computer networking sites, but with the added
complications introduced with the niche requirements of supercomputing at a secure
facility.9

4 Hydra

In 1970, with the success of MUX, Lazarus authorized development of the Lab’s first
computer network. The network came online in 1974, one year later than planned. Ron
Christman, also a designer of the new network, indicated that the delay was largely due
to an overly ambitious early design, and insufficient coordination within the develop‐
ment team for such a complex system. The relative simplicity and small scale of MUX
did not prepare the C Division networking team for the challenges of interconnecting
multiple supercomputers in the Central Computing Facility (CCF). The resulting
network was, by necessity, greatly scaled-back from the original plan, with proposed
features like graphical interface capabilities stripped from the final design. Called
“Hydra”, the network initially connected each of the Lab’s four CDC 7600 supercom‐
puters to a shared pool of short-term, long-term, and archival storage systems through
a central front-end machine, itself a Control Data 6600 supercomputer. The front-end
machine, doing no production work of its own, also managed remote terminal connec‐
tions to the four 7600s. Although the original plans called for a new computer to serve
as the front-machine, C Division opted to convert one of its production 6600s for use
on Hydra due to an initial lack of funds. The one 6600, itself, represented only a small
portion of the Lab’s overall computing capacity. Christman argued at the time of Hydra’s
development that the benefits of more flexible, shared storage options would outweigh
the small loss in processing power. Roger Lazarus agreed.10

8
Ronald D. Christman, “MUX, a Simple Approach to On-Line Computing,” Communications
of the ACM 15, No. 5 (May 1972), 319-329; Jeffery L. Peterson, “MUX, adieu, faithful friend,”
The Atom (October 1979), 14-16; Ronald D. Christman, interview by Nicholas Lewis, Los
Alamos, NM, July 2, 2014.
9
Peterson, “MUX, adieu, faithful friend,” 14-16; Christman, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014.
10
Ron Christman, “A Review of the Hydra Project,” (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory, 1974); “The Computer Science and Services Division Annual Report,
January—December 1975” (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, LA-6228-
PR, 1976), 5.
 The Homegrown Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network 7

Lawrence Livermore, beginning development in the mid-1960s, constructed a

similar network before Hydra, called “Octopus,” which used two DEC PDP-6 computers
as its front-end machines. Despite the historical rivalry between Los Alamos and
Lawrence Livermore, the two nuclear weapons design labs of the AEC complex, their
computing divisions maintained (and still maintain) collaborative relationships on the
development, purchase, and usage of HPC systems, as both labs had similar computing
requirements and faced similar technical problems. However, particularly between the
1950s and 1980s, the two often followed somewhat different technological paths, as in
the case of networking development, due to differences in funding, lab-specific goals,
particular demands from users, and styles of leadership. Livermore was founded in the
1950s largely to stimulate a competitive environment with Los Alamos, with either lab
pursuing similar lines of R&D, but from slightly different philosophical angles. These
tendencies were reflected in their approaches to computing. Los Alamos C-Division
staff remained apprised of the problems with Livermore’s Octopus through publications
and inter-lab technical meetings, and attempted to avoid similar issues with Hydra.
Hydra had fewer initial performance and reliability issues than did Octopus, partly due
to the higher performance of the CDC 6600 as the Hydra front-end machine, and the
lessons learned from Livermore’s earlier foray into centralized-storage networking.
However, both custom networks had similar drawbacks for maintenance, operability,
and reliability. The total dependence on a central front-end machine was the single
largest drawback for network reliability. C Division prepared one of the production
6600s in the Central Computing Facility (CCF) as a backup for the Hydra front-end
machine, allowing the other CDC computer to take over if the primary 6600 failed, but
that solution could not completely address the inherent deficiencies in Hydra’s config‐
uration, only minimize their impact.11
The purpose of Hydra, a “star” configuration network, was to reduce the redundancy
of data storage purchased for each of the Lab’s supercomputers, and to allow users to
access their files on any of the machines in the CCF, regardless of whichever machine they
had used previously. Aside from the Control Data channel couplers, the point-to-point
interconnects which C Division had repurposed to link each of the supercomputers to the
Hydra front-end machine at 12Mbits/s, the network was entirely custom to Los Alamos,
including the Hydra OS, which replaced the CDC Scope operating system on the 6600
front-end machine. After the MUX development team found the Scope OS to be unreli‐
able and difficult to adapt to the needs of the project, C Division opted to pursue its custom
OS for Hydra, despite the greater development costs. Data storage on Hydra consisted of
CDC disk units for short- and long-term storage, and the IBM 1360 “Photostore”, a
massive archival system that stored data on photographic film chips. The Photostore, one
of only six IBM constructed, provided about one-terabit of storage in total.12

11
“The Computer Science and Services Division Annual Report, January—December 1975,” 5;
William J. Worlton, Lab Notebook (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,
4/6/71), 27.
12
“The Computer Science and Services Division Annual Report, January—December 1975,” 5-6,
9; Christman, “A Review of the Hydra Project”; Christman, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014;
John Morrison, interview by Nicholas Lewis, Los Alamos, NM, 7/1/2014.
8 N. Lewis

4.1 The Homegrown Tradition

Retired Lab networking experts Don Tolmie and John Morrison recalled that C Division
opted to develop its custom networking and storage system because the commercial
market for supercomputer networking did not yet exist in the early 1970s. Los Alamos
and Livermore were among the few civilian facilities at that time pursuing the kinds of
data speeds, volumes, and security needed for interconnecting supercomputers for clas‐
sified work. This was not an unusual situation at the Laboratory. In the early 1950s, the
digital computing industry was still in its infancy, with very few computers in existence
worldwide. In addition to its modified IBM accounting machinery and a Hand Calcu‐
lation Group of human computers, Los Alamos had spent the immediate post-war years
utilizing whatever available computer resources existed outside the Lab, such as the
ENIAC in both Pennsylvania and Maryland, and IBM’s electromechanical SSEC
machine in New York. The most demanding of these calculations were usually in support
of the hydrogen bomb project. However, traveling great distances for computer access,
particularly to machines that were not typically well suited to the types of calculations
Los Alamos performed in the early Cold War, was not a practical solution.13
In the 1950s, Los Alamos cultivated a native capacity for developing and maintaining
its own computing solutions. For example, the MANIACs I and II, from 1952 and 1957,
respectively, were first-generation digital computers constructed at Los Alamos. These
machines provided computing capacity for the Lab when vendor solutions were still
relatively scarce. Just as important, the intimate knowledge of digital computing gleaned
from developing the MANIACs also provided the Lab community with in-depth knowl‐
edge of a mission-critical technology, which continued forward as Los Alamos transi‐
tioned to the maturing array of vendor solutions that appeared from the mid-1950s
through the early 60s. The Lab continued to customize vendor hardware as needed, and
to create bespoke devices when no others were available. T and then C Divisions of the
1950s and 60s developed much of their own software in-house, due to the relative dearth
of software for the niche scientific-computing market, and to maintain a local capacity
for producing software tailored to the Lab’s requirements. Much was the case in the
1970s with computer networking. C Division opted to pursue its own networking solu‐
tions to meet the Lab’s unusual requirements while the supercomputer-networking
industry was young and provided few ready-made options. Pursuing technically chal‐
lenging custom solutions, according to the C Division leadership of the 1970s, also
fostered local networking expertise, and aided the division in attracting new talent.14

13
Morrison, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014; Don Tolmie, interview by Nicholas Lewis, Los
Alamos, NM, 7/14/2014; The first ever calculation on the ENIAC was a Los Alamos feasibility
study of the hydrogen bomb. The calculation was less than ideal, because ENIAC's limited
memory forced Los Alamos to simplify the variables of the problem to the point that the results
were mostly inconclusive. However, Los Alamos would use ENIAC repeatedly in the 1940s,
due to the scarcity of digital computers in the early Cold War years.
14
Christman, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014; MacKenzie, “The Influence of the Los Alamos
and Livermore National Laboratories,” 186.
 The Homegrown Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network 9

5 The Integrated Computer Network

C Division began to modify the centralized Hydra network soon after it first entered
service, replacing the 6600 with a CDC Cyber 73 as the front-end machine in 1975,
when the funding became available. C Division also took advantage of the growing
range of minicomputers available on the market to augment network services. Mini‐
computers became the Swiss Army knives of Lab networking, with C Division custom‐
izing UNIX-powered DEC PDP-11s, and later DEC VAX, SEL, and Gould minicom‐
puters, to serve in a variety of roles. For example, in order to connect remote users to
Hydra, Los Alamos developed the KCC (Keyboard Communications Concentrator), a
custom device based on a PDP-11 and DEC interface unit to provide a single connection
to the Hydra front-end machine for up to 96 keyboard-based terminals. The CCC
(Computer Communications Concentrator) provided a similar connection for up to 18
computer-based terminals, which were usually other DEC minicomputers.15
In 1975, when the number of keyboard-based terminals in use exceeded the capacity
of a single KCC, C Division developed the PDP-11-based Synchronous Concentrator
(SYNC). The SYNC served as a concentrator and message switcher to interconnect the
KCCs with the Hydra front-end machine. More importantly, the SYNC provided direct
terminal connections with each of the networked supercomputers in the CCF. Providing
direct terminal access to the “worker” supercomputers reduced the centralization of the
Hydra system, which C Division increasingly recognized as an unreliable network
model. The CDC channel couplers proved to be the single most unreliable component
of Hydra, as they were never intended to connect more than two CDC computers
together. Troubleshooting a connection error required maintenance staff to take both the
originating machine and the Hydra front-end computer offline.16
As frustrating as Hydra’s shortcomings were to users and to C Division, including
its problematic interconnect technologies, a front-end machine that CDC had not
intended to be a storage or terminal-access controller, and an interface that was
unfriendly to users, they offered a hands-on learning experience with the complexities
of networking in the Lab environment, just as the Lab’s home-built computers had with
digital computing in the 1950s. Having a clearer understanding of what did and did not
work well at Los Alamos, and in supercomputer networking in general, C Division’s
networking team developed a network plan for the remainder of the 1970s. The plan
emphasized a reduced dependency on Hydra and the eventual phasing-out of the Hydra
storage system completely. The plan also called for an increase in network speeds to
support supercomputers with faster I/O capabilities, such as the new Cray-1, and

15
“The Computer Science and Services Division Annual Report, January—December 1975,” 5;
Fred W. Dorr, “Computer Science and Services Division of the Los Alamos Scientific Labo‐
ratory” (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, LA-UR-74-1566, 1974), 2; Leo
Romero and Bill Buzbee, “Overview of the Los Alamos Integrated Computing Network” (Los
Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, LALP-85-34, 1985), 23-24.
16
Romero, “Overview of the Los Alamos Integrated Computing Network,” 23; “The Computer
Science and Services Division Annual Report, January—December 1975,” 5-6; Christman,
interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014.
10 N. Lewis

growing the network to accommodate a variety of new services and users. The plan
meant adding new transport, switching, and security systems, all of which would be
custom to Los Alamos, primarily due to the relative infancy of the high-performance
computer networking industry as the 1970s came to a close.17
One of the first products of C Division’s new networking plan was the Los Alamos
File Transport machine, introduced in 1977. While the SYNCs provided complete
terminal access to the supercomputers of the CCF independent of Hydra, Los Alamos
lacked similar direct connectivity for file access. The File Transport (FT) machine used
the same architecture and low-level protocols as the SYNC to provide high-speed data
links of up to 40Mbit/s between the CCF supercomputers. The first FT linked together
the Cray-1 and two CDC 7600s. Additional FT machines formed a File-Transport
Network (FTN), creating a high-speed backbone for direct file transfers, which reduced
the need for routing data through the Hydra front-end machine. The FTN was also
important for serving the rapidly growing number of high-speed graphics terminals at
the Lab. The new terminals, once connected to the FTN, allowed users to stream color
graphical data at 150kbits/s from the supercomputers of the Central Computing Facility
directly to their offices. Conventional terminals operated at only about 9.6kbits/s.
Improving support for a growing range of small computing systems would become an
important theme in Los Alamos network development over the following decade. While
the Lab network would grow far beyond its original size and complexity as the 1980s
began, reorienting to accommodate small-scale computing, in addition to adapting to
more powerful and data-intensive supercomputers in the CCF, would pose a significant
challenge to C Division, as it often meant rethinking how and why computer networks
were used at Los Alamos. Those challenges were only emerging during the ICN’s first
great expansion, taking place in the late 1970s.18

5.1 ICN Security in the Late 1970s

Increasing the range of services and users on the new Integrated Computer Network in
the late 1970s required a significant reconfiguration of network security. The original
Hydra network had a simple approach to the complex issue of security at a weapons
laboratory; only classified users were allowed on the network. In order to accommodate
unclassified supercomputer users, and to facilitate administrative Lab functions across
the network, C Division developed a custom, minicomputer-based Network Security
Controller (NSC) to monitor and restrict file and resource access based upon user pass‐
words. The NSCs separated the ICN into three partitions: Secure, Administrative, and
Open. Several of the supercomputers in the CCF were moved to the Open partition for

17
Christman, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014; Fred W. Dorr, “Computer Science and Services
Division CCF Five-Year Plan” (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,
LA-6921-MS, 1977), 3-4, 13, 43-45, 79; Fred W. Dorr, “Computer Science and Services
Division Activities and Plans” (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, LA-7093,
1978), 4, 12, 19.
18
Romero, “Overview of the Los Alamos Integrated Computing Network,” 24; Morrison, inter‐
view by Nicholas Lewis, 2014.
 The Homegrown Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network 11

unclassified use, while the Administrative partition users had dedicated CDC Cyber 73
mainframes. Users of the Administrative or Open partitions could share files with users
on the Secure partition, but not the other way around, in order to prevent a “write down”
of classified data to a lower classification level. Each data packet ran through two NSC
checks, providing redundancy to guard against error. The NSCs did not run any user
code, and prevented the need to rely upon worker machines to enforce security rules.
Using the NSC to monitor and control network security on the single physical network
was far less costly than developing separate networks for each security level, allowing
classified and unclassified users to share the same resources.19

5.2 The Los Alamos High-Speed Parallel Interface

The ICN jumped from about 2,200 mostly local users in 1977 to over 6,000 by the
mid-1980s, with an additional 2,000 users remote to Los Alamos. As networked
resources became more widely used and more mission-critical to the Laboratory, the
demands of connecting larger numbers of machines and services to the ICN grew more
difficult and time consuming. The various supercomputers, minicomputers, storage
systems, printing services, and other devices employed at the Lab were never intended
to function together on a single network. A variety of incompatible interconnect tech‐
nologies and proprietary communication protocols meant that C Division had to develop
expensive hardware and software conversion systems that could translate the native
I/O of one machine into that of every other device with which it needed to connect on
the network. This engineering task grew increasingly impractical as the network became
larger and more heterogeneous as the 1970s drew to a close. C Division’s solution was
one of the first efforts toward network interface standardization in the supercomputing
arena.20
Beginning development in 1978, the Los Alamos High-Speed Parallel Interface
(HSPI) converted the native I/O of a computer or another networked device into the
standard ICN higher-level protocol suite, which was also developed at Los Alamos. The
suite primarily consisted of SIMP (Simple Inter-Machine Protocol), PTP (process-to-
process), and AFT (File Transport), which would remain in use for well over a decade,
much like the HSPI. The custom Lab protocols were designed to accommodate large
data blocks with low latency, high burst rates, extensive error detection and correction,
and minimal message passing. C Division had to design and construct a HSPI, including
the hardware and drivers, for each new device placed on the network, but each HSPI
only had to convert the native I/O interface and protocols of the new device into the
standard ICN protocols. The HSPI of each receiving device then converted the ICN

19
Romero, “Overview of the Los Alamos Integrated Computing Network,” 24; Robert H. Ewald,
et al., “Computing Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1981-1982” (Los Alamos, NM:
Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1981), 41-42.
20
Dorr, “Computer Science and Services Division Activities and Plans,” 5; Ewald “Computing
Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1981-1982,” 36; Romero, “Overview of the Los
Alamos Integrated Computing Network,” 43; Tolmie, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014;
Andrew and David Dubois, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 7/17/2014.
12 N. Lewis

protocols back into that device’s native I/O. Once connected to its HSPI, a device had
full access to the entire Los Alamos network, which significantly reduced the time
required to integrate new equipment onto the ICN.21
HSPIs provided full-duplex point-to-point transfers to the various machines of the
CCF, with error correction integrated into the HSPI hardware. The HSPI supported data
transfers of up to 60Mbits/s, which was intended to exceed the I/O capabilities of the
fastest devices on the network, so that the network interfaces would not act as perform‐
ance bottlenecks. In order to accommodate different data rates (for example, 3Mbits/s
for the PDP-11, and 50Mbits/s for the Cray-1), a handshake between HSPIs determined
the maximum data rates of the exchanging machines. The HSPI employed hardware
error detection and correction while data was on the fly, so as not to slow the data transfer.
When double-bit errors were detected, the HSPI hardware aborted the transfer. The first
completed HSPI was for the ubiquitous PDP-11, with others following in short succes‐
sion in the 1970s and 80s.22

5.3 CFS and the ICN of the 1980s

The late 1970s’ introduction of higher networking speeds, new security partitions, and
standardized interfaces and protocols on the Integrated Computer Network coincided with
the end of Hydra in 1979, completing the Lab’s transition to a modular network configu‐
ration. Replacing Hydra as the networked storage system on the ICN was the Common
File System (CFS), which represented a middle ground between vendor-sourced
networked storage systems and the entirely custom Hydra system. The networked-storage
market had improved significantly in the years after Hydra’s deployment, and C Division
was able to use off-the-shelf IBM storage hardware and operating systems, rather than
developing its own. IBM disc units replaced older Control Data storage devices, and the
tape-cartridge-based IBM 3850 replaced the Photostore. While CFS still required a central
storage controller, unlike the repurposed CDC front-end computers of Hydra, the CFS
controller was designed and used specifically for storage. The CFS hardware offered a
maximum data transfer rate of about 5Mbits/s, and stored about 384 gigabytes of
combined online and offline data on the network as of 1980, with a growth rate of about
175 gigabytes per year. While the hardware and operating system were vendor-sourced,
saving C Division considerable development time and cost, the division had to develop in-
house the CFS application and interface software, as vendors in the HPC space still did not

21
Donald E. Tolmie, et al., “Interconnecting Computers with the High-Speed Parallel Interface”
(Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-9503-MS, 1982), 2-12; Ewald
“Computing Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1981-1982,” 43; Granville Chorn, et al.,
“The Standard File Transport Protocol” (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory,
LA-7388-MS, 1978).
22
Norman R. Morse and Joseph L. Thompson, “Bringing A Large Computer Network Into
Focus” (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, LA-UR-82-83, 1982), 8-11;
Tolmie, “Interconnecting Computers with the High-Speed Parallel Interface,” 1-5.
 The Homegrown Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network 13

offer a complete package needed for tying together their storage devices with the complex,
high-performance network environment of a national laboratory.23
After the introduction of CFS, the C Division leader, Robert “Bo” Ewald, noted a
drop in the number of tapes at the Central Computing Facility, as the storage system
reduced the number of redundant, partially filled tapes in circulation. Much of the CFS
development team originally worked on the Hydra project, and had feared a repeat of
the design difficulties that had delayed the rollout of Hydra. As a consequence, the team
leaders invested in a “structured” design process of allocating and reviewing program‐
ming work. Individual programmers on the project were assigned specific parts of the
CFS coding effort, with their code being checked at least three times by other program‐
mers for errors and efficiency before the code was added to the CFS application suite.
The process itself was time-consuming, but team members recalling the effort cite it as
a key reason for the on-time, unusually smooth roll-out of CFS, and its long-term reli‐
ability.24
To the astonishment and delight of the CFS development team, Los Alamos
network users, who were never shy about voicing their dissatisfaction over the prob‐
lems and perceived shortcomings of the Lab’s network services, wrote letters of
praise to CFS for its on-time delivery, reliability, and intuitive, platform-agnostic
interface. The transition to CFS concluded with the Photostore, which IBM no longer
supported, being placed into a read-only mode until 1980, so that users could move
their remaining files before Hydra was finally shutdown. With its success at Los
Alamos, General Atomics Corporation sold CFS commercially as DataTree. The CFS
development team aided in creating or reconfiguring components of the CFS appli‐
cation suite for use in a variety of supercomputing environments. Over the next
decade CFS, as DataTree, entered use at several dozen data-intensive computing sites
worldwide. Los Alamos networking personnel often visited sites, including those
overseas, that had purchased the DataTree system, and aided in its installation, opti‐
mization, and personnel training for that site’s unique requirements. CFS, and its
success at and beyond Los Alamos, during the 1980s represented a transitionary
period in networked data storage, when the number of data-intensive computing sites
had grown markedly since the development of Hydra in the early-to-mid 1970s. CFS
also marked the important role that Los Alamos would play in networked storage
development, with the Lab collaborating with partners in industry and academia on

23
Bill Collins, interview by Nicholas Lewis, Minneapolis, MN, 2/19/2015; Christman, interview
by Nicholas Lewis, 2014; Bill Collins, Marjorie Devaney, and David Kitts, “Profiles in Mass
Storage: A Tale of Two Systems,” Ninth IEEE Symposium on Mass Storage Systems, 1988.
Storage Systems: Perspectives (Oct. 31, 1988 – Nov. 3, 1988), 61-67.
24
Christman, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014; Ewald “Computing Division Two-Year Opera‐
tional Plan, FY 1981-1982”, 37.
14 N. Lewis

many other high-speed and high-capacity storage systems, such as HPSS and
Panasas, from the 1990s to the present.25
By 1981, the Los Alamos ICN consisted of several modules. The modules included
the “worker” machines (the nine supercomputers in the CCF, which performed the bulk
of the scientific computing work at the Lab), the Common File System (which allowed
the supercomputers to store and share files via the network), the Terminal Network
(connecting terminal users from the Secure, Administrative, and Open security partitions
to the ICN), and PAGES (a service center that allowed users of the ICN to print to shared
laser printers, plotters, or other graphical media). The various modules were intercon‐
nected through the File Transport Network, which provided the ICN’s high-speed data
transfer capability. Two additional modules catered to differing levels of production
control on the network. FOCUS, a VAX-11-based control interface, allowed operators
to monitor and manage the Lab’s Cray and CDC 7600 supercomputers via the ICN. The
final module, XNET (eXtended Network Access System), marked the beginning of the
Lab’s incorporation of outside protocols onto portions of the ICN. Beginning in 1979,
the XNET module brought “distributed processing” to Los Alamos, that is, support for
user-operated minicomputers on the network, which a growing number of ICN users
were requesting as the 1970s drew to a close. Text-based and graphical terminals
performed no production work of their own, and simply connected remote users to the
supercomputers of the CCF. VAX-11 minicomputer “distributed processors” allowed
users to perform production work locally, or on a remote VAX machine, while retaining
full access to the resources of the ICN. Most XNET users were local to Los Alamos, but
some were located in other states. Smaller-scale computing complicated the structure
and philosophy of computer networking at Los Alamos, as it did elsewhere, with small,
but powerful systems performing an increasing amount of production work that
normally would have been done on the Lab’s larger computers. C Division invested
significant time and research energies into supporting smaller computing systems in a

25
M. Blood, R. Christman, and B. Collins, “Experience with the LASL Common File
System,” Fourth IEEE Symposium on Mass Storage Systems (New York: The Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1980); Bob Ewald, “Overview,” User Interface
67 (May 1981), 3-4; Collins, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2015; Gary Grider, interview
by Nicholas Lewis, Los Alamos, NM, 8/21/2015; Fred Mcclain, "DataTree and UniTree:
Software for File and Storage Management," Digest of Papers. Tenth IEEE Symposium on
Mass Storage Systems: Crisis in Mass Storage (1990): 126-28. Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory also developed its own networked-storage system, which sold commer‐
cially as UniTree. As the name indicates, UniTree ran atop the Unix operating system,
while Los Alamos’ DataTree/CFS relied on IBM’s MVS OS. While MVS was a more
mature platform in the late 1970s, when both networked-storage solutions were under
development, it left DataTree/CFS tied to IBM operating sytem development and support
at a time when the national labs and supercomputing in general were moving toward Unix
in the late 1980s and 1990s.
 The Homegrown Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network 15

variety of capacities on the ICN over the 1980s, while attempting to maintain the overall
performance and security of the larger network.26
The VAX distributed processors initially used the proprietary DECnet protocol to
communicate with the XNET concentrators, forming a smaller network of minicom‐
puters on a module of the larger ICN. The use of DECnet on the XNET module offered
the Lab several advantages. For one, it allowed Los Alamos ICN users access to the
latest tools available from vendors, such as smaller-scale computing and networking,
without requiring the Lab to develop its own, costlier solutions. Los Alamos already
followed a similar, but custom path with its terminal access, as it continually upgraded
the terminal network module to coincide with improvements in vendor-supplied termi‐
nals over the 1970s. However, upgrading the custom system took longer, and offered
no vendor support. The XNET module also allowed Los Alamos to experiment and gain
experience with outside networking advancements, such as the proprietary DECnet
system, while retaining its custom, mission-critical portions of the ICN.27
In the early 1980s, Los Alamos became part of the broader networking community,
establishing links in 1983 with multiple external networks, including a purchased link
to GTE’s Telenet, a commercial packet-switching network. Connecting with external
networks brought resources to Los Alamos from beyond the Lab, and allowed easier
collaboration and information access for remote users. The Telenet connection, for
example, allowed Open partition users access to globally distributed computing and
information resources. Telenet also offered remote dialup access to the ICN for a
substantially lower cost than a dedicated phone line. 1983 also marked the Lab’s first
link with ARPANET, the Department of Defense’s packet-switching network of univer‐
sities, research institutions, and unclassified DoD traffic. C Division connected an
ARPANET IMP (Interface Message Processor) to a custom VAX gateway, which trans‐
lated ARPANET’s TCP/IP traffic into the ICN’s local protocols. For security purposes,
traffic from external networks connected only to the Open partition of ICN.28
Although TCP was being forcibly rolled-out onto ARPANET in 1983, and was
spreading elsewhere due to ARPA and the Department of Defense incentivizing its
adoption among outside networks and computing vendors, Los Alamos had little interest
in TCP/IP in the early 1980s. The ARPANET suite had little to offer in terms of
performance, security, or compatibility with systems in use on the Lab network. Indeed,
maintaining a custom-networking environment offered the Lab distinct security advan‐
tages, as few outsiders were familiar with the Los Alamos network or its largely bespoke
systems and protocols. However, as with changes in supercomputing technologies, the

26
Robert H. Ewald, “Computing Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1983-1984” (Los
Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-9712-MS, 1983), 43-52; Ewald,
“Computing Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1981–1982,” 27, 31-38; Romero,
"Overview of the Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network," 24.
27
Ewald, “Computing Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1983-1984,” 67; Ewald,
“Computing Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1981–1982,” 39-40; Romero, "Over‐
view of the Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network," 24.
28
Morrison, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014; Ewald, “Computing Division Two-Year Opera‐
tional Plan, FY 1983-1984,” 67.
16 N. Lewis

Computing Division actively studied new networking technologies that were emerging
from the maturing computer networking community in the 1980s.29
While Los Alamos remained committed to its locally developed protocol suite for
mission-critical parts of the ICN, such as the worker machine and File Transport
modules, C Division was open to expanding its use of external protocols where they
offered greater compatibility with the growing range of networked devices entering the
market. Such protocols and devices had the potential to reduce the high development
and maintenance costs associated with custom solutions. In 1983, C Division began
investigating the potential of the X.25 networking protocol for its distributed processor
network, as DEC was slated to incorporate X.25 support into its VAX VMS operating
system. As an international standard, X.25 was also promising as the Lab’s preferred
protocol for interfacing with commercial packet-switching networks, such as Telenet
and Tymnet. By 1985, C Division had converted XNET to run the X.25 protocol over
DECnet, with over 75 VAX distributed processors on XNET connecting to the ICN via
three, and soon four, gateways. After extensive security testing, the Lab allowed distrib‐
uted XNET processors access to the Secure network partition, bringing small-scale
computing to all network users at Los Alamos.30
The Lab’s connections with the wider networked world changed rapidly in the
mid-1980s. In 1984, the DoD separated MILNET from ARPANET. ARPANET retained
the university and research traffic, while MILNET linked together government, Defense
Department, and Department of Energy facilities, including Los Alamos. Los Alamos
established direct links to three other MILNET nodes. Each node connected to MILNET
via a gateway host computer. The Lab’s host allowed minicomputers on DECnet to
exchange e-mail, and enabled TCP/IP access to the open partition of the larger Depart‐
ment of Defense Network. In 1986, Los Alamos added a fourth security partition to the
ICN, the National Security partition, so that Department of Defense users who lacked
Department of Energy (DOE) clearances could have access to secure computing resources
separate from secure DOE computing work. Los Alamos moved one of its Cray-1A super‐
computers into the new security partition for the benefit of military users and Defense
contractors, like the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), SDI, and DARPA.31
As a site once selected for its geographical isolation, the Lab’s experience with
computer networking quickly brought Los Alamos into the center of collaborative
information processing, distribution, and management for the Department of Energy in
the 1980s. The Department of Energy’s WBCN (Wide-Band Communications Network)
and NWCNET (Nuclear Weapons Complex Network) projects exemplified the Lab’s
place in bridging remote government computing sites. Begun in 1985, the DOE initiated

29
Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 140-143; Morrison, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014; Ewald,
“Computing Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1983-1984,” 76.
30
Ewald, “Computing Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1983-1984,” 47, 67; Robert H.
Ewald, “Computing Division Two-Year Operational Plan, FY 1984-1985” (Los Alamos, NM:
Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-9978-MS, 1984), 100-101; Romero, "Overview of the
Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network," 25.
31
Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 142-145; Ewald, “Computing Division Two-Year Operational
Plan, FY 1984-1985,” 101-102; N. R. Morse, “C-Division Annual Review and Operating Plan,
January 1987” (Los Alamos, NM: Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-10932-MS, 1987), 84.
 The Homegrown Los Alamos Integrated Computer Network 17

the two related networking projects to link together the computing resources of the
national Nuclear Weapons Complex, which consisted of Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, and eleven other research
and development sites. WBCN was the hardware component that allowed for secure
transmission of data among the sites of the nuclear weapons complex, and consisted of
DEC VAX-11/750 minicomputers that served as gateway controllers at each location,
along with accompanying encryption and communication hardware.32
WBCN initially ran over terrestrial circuits, which were replaced with satellite
circuits in the late 1980s. NWCNET comprised the basic tools used at each site for the
storage and transmission of weapons-related data across WBCN. The first NWCNET
tool was CFS, the Common File System developed at Los Alamos, which stored and
managed the secure data at each location in the complex. Another tool was the software
that interfaced CFS with the WCBN, while a third tool was the software that allowed
the various NWCNET devices to communicate via Hyperchannel. A fourth tool allowed
for secure e-mail capability between the different locations. The system first linked Los
Alamos and the Rocky Flats weapons production facility in Colorado in 1986, with the
other sites following soon thereafter. Many of the components and services driving the
WBCN and NWCNET systems originated at Los Alamos. C Division produced a modi‐
fied version of CFS that could be used at the other weapons complex locations, and
created a network interface for the IBM MVS operating system (the OS platform for the
CFS application suite), which allowed users and worker machines access to CFS across
a Hyperchannel link. Because of its extensive networking experience, Los Alamos
functioned as both the development site and the Tech Control for WBCN, testing the
network’s components on the Lab’s ICN, and ensuring the smooth operation of the other
WBCN nodes (see Footnote 32).
As Los Alamos became the lead development site for networking efforts inside the
DOE complex, the Lab continued its onsite supercomputer-networking development,
which brought Los Alamos into the world of network standards setting. By the
mid-1980s, the Los Alamos HSPI, the custom network interface the Lab had employed
since the late 1970s, was reaching the end of its lifespan, as its 60Mbits/s throughput
could not accommodate the anticipated performance increases of the next decade. The
rapid increase in traffic across the ICN, and the introduction of new supercomputers with
much faster I/O capabilities, such as the Cray Y/MP, meant that Los Alamos would soon
require interface speeds far beyond what the networking industry offered in the late
1980s. However, developing interfaces in-house for each device the Lab purchased was
expensive, and meant the Lab had to provide its own support. C Division had little choice
but to create custom interfaces when it developed the HSPI in the 1970s and early 1980s,
but vendors and standards-setting bodies associated with networking had evolved
considerably between that time and the late 1980s. C Division proposed a standard

32
Morse, “C-Division Annual Review and Operating Plan, January 1987,” 84; N. R. Morse and
B. L. Buzbee, “C-Division Annual Review and Operating Plan” (Los Alamos, NM: Los
Alamos National Laboratory, LA-10631-MS, 1986), 110-111.
18 N. Lewis

interface for the supercomputing industry, which would provide an alternative to propri‐
etary vendor interconnects.33

6 The “Lunatic Fringe” and the HIPPI Standard

In 1987, a Los Alamos delegation, led by C Division networking expert Don Tolmie,
approached the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Networking Task Group
with a proposal for the High-Performance Parallel Interface (HIPPI), the first gigabit
network interface. Although ANSI initially labelled the Los Alamos group as “the
lunatic fringe,” because of the extreme performance it was proposing, ANSI soon formed
a new task group (the first ever in the supercomputer industry) to pursue the Lab’s
interface. Developed at Los Alamos, the HIPPI became an ANSI standard in 1991, and
an ISO (International Organization for Standardization) standard soon thereafter,
marking the first standard networking interface for supercomputers and their peripherals.
Much as the Lab’s collaborative development of the first supercomputer with IBM
signified the maturation of digital scientific computing, the standardization of the HIPPI
represented a similar maturation of supercomputer networking in the 1980s. Since the
1970s, the number of institutions utilizing supercomputers, including industry and
centers of scientific research, had increased significantly, as the computers themselves
became more compact and reliable, and as the software tools for using them improved.
Older, advanced scientific computing centers, such as Los Alamos, had endured the
challenges of early computing, which included the need to write locally much of the
software used on their machines. This barrier largely precluded the deployment of
supercomputers where the users lacked the ability or willingness to write their own
application software.34
By the mid-1970s, institutions like NCAR, the National Center for Atmospheric
Research, began to demand from vendors the inclusion of basic software packages
with the supercomputers they bought, as was the case with NCAR’s purchase of the
first commercially available Cray-1 in 1977. Advancing supercomputing hardware
and software, and the growing number and range of users, fed into a rapidly maturing
scientific computing environment by the 1980s, including the maturation of ancil‐
lary technologies, such as high-speed networking. With the Los Alamos HIPPI
standard in place, and with a growing range of customers to provide pressure on
vendors to use the standard, supercomputers and related devices began to ship with

33
Tolmie, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014; Don E. Tolmie and John K. Renwick, “HIPPI –
Simplicity Yields Success,” IEEE Network – The Magazine of Computer Communications
(November, 1992), 1-2, 4.
34
Tolmie, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014; Morrison, interview by Nicholas Lewis, 2014;
Don E. Tolmie, “What’s Happening with Supercomputer Networks” (Los Alamos, NM: Los
Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR-91-2704, 1991), 1-3.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 "Mikä?" kysyi Sam hämmästyneenä.

"Sanantapa", vastasi mies ja vilkasi tovereihinsa.

"En oikein ymmärrä teitä", sanoi kokki. "Miten joku paikka voi olla
sanantapa?"

"Asia johtuu kokonaan eräästä velikullasta, jonka nimi oli kapteeni

Piggot", selitti kalastaja. "Hän oli kovin hauska veitikka ja erään
kerran oli päänsä tavallista täysinäisempänä. Silloin hän löysi
Etelä-Amerikan! Eikös se niin ollut Dan?"

"Niin kai se oli", vastasi vanha mies. "Hän luuli löytäneensä uuden
maanosan", jatkoi kalastaja "ja laski laivansa erääseen lahteen, veti
Suurbritannian lipun tangon nenään ja kutsui lahden nimensä
mukaan Piggotin lahdeksi. Tämä pääsi ulos miehistöltä kotia
saavuttua. Ja nyt jos joku täällä käyttäytyy hullumaisesti sanotaan
hänen ajavan takaa Piggotin lahtea. Siinä koko juttu."

Hän alkoi uudestaan nauraa, ja Sam, joka surukseen huomasi

miehen suureksi ja vahvarakenteiseksi, kääntyi ympäri ja seurasi jo
mäkeä ylöspäin harppaavaa kokkia. Saavuttuaan kukkulalle
katsoivat miehet taakseen; Stonepen Quay nauroi vielä.

Turvatakseen "koskemattomuuttaan" tekivät miehet ison

kierroksen maallepäin. "Ennen pari penikulmaa toiselle suunnalle
ennenkuin kohdata Dickiä", oli kokin tunnuslause. Puhe ei ottanut
sujuakseen, ja kuivin suin ja särkevin säärin asteltiin alakuloisina
tomuista tietä.

"Merilokkiin" saavuttua kello 7 pyydettiin laivalla yksinään oleva

Henry keittämään teetä.
 "Missä Dick on?" kysyi Sam ikäänkuin sattumalta.

"En ole nähnyt sitten päivällisen", vastasi poika. "Luulin hänen

olleen teidän seurassanne."

Sam pudisti päätään, hörppäsi teensä ja heittäytyi purjepakalle

kokin viereen. Väsyneinä kävelystä ei kumpikaan liikahtanut
paikaltaan ennenkuin yhdeksältä, jolloin noustiin ylös. Odottavan
näköisinä vilkaistiin suunnalle, mistä Dickiä varrottiin, mutta kun ei
mitään näkynyt, kiivettiin kojuihin.

Lamppu sai palaa romaania lukevan Henryn suureksi mielihyväksi.

Kello löi kaupungilla kymmenen — miehet vaihtoivat levottomia
katseita. Kun molemmat nyt makasivat lämpimissä vuoteissaan,
muistui väkistenkin mieleen Dick; oltiin ehkä oltu liian
ajattelemattomia. Puoli tuntia myöhemmin katsoi Henry yht'äkkiä
ylös; jotakin pehmeää kuului pudonneen kannelle ja lähestyvän
tassutellen hyttiä. Seuraavassa silmänräpäyksessä huudahti poika
pyhällä hartaudella.

"Dick! Dick?!”

"Tuki suusi!" ärisi Dick vaipuen merimies-arkulleen. "Oi, Herra

Jumala!
Jos joku ihminen tietäisi mitä minä olen kärsinyt!"

"Ihmettelen teitä", sanoi Henry ja heitti peitteen alastoman

merimiehen hartioille. "Mihin häveliäisyytenne on joutunut Dick?"

"Jos vielä sanallakin pilkkaat, väännän niskasi nurin, kirottu

irvinaama", sanoi Dick suuttuneena. "Ellei minulla häveliäisyyttä olisi,
niin päivällä jo olisin laivaan saapunut. Ei yksikään syntinen ihminen
voi tietää, mitä minä olen kärsinyt."

"Missä teidän vaatteenne ovat?" kysyi Henry. "Mistä helkatista

minä sen tiedän", tiuskasi toinen. "Jätin ne rannalle, kun menin
uimaan, ja palatessani olivat ne poissa. Olen istunut noilla kirotun
kylmillä kivillä aina kello kolmesta iltapäivällä, eikä ristin sielua
kulkenut ohitseni. Se oli ensi kerta, kun etsin kapteeni Gethingiä,
mutta viimeinen se myöskin oli."

"Vai sellaisissa asioissa olette liikkunutkin", sanoi Henry.

"Sanoinhan teille niistä seuraavan vaan ikävyyksiä."

"Olet aivan liian viisas ikäiseksesi", murisi Dick. "Samille ja kokille

et puhu tästä mitään. Ymmärrätkö?"

"Miksikä ei?"

"Sentähden, että minä en tahdo sitä", sanoi Dick ärtyisesti. "Se on

syy."

"Luultavasti he sen jo tietävätkin", sanoi Henry kiusottelevasti.

"Luulen Samin kuuntelevan unissaan."

Dick nousi ylös ja tarkasti varovasti molempia nukkuvia. Toistaen

varoituksensa ja uhaten kauheimmilla rangaistuksilla
tottelemattomuudesta meni hän omaan kojuunsa ja unohti
kärsimyksensä unen helmaan.

Dick säilytti salaisuutensa koko seuraavan päivän, mutta kun hän

tiistai-aamuna kannelle tultuaan huomasi vaatteensa ankkurin
vieressä likaiseen sanomalehtipaperiin käärittynä, paljastui
salaisuuskin. Sekä Samille että kokille kertoi hän kaikki, ja kun
miehet eivät nauraneet, kuten hän kovasti oli pelännyt, nousi heidän
arvonsa hänen silmissään suuresti. Kumpikaan ei edes suutaan
hymyyn vetänyt, kuuntelivat vaan tahdottomina, ja heti kun Dick oli
lopettanut kertomuksensa nukahtivat siihen paikkaan. Sen he
muuten tekivät aina kun vaan saivat siihen tilaisuutta.
VIII LUKU.

"Merilokki" seisoi Cocklemouthissa vielä kolme päivää, jona aikana

Dick, käveltyään kaksitoista penikulmaa sai Piggotin lahdesta
tietoonsa kaikki, mitä tiedettiin. Tämä toinen loukkaus oli saattaa
hänet vuoteen omaksi, mutta silloin juuri pälkähti hänen päähänsä
muuan mainio ajatus.

"Olen tullut ajatelleeksi, Sam", sanoi hän seuraavana aamuna,

"että olen ollut hyvin itsekäs. Tarkoitan tuota osakeyhtiötä. Minun
olisi pitänyt yhtyä siihen."

"Voithan sen vielä tehdä", sanoi Sam.

"Niin, ajattelin näin: parempi myöhään kun ei koskaan", sanoi Dick

ja kääntyi kokkiin. "Toimitan teidät kapteeni Gethingin jälille."

Kokki näytti hämmästyvän.

"Tiedän varmasti hänen asuvan eräässä paikassa, jota kutsutaan

Piggotin lahdeksi", jatkoi Dick. "Jos teitä haluttaa kävellä sinne
jonakuna iltapuhteena ja ottaa selvä kapteenista, saatte kaksi
kultaista' mieheen. Minä puolestani tyydyn yhteen."
 "Oo…", sanoi Sam ja seisoi kuin kivettyneenä moisesta
julkeudesta.

"Ei! — Sehän olisi vahinko sinulle, Dick", sanoi kokki. "Emmekä

me voi nauttia etuja sinun kustannuksellasi. — Ei. — Viisi puntaa
ovat sinun."

"Minä en niistä huoli", sanoi Dick totisena. "Ahneuteni saakoon

rangaistuksensa. Jos te kaksi menette ja otatte selvän hänestä,
pidän sitä oikein rehellisenä ystävyyden merkkinä."

"No! Voimmehan siellä käydä", sanoi kokki teeskennellyllä

ihastuksella.

"Dickillä on sydän oikealla paikallaan", sanoi Sam kokille. "Parasta

kun menemme heti juomaan teemme."

"Anna kun puristan kättäsi, Dick", sanoi kokki kiitollisena.

"Sen tahdon minäkin tehdä", sanoi Sam ja tarttui vuorostaan

Dickin kouraan. "Sinä olet oiva mies, Dick, siitä ei voi olla eri
mielipidettä."

"Oikein kunnon mies", säesti kokki.

"Lähdemme heti teen jälestä, jos sinä viitsit katsoa lipun meille,
Dick", sanoi Sam.

"Lipun?" toisti Dick. "Lipun?"

"Niin, tietystikin! Suurbritannian lipun", sanoi Sam ja katseli miestä

viattomalla kummastuksella. "Eihän Piggotin lahteen voi
Suurbritannian liputta mennä. Etkös sitä tiedä? Kävithän siellä eilen
illalla."

Sam seisoi rauhallisena ja odotti vastausta, katsellen ihmetyksellä

oikein ammattipetturia — ja Dick ryntäsi hyttiin suuttuneena kuin
kimalainen. Ollen luulevinaan Dickin lähteneen etsimään puheessa
ollutta lippua, pisti Sam varovasti päänsä hytin ovesta ja sanoi parin
uimahousujakin kelpaavan, paremman puutteessa — pilapuhe,
minkä hän halusta olisi ottanut takaisin, ennenkuin tapasi Dickin
päivällisellä.

Northfleet'iin uudestaan saavuttua oli koko etsimishalu

näennäisesti kadonnut jokaiselta. Ensiksikään ei ketään haluttanut
antautua alttiiksi Henryn pilapuheille ja toiseksi, kun asiaa punnittiin
järjen kannalta, tuntuivat edellytyksetkin hyvin mitättömiltä.
Kajuutassakin vallitsi alakuloinen mieliala; ainoastaan perämies
hoiteli puhetorvea.

"Sehän on suoraan vastoin parempaa ymmärrystä", sanoi hän

erään kerran, kun asiasta oli sukeutunut pitempi keskustelu. "Te ette
edes voi odottaa löytävänne häntä. Seuratkaa neuvoani: jatketaan
vanhoja vuoroja Brittlesean välillä; tyytykää siihen."

"En, siihen en tyydy", sanoi laivuri itsepintaisesti.

"On aivan synti heidän kanssaan — tarkoitan ukkoja, joilla on

vähänkin ikää ja harmaa parta —, että heitä ajetaan takaa kuin
mitäkin metsän otuksia. Ja sitäpaitsi joutuu miehistökin ennen pitkää
selkkauksiin, siitä olen varma."

"Puhukaa niin paljon kuin teitä haluttaa, se ei minua liikuta", sanoi

laivuri ja hieroi saippuaa kasvoihinsa kovassa puhdistushommassa.
 "Vai niin! Koetatte taas kaunistaa itseänne", sanoi perämies. "Ja
kenen tähden? Toisen miehen kihlatun morsiamen. Niin se kuitenkin
on, vaikka asiaa mihin päin vääntelisitte."

"Kun tarvitsen teidän neuvojanne, niin pyydän niitä", sanoi laivuri

suuttuneena.

Hiljaisuuden vallitessa lopetti hän vaatetuksensa, meni maalle,

käveli ja katseli puotien ikkunoita, lopulta kuitenkin kääntyen
Gravesendiin päin. Ainoat valonsäteet hänen nykyisessä
elämässään olivat säännölliset kouluvuorot, ja jatkaessaan
matkaansa siunasi hän opettajain tarkkaa velvollisuuden tunnetta —
joka ainakin kello neljältä ilmeni.

Mutta tänään riemuitsi hän liian aikaiseen, sillä vaikka lapset jo

aikoja sitten olivat päässeet koulusta, ei vaan näkynyt varjoakaan
Annis Gething'istä. Laivuri asteli edestakaisin katua ja ihmetteli.
Puoli viisi. Hän odotti kello kuuteen ja aikoi juuri lähteä matkaansa,
kun Annis neljännestä yli kuusi ilmestyi koulun rappusille.

"Kas! Tekin olette taas täällä", sanoi hän ja tervehti laivuria.

"Saavuimme juuri äsken."

"Ei mitään tietoja isästäni, otaksun?" kysyi Annis.

"Ei, ikävä kylläkin", vastasi laivuri! "Olitte myöhään koululla tänään.

Eikö totta?"

"No! — Kyllä."

"Näytätte väsyneeltä", sanoi laivuri auliisti.

 "Mutta sitä en ole", vastasi Annis. "Olin miss Grattan luona
juomassa kupin teetä. Äiti lupasi mennä ulos enkä minäkään
sentähden pitänyt mitään kiirettä."

"Onko hän ulkona vieläkin?" kysyi laivuri.

Miss Gething nyökkäsi ja pysähtyi seuraavassa kadun kulmassa.

"En aio vielä mennä kotiin", sanoi hän. "Täytyy vähäsen kävellä
raittiissa ilmassa."

Wilson oli kahdella päällä tarjoutuako seuraan vai ei.

"Hyvästi", sanoi hän lopulta ja ojensi kätensä.

"Hyvästi", vastasi Annis. "Jos haluatte pistäytyä meille ja odottaa,

niin äiti varmaan kotiin saavuttuaan on hyvin iloinen."

"Onko siellä ketään, jotta pääsen sisään", kysyi laivuri.

"Herra Glover, luullakseni", vastasi Annis ja katsoi pitkin katua.

"Sitten — sitten tulen toisella kerralla", änkytti Wilson

hätääntyneenä. "Luulin muuten…"

"Mitä luulitte?"

"En mitään", vastasi laivuri. "Minä… Menettekö pitkällekin?"

"No, enpä juuri. Miksi sitä kysytte?"

"Ajattelin vaan, että kernaammin kai kävelette yksinänne?"

 "Samantekevää", sanoi Annis. "Voittehan tekin tulla mukaan jos
haluatte."

He astuivat äänettöminä katua alas.

"Mitä te äsken aioitte sanoa?" kysyi Annis vihdoin, kun vaitiolo

näytti vaivaavan kumpaakin.

"Koska?"

"Kun sanoin herra Gloverin olevan meillä, niin sanoitte te

luulevanne…?" Tätä sanoessaan katsoi Annis laivuriin silmäyksellä,
jota tämän oli mahdoton käsittää.

"Niin, minä luulin", sanoi laivuri epätoivoisen rohkeudella, "teidän

kernaimmin haluavan kotiin."

"En ymmärrä teitä", sanoi Annis kylmästi. "Olette äärettömän

nenäviisas."

"Pyydän anteeksi", sanoi Wilson nöyrästi. "Olen hyvin — hyvin

pahoillani."

Seurasi uusi hiljaisuus.

"Antaisin vaikka mitä, jos löytäisin teidän isänne", sanoi Wilson

totisena.

"Niin! Toivoisin teidän onnistuvan — toivoisin teidän onnistuvan",

sanoi Annis katsoen olkapäänsä ylitse laivuria.

"Otaksumpa herra Gloverinkin tekevän parhaansa", sanoi Wilson.

 "Minun täytyy saada isäni takaisin", huudahti yht'äkkiä Annis.
"Minun täytyy saada hänet, mutta halusta soisin jonkun toisen, kuin
hra Gloverin, löytävän hänet."

"Tehän juuri menette naimisiin, jos isänne löytyy", sanoi laivuri

ihmeissään.

"Niin, jos herra Glover hänet löytää", sanoi Annis matalalla

äänellä.

"Tarkoitatteko…?" sanoi laivuri ja tarttui tytön käsivarteen.

"Tarkoitatteko ettette mene naimisiin herra Gloverin kanssa, ellei hän
löydä isäänne?"

"Niin", sanoi Annis. "Siten se on päätetty. Äiti haluaa sitä niin — ja

minulle on asia yhdentekevää kun vaan löydän isäni. Siihen olen
antanut lupaukseni."

"Mutta jos joku toinen hänet löytää?" änkytti Wilson.

"Siinä tapauksessa", sanoi Annis ja katsoi veitikkamaisesti

Wilsonia, "en mene naimisiin. Niinkö tarkoitatte?"

"En… En minä juuri sitä tarkoittanut", sanoi laivuri. "Aijoin

sanoa…"

"Katsokaa", sanoi Annis ja pysähtyi samassa, "mikä ihana näköala

tästä on joelle.

"Hurmaava", sanoi laivuri.

"Tämä onkin lempikävelypaikkani", jatkoi Annis.

Wilson painoi sen mieleensä.

 "Erittäinkin silloin kun herra Glover sattuu olemaan kotonanne",
sanoi hän enempää ajattelematta.

"Herra Glover on ollut hyvin kiltti", sanoi Annis totisena. "Hän on

ollut hyvin kiltti äidille ja nähnyt paljon vaivaa isäni etsimisestä."

"Toivon kumminkin, ettei hän onnistu löytämään häntä", virkkoi

Wilson.

Annis kääntyi ja tarkasti laivuria.

"Onko tuo ystävällistä?" sanoi hän kiivaasti.

"Tahdon itse hänet löytää", sanoi laivuri. "Te tiedätte

minkätähden."

"Nyt täytyy minun kiirehtää kotiin", sanoi Annis vastaamatta

laivurin arveluihin.

Wilson tunsi rohkeutensa loppuvan ja yritti kaikin mokomin saada

sanottavansa lausutuksi.

"Toivoisin teidän kohtelevan minua samalla tavalla kuin herra

Gloveriakin."

"Sen teen halusta", vastasi Annis kiireesti. Hän ei voinut estää

huuliensa värisemistä, ja hänen katseensa kääntyi toisaalle.

"Olen rakastanut teitä ensi näkemästä", sanoi laivuri yht'äkkiä

laukaisten.

Aivan valmistumattomana näin pikaiseen hyökkäykseen ei miss

Gething tiennyt mitä vastata. Osat olivat vaihtuneet, ja punastuneena
kääntyi hän toisaalle.
 "Olen viettänyt päiviä käyden edestakaisin koulunne edessä, edes
vilahdukseltakin nähdäkseni teidät", jatkoi Wilson. "Toisinaan olen
ihmetellyt, etteivät lapset ole jo mitään huomanneet."

Miss Gethingin karmiinin punainen poski kääntyi häneen.

"Sen ne kylläkin ovat tehneet", sanoi hän. "Eräs pieni toitottaja sai
seistä tunnin nurkassa oppiakseen pitämään suunsa kiinni."

"Minä en voi sitä auttaa", sanoi Wilson. "Saatte panna vaikka koko
koulun nurkkaan ettekä sittenkään saa minua estetyksi rakastamasta
teitä."

"Ehkä nyt käännymme ympäri", sanoi Annis kylmästi. Molemmat

astuivat ajatuksissaan eikä kumpikaan puhunut sanaakaan. Vähää
ennen kaupunkiin saapumista Wilson pysähtyi ja katsoi pelotta ja
vakavasti tyttöä silmiin. Hän oli päättänyt ajaa asiansa loppuun,
maksoi mitä maksoi. Miss Gething peräytyi ja katsoi maahan.

"Lupaatteko kohdella meitä molempia yhtäläisesti?" kysyi Wilson

matalalla äänellä.

"En", vastasi Annis ja katsoi pelokkaasti hymyillen laivuria.

Ikäänkuin huumaantuneena tarttui tämä tytön käteen ja yritti vetää
hänet luoksensa.

"Ei", sanoi Annis ja vetäytyi kiireesti syrjään. "Ei, se ei sovi."

Wilson pelästyi, huomaten menneensä liian pitkälle, ja pelko sai

hänessä uudestaan vallan.

"Miksikä se ei sovi?" kysyi hän koettaen näyttää viattomalta.

 Lyhyt, mutta onnettomuutta uhkaava kipinä välähti miss Gethingin
silmissä.

"Pyydän anteeksi", sanoi laivuri nöyrästi.

"Mitä?" kysyi miss Gething, ja nyt oli hänen vuoronsa näyttää

viattomalta.

Väsyneinä kiertoteihin, joissa hän aina joutui tappiolle, päätti

Wilson taas käydä suoraan asiaan.

"Kun koetin suudella teitä ja sitten olin olevinani ymmärtämätön",

sanoi hän avomielisesti.

"Kapteeni Wilson… minä… minä en käsitä mitä te tarkoitatte."

"Kyllä te käsitätte", sanoi Wilson levollisena.

Kipinä välähti taas miss Gethingin silmissä, hän puri huultaan ja

kääntyi poispäin, huomattuaan mahdottomaksi rangaista tätä
syntistä olentoa.

"Varmaankin sanotte ensi kerran tällaisia asioita jollekin tytölle",

sanoi hän lopulta. "Niin", sanoi Wilson vakuuttavasti.

"Tahdotte harjotella", sanoi miss Gething halveksivasti.

"Niin, sitä juuri haluan", sanoi Wilson innokkaasti.

Hän teki taas liikkeen lähestyäkseen tyttöä, mutta tämän katse

pidätti hänet.

"Ei kuitenkaan tytön kanssa, joka jo on puoliksi kihloissa", sanoi

Annis ja katsoi laivuria lempeän moittivasti. "Se ei ole oikein."
 "Tietääkö hän asian oikean laidan?" kysyi Wilson, tietystikin
tarkoittaen herra Gloveria. Miss Gething nyökkäsi.

"Silloin katson asian olevan aivan oikein ja paikallaan", sanoi

Wilson.

"Mutta sitä en tee minä", sanoi Annis ja ojensi kätensä. "Hyvästi

nyt!" sanoi hän varmalla äänellä. "En halua tavata teitä ennen isäni
löytymistä. Ja, jos herra Glover hänet löytää, en halua tavata teitä
koskaan. Voikaa hyvin."

Laivuri tarttui ojennettuun käteen ja ihmetellen rohkeuttaan, veti

hän vastusta tekevän tytön luoksensa. Sitten taivutti hän päänsä ja
miss Gethingin suosiollisella avulla suuteli hänen hattunsa
koristuksia. Tyttö riuhtasi itsensä irti, juoksi aina kadun toiseen
päähän ja katosi nurkan taakse. Laivuri vilkasi vihaisesti aidan
takana katselevaa hevosta, tapauksen ainoaa elollista näkijää, ja
lähti kiireesti kohti Northfleetia, kehottaakseen rohkeutensa
menettänyttä miehistöään uusiin ponnistuksiin.
IX LUKU.

Laivurin ihmeeksi ja harmiksi piti Annis sanansa. Hän tiesi hyvin,

ettei voinut estää laivuria kohtaamasta itseään kadulla, ja sentähden
otti hän mukaansa pari koulutyttöä. Kun ei tämäkään näyttänyt
auttavan, lisättiin lukua, ja sen päivän perästä, jolloin Anniksen
mukana kulki viisi nauravaa pienokaista, ei laivuria enää näkynyt.

Etsimistä jatkettiin koko kesä, ja "Merilokin" miehistö sai osakseen

monet naurut ja ihmettelyt nuuskivasta esiintymisestään.

Syyskuun alkupäivinä oltiin Iranbridgessä, pienessä kaupungissa,

Lebbe-joen rannalla. Kuten tavallista, eivät laivurin tiedustelut
johtaneet mihinkään tuloksiin. Iranbridge oli siksi vähäinen
paikkakunta, ettei kukaan siellä voinut piilottautua. Kuitenkin sai
Henry eräänä kauniina päivänä, kun huomattiin hänen
vastenmielisyytensä lastin purkaukseen, luvan mennä maalle
ostamaan tupakkaa kokille ja samalla katselemaan vähän
ympärilleen.

Henry astuskeli hiljalleen ja heitti tuontuostakin katseen taaksensa

tomupilveen, mikä ympäröi "Merilokkia." Paikkakunta oli uusi ja
tuntematon ja hänen mielensä hehkui seikkailuihin.
 Kaupungissa ei löytynyt montakaan näkemisen arvoista paikkaa.
Ennen rautateitä oli se kylläkin ollut vilkas satamakaupunki; nyt olivat
sen kadut tyhjät ja ranta melkein autio. Paitsi "Merilokkia", löytyi
vaan pari jahtia, joiden lastia miehet koreilla kantoivat maalle.

Hiljaisuus vaikutti painostavasti Henryyn; juotuaan kohtuullisen

puolikkaan olutta sytytti hän piippunsa ja asteli Isoakatua kädet
housuntaskuissa.

"Ei! Kyllä Lontoo on sentään toista", sanoi hän ja pysähtyi korkean

tiilimuurin viereen katselemaan hedelmäpuita sen takana. "Täällähän
on kaikki ihan kuollutta."

Hän kiipesi muurin harjalle, istui sinne hajareisin ja vihelteli.

Kasvava oluthalunsa oli muuttunut vanhaan rakkauteen omeniin.
Puut peittivät takana olevan rakennuksen, tilaisuus oli mainio, ja
meikein pakosta hyppäsi hän muurin toiselle puolelle, ja alkoi
kiireimmän kautta sulloa omenia taskuihinsa.

Kaikki oli äärettömän hiljaista. Poika matki romaanissa lukemiansa

"punanahkain" hiipiviä liikkeitä tällaisissa tapauksissa, niin hyvin kuin
kaksi tai kolme omenakiloa taskuissa sallivat, lähestyi sitten tutkien
isoa huvihuonetta, ja kurkisti ovesta sisään. Se oli tyhjä, paitsi
pöytää ja paria puupenkkiä. Henry istuutui ja maistoi omenaa.

Mutta samassa huomasi hän tilansa vaarallisuuden. Kuului

lähestyviä askeleita, joiden päämääränä epäilemättä oli huvihuone.
Äänettömästi ja kiireesti kuin vanha tottunutkin murtovaras ryömi
Henry pöydän alle.

"Pysy tuolla, hävytön penikka", kuului samassa naisääni. "Ja

ennen et pääse ulos, kun osaat joet aivan kuin vettä."
 Joku työnnettiin huvihuoneeseen, ovi suljettiin ja väännettiin
lukkoon. Askeleet poistuivat ja hämmästynyt ryöväri käsitti nyt tilansa
koko vaarallisuuden: elämänsä riippui pienestä tytöstä.

"Minä en välitä teidän saarnoistanne", kuului vastustava ääni.

"Minä en välitä — en! Syljen teidän jokiinne — syljen teidän jokiinne
— syljen teidän jokiinne."

Äänen omistajatar istuutui pöydälle. Hädissään koetti Henry

parantaa asentoaan, vaan löi vahingossa päänsä kovasti pöytään.

"Ooooh!…" huusi pieni tyttö kauhistuneena. "Älkää peljätkö", sanoi

Henry nöyrästi ja katsoi tyttöön. "En minä tee teille pahaa."

"Hyi! — Hyi", sanoi tyttö. "Poika…!"

Henry ryömi esille ja istuutui arvokkaasti, vaan yskäsi samassa

nolona huomatessaan tytön katseen kiintyvän hänen taskuihinsa.

"Mitä sinulla on taskuissasi?" kysyi tyttö. "Omenia", vastasi Henry

houkuttelevasti. "Ostin niitä kaupungista."

Tyttö otti pari kappaletta ja tarkasti niitä tyystin. "Olet paha ja

kelvoton poika", sanoi hän ja purasi toista omenaa. "Mutta kyllä tulet
saamaankin, sinä, kunhan miss Dimchurch tulee."

"Kuka miss Dimchurch on?" kysyi Henry, anteeksiannettavalla

uteliaisuudella. "Opettajatar."

"Onko tämä koulu?"

Pieni tyttö nyökkäsi suu omenaa täynnä. "Onko täällä miehiäkin

opettamassa?" kysyi Henry, teeskennellyllä välinpitämättömyydellä.
Tyttö pudisti päätään.

"Sinä olet ainoa poika, minkä koskaan olen täällä nähnyt", sanoi
hän iloisesti. "Kyllä sinä saat, sinä, kunhan miss Dimchurch tulee."

Joku painostava levottomuus putosi Henryn sydämeltä ja hän

hymyili tyytyväisenä.

"Vanhoja mamselleja minä en pelkää", sanoi hän rauhallisesti, veti

piipun taskustaan ja täytti sen.

Pienen tytön silmät loistivat ihastuksesta.

"Oi! Jos minäkin olisin poika", sanoi hän kaiholla. "Silloin en

välittäisi mitään miss Dimchurchista. Oletko sinä merimiespoika?"

"Merimies", oikaisi Henry. "Kyllä."

"Minä pidän merimiehistä", sanoi pieni tyttö ystävällisesti. "Saat

kappaleen omenastani, jos haluat."

"En, kiitoksia", sanoi Henry kiireesti. "Minulla on vielä

alkamattomia."

Pikku tyttö nousi pystyyn ja katsoi ylpeästi poikaan, mutta

huomattuaan, ettei tämä vilkaissutkaan häneen, puri hän uudestaan
omenaansa. "Mikä sinun nimesi on?" kysyi tyttö. "Henry Hatkins",
vastasi poika. "Entäs sinun?"

"Gertrude Ursula Florence Harcourt", sanoi tyttö suoristaen

selkäänsä.
"Minä en pidä Hatkins nimestä."
 "Etkö?" sanoi Henry ja koetti peittää loukkaantumistaan. "Minä en
taas pidä Gertrudesta taikka Ursulasta taikka Florencesta, ja
Harcourt minusta on kaikkein hullumpi."

Miss Harcourt siirtyi pari kolme tuumaa etemmäksi ja naputti

hermostuneesti sormenpäillään pöytää.

"Minä en välitä mistä sinä pidät", sanoi hän ylpeästi.

"Minä pidän Gertystä", sanoi Henry tuntijan äänellä ja katsoi pieniä

rusottavia kasvoja. "Gerty on hyvin kaunis, siitä minä pidän."

"Siten minua tavallisesti kutsutaankin", sanoi miss Harcourt

huolimattomasti. "Purjehtiiko sinun laivasi suurilla merilläkin?"
"Kyllä", vastasi poika.

"Ja kuinka monta kertaa", sanoi Gertrude Ursula Florence

Harcourt, "olet taistellut merirosvojen kanssa?"

"En nyt niin varmaan muista — kuusi tai seitsemän kertaa", sanoi
Henry
Hatkins. "Luulen niitä sentään olleen vaan kuusi."

"Kerro minulle niistä kaikista", sanoi miss Harcourt, joka vaivoin

pysyi alallaan.

Henry puri kappaleen omenastaan ja alkoi, romaanejaan

muistellen, juttunsa. Hän valloitti laivoja tavalla, jota eivät edes
amiraalit olisi voineet uneksiakaan, vielä vähemmän merirosvot,
jotka aina tulivat lyödyiksi. Miss Harcourt pidätteli henkeään, ja
hänen pienet (eivät suinkaan liian puhtaat) sormensa puristivat pojan
käsivartta kovemmin ja heikommin, aina kertomuksen kulun mukaan.