Joining Hitler s Crusade European

Nations and the Invasion of the Soviet

Union 1941 David Stahel
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://textbookfull.com/product/joining-hitler-s-crusade-european-nations-and-the-inv
asion-of-the-soviet-union-1941-david-stahel/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Operation Barbarossa Hitler s Invasion of Russia 1941

1st Edition Glantz David M

https://textbookfull.com/product/operation-barbarossa-hitler-s-
invasion-of-russia-1941-1st-edition-glantz-david-m/

Slaughter on the Eastern Front Hitler and Stalin s War

1941 1945 Anthony Tucker-Jones

https://textbookfull.com/product/slaughter-on-the-eastern-front-
hitler-and-stalin-s-war-1941-1945-anthony-tucker-jones/

Operation Barbarossa and Germany s Defeat in the East

Cambridge Military Histories Stahel David

https://textbookfull.com/product/operation-barbarossa-and-
germany-s-defeat-in-the-east-cambridge-military-histories-stahel-
david/

The Government and Politics of the European Union

Nugent

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-government-and-politics-of-
the-european-union-nugent/
The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the UN Genocide
Convention Anton Weiss-Wendt

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-soviet-union-and-the-
gutting-of-the-un-genocide-convention-anton-weiss-wendt/

The History Of The European Union Constructing Utopia

Giuliano Amato

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-history-of-the-european-
union-constructing-utopia-giuliano-amato/

Graphic Satire in the Soviet Union: Krokodil’s

Political Cartoons John Etty

https://textbookfull.com/product/graphic-satire-in-the-soviet-
union-krokodils-political-cartoons-john-etty/

The EU s Neighbourhood Policy towards the South

Caucasus Expanding the European Security Community The
European Union in International Affairs Simão

https://textbookfull.com/product/the-eu-s-neighbourhood-policy-
towards-the-south-caucasus-expanding-the-european-security-
community-the-european-union-in-international-affairs-simao/

Private Health Insurance and the European Union Cyril

Benoît

https://textbookfull.com/product/private-health-insurance-and-
the-european-union-cyril-benoit/
i

Joining Hitler’s Crusade

The reasons behind Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union are well known,
but what about those of the other Axis and non-Axis powers that joined
Operation Barbarossa? Six other European armies fought with the
Wehrmacht in 1941 and six more countries sent volunteers, as well as
there being countless collaborators in the east of various nationalities
who were willing to work with the Germans in 1941. The political, social
and military context behind why so many nations and groups of vol-
unteers opted to join Hitler’s war in the east reflects the many diverse,
and largely unknown, roads that led to Operation Barbarossa. With each
chapter dealing with a new country and every author being a subject
matter expert on that nation, proficient in the local language and his-
toriography, this fascinating new study offers unparalleled insight into
non-German participation on the Eastern Front in 1941.

David Stahel is a Senior Lecturer in European history at the University

of New South Wales in Canberra, Australia. His latest book, The Battle for
Moscow (Cambridge, 2015), was shortlisted for the British Army’s mili-
tary book of the year, 2016.
ii
iii

Joining Hitler’s Crusade

European Nations and the Invasion of the
Soviet Union, 1941

Edited by
David Stahel
University of New South Wales, Canberra
iv

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India
79 Anson Road, #06-​04/​06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781316510346
DOI: 10.1017/​9781108225281
© Cambridge University Press 2018
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2018
Printed in the United Kingdom by Clays, St Ives plc
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Stahel, David, 1975– editor.
Title: Joining Hitler’s crusade : European nations and the invasion
of the Soviet Union, 1941 / edited by David Stahel, University
of New South Wales, Canberra.
Description: Cambridge; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2017. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017037637| ISBN 9781316510346 (hardback : alk. paper) |
ISBN 9781316649749 (paperback)
Subjects: LCSH: World War, 1939–1945 – Campaigns – Soviet Union. |
Germany – Armed Forces – History – World War, 1939–1945. |
Foreign enlistment – Germany – History – 20th century. |
World War, 1939–1945 – Collaborationists – Soviet Union.
Classification: LCC D764 .J64 2017 | DDC 940.54/217–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017037637
ISBN 978-​1-​316-​51034-​6 Hardback
ISBN 978-​1-​316-​64974-​9 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-​party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.
v

Contents

List of Figures page vii

List of Contributors ix
Preface xv
dav i d s ta h e l
Acknowledgements xviii

Introduction 1
DAVI D STA H E L

PA RT I T H E N ATIONA L A R M IES  15
1 Finland 17
H E N R I K ME I N A NDER

2 Romania 46
D E N N I S D E L ETANT

3 Hungary 79
I G N ÁC RO MSICS

4 Slovakia 107
J A N RY CH L Í K

5 Italy 134
T H O MA S SC H LEM M ER

6 Croatia 158
RO RY Y E O MANS

PA RT I I T H E VOLU NTEER S  191

7 Spain 193
XAVI E R MO R ENO JULIÁ

v
vi

vi Contents

  8 The Netherlands 214

E VE RT J A N VA N ROEKEL

  9 Denmark 236
J OACH I M LU ND

10 Belgium 260
N I C O WO U TERS

11 France 288
O L E G BE Y DA

12 Norway 317
SI G U R D SØRLIE

PART III COLLABORATORS FROM WITHIN THE

SOVIET UNION  341
13 The Baltic States: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 343
VA L D I S O. LU M A NS

14 The Soviet Union 369

O L E G BE Y DA A ND IG OR PETROV

Index 427
vii

Figures

0.1 Foreigners and Ethnic Germans in the Wehrmacht and

Waffen-​SS (January 1942) page 7
0.2 Non-​German National Armies in the East, 1941 12
1.1 Finnish soldiers crossing the Soviet border. The inscription
in Russian reads ‘Finland’ (Virolahti, 29 June 1941) 40
1.2 Leonid Shavykin, a Finnish national of Russian descent
and a Winter War veteran, is urging the Soviets to
surrender (Ilomantsi, Tolvajärvi, 6 August 1941) 42
2.1 Adolf Hitler and General Ion Antonescu emerge from
their meeting in Munich on 10 June 1941 68
3.1 A sign in Hungarian and Russian which reads: ‘Russians!!
It was the Hungarian Army that brought you back: The
cross, the land and your freedom. 1942.’ Koltunovka,
Belgorod region, presumably the summer of 1942 101
3.2 Hungarian military cemetery (Alekseevka, Belgorod
region, presumably the end of the summer of 1942) 103
4.1 Soldiers of the Slovakian Mobile Brigade at the battle of
Lypovec (end of July 1941) 125
5.1 Hitler, Mussolini and Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt,
commander of Army Group South, during a visit to
German-​Soviet front on 28 August 1941 144
6.1 Croat soldiers training with live rounds on a 5 cm light
mortar (late 1941) 185
7.1 A Spanish recruitment centre for the Spanish Blue
Division. The Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las
Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FET y de
las JONS) is the Traditionalist Spanish Falange and
Committees of the National Syndicalist Offensive. It was
the sole legal party of the Francoist dictatorship in Spain 206
8.1 Lieutenant-​General Henry Alexander Seyffardt hands a
member of the Legion their flag before departing for the
German-​Soviet front (The Hague, 27 July 1941) 221
vii
viii

viii Figures

8.2 Volunteers from the Dutch Volunteer Legion are

marching to the train station to leave for the German-​
Soviet front. The commander of the legion, Lieutenant-​
General Henry Alexander Seyffardt (second from left on
platform), is saluting them as they march past
(The Hague, 7 August 1941) 222
9.1 The first volunteers of Frikorps Danmark are arriving at
the Langenhorn barracks near Hamburg. The Frikorps’
first chief, Christian Peder Kryssing, is marching in the
second row, second from the right (19 July 1941) 248
10.1 Staf DeClercq (centre) saluting the first volunteers of the
Flemish legion who are leaving Belgium for a training
camp (Brussels, 6 August 1941) 269
10.2 Leon Degrelle speaking to the first volunteers of the
Walloon legion who are about to leave Belgium (Brussels,
8 August 1941) 271
11.1 ‘The Great Crusade: Legion of French Volunteers Against
Bolshevism.’ Propaganda poster for the French Legion of
the Wehrmacht (early 1942) 303
12.1 Jørgen Bakke, the Viken Battalion commander, giving
a speech at the Fallingbostel training camp in October
1941. Hans Jüttner, head of SS-​FHA (second from left),
Vidkun Quisling (second from right) and Paul Wegener
of the German Reichskommissariat in Norway
(on the far right) 336
13.1 Public murder of Jews by Lithuanian nationalists after
the occupation of the city by German forces (Kaunas,
28 June 1941) 357
13.2 Lieutenant-​General Kurt Daluege in discussion with the
Latvian officer Voldema﻾rs Veiss 360
14.1 On 13 October 1941, ninety-​four Jews were shot in
Miropol. The photographer, Skrovina Lubomir, testified
in 1958 that the action was performed by local Ukrainian
militia. The Ukrainian (blue/​yellow) coloured armband is
seen on the foremost perpetrator’s left arm 407
14.2 Ukrainian auxiliary police (presumably summer 1942) 412
ix

Contributors

O L E G BE Y DA obtained his MA from the Russian State University for

the Humanities in 2013 and is currently completing his PhD in his-
tory at the University of New South Wales, Canberra. His research
concerns White Russian émigrés who fought in the Wehrmacht on the
German-​Soviet front. Beyda’s past publications include a book on the
French Legion of the Wehrmacht, Frantsuzskii legion na sluzhbe Gitleru
(2013), and the diary of an émigré who served in the Walloon legion
of the Wehrmacht, Zavadskii, R. V., Svoia chuzhaia voina: Dnevnik
russkogo ofitsera vermakhta 1941–​1942 (2014). His work has also been
published in numerous journals including Journal of Slavic Military
Studies; Neprikosnovennyi Zapas; Otechestvennye Arkhivy; and Novaia i
Noveishaia Istoriia.
is Visiting Ion Rațiu Professor of Romanian
DE N N I S D E L E TANT
Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,
Washington DC. He is Emeritus Professor of Romanian Studies at
University College, London. For this service he was made an officer
of the Order of the British Empire in 1995. He was awarded Ordinul
pentru merit with the rank of commander for services to Romanian
democracy on 1 December 2000 by President Emil Constantinescu
of Romania and ‘The Star of Romania’, Romania’s highest civilian
honour, by President Klaus Iohannis on 26 October 2016 for his
activity in the promotion of Romanian history, language and culture.
His publications include Hitler’s Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and his
Regime, Romania, 1940–​1944 (2006) and British Clandestine Activities
in Romania during the Second World War (2016).
produced his doctorate at the University of North
VA L D I S O. L U MA NS
Carolina Chapel Hill. His research projects focus on Nazi Germany
and the Second World War, with special interests in the Third Reich’s
relationship with Eastern Europe, ethnic Germans, Nazi ideology, the
SS and the Baltic States. He earned the title of Distinguished Professor

ix
x

x Contributors

Emeritus of History, having taught for thirty years at the University of

South Carolina Aiken, where he served his final twenty years or so as
Chair of the Department of History, Political Science and Philosophy.
He has published two major books: Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe,
1933–​1945 (1993) and Latvia inWorldWar II (2006), along with numer-
ous book chapters, journal articles and book reviews. He is currently
translating and transcribing family materials for a personal commen-
tary on the Latvian post-​war displaced persons experience.
JOACHIM LUND obtained his PhD from the University of Copenhagen
in 1999. He is currently an Associate Professor in the Department
of Business and Politics at the Copenhagen Business School. His
research interests include business networks during war and occupa-
tion as well as Denmark’s political and economic collaboration with
Nazi Germany. He is currently working on a biography of the business
manager and cabinet minister Gunnar Larsen (1902–​73). Key publica-
tions include: ‘A Faustian Bargain: Denmark’s Precarious Deal with
the German War Economy’, in Industrial Collaboration in Nazi-​Occupied
Europe (2016); Samarbejdets mand. Minister Gunnar Larsen –​Dagbog
1941–​1943, I-​III (ed., with John T. Lauridsen, 2015); Danmark besat.
Krig og hverdag 1940–​45, (4th ed., with Claus B. Christensen, Jakob
Sørensen and Niels W. Olesen, 2015); ‘The Wages of Collaboration.
The German Food Crisis 1939–​1945 and the Supplies from Denmark’,
Scandinavian Journal of History 38 (4), 2013, 480–​501; Hitlers spisekam-
mer. Danmark og den europæiske nyordning 1940–​43 (2005).
H E N R I K ME I N ANDERcompleted his MA in 1987 and obtained his PhD
from the University of Helsinki in 1994. He was appointed Professor
of History at the same university in 2001. Before that he worked both
as curator of the Mannerheim Museum in Helsinki and director of the
Finnish cultural institute in Stockholm. He has published a number
of monographs on Finnish and Scandinavian history in the twenti-
eth century and has received most attention for his books A History
of Finland (2006, English 2011) and Finland 1944: Krig, samhälle,
känslolandskap (2009). He is currently director of the research pro-
gramme ‘Driving Forces of Democracy: Patterns of Democratization
in Finland and Sweden, 1890–​2020’.
X AVI E R MO R E N O JULIÁ studied history at the University of Barcelona
where he received his PhD in 2003. He teaches contemporary his-
tory at Rovira i Virgili University in Tarragona, Spain. He has a First
National Award for Research, which is the most prestigious academic
xi

Contributors xi

award granted by the Spanish Ministry of Education. His main works

include La División Azul: Sangre española en Rusia, 1941–​1945 (2004,
2009), which appeared in English translation as Blue Division: Spanish
Blood in Russia, 1941–​1945 (2015). This was the first book of an infor-
mal trilogy with the other two volumes, published in Spanish as Hitler
y Franco: Diplomacia en tiempos de guerra (1936–​1945) (2007) and
Legión Azul y Segunda Guerra Mundial (2014). He is now working on
the biography of the most important German Ambassador in Spain
during the Spanish Civil War and Second World War.
I G O R P E T ROVis an independent researcher based in Munich. His main
areas of interest include Russian emigration in Germany prior to, dur-
ing and after the Second World War and Soviet collaboration with the
Axis powers during the Second World War. He has translated, edited
and commented on the Russian publication of Alfred Rosenberg’s
diaries, Politicheskii dnevnik Al’freda Rozenberga: 1934–​1944 (2015). He
co-​authored a large series of radio broadcasts entitled ‘Russian collab-
oration’ on Radio Liberty. His works have been published in numer-
ous journals and magazines, including Neprikosnovennyi Zapas and
Russkaia Zhizn’.
E VE RT J A N VA N ROEKELstudied Dutch Law at Utrecht University (LLM)
and History, Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the University of
Amsterdam (MA). His research focuses on Dutch Waffen-​SS volun-
teers. In 2010 his master thesis was shortlisted for the prestigious Erik
Hazelhoff Roelfzema prize for promising young academic writers in
the social sciences. In 2011 his first book Jongens van Nederland was
published. Van Roekel has published multiple articles in several Dutch
historical magazines and journals. In 2010 his article in Historisch
Nieuwsblad, ‘Nederlandse SS’ers en de Holocaust’, about the involve-
ment of Dutch Waffen-SS volunteers in genocide on the Eastern
Front, generated nationwide media attention. Van Roekel was also a
columnist for the historical magazine Wereld in Oorlog (2011–​14). He is
currently finishing his PhD about Dutch Waffen-​SS volunteers at the
University of Amsterdam.
IGNÁC ROMSICS is Professor of Modern Hungarian History and Head
of the Doctoral School at Eszterházy University, Eger. Between 1986
and 1991 he served as deputy director of the Institute of Hungarian
Studies. From 1991 to 2008 he taught modern Hungarian history at
Eötvös University and at the same time, between 1993 and 1998 and
in the academic year of 2002–​2003, he held the Hungarian Chair at
Indiana University, Bloomington, United States. From 1999 to 2007
xii

xii Contributors

he was General Secretary of the Hungarian Historical Society and since

2001 he has been a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
His awards include the Széchenyi Prize, which is the highest scholarly
achievement in Hungary. His publications include Wartime American
Plans for a New Hungary (1992); Hungary in the Twentieth Century
(1999); From Dictatorship to Democracy.The Birth of the Third Hungarian
Republic 1998–​2001 (2007); and A Short History of Hungary (2016).
J A N RY C H L Í K obtained a PhD in ethnology and folklore from the St
Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia, Bulgaria and in 1998 another
doctorate in history from the Institute of History at the Czech
Academy of Sciences in Prague. He is a regular professor of Czech and
Slovak modern history at the Charles University in Prague and exter-
nal professor at the Technical University in Liberec. He is chairman
of the Czech-​Slovak/​Slovak-​Czech Historical Commission. In 2014
he obtained a doctorate honoris causa in historical sciences from the
St Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia. His publications include Češi
a Slováci ve 20. století (The Czechs and Slovaks in the 20th Century),
2 vols., (1997, 1998), and R W. Seton-​Watson and His Relations with the
Czechs and Slovaks. Documents, 1906–​1951 (with Thomas D. Marzik
and Miroslav Bielik), 2 vols, Ústav T. G. Masaryka –​Matica slovenská,
Praha-​Martin 1995, 1996.
T H O MA S SC H LEM M ER obtained his PhD in 1996 from the University
of Munich and in 2001–​2005 was a Research Fellow at the German
Historical Institute in Rome. From 2009 to 2012 he was a member
of the Joint German-​Italian Historical Commission and since 2005 a
staff historian at the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich.
He is the deputy managing editor of the prestigious Vierteljahrshefte
für Zeitgeschichte and a lecturer at the University of Munich. His pub-
lications include Invasori, non vittime: La Campagna italiana di Russia
1941–​1943 (2009); Lutz Klinkhammer/​ Amedeo Osti Guerrazzi/​
Thomas Schlemmer (eds.), Die ‘Achse’ im Krieg. Politik, Ideologie und
Kriegführung 1939 bis 1945 (2010); and Thomas Schlemmer/​ Alan
E. Steinweis (eds.), Holocaust and Memory in Europe (German Yearbook
for Contemporary History, vol. 1) (2016).
SI G U R D SØ R L IE holds a PhD in history from the University of Oslo and is
currently working as an Associate Professor at the Norwegian Institute
for Defence Studies. His previous publications include a monograph on
the experiences, attitudes and behaviour of Norwegians in the Waffen-​
SS (Solkors eller hakekors. Nordmenn i Waffen-​SS 1941–​1945). This book
is currently being translated into German and will be published by
Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag. He has also written a book chapter on
xiii

Contributors xiii

the Waffen-​SS volunteers’ role in Norwegian post-​war memory cul-

ture (‘From Misguided Idealists to Genocidaires: The Waffen-​SS
Volunteers in Norwegian Memory Culture’ in From Patriotic Memory
to a Universalistic Narrative? Shifts in Norwegian Memory Culture after
1945 in Comparative Perspective). As of 2017 he has been engaged in a
comprehensive research project on Norway and the Second World War
headed by UiT, the Arctic University of Norway and funded by the
Norwegian government.
DAVI D STA H E L attended Monash University, Boston College and King’s
College London (MA) before receiving his PhD from the Humboldt
University in Berlin in 2009. He is currently a Senior Lecturer at
the University of New South Wales in Canberra and teaches at the
Australian Defence Force Academy. He has authored a series of books
for Cambridge University Press charting the German invasion of the
Soviet Union in 1941, including Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s
Defeat in the East (2009); Kiev 1941 (2012); Operation Typhoon (2013);
and The Battle for Moscow (2015). His latest book was short-​listed for
the British army military book of the year award (2016). He has previ-
ously co-​edited (with Alex Kay and Jeff Rutherford) Nazi Policy on the
Eastern Front, 1941: Total War, Genocide and Radicalization (2012). His
next study will constitute a revised account of the German retreat in
December 1941 and January 1942.
NI CO WO U T E R Sholds a PhD in history and is the operational director of
the Belgian Centre for War and Documentation (State Archives). He
is also a guest professor at the University of Ghent, co-​editor in chief
of the Journal of Belgian History and an honorary research fellow at the
School of History at Kent University. His main interests are the history
of occupation during the Second World War (administrations, collab-
oration, resistance, post-​war purges) and issues of collective memory
related to both oral history and state-​sponsored politics of memory. His
recent publications in English include (as editor) Transitional Justice
and Memory in Europe (2014) and Mayoral Collaboration under Nazi
Occupation in Belgium, the Netherlands and France, 1938–​46 (2016).
RORY Y E O MA N Sobtained his PhD from the School of Slavonic and
East European Studies, University College London in 2005. He
has held fellowships at Oxford University, the Centre for Advanced
Study, Sofia and the Wiener Wiesenthal Institute, Vienna. He has also
been an EHRI fellow in Berlin. He has taught at University College
London, City University, the University of Leeds, Oxford Brookes
University and the University of Zagreb. His publications include
Visions of Annihilation: the Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics
xiv

xiv Contributors

of Fascism, 1941–​1945 (2013); Racial Science in Hitler’s New Europe,

1938–​1945 (2013) as co-​editor with Anton Weiss-​Wendt; and editor of
The Utopia of Terror: Life, Death and Everyday Experience in the Ustasha
State (2015). For the academic year 2017–​18 he will be a member of
the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton where he will be writ-
ing and researching a manuscript on ideological travellers between the
Independent State of Croatia and the new Europe.
xv

Preface

No other action impacted Germany’s fate in the Second World War more
directly than Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union. Indeed, given
the enormous loss of life, the extraordinary destruction wrought and the
sweeping political implications it engendered, the invasion of the Soviet
Union remains one of the pivotal decisions of the twentieth century. The
war in the east also led to Hitler’s momentous attempt to mass mur-
der all Soviet Jews, which paralleled the already ubiquitous criminal-
ity perpetrated by the SS and Wehrmacht against the occupied Slavic
population and captured Red Army men. Thus, there can be no question
that the decision to invade the Soviet Union reflected Hitler’s ideological
worldview about which so much has been written. By contrast, far less
is known about why so many nations or individual volunteers opted to
support Hitler’s war in the east.
This book looks at the diverse countries, personalities and unique
national circumstances that led to so many states to send men to fight
against the Red Army in 1941. This is not the first book to address
Germany’s allies on the eastern front, but those that do are almost exclu-
sively military histories with a focus on armies and campaigns and less
the domestic politics, foreign policy pressures, prominent personalities
and social conditions that led so many European nations and volun-
teers into war with Hitler. The 1976 study by Peter Gosztony, Hitlers
Fremde Heere: Das Schicksal der nichtdeutschen Armeen im Ostfeldzug,
and the more recent 2007 book by Rolf-​Dieter Müller, An der Seite
der Wehrmacht: Hitlers ausländische Helfer beim ‘Kreuzzug gegen den
Bolschewismus’,1 are both cases in point. They also both deal with the
whole period of foreign involvement in the war, which leaves very little
discussion for why these nations took part in the first instance. A bet-
ter guide is Kenneth Estes’s 2015 book A European Anabasis: Western
European Volunteers in the German Army and SS, 1940–​45, which offers

1
An English translation of this appeared in 2012. Rolf-​ Dieter Müller, The Unknown
Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitler’s Foreign Soldiers (London, 2012).

xv
xvi

xvi Preface

a good mix of social and military history that is helpful in understand-

ing the motivations of the volunteers. However, it too covers the whole
period of the war in fewer than 200 pages and therefore lacks compre-
hensive discussion of 1941 (as well as excluding all the non-​volunteer
nations). Jonathan Adelman’s 2007 edited collection Hitler and his Allies
in World War II focuses on foreign relations with Nazi Germany, but again
deals with much more than just Operation Barbarossa in 1941 and, with
one exception, excludes the nations from which volunteers came.
There is some excellent discussion of Germany’s allies and their moti-
vation to participate in Operation Barbarossa by Jürgen Förster in the
fourth volume of Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, but, apart
from having been published over thirty years ago, it suffers from the
inevitable problem that all who have attempted this subject confront.
Archival and secondary literature for all of these nations require linguis-
tic skills that no single author commands, which means that the little that
has been written on this subject is restricted to the small base of largely
German, French and English source material. The advantage of the pre-
sent volume is that each author not only has the necessary linguistic
skills, but is an established authority in the local debates and literature
with extensive research experience in the field. The opportunity here is
to offer a fresh perspective on Operation Barbarossa, one showcasing
the beginning of the war from numerous new perspectives (beyond just
German), while at the same introducing a good deal of previously una-
vailable material into the Anglo-​American world.
Given the variety of national experiences under consideration, which
varies from nations that sent a few hundred volunteers to those that
sent hundreds of thousands, the variety of approaches to this question
is wholly consistent with the wide spectrum, and complexity, of the con-
trasting paths to Barbarossa. Indeed, often the only common link among
all the countries is the fact that they each had nationals fighting together
on Germany’s eastern front. While some nations made the decision to
join the war at a state level (often with little concern for popular opin-
ion), others only sent volunteers meaning the decisions rested with the
individual and are therefore much more reflective of varied social, polit-
ical and personal attitudes. Some of these nations were ruled by fascist
governments, which, as in the case of Croatia or Romania, proved every
bit as willing as the Nazis to employ violent coercion and mass mur-
der. Other nations lived under a form of German military occupation
or were ruled by collaborationist regimes, which by no means deterred
local right-​wing nationalists, and sometimes other groups, from support-
ing Hitler. Spain was nominally a neutral country, but accounted for the
highest number of volunteers sent to the eastern front in 1941. Finland
xvii

Preface xvii

was even a constitutional democracy, while Denmark retained its pre-​

war democratic government under German occupation, but both sent
troops to fight in the east. Clearly, there was no prescriptive formula
for the states involved in Operation Barbarossa and, as the essays in this
study confirm, motivations within individual countries were often like-
wise splintered.
Only in the broadest sense can we then divide the nations under
review and categorize them into general groups on the basis of their par-
ticipation. The first six chapters of this book will focus on the nations
which sent elements of their national army to take part in Operation
Barbarossa. The next six chapters represent the occupied and neutral
countries who sent volunteers to join the war and the last two chapters
have been devoted to the diverse peoples inside the Soviet Union. These
final two chapters are divided between the Baltic states of Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia, which were only absorbed into the Soviet Union in
1940, and a separate chapter dealing with Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian
and Cossack collaboration.
xvii
newgenprepdf

Acknowledgements

Since 2012 I have had the extraordinary good fortune of finding myself a
part of the academic community at the University of New South Wales,
Canberra with the best team of military historians in Australia –​and
none more so than Professor Jeffrey Grey. Serious students and scholars
of military history will already know his unique contribution to the field;
for others it is suffice to say he was a towering figure. His passing was
sorely felt by all.
If there was one thing Jeff firmly advocated, even insisted upon, it was
the virtue of academic exchange. In the past twenty-​five years he hardly
missed a meeting of the Society for Military History and he even became
its first non-​American president in 2015. Jeff attended countless other
conferences around the world and edited or co-​edited dozens of publica-
tions that brought scholars together on almost any topic related to mili-
tary history. Not surprisingly, Jeff strongly encouraged me in the current
project and it is therefore fitting that a collaborative work of new scholar-
ship is dedicated to him.
Professor Jeffrey Grey (1959–​2016)

Without question, my first debt of thanks for the completion of this

book goes to its contributors. It was a pleasure working with a team who
willingly met my every request and devoted so much of their time to its
completion. I could not have asked for more.
A special note of thanks must also be extended to Oleg Beyda, who
gladly took on small tasks and generally shared my passion for the pro-
ject. To those who donated, located and suggested the many rare images
reviewed, I also extend my gratitude. Lastly, to the production team at
Cambridge University Press, my sincere thanks for all the hard work.

xviii
1

Introduction

David Stahel

From 1147 to 1149 Friedrich Barbarossa participated in the ill-​fated

Second Crusade serving under his uncle Conrad III (1093–​1152). Forty
years later, as Holy Roman Emperor, Friedrich called for a new Third
Crusade to the Holy Lands, which he led in 1189.1 His soldiers came
from across the empire’s vast European domain, which at that time
spanned from Flanders to Moravia and from the Baltic Sea down into
northern Italy. For his battlefield acumen, his political astuteness and his
resolute determination, Friedrich was arguably the greatest of the Holy
Roman Empire’s medieval emperors. Accordingly, recruitment for what
he referred to as his ‘army of the Holy Cross’2 was described by one con-
temporary as being led ‘by his own example, he inspired all the young
men to fight for Christ’.3 The result, especially for its time, was the rais-
ing of a truly enormous force. According to some accounts, Friedrich’s
army set out with 20,000 knights and 80,000 infantry, a force so large
that it took three full days to pass any single point.4 Yet it was not sim-
ply the scale of Frederick’s undertaking which captured the attention
of the medieval world; the political realignment after decades of con-
frontation between his empire and the papacy was transformative. As
Christopher Tyerman conspicuously points out in his pioneering history
of the crusades, not only did this ‘translate imperial claims into polit-
ical authority within Germany, it also represented the consolidation of
a new European order’.5 Tyerman’s depiction of the ground-​breaking

1
Graham A. Loud, The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa: The History of the Expedition of the
Emperor Frederick and Related Texts (Farnham, 2010).
2
Christopher Tyerman, God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (Cambridge, MA, 2006),
p. 421.
3
Edgar N. Johnson, ‘The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry IV’ in Robert L.
Wolff and Harry W. Hazard (eds.), A History of the Crusades.Volume II. The Later Crusades,
1189–​1311 (Madison, WI, 1969), p. 90.
4
Nor are these the largest estimates. Arnold of Lübeck’s account from the early thir-
teenth century suggested Friedrich commanded 50,000 knights and 100,000 infantry.
Christopher Tyerman, God’s War, p. 418.
5
Ibid., p. 417.

1
2

2 David Stahel

political developments of 1189 might apply as equally to another cru-

sading German leader 752 years into the future. Of course Adolf Hitler’s
proposed vision of a new European order was categorically different in
many respects, but the demonization of his enemy and the unity of a
Christian Europe against a ‘godless’ enemy were recurrent themes. Not
surprisingly, therefore, Hitler sought to cast his war against Bolshevism
as a modern-​day European crusade modelled on Friedrich I’s reputation
and exploits. As the Nazi dictator explained to Mile Budak, the Croatian
minister stationed in Berlin, the war against the Soviet Union ‘is a cru-
sade such as previously took place only against the Huns and against
the Turks. This struggle must bring together and unite the European
peoples.’6 Consequently, Hitler’s codename for the military campaign to
crush Bolshevism in the east was Operation ‘Barbarossa’.
There is no question that Hitler’s conception of foreign countries was
built upon racist stereotypes and xenophobic clichés characteristic of the
propaganda disseminated by the pan-​German organizations and nation-
alistic press of the pre-​First World War era.7 Yet even Germany in Hitler’s
conception was not framed by conventional geographical or constitu-
tional definitions. Instead Hitler emphasized the German nation as a
unique and distinct Volk defined by narrow ethnic and cultural charac-
teristics. This allowed ethic Germans, even those living in Russia since
the eighteenth century, to be considered ‘German’ because of their sup-
posed shared values, common language and ‘blood’. By the 1920s the
notion of the Volk became infused with pseudo-​scientific writings linking
it to biology, allowing the German to become a separate racial unit who
was both of a common physical origin as well as culturally and spiritually
superior.8 Emphasizing his view of different ‘peoples’, which was often
employed as a synonym for nations, Hitler stated in his unpublished
second book, dictated in 1928:
If we start from the premise that all peoples are not the same, then the peoples’
intrinsic value is not the same either. […] The effect of this particular value can
be very different and can occur in very different areas, but together they provide
a benchmark for the overall valuation of a people. The ultimate expression of this
overall valuation is the historical cultural image of a people, in which the sum
of all the rays of its genetic qualities –​or the racial qualities united in it –​are
reflected.9

6
Jürgen Förster, ‘Volunteers for the European Crusade against Bolshevism’ in
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Germany and the Second World War. Volume
IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union (Oxford, 1998), pp. 1050–​1.
7
Percy Ernst Schramm, Hitler: The Man and the Military Leader (Chicago, 1999), p. 52.
8
Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (London, 2004),
p. 549.
9
Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitler’s Second Book (New York, 2003), p. 32.
3

Introduction 3

In Hitler’s conception the state was less an administrative institu-

tion than an organism of the people’s will, which needed to be strong,
even ruthless, in order to protect itself against competing and preda-
tory outsiders. There could be no private sphere of individual rights
because the Volk had to be safeguarded through the absolute authority
of the state. Accordingly, the state was justified to make almost any
intervention in the lives of the Volksgenosse (a member of the Volk) to
ensure survival and dominance.10 ‘The higher the racial worth of a peo-
ple’, Hitler’s second book explained, ‘the greater overall value, which,
in conflict and in the struggle with other peoples, it must then mobilize
for the benefit of its life’.11
As Richard Overy has observed, nations, in Hitler’s view, were
therefore coterminous with race and can be broadly divided into two
categories. The first being ‘higher nations’, which were dedicated to self-​
preservation and exhibited superior culture as evidence of their racial
pre-​eminence. The second category was ‘lower nations’ which were con-
trastingly degenerate and marked by cultural sterility and biological infe-
riority. Importantly, the survival of nations was seen to be analogous to
survival in nature, with the weaker being subjugated by the stronger,
resulting in either cultural assimilation or physical annihilation. Under
National Socialism non-​Germans were, by definition, incapable of being
or becoming full members of Hitler’s racial state as they represented an
impurity indicative, in the most extreme case, of the maligning influence
of the parasitic Jew, which threatened all higher culture.12 Such a danger
existed when there was any kind of departure from, or diluting of, one’s
own culture. As Hitler explained:
The mixing of blood and the decline of the race are, then, the results that in the
beginning are not infrequently introduced by a so-​called Ausländerei [love for
foreign things] –​in reality an under-​appreciation of one’s own cultural value in
comparison to that of foreign peoples. As soon as a people no longer values the
genetically conditioned cultural expression of the life of its own soul, or even
begins to be ashamed of it and turns to foreign ways of life, it renounces the
power that lies in the harmony of its blood and the cultural life that springs from
it. … Then the Jew can move in, in every form, and this master of international
poison concoction and racial debasement will not rest until he has completely
uprooted and thereby corrupted such a people.13

10
Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion
(New York, 1972), p. 14.
11
Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitler’s Second Book, pp. 32–​3.
12
Richard Overy, The Dictators, pp. 552–​3.
13
Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitler’s Second Book, p. 33.
4

4 David Stahel

Such a dire pronouncement forms an important intellectual context in

understanding Hitler’s conception of both his enemies as well as his allies.
Indeed, distinguishing between the two was sometimes complicated by the
eternal struggle between the nations that Hitler envisioned. Higher nations,
typically identified by a supposed ‘Nordic’ culture and racial characteris-
tics, were cautiously accepted as armed allies, while others, despite their
common cause, goodwill and willingness to serve Nazi goals, were rejected
as members of lower, degenerate nations. Nevertheless, as the Wehrmacht
advanced in the east, incorporating millions of people into the German
zone of occupation, Hitler’s troops were frequently greeted as liberators.14
Older people contrasted their recent experience of Soviet tyranny with the
affirmative, if distant, memory of a generally benevolent German occu-
pation dating from the First World War.15 The suggestion has even been
made that the black crosses adorning the vehicles of the German army (the
Balkenkreuz) were interpreted by peasants as a sign of Christian liberation
from Soviet atheism.16 Not only did some formations of the Red Army will-
ingly surrender in the summer of 1941, but it was not uncommon that the
soldiers requested to be rearmed to join the war against Stalin, commun-
ism or ‘the Jews’. Hitler, however, would have none of it and commented
emphatically:
No one but a German shall ever be allowed to bear arms! This is of the utmost
importance; even if it may seem easier at first to mobilize the military support of
some foreign subject peoples, it is wrong! Because one day it will backfire, abso-
lutely and inevitably. Only the German may bear arms, not the Slav, not the Czech,
not the Ukrainian!17
Whatever Hitler’s long-​ term aversion to arming his subjected
peoples in the east, the fact remains that in the opening weeks of
Operation Barbarossa the Nazi leadership, as well as the army com-
mand, did not believe that the Wehrmacht was in need of such support.
Thus, those who have admonished Nazi Germany’s rejection of the

14
According to German command reports and intelligence estimates, around 90 per
cent of the Ukrainian population exhibited a friendly disposition. Alex Alexiev, ‘Soviet
Nationals in German Wartime Service, 1941–​1945’ in Antonio Munoz (ed.), Soviet
Nationals in German Wartime Service 1941–​1945 (2007), p. 13.
15
Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule
(Cambridge, MA, 2004), pp. 20–​1.
16
Antony Beevor and Luba Vinogradova (eds.), A Writer at War: Vasily Grossman with the
Red Army 1941–​1945 (New York, 2005), p. 38.
17
Rolf-​Dieter Müller, An der Seite der Wehrmacht: Hitlers ausländische Helfer beim ‘Kreuzzug
gegen den Bolschewismus’ 1941–​1945 (Berlin, 2007), p. 14; Gerd R. Ueberschär and
Wolfram Wette (eds.), “Unternehmen Barbarossa” Der deutsche Überfall auf die Sowjetunion
1941 (Paderborn 1984), p. 331.
5

Introduction 5

disaffected non-​Russian minorities,18 fail to understand Germany’s own

Weltanschauung (worldview) from which it cannot be separated. Much
less than a lost opportunity, the denial of arms was simply irreconcilable
with Nazi plans for the east. On 20 June 1941 Alfred Rosenberg, who
would shortly become Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
told his colleagues that Germany was not waging a ‘crusade’ against
Bolshevism in order to save ‘the poor Russian’, but ‘to pursue German
world policy and to safeguard the German Reich’.19
Even if one sets aside the ahistorical nature of the debate and seeks to
explore the strictly military implications of arming the anti-​Soviet con-
tingents, the fact remains that little could probably have been expected.
This is not to doubt the ability, resolve or size of the disaffected groups,
but rather a commentary on the weakness of Germany’s economic base.
At over 3 million men the German Ostheer (eastern army) was already a
patchwork force fielding equipment seized from all over Europe and still
suffering notable shortages. Mobilizing hundreds of thousands, even mil-
lions, of additional ‘eastern troops’ therefore raises the question of how
they would have been armed, equipped and supplied. A certain number
could have been equipped from captured Soviet equipment (as those
contingents raised in 1941 were), but sustaining them in the numbers
required to make a difference on the eastern front would have posed
numerous and unresolved problems.20
While Germany’s propaganda surrounding the ‘crusade against
Bolshevism’ was certainly intended to generate political support for the
war in the east, it was only the SS who had previously been active in
recruiting foreigners for volunteer formations.21 The German Foreign
Office and the Wehrmacht were both caught unprepared for the political,
legal and administrative issues that foreign volunteers joining the war
constituted. A hurried meeting was organized for 30 June 1941 between
representatives of the Foreign Office, the Wehrmacht High Command,

18
See for example: Heinz Magenheimer, Hitler’s War: Germany’s Key Strategic Decisions
1940–​1945 (London, 1999), p. 116.
19
As cited in: Jürgen Förster, ‘Volunteers for the European Crusade against Bolshevism’,
p. 1050.
20
David Stahel, Kiev 1941: Hitler’s Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge, 2012),
pp. 82–​3.
21
See the unpublished PhD by Mark Philip Gingerich, Towards a Brotherhood of
Arms: Waffen-​SS Recruitment of GermanicVolunteers 1940–​1945 (University of   Wisconsin-​
Madison, 1991); Adrian Weale, Army of Evil: A History of the SS (New York, 2012)
Chapter 19: Making up the Numbers: Foreign Volunteers and Criminals in the Waffen-​
SS; George H. Stein, The Waffen SS –​Hitler’s Elite Guard at War 1939–​1945 (New York,
1984), pp. 121–​7.
6

6 David Stahel

the SS main office and the NSDAP, which led to the ‘Guidelines for
the employment of foreign volunteers in the struggle against the Soviet
Union’. These guidelines reflected the strict ideological nature of
Germany’s engagement with foreign citizens, even if they were willing
to fight for them. Volunteers were divided into two groups, ‘Germanic’
and ‘non-​Germanic’, with the former –​designated as Danes, Finns,
Flemings, Dutchmen, Norwegians and Swedes –​to be incorporated into
the Waffen-​SS. The latter group, consisting of French, Croats, Spaniards
and Walloons, were directed to fight in the Wehrmacht.22 All Czech and
Russian émigré volunteers were to be rejected.23
In total, some 29,248 ‘non-​Germanic’ volunteers had entered service
with the Wehrmacht by January 1942, the great majority being Spanish
(18,372), but the next largest category being Soviet citizens (4,250)24 –​
explicitly against Hitler’s instruction. This reflects the disconnect, already
apparent in 1941, between the demands for manpower in the east and the
extent to which local German commanders were prepared to turn a blind
eye or even actively subvert official regulations.25 After the Spaniards and
Soviets, the Wehrmacht received 3,795 Croats, 1,971 French and 860
Belgian Walloons. In addition, there were some 12,000 ‘Germanic vol-
unteers of non-​German nationality’ who had entered service with the
Waffen-​SS by the end of 1941. These included some 4,814 Dutchmen,
2,399 Danes, 1,883 Norwegians, 1,240 Flemings, 1,180 Finns, 135
Swiss and Liechtensteiners and 39 Swedes.26 Significantly, the Waffen-​
SS also gained another 6,200 ‘ethnic Germans’ from around Europe
with the majority coming from Romania (2,500) and Serbia and Croatia
(2,200), but smaller contingents from Slovakia, Hungary, Luxembourg,

22
Jürgen Förster, ‘Volunteers for the European Crusade against Bolshevism’, pp. 1051–​2.
23
In fact volunteer Russian émigrés did manage to serve in the east. See: Oleg Beyda, ‘Iron
Cross of the Wrangel’s Army: Russian Emigrants as Interpreters in the Wehrmacht’ in
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27 (3) (2014), pp. 430–​48; Oleg Beyda, ‘A Different
Russian Perspective or ‘Their Long Defeat’: White émigrés and the Second World War’
in Tristan Moss and Tom Richardson (eds.), New Directions in War and History (Newport,
Australia, 2016), pp. 72–​87.
24
Given the official restrictions and the tendency of under-​reporting or no reporting at all,
this figure is almost certainly far from the real number.
25
The fact that anti-​Soviet contingents were raised in 1941 in spite of official prohibitions
demonstrates Jeff Rutherford’s thesis about prevalence of ‘military necessity’ over simple
ideology. See: Jeff Rutherford, Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front: The German
Infantry’s War, 1941–​1944 (Cambridge, 2014).
26
On Western European volunteers generally see: Kenneth Estes, A European
Anabasis: Western European Volunteers in the German Army and SS, 1940–​45 (Solihull,
2015); Martin Gutmann, ‘Debunking the Myth of the Volunteers: Transnational
Volunteering in the Nazi Waffen-​SS Officer Corps during the Second World War’ in
Contemporary European History 22 (4) (November, 2013), pp. 585–​607.
7

Introduction 7

13896

6200
4814
4250
3795

1971 2399
1883 1571
850 1180
39 135
Spaniards

Croats

French

Belgians

Soviet Citizens

Finns

Swedes

Norwegians

Danes

Dutch

Belgians (Flemish)

Swiss, Liechtenstein

Ethnic Germans
Figure 0.1 Foreigners and Ethnic Germans in the Wehrmacht and
Waffen-​SS (January 1942).

Alsace and Lorraine.27 Overall, some 47,000 volunteers of both the

‘Germanic’ and ‘non-​Germanic’ classification had volunteered to fight
with the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-​SS by the beginning of 1942.28
While the mix of foreign volunteers gave political credence to German
propaganda about a European ‘crusade’ against Bolshevism, in practical
terms they meant far less given the scale of fighting on the eastern front.
The overwhelming bulk of foreign military support for the Wehrmacht
came from the national armies of Finland and Romania with further note-
worthy contingents provided by Italy, Hungary and Slovakia. Yet even

27
On ethnic Germans generally see: Valdis O. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933–​1945 (Chapel
Hill, NC, 1993).
28
Figures adapted from Bernhard R. Kroener, ‘The Winter Crisis of 1941–​1942: The
Distribution of Scarcity or Steps Towards a More Rational Management of Personnel’
in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Germany and the Second World War.
Volume V/​I. Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power (Oxford, 2000),
pp. 1027–​8.
8

8 David Stahel

these nations, four of which were signatories of the Tripartite Pact, were
held at arm’s length. Only the Finns and the Romanians were brought
into the military planning for Operation Barbarossa and that was mainly
to ensure essential staging areas for German troops or to safeguard stra-
tegic assets against anticipated Soviet counterattacks. Even the racially
acceptable Finns, imbrued with ‘Nordic culture’ and an open loathing
of Stalin’s state, were denied precise information about the timing of the
invasion, National Socialist war aims and, on Hitler’s explicit instruction,
any operational details not deemed absolutely necessary for successful
local co-​operation.29 This was in spite of the fact that Finland mobilized a
greater proportion of its small population than any of the other combat-
ants, including Germany (476,000 men from 3.7 million inhabitants).30
Moreover, Finland allowed over 30,000 German troops to concentrate
on its territory as well as permitting the Wehrmacht to administer some
100,000 square kilometres of northern Finland.31 It is not surprising
that Finland’s leadership was reticent about any formal alliance with
Nazi Germany and preferred the term Waffenbrüderschaft (brothers-​in-​
arms).32 Indeed, only the day before Barbarossa began Finnish President
Risto Ryri stated to a parliamentary delegation: ‘Germany is the only
state today that can defeat Russia, or at least considerably weaken it.
Nor would it probably be any loss to the world if Germany were to be
weakened in the fray.’33 Given both their common enemy and shared
expansionist goals (a ‘Greater Finland’ was based on the slogan ‘Short
Borders –​Long Peace’34), the mutual suspicion and distrust was to prove
an ominous starting point for what Finland’s commander-​in-​chief, Field
Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, called the ‘holy war against the
enemy of our people’.35

29
Gerd R. Ueberschär, ‘The Involvement of Scandinavia in the Plans for Barbarossa’ in
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), Germany and the Second World War. Volume
IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union (Oxford, 1998), pp. 461–​2.
30
By no means did all of the men mobilized in Finland serve at the front. In total there
were sixteen Finnish divisions with some 200,000 front-​line troops. See ibid., p. 463.
31
Manfred Menger, ‘Germany and the Finnish “Separate War” against the Soviet Union’
in Bernd Wegner (ed.), From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia and the World, 1939–​
1941 (Oxford, 1997), pp. 529 and 533.
32
See the excellent discussion in: Michael Jonas, ‘The Politics of an Alliance Finland in
Nazi Foreign Policy and War Strategy’ in Tiina Kinnunen and Ville Kivimäki (eds.),
Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations (Boston, 2012), pp. 117–​18.
33
Olli Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia (New
York, 2002), p. 89.
34
Manfred Menger, ‘Germany and the Finnish “Separate War” against the Soviet Union’,
p. 532.
35
Vesa Nenye, Peter Munter, Toni Wirtanen and Chris Birks, Finland at War: the
Continuation and Lapland   Wars 1941–​45 (Oxford, 2016), p. 49.
9

Introduction 9

Romania, under General Ion Antonescu, was ideologically far closer

to Nazi Germany and shared Hitler’s conception of the war in the east
not only as a necessary conventional struggle against Soviet power, but
as a reckoning with ‘the Jews’ who Antonescu referred to as ‘Satan’ in
need of ‘purification’.36 Of course, Romania also shared Finland’s bit-
ter territorial grievances resulting from recent Soviet aggression and
was prepared to commit its own ‘Army Group Antonescu’, consisting
of the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies with some 325,685 men,
to Operation Barbarossa.37 Nominally Antonescu’s army group was
also given command of the German Eleventh Army, under Colonel-​
General Eugen Ritter von Schobert, but this was only for appearances
as Hitler explained to his Romanian counterpart that ‘he intended to let
him appear before the Romanian people as the supreme commander in
this region’. In practice, however, Schobert was in charge of the army
group’s operations, while Hitler reserved the right to issue instructions
through Antonescu ‘which referred to the Romanian Army’.38 Indeed,
while Hitler respected Antonescu for his strict, authoritarian rule as well
as his fervent anti-​communism and anti-​Semitism, this did not redress
his disdain for the ‘lower nation’ that he led. Speaking informally to his
inner circle, Hitler remarked: ‘Antonescu is of Germanic origin, not
Romanian; he’s a born soldier. His misfortune is to have Romanians
under his command.’39 Clearly, even Hitler’s most enthusiastic and com-
mitted allies could still be dismissed as ‘foreign’ in spite of their willing-
ness to sacrifice and fight in what the Vice-​President, Mihai Antonescu,
declared to be Romania’s ‘great holy war’ against the Soviet Union.40
While Finland and Romania played by far the largest roles in Operation
Barbarossa, Italy under Benito Mussolini was personally Hitler’s closest
ally.Yet contravening the very essence of the German-​Italian Pact of Steel
(May 1939), Mussolini was only informed about the start of Operation
Barbarossa on 22 June 194141 (although Italian military intelligence

36
Dennis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and his Regime, Romania 1940–​1944
(London, 2006), pp. 116–​17. On Romania’s role in the Holocaust see: Dennis Deletant,
‘Transnistria and the Romanian Solution to the “Jewish Problem” ’ in Ray Brandon
and Wendy Lower (eds.), The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization
(Bloomington, 2008), Chapter 4.
37
Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafes and Cristian Craciunoiu, Third Axis Fourth Ally: Romanian
Armed Forces in the European War, 1941–​1945 (London, 1995), p. 45.
38
Dennis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally, p. 80.
39
Hugh R. Trevor-​Roper (ed.), Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941–​1944: His Private Conversations
(London, 2000), p. 49.
40
Dennis Deletant, ‘German-​ Romanian Relations, 1941–​ 1945’ in Jonathan Adelman
(ed.), Hitler and his Allies in World War II (New York, 2007), p. 176.
41
Richard J. B. Bosworth, Mussolini (New York, 2002), p. 378, see footnote 181.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.

1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is derived

from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not contain a
notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the copyright
holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in the
United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must
comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through
1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted

with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works posted
with the permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of
this work.

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project

Gutenberg™ License terms from this work, or any files containing a
part of this work or any other work associated with Project
Gutenberg™.

1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this

electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg™ License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form,
including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you
provide access to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work
in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in
the official version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™ works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing

access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
provided that:

• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the
method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The
fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty
payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on
which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your
periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked
as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information
about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation.”

• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who

notifies you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that
s/he does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
 copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and
discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of Project
Gutenberg™ works.

• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of

any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in
the electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90
days of receipt of the work.

• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg™

electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend

considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe
and proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating
the Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the medium on which they may
be stored, may contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to,
incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt data, transcription errors, a
copyright or other intellectual property infringement, a defective or
damaged disk or other medium, a computer virus, or computer
codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except

for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph
1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner
of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party
distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work under this
agreement, disclaim all liability to you for damages, costs and
expenses, including legal fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO
REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF
WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE
FOUNDATION, THE TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY
DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE
TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL,
PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE
NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you

discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it,
you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by
sending a written explanation to the person you received the work
from. If you received the work on a physical medium, you must
return the medium with your written explanation. The person or entity
that provided you with the defective work may elect to provide a
replacement copy in lieu of a refund. If you received the work
electronically, the person or entity providing it to you may choose to
give you a second opportunity to receive the work electronically in
lieu of a refund. If the second copy is also defective, you may
demand a refund in writing without further opportunities to fix the
problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth in
paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied

warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted
by the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any
provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the
Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the
Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any
volunteers associated with the production, promotion and distribution
of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless from all liability,
costs and expenses, including legal fees, that arise directly or
indirectly from any of the following which you do or cause to occur:
(a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg™ work, (b)
alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any Project
Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any Defect you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of

Project Gutenberg™
Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.
It exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and
donations from people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the

assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg™’s
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™ collection will
remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a
secure and permanent future for Project Gutenberg™ and future
generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help,
see Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at
www.gutenberg.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project

Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500 West,

Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact

Section 4. Information about Donations to

the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without
widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can
be freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the
widest array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small
donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax
exempt status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating

charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and
keep up with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in
locations where we have not received written confirmation of
compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of
compliance for any particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where

we have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no
prohibition against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in
such states who approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make

any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of
other ways including checks, online payments and credit card
donations. To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.

Section 5. General Information About Project

Gutenberg™ electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could be
freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose network of
volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several printed

editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.

Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.

This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,

including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how
to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.