‘Since men live upon the land and not upon

the sea, great issues between nations at war

have always been decided - except in rarest
cases - either by what your army can do
against your enemy’s territory and national
life or else by the fear of what the fleet
makes it possible for your army to do.’

Corbett

A Guide to

NAVAL HISTORY

For Staff College Entrance Examination

Lt Cdr M Mizanur Rahman, (G), BN

July 2012

Revised: July 2013

 WW-I AT SEA

Introduction

1. World War I was a military conflict centered on Europe that began in the summer of
1914. The fighting ended in late 1918. This conflict involved all of the world's great powers,
assembled in two opposing alliances: the Allies (centered on the Triple Entente) and the
Central Powers. The Triple Entente was the name given to the alliance between Great
Britain, French Republic and Russia after signing of Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907. On
the other hand, the Central Power was made up of the German Empire, Austro-Hungarian
Empire, Otoman Empire and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. More than 70 million military
personnel, including 60 million Europeans, were mobilized in this war. More than 9 million
combatants were killed in this second deadliest conflict in history. The assassination on 28
June 1914 of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, the heir to the throne of Austria-
Hungary, is seen as the immediate trigger of the war. Long-term causes, such as
imperialistic foreign policies of the great powers of Europe also played a major role. The
conflict opened with the German invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg and France; the
Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia; and a Russian attack against Germany. Additional
fronts opened after the Ottoman Empire joined the war in 1914, Italy and Bulgaria in 1915
and Romania in 1916. After a 1918 German offensive along the western front, United
States forces entered the war and the allies drove back the German armies in a series of
successful offensives. Germany agreed to a cease fire on Armistice Day, 11 November
1918.

Effect of WW-I

2. By the war's end, four major imperial powers—the German, Russian, Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman Empires—had been militarily and politically defeated. The
revolutionized Soviet Union emerged from the Russian Empire, while the map of central
Europe was completely redrawn into numerous smaller states. The League of Nations was
formed in the hope of preventing another such conflict.

WW-I at Sea

3. Significant action took place at sea in WW-I. Some of them are as described in
subsequent paragraphs.

4. Battle of Heligoland. It was the first naval battle of WW-I and was fought on
28 Aug 1914 between Britain and Germany. Fighting off the Island of Heligoland (off NE
Germany), the RN defeated a force of German light cruisers. Germany suffered heavy loss
and as a result, the German govt. restricted the freedom of action of the German fleet,
instructing it to remain in port and avoid any contact with superior force.

5. Battle of Coronel. The Battle of Coronel was fought on 01 Nov 1914 near
the coast of Central Chile, near the city of Coronel. The German East Asiatic Squadron
soundly defeated British fleet sent to stop them from reaching the Atlantic. The Battle of
Coronel was the first major British defeat at sea since 1814.

6. Battle of Falkland. The Battle of the Falklands was fought on 08 December

1914 between ships of the Royal Navy and the Imperial German Navy. Steaming for home
1
after a victory at the Battle of Coronel, the German East Asia Squadron was intercepted by
a British task force. Battling off the Falkland Islands, the British succeeded in sinking the
entire German force.

7. Sinking of the Lusitania. RMS Lusitania was a British luxury liner. Lusitania
was torpedoed off the southern coast of Ireland by U-20 on 07 May 1915. The liner sank
within 18 minutes killing 1,198 passengers including 128 Americans. The sinking turned
public opinion in many countries against Germany and contributed to the entry of USA in
WW-I.

8. Battle of Jutland. It was the largest naval battle of World War-I and the only full
scale clash of battleships in that war. It was fought on 31 May - 01 June 1916 in the North
Sea near Jutland, Denmark between the German High Sea Fleet and the British Grand
Fleet. Inconclusive in its results, the Battle of Jutland saw both sides claim victory, though
the German fleet never again ventured into the North Sea to seek action.

2
 WW-II AT SEA

Introduction

1. World War II was a global military conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945 which involved
most of the world's nations, including all of the great powers, organised into two opposing
military alliances: the Allies and the Axis. The Allied Countries consisted of countries like
USA, UK, USSR, France, Australia, etc. On the other hand the Axis countries were mainly
Germany, Japan and Italy. It was the most widespread war in history, with more than 100
million military personnel mobilised. Marked by significant action against civilians, including
the Holocaust and the only use of nuclear weapons in warfare, it was the deadliest conflict
in human history that resulted in fifty million to over seventy million fatalities.

2. The war is generally accepted to have begun on 01 September 1939, with the
invasion of Poland by Germany and subsequent declarations of war on Germany by
France and most of the countries of the British Empire and Commonwealth. The war
ended with the total victory of the Allies over Germany and Japan in 1945.

Effect of WW-II

3. World War II left the political alignment and social structure of the world significantly
altered. The United Nations was established to foster international cooperation and
prevent future conflicts (such as World War III). The Soviet Union and the United States
emerged as rival superpowers, setting the stage for the Cold War, which would last for the
next 46 years. Besides, the influence of European great powers started to decline - while
the decolonization of Asia and of Africa began after WW-II.

WW-II at Sea

4. Significant action took place at sea in WW-II. Some of them are as described in
subsequent paragraphs.

5. Attack on Pearl Harbour. The attack on Pearl Harbour took place on 07

December 1941, and brought the United States into World War II. Launching from aircraft
carriers, Japanese planes conducted a surprise attack and sunk or badly damaged eight
battleships.

6. The Battle of the Coral Sea. It was fought during 04 - 08 May 1942. The Battle
of Coral Sea was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the
Imperial Japanese Navy and Allied naval and air forces from the United States and
Australia. The battle was the first fleet action in which aircraft carriers engaged each other.
It was also the first naval battle in history in which neither side's ships sighted or fired
directly upon the other. The battle took place in Coral Sea, which is a marginal sea of the
NE coast of Australia. In an attempt to strengthen their defensive positioning for their
empire in the South Pacific, Imperial Japanese forces decided to invade and occupy Port
Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the southeastern Solomon Islands. The U.S.
learned of the Japanese plan through signals intelligence and sent two United States Navy
carrier task forces and a joint Australian-American cruiser force, under the overall
command of Admiral Frank J Fletcher, to oppose the Japanese offensive. With both sides
having suffered heavy losses in aircraft and carriers damaged or sunk, the two fleets
disengaged and retired from the battle area. Because of the loss of carrier air cover,
3
Japanese commander recalled the Port Moresby invasion fleet, intending to try again later.
Although a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk, the battle would prove
to be a strategic victory for the Allies as it prevented Japan from annexing their imperialism
in south pacific.

7. Battle of Midway. The Battle of Midway is widely regarded as the most important
naval battle of the Pacific Campaign of World War II. It was fought between 04 - 07 June
1942.The US Navy under the leadership of Admiral Nimitz, defeated an Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN) attack, under leadership of Admiral Yamamoto, against Midway Atoll (located in
north pacific near the NW end of Haiwan archipelago), inflicting irreparable damage on the
Japanese fleet. Military historian John Keegan has called it "the most stunning and
decisive blow in the history of naval warfare." The Japanese operation, like the earlier
attack on Pearl Harbor, aimed to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the
Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese hoped that another demoralizing defeat would force the
U.S. to capitulate in the Pacific War. The Japanese plan was to lure the United States' few
remaining aircraft carriers into a trap. The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway Atoll
as part of an overall plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle
Raid. This operation was considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and
Samoa.

8. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. This battle took place between 12 – 15

November 1942, and was the decisive engagement in a series of naval battles between
Allied (primarily United States) and Imperial Japanese forces during the months-long
Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomon Islands. Guadalcanal is a tropical island in the SW
Pacific and the largest in the Solomon Islands group. The action in this battle consisted of
combined air and sea engagements over four days, mostly near Guadalcanal and all
related to a Japanese effort to reinforce land forces on the island. The battle is especially
noted for the deaths of the United States Navy's only two admirals to be killed in action
during a surface engagement in the war. The battle turned back Japan's last major attempt
to dislodge Allied forces from Guadalcanal and nearby Tulagi, which the Allied already
occupied, resulting in a strategic victory for the U.S. and its allies and deciding the ultimate
outcome of the Guadalcanal campaign in their favor.

9. Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Battle of Leyte Gulf is generally considered to be

the largest naval battle of World War II and also the largest naval battle in history. It was
fought in waters near the Philippine islands of Leyte, Samar, and Luzon, from 23 - 26
October 1944, between allied American and Australian forces against the Japanese. On
20 October, United States troops invaded the island of Leyte as part of a strategy aimed at
isolating Japan from the countries it had occupied in South East Asia, and in particular
depriving its forces and industry of vital oil supplies. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)
mobilized nearly all of its remaining major naval vessels in an attempt to defeat the Allied
invasion, but was repulsed by the US Navy's 3rd and 7th Fleets. The IJN failed to achieve
its objective, suffered very heavy losses, and never afterwards sailed to battle in
comparable force. The majority of its surviving heavy ships, deprived of petroleum fuel,
remained in their bases for the rest of the Pacific War. The Battle of Leyte Gulf is also
notable as first battle in which Japanese aircraft carried out organized kamikaze attacks.

4
Other Important Incidents at Sea

10. Battle of Cape Matapan. Cape Matapan is on the SE coast of Greece’s

Peloponnesian peninsula. The Battle of Cape Matapan saw British naval forces inflict a
severe defeat on the Italian Regia Marina. The battle took place on 27-29 March 1941.
The victory at Cape Matapan led to the Italians abandoning the eastern Mediterranean.

11. Battle of the Denmark Strait. The Battle of the Denmark Strait (Denmark
Strait is between Greenland and Iceland) was fought on 24 May 1941. Departing port, the
German battleship Bismarck and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen attempted to break in the
North Atlantic to attack Allied shipping. They were intercepted by the British ships HMS
Hood and HMS Prince of Wales. But Germans defeated the British in the resulting Battle.

12. Battle of the Java Sea. The Battle of the Java Sea occurred on 27 February
1942, as Allied naval forces attempted to block the Japanese invasion of Java. The Java
Sea lies between the Indonesian islands of Borneo to north, Java to south, Sumatra to
west and Sulawesi to east. The Allied navies suffered disastrous defeat by JIN and the
Allied commander Dutch Admiral Karl Doorman was killed in action. Subsequently the
Japanese repulsed the Allied attacks.

13. Capture of U-505. On 04 June 1944, the German submarine U-505 was
captured by American forces off the coast of Africa. After a mix of surface and aerial
attacks forced U-505 to surface, an American boarding party managed to save the ship
before it sank. This was the only enemy warship captured at sea by the US Navy in the
20th century.

14. Battle of the Philippine Sea. The Battle of the Philippine Sea was fought 19-20
June 1944, and was a decisive victory for the Allies. Attacking in the Philippine Sea while
Allied forces were invading Saipan, the Japanese were repulsed with the loss of three
carriers. The battle is often referred to as the "Marianas Turkey Shoot" due to the large
number of Japanese planes downed by American pilots.

15. HMS Venturer Sinks U-864. On 09 February 1945, HMS Venturer and U-864
engaged in the only known battle where one submerged submarine sank another. Sailing
off the coast of Norway, Venturer had been sent to intercept U-864 which was carrying
mercury and Me-262 aircraft parts to Japan. After a three-hour chase, Venturer fired four
torpedoes, one of which hit and sank U-864.

16. Operation Ten-Go. Operation Ten-Go was a last ditch attempt by the
Japanese to aid the garrison on Okinawa. Calling for the super battleship Yamato and its
escorts to break through the US fleet, Operation Ten-Go was a glorified suicide mission.
On 07 April 1945, Yamato and its escorts were attacked and sunk by Allied air attacks.

5
 NAVAL DEVELOPMENT FROM WW-I TO WW-II

1. Naval warfare in World War I was mainly characterized by the efforts of the Allied
Powers, with their larger fleets and surrounding position, to blockade the Central Powers
by sea, and the efforts of the Central Powers to break that blockade or to establish an
effective blockade of the United Kingdom and France with submarines and raiders.
Germany's attempt to build a battleship fleet to match that of the United Kingdom, the
dominant naval power on the nineteenth century and an island country that depended on
seaborne trade for survival, is often listed as a major reason for the enmity between those
two countries that led the UK to enter World War I. German leaders desired a navy in
proportion to their military and economic strength that could free their overseas trade and
colonial empire from dependence on Britain's good will, but such a fleet would inevitably
threaten Britain's own trade and empire.

2. During early twentieth century, Mahan's thesis was highly influential and lead to an
explosion of new naval construction worldwide. Thus, naval technology in World War I was
dominated by the battleship, a Mahanian concept. Battleships were built along the
DREADNAUGHT model, with several large turrets of equally sized big guns. The British
launched the HMS DREADNAUGHT in 1906, which made all previous warships obsolete.
She had steam turbine engine, making her the fastest capital ship then afloat. She was
capable of making speed of 21 knots. In general terms, British ships had larger guns and
were equipped and manned for quicker fire than their German counterparts. In contrast,
the German ships had better optical equipment and range finding, and were much better
compartmentalized and able to deal with damage. The Germans also generally had better
propellant handling procedures, a point that was to have disastrous consequences for the
British battle cruisers at Jutland.

Naval Technology in WW-I

3. Platforms. The torpedo boat caused considerable worry for many naval planners.
In theory a large number of these inexpensive ships could attack en-mass and overwhelm
a Dreadnought force. This led to the introduction of ships dedicated to keeping them away
from the fleets, the torpedo boat destroyers, or simply destroyers. Although the mass raid
continued to be a possibility, another solution was found in the form of the submarine,
increasingly in use. The submarine could approach underwater, safe from the guns of both
the capital ships and the destroyers (although not for long), and fire a salvo as deadly as a
torpedo boat's. Submarines were generally more effective in attacking poorly defended
merchant ships than in fighting surface warships, though several small to medium British
warships were lost to torpedoes launched from German U-boats. Aviation was primarily
focused on reconnaissance, with the aircraft carrier being invented in 1918 (HMS
ARGUS), and bomber aircraft capable of lifting only relatively light loads.

4. Weapons. Naval mines were also increasingly well developed since the
beginning of WW I. Defensive mines along coasts made it much more difficult for capital
ships to get close enough to conduct coastal bombardment or support attacks. The first
battleship sinking in the war — that of HMS AUDACIOUS — was the result of her striking
a naval mine on 27 October 1914. Suitably placed mines also served to restrict the
freedom of movement of submarines.

6
5. Electronics, Comm & Int. Radio was in early use, with naval ships
commonly equipped with radio telegraph, merchant ships less so. Sonar was in its infancy
by the end of the war.

Technology in WW-II

6. Military weapons technology experienced rapid advances during World War II, and
over six years there was a disorientating rate of change in combat in everything from
aircraft to small arms.

Ship

7. Naval warfare changed dramatically during World War II, with the ascent of the
aircraft carrier to the premier vessel of the fleet, and the impact of increasingly capable
submarines on the course of the war. The development of new ships during the war was
somewhat limited due to the protracted time period needed for production, but important
developments were often retrofitted to older vessels. Advanced German submarine types
came into service too late and after nearly all the experienced crews had been lost. The
most important shipboard advances were in the field of anti-submarine warfare. Driven by
the desperate necessity of keeping Britain supplied technologies for the detection and
destruction of submarines was advanced at high priority. The use of ASDIC (SONAR)
became widespread and so did the installation of shipboard and airborne radar.

Weapon

8. The actual weapons; the guns, mortars, artillery, bombs, and other devices, were as
diverse as the participants and objectives. A bewildering array was developed during the
war to meet specific needs that arose, but many traced their development to prior to World
War II and were aimed with the aid of radar and airplanes. Torpedoes began to use
magnetic detonators; compass directed, programmed and even acoustic guidance
systems; and improved propulsion. Fire-control systems continued to develop for ships'
guns and came into use for torpedoes and anti-aircraft fire. Human torpedoes and the
Hedgehog (weapon) were also developed.

Electronics, Communication & Intelligence

9. Electronics rose to prominence quickly in World War II. While prior to the war few
electronic devices were seen as important pieces of equipment, by the middle of the war
such instruments as radar and ASDIC (sonar) had proven their value. Additionally,
equipment designed for communications and the interception of those communications
was becoming critical. Digital electronics, particularly, were also given a massive boost by
war-related research. The semi-secret ENIAC and the super-secret Colossus
demonstrated using thousands of valves (vacuum tubes) could be reliable enough to be
useful, paving the way for the post-war development of stored program computers.

10. The UK and the USA were the leaders in electronics. The British developed the
cavity magnetron which gave a high power source of microwaves suitable for radar.
Electronic and optical countermeasures such as jamming and radar absorbing material
were developed. While the war stimulated many technologies, such as radio and radar
development, it slowed down related yet non-critical fields such as television and radio.

7
 BATTLE OF JUTLAND

INTRODUCTION

1. It was the largest naval battle of World War-I and the only full scale clash of
battleships in that war. It was fought on 31 May 01 June 1916 in the North Sea near
Jutland, Denmark between the German High Sea Fleet and the British Grand Fleet.
Inconclusive in its results, the Battle of Jutland saw both sides claim victory, though the
German fleet never again ventured into the North Sea to seek action. It was also the
largest sea battle to date with 252 ships engaged with 25 Admirals flying their flags and
was the last sea battle in which all types of classic ships like battle cruisers, battle ships,
armoured cruisers and light cruisers played their parts.

2. The intention of the German fleet was to lure out, trap and destroy a portion of the
Grand fleet, part of their larger strategy of breaking the British naval blockade of the North
Sea and allowing German mercantile shipping to operate again. The Royal Navy, on the
other hand, was pursuing a strategy seeking to engage and cripple the High Seas Fleet
with a single engagement, and secondarily keep the German force bottled up and away
from their own shipping lanes (SLOC).

BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE

German planning

3. By the spring of 1916 the German High Seas Fleet had only 18 battleships and was
falling increasingly further behind as the war progressed. Since the British Grand Fleet had
33, there was little chance of defeating the British in a head-to-head clash of battleships.
Instead, the German strategy was to divide and conquer: by staging raids into the North
Sea where they hoped could lure out small British squadrons and pickets who could then
be attacked and destroyed by superior forces or submarines.

4. The plan for May 1916 was to station a large number of U-boats off the British naval
bases and lure Beatty's battle cruiser squadrons out by sending a fast cruiser fleet under
Hipper to raid the coast of Sunderland. If all went well, after the British sortie in response
to the raiding attack force, the British squadrons would be attrited by the picketing
submarine ambush, and the British Navy's centuries long tradition of aggressive command
could be used to draw those pursuing but weakened units after Hipper's cruisers towards
the German dreadnoughts positioned in a high seas ambush under Scheer and destroyed.

5. It was further hoped once a submarine attacked successfully, that fast escorts such
as destroyers, the scouting eyes of the main fleets, would be tied down conducting anti-
submarine operations against that line, and effectively hold the larger British units off shore
against the submarine force between it and its ports. The German planning thus had
several strings to their bow, and had they caught the British in the positions where they
expected them to be, had a good chance to favorably alter the numerical imbalance by
inflicting serious damage on the scattered British forces.

6. Unfortunately for the German planning, the British had gained possession of the
main German code books (the British had been given a German codebook from the light
cruiser SMS Magdeburg, boarded by Russian naval officers after the ship ran aground in
Russian territorial waters) so intercepted German naval radio communications could
usually be deciphered, and hence the British Admiralty was therefore usually aware of
8
German deployments and activity levels, giving them a glimpse into the German plans and
the ability to formulate better responses from this extra military intelligence.

British Response

7. The British intercepted and decrypted a German signal on 28 May ordering all ships
to be ready to put to sea on the 30th. Further signals were intercepted and although they
were not decrypted it was clear that a major operation was likely. The throat of the
Skagerrak, the strategic gateway to the Baltic and North Atlantic, waters off Jutland and
Norway.

8. Not knowing the Germans objective, Jellicoe and his staff decided to position the
fleet to head off any attempt by the Germans to enter the North Atlantic or Baltic through
the Skagerrak by taking up a position off Norway where they could possibly cut off any
German raid into the shipping lanes of the Atlantic, or prevent the Germans from heading
into the Baltic. A position further west was unnecessary as that area of the North Sea
could be patrolled by air using Blimps and scouting air craft.

9. Consequently, Admiral Jellicoe lead the Grand Fleet of twenty-four dreadnoughts

and three battle cruisers out of Scapa Flow east before Hipper's raiding force left the Jade
Estuary on 30 May and the German High Seas Fleet could follow. Beatty's faster force of
four dreadnoughts and six battle cruisers left the Firth of Forth on the next day, and
Jellicoe's intention was to rendezvous 90 miles (144.8 kilometers) west of the mouth of
Skagerrak off the coast of Jutland and wait for the Germans or their intentions to become
clear. The planned position giving him the best mix of responses to likely German
intentions.

OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE

10. Physical Outcome. At the end of the battle the losses incurred by both the forces is
given below:

Type of Ships British Fleet German Fleet

Battle ships Nil 01
Battle Cruisers 03 01
Armoured cruisers 03 Nil
Light Cruisers Nil 04
Destroyers 08 05
Total 14 11
Total tonnage 112,000 tons 61,000 tons
Killed 6,097 2,551

11. Strategic and Tactical Outcome. Jutland was undoubtedly a material and moral
victory for the German High Seas Fleet whilst being a strategic victory for the British Grand
Fleet. The Germans had inflicted heavier losses on the numerically superior Grand Fleet
and had escaped near destruction but had failed to break the British blockade or control of
the North Sea and had not altered the balance of power in any meaningful way. On the
other hand, The Royal Navy had failed to achieve a new Trafalgar, to both it's and the
British public's disappointment, although it had ended the battle in control of the battlefield
and with the balance of power unchanged.

9
12. Far Reaching Outcome. The far reaching result of Jutland was that it convinced
Scheer and the German Naval staff that the only way of gaining naval victory was via
unrestricted submarine warfare, and not by defeating the British in battle. By summer
1916, the German high command decided that a further major naval battle would involve
unacceptable risks. The High Sea Fleet was placed on the defensive, and their morale
suffered badly, which resulted in mutiny in August 1917 and subsequently a major revolt in
1918.

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE

Maritime Strategy and the Battle

13. British Strategy. The British concept was defence oriented. For the British the
maintenance of sea supremacy was the prime concern and not the destruction of the High
Seas Fleet. As long as the German fleet did not venture out and threaten the British lines
of communication, British aim was being achieved. The British did not find the option of
pursuing the obstruction of High Seas Fleet cost effective. Admiral Jellicoe was not willing
to risk his heavy battle ships, unless there was reasonable chance of destroying High
Seas Fleet without heavy losses to own ships. However, Admiral Jellicoe believed that
complete destruction of the High Sea Fleet by decisive battle would ensure the complete
command of the sea. Thus reacted on receiving the news of German’s initiative. Overall
British strategy can be summarized as appended below:

a. Maintain command of the sea.

b. Maintain sea line of communications.
c. Deny germany use of the sea.
d. Disrupt german commerce.

14. German Strategy. German Naval strategy was built on caution and defensive
concepts. They thought the confrontation was unnecessary in any events since mines and
submarines would tackle the toll of British ships. But the pressure of the British Blockade
was becoming unbearable. In view of their deteriorating position, The German began to
reassess their naval strategy to gain limited sea use capabilities by adopting Fleet-in –
being strategy. This strategy of the High Sea Fleet is also reflected in Admiral Scheer’s
historical speech, “The Fleet would strike when the circumstances are favourable ... Fleet
will therefore, seek battle with the English Fleet only when a state of equality has been
achieved by the method of guerrilla warfare”. Overall German strategy was as under:

a. Hold the British fleet at risk by adopting fleet in being strategy.

b. Disrupt British commerce

The end result was British strategic victory.

Tactical Analysis

15. German U-boat Failure. The German U-boats were completely ineffective in this
battle. They did not sink a single ship and provided no useful information as scouts.
Jellicoe's ships proceeded to his rendezvous undamaged.

16. Disposition of Fleet. The British Admirals were in Favour of centralized command.
The primary means of communication was by visual signals. All ships were fitted with W/T
but their use for tactical maneuvering was not being exploited. Although the fleet could be
10
divided into squadrons and divisions and deployed on independent missions, the chances
of these surviving against the fleet were very grim. If the fleet without its other units was
engaged with the enemy’s fleet, the chances of survival were hardly any units.

17. Gun Engagements. The British tactics during the war were to deploy in the
line ahead formation, at right angles to the enemy’s line of bearing so that heavy broad
side could be used to defeat the enemy. This engagement was only possible if the enemy
continued in line-ahead formation. The British’s always aimed at crossing the enemy’s ‘T’
in order to engage where as the Germans knowing their limitations tried to avoid direct
engagement with the Grand Fleet. But with the arrival of Admiral Jelico, Germans was in
such position and suffered heavy loss.

18. The Battle Turn. The Germans successfully executed the battle turn and managed
to evade the British attacks. In a ‘battle turn’ each ship wheeled over hard and reversed
course in succession beginning from the rear. When this turn was being executed the
German destroyers to hide the movement deployed smoke screen and subsequently the
destroyers would break out to carry out a torpedo attack on the pursuing enemy.

19. Destroyer Tactics. The Germans exploited poor visibility conditions in the North
Sea, where it is misty most of the time. The German destroyers used to break out from the
smoke screen and launch attack on the pursuing enemy from ranges of 10,000 yards to
6,500 yards (range of German torpedo 8000 yards). The only countermeasure the British
had was to turn away from the torpedo and open out in range.

20. Night Attack. The German organization at night was very good. Their system of
recognition signals was extremely well practiced where as the British’s had no system of
recognition at night. The Germans made good use of their searchlights, which were
superior to the British. Their method of firing at night produced excellent results. The
British were poorly trained in the night fighting capability.

21. Tactical lesson. Speed and long-range gunfire outstripped the commander's
means of observation and control of forces.

22. Present Day tactical Implication. The tactical concepts adhered by both the fleets
has little significance in today’s warfare. With the advent of long range radar’s, air cover
and the capability to engage enemy at extended range (BVR) allows flexibility of
operations. The modern day fleet can be further subdivided into various groups, units and
elements. These ships although operating independently can remain in touch with each
other due to modern W/T systems, which were not available to forces in Jutland. Engaging
enemy war ships with guns today would be the last resorts. Major of the surface
combatants is fitted with ultra modern surface to surface missiles and fire control systems.

Implication of C3I

23. Grand Fleet. At the beginning of the battle, British Naval Intelligence had captured
German cipher and signal book and square maps of North Sea from the Russians.
Russian boarded a grounded German u boat named SMS Magdeburg in their territorial
sea. Though British could intercept and decoded German transmission but could not
capitalize the benefit fully. Admiralty intelligence misled Jelico about the arrival of Scheer
in Jutland. The difference between the intelligence report and actual arriving time was 9
hours. The Grand fleet had centralized command and the co-ordination between various
commands and units were not achieved. The British trusted on visual communication. But
both their night signalling equipment and system used was not as good as those of
11
German. Neither they were well practiced in using those. Even more they did not have a
precise set of recognition system. As a result C-in-C was unable to keep control of the
comparatively modern high-speed fleet in a smoke filled battle zone. The under commands
did also failed to report the positions and movements of enemy ships in time to the
command ship.

24. High Seas Fleet. Although Germans cipher and crypto system was disclosed by
the British intelligence, German’s were unaware of the fact. However, German’s
centralised command and control was quite effective and they maintained it all through the
Battle. They developed as precise set of identification and recognition system. They also
cold effectively use those at night engagement. Their light signaling apparatus was
extremely good and they could effectively use those. There by they could inflict
considerable damage to British fleet and could evade blockade and made their way home.

Leadership Trend

25. Grand Fleet Commander Admiral Jellicoe. The then First Sea Lord Fisher used
to describe Admiral Jellicoe as future Nelson. With a long and distinguish career, Jellicoe
was a genius in his own way. In addition to his firm belief in the “line ahead” and the “big
guns” his strategy for the fleet emphasized defense. However, he was found quite rigid in
traditional thinking and not flexible in some occasions. He also was in favour of centralized
command, which proved ineffective in Jutland. He was a thorough professional; he
inspired trust in his leadership. The Grand Fleet was nursed and prepared for the day of
the battle and the blockade work was done with an administrative care for which Admiral
Jellicoe deserves credit. At the time Jellicoe was criticized for his caution and for allowing
Scheer to escape. Beatty in particular was convinced that Jellicoe had missed a
tremendous opportunity to win another Trafalgar and annihilate the High Seas Fleet.
Jellicoe's career stagnated; he was promoted away from active command to become First
Sea Lord, while Beatty replaced him as commander of the British Grand Fleet.

26. High Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Scheer. On the other hand, Admiral
Scheer was full of enthusiasm. He was appointed as C-IN-C of High Sea Fleet by
replacing Admiral Phol, a man of ill health and ingrained caution. Soon after his
appointment, he prepared his fleet for a greater mission and he could effectively inspire his
team for that. Scheer was a man, young in ideas, willing to take risking orders that new
methods and inventions might be tried. He was daring and inventive. In this battle he
correctly appreciated his formidable enemy and took a valuable decision of withdrawal at
night through enemy.

War Technology

27. Ship Design Philosophy. The displacement and dimensions of these ships are
almost similar. But the battle showed that the British concept and use of the battle cruiser
was wholly flawed. The battle cruiser had been designed according to Jackie Fisher's
dictum that "speed is armour". They were intended to be faster than battleships, with
superior fire control. Indeed, the whole concept was negated when British battle cruisers
were asked to fight German ships which were just as fast, and better armoured. The weak
design and faulty use of the battle cruisers were important in the serious losses of the
British. The battle is often regarded as demonstrating that the Royal Navy was
technologically and operationally inferior to the German Navy.

12
28. Armour Protection Concept. During the battle, it had been assumed that naval
battles would be fought at a maximum of 10,000 yards. At that range shells hit horizontally
and vertical armour is of paramount importance. The 9” armour of the ships was assumed
to be sufficient to protect the ship from German gunnery. Unfortunately, the range at which
battle commenced was almost twice this distance. SMS LUTZOW opened fire at yards,
about 18,500 yards. At this range the shells trajectory is no longer horizontal, but plunging.
The facts which contributed to the British losses were, first, the indifferent armour
protection of battle-cruisers, particularly as regards turret armour and deck plating, and,
second, the disadvantage under which vessels laboured in regard to the light. No British or
German ships had deck armour. They had protective plating only up to 2.5 inches thick.
But, the German deck plates were made of much superior materials than the British. So
the British ships were more vulnerable to long range plunging fire and suffered for these
material differences to the Germans.

29. Range Finders. It was clearly demonstrated that the British fired more number
of shells but surprisingly received more shots by the Germans. One of the main reasons
behind this was the superior range finder as used by the Germans. The British range
finders where co-incidence was the Germans were stereoscopic. The British range finders
were also of a shorter base (9-foot) than the Germans, which made long distance range,
finding more difficult. So the German range finders were quicker to find the correct range.

30. Cordite. During the summer of 2003, a diving expedition examined the wrecks
of Invincible, Queen Mary, Defence, and Lützow to investigate the cause of the British
ships' tendency to suffer from internal explosions. On this evidence, a major part of the
blame may be laid on lax handling of the cordite propellant for the shells of the main guns.
This, in turn, was a product of current British naval doctrine, which emphasized a rapid
rate of fire in the direction of the enemy rather than slower, more accurate fire. In practice,
the cordite could not be supplied to the guns rapidly enough through the hoists and
hatches; in order to bring up the propellant for the next broadside before the time when it
had to be loaded, many safety doors which should have been kept shut to safeguard
against flash fires were open. Furthermore, whereas the German propellant RP C/12 was
supplied in brass cylinders, British cordite was supplied in silk bags, making it more
susceptible to flash fires.

31. Shell Design. The British armour Piercing shell proved to be ineffective. Their
armour-piercing shells exploded outside the German armour rather than penetrating and
exploding within. As a result some German ships with only 8 inch (203 mm) armour
survived hits from 15-inch (381 mm) shells. Had these shells performed to design, German
losses would probably have been. The shells tested at 90-degree angle, was defective in
design when hitting at lesser angles. This problem had been suspected for, but the
Admiralty had neglected to conduct proper testing.

32. Shell Handling Room. Germans showed their mastery in shell handling. There
was no fundamental weakness in the design of the British ships. At Dogger Bank, SMS
SEYDLITZ was almost destroyed when a plunging shell penetrated a turret and the
resulting cordite flash killed every one in two turrets. The Germans through this tragedy
learnt and immediately introduced, flash tight shell handling room. The British unaware of
this kept the existing design. In Jutland, a number of British ships including HMS LION
were damaged by hit on Q-turret, which sent a flash down the hoist.

13
 APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

33. The principles of war are the most fundamental form of doctrine, and they represent
the basic guiding elements of warfare. Principles of war followed by the British and the
German are mentioned below:

a. Maintenance of Aim. Both the British and the Germans had specific
and a solid set of aim to achieve national objectives. The intention of the German
fleet was to lure out, trap and destroy a portion of the Grand fleet and allowing
German mercantile shipping to operate again. The Royal Navy, on the other hand,
was pursuing a strategy seeking to engage and cripple the High Seas Fleet with a
single engagement. Due to the overwhelming concentration of British forces the
Germans could not maintain their aim till the end of the battle. British could maintain
the aim throughout the battle.

b. Offensive Action. The Germans courageously displayed the offensive

action all through but the British resolutely displayed the same but sometimes they
were reluctant.

c. Concentration of Force. Throughout the battle the High Sea Fleet could
concentrated their force but the Grand Fleet could not due to their lack in
communication. Communication between ships and the British commander-in-chief
were poor. For most of the battle Jellicoe had no idea where the German ships
were, even though British ships were in contact.

d. Economy of Effort. Although British achieved strategic victory, they had to

mobilise all of their efforts and force against comparatively small force. On the other
hand, the Germans were able to cause more damage to the British by using inferior
force. Thus, the Germans had rightly utilised economy of effort while the British
failed.

e. Flexibility. German had greater organisational flexibility as they were

practising decentralised command. On the other hand, the British were bounded by
the Jellicoe adopted rigid “Grant fleet orders”, which many a times, prevented
subordinate commanders to act independently.

f. Security. The Germans could not ensure the security of their cipher and
signal books. Unfortunately for the German planning, the British had gained
possession of the main German code books. So, intercepted German naval radio
communications could usually be deciphered, and hence the British Admiralty was
therefore usually aware of German deployments and activity levels.

g. Surprise. British achieved the initial surprise giving them a glimpse into
the German plans and the ability to formulate better responses from this extra
military intelligence. They also had early information on the Germans submarines
deployment. But none of the provisions could be exploited to achieve tactical gain.

h. Maintenance of Morale. Both the nations had high morale. The Germans
morale was especially very high because they were defending their existence. The
leadership of the Germans was highly appreciated. The morale of British force was
high as they had the control of the sea as well as modern ships with superior force.

14
 j. Co-operation. The co-operation amongst the units of the Grand Fleet
was very less. It happened due to communication gap. On the other hand the
Germans had good co-operation between two forces and thus could give extra
effort on certain attacks.

k. Administration. The British lacked flexibility in administration while, the

Germans had efficient and flexible administration among the High Sea Fleet. The
decentralised command of the Germans acted superbly in this warfare.

LESSONS LEARNT

34. By the time of Battle of Jutland Radar was not invented and human eye is the only
method of detecting enemy, wireless communication was also not in a praising standard.
On the other hand today Missiles, high accuracy torpedoes, smart ammunitions various
highly accurate sensors and precision weapons available. But still there are many lessons
to learn from battle of Jutland; such as

a. Intelligence plays a vital role in a battle but requirement of using them

effectively is paramount importance. Further distribution of available information to
battle units via effective communication is also essential and lack of these will be a
disaster in battle field.

b. Tactical victory may not always achieve the objectives of a battle. Proper
implication of the technology available is essential for wining a battle especially at
sea.

c. Submarine can play a deterrent role in naval warfare, but implementing

combination of surface, sub-surface and air always produce a better result.

d. Battle of Jutland clearly evident that numerical achievement/supremacy may

not always bring success as Grand fleets’ number and damage by Germans to
Grand fleet.

e. Naval tactics are never outdated. It may be backdated to present time, but
commanders may find it effective at any suitable situation.

15
 ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOUR

INTRODUCTION

1. The attack on Pearl Harbor (called the Hawaii Operation or Operation Z by the
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, and the Battle of Pearl Harbor by some
Americans) was a surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy
against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on the morning of 07
December 1941. The next day the United States declared war on Japan resulting in their
entry into World War II. The attack was intended as a preventive action in order to keep
the US Pacific Fleet from influencing the war that the Empire of Japan was planning in
Southeast Asia, against Britain and the Netherlands, as well as the US in the Philippines.
The base was attacked by Japanese aircraft (a total of 353, in two waves) launched from
six aircraft carriers.

2. The attack was a major engagement of World War II and came as a profound shock
to the American people. Domestic support for isolationism, which had been strong,
disappeared. Germany's ill-considered declaration of war on the US, which was not
required by any treaty commitment, moved the US from clandestine support of Britain into
active alliance and full participation in the European Theater. Despite numerous historical
precedents for unannounced military action, the lack of any formal warning by Japan,
particularly while negotiations were still apparently ongoing, led to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt proclaiming 07 December "a date which will live in infamy".

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3. In 1939, World War II was beginning with a string of victories by German forces.
German's success included defeats of Poland, Netherlands and France along with a
seizure of England. Many of the European allied nations had control over important
colonial empires such as the East Indies and Singapore in South East Asia. These South
East Asian countries contained many of the natural resources that Japan so desperately
needed. Japan felt that she should take the opportunity to take over some of them.

4. At the same time in the United States President Franklin D Roosevelt wanted to halt
the expansion of Germany and Japan but many others in the government wanted to leave
the situation alone. The US began to supply materials to the countries at war with
Germany and Japan but it wanted to remain neutral to prevent any overseas war.
Meanwhile Germany, Italy and Japan formed the Axis Alliance in September 1940. After
that President Roosevelt imposed an embargo on US export of oil and scrap iron steel to
Japan. Japan was becoming desperate for more natural resources. In July of 1941 Japan
made the decision to secure access to the abundance of the much-needed resources in
South East Asia. It needed to build up its armies in order to stay in the war. It also had to
worry about the US reaction to their plan to seize Southeast Asia.

5. In July 1941 Japan occupied Southern Indo-china - an obvious prelude to further

expansion in South East Asia, a rich source of rubber, tin, oil, timber, foodstuffs and other
vital raw materials.

6. Japanese Prime Minister prince Konoye Fumimaro hoped that the United States
would accept Japan’s actions but in July 1941 US froze all Japanese assets in the United
States. This action virtually ended US-Japanese trade depriving Japan of vital oil imports.
Similar action by Great Britain and Netherlands affected shipments of oil from the East
16
Indies and this created a critical situation for Japan. The cabinet decided that unless the
US made concession, the oil field to the south would be seized by military operation.

7. The United States regarded Japan’s adamant refusal to budge on their stance as a
sign of hostility. They responded to this potential war with Japan by adding to the military
forces stationed in the Pacific. The most powerful and most crucial part of American
defense in the Pacific Ocean was that of the US Pacific Fleet. With war looming, the US
Pacific Fleet was moved to the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii. This was the perfect
location for the American forces in the Pacific because of its location, halfway between the
United States West Coast and the Japanese military bases in the Marshall Islands.
President Roosevelt felt that the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii would retard any
Japanese attempt at a stroll on the United States.

JAPANESE PLAN AND PREPARATION FOR ATTACK

Japanese Plan for Attack

8. The Japanese General Staff of the Navy initially planned the attack on Pearl
Harbour. He planned to carry out direct attack on Pearl Harbour and thereby to achieve
the objectives of Japan very quickly towards the South Pacific. He planned to deal with the
US Pacific Fleet at a place namely Tsushima in case the US Pacific Fleet would attempt
an encounter with Japanese striking force from the Western Pacific side. Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, Commanding the Japanese combined Fleet, had a different plan. He believed
that the US Pacific Fleet would have to be destroyed in the first year of the war before it
could be strengthened by the building program then in progress. His plan called for a
carrier air attack on this fleet at its base in Pearl Harbour as the opening act of the war,
while the advance to the South would be supported primarily by land based aircraft. When
a test of the plan on a game board predicted heavy losses, the Navy General Staff
opposed it, but the popular Yamamoto forced its consent by a threat of resignation.

9. In January 1941, Admiral Yamamoto first began to commit to the strategic gain of
Japan by planning out his attack and showing to other Japanese officials. Yamamoto
developed the following eight guidelines for the attack:

a. Surprise was crucial.

b. American aircraft carriers there should be the primary targets.
c. US aircraft there must be destroyed to prevent aerial opposition.
d. All Japanese aircraft carriers available should be used.
e. All types of bombing should be used in the attack.
f. A strong fighter element should be included in the fleet for air coverage.
g. Refueling at sea would be necessary.
h. A day light attack promised best results, especially in the sun rise hours.

10. For the attainment of the important guidelines of Admiral Yamamoto the Japan
planned their attack in the following manner:

a. Japan planned to strengthen diplomatic relationship with USA and thereby to

put USA into the dilemma about the Japanese intention of attack in Pearl Harbour.

b. Japan planned to collect secret data from Taranto of Italy for using the British
attack policy as a counter check to their overall plan of attacking Pearl Harbour.

17
 c. Japan planned to continue the movement of her expeditionary force towards
Malay Peninsula for a drive on Singapore. In the shadow of such movements they
planned to shift all the six of their largest carriers to the Kuril Islands anchorage.
They also planned to move the six carriers to a place 200 miles north of the Pearl
Harbor in a suitable time without giving any flickers into the minds of US military
planners about the Japanese intentions.

d. Japan planned to conceal the movement of huge carriers by utilising the dark
hours. They also planned to carry out the attack at a staggered time.

e. Japan planned the effective utilization of merchant ships in receiving

intelligence of the enemy movements. That is how they were guided for selecting a
route towards the target by avoiding US fleet and any other shipping.

Japanese Preparations

11. For the attainment of the eight vital elements of Admiral Yamamoto's guidelines
Japan took some measures as the preparation for an attack. Those were:

a. Japanese constructed some midget submarines for deep penetration into the
Pearl Harbour. A training program under way included towing them from Japan to
positions of the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.

b. They employed a naval officer as a spy in Pearl Harbor. This officer used to
monitor all the movements of major US warships in and out of the Pearl Harbor
informing the Japanese supreme command on a daily basis. Thus Japanese were
able to consolidate their knowledge about the strategic deployment and maritime
objectives of the US fleet in Pearl Harbor.

c. Japanese Airborne torpedo were equipped with ailerons to enable them to be

used in the shallow depth of Pearl Harbour and fins were fitted to armour piercing
shells to convert them to bombs.

d. Japanese collected the precise grid positions of each and every major
warship located in the Pearl Harbor through the High commission of Japan in
Hawaii. Thus they derived necessary data for carrying out precision and torpedo
bombardment.

e. They selected a bay namely Ariake Bay which had almost similar
characteristics like the Pearl Harbor where they used to practice their typical and
surprise attack methods planned for Pearl Harbor. The officers of the Japanese
Navy were dedicated to their profession and they drove themselves and their men
hard. Training was tough and realistic and loss of life was accepted, as it would be
in war.

12. The Japanese had been rehearsing for the attack on Pearl Harbor in April and May
1941 and thereby assessed their potentiality of carrying out a successful attack. Admiral
Yamamoto ordered the preparation for mobilization of 6 aircraft carriers by June 1941. The
main strike force was planned to consist of Japan’s 6 largest carriers, 2 fast battle ships, 2
cruisers and a number of destroyers and tankers, commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi
Nagumo. The strike force was planned to sail from Home Island by the second week of
November 1941 for the Kuril Islands under complete radio silence.

18
13. Japan had to take a long preparation and practice before carrying out the surprise
attack of very short duration on Pearl Harbor. Japan considered some salient points of
principles of war while planning the attack on Pearl Harbour. Those were:

a. Choice of Target. Japanese chose the Pearl Harbor for destroying

American Pacific Fleet by avoiding encounter with main Pacific Fleet.

b. Flexibility. The attack was planned keeping the flexibility of the task force
to enable easy withdrawal of the force in case of unforeseen eventualities. The
Japanese catered such flexibility anticipating any likelihood of fruitful negotiations or
encounter by US task forces on positive identification of Japanese intentions.

c. Formation of Forces. The Japanese planned concentration of task

force consisting of 6 carriers, 2 battle ships, 3 cruisers, 9 destroyers and 3
submarines in Hitokappu Bay in the Kuril Island. They scheduled the task force to
depart Kuril anchorage by last week of November 1941. The task force was
planned to arrive at the lunching point about 200 miles north of the Hawaiian
Islands exactly by 6 AM on December 07. They planned the positioning of a force of
16 fleet type submarines off Pearl Harbour before the arrival of main task force to
the launching point.

d. Co-ordination. Plan of Pearl Harbour attack was perfectly coordinated

at the planning stage among Vice Admiral Nagumo as the task force commander,
Commodore Minoru Genda as the tactical planner of the attack and Commodore
Mitsuo Fuchida as the actual attack Commander. The coordination involved the
distribution of various types of strike aircraft onboard various carriers.

e. Minimal use of Force. Admiral Yamamoto planned minimal use of force

during the planning stage by considering the unprepared state of US fleet at Pearl
Harbour and also the absence of major elements of US Pacific Fleet from Pearl
Harbour namely 3 Carriers, 1 Battle ship, 13 Cruisers and 29 Destroyers.

f. Morale. The Japanese considered the state of morale of their officers

and men while planning the attack. The comparative statement of the Japanese
Fleet and the Fleet of allied forces present in the Pacific acted as the denominator
of high morale of Japanese officers and men during the planning stage.

g. Security. Japan planned maintenance of the security in the highest order

regarding the movement of her task force. They planned to take a big task force
completely unnoticed by the enemy to a far distant place.

US RESPONSE TOWARDS JAPANESE WAR PREPARATION

14. The attack on Pearl Harbour was on 07 December 1941 but the Washington DC
was first informed on 27 November 1941. In more than 10 months period different
intelligence sources, diplomatic mission and other countries passed several messages to
Washington DC about the attack on Pearl Harbour.

19
15. President Roosevelt provoked the attack, knew about it in advance, and failed to
warn the Hawaiian commanders. Roosevelt needed the attack to declare the war since the
public and congress were against war in Europe. It was his back door to enter the war.

Roosevelt’s Denial to Send Intelligence to Hawaii

16. The US was warned by the governments of Britain, Netherlands, Australia, Peru,
Korea and Soviet Union that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour was coming. Most
Japanese codes were broken. Roosevelt, Marshall and others also knew that the attack
was coming. But they allowed the attack and covered up their knowledge. From following
few indifferent acts of Washington DC it will be clear how Washington denied the
intelligence:

a. In May 1940, Roosevelt ordered the fleet to transfer from the West Coast to
its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet to remain stationed at Pearl
Harbour. Admiral Richardson complained that there was inadequate protection from
air attack and no protection from torpedo attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he
twice disobeyed the orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue
personally with Roosevelt in October 1940. On November British torpedo bombers
launched an attack on Taranto harbour in Italy. This sent worry into United States
government officials who were afraid that the same could happen to Pearl Harbour.
In February 1941 Admiral Richardson was replaced officially by Admiral Kimmel.
Kimmel also brought up the same issues with Roosevelt in 1941. The Chief of
Naval Intelligence Captain Kirt was replaced because he insisted on warning
Hawaii. Moreover it was known to US that a senior Japanese Naval person had
gone to Taranto to collect all secret data on attack.

b. In October 1941, Kilsoo Haan, an agent for the Sino-Korean Peoples league
convinced US Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were planning to attack in
coming December or January. Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and
Navy intelligence personnel.

c. A Dutch Sailor had visually tracked the attack fleet to the Kuril Island in early
November 1941 and this information was passed to Washington DC. But
Washington DC did not give it to Hawaii.

d. On 04 December 1941, US General Thorpe at Java sent four warnings of the

Pearl Harbour attack. But Washington DC ordered him to stop sending warnings.

e. On 07 December at 0930 Aides Mc Crea and Frank Beatty begged the Navy
Chief to send a warning to Hawaii but he did not. At 10 am Roosevelt read the
decoded Japanese diplomatic declaration of war and set the time for declaration of
war to be delivered to the State Department at 1 PM. Marshall made strange delay
and refused to use the phone on his desk, refused to send a warning by fast navy
system. When he was informed it would take 30 to 40 minutes by army radio. But
he had delayed enough so the warning would not reach Pearl Harbour until 1 PM
Washington time the dead line. The warning was in fact sent by commercial without
priority identification and arrived 6 hours late.

17. These are clear indication of denial of intelligence.

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18. Confusing Message. On 27 November 1941 Secretary of War Stimson sent a
confused warning to Hawaii stating that “Hostile action possible". The Army, which could
not do was ordered to but the Navy, which could, was ordered not to. The Army was
ordered on sabotage alert; specifically prevent attention to outside threat. Navy attention
was misdirected from Hawaii. Washington DC repeated it not less than three times as a
direct instruction of the President. One purpose of this message was to misled Hawaii into
believing negotiation were continuing.

19. False information to Hawaii. Mac Arthur's command sent a series of

messages, on 26, 29 November and 02 December to Hawaii lying about the location of
Japanese carrier fleet saying it was in South China Sea. This false information was the
true reason that Hawaii was caught unaware.

20. The issue of whether Washington DC was responsible for Pearl Harbour attack was
decided by two courts of law in 1944. Both the Navy and Army board found Washington
guilty.

21. Most of the military men were Roosevelt’s own choice. Men who only followed the
orders and Roosevelt never delegated the authority.

22. The Washington DC manipulated the war game to grow the public and congress
against the war in Europe and ignored the Japanese preparation for attack till the hour of
bombardment.

LESSONS LEARNT

23. Japanese aim was to destroy the US Pacific Fleet to dominate the Central Pacific
and South East Asia. Actually how far they were successful is subject to debate. However,
analyzing the important aspects of the attack, following lessons can be drawn:

a. The attack was an unimaginable thrust to US, which crippled the US Pacific
Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbour without any resistance. That was a complete
achievement to Japan's desired aim.

b. They did not destroy the oil reservoirs though it was included in their plan.
Why they did not is still a mystery. There was storage of huge quantity of oil, the
destruction of which could have crippled the Pacific Fleet for prolonged time.

c. Japan's primary plan was to destroy the US Aircraft Carriers. At the same
time they wanted to avoid encountering the US main Pacific Fleet consisting of 3
Aircraft Carriers. Finally they bombed on the harbour in absence of the Carriers.
This indicates existence of ambiguity between their plan and execution.

d. Admiral Yamamoto persuaded the attack plan through his personal influence
on higher echelon of the government and against the opinion of Navy's General
Staff. Though it was an instant success but it brought disaster for Japan later on. It
seems that this attack was decided whimsically.

e. Through this attack Japan involved herself in the scenario of global war.

21
f. President Roosevelt and his associates manipulated the sentiment and
opinion of US Congress and general mass towards the war by keeping the nation in
darkness about the actual scenario. For this he did the following indifferent acts:

(1) Ignoring vital intelligence reports.

(2) Sending confusing messages to Hawaii about the attack.
(3) Feeding false information to Hawaii about the location of Japanese
fleet.
(4) Removing senior officials and thereby suppressing expert's opinions.

g. Provoking Japan to attack Pearl Harbour was totally an act of President

Roosevelt himself and few of his associates. It is a clear reflection of conspiracy on
their part.

22
 THE BATTLE OF ATLANTIC

INTRODUCTION

1. The Second World War was the most devastating war in human history in terms of
lives lost and material destruction. It began in 1939 as a European conflict between
Germany and an Anglo-French-Polish coalition but eventually widened to include most of
the nations of the world.

2. In the early morning hours of 01 Sep 39, the German armies marched into Poland.
On 03 Sep, the British and French surprised Hitler by declaring war on Germany. The
Germans hoped to subdue the British by starving them out. In June 1940 they began the
Battle of Atlantic, using submarine warfare to cut the British overseas lifelines. It was a
battle on which the whole outcome of the World War II depended.

3. It was to the Atlantic that ships from the seven seas came, laden with weapons,
munitions, raw materials and fuel. It was in the Atlantic, therefore, that Germany had the
best chance to deliver a mortal blow. Every phase of the war against Germany was
dominated by the necessity to bring Britain's laden ships safely to her port.

4. The Battle of the Atlantic was war under the sea unlike any that ever had been
before - secret, nearly invisible, only faintly heard, and then at second hand, through its
echoes. The Battles of Atlantic was fought in many parts of the huge plains of Atlantic over
an extended period of about 3 years.

AIM

5. The aim of this write-up is to draw a pen picture of the Battle of the Atlantic.

BACKGROUND

German Perception

6. The Germans knew from the very start that the sea borne commerce was vital to
Britain’s survival. German Navy made plans to use battleships and cruisers to sink
merchant ships on the high seas. They also planned to sow the waters around Britain with
deadly mines, and to employ armed merchantmen disguised to look like innocent
freighters to sneak up on unwary ships and sink them.

7. Admiral Donitz, Commander of U boat force had always known that their chief hope
of blockading Britain lay in the U-boats, which could sink the ships that were bringing
supplies and troops across the Atlantic.

8. However, after months of intense debate in 1938, Admiral Raeder, Chief of German
Navy presented two alternative plans to Hitler. The less expensive and more quickly
achievable plan was “Tonnage war” against British shipping by armed merchantmen, U
boats and pocket battleships. The other plan known as the Z-plan - included submarines
only as one part of a balanced force, new aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and
destroyers that could challenge Great Britain's control of the seas.

9. Hitler opted for the plan Z and in January 1939 ordered that top priority be given to
balanced construction. But within nine months, Germany was at war, and Plan Z became

23
one of the first causalities. When the war broke out, Germany had only 46 boats ready for
action in the Atlantic.

British Misjudgments

10. At the outset Britain was ill equipped to fight, even though she was the world's
foremost sea power. Britain's un-preparedness stemmed from a variety of misjudgements.

11. First, there was the widely held view that the Germans would never again resort to
the kind of merciless, unrestricted submarine warfare that had been waged in the First
World War. There were good reasons for this belief. The London Submarine Protocol of
1936, which the Germans had signed, expressly outlawed the sinking of any unescorted
merchant ship without warning.

12. Secondly, the Royal Navy had been more concerned with Germany's emerging
surface fleet than with the potential submarine menace.

13. There was another reason why the Britain did not take the submarine threat more
seriously. It was from an undue reliance on a system called ASDIC. Unfortunately, the
basis on which ASDIC was founded was thoroughly unsound.

BATTLE CHRONOLOGY

The Early Days

14. The Battle of Atlantic officially started on 03 Sep 39, the day Britain declared war on
Germany. However, 10 months passed before the battle became desperate. The early
days of the battle were marked by isolated incidents of U-boat attacks against British
shipping. During this period, the U-boat activities were confined to the coastal waters
around the British Isles, particularly at the western end of the English Channel.

The Raid at Scapa Flow

15. One of the most significant incidents of the early days of the war was the attack by
one German submarine against the British fleet anchored in Scapa Flow in Northern
Scotland. In the early days of the war, Donitz had been formulating the idea of attacking
the British ships in harbour itself. His idea began to take shape when German intelligence
reported the presence of the British fleet at its anchorage at Scapa Flow in the Orkney
Islands. Lt Cdr Gunther Prien, Commanding Officer of U-47, was chosen to execute this
dangerous mission. On the night of 13 Oct 1939, he entered Scapa Flow manoeuvring his
boat past the sunken ships at the entrance of Kirk Sound. Subsequently he sunk battleship
Royal Oak at its anchorage after firing two salvos of torpedo. This daring mission marked
as one of the most significant German victories in the early days of the war.

The First Happy Times (1940)

16. By mid 1940, all ships bound for Britain across the Atlantic were assembled into
convoys. U-boats were not yet ranging across the Atlantic and so the outbound convoys
were dispersed on crossing the 15 degree west meridian and the escorts then met and
escorted the home bound convoys back. The British, limited by the availability of escorts
shifted the dispersal point for ships to seventeenth west meridian. Harassed by the ASDIC

24
and the air patrols by day, the U- boats reverted to their first world war tactics of attack by
night. No wonder this was known as ‘The Happy Times’.

17. The German occupation of France in June 1940 made available a number of bases
on the Atlantic coast in the Bay of Biscay. These reduced distances to their bases,
enabled them to carry out deadly offensive further west into the Atlantic.

18. In October 1940, the convoy 'SC 7' comprising of 35 slow ships escorted by the
Little Sloops set out for Britain. It was sighted by U-48 and then along with other six, she
went for attack and sunken 20 ships and 2 damaged out of 35. But even as the surviving
ships were entering the North Channel another convoy was also suffering a similar fate.
This was the first occasion when tactics involving simultaneous attack by a number of
submarines were employed. It came to be known as ‘Wolf Pack Tactics’. Encouraged by
their success, Admiral Donitz ordered them to be the standard tactics to be used.

19. German surface raiders and aircraft although achieved few successes, they
constituted a permanent threat to the whole convoy and were to tie down British naval
strength. The presence of German battle cruisers in the Atlantic led to complete disruption
of the whole complex cycle of convoys with a serious drop in vital imports to Britain. Thus
the absence of U-boats during the lull caused by the severe winter was offset by the
successes of the German surface warships and the Kondors. In May 1941, the battleship
BISMARCK and PRINCE EUGEN took to the seas. Having sunk the British battle cruiser
HOOD and damaging the battleship PRINCE OF WALES, BISMARCK was sunk by the
British fleet after she was crippled by the aircraft from ARK ROYAL. The German
battleship PRINCE EUGEN returned home without much accomplishment.

The Battle Shifts Westward

20. By March 1941 German submarine concentration was moved to an area south of
Iceland. Despite all out efforts by the U-boats few ships were sunk. The Germans losses
were however mounting. Shaken by the losses, Admiral Donitz ordered the submarines to
shift in a south westerly direction to an area beyond the western limits to which the escorts
based in Britain could go without refueling. The move was at once successful. To counter
this, the British based escort groups in Iceland to provide cover to its convoys up to 35
degree west. Thus the battle spread westward.

21. The lack of success of the submarines in the western approaches during July and
August 1941 led Admiral Donitz to send them once again towards Greenland. A strong
force of 17 boats was deployed in the area. In the battle that heavy casualties were
inflicted on the British merchant fleet with few losses on the German side.

Declaration of War with America - The Second Happy Times

22. Germany declared war against USA on 11 Dec 41 and deployed Wolf Packs to the
North Atlantic. The Americans lost over 492 merchant ships between Jan and Jun 1942.
This, therefore, was the “Second Happy Times” for the U-boats.

23. By July 1942 the Second Happy Time came to an end due to the wide-spread
introduction of escorted convoys, new radar and DF technology by the allies. Thus, the
escorts held the advantage of first sighting, which the U-boats had enjoyed earlier. Another
important development, which could overcome the limitations of ASDIC in the battle was,
the advent of ‘Hedgehog’, which gave escort ships an edge over U-boats.

25
24. In mid 1942, battle had shifted to mid Atlantic. There was no air cover available to
the convoys in this area, which was termed as “the Black Pit”. Admiral Donitz exploited
the gap in the air cover, which extended up to south of Greenland. This gap covered an
area of diameter of 300 nm. To cover this gap very long range MR aircraft were required
but they were not forthcoming. Finally a total of 255 Liberators were employed for escort
duties with the North Atlantic convoy.

25. By then, a majority of convoys ran without losses either because of skilful diversion
by shore command based on intelligence or because of newly acquired capability of
surface escorts to detect, hold down, drive off and perhaps destroy the U-boats.

26. From German point of view merchant ships were being sunk at a rate greater than
their replacement. The allies on the other hand were able to provide improved protection to
convoys and this system was being extended. Thus the battle of mid Atlantic lay in a
balance.

North Atlantic Convoys

27. The use of escort carriers from March 1943 onwards provided continuous direct air
escort and was of inestimable value. The use of HFDF, centimetric Radar and MR aircraft
turned the tide against the U-boats.

28. April and May 1943 were the critical periods during which German U-boats
offensive strength began to diminish. U-boats failed to have successful attacks on convoy
SC-130 and HX-239 for the first time, when favourably placed to do so. Thus German U-
boat campaign began to collapse under the weight of the combined allied effort. Finally on
24 May 1943 Admiral Donitz ordered to withdraw his submarine force from Atlantic.

OUTCOME OF BATTLE

29. Man and Material. In all, the German submarines accounted for the loss of
2603 merchant and 175 naval vessels. Apart from this a total of 2101 allied ships were
sunk by German air craft, surface raider and mines. Out of the 1162 U-boats built, 784
were lost. When the Battle of Atlantic was over, more than 4600 merchant ships totalling
more that 21 million tons was lost. In human terms, the cost to both sides was stupendous.
More than 28,000 German U-boat sailors lost their lives. More than 30,000 men of the
British navy and merchant marine lost their lives with many more thousands of merchant
seamen from other countries.

30. Invention of New Weapon/Technology. During the war some important

technical advances were made in terms of detection equipment and weapons. Those are:

a. New 10 cm radar.
b. High frequency direction finder.
c. New weapon ‘Hedgehog’.

26
 IMPLICATION OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS

31. Adoption of the Strategy of Sea Denial. The Germans correctly adopted the
strategy of sea denial for the weaker German Navy. This strategy was practiced by two
complimentary methods that are the Tonnage Strategy and the Flow Strategy:

a. The Tonnage Strategy. Donitz believed that in order to win the war,
Germany had to sink ships faster than the allies could build them. This was the
tonnage strategy.

b. The Flow Strategy. It was about attacking allied shipping at dispersed

locations thereby increasing the turn round time. This would prevent essential cargo
from reaching in required time.

32. Wolf Pack Tactics. German continued Wolf Pack tactics as long as it was
possible. Despite the limitation of air effort available, Donitz devised this as the best tactics
for his submarine. In the present day, with the availability of MR aircraft and integral helo
with the adversary, this tactics is not feasible.

33. The Hunter Killer Concept. This Allied concept was based on an ASW group
with an escort carrier could maintain control of the sea against the U-boat. This strategy
was a failure as it wasted the scarce assets in searching areas not immediately relevant.
After the losses of ARK ROYAL and COURAGEOUS, the Hunter-Killer concept was
abandoned by the Admiralty. This concept of achieving sea control of an area using escort
carrier group is not feasible today.

34. The Convoy Escort Concept. Despite the initial dilemma of adopting this
concept by both allied powers, it was the main stay of their success in the Battle of
Atlantic. This concept was perfected during this war and still effective today.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Selection and Maintenance of Aim

35. During the Battle of Atlantic, this essential Principle of War was ignored by the
German Navy. Despite being unprepared for the war, the U-boat campaign very nearly
starved Britain into surrender. However, the deployment of U-boats suffered from a clear-
cut aim, which should have been severing the sea-lanes to Britain.

36. In the present day scenario of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that the national
polity and the military leadership are in consonance on the aim and the strategies of war.

Concentration of Force

37. At critical junctures where the Battle of Atlantic would have swung in favour of U-
boats, Hitler ordered their diversion to the Norway and later to the Mediterranean. These
disruptions resulted in dilution of efforts in the Atlantic.

The Principle of Co-operation

38. For German U-boats operation, MR aircraft were not available in sufficient numbers
due to inter service rivalries. Donitz tried to offset this disadvantage by placing his U-boats
27
in a patrol line across the convoy routes but the Ocean is a vast space and the patrol line
could not cover all of it.

39. Incidentally, this malaise also afflicted the RAF in the initial stages of war, wherein
long-range bombers were not spared for convoy escort duties.

40. In future scenario, air-sub co-operation would form a vital link in maritime warfare.

Unity of Command

41. In 1940, U-boat U-47 penetrated the defences of the British Naval Base at Scapa
Flow. Unknown to the U-boat command, the German Naval High Command sailed
warships into North Sea at the same time. This caused the British carriers and the
battleships to sail from Scapa Flow to counter the German surface forces, thereby denying
Gunther Prien of a much more successful sortie. In today’s multi dimensional war, a joint
command or positive jointmanship is mandatory to ensure that the left hand knows what
the right is doing and own forces do not work at cross purposes.

LESSONS OF THE BATTLE OF ATLANTIC

Failure to Learn from the Past

42. The British Government’s failure to learn from history resulted in no Ocean escorts
for convoys being built in the 30s. Even after the WW II broke out, no formal convoying
was resorted to till such time heavy losses forced the Admiralty to form convoys. The
Germans were no better at learning their lessons from Admiral Raeder’s plan for building
aircraft carriers and battleships despite the failure of High Sea fleet and the success of the
U-boat campaign in the previous war.

Leadership

43. On the German side Admiral Donitz failed to influence Hitler’s decision to divert his
U-boat forces to the Norwegian and Mediterranean theatre, despite the unprecedented
success and strategic significance of his Wolf Packs in the Atlantic. On the other hand
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill by his mastery in diplomacy could pursue the USA
to provide US$ 5 billion worth of military hardware to Britain, including 50 destroyers and
14,000 aircraft in exchange of British possessions of West Indies. This huge hardware
supply reinforced the British efforts in convoy escort duties successfully.

Necessity of Aligning National and Maritime Strategy

44. In this battle Britain successfully aligned her national and maritime strategy to keep
SLOC open. However, Hitler failed to appreciate that the centre of gravity for Britain was
her sea routes to her colonies and the USA. If these could be severed, Britain would be
brought to her knees.

Necessity for Integral Air/ Shore air support

45. Atlantic campaign shows that the sinking of allied ships reduced considerably with
the introduction of radar equipped MR aircraft. These Aircrafts forced the U-boats to
remain submerged, thereby decreasing their effectiveness.

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46. Today, with the advent of integral helicopters equipped with radar and dunking
sonar and improvements in shore based MR aircraft, this factor is perhaps even more
applicable for Bangladesh.

Importance of the Geography of a Nation

47. The continental geography of Germany prevented free access of her warships to
the Atlantic to disrupt British SLOCs. This caused the powerful German surface fleet to
remain inactive almost throughout the WW II. The utilization of Germans U-boat base
facilities from the French Atlantic coast dramatically enhanced the operating range of the
German Navy. These results were immediately evident in the Battle of Atlantic.

Need for a Secure Submarine Base

48. The location of the U-boat bases were known to the allies almost since the time
they were constructed. The allied efforts at bombing the U-boat bases were correct as far
as they wanted to destroy the threat at source.

49. In the present day context, with the advent of PGMs and special weapons, these
bases would have been easily destroyed. Thus effective means for passive and active air
defence of these bases are of paramount importance today.

Necessity of Secure Communications

50. The Germans and the allies were able to break into each other’s codes used for
communicating with submarines and ships. Thus the fortunes of the U-boats and the
convoys fluctuated. The allies were also able to locate the Wolf Packs and take effective
measures.

51. It is therefore necessary that our forces should have secured communications,
which do not reveal its position.

29
 BATTLE OF MIDWAY

INTRODUCTION

1. The Battle of Midway is widely regarded as the most important naval battle of the
Pacific Campaign of World War II. It was fought between 04 - 07 June 1942.The US Navy
under the leadership of Admiral Nimitz, defeated an Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) attack,
under leadership of Admiral Yamamoto, against Midway Atoll (located in north pacific near
the NW end of Hawaiian archipelago), inflicting irreparable damage on the Japanese fleet.
Military historian John Keegan has called it "the most stunning and decisive blow in the
history of naval warfare." The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor,
aimed to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the Pacific, thereby giving
Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The
Japanese hoped that another demoralizing defeat would force the US to capitulate in the
Pacific War. The Japanese plan was to lure the United States' few remaining aircraft
carriers into a trap. The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway Atoll as part of an
overall plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle Raid. This
operation was considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa.

LOCATION AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF MIDWAY

2. Midway is an integral territory of the United States in the central Pacific Ocean. The
tiny Coral atoll is located about 1,150 miles west of Pearl harbour, 1,300 miles west of
Hawaii and 2,500 miles east of Tokyo. It consists of 2 islands named Eastern (Green) and
Sand Island with a circumference of 15 miles, but the area of the main islands is 2 square
miles. The climate of the island is subtropical. It was under the US possession since 1859.
In 1903, President Roosevelt placed the islands under the control of American Navy.

Strategic Importance of Japan

3. By virtue of its geographical location, the Midway possessed very significant

strategic importance to dominate the Northern Pacific Ocean. Thus, to control the total sea
boundaries from Aleutian to South East Asia, Japan was interested for this island. After
two consecutive successes over battle of Pearl harbour and Coral Sea, capturing of
Midway Islands became very vital issue to Japan. Capturing these two islands could be
used by the Japanese as a launching pad to facilitate their aggression further to Hawaiian
Islands and gain complete control of the Pacific by pushing away the Americans to the
coast of California. They could also use it as a forward Naval and Air base or for other
administrative purposes. Moreover, capturing of both Midway and Hawaiian Islands could
cut-off the sea lines of communication between the US - Australia and also the US - south
east Asia, which indeed could allow the Japanese to extend its sea dominating boundary
to furthest of Pacific.

Strategic Importance of the United States

4. For the same dominating purpose in the Pacific Ocean and to inter link the United
States with other Australasian countries, it was obligatory for the American to possess the
Midway Islands. The geographical position of these islands gave extra facilities to control
the surrounded regions of the Pacific.

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5. Since 1903, the Midway was a dominant US Naval Base in the Pacific at a close
distance from Hawaiian Islands. It was a station of Hawaii-Luzon submarine cable. From
1936, it became vital for transpacific aviation, refueling of American carriers, submarines,
and aircraft. American made it for huge ammunition dumps, seaplane hanger, military
airport and other military stores. Moreover, all military reinforcement and replenishment to
the US campaign in the east and Southeast Asia was transported through this sea route.
To keep American domination intact over Pacific, the Possession of Midway was essential
for the US, as it was an important naval base close to Japan and other Australasian
countries.

War Strategy of Japanese and the US Forces

6. Japanese Strategy. Being superior force the Japanese adopted strategy of a

decisive battle. The ultimate aim of which was to seize the Midway Island. Their furthest
aim was to drive away the American forces from the Southeast Asian countries and Pacific
Ocean to gain complete command of the sea. Yamamoto’s overall plan was closely similar
to the Japanese traditional Samurai Warrior attack where feints and surprise was the
vitality and diversionary tactics was the spindle.

7. US Strategy. The American took totally defensive strategy after the Battle of
Pearl harbour, where the Japanese heavily damaged the port's ships and various
installations. The most plus point of American high command was, by the help of their
intelligence, they could break out the Japanese secret naval codes. Thus Admiral Nimitz
was able to get the correct information about detail plan of each and every movement of
the Japanese forces. In comparison to the Japanese forces the Americans were inferior
both in terms of quality and quantity. Thus it was very essential to achieve surprise, since
a head-on tactics could only end the battle in disaster.

Tactical Deployment of Japanese & the US Forces

8. Japanese Forces. Japanese wanted an early warning of threatened naval attack

on homeland. They also required a base for a raid to American pacific base at Pearl
Harbour and obtain sufficient capability to provide fuel to operational ships. Admiral
Yamamoto was thinking that YORKTOWN was severely damaged during Pearl harbour
attack. So, she would not be available at Midway Battle. ENTERPRISE & HORNET and
other forces were still in the south sea (Coral Sea) would be unable to reach Midway
before 07 June. Yamamoto also knew that American Hawaii based forces were still
potentially strong and burning for revenges. Considering all points, Yamamoto decided to
deploy his forces in five groups. With that Yamamoto was expecting no challenge from the
enemy and rather planned to surprise attack on the Midway. The plans were narrated
below:

a. Northern Force. It was assigned under the leadership of Admiral

Hosogaya to attack Aleutian Islands to deceive Americans from midway. The
force consisted of two carriers, six cruisers, twelve Destroyers and the troop
transport of the Occupation force.

b. Mobile Task Force. Mobile Task Force was in between Northern and
Carrier Striking Force to re-enforce these two where necessary.

c. Carrier Striking Force. Carrier Striking Force was assigned to attack on

Midway under Admiral Chinchu Nagumo, Cdr of Japan’s First Air Fleet. This

31
 comprised the carriers AKAGI, HIRYU, KAGA and SORYU backed by four Cruisers
and twelve Destroyers.

d. Main Body. The Main Body under the leadership of Admiral Yamamoto was
planned to stay 300 miles behind the striking force to destroy any incoming enemy
forces on the way to Midway.

e. Invasion Force. Invasion group of submarine was planned to deploy in

between midway and Hawaii to provide blockade and early warning about the
movement of American forces stationed at Pearl harbour and to deal with them.

9. The US Forces. Admiral Nimitz, Commander in chief the US Pacific Fleet had
spent enough time to review the situation in his Pearl harbour office. He was thinking the
grim litany of pearl harbour, Guam, Wake, the Philippines, Java Sea and the Indian
Ocean. Only consoling thought was broken of Japanese diplomatic code as early as 1940
and naval code partially through radio monitoring and dogged effort by the combat
intelligence unit at Pearl harbour, under Commodore Joseph Rochefort. By mid-may,
intelligence revealed that three Japanese Fleets would attack on Midway on 05 June.
Intelligence also knew that a diversionary strike would be launched at the Aleutians.

a. ENTERPRISE and HORNET was ready for action but urgency arose to
repair damaged YORKTOWN within short period. Nimitz knew that Aircraft carrier is
a means of checkmating the enemy at Midway. When she arrived Dockyard on 27
may, it was estimated to repair damages in between two weeks to three months
much too late for the battle. But Nimitz would not give up Yorktown without a fight.
No sooner had the carrier settle in the dry dock than she nearly disappeared under
a swarm of electricians, machinists, and welders. Surprisingly, 1400 skilled worker
made her ready within only 48 hours.

b. Nimitz called for final briefing with his two carrier fleet commanders. Rear
Admiral Raymond would command Task Force-16 with Hornet and Enterprise and
Rear Admiral Fletcher Task Force-17 from Yorktown. As per the Nimitz plan, the
Task Force-16 left the next day and Fletcher to follow as soon as YORKTOWN was
operational. They were to RV about 325 miles northeast of Midway beyond the
aerial search range of Japanese forces. They were to wait for Midway’s land-based
longer-range patrol aircraft to locate the Japanese striking force for them. They
would then attack the striking forces one by one at the most opportune moment.
Because it was essential to achieve surprise since a head-on battle could only end
in disaster.

BATTLE ANALYSIS

Application of Principal of War

10. The battle of Midway can be analyzed in light of principal of war, which have stood
the test of time and marked the success of Commanders in past war. The principals of
those were observed in the battle of Midway appended below:

a. Selection and maintenance of Aim. The Japanese had aimed to capture

the Midway Island, but complicated diversionary groups changes the situations. The
US fleet had clear aim to defend Midway.

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 b. Maintenance of Morale. Japanese morale were low due to exclusion of
two carriers SHOHAKU and ZUIKAKU, the damage of those could not repair of
Coral Sea battle due to speedy execution. Unexpected absence of two
commodores of Air operation fleet due to sickness, also effect on the morale of the
Japanese forces. On the other hand, Breaking of Japanese Naval code enhanced
the morale of the US forces which gave them tactical advantage.

c. Offensive Action. Japanese had the right strategy of decisive battle, as

they were superior. But they could not derive any benefit out of it because of over
confidence, lack of intelligence and foresightedness. But the American maintained
tactically offensive till the last.

d. Security. The US broke the Japanese Naval code and Japan lost the
breach of security of their most secret tactical plan. But American security system
was too secured to decode by the rival Japanese.

e. Surprise. Yamamoto followed the traditional Samurai tactics where

surprise was the essence of victory, but they could not safeguard the breach of
information and could not achieve surprise. Deception is an element of surprise,
which was perfectly achieved by the Americans.

f. Economy of Effort. Nimitz properly utilize his lesser forces and did not spare
any forces to counter the Japanese diversionary group. Japanese used much force
but could not use the principal of War effectively.

g. Flexibility. The Japanese did not have the flexibility through the operation
but the US had flexibility in every operations.

h. Co-operation. The US forces co-operated properly. American

Marin corps aircraft participated the battle and operated jointly with Midway forces.
Japanese groups did not have any communication and did not pass information to
Striking forces about American detection.

j. Administration. The US carriers YORKTWON was badly damaged and

made repaired with in only three days through sound Administration, which was
totally unexpected to Japanese forces.

k. Concentration of Forces. The US concentrated their maximum forces for

safe guarding Midway. Whereas Japanese diverted the major portion of their force
toward Aleutian Islands, thereby weakening their forces for the major offensive
actions to achieve the aim.

Leadership Analysis

11. Leaders play the game of the war and their leadership sees the end either by win or
by defeat. Hence, in the perspective of Battle of Midway, reflection on Japanese as well as
American Leadership of every individual leader who were engaged in the battle needs a
careful to study see into their leadership. So, an assessment of those great leaders is
therefore made hereunder for comprehension.

a. Admiral Nimitz. Admiral Nimitz was a leader of intelligence coupled with

foresightedness, patience and free of emotion. Having a great thrust in the Coral

33
 Sea with severe damage of his fleet, he very prudently adopted the plan with
Admiral Fletcher and Raymond to head for Midway to counter the Japanese fleet
from a distant hideout which was out of the aerial search of his enemy. Here he
used foresightedness backed up by strong intelligence. In fact, out of such plan for
heading to Midway, he reflected his latent determination to hit the Japanese in an
opportune moment and defeat them to govern the Pacific region.

b. Rear Admiral Fletcher. Admiral Fletcher was very keen and displayed his
high level of foresightedness and dynamism to attack the Japanese force. He was
almost certain of his success of his policy to fight out the enemy incomparably
superior to them from a hideout. It is to say from the panorama of the battle that
Fletcher was really very courageous and decisive too to beat his enemy as per his
plan. Fletcher with a very cool headed judgment and beyond any hesitation
engaged his enemy according to his plan and succeeded the mission.

c. Admiral Yamamato. The most courageous, bold and decisive leader

was admiral Yamamato. He used to lead a war with aggressive skill and
determination. He as a leader always prefers surprise attack and deception upon
the enemy. In his usual manner he also adopted the same strategy to occupy the
Midway Island. But he could not know that his plan of occupying the Midway Island
was in the hands of the enemy. Ultimately, he proved himself to be the most
passionate and emotional leader without prudence and foresight in the Midway. It
was so reflected in his military character that he was dominated by his
overwhelmingly superiority complex over his enemy due to his strong military
capability. He could not simply appreciate the enemy’s latent power and he should
have had an alternative to counter any unprecedented attack from the enemy. In
fact, his imprudence, over confidence and planning to head for the Midway Island
without understanding the enemy, proved him to be the most ineffective leader in
the battle. In the perspective of the battle of Midway, it is to say that the imprudent
leadership of Yamamato caused Japanese to lose mastery over the Pacific.

d. Admiral Nagumu. As like as a brave warrior, Admiral Nagumu also had no

exception to it. His courage, boldness and single-minded devotion to fight the war at
the exchange of his life gave him this name and fame in the Second World War. But
notwithstanding all that he showed himself as a leader of failure in the Midway
scenario. He was strongly rigid in his decision and did not care for the advice of his
subordinate Admiral Yamaguchi of reserving a standby aircraft to face any
unexpected attack from the enemy. For this, he had to sustain a total destruction of
his fleet. At last he also embraced his end of life out of pangs of his poor leadership
in the Midway.

Total Loss

12. Japan suffered heavy loss with its Air striking power badly crippled in the battle.
Japan lost four heavy Carriers, a heavy Cruiser, and 322 Aircraft including many
experienced Pilots and 3,500 men against one US Carrier, one Destroyer and 150 Aircraft
including many Pilots and only 307 men.

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 LESSONS LEARNT

13. As far as war studies are concerned, it is mentionable that the strategy as well as
the battle scenario of Midway reflects a significant lesson for officers of BN. However,
following lesson can be derived from the battle of Midway:

a. Only the possession of superior force and modern war material cannot have
supremacy over the enemy.

b. Over confidence and undermining the enemy may cause a severe defeat in
the war.

c. Nowadays in the high tech modern warfare, intelligence plays a vital role in
succeeding the war.

d. Security of information of a force has to be maintained at any cost. Breach of

security of information may cause a defeat in a war as happened to the Japan.

e. Offensive action is not the only way to head for a decisive battle.

f. Though the fleet-in-being strategy is designed for the weaker forces, but this
may give a chance to launch an offensive attack on the enemy in an opportune
moment.

g. The weaker force may go for surprise attack in a deception manner.

h. Timely action is a must to achieve the mission in the war.

j. A weaker force may also win a war over a superior force by virtue of ideal
leadership of a warrior.

14. Lessons for Bangladesh Navy. Battle of Midway leaves a significant

lesson for a naval force of a third world country like Bangladesh. The US forces own the
battle with lesser forces and fighting capabilities. They planned the war with utmost
sincerity and proper implementation of tactics, intelligence, admin and co-operation. Being
inferior maritime country, Bangladesh may keep a note for determining its Maritime
Strategy.

35
 NORMANDY LANDINGS AND THE CONQUEST OF FRANCE
INTRODUCTION

1. The Normandy landings were the landing operations of the Allied invasion of
Normandy, also known as Operation Overlord and Operation Neptune, during World
War II. The landings commenced on Tuesday, 06 June 1944 (D-Day). The assault was
conducted in two phases: an air assault landing of 24,000 British, American, Canadian and
Free French airborne troops, and an amphibious landing of Allied infantry and armoured
divisions on the coast of France. There were also decoy operations mounted under the
code names Operation Glimmer and Operation Taxable to distract the German forces from
the real landing areas. The operation was the largest amphibious invasion of all time, with
over 160,000 troops landing on 06 June 1944. 195,700 Allied naval and merchant navy
personnel in over 5,000 ships were involved. The invasion required the transport of
soldiers and material from the UK by troop-laden aircraft and ships, the assault landings,
air support, naval interdiction of the English Channel and naval fire-support. The landings
took place along a 50-mile stretch of the Normandy coast divided into five sectors: Utah,
Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword.

BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2. In the initial stages of World War II, Hitler’s army launched a Blitzkrieg and
conquered almost complete Europe. The axis powers comprising Italy and Germany
dominated from Norway to North Africa. On 22 June 1941 the Hitler’s forces smashed
across the Russian frontier. But this was to prove as one of his strategic mistakes. Soon
the German invasion was halted by the Russian counter offensives. After pearl harbour,
the Americans also joined in the war. By this time Germany was fully committed on
Eastern front, yet German army still controlled almost entire main land Europe. Through
the summer of 1943 the Russians started pushing back the Germans. The Russians kept
calling allies to open a second front against Germany in the west but that could not
materialise.

3. In 1944, the German war machine was still reckonable despite many setbacks on
the Eastern Front. What it lacked in air power and materials, it made up for battle
hardened manpower. Also its armour, heavy infantry weapons and anti-tank capabilities
were years ahead of the Americans and British. But the Allies controlled the air, sea and
what they lacked in quality, they hoped to make up for in quantity. By June of 1944, the
stage was set to open a second front on the French Coast and mount an amphibious
assault from the shores of Britain to regain control over France and subsequently over
entire Europe. The operation was code named as OVERLORD. The naval component of
Overlord was named as OPERATION NEPTUNE.

4. Before having the review of the strategic setting, it would be appropriate to discuss
the opposing command structure.

ALLIED AND GERMAN COMMAND STRUCTURES

Allied Command Structure

5. General Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander. Air Chief Marshall
Tedder was Deputy Supreme Commander. Naval and air forces were commanded by
36
Admiral Ramsay and Air Marshal Mallory respectively. The duties of Ground Commander
were entrusted in General Montgomery.

German Command Structure

6. Opposing the Allied Commander on the German side was Field Marshal Rundsted
as Commander-in Chief West working under the supreme command of Hitler. He was
responsible to Hitler for the defence of entire western front in occupied France. Under him,
there was Field Martial Rommel who was responsible to Rundsted for the defence of North
West France. Field Marshal Rommel was additionally made responsible by Hitler for entire
beach defences of the European continent and thus also worked directly under Hitler at
the same time.

Selection of Assault Area - Normandy

7. For this purpose allied had identified six possible sites. These included the North
Sea coast of Holland and Belgium; the Pas de Calais shore; the mouth of Seine near Le
Havre; Normandy coast, the Brittany peninsula and lastly the Biscay coast. Holland,
Belgium, Brittany peninsula and Biscay coast were discarded from the outset considering
the short range of British fighters and long sea voyages of naval forces. Pas de Calais
offered the shortest distance of 20 miles across the British Channel. Logistic support and
air cover could be easily provided. Its beaches had suitable capacity. The Germans were
also aware of these advantages and therefore concentrated their defences in the area.
This would mean heavy resistance and loss of surprise for allies and was therefore
discarded. Seine, being in close vicinity met same fate. This left Normandy as the only
choice. The attributes of Normandy can be summarised as:

a. Adequate stretches of sandy beach.

b. Open landing shore with minimum of enemy’s land defences.
c. Availability of port of Cherbourg.
d. Gradual beach gradient.
e. Average Tidal range.

8. While the allies were finalising the choice of an invasion beach, the German high
command was still unclear regarding where and when would the invasion come?

PHASES OF WAR

The Attack Plan

9. Besides the material preparations to mount the largest amphibious operation in

history, the overall attack plan was also being finalised. The plan envisaged:

a. Amphibious landings on Normandy coast in June 1944.

b. To invade on a five division front with two divisions in immediate follow up.
c. At least two airborne divisions were to be dropped before the actual
seaborne assault.
d. The assault would be on a fifty-mile front.
e. The invasion front was divided into five sectors named as Sword, Juno, Gold,
Omaha and Utah.

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The Deception Plan – Operation Bodyguard

10. To conceal the actual attack plan, extensive efforts under operation Bodyguard
were made to deceive German intelligence regarding the original landing site. Besides
other activities, a fake US 1st Army Group was raised on English soil just across Pas de
Calais to deceive Germans that actual invasion shall be mounted on Calais. Dummy Radio
traffic was generated, plywood and canvas installations were constructed, inflatable tanks
and vehicles were used extensively. In addition, on the night of the invasion, airborne
deception presented a "phantom" picture of an invasion fleet to German radar stations in
Calais, while radar jamming disguised the transit of real convoy to Normandy.

Rehearsals

11. To ensure smooth conduct of operations, extensive rehearsals were conducted. In

order to make these exercises more realistic, live ammunitions was also used sometimes.
In one of the exercises, allied forces also came under German attack resulting in death of
about 1000 soldiers.

Selection of D - Day and H - Hour

12. The choice of H-Hour was linked to sun rise, as a short period of daylight before H-
Hour was necessary for navigation of small landing craft and accurate aerial
bombardment. As regards the tide, the army wished to make the landings within an hour of
high water in order to reduce the time required for troops to cross the exposed patches.
The Navy on the contrary argued for a low water landing so that craft could ground outside
the beach obstacles and land demolition teams to clear them before the tide rose. A late
rising moon was also a consideration to facilitate the Para drops which were planned well
before H-Hour.

13. 05 June 1944 was the first day which fulfilled all desired conditions and was
provisionally fixed as D-Day. However due to inclement weather, the operation was
postponed by 24 hours and the D-day was finally fixed as 06 June 1944.

The Operation Commences

14. An armada of about 3,000 landing craft, 2,500 other ships, and 500 naval vessels
comprising escorts and bombardment ships began to leave English ports. On the night
between 05 and 06 June, 822 aircraft, carrying parachutists or towing gliders, roared
overhead Normandy landing zones. They were a fraction of the air effort of 14,000 aircraft
that would support D-Day.

15. The allied forces after sailing from various British ports proceeded towards the
assigned amphibious objective area. US amphibious forces were allocated western
beaches of Omaha and Utah whereas British and Canadian forces were designated
Sword, Juno and Gold. US 82nd and 101st airborne divisions were dropped behind
western sectors whereas British 6th airborne division was dropped behind eastern sector.
The invasion fell on the area of responsibility of German 7th army. The notable German
division in the area was 21st panzer division which was to play a key role later.

38
The German Response

16. The German high command was initially slow to respond. The Rommel had gone
home on leave. Hitler released 21st Panzer Division very late which drove into the gap
between the British 3rd and Canadian 3rd divisions and almost reached the sea. Had they
done so, the landings might have failed. Fierce resistance by British antitank gunners
turned the tide in late evening. No German counter air attacks took place. The Eastern
Task Force was however attacked by three German Torpedo boats in which one
Norwegian destroyer was sunk.

Causalities

17. The breakdown of casualties that both the belligerents suffered is as follows:

a. German 2,40,000

b. American 1,26,000

b. British
84,000
d. Canadian

ANALYSIS

18. Normandy Landing due to its significant importance became a legend in the history
of warfare. In profession of arms, detailed analysis is necessary to learn lessons from
history with a view not to repeat them in future. The analysis of Normandy Landing is
discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.

German Side Review

19. Command and Control. There was a critical flaw in the German Command and
control structure. The Hitler being the political head of state had also donned the mantles
of war minister and the Commander In Chief. He believed that he alone could master mind
all plans and execute them to achieve this objective. This interference made the German
Generals feel deprived of their rightful authority. Even, Rundstedt, who was Commander-
in-Chief West, is said to have told his interrogator after the war "as Commander-in-Chief
West my only authority was to change the guard in front of my gate".

20. State of German Armies. Several German infantry divisions were

inexperienced and contained lower quality young troops, older men and prisoners from the
Russian front. Their capabilities and stamina had also been stretched due to prolonged
battles. The overtaxed German armies had started showing signs of fatigue and
frustration. There were material, fuel and mobile transport shortages and armies were
relying on heavy use of horse and train.

21. Imbalance in Armed Forces. There was an imbalance in German armed

forces. Both German Navy and Air force were almost rendered ineffective by sustained
allied campaign. Therefore joint operations could not be conducted.

39
22. Poor Intelligence Network. German intelligence failed miserably in predicting
time of invasion or landing site. The success of allied propaganda machinery made the
Germans believe in allied deception plans.

23. Varying German Perceptions. Strong differences of opinion among the Germans
leadership regarding the allied plans and the counter strategy resulted in a delayed
German reaction. Hitler, Rundstedt and Rommel had different perceptions which curtailed
effective utilisation of German defences to stop invasion.

Allied Side Review

24. A Central and Unified Command. The key to allied victory was a central and
unified Command independent to take tactical decisions. A central command headquarters
ensured detailed operational planning. Division of operational responsibilities was clearly
defined and inter services or country rivalries had been eliminated through intelligent
staffing.

25. Success of Deception Plans. Sun Tzou said, “All form of warfare is based upon
deception”. The deception plans of the allies contributed significantly to their success.
Operation Bodyguard proved to be a tremendous success and allowed a complete
psychological surprise over the Germans. The plan was so thorough that it took Hitler and
Rundstedt 10 days to react in a determined way.

26. Effective Intelligence. An effective use of intelligence network by allies

provided them with max possible information regarding the German intentions and
deployment plans. However, a minor lapse to detect deployment of German 352 Div
caused major casualties at Omaha.

27. Use of Technology. Unique technical innovations were made by the allies in
the shape of pre fabricated harbours and pipeline under the Ocean. The Germans also
used innovative beach defences in shape of Atlantic Wall.

Analysis In Light of Principles of War

28. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. In June 1940, when 3,30,000 British troops
were evacuated from Dunkirk and the battle for France was almost lost, Sir Winston
Churchill is said to have remarked, “ Britain will fight on…if necessary for years… if
necessary alone … We shall go back.’ This reflects the doubtless determination of one of
the allied leaders and the singularity of aim to retake the continent of Europe. There was
absolutely no shadow of compromise. This aim was accepted by all the participants and
maintained till the final victory. The Hitler on the other hand resorted to expansion of
German empire and could not put a limit to his aim. As a result, maintenance of aim was
not possible. At lower level, the German command had differences in opinion on the
methods of approach to defeat the invasion. Fighting simultaneously on two fronts,
German forces were frustrated due to prolongation of the war without any aim.

29. Maintenance of Morale. A strong determination was displayed by the

allied command. The allies were confident about the success of their war machine as the
tide of axis powers was turning. This contributed in maintaining their morale. On the other
hand, the centralisation of powers in the hands of Hitler resulted in dissatisfaction among
senior officers which contributed immensely in lowering the morale of German troops.

40
30. Offensive Action. The allies resorted to offensive action in Normandy.
They mustered the courage, will and determination to carry the war into captured territory.
The entire Allied planning was based on offensive action even at the preparatory stage.
The Germans had long since lost the initiative and were waiting passively for the Allies.
However Germans also launched an offensive action in the operation ‘Luttich’, which failed
due to allied intelligence.

31. Security. The principle of security was successfully adopted by Allies. Elaborate
precautions were taken to maintain secrecy and access to large areas of Britain was
severely restricted. The highest security classification was code named ‘Bigot’. The papers
bearing this classification could be seen by a few people who had been positively vetted
and cleared. Therefore, Germans could not get a clear picture of allied intentions. The
Germans had to suffer extensive damage caused by constant bombardment due to their
failure in safe guarding security of information.

32. Surprise. It is said that surprise is half the battle and a major force multiplier.
The greatest achievement of allies was made possible due to the element of surprise by
striking where the enemy was least expecting. The Allies deception plan was realistic. On
the D-day, the entire German command was convinced that landings at Normandy were
probably a feint. Therefore they were caught off guard when the invasion came.

33. Concentration of Force. Effective concentration of forces in critical time

and space is considered an essential for success in any war. The allies concentrated
thousands of ships and aircraft in Britain with a specific purpose of invading occupied
France. The already depleting German forces had a long coastline to defend. Their forces
were spread all along the coastline. Their failure to predict the landing site and time due to
successful allied deception did not allow them to concentrate their forces to thwart the
allied assault.

34. Economy of Effort. The economy of effort principle was exercised by allies
to a certain degree by undertaking extensive cost effective deception measures to
minimise the extent of German opposition and the resulting damage. Thus allies sustained
minimum damage in the landing phase as a result of enemy action. Whereas the Germans
also utilised this principle by making Atlantic wall so that maximum defence can be
ensured utilising cost effective measures.

35. Cooperation. A high standard of cooperation was displayed by allies.

Operations of a large force were coordinated without any major incident.

36. Administration. The administration and logistics played a vital role towards
success of this tremendous operation. Considering the gigantic scale of forces involved, a
very high level of co-ordination was exercised. Safe transportation, timely positioning and
provisioning of men, vehicles, stores and supplies across the English Channel was
ensured. The German supply and logistic system had been paralysed by constant Allied
bombing.

LESSONS LEARNT

37. Surprise and Deception. The Normandy once again demonstrated that the
core principle of Surprise can be instrumental in achievement of victory.

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38. Importance of Integration in Joint/Combined Operations. The importance
of integration in combined/joint operations needs no emphasis. The allied ensured
seamless integration of all land, air and sea forces of many countries for the assault,
whereas German defences were entrusted to land forces only. This is even more relevant
in today’s scenario when a single service cannot achieve the aim while acting in isolation.

39. Strengthening Maritime Power. The importance of a strong maritime power

was amply demonstrated during this operation. Despite crippling the German might
through strategic bombing, it was only the maritime power which exploited the access
through sea to land forces on the continent.

40. Balanced Naval Force. A country’s armed services need to be balanced. It is

said that a chain is only as strong as the weakest link it contains. Weakness of a particular
service in Joint Operations cannot be compensated by the strength of the other services.

41. Security of Information. ‘He who guards his secrets attains his goals’. Extra
emphasis needs to be laid on security aspects in all matters of national defence.

42. Logistics. Logistics being the lifeline of any combat operation is vital for combat
and needs meticulous planning down to the grass root level.

RECOMMENDATIONS

43. In light of the study of Normandy landing and keeping in view the present scenario,
following is recommended:

a. Inter services coordination is of paramount importance, therefore focused

attention is required on joint operations, planning and training.
b. Intelligence network should be further strengthened and personnel should be
trained to make use of modern techniques.
c. There should be an endeavour to attain maximum achievable surprise and
deception in every operation and plan.
d. Increased emphasis on security aspect needs to be laid with special
attention to security of information keeping in view the technological advancements.
e. The delegation of authority must be exercised and decision making should
never rest with a single person.
f. All plans and operations should be realistic and most importantly, achievable.

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 KOREAN WAR/ INCHON LANDING

INTRODUCTION

1. The end of World War II gave birth to the war of ideologies between the capitalists
and communists. Division of Korea into North and South and the ensuing struggle of
Korean people is a typical example in which a country was torn apart by the two super
powers.

2. Historically the Navy has played a decisive role in the outcome of many wars.
Amphibious Landing at Inchon is a typical example which turned the entire course of the
Korea War fought from June 1950 to July 1953. It began as a war between North and
South after the North's invasion of the South. The conflict swiftly developed into a limited
international war involving the United States and 19 other nations. Inchon landing presents
a typical example of successful implementation of Principles of War which lead to dramatic
recovery of Allied Forces. This write up will present the Korean War with special emphasis
on Inchon landing.

GEOGRAPHY AND TOPOGRAPHY OF KOREA

3. The Korean peninsula is located in the East Asia. North Korea is surrounded by two
traditional foes; China on North, Japan on the East across the Sea of Japan. While on the
North East there is Russia and on West the Yellow Sea. The peninsula has 9 rivers out of
which 3 are important. The major areas which staged different important events of the war
includes, Wolmi-do, Inchon, Kimpo airfield, Seoul, Pyongyang, Pusan Perimeter, and
Kunsan. North Korea is extremely mountainous and has deep, narrow valleys extending
across the country in a generally northeast to southwest direction. Whereas the South
Korea has a rugged, mountainous terrain extending in a generally north–south direction
parallel to the East Coast. Plains are concentrated in the west along the coast and
constitute less than one-fifth of the total area.

4. Due to long shoreline of over 5500 miles sea communication is very important. The
eastern coast due to mountainous terrain provides very few ports of any importance, while
the western and southern parts of the country houses major harbors like Pusan, Inchon,
Chinnampo and Kunsan.

5. For the land communication there is one main railway line running north to south
connecting Pyongyong, Seoul, and Pusan. The road conditions were not good. The
condition of roads in the north was slightly better than the south, but generally roads were
not fit for a sustained military operation. One major road linked Sinuiji to Pusan over a
distance of 600 miles and another major road linked Chongjin and Makpo.

6. The weather is hot during the summer and extremely cold during winter season
when cold wind blows and brings the temperature below the freezing point. This makes
mechanised operation very difficult if not impossible.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

7. Traditionally the peninsula had always been a bone of contention between the three
regional powers i.e. China, Japan and Russia. As for Japan it offered easy access to
China and for Russia warm water ports of commercial interests. China being the only
traditional friend had always influenced the Korean society by the philosophical thoughts of
Sun Tzu a famous Chinese philosopher.
43
8. Historically, Mongols, Japanese, Americans and the French had invaded the
Peninsula but none had been able to colonise it. In 1905 Russo-Japanese War of
Tsushima resulted in the defeat of Russia who recognised Korea as Japanese sphere of
influence by signing the Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan then formally colonised Korea by
establishing the Protectorate Treaty in 1905. Japanese rule remained till the end of World
War II.

PREAMBLE OF THE WAR

9. The surrender of Japan was inevitable after the United States dropped the second
atom bomb in August of 1945. Stalin was just waiting for such an opportunity where the
Soviets could enter the war against Japan while incurring minimal loss, and so he declared
war against Japan. The Soviet military forces swept through Manchuria and North Korea,
taking over Japanese control over these provinces. The Americans reacted swiftly after
realising the potential danger of having the strategic peninsula fall under the control of
communist forces. United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
agreed to divide Korea at the 38th parallel for the purpose of accepting the surrender of
Japanese troops. President Truman proposed Stalin a joint occupation of Korea by the two
powers where the Soviets would occupy the territory north of the 38 parallel, while the US
would control the area south of the line. Both super powers wanted to establish a stable
and unified Korea in order to withdraw their military forces from the area. However, neither
the Soviet Union nor the US wanted the peninsula to fall into the other's hand. They rather
wanted to leave behind a nation that was favourable to either ideology. So the roots of
division were laid from the very onset of Korea's liberation.

10. Communist elements in the north were present during the Japanese colonial period,
but with the north now under Soviet tutelage the leftist factions were able to seize power.
During the period of civil turmoil of 1945 - 1946, the Soviets helped establish Kim IL Sung,
an anti-Japanese Communist, against the moderates as the leading political figure in the
north. While in the South America General Hodge supported Syngman Rhee, a strong anti
communist nationalist who had lived in exile in the United States during the Japanese rule.
His dogmatic advocacy for Korea's full independence often caused friction between him
and US officials. By 1947 Syngman Rhee positioned himself as the dominant political
leader in South Korea.

11. Although two different provisional governments had emerged in Korea by 1947, the
fact that they were still only provisional gave the Korean people hope for a possible
unification and the nationalists from both the North and South continued their efforts for a
unification treaty.

12. After the failure of talks between US and USSR in 1946-1947 US pressured the
United Nations to allow for a general election in South Korea, to establish some sort of
legitimate government, while the Soviets refused to allow the same in North. Thus, in May
1948 South Korea held its first general elections leading to the creation of Republic of
Korea (ROK). The elections were heavily protested by Korean leftists who feared that
these elections would kill all chances for unification. A month after, the north followed with
similar actions and Kim IL Sung was declared president of the new Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPKR) which was immediately recognised by the Soviet Union and
other communist countries as the legitimate government.

44
13. The elections and the division of Korea set the stage for a civil war. By 1950, both
North and South sensed that war was inevitable. Syngman Rhea and Kim Il Sung declared
on several occasions that military force would be necessary to unify Korea. North Korean
military had a clear advantage over the South in terms of number of troops, experience of
Chinese Civil War and limited military industrial set up. North also enjoyed the support of
the Chinese Military. Therefore North had all the temptations for crossing the boundaries
to make a much-awaited dream come true.

THE WAR

14. The North Korean aim was to militarily re-unite the Korean peninsula. While the
initial Allied aim was to liberate the South Korea. On 25th of June 1950 the North Korean
forces crossed the 38th parallel and attacked South Korea. In a matter of days the southern
army along with a few US troops were steadily pushed south. Since the lines of
communications of the northern army started to extend a bit too much on a very broad
front and without much strengthening, the temptation to cut off these lines and straddling
the aggressor was always there. Since 4th of July, planning for an amphibious landing at
Inchon was going on under code name operation BLUEHEARTS. Due to the deteriorating
condition of the Allied forces who had not only been steadily losing ground but men and
material as well, the operation BLUEHEARTS was abandoned and on 18 th July the Allied
troops of the 1st Cavalry division were landed at the port of P’ohang-dong behind the
friendly lines.

15. By 4th August the Allied troops were driven down to the suburbs of the coastal city
of Pusan. A defensive perimeter was set up around the city with the mountains in the north
and the Naktong River on the west and was dubbed as the Pusan Perimeter. The allied
forces clung on to this tiny piece of land till the amphibious landing at Inchon.

INCHON LANDING

16. Even after abandoning operation BLUEHEARTS the planning for an amphibious
landing continued. Three sites for an amphibious assault were proposed under code name
Operation CHROMITE. The first site was Chumunjin, up on the East Coast, second was
Kunsan on the west coast and the third was Inchon, also on the west coast. After much
deliberations and discussions the site of Inchon was selected.

Choice of Landing Site

17. The factors that influenced the choice of Inchon as the landing site are:

a. The tidal range at Inchon was approximately 32 feet.

b. At low tide the channel and harbour were studded with mud flats.
c. Currents in the channel ran as fast as 7 to 8 knots, close to the speed of a
landing craft.
d. The channel had very little sea room to facilitate turning or manoeuvring.
e. The channel could be easily mined and a sunken or disabled vessel would
pin down the remaining vessels on either side.
f. A tidal height of 29 feet was required for the landing ship tanks. Tidal height
of such magnitude was available for only three to four days a month.
g. Only three small beaches were available for landing tactical units at Inchon.
45
18. These factors may not seem like the most advantageous. However, the truth of the
matter is that compounding all these factors makes Inchon the most unsuitable site for an
amphibious assault; thus also making it the best site as the enemy would never guess it.
The other major tactical advantage was that landing at Inchon would not only out flank the
enemy but totally envelop it.

Intelligence

19. However, during the planning for landing it was discovered that there was an
incredible lack of intelligence regarding the enemy strengths, harbour and the height of
sea wall at Inchon. To obtain this information, one US naval officer and two South Koreans
were infiltrated in the area. This trio gathered invaluable information regarding the strength
of forces at Wolmi-do, Kimpo airfield and Inchon, the height of sea wall at different heights
of tide and most importantly they discovered that one of the main navigation light of the
approach channel could be re-lit.

Plan

20. Considering the intelligence information, hydrographical data and the urgency
required due to the situation in the Pusan perimeter, 15 Sep 1950 was set as the D-day.
The plan was to land at the Green beach on Wolmi-do during the morning high tide and
capture the radio hill overlooking the city and harbour of Inchon. During the evening high
tide, the red and blue beaches on the main land would be attacked and the two landing
forces will then merge and neutralise the city. Thereafter, the immediate objective would
be the Kimpo airfield and then Seoul. At the same time the 8 th army in Pusan perimeter
would make an attack northwards. This attack was expected to tie down the enemy forces
in the south and prevent movement of enemy reinforcements northwards to oppose the
landing forces.

Deception at Kunsan

21. To deceive the enemy and keep Inchon secret, an elaborate deception plan was
carried out at Kunsan. Some of the features of this deception plan were:
a. Leaving of military digging equipment on the shores of Kunsan.
b. Spreading the rumours of a landing at Kunsan.
c. Shore bombardment by Allied ships on Kunsan harbour.
d. Extensive air raids on and around the city of Kunsan.
e. Dropping of leaflets over Kunsan warning the civilians to flee to the interior to
escape the looming violence.

22. Thus the Allies were able to deceive the North Koreans of their actual landing site.

The Landing

23. On the D-day, 15 Sep 1950, the first assault group boarded the landing crafts at
0600 and landed on the Green beach at Wolmi-do. Within one hour and 15 minutes of
landing the island was captured. In preparation for the landing on Red and Blue beaches
the naval gun support group began bombarding Inchon at 1200. Carrier based aircraft
joined in the pre-assault fires which continued to rake Inchon throughout the afternoon.
The Red beach assault force started their 7-minute run at 1724. The Blue beach assault
crafts landed at their site at 1730. And by the end of the day the city was neutralised.
Within the next two days the important Kimpo airfield was also captured. Heavy fighting
46
ensued for Seoul and by the 26 th Sep the 1st cavalry from south had linked with the forces
at north. Finally on 27th Sep Seoul fell to the Allied army, totally destroying the North
Korean army in the process. South Korea was liberated.

EPILOGUE

24. By first Oct 1950 the South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and on 7th Oct
the US forces followed when UN general assembly voted in favour of this attempt to
reunify Korea. General Mac Arthur led the UN forces into more complex and risky
operations. An attempt to repeat the Inchon landing at Wonsan on the east coast ran into
trouble when the amphibious forces were held up by a huge mine field. When the troops
finally got ashore they were already two weeks behind their ground forces, who had
liberated the city by conventional means.
25. In the meantime, despite repeated warnings from China to stay away from Yalu
River, UN forces kept pushing north. On 25 November the Chinese attacked and soon the
UN troops were in general retreat conceding not only the occupied North Korean territory
but also Seoul on 14 March 1951. On sensing the heat of Chinese intervention, the US
president redefined his policy in North Korea by replacing General Mac Arthur. The US
president was unwilling to engage China, which in his opinion could have led to a third
world war and abandoned the objective of militarily re-uniting Korea. The war dragged on
until 27 July 1953 when the armistice was signed ending the three years of conflict at 38 th
parallel.
ANALYSIS

26. Korean war lasted for more than three years, resulted in over 4 million casualties,
led to the dismissal of a legendary American military leader and radically altered the US
strategic policy in NE Asia. The North Korean invasion represented the first real challenge
to the US in terms of contemplating the use of US forces in a hot war that could escalate
into a far greater conflict involving the Russia and China. After the initial Korean onslaught
the Allied troops were constantly on the defensive and often at the brink of disaster. Ridge
by ridge and mile by mile the allied troops retreated from the dividing line to the southern
port of Pusan. It was on 15 September 1950 that the Inchon landing resulted in the defeat
of North Korean forces and reversed the course of Korean War. The three basic principles
applicable in any amphibious landing are:
a. Local maritime and air superiority are essential for the passage of the force
and landing. This enables the beachhead to be isolated from enemy reinforcements
and attacks, so that the ships can be unloaded swiftly and in relative safety, and
allow the landing force to have continuous naval and air support during the
operation.
b. The landing force must have substantial superiority over the enemy forces
ashore in the objective area. In an opposed landing this would require an advantage
of about 3 to 1, but such a precise calculation would not apply to an unopposed
landing when the force needs only to be able to overcome any minor and
unexpected opposition.

c. There must be clear and unambiguous arrangements for the command of the
force. Overall command is vested in a naval officer because this is essentially a
maritime operation, and the problems of the security of the task force are naval
ones.

47
27. The analysis would therefore be carried out keeping in mind the unique and peculiar
circumstances. There was no surface, subsurface or air opposition and the actual
opposition to landing was insignificant. Had any or all these factors been introduced, the
assault would have been more difficult and costly. The success of Inchon, therefore,
cannot be blindly accepted as standard for any future amphibious venture. Inchon must be
a guide but not a criterion.
28. Strategy. The US in fact did not have a well-defined strategy regarding future
interest of Allied in the newly divided Korean peninsula. The focus of attention at that time
was Eastern Europe theatre for the US policy makers. In order to secure land near China
and Russia, American installed a pro US government in the South, using UN as a tool of
legitimisation for the puppet government. Apparently, to US this was the end of a volatile
situation but the fact remains that it was the start of a yet another phase in which the US
perspective was turned up side down. When the North Korean forces backed by the
communists invaded South Korea. US President hastily ordered the Far East Command to
defend the US forces, which were by then driven back into the Pusan Perimeter. This was
the time when the US thought of implementing a well-defined strategy capable of
safeguarding the capitalistic interests and containment of communist ideology from
spreading in East Asia during the newly introduced cold war era. Though the natives
always had a desire for reunification but they remained hostages to the two giants of the
post WW II era, in which both sides were inspired to expand their sphere of influence.
Russia and China being the neighbouring countries always felt uneasy and insecure due
to the presence of US set up in the Korean Peninsula, and desired to reunify the Korean
peninsula under communist flag.
29. Causes of Invasion. The immediate causes of a sudden North Korean
Invasion were:
(1) Decision of US National Security Council to withdraw American troops from
South Korea because of non-committal policy leaving behind some 500 US
personal.
(2) Persistent political confusion and view of American Far Eastern policy
makers that US has no strategic interests in Korea.
(3) Political and economic chaos in the Republic of Korea.
(4) Temptation of North Korea to invasion across 38 parallel and reunify Korea
under communist flag.

30. State Of Korean Forces. North Korea forces were tough and capable of enduring
hardships. They were well trained, well equipped and were having arms and equipment of
Soviet origin. Most of the troops had either served in the Chinese and Soviet armies or
were regular soldiers in Japanese army in WW II. In contrast South Korea army was
nothing more than a constabulary force. Their higher officers had no battle experience.

31. Tactical Plans. The tactical plans of North Korea were:

a. North Korea

(1) North Korea followed ancient routes of invasion.

(2) North Korea advanced on a broad front creating consternation all
along the South Korea border.
(3) They concentrated on speed totally disregarding the logistic and
terrain difficulties.

48
 b. UN Forces

(1) In defending along continuous broad front South Korean and US

forces became too thin, lacked mobility and logistics.
(2) US planned retreat to the port city of Pusan was tactically
advantageous as it concentrated the otherwise scattered US forces and
ensured the intactness of supply lifeline through sea.
(3) The North Korean advance was correctly assessed and the American
intervention was initially concentrated at right fronts.
(4) The hold at Pusan perimeters showed considerable grasp of the
principle of Defense. Gen Mac Arthur's decision of Inchon landing rather to
make a breakout from Pusan sector and withdrawal of one marine brigade
despite forceful representation showed yet another element of grasp of
strategy i.e. bring movement into strategy rather than to win war by
preponderance of men and fire.

32. Principles of War. Inchon landing in light of the principles of war can be analysed
as:
a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. The allied aim was to cut the
logistic and command line of the North Korea troops. Selection of this aim proved to
be hallmark for UN forces as the North Korea army was defeated within days.
b. Surprise and Deception. Due to its topographical hazards Inchon
was the worst possible and least expected place for assault. This less expectation
on part of North Korea forces Coupled with poor intelligence resulted in a total
surprise. Deceptions taken by UN forces mislead the North Korea that it is an
attempt to draw their attention from Pusan parameter.
c. Offensive Action. It is the ability to destroy and deter the enemy. It is said
that ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. The defensive posture
at Pusan did not help the UN, therefore, Mac Arthur adopted an offensive posture
that resulted in a decisive blow to North Korea forces.
d. Concentration of Forces. It is the commander’s ability to concentrate
a superior force to that of enemy at decisive time and space. While 1 st Maine
division and 7 US infantry division provided the anvil, the eight's US army
hammered from Pusan perimeters and completed the destruction of the enemy On
the other hand when North Korea was to fight on two fronts, it was unable to
respond and was to retreat in result.
e. Morale. Morale is a battle-winning factor. It is the state of mind that
enables a soldier to overcome the fear of war and carryout the difficult tasks. North
Korea in their initial offensive had crushed the South Korea on the sheer strength of
their high moral. This was correctly recognised by Mac Arthur and he decided to
take on the odd venture of Inchon landing, the biggest effect of which was, that it
broke the North Koreans will to fight.
f. Cooperation. It is the feeling of being a part of a team from unit level to
national level. The smooth execution of operation CHROMITE by 19 nations is a
classic example of multinational cooperation.

33. The role of UN supreme Commander Gen Douglas Mac Arthur. While
reviewing the past events it is easy to criticise or dole out lavish praise on the incumbents.
But it is hard to correctly analyse the operational environments and related psychological
pressures infesting the commander’s mind at the time of decision making. Mac Arthur also
49
had a difficult decision to make in the face of both external and internal opposition, but it
was his genius, faith, style and the force of his personality that made the OPERATION
CHROMITE a gigantic success. However, after Inchon Mac Arthur’s judgement, decisions
and actions contributed in no small part to the disaster, which befell the UN forces in North
Korea. Among those which should have been questioned are:
a. Ignoring off repeated warning of possible Chinese intervention in the war.
These warning grew increasingly ominous as US forces penetrated more deeply
into North Korea.
b. His failure to adequately protect the lengthening lines of communication as
the UN forces approached the Manchurians border.
c. His committing of UN forces to operations in North Korea in terrain with
virtually un-crossable mountain ranges separated their right and left flanks
respectively precluding any mutual support.

LESSONS LEARNT

34. Bismarck said, “Only fools learn from experiences, I learn from others experience.
Therefore, few lessons that we can draw from this War are:

a. We must never allow our forces engaged in a battle to be so dispersed as to

be unable to support each other.
b. Use of unorthodox tactics, use of imagination and ingenuity. A number of
instances where the use of this tactics paid dividends are available in military
history, e.g. the activities of Pathans against British for liberation of Gilgit by handful
of Gilgit Scouts and volunteers.
c. There is a need to further improve the tri-services co-ordination by
conducting joint exercises to iron out any unforeseen hitches.
d. Good intelligence network and latest means are essential. Similarly, failure to
evaluate the intelligence at hand could be disaster.
e. The art of amphibious warfare can change defensive posture to an offensive
action; therefore, military power that can afford to maintain an amphibious force
must establish such capability.

CONCLUSION

35. The Korean War was fought on World War II pattern, without the nuclear weapon
but with more advanced aircraft. Despite the air supremacy the importance of naval
support cannot be undermined. Whither it was Normandy or Inchon Amphibious landing
did turn the tide into allied favour. It will not be fair to say that South Korea was saved by
land or air operations of the UN or by the famous Inchon landing, but by the capability to
launch amphibious operation. Without flexible and constant support of sea power there is
little doubt that the amphibious operations of UN would have been successful. In today's
warfare amphibious landing can be conducted more rapidly using modern air and sea
based platforms Such a smart force can be deployed at very short notices and can turn the
tide in to one’s favour. We should also develop the capability of conducting such
operations as our adversary has a large coastline with many potential landing sites.

50
 BATTLE OF CORAL SEA

INTRODUCTION

1. It was fought during 04 – 08 May 1942. The Battle of Coral Sea was a major naval
battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and
Allied naval and air forces from the United States and Australia. The battle was the first
fleet action in which aircraft carriers engaged each other. It was also the first naval battle in
history in which neither side's ships sighted or fired directly upon the other. The battle took
place in Coral Sea, which is a marginal sea of the NE coast of Australia. In an attempt to
strengthen their defensive positioning for their empire in the South Pacific, Imperial
Japanese forces decided to invade and occupy Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in
the southeastern Solomon Islands. The US learned of the Japanese plan through signals
intelligence and sent two United States Navy carrier task forces and a joint Australian-
American cruiser force, under the overall command of Admiral Frank J Fletcher, to oppose
the Japanese offensive. With both sides having suffered heavy losses in aircraft and
carriers damaged or sunk, the two fleets disengaged and retired from the battle area.
Because of the loss of carrier air cover, Japanese commander recalled the Port Moresby
invasion fleet, intending to try again later. Although a tactical victory for the Japanese in
terms of ships sunk, the battle would prove to be a strategic victory for the Allies as it
prevented Japan from annexing their imperialism in south pacific.

PRELUDE

Strategic Background of Japanese Expansion

2. Emergence of Japan as a major pacific power. The Anglo-Japanese alliance

of 1902 seemed hardly effective after Britain’s declaration of war against Germany in
August 1914. Japan, however declared war against Germany in October 1914, rather
became busy in seizing every German territory in the Pacific Ocean she could lay her
hands on. At the first opportunity Japanese naval force occupied Tasingao, the greatest
natural port in the whole of East Asia that included Kiaochow Bay and coal rich province
Shantung. Later Japan also occupied the Marshal, Marinas and Coroline islands north of
equator which afterward got the League of Nations mandate. However, under continued
pressure from western allies the Japanese force had to withdraw from Shantung in 1926
when the Japan already established her hegemony territory throughout the north China.
Rest of the German territory south of the equator was taken by Australia with League of
Nations mandate. The New Zealand also got mandate over Western Samoa sharing the
island group with the US. Britain took the phosphate rich island of Nauru. Thus Japan
emerged as a major pacific power following the post war partition of the entire former
German colonies in the pacific.

3. Armament Modernisation. The post world war political scenario of Japan

was not as simple as single leader Hitler’s Germany. Soon after the First World War Japan
signed the Washington naval treaty to limit the displacement and main armament of capital
ships, aircraft carriers and cruisers, and total tonnage and age of the first two categories,
adding more to the general resentment at the post war settlement of the pacific. Already
many Japanese believed that the western allies had cheated Japan out of racial
discrimination, not giving her due share of the pacific gains. Japanese military leaders had
much influence in national issues due to their constitution style. But they had less control
over the army and navy personnel who seemed to be over enthusiastic many times to take
independent decisions. Japan was also worried to see the rise of Chinese nationalism in

51
the 1920s as the leading Asian nation. All these factors together seemed to cause the
ignition when Japanese Manchuria army aggressively occupied the Chinese province of
Manchuria without informing the central command which was probably provoked by
themselves. But this incident confirmed Japanese isolation from the west. Following the
Manchurian issue Japan left League of Nations in 1933. Japanese leaders began to
realise the needs of more sophisticated war machines. Accordingly steps were taken to
modernise her previously unimpressive armament program. Industrially well developed
Japan started to manufacture huge armament including large aircraft carriers and most
efficient fighter aircraft of the age.

4. Diplomatic Missions. Ever since the occupation of Chinese Manchuria by the

Japanese army tension grew more and more between two countries. Eventually a serious
fighting took place between the Japanese army and the Chinese nationalist soldiers.
Japanese army initiated an undeclared war in which they occupied most of the major cities
of China including major ports by February 1939. Following the series of occupation and
anticipating future war with potential enemies, Japan took some subsequent steps:

a. In March 1940 Japan established a Chinese puppet government in Nanking.

b. After possessing the Chinese ports Japan started to put pressure on France
to stop flow of supplies through Indo-China and on Britain to do the same with the
Burma Road.

c. In September 1940 Japan signed a ten-year treaty of military and economic

co-operation with Germany and Italy after occupying the northern portion of French
Indo-China in Jun 1940.

d. For protecting the northern flank in case of war with the western powers in
future Japan signed a non aggression pact with Russia on April 1941. This pact
benefited both, Russia could free some troops for deploying in Europe and Japan
could concentrate on expansion southwards.

e. Following the extension of Japanese control towards the southern Indo-

China, the US, Britain and Holland freezed all Japanese assets and imposed a
trade embargo, thus cutting of 75% of Japanese trade and 90% of her oil supplies.
Japanese troops still continued going in.

f. Diplomatic negotiation continued between the US and Japan regarding the

conditions of trade embargo. US demanded withdrawal of Japanese forces from
China as well as Indo-China. Meanwhile Japan accelerated preparation for war
secretly. Japan’s war minister General Tojo took over the power to suit with their
military mission.

5. Genesis of Attack on Pearl Harbour. Following the trade embargo by the

US Japan faced an intolerable choice: either to withdraw all the forces from occupied
portion of China and Indo-china or to go for a war before her oil stocks finished. Japan’s
main aim was still the conquest of China. So the Japanese leader devised a plan to
conquer resource producing areas like oil fields of Dutch East Indies and thereafter
establish a huge defence perimeter right from Burma stretched round up to the Aleutian
Islands. In this way Japan hoped to defend any counter attack and, using the resources
build up developed more war machines. Though the Japanese leaders were aware of their
limited resources in devising such a plan they thought that once they can diminish the US

52
Pacific fleet, US would come for a compromise instead of prolonged and costly war
against reinforced Japan. Also for conquest of south-east Asia, the American base at
Philippines was a major question mark for the Japanese plan of invasion. Hence with the
intention of destroying the Pacific Fleet rather than waiting for it to fight through to the
Philippines, Japan launched a surprised air attack in the early morning of 8 Dec 1941 at
Pearl Harbour, HQ of the US Pacific Fleet.

6. Invasion Moves – A Triumphant Sweep to East Asia. After the attack on

pearl harbour Japan began an extensive sweep towards East Asia that was more
successful than what was expected. Without much involvement of ground troops and with
minimum losses Japan achieved her aim using the carrier borne troops with unbound
pride. Within about three months Japanese conquest forces achieved mentionable
success.

7. Extension of Defence Perimeter. By early 1942 Japan drove out the western
allies from Hongkong, Burma, Philippines, Malaya and East Indies. These series of
victories after the pearl Harbour attack made the Japanese leaders absolutely ‘Drunk of
Conquest’. On 18 Apr 42, sixteen US Army B-25 flew 800 miles from carrier HORNET and
bombed at Tokyo and other cities surprising little to defence. The senior Japanese leader
decided to extend the defence perimeter further without delay. Accordingly Japanese
invasion force moved to seize Tulagi in the southern Solomon and port Morseby in south
Eastern New Guinea. With this move Japan hoped to win air mastery in the Coral Sea
besides isolating Australia from the US. It would also provide the scope of striking the US
Pacific fleet from better position and enable the Japanese fleet roam around western
pacific to ensure the collection of raw materials. Thus Japan would build even better war
machines to ensure supremacy in her ambitions so called greater East Asia co-prosperity
sphere.

The Allied Forces Strategy

8. Being the most influential super power of the west, attack on Pearl Harbour by
Japan was simply a big blast for the US. Besides, she tried to take every opportunity to
uphold her superiority with emergence of Japan as a challenge. USA was definitely
embarrassed and annoyed. Much of the American concentration during these days was
towards Japan. The most significant fact of this was that Americans could break most of
the Japanese crypto codes. Thus by 17 April 1942, the American were aware of Japanese
plan to invade Port Morseby. Admiral Chester Nimitz was accordingly assigned with the
following tasks:

a. To hold the Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) between US and Australia.

b. To contain the Japanese in the Pacific.

c. To support the Defence of North America.

d. To prepare for amphibious counter offensive in the south and southwestern

pacific.

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE

9. The Battle of Coral Sea was a very short but significant battle in tactical and
strategic point of view. The world's first battle to be fought entirely by carrier borne aircraft

53
was the battle of Coral Sea. It is evident from the scene of the battle that this indecisive
battle brought serious losses and casualties to both Japan and the US. It is clear that the
Japanese had a tactical victory, but for the US, it was definitely a strategic victory because
the Japanese intention to capture Port Moresby and Solomons islands was not achieved
and the Japanese had been stopped in their attempt to extend their defensive perimeter
and isolate Australia.

Positive Efforts

10. US Forces. By the end of April both the US and Japan had learnt ironically without
the other knowing it, something of each other’s plan. But the efforts made by US were
praiseworthy. The US was much concerned about their radio intelligence. They made
every effort to ensure no leaks concerning their information but at the same time they were
successful in breaking the crypto system of Japan which gave them a priceless advantage
over the Japanese in taking timely decision. The US pilots were quite good in contact
report as such they could sight first the Japanese landing at Tulagi. They believed in hit
first hit hard principle that made them open the battle with a first blow by attacking Tulagi.
They also did not waste the opportunity to strike Japanese carrier Shoho. The American
aircraft carriers were widely dispersed on various missions while Japanese started
concentrating their forces in the south. But the US could assemble the strongest possible
force in the Coral Sea. They also took adequate measures to reinforce their fleet with
carrier Hornet and Enterprise, though the short battle of Coral Sea ended before their
arrival. Their ships handling capabilities were better which served in evading their task
force 44 very skillfully from the Japanese severe air attack.

11. Japanese Forces. By early April 1942 success had attended Japan’s every
move. Japanese exultation was at its zenith. So Japanese had a very good morale to start
the invading mission in the Coral Sea to destroy the US force and its allies. They hoped to
win air mastery over the Coral Sea. To isolate Australia from US and to bring to action and
destroy the US pacific fleet before it could be reinforced. So they built up strong
determination accordingly. They had more training and past experience of offensive. Their
modern weapons of the age led them to plan aggression. The Zeke fighter was more
effective than those of US wildcats which grew their air supremacy.

Deficiencies

12. US Shortcomings. The US and allied forces deployed in the coral sea
seems to be less aggressive, though they made the first attack on Tulagi, but Tulagi
operation was certainly disappointing in terms of ammunition expended to results
obtained. They also did not keep adequate aircraft to safeguard their own carriers. The
task force 44 did not play any vital role to contribute for the battle, though Admiral Nimitz
justified their deployment as misguidance to the Japanese. Though the detachment of
Admiral Crace’s support group was sent forward so that it would be ready to block Jomard
passage, it was once mistaken by US B-17, for enemy.

13. Japanese Shortcomings. The Japanese had victory disease and they either
forgot that American inferiority in sea power would be short lived or convinced themselves
that they would win because the western democracies were not ready to face a life and
death struggle. These were the false assumptions the Japanese made. Their security and
intelligence were poor. They could not understand that their crypto system was broken by
the US. They were over confident and that is why they did not maintain radio silence. Their
aim of invading Tulagi and Port Moresby with the simultaneous engagement with US

54
Pacific fleet was very difficult to maintain at a time. They did not cater any air attack for
carrier Shoho which was busy in transportation duties which is why she could not resist US
air strike. Japanese Admiral Inoue inappropriately scattered his forces. A well planned
concentration of forces would be able to neutralize the enemy. Japan in fact undermined
the strength of US fleet which ultimately caused withdrawal of their forces instead of
extension of their defense perimeter. Japan also did not have RADAR in their carriers so
they had to depend on air recce and they were totally incapable of identifying enemy at
night. Also it is evident from several incidents that Japanese pilots were weak in first
sighting US force and they made wrong contact report several times.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

14. A Commanders common sense and judgment must be backed by a sound

knowledge of principles of war which have marked the success of commanders of the past
wars. In the battle of Coral Sea the opposition forces disregarded most of the principles
which ultimately brought disaster for them. A documentary data of disregard of principles
of war during battle of Coral Sea are mentioned below:

a. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. In a war, it is vital to set out the aim
of a military operation before the battle starts. In this battle US aim was to check the
Japanese in their attempt to extend their defensive perimeter and held own SLOC
with Australia. They maintained it well. But Japanese aim was to capture Port
Moresby, Tulagi and strike on US fleet simultaneously was inappropriate. That was
the reason they could not maintain their aim.

b. Maintenance of Morale. Initially Japan had very high morale basing on

their past victories. But finally it was shadowed on the loss of carrier Shoho and
damage to Sokaku. That’s why even after sinking of Lexington they did not attack
on the surviving Yorktown. Yorktown thus escaped when perhaps one torpedo
could have sunk her.

c. Offensive Action. The evidence of history shows that virtually no military

campaign can be won without offensive action. At the last phase of battle Japanese
action with Lexington and Yorktown with aircraft was appreciable. From the
beginning of the battle both the forces made offensive actions with aircraft only.
Japanese could have made some offensive with cruisers and submarines while US
forces were busy with rescuing survivors and aircrafts of Lexington. In that case it
would be difficult for Yorktown to leave the battle field.

d. Security. The security of bases and supporting crafts is much important

during the offensive action. But none could keep their platforms secured. On 04
May 1942 Fletcher launched air attack leaving Yorktown almost unprotected. Again
US oil tanker (Neosho) and one destroyer (Sims) had no protection while steaming
towards a fuelling rendezvous. On the other hand Japanese light carrier Shoho was
attacked almost unopposed when her aircraft were engaged covering the troop
transports.

e. Surprise. To hit the enemy at their weakest situation would be the best
surprise, which was not achieved by both. Virtually their breach of security of
information and plan made the total loss of surprise. In fact surprise at strategic
level is difficult to achieve but in tactical level also we did not find any remarkable
operation which achieved surprise.

55
 f. Concentration of Force. Allied force had their forces concentrated except
the detachment of task force 44, which seemed to be unjustified. But Japanese
force was not concentrated. Their plan was such that from the beginning force was
divided.

g. Economy of Effect. The most uneconomic effort was carried by the US

aircraft attacking on the Japanese newly captured base at Tulagi Harbour. Admiral
Nimitz commented, “The Tulagi Operation was certainly disappointing in terms of
ammunition expended to results obtained”. Unplanned surveillance and striking on
the enemy fuel tanker and destroyer by the Japanese aircraft assuming these as
carriers and cruiser was not economical.

h. Flexibility. Both the oppositions had flexibility in using their force.

Especially the Japanese could have been employed submarine or even surface
ship instead of using aircraft only. They could be flexible in selecting target also.
Port Moresby invasion group could have been employed other mission.

j. Co-Operation. US co-operation between the countries and in the

tactical field was better than the Japanese force.

LESSON LEARNT

15. One of the sheer truths of the history is that though it repeats itself, nobody takes
any lesson from it. If we probe into the history of wars we will come across the repetition of
this truth. War is like gambling where both sides think that they will win. It is the most
commonly applied strategy of winning supremacy over others. And the proverb goes -
nothing is wrong in war. But a man is different from wild beings because of his rationality.
So anything done by a human being should be governed by principles of well being of
others. If we probe into the history of wars what took place over the decades we will come
to see that instead of common interest, the ego of an individual under the veneer of State
had been the main reasons of war. Battle of Coral Sea also was not any exception of this
truth in this respect. The lessons learnt from the battle of Coral Sea are:

a. Selection of Aim. Japanese gave equal importance for landing at Tulagi

and Port Moresby and in neutralizing enemy carriers at the same time. Japan
having stronger fleet could not win the battle due to wrong selection of aim.

b. Security. Due to break of security neither US nor Japan achieved a

surprise, which was essential particularly for Japanese invasion forces.

d. Concentration of Force. Lack of concentration of forces on the part of both

US and Japan brought devastation to each other rather than making it a decisive
battle.

16. Other than principles of war some other lessons may be derived from this battle:

a. Over confidence. With series of victory in the past Japanese became so

over confidant that it ultimately brought a catastrophe to their force.

56
 b. Importance of Air Power. This battle proved the effectiveness of air power
as striking element over any other power. Thereby from this way onward the
supremacy of battleships was by gone.

c. First Sighting the Enemy. Despite possessing a superior force Japanese

failed to neutralize their enemy as their surveillance aircraft repeatedly failed to
sight the enemy and gave wrong description of enemy sometimes. On the other
hand the Americans availed the opportunity in earlier sighting of their enemy.

17. In respect of flexibility, co-operation and administration one thing we learn is that
war is a game, where morale is sharpened and re-sharpened by constant logistic and
administrative support. The throwing out of torpedoes and bombs from Japanese aircraft
into the sea proved that it is not the war machine but the life of human being that cost
much.

57
 NAVAL ASPECT OF GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN

INTRODUCTION

1. This battle took place between 12 – 15 November 1942 and was the decisive
engagement in a series of naval battles between Allied (primarily United States) and
Imperial Japanese forces during the months-long Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomon
Islands. Guadalcanal is a tropical island in the SW Pacific and the largest in the Solomon
Islands group. The action in this battle consisted of combined air and sea engagements
over four days, mostly near Guadalcanal and all related to a Japanese effort to reinforce
land forces on the island. The battle is especially noted for the deaths of the United States
Navy's only two admirals to be killed in action during a surface engagement in the war.
The battle turned back Japan's last major attempt to dislodge Allied forces from
Guadalcanal and nearby Tulagi, which the Allied already occupied, resulting in a strategic
victory for the U.S. and its allies and deciding the ultimate outcome of the Guadalcanal
campaign in their favor.

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

2. Guadalcanal Campaign was fought collectively in six adjacent islands in South

Pacific near the Solomon Islands. Solomon Islands are situated between latitudes 5°S and
11°S. It consists of a chain of islands running in a South Easterly direction. This is 600
miles far from Bismark Archipelago where Japanese were using Rabaul as their main
base. The islands can be divided into two Columns namely Northeasterly column and
Southeasterly column. Guadalcanal is the largest island of the independent state of
Solomon Islands. It has an area of 6,500 sq km. She is located on the Southeastern end of
this group. A small island named Florida is situated on the North East of its western end.
On its South coast, the islet of Tulagi formed a small but secure anchorage. The Volcanic
island of Savo is located seven miles to the North East of Guadalcanal.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

3. Guadalcanal had the significant strategic importance especially for its geographical
location. Their importance from both Japanese and American viewpoints is enumerated
below. Possession of Guadalcanal was vital for the Japanese in order to have the
command in South Pacific Ocean. This would cut off the sea line of communication
between USA and Australia through Fiji Islands and Pearl Harbor. The possessions of
those islands between the United States and Australia were hugely essential for the US
force also. For securing the sea line of communications and also driving out the Japanese
force away from South Pacific.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

4. At the initial stage of World War II the Japanese completed an impressive list of
conquests in a remarkably short time. In January 1942, the Japanese had occupied the
island of New Britain, facing little resistance. Then Japanese proceeded to turn Rabaul
into their major advance base in the region.

58
5. After the seizure of New Britain, in February the Japanese began to conduct air
raids against Port Moresby. In March, the Japanese landed on the Northeast coast of New
Guinea and quickly established their foothold over there. The British administrative capital
of the Solomon’s was on Tulagi. By May 1942, the Japanese occupied it. In June, it was
reported by the coast watchers that the Japanese had also occupied the Northwest coast
of Guadalcanal opposite of Florida Island.

6. On the other hand, Major Bases of allied forces were at Fiji Island, New Caledonia,
Sydney, Briston and, Auckland. There were some minor bases at Samoa Island, Canton
Island, Espiritu Santa Island, Port Moresby, Tonga Island, Borabora Island and Palmyra
Island. To counter the steps of Japan the US Marines landed on Guadalcanal on August
7,1942 and campaign broke out.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

7. The Allied forces deployed a total of about 60,000 Army and Marine Corps ground
forces in the Guadalcanal Campaign. On the other hand more than 36,000 Japanese from
the 17th Army and the Special Naval Landing Forces fought on Guadalcanal Campaign.
Comparatively the Japanese suffered much more heavily. Both the sides lost good number
of Aircraft, ships, and men. Aa list of damage in the Campaign is appended below:

Description of the Loss Allied Japanese

Aircraft Carrier 02 01
Battle Ship - 02
Cruisers 07 04
Destroyer 14 11
Killed/Missing 1600 14,800
Injured 4,245 -
Died of disease 9,000
Prisoner 1,000

8. On 2 July 1942 the U S Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Allied forces in the Pacific to
mount a limited offensive to halt the Japanese advance toward the line of communications
from the United States to Australia and New Zealand. There were few warships;
transports, and cargo ships, trained troops, weapons were then available. and supplies
that any offensive in the Pacific, for which the United States would have to provide most of
the forces, would necessarily be limited in scale. Yet it was essential to halt the Japanese
who were then moving ever nearer to the flank of the tenuous line of communications. The
Joint Chiefs' decision of 2 July led to the long, grim struggle for the possession of
Guadalcanal.

A STUDY OF APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

9. The principles of war applied in the Guadalcanal Campaign are summarized below:

a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim.

(1) By the Allied Force. Selection and maintenance of the aim was well
achieved by the Allied forces. US force successfully launched attack on
Guadalcanal and held it. Thereby they secured the sea lines of
communication between USA, Australia and New Zealand.
59
 (2) By the Japanese Force. On the other hand the Japanese could
have achieved their aim of recapturing the island provided during the first
offensive launch they could destroy the transport and supplies, which were
meant for the marines. At the last stage of campaign the Japanese
commanders were not certain.

b. Maintenance of Morale.

(1) By the Allied Force. The morale and mental attitude of the allied
forces were continued to be an integral part of their preparation for combat.
This reflects their high morale. Particularly the US mariners were gifted with
high morale. Their better training, well motivation and superior reputation
enhanced their morale.

(2) By the Japanese Force. The morale of the Japanese force was also
but high. They continued to fight the battle despite of starving. Logistic
problem could not curtail their morale and initiative.

c. Offensive Action. Both the forces were offensive at times:

(1) By the Allied Force. “Operation watchtower’ began with an assault by

US Marines on Tulagi and Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942.

(2) By the Japanese Force. The Japanese reaction was rapid, on the
night of 8-9 August, laid a force of cruisers off Savo Island.

d. Security.

(1) By the Allied Force. Allied forces could gather the information of
constructing airstrip in Guadalcanal by the Japanese through crypto-analysis
and also the coast watchers. In the battle of Cape Esperance, Battle of Santa
Cruz and battle of Guadalcanal their better early warning system allowed
them to achieve initiative.

(2) By the Japanese Force. When, the 1st Marines had been
scheduled for six months' training before going into combat, The Japanese
remained almost entirely ignorant of these preparations.

Moreover, they could not gather the information about the allied forces
amphibious landing.

e. Surprise. Elements of surprise are very important to win any Battle. Both
the forces could show surprise in the campaign.

(1) By the Allied Force. The landing on Guadalcanal was a great

surprise to the Japanese. This was achieved when the Allied ships entered
Guadal-Tulagi area undetected using bad weather to their advantage.

60
 (2) By the Japanese Force. Vice Admiral Mikawa hoped to obtain
surprise by moving mostly at night, but his force was immediately spotted
and reported by the US Navy submarine S-38, lying in secret outside Rabaul
harbour. Thus the counter offensive by the Japanese on the night was a
surprise to the Allies as they were sure that the Japanese would never
launch their offensive during the night.

f. Concentration of Force. Both the forces were found that they concentrated
their forces effectively. The US force extensively and effectively utilized all their
resources including army, navy and air power. But the Japanese didn’t use the air
power effectively.

g. Economy of Effort. The Japanese had gathered a huge armada, yet most of
their ships returned from Guadalcanal without taking part in any meaningful
engagement during the encounters. The Allies on the other hand utilized their
forces well on land and at Sea to guard the Guadalcanal and its surrounding areas.

h. Flexibility. The US commanders found more flexible in this campaign. In

some battles in varying situation they alter their plan and that brought success
eventually. But in the other hand the Japanese commanders were found sticking to
their plan. When it was evident that they lost the island they could reduce the loose
by withdrawing. Even the forecast was made by Admiral Tanaka that Guadalcanal
is indefensible and he suggested to evacuate the army before they are destroyed.
But the high command ignored his advice.

j. Co-Operation. Lack of co-operation between both the forces was

observed:
(1) By the Allied Force. There was lack of cooperation on the part of
Allies when Admiral Fletcher decided on his own to withdraw the carrier task
force from covering position thus depriving the landing Forces of air cover.

(2) By the Japanese Force. On the other hand, there was no unified
Japanese command controlling operations in the Solomons area. The inter
service rivalries between the Imperial Army and Navy were so bad that they
made relations between the US military services look friendly in comparison.

k. Administration.

(1) By the Allied Force. The Administration part was well planned by the
Americans, and no such incident occurred where the marines suffered for
st
poor admin. Six months pre-deployment training was arranged for the 1
Marine division in New Zealand. Whenever the lacked ration they utilized the
captured ration and they could successfully lived on land. The recycling of
the troops made huge difference, as fresh troops could perform.

(2) By the Japanese Force. Man and sup carried by the Japanese was
never enough. They failed to recycle the troops in this campaign. They were
outsmarted by the US troops in terms of training. There was command coord
gap between the imperial HQ and the tac HQ. Even their army didn’t know
their plan of bldg the air fd.
61
 AN ASSESSMENT ON LEADERSHIP

10. Leaders play a vital role to decide the course of the campaign. It is therefore
imperative for the naval officers to know the leadership traits of the great leaders. An
assessment is therefore carried out to find out the positive or negative leadership traits of
the great leaders of the Guadalcanal Campaign.

11. Japanese Force.

a. Admiral Nagumo. He was the commander of the Japanese striking force

with the carrier Shokaku and Zuikaku and a diversionary group based on the small
carrier Ryujo. He showed excellent command capability in night and also in air
operations.

b. Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa was the
Cruiser force commander. The joint chief of staff had full trust on him. Thereby
successfully conducted attack on US force at night, achieved surprise and sunken 4
allied heavy Cruisers. But he failed to achieve the main objective, the destruction of
large fleet of amphibious transport as he withdrew prematurely. He had poor
understanding with the army commanders.

c. Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka. He was the Japanese commander of the

Guadalcanal reinforcement force (Tokyo Express). He was blessed with good
foresightedness. He could correctly asses the Japanese defeat at the US hand,
thereby suggested the imperial headquarters to evacuate the land force from the
Guadalcanal before being destroyed. His sound but pessimistic appraisal of the
military situation brought about his dismissal.

12. Allied Force.

a. General Douglas Macarthur. Army General Douglas MacArthur was

assigned with the command of the "Southwest Pacific Area". The Solomons islands
fell under his responsibility also.
b. Admiral Nimitz. The Pacific to the north and east of Macarthur’s
command was similarly designated the "Pacific Ocean Areas", and was the
responsibility of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, operating from his headquarters in
Honolulu. His domain included the Marshalls, the Carolines, the Marianas, the Fijis,
Samoa, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and New Zealand. He was found
sometimes frustrated.

c. Admiral Grohmly. He remained pessimistic throughout the campaign.

Admiral Nimitz was disturbed by his lack of confidence. He was later replaced by
Admiral Helsy.

LESSONS LEARNT

13. There are numerous lessons, which could be learnt from Guadalcanal campaign.
However, through the study of this Campaign following important lessons are narrated:

a. Helena and Washington used their Early Warning Radar (EWR) effectively to
identify the opponents well in time. Thus EWR plays a vital role in naval warfare.
62
b. Vulnerable site for landing should be well defended.
c. Training and rehearsal are paramount for amphibious landing.
d. It is very important to ensure logistic supply throughout the battle.
e. Aim should be maintained throughout the operation.
f. Air power is a wining factor in the battle.
g. Over confidence may bring disaster in the battle scenario.
h. Co-ordination in the joint warfare is a must in the battle.
j. Good damage control can save the ship in crisis.
k. Crypto security to be maintained judiciously.

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 BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF

INTRODUCTION

1. Intentions of Allied Forces. The allied intentions, against Japanese

forces were concentrated towards the China-Luzon-Formosa triangle, with primarily three
objectives:

a. Tapping of immense reserves of Chinese manpower for use directly against

Japan.

b. Blockading of Japan by cutting off the flow of vital materials, especially oil,
from the Southern Resources area.

c. Obtaining a base suitable for advances against Japan. The map of West
Pacific area of operations is placed at Annex ‘A’.

2. Background. By the end of 1944, it was evident that it was impossible for the
Chinese to break through Japanese held coastal areas to join the Allies. Therefore, the
Allied plans were concentrated towards Luzon, as this would facilitate attack on the
Japanese held Formosa. Despite opposition from Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations,
the President of United States and other Commanders were in favour of attacking Luzon,
influenced by reports of thousands of Filipino guerrillas troubling Japanese Occupation
forces. Even reports from the on-site Commander, Admiral Halsey indicated a demoralised
enemy, “a hollow shell with weak defences” were the words used. The dilemma of
President Roosevelt, to attack Philippines (map placed at Annex ‘B’), did not last long, as
Admiral Halsey scored a spectacular success in the area destroying 200 enemy aircraft at
a cost of only eight planes. This led to the invasion of Leyte Gulf on 20 Oct 44, two months
before the scheduled date.

2. The Japanese coastal defence forces looking after Leyte were overrun by the Third
and Seventh Amphibious forces with ease. In fact, the assault on Leyte proved to be one
of the easiest in the war. On receipt of reports of troop landings at the mouth of Leyte Gulf,
Admiral Toyoda, in Tokyo, promptly ordered execution of SHO-1, the naval defence plan
for Philippines. This lead to the historic Battle of Leyte Gulf, which shattered the Japanese
Naval fleets and brought an end to purely naval engagements in World War II.

THE BATTLE UNCOVERED

Introduction

4. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest battle in the naval history fought in the
Pacific in World War II, in terms of involvement of large number of ships, extending over
four major engagements between Oct 23 and 26, 1944, collectively known as The Battles
of Leyte Gulf. These sea battles consisted of four separate, major fleet actions fought in or
near the Philippine archipelago. It proved to be one of the most decisive Sea and Air
battles fought in the World War II and dealt a fatal blow to the Japanese aspiration of sea
control. It was the final defeat for the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Americans
managed to destroy Japanese naval power for good in Leyte Gulf and henceforth,
Japanese Navy was restricted to minor coastal operations.

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Build-up

5. Strategic Importance of Leyte Gulf. The Japanese actions in the 1930s, such
as the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the outbreak of war with China in 1937 led to
increasing tensions between Japan and the Western powers. With this development of
tension, the United States, which supplied 80 to 90 percent of Japanese oil, placed
increasingly severe restrictions on the sale of oil, oil-manufacturing equipment, and
technology to Japan. Later, the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina in July
1941 led to an oil embargo by the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands in August
1941. The United States in effect had provided Japan with two options, to either withdraw
their Army from China or do without US oil. The Japanese chose a third alternative, they
captured the oil rich East Indies, Guam, Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore. Capture
of Philippines was essential for the Allied forces and ranked high on the agenda, however,
threat to US-Australia communications diverted Allied efforts to the South. In the days
preceding the Battle for Leyte Gulf, the Japanese surface fleet was at Lingga Roads near
Singapore, close to the source of oil. Occupation of Philippines by US would have cut off
Japan from the oil source and divided the surface fleet from the carrier fleet, based at
Inland sea closer to home. Meanwhile, Americans had also been receiving reports that
thousands of Filipino guerrillas were harassing the Japanese occupation forces and could
be counted on to join American campaign for liberation, thus providing an opportune
moment to occupy Philippines with minimum resistance. The Japanese had established air
strips and were carrying out attack on Allied forces through land based aircrafts based at
Iwo Jima, Luzon, Formosa and Okinawa. Control of Philippines by Allied states would
have given them access to Luzon air strips which could provide required range to their
bombers to carry out attacks on Iwo Jima, Formosa and Okinawa. Leyte was chosen for
the amphibious assault as Japanese coastal defence in the islands flanking the entrance
to Leyte Gulf was considered to be weak.

6. Days Preceding the Battle. The Japanese expected that the United States
would be attacking the Philippines as well as other potential targets. They came up with a
plan to defend the Philippines called SHO-1. (SHO-2, 3, 4 were plans to defend other
targets such as Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands; the Home Islands of Honshu, Kyushu,
and Shikoku; and Hokkaido and the Kuriles. SHO is the Japanese word for victory). Their
plan would be adjusted when they knew just where the Americans decided to land. The
key to the success of the Japanese SHO-1 plan was for the main surface forces
commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita (called the Centre Force) and Vice Admiral
Shoji Nishimura to simultaneously approach in a pincer manoeuvre and annihilate the
American forces landing their troops on the Leyte beaches. To accomplish this, the
Japanese had to lure the overwhelmingly powerful American carrier forces away from the
Leyte beaches by executing a clever ruse. That deception was to use the now depleted
Japanese carrier forces that had suffered unrecoverable naval aviation losses in planes
and aircrews at the Marianas Island. Knowing that dangerously impulsive Admiral William
F. Halsey commanded the enormously powerful American Third Fleet, the Japanese felt
that if they could make Halsey believe that the toothless carrier force was the primary
threat to the Leyte landings and move away from the Leyte area, the chances for their plan
to succeed would considerably improve. The man they chose to command the force
(known as the Northern Force) was Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, a highly respected
advocate of Japanese naval aviation who had a fine war record. A cruiser force under the
command of Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima was to follow Nishimura and provide any aid he
might need. The Japanese sent every ship they could spare. Although the Imperial
Japanese Navy had suffered terrible losses in ships, planes, and men since Pearl
Harbour, the fleet they deployed to defend the Philippines against American invasion was

65
still an awesome force to be reckoned with. It had one fleet carrier, three light carriers, six
battleships, 13 heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, and 35 destroyers for a total of 67 ships.
The Americans assembled an even more powerful force of ships, aircraft, men and
materiel to attack the Philippines. Leading the way was the Third Fleet under Halsey’s
command with eight fleet carriers, seven light carriers, six fast battleships, six heavy
cruisers, eight light cruisers, and 61 destroyers. The Seventh Fleet, under the command of
Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, supported the landings with a powerful force of six
battleships, 16 escort carriers, four heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 48 destroyers or
destroyer-escorts, and 39 PT boats. The total number of American warships was 213
resulting in a 3:1 advantage in ships over the Japanese fleet.

Command Structure

7. American Structure. The American command structure, placed at Annex ‘D’

had two senior commanders in charge of the operation: General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander South-West Pacific and Admiral Chester W Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet. Reporting to Admiral Nimitz was Vice Admiral William Halsey who
commanded the Third Fleet. Halsey had two key commanders reporting to him: Vice
Admirals Marc Mitscher and Willis Lee. Mitscher was a naval air power advocate who had
a highly distinguished record as commander of the carriers throughout the Pacific war.
Vice Admiral Lee had served with distinction at Guadalcanal as commander of battle lines
through the Battle of the Philippine Sea. MacArthur commanded the forces responsible for
the actual invasion of Leyte Island and to directly support the landings. Reporting to
MacArthur was Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid as commander of the Seventh Fleet, who
had been in command of what had been known as “MacArthur’s Navy” during the
General’s historic drive up New Guinea’s northern coast. Reporting to Kinkaid was Rear
Admiral Thomas Sprague, who commanded three escort carrier task groups with the call
signs of Taffy 1, 2, and 3, which provided air support to the ground troops and one of
which, Taffy 3, played a pivotal role in the upcoming confrontation. Another commander
reporting to Kinkaid was Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, who commanded the ships that
would provide fire support for the invasion. The landing force itself was under the
command of Vice Admiral Thomas S. Wilkinson with Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf
commanding the Battle Line that later achieved an overwhelming victory in Surigao Strait.
The combined American naval force was the most powerful ever assembled since the
invasion of France in June 1944. As the ships from both sides prepared for the impending
conflict, American submarines moved their assigned patrol stations to watch out for the
approaching Imperial Japanese Navy.

8. Japanese Structure. The Japanese command, placed at Annex ‘E’ was highly
unstructured that reflected the desperation they faced at that time in their war against
America. The orders that each Japanese commander received were not more specific
than to destroy the American landings. There was no person in overall command. The
SHO-1 plan involved a co-ordinated attack of the three surface forces of the Japanese
combined fleet: The Central Force (First Strike Force “A” and “B”) comprising five
Battleships, twelve Cruisers and fifteen Destroyers under Vice Admiral Kurita; the van of
the Southern Force (Strike Force “C”) comprising two Battleships, one Cruiser and four
Destroyers under Vice Admiral Nishimura: and the rear of the Southern Force (Second
Strike Force) comprising three Cruisers and four Destroyers under Vice Admiral Shima. A
fourth force designated the Northern Force under Vice Admiral Ozawa and comprising four
Carriers, two Battleships, three Cruisers and ten Destroyers was to act as a deliberate
decoy for Vice Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet. In addition, the Japanese committed to action
virtually all that was left of their operational land based Air Force, which included

66
approximately 500 to 700 aircrafts. The SHO-1 plan relied on precise timing of each
force’s movements. If anything should happen to change that timing, there was no
forethought for any changes in the plan. That task would be the responsibility of each
commander. Since Japanese naval training never provided for contingency planning if
something should go awry, to ask each Japanese commander to change his plans without
specific orders was counter to how they had been trained.

Plans

9. American Plan. The primary objective of the Americans was to drive a wedge
between Japan and its sources of oil in the East Indies. In addition, the American president
had made a promise in his pre-election campaign to liberate the Philippines from the
Japanese occupation. The Navy led by Admiral Nimitz was initially not in favour of a war
campaign in the Philippines, instead suggesting a campaign against Formosa, which
would have provided them a better opportunity to help the embattled Chinese and also
attack Japan with the help of aircrafts taking off from Formosa. However, General
MacArthur favoured an operation in Phillipines to keep the American Sea Lines of
Communication (SLOC) to Australia open while reminding the President of the impending
elections. President favoured Genral MacArthur’s strategy and accordingly amphibious
operations were carried out on the island of Leyte co-ordinated by Seventh Fleet under
Vice Admiral Kinkaid and supported by Third Fleet under Vice Admiral Halsey. The
Americans were aware about the possibility of a Japanese naval assault on Philippines
and thus shifted the patrol area of their submarines to keep a watch on the movement of
Japanese forces. The American plans were centred around the protection of San
Bernardino Strait, but the Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet was lured away by Japanese decoy
carrier force to Cape Engano. This lapse could have proved to be disastrous but for the
inability of the Japanese to exploit the situation and take advantage of it.

10. Japanese Plan. The Japanese command knew that if the Philippines were lost
then the war was also lost. They therefore drew up a desperate plan which risked their
remaining surface forces, but offered them a remote chance of destroying the American
invasion fleet and isolating the Allied ground forces on Leyte. Like many previous
Japanese operational plans it depended on the use of a decoy force. As related above, the
Japanese carriers were now all but impotent for lack of trained aircrew, and were therefore
the ships selected to play the most important decoy role. Vice Admiral Ozawa, with four
aircraft carriers and a dozen other ships, would come down from the North and draw off
the main American covering force. Meanwhile two powerful battleship forces would
penetrate the Central Philippines and then converge on the invasion shipping in Leyte
Gulf. The southern and weaker of these battleship forces, commanded by Vice Admiral
Nishimura, would penetrate through Surigao Strait just south of Leyte. The more powerful
of the two battleship forces, the Central Force under the command of Vice Admiral Kurita,
containing five battleships including the giant Yamato and Musashi (the largest warships in
the world), 10 heavy and 2 light cruisers, and 15 destroyers, would penetrate through San
Bernadino Strait, sail down the coast of Samar, and fall on the American invasion fleet
from the north-east.

Phases of War

11. The Opening Phase. The first Japanese force to be located by American
forces was Adm Kurita's Center Force, encountered in the Palawan Passage early on 23
October by two US submarines, Darter and Dace. The Kurita’s force had unaccountably
failed to deploy destroyers in an anti-submarine screen ahead of his heavy ships. Thereby,

67
US submarines torpedoed and sank 2 heavy cruisers and severely damaged 1 Japanese
destroyer. On the other hand, while US forces were preparing their first strikes against
Kurita's force the northernmost of the three carrier groups of Adm Sherman’s came under
heavy air attack from Japanese aircraft based on Luzon. Three separate raids, each of 50-
60 aircraft, were repelled with very heavy losses by Sherman's fighters and AA fire, but
one Japanese dive-bomber got through and hit the light carrier Princeton with a bomb.
Later there was a huge explosion in her torpedo stowage and she had to be abandoned.
The explosion also damaged the cruiser Birmingham, which was alongside the carrier
giving assistance.

12. Engagement in Sibuyan Sea. The opening phase was followed by the Battle of
the Sibuyan Sea in which the 3rd Fleet attacked the Center Force repeatedly during the
day, making a total of 259 sorties against Adm Kurita's ships. This force should, according
to the Japanese plan, have had considerable land-based fighter cover during its approach
to the Philippines, but in fact Kurita was never provided with more than a token combat air
patrol, and, even though his fleet had a large number of anti-aircraft guns (each battleship
had 120 or more) their fire proved to be largely ineffective. Eighteen US aircraft were lost
in these attacks. The US carrier air groups concentrated attack on enormous Japanese
battleship Musashi and sank it. Cruiser Myoko also came under heavy attack and later
retired from the area. Several other Center Force ships received bomb hits, which caused
damage but did not substantially affect their fighting efficiency. However, still a very
powerful force consisting of 4 battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and a dozen
destroyers was fully operational and ready to fight. Later Kurita received a signal from
Admiral Toyoda, C-in-C of the Combined Fleet that all forces will dash to assist Kamikaze
operations, which eventually motivated Japanese forces to carry out all out offensive
against US Forces.

13. Engagement in Surigao Strait. The Battle of the Sibuyan Sea was followed by
the battle of Surigao Strait. During the battle, US Admiral Oldendorf with his force was
tasked to stop the Japanese Southern Force under Adm Nishimura in Surigao Strait. Also
39 motor torpedo boats were deployed beyond the Strait, which could only make initial
contact reports, which were of great assistance. As Nishimura's ships entered Surigao
Strait they came under devastating torpedo attack from American destroyers disposed on
both sides of their line of advance and Japanese battleships were severely hit. The 2nd
striking force commanded by Vice Admiral Shima approached Surigao Strait about 40
miles astern of Nishimura’s force. It too came under attack from the Patrol Torpedo boats,
and one of these hit the light cruiser Abukuma with a torpedo, which crippled her and
subsequently withdraw. Oldendorf's force and the PT boats then followed the retreating
Japanese. Later Adm Oldendorf recalled his light forces from the pursuit. Less than ten
minutes later he received the astounding report that the 7th Fleet's escort carriers had
been surprised by the Japanese main force off Samar and were under heavy attack, a
report which meant that the invasion shipping in Leyte Gulf and the entire Leyte operation
itself was now in great danger.

14. Engagement off the Coast of Samar. At dawn on the 25 October three escort
carrier from the 7th Fleet's were operating off the east coast of Samar. In accounts of the
battle these units are generally referred to by their radio call-signs "Taffy One", "Taffy Two"
and "Taffy Three”. The threat from the Japanese Southern Force had been eliminated by
Oldendorf's force during the previous night, and Halsey's Third Fleet with its immense
strength lay to the north between the escort carriers and the Japanese Central and
Northern forces. Just before 7am Taffy Three came under surprise Japanese attack. Adm
Kurita then ordered "General Attack," permitting his ships' commanding officers to deploy

68
against the US ships on their own initiative and without referring to the flagship. This
meant that he lost control of the battle, and his giving such an order when his force was
already engaged in redeployment caused immense confusion within the Japanese
formation. Later Sprague ordered his three Fletcher-class destroyers to counter-attack the
Japanese formation. This they did with remarkable heroism and tenacity. Nonetheless,
with the weapons available to them, the aircraft succeeded in sinking three heavy cruisers
and damaging several other ships. These air attacks also played a vital role in support of
the destroyers in distracting the enemy ships from the escort carriers, forcing them into
evasive maneuvers, and disorganizing the Japanese formation. While Taffy Three was
fighting Kurita's ships, Taffy One was being subjected to the first organized suicidal attacks
by Japanese pilots commonly known as ‘Kamikaze’. Later that morning Taffy Three itself
was attacked by kamikazes. Four more of the 7th Fleet's escort carriers were damaged by
kamikaze attack on 25 October. Meanwhile, far to the north, 3rd Fleet was attacking the
Japanese decoy force in the Battle off Cape Engano.

15. Engagement in Cape Engano. Shortly before midnight 24 October, Halsey's

three available carrier groups made rendezvous off Luzon and began a high-speed run
northwards to strike the Japanese Northern Force. Halsey now passed tactical command
of Task Force 38 to Vice Admiral Mitscher. During the run northward the ships, which were
to form Task Force 34, were detached from the carrier groups and Task Force 34 was
officially formed, with Vice Admiral Lee as Officer in Tactical Command. This force swept
northwards in the van of the carrier groups. Halsey's intention was that they would follow
up with gunfire on Ozawa's ships. On 25th Oct, 3rd Fleet's attacks on Ozawa began.
Meeting little opposition, Task Force 38's air strikes continued until the evening. Mitscher's
aircraft had flown 527 sorties against the Northern Force and had sunk Ozawa's flagship
Zuikaku and two of the three light carriers, crippled the remaining light carrier, and sunk a
destroyer, as well as damaging other ships. Meanwhile, Mitscher's second strike was
approaching the Northern Force. Halsey in New Jersey received an urgent signal in plain
language from Adm Kinkaid saying that the 7th Fleet escort carriers were under attack off
Samar and that assistance from 3rd Fleet's heavy ships was desperately needed. This
was the first of a succession of pleas for help received by Halsey, which he ignored and
continued to ignore for nearly three hours, despite their including an alarming report that
the 7th Fleet battleships were low on ammunition. Halsey continued to the north with Task
Force 34, while the men of Taffy Three were fighting for their lives and the Leyte invasion
itself was being placed in jeopardy. Adm Nimitz was alarmed about the safety of the 7th
Fleet and considered that the 3rd Fleet battleships should be in action off Samar. He
eventually persuaded Halsey to turn Task Force 34 around and send it south again
although it was by that time too late. At about 2310 the US submarine Jallao torpedoed
and sank the light cruiser Tama of Ozawa's force. This was the end of the Battle off Cape
Engano, and apart from some final air strikes on the retreating Japanese forces on 26
October the end of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

Battle Losses

16. US Forces. The American Forces lost six major warships during the battle. List of
lost combatants is as follows:

a. 1 x Light Carrier - PRINCETON

b. 2 x Escort Carriers – GAMBIER BAY and ST LO
c. 2 x Destroyers – HOEL and JOHNSTON
d. 1 x Destroyer Escort – SAMUEL B ROBERTS

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17. Japanese Forces. The Japanese Forces lost 26 frontline warships during the
battle. List of lost combatants is as follows:

a. 1 x Fleet Carrier - ZUIKAKU

b. 3 x Light Carriers – ZUIHO, CHIYODA and CHITOSE
c. 3 x Battleships – MUSASHI, YAMASHIRO and FUSO
d. 6 x Heavy Cruisers – ATAGO, MAYA, SUZUYA, CHOKAI, CHIKUMA and
MOGAMI
e. 4 x Light Cruisers – NOSHIRO, ABUKUMA, TAMA and KINU
f. 9 x Destroyers – NOWAKI, HAYASHIMO, YAMAGUMO, ASAGUMO,
MICHISHIO, AKITSUKI, HATSUTSUKI, WAKABA and URANAMI

THE BATTLE ANALYSIS

Strategic Analysis

18. The [SHO -I] Plan. The [SHO -I] plan was daring and desperate and in the face of
a far more powerful American Force, was dependent upon stealth and cunning, night
operations, and what air cover could be provided by land based planes operating from
Philippine bases and working in close conjunction with the Japanese Fleet. The success of
the American defensive effort, on the other hand, rested almost entirely upon a hastily
executed, last ditch effort by a skeleton force of lightly or improperly armed surface ships
and escort carriers. This is an opposition to the “planned” application of the principle of
war.

19. Japanese Striking Force Tactics. The Japanese had evidently planned a
three-prong attack on allied forces in Leyte Gulf. The Northern Force (Carrier Force)
approaching from the Empire, the Central Force (Main Body) to exit from San Bernardino
Strait, and the Southern Force (Troop-laden Leyte Reinforcement Force) approaching from
the South to emerge from Suriago Strait were all to concentrate toward a predetermined
geographical and time focus. All these three forces were divided into two groups. In
practically, all of the major engagement made by the Japanese Forces has divided into
groups. The approach of three forces from different directions and the divisions of forces
into two groups was referred by the Americans as the “Japanese Striking Force Tactics,
‘know your enemy’”. Japanese followed this “Striking Force Tactics” to divert and restrain
US forces on one side, and then attack suddenly from the flank.

20. Number of Carriers in Northern Force. The Northern Force, under the Viice
Admiral Ozawa, included four carriers, two battleship-carriers, three cruisers and ten
destroyers. Northern Force was to sail south (from Japan) toward Luzon and lure the
American Third Fleet away from the Leyte beachhead, clearing the way for the Central and
Southern forces. The reasons for the presence of the carriers in the Northern Force is still
a matter of debate; whether they were expecting the early return of their air groups from
re-servicing ashore, or, alternately, the arrival of replacement groups. Surely, the number
of carriers present was not necessary to maintain the combat air patrol in the numbers
actually found over the fleet on the morning of 25th October. Unless the expectation was
as stated above, the Japanese made a grave error in not sending back, at best speed
during the night, those carriers denuded of their air groups.

21. Suicidal Attacks. The Japanese resorted to Kamikaze, suicidal attacks by

aircrafts, as a last desperate measure. Kamikaze, which in Japanese means “divine wind”,
were suicide squadrons organised by the Japanese Air Force in the last months of World

70
War II. Pilots flew their aircrafts, loaded with explosives, directly into US naval vessels.
Kamikaze pilots, sacrificing their lives in a last ditch effort to stop American advance, sank
about 40 American ships. The attacks were successful initially, but the poor training of the
pilots and effective measures adopted to ward them off, reduced their success.

22. Effect on World War II. The Japanese naval presence in South West Pacific
was almost annihilated in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Finally, on 21 Dec General Douglas
MacArthur announced victory and liberation of Philippines, thus fulfilling President
Roosevelt’s election promise. The battle secured the beach heads of the US sixth army on
Leyte against attack from the sea, broke the back of Japanese naval power and opened
the way for an advance to the Ryukyu Islands in 1945. The losses suffered during the
battle severely restricted the ability of Imperial Japanese Navy to operate in waters away
from the shore. This restricted them to a coastal defence role leaving the oceans free for
the allied forces. The loss of mighty battleships was a huge psychological blow, from which
the Japanese never recovered. Frequency of Kamikaze attacks started increasing due to
their limited success in the battle, and losses suffered by the Americans due to Kamikaze
strikes increased. The oil sources in East Indies were cut off from Japan and severely
limited Japanese war efforts. This paved way for an American invasion to Japan and
remained in the same state till cessation of hostilities.

Tactical Analysis

23. Use of Sub-surface and Air Power. The Central Force (under Vice Adm Kurita)
was attacked in the Palawan Passage by submarines on 23 Oct, and by aircraft from
Halsey’s Third Fleet on the following day in the Sibuyan Sea. These attacks sank one
battleship and two cruisers, disabled two cruisers and seriously disrupted the timing of the
Central Force’s co-ordination plan with the Southern Forces. The van of the Southern
Force (Striking Force “C” under Vice Adm Nishimura and rear of the Southern Force, the
Second Striking Force under Vice Adm Shima) was intercepted in the Surigao Strait before
dawn on 25 Oct, and “was utterly routed and nearly destroyed”. The rear of Southern
Force never caught up with the van; nor did it engage any US ship in Surigao Strait.

24. Security of San Bernardino Strait. Mistakenly believing that the Central Force
no longer posed a threat, Admiral Halsey took off in pursuit of the decoy Northern Force
with the Third Fleet, leaving the San Bernardino Strait unguarded (unknown to the Seventh
Fleet Commander). Consequently, the “battered but still powerful Central Force” sailed
through the Strait unopposed in the early hours of Oct 25th, attacked a Seventh Fleet
escort carrier unit (Taffy III), off the coast of Samar, sinking four American ships.

25. Efficient Air Crews. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf, American held the advantage
in all categories of warships except heavy cruisers. In addition, carrier air power was by
then clearly the striking power of the fleet, and contributed significantly to American victory
at Leyte. Although the Japanese still possessed a significant number of large carriers, they
no longer had the experienced air crews to man them.

26. Anti-Aircraft Disposition. The threat of the Japanese suicide bomber, which
places the brunt of the anti-aircraft defence burden on the ships being attacked,
necessitated reconsideration of carrier task group AA disposition. Disposition 5-V, which
proved so successful against torpedo attacks, was found to provide inadequate protection
against dive and glide bombers, and more specifically, against suicide bombers. In 5-V
disposition on which the task group 38 was formed, the cruisers and destroyers were on
the 3000-yard circle, with one carrier at the center and three others on the 2000-yard

71
circle. This is considered too open a formation for effective gunfire support of the carriers
by either the cruisers of destroyers, which was evidenced by the fact that the planes dive
bombing the carriers were able to make their attacks without exposing themselves to
gunfire from the screen at ranges less than 6000-7000 yards. Against such attacks ships
of the screen found their high firepower capacity virtually helpless as a protection for the
carriers. The inadequacy of the standard AA disposition became more apparent in the
Leyte operation when Japanese pressed their dive bombing with fanaticism, resorting to
suicide dives against American ships.

27. Interception of the Japanese Aircraft. Almost all “raids” by Japanese were of the
“suicide dive” type from altitudes of 10,000-15,000 feet or above. The problem of
interception was intensified as it was not only necessary to intercept and disperse the
“raid”, but rather to destroy all aircraft before they were in a position to begin their dive.
The problem was more significant as most of these “raids” were made by two to three
aircraft rather than in large, easily detected groups. Great difficulty was experienced in
picking up the high altitude sneak “suicide raid” by single or two planes. The fact of being
close to the land where there was a limited distance in which to pick up “bogey”
indications, plus the lack of quick altitude information magnified the problem of “early
interception”. Added to these problems, was the fact that US aircraft were continually
going back and forth to the beaches. In consequence, it was relatively easy for Japanese
aircraft in “small numbers” to time their attacks to coincide with the return of US aircraft
and come in undetected until relatively close to the formation. When they got in close, they
were difficult of detection due to the movement of the own aircraft and a generally
“cluttered” screen. In this regard, it is suggested that in the future, flights do not return to
the ship from the objective area until fully rendezvoused and closed up so as to present
only one clearly defined friendly indication on the scope.

Characteristics of Leadership

28. Admiral Halsey. Admiral Halsey was not a fleet commander in the sense of
employing amphibious forces and escort carrier as well as battle forces, he was in fact the
fast carrier task force commander at Leyte, and not a very good one at that. He was
audacious by nature, prone to adhoc rather than detail planning, guilty of sloppy technique
and often vague despatches. These traits were applied effectively in the early days to raid
enemy island outpost. But he could not realise it in a complex war like Leyte. He had some
veterans of the central pacific offensive such as Mitscher, Lee, Bogan and Sherman but
Halsey too proud and too stubborn, lacked the good sense to utilise their experience. His
experience in carriers stemmed from pre-Midway days and from Salomons, when lack of
concentration anti-aircraft strength literally meant a carriers life. He became the first carrier
Admiral to lose an attack carrier as he took risk only within the inviolable rule of
concentration. Had Halsey been an efficient planner, he could have split his force in
groups to deal with Kurita and to handle Ozawa. But Halsey’s decision to move north was
a clear mistake, though every navy in the world has the destruction of enemy carrier as its
number one priority. Halsey was guilty of neglecting the safety and security of
safeguarding San Bernardino Strait, at least a destroyer patrol ought to have covered it.
After the war, equal blame was placed on Halsey and Kinkaid. Halsey being absent in the
north and Kinkaid failed to use own air squadron for search at a crucial moment.

29. Vice Admiral Kinkaid. Vice Admiral Kinkaid had no experience in long range
central pacific amphibious operations involving large surface forces. His position at Leyte
was to protect amphibious forces. The divided command set up at Leyte made co-
ordination more difficult, but Kinkaid had central pacific air support commander to advice

72
him and even their advice to launch a search to north was not executed expeditiously.
Again as long as Kinkaid did not have accurate and reliable information as to the location
of the enemy, it does not make sense to send all battleships to chase Nishimura
uncovering the beachhead. Kinkaid was not careful enough in this tactics. He took Halsey
too much for granted and left too much to the discretion of subordinates. Kinkaid’s
indecisiveness and inability to assess the situation properly could have caused much
heavier losses to the Americans, but for the gaffe by Kurita of ordering a “General Attack”
causing mayhem amongst the Japanese.

30. Vice Admiral Ozawa. Vice Admiral Ozawa was the only Japanese Admiral
who successfully carried out his mission at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. His assignment was to
take his Northern Force to a position north-east of Luzon island and lure Halsey’s Third
Fleet northward and leave San Bernardino Strait unguarded. Ozawa was one of the
leading advocates of naval aviation in the Japanese Navy. His carrier was filled with
distinction and conducted himself with dignity and honour. With the possible exception of
Yamamoto, Vice Admiral Ozawa was the ablest strategic thinker amongst the Japanese
Admirals, a quality which no doubt accounted for his appointment as a professor in the
Naval Academy in 1935.

31. Vice Admiral Kurita. Vice Admiral Kurita was the commander of central force
of Japan. He was an astute Military planner with thorough knowledge of Principles of War.
Creating a diversionary Carrier force as decoy was a masterstroke that went wrong. The
full responsibility of Japanese defeat rested with him for his failure to complete destruction
of the US warships and available amphibious shipping in the Leyte Gulf. Though initially he
was determine about his task and made all the right moves, adopted good tactics to
confuse the US forces and could even achieve surprise when he appeared at the Samar
Bay. But as Kurita was already rattled by the events unfolding in the preceding days, the
site of the enemy carrier made him despondent rather than eager, for he feared the
aircrafts. He started giving confusing orders that lead to poor gunnery by his ships. Even a
little resistance from the opponent caused him to lose heart, with the Leyte invasion fleet
just over the horizon and at his mercy, he turned away and returned home.

Lessons Learnt

32. A thorough study reveals following important factors that played a decisive role in
shaping the course of the battle:

a. Dogmatic approach to any situation may prove fatal.

b. Cooperation in mutual support operations is mandatory wartime function.
c. Flexibility in plans is a very important aspect of any warfare i.e. Operational
Plans should not be rigid.
d. Unified Command is necessary to avoid complicated situations and
confusions.
e. Forces must seek continuous Intelligence of the enemy to deny surprise.

Implication to Present Day Warfare.

33. The Battle of Leyte Gulf has significantly contributed to improvement in naval plans
during the later years. It was one battle in which the decisions taken by the commanders of
two opposing forces decided the course of battle. It was also one battle in which lot of new
innovative concepts adopted by the two forces. Use of submarines, in the beginning of the
battle, rattled Kurita so badly that he could not recover from the shock. Use of submarines

73
in offensive role has gained in prominence since those days and they continue to pose a
significant threat to major surface combatants.

34. Use of effective air power by the American Forces tilted the balance in their favour.
Japanese had the comfort of operating from land based air strips, but their pilots were
poorly trained. Kamikaze tactics proved successful initially but poor training reduced their
effectiveness. Air support is a crucial component of present day warfare and is used both
in defensive and offensive operations.

35. Use of effective communication is an important part and essential to have flexibility
in operations. Ozawa was successful in luring away the Third Fleet but he could not
communicate the success of his plan to Kurita resulting in disarray amongst the Japanese
Forces. The technology in communication has evolved over the years and all major forces
pay adequate attention to maintenance of reliable communication.

36. The operational plan is very important aspect of any campaign. Japanese had
devised plans for every eventuality, but the plans were extremely complex to understand
and execute. They lacked clarity and were ambiguous relying more on pre-conceived
plans and doctrines, also known as “Dogma Loop”. The lack of flexibility in planning was
overcome by Kurita, to a certain extent, by creating a diversionary force. Thus, the
unnecessary complexity led to the failure of operational plan.

37. The Japanese always looked for a decisive battle and wanted to engage the
American Forces in a single battle to decide the outcome. This concept led them to build
large battleships with enormous firepower, but these ships were sitting ducks for
submarines and aircrafts due to lack of support from other combatants. The Battle of Leyte
Gulf added to the realisation of supremacy of carriers over massive battleships. In present
context, carriers have a central role and are a bigger threat than the battleships.

38. Japanese believed in displaying false external appearances in order to set a trap for
the opponent while keeping the true objective hidden, as was demonstrated by Ozawa’s
Northern Force. The use of diversionary tactics and its effectiveness has brought this
factor into prominence in the present day warfare. The diversionary tactics used by the
Japanese was a combination of surprise and deception.

CONCLUSION

Summary

39. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the largest Battle in the Naval history fought in the
Pacific in World War II, in terms of involvement of large number of ships. The Americans
launched an amphibious assault on Leyte to drive a wedge between Japan and its oil
sources, and on the basis of intelligence input indicating Japanese defence to be weak.
This caused Japan to execute SHO-I, the plan for defence of the Philippine. The Japanese
assembled a force of 67 ships, which was numerically and technologically inferior to the
American Strength of 213 ships. There were conflicting opinions on the conduct of
campaign between General Mac Aurthur, who favoured an attack on Philippines and
Admiral Nimitz, who was in favour of Formosa. However, the president of the United
States favoured Mac Aurthur. The Battle was conducted in four main phases comprising of
engagement Sibuyan Sea, Surigao Strait, off Samar and Cape Engano. The Japanese
forces lost 26 front line warships, while the American loses was restricted in only 6.
Analysis reveals that the SHO plan was daring but very complex. The reason for presence

74
of the carriers in Northern Force is a matter of debate, because the number of carriers
present was not necessary to maintain combat air patrol. Kamikaze was introduced for the
first time during the Battle. The American made effective use of submarines and aircrafts.
Leaving of San Bernardino Strait unguarded was a terrible mistake which Admiral Halsey
had to leave with throughout his life. Inexperience of Japanese air crew proved a decisive
factor. The Anti Aircraft disposition of American Task Group made it susceptible to
Kamikaze. The Japanese tactics of sending Kamikaze in bunches of two or three proved
highly effective. In the end, despite having the foresight of preparing a defence plan for
Philippines, the Japanese lost the Battle of Leyte Gulf because of superior American
Forces and their own indecisiveness and lack of confidence in the face of action.

Legacy of Leyte Gulf

40. The Battle of Leyte Gulf proved to be the last great naval battle the world would
ever see. Great fleets would never confront each other as had been at Trafalgar, Jutland,
Punta del Este, Dogger Bank, and Surigao Strait. The battleship – once the primary
symbol of a nation’s power – had been rendered irrelevant. While they remained part of
naval fleets, they would be relegated to bombardment platforms in support of landing
operations and as a powerful artillery platform. Eventually they would be moth-balled,
turned into scrap, or transformed into museums. World War II changed the balance of
naval power to where naval aviation and the submarine would dominate the future of naval
warfare. No longer would battleships form battle lines and hurl huge shells at each other.
Future naval battles would be between ships and submarines, ships and aircraft, and
aircraft and submarines. The Battle of Leyte Gulf provides one valuable lesson. Human
decisions played the most important part in this great confrontation between two greatest
naval powers in war in the Pacific, not the size of fleets and the power of ships.

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 LIBERATION WAR OF BANGLADESH

INTRODUCTION

Initial Objective of Mukti Bahini & Effect of Naval Component

1. After the historic massacres by the Pakistan Army on 25 march 1971 many former
of Bengali officers and troops of the Pakistan Army had Joined Mukti Bahini. The initial
objectives of Mukti Bahani were:

a. To resist Pakistani Army through Bush attack.

b. Disrupt communications by destroying bridge, rails, roads etc.
c. Carryout clandestine attacks on Pakistan vital Installations like T&T, Post
Office, PDB, and Radio & TV stations.

Why those Objectives were not Effective?

2. The objectives of Mukti Bahini were not successful and did not bring result in their
favour because Pakistani troops were well equipped and well trained. They had
constructed strong defence around the cities, had continuous inflow of supplies of arms
and ammunitions and other essential through the SLOC.

Strategic Considerations

3. Since East and West Pakistan were two separate geographical entities more than
1,600 miles apart, the only way Pakistani forces in East Pakistan could be sustained was
through the sea. So the disruption of Pakistani SLOC through Bay of Bengal and
destruction of port facilities were the determinant factors of success against Pakistani
force.

Formation of Naval Components

4. Commandos. Eight valiant Bengali sailors, defected Pakistan Navy

Submarine PNS MANGRO under construction in France pioneered the formation of naval
element with the assistance of IN (Indian navy).

5. Naval Wing. Mukti Bahini Naval Wing was formed in Sep 71 at Haldia with
the defected Bengali sailors and volunteers with two harbour boats PADMA and PALASH.

Effects on the Total War

6. Commando Action. Naval Commando after necessary training was shipped

into East Pakistan on 10 August 1971. They carried limped mines, swimming gears, arms
and only means of communication-radio. On 15 August “Operation Jackpot” was launched
in Chittagong, Mongla, Chandpur and Daudkandi ports and made those ports out of action
by sinking ships. With that success they also carried out more hundred attacks including
“Operation Hot Pants”.

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7. Surface Action by Naval Wing of Mukti Bahini. PALASH and PADMA in Nov
and Dec 71 carried out a number of surface actions including:

a. Mining from Fair Way Buoy to Hiron Pt.

b. Interception of Mongla bound foreign ship.
c. Landing Operation in Mongla Port on 10 Dec 71.

8. Effects on the War. The Mukti Bahinis initially were suffering from the
absence of maritime power, but with the actions of Naval Commandos and surface ship
resulted following affects on war:

a. Inactivated Chittagong and Mongla ports and thus deprived Pakistanis from
supplies to conduct war.
b. Inactivated major inland ports thus disrupted their inland water
communication. Inland river routes were totally stopped by the fear of commandos.
c. Foreign ships refused to come to East Pakistan.
d. Commando and surface action drew much publicity in the international media
which prompted the support of international community on Mukti Bahini.

TASK FORCE OBJECTIVE IN THE EASTERN FRONT

9. The TF objectives in the Eastern front were as under:

a. Neutralization of Pakistan force in the than East Pakistan.

b. Disruption of SLOC.
c. The containment and if possible destruction of Pakistan Navy.

10. Accordingly their Course of action was:

a. Destruction of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar air fields.

b. Attack on Chittagong and Khulna Harbour and ports installation.
c. Bombardment of troop Concentrations in support of army operations in
coastal areas.
d. Amphibious landing, to support army operations.
e. Destruction of enemy shipping.

Accomplishment of Objective

11. Eastern Command ORBAT. The Indian Eastern command ORBAT included
the carrier VIKRANT, 3 DD/FF as her escort, 4 War ships, 2 Submarines, 1 Minesweeper,
5 Gun Boats and 3 Landing Crafts.

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12. Vikrant in Action. The Eastern fleet of Indian Navy operated in Bay of Bengal
without any opposition. Starting on 04 Dec INS VIKRANT launched series of air strikes on
variety of targets along East Pakistan’s coast. Using Seahawks by day and Alizes by night
the pressure was kept up by the aircraft carrier during the last leg of war. On the very first
day, raids were carried out over Ctg harbour, the outer anchorage and the airfield and the
airstrip at Cox’s Bazaar. During the raid the Indian succeeded inflicting considerable
damage to ships and shore installations. The gunboat Comilla was sunk and Rajshahi
severely damage during the air attack on the outer anchorage. On 05 and 06 December
carrier-borne aircraft carried out attacks on Ctg, Khulna and Mongla harbours and at ships
in the river. Gunboat PNS Jessore and another riverine boat were sunk in Khulna. The
other three maneouvre into mangrove thickets and stayed hidden. The oil installations at
Ctg caught fire and the Greek merchant ship THETIC CHARLIE was sunk at the outer
anchorage. In strikes over Ctg on 07 December the oil installations and damaged. Troop
concentrations in Barisal, Bakargonj and Patuakhali areas were subjected to attacks by
carrier aircraft on 08 to 12 December. Pounding of Ctg and Cox’s Bazar airfield and control
tower continued to stop any use of those by PAF.

13. Sinking of PNS GHAZI. Keeping the whole fleet at western theatre PN
considered sending very old submarine PNS GHAZI to Eastern theatre. PN probable plan
was if PNS GHAZI been able to sink or even damage the Indian aircraft carrier INS
VIKRANT, the shock effect alone would have been sufficient to upset Indian Naval plans. It
proved to be a very foolish plan. The ill fated PNS GHAZI under the command of Cdr Zafur
Mohammad Khan alongwith 82 crews sunk off Visakhaptnam before the Indo-Pak war
broke out on 3 Dec 1971. Though Indian Navy claimed the destruction of PNS GHAZI but
the mystery surrounding the circumstances in which it sank will ever be unveiled.

14. Amphibious Landing in Cox’s Bazar. Fearing a possible amphibious landing, the
approaches to Ctg were mined by the Pakistan Navy from 7 to 12 December. It denied to
Indian naval forces direct access to Ctg port for a long time even after the 16 December
1971. Indian Amphibious Group made an amphibious land on 15 and 16 December at
Cox’s Bazar to cutting off the line of retract of Pakistani troops.

CONCLUSION

15. By all standards, the emergence of Bangladesh was a major event in the post
Second World War era. Initially the combined efforts of Mukti Bahini without the maritime
component could not bring much success. But joining of naval component and the Eastern
Fleet action by isolating East from the essential supplies of food, ammunition, arms and
other reinforcement, Pakistanis had no hope of winning. It was the sea power which was
the determinant factor for winning the war of 71 and liberation of Bangladesh.

16. The lone threat for eastern fleet, during 71 was submarine GHAZI, which was sunk
on the night of 3/4 Dec 1971.

17. On 02 Dec 71, Indian Fleet moved close to Bangladesh coast. From then onwards,
the Naval aircraft Sea Hawks of VIKRANT wrecked the military facilities at Cox’s Bazar,
Chittagong, Mongla Khulna. Barisal, Patuakhali and suspected moving craft on river/sea
routes till 12 Dec 71. Eastern naval fleet conducted an effective blockade and Chittagong
port was put out of action.

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 NAVAL ASPECTS OF LIBERATION WAR

INTRODUCTION

1. The freedom and legal right of any nation cannot be suppressed by power and
might. Obviously it comes out at some time at some stage. In the same way freedom of
Bangladesh could not be restrained by Pakistan government merely with their military
might. To achieve victory in a war, naval operations can play a vital role as it has got multi
dimensional flexibility. It can give surprise when the enemy is not aware. Though, naval
service, better known as ‘silent service’, performs its roles beyond public eyes. People are
not aware of the ‘sui genries’ of naval action in any campaign or war. Sea line of
communication for a maritime country like Bangladesh is vital for the sustainability of a
military force which was confined by the hostile land boundary neighbor and antipathy
civilian population. So disruption of sea line of communication caused great havoc to the
occupying forces. Though the naval activities are not visible from the living area but their
role in a war cannot be under minded. Rather the absence of our small naval elements in
the liberation war could bring a different scenario.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2. War does not wage within a day. People never get their right unless asked or
established. If we look back to our history we can easily understand the tragic
chronological sequences which led our people to draw arms in 1971, which were:

1947 - Partition of the Sub-Continent.

1952 - Nation’s Language Movements.
1966 - Six Points Movement.
1969 - General Mass Upsurge
1970 - General Election and Dissolve of National Assembly
07 Mar 71 - Historic Speech of Bangabandhu
25 Mar 71 - Pakistan Army’s Crack Down

3. Partition of Sub-continent. In 1947, though this sub-continent got

independence from two hundred years of British repression but the Bengali’s fate
remained unchanged. Bengalis were repressed and suppressed by the Pakistani rulers as
like their predecessor. It can be seen from a comparative statement of two wings:

SECTOR WEST PAKISTAN EAST PAKISTAN

Annual growth 8% 4%
Private investment 75% 25%
Export income 30% 70%
Import expenditure 75% 25%
Government revenue expend (tk) 5000 (CORE) 1500 (CORE)
Educational expenditure 73% 27%
Employment in Army 95% 5%
Employment in Navy 91% 9%
Employment in Air force 89% 11%
Armed forces strength 5,00,000 45,000
Big Industry 82% 18%
Development expenditure 78% 22%

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4. Language Movements of 1952. The Pak ruler even tried to change our
mother tongue from Bengali to Urdu as they wished. But the Bengalis shed their blood on
the street to stop this Pakistani inhuman demand.

5. Six Points Movements. Step by step Bengalis became united under the dynamic
leadership of Sheikh Muzibur Rahman and raised specific six points program in 1966,
demanding autonomy for eastern zone.

6. General Mass Upsurge. As the suppression and repression was going on in the
same way and all the demands of the Bengali were just thrown off, so the movement turn
into a general mass upsurge in 1969.

7. General Election and Desolve of National Assembly. Due to the mass

upsurge, Pak ruler compelled to hold General Election in 1970. In that election Sheikh
Muzibur Rahman of East Pakistan won the absolute majority. According to the
Constitution, Muzib should then rightfully form the government and become the Prime
Minister. But the Pak ruler declined to hand over the power. Here the political maneuvering
started and Pak Military Government tried to take time to divert the result into some other
way.

8. Historic Speech of Bangabandhu at Race Course. Sheikh Muzibur Rahman,

the nation’s Great Leader could fore-see that the rude Pak ruler would not hand over the
power and will go for military actions. So, he delivered the historic speech on 07 Mar 1971
in front of millions of people to get united and hold arms against Pakistani Government.
Here lies the indication of Liberation War.

9. Pakistan Army’s Crack-down. On the night of 25 March the barbarian

Pakistan military cracked-down on the unarmed innocent Bengali people and started
genocide. Then to resist surviving, the Bengalis confronted the Pakistani military and
practically Liberation War of 1971 started.

PAKISTAN NAVY IN LIBERATION WAR

10. In all the areas that Pakistan fought after its independence in 1947, the Army and
the Air force had remained the principal actors. In 1971 war, the world witnessed the
Pakistan Navy’s role which was small but significant. Most interestingly it was a measure
of Pakistan's attitude towards its navy that the navy was not even taken into confidence
regarding the planned military action in East Pakistan in March 1971, nor of the decision to
commence hostilities against India on 03 December 1971. Ironically this naval aspect later
proved to be one of the vital turning points for the West Pakistani Military Ruler to accept
defeat at East Pakistan.

11. Total naval activities of Pakistan Navy in the 1971 Liberation War may be
summarized as:

a. Supportive role to Army’s operations in inland waterways of East Pakistan.

b. Security of dock areas and port facilities of Chittagong and Chalna.
c. Raising a Marine Force which includes commando and assault battalions.
d. Ensuring operations of the IWTA along with its conservancy, pilotage and
hydrographic functions.
e. Protection of shipping traffic from the Persian Gulf to West Pakistan.

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 f. Trying to break the sea blockade in Eastern Theatre to keep sea line of
communication open between West and East Pakistan.
g. Seaward defense of the port of Karachi in the time of war with India.

12. The naval strength that Pakistan Navy had in East Pakistan was very insufficient.
Like the economic, administrative and political disparities, West Pakistan neglected East
Pakistan in naval aspect also. They gave very little attention to develop the naval
infrastructure in this province to safeguard its two main seaports namely Chittagong and
Chalna. While Pakistan Navy was possessing one cruiser, 5 destroyers, 2 frigates, 4
submarines, 6 midget submarines, 8 minesweeper, 1 replenishment tanker and good
number of small crafts, they could spare only four patrol boats for safety of Chittagong and
Chalna ports.

War Fronts

13. Pakistan Navy’s activities can be brought under four main heading:

a. Inland water of East Pakistan.

b. Raising Marine Force.
c. War in eastern sea front e.g. at Bay of Bengal.
d. War in western sea front e.g. at Arab Sea.

Inland water of East Pakistan

14. From very beginning of the war the navy was involved with the other military forces
to suppress the freedom fighters of East Pakistan, not in active role but in supportive role
of Army operations.

15. On 26 March 1971, Captain M Saeed PN was detailed by Major General M Akbar
Khan, Director General of Inter Services Intelligence, to proceed to Dhaka to render urgent
assistance to the Corps Commander. Captain Saeed had earlier been posted in East
Pakistan and was familiar with the waterways which served as the major means of the
communication system in this delta region. On arrival at Dhaka, Captain Saeed was
directed by the Crops Commander to arrange movements of two battalions of 57 Brigade
by river from Narayanganj to Nagarbari, as the road link had been rendered too hazardous
for military movement and several of the bridges on the route had been blown up.

16. Proceeding to Chittagong by a special flight, Captain Saeed discussed the situation
with the then Naval Officer in Charge and returned to Dhaka with a party of experienced
CPOs, POs and essential technical personnel. Most of the LSTs and other craft of the
Army of Riverine Support Unit stationed at Pagla had been rendered unserviceable and in
any case their Bengali crew had deserted them all. Captain Saeed and his men made the
river crafts operational. Two battalions of 14th Punjab Regiment and 18th Frontier Force
Rifles were embarked late at night on 29 March and sailed for Nagarbari.

17. A major obstacle in the journey was non-availability of the up-to-date charts of the
inland waterways, combined with the fact that the river frequently changed course making
movement particularly hazardous for those unfamiliar with it. Most of the navigational
marks on the riverbanks had also been removed or tempered with and could not be relied
upon. The width of the river at places was up to 2 km and without proper knowledge of the
river depth the going had to be slow. To make matters worse, no experienced pilot was
available and the crafts were without echo sounders.

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18. Anyway the LSTs at last reached their destination late at night and the troops
landed at midnight of 31 March. The local population of Nagarbari mistook the troops for
Indians, presuming they had come to their assistance; the later took chance and played
havoc with massacre. Not unexpectedly, the army was extremely pleased with the naval
performance at the safe arrival of the troops and the services of Captain Saeed were
recognized with the award of SITARA-E-QUAID-E-AZAM.

19. How Pakistan Navy helped their counterpart of army during the war was unknown
to us. Throughout the whole 09 months of war period the army depended almost entirely
on the navy transport element to keep them going. It was required to provide mobility to
the army as almost all assaults against the freedom fighters had to be water borne. The
rail and road communication was in a state of disarray; hence logistic support too was
entrusted to the navy - not only for the army but also for the civilian administration. To
support in this commitment, navy acquired or requisitioned all available craft on an as
required basis. Converted numbers of IWTA crafts were fitted with variety of guns like
40mm Bofors, 20 mm Oerlikon, 50 mm Bofors and Chinese type 14.5 mm gun.

20. It may be mentioned here that while PN was looking for possible assistance to fight
against freedom fighter, Royal Saudi Navy came up with very generous assistance by the
help of Retd Cdre A Hameed who was Pakistani Ambassador in Jeddah. Two fast patrol
crafts of RSAN were donated to PN, which were commissioned as PNS SADAQAT and
PNS RIFAQAT. Though these were given to fight against Bengali but those could not be
shifted to East Pakistan for various unavailable reason.

Raising Marine Force

21. To show their commitment to the Military Junta PN managed to obtained approval
of government by June 71 to raise a Marine force for navy to subside the freedom fighter
of Pakistan. Cdr S H Khalid PN was selected as first project Officer and later to take over
command of the battalion. Selected volunteers from navy were dispatched to the Army
Infantry School at Quetta for 8 weeks course on motor and antitank weapons. Navy started
formation of marine as an integral part of the navy, much on the lines of the Royal
Marines, but smaller in size to tackle in their words, “Insurgency operations in East
Pakistan”. As they raised this force to handle the Bengali, the Marine Base/Depot was
planned to be stationed at East Pakistan and on 02 Dec 71 accordingly approval was
accorded to naming the marine base in East Pakistan as ‘PNS Haider’ at PSO’s meeting.

22. Though their plan could not be materialized due to early break away of East
Pakistan from West Pakistan, but a party of three came to East Pakistan on 27 Nov 71.
They carried out operations against freedom fighters near Juldia. The marines also took
over port security duties from the army on 05 December and took up position on Patenga
beach where they remained employed till the end of the war. Some of them were
employed on the anti-aircraft guns fitted in the oil refinery and airport area. On repatriation
from India, the battalion was disbanded as it had been raised excessively for East
Pakistan.

23. Three gunboats namely PNS COMILLA, PNS RAJSHAHI PNS SYLHET and the
improvised gunboat PNS BALAGATA were stationed at Chittagong. PNS JESSORE and
four improvised boats were stationed at Khulna. All those boats were used to support army
and sometimes used for limited operations in remote islands and to give security coverage
to ports all along the war period.

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War in Eastern Sea Front

24. India enforced a naval blockade in Bay of Bengal to confine the military forces
stationed in East Pakistan during the last leg of war. To enforce the blockade India
stationed all its Eastern Fleet including the aircraft carrier INS VIKRANT. It was classic
case of naval imbalance, as PN has kept only 4 gunboats and some improvised boats to
protect their Chittagong and Chalna ports. Keeping the whole fleet at western theatre PN
considered sending very old submarine PNS GHAZI to Eastern Theatre. Probable plan of
PN was if PNS GHAZI been able to sink or even damage the Indian aircraft carrier INS
VIKRANT, the shock effect alone would have been sufficient to upset Indian Naval plans,
which proved to be a very foolish plan. The ill fated PNS GHAZI under the command of
Cdr Zafur Mohammad Khan with 82 crews sunk off Visakhaptnam before the Indo-Pak war
broke out on 03 Dec 1971. Though Indian Navy claimed the destruction of PNS GHAZI but
the mystery surrounding the circumstances in which it sank will never be unveiled.

25. So, the Eastern Fleet of Indian Navy operated in Bay of Bengal without any
opposition. Starting on 04 December INS VIKRANT launched series of air strikes on a
variety of targets along East Pakistan’s coast. Using Sea Hawks by day and Alizes by
night the pressure was kept up by the Aircraft Carrier during the last leg of war. On the
very first day, during raids over Chittagong harbour, the outer anchorage and the airfield
and the airstrip at Cox’s Bazaar, the Indian succeeded inflicting considerable damage to
ships and shore installations. The gunboat COMILLA was sunk and RAJSHAHI was
severely damaged during an air attack on the outer anchorage.

26. On 05 and 06 December carrier-borne aircraft carried out attacks on Chittagong,

Khulna and Mongla harbours and on ships in the river. Gunboat PNS JESSORE and
another riverine boat were sunk in Khulna. The other three maneouvred into mangrove
thickets and stayed hidden. The oil installations at Chittagong caught fire and the Greek
merchant ship THETIC CHARLIE was sunk at the outer anchorage. In strikes over
Chittagong on 07 December, the oil installations had damaged. Troop concentrations in
Barisal, Bakergonj and Patuakhali areas were subjected to attacks by carrier aircraft on 08
to 12 December. Pounding on Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar airfield and control tower continued
to stop any use of those by PAF.

27. Fearing a possible amphibious landing, the approaches to Chittagong were mined
by the Pakistan Navy from 07 to 12 December. It denied Indian naval forces direct access
to Chittagong port for a long time even after the 16 December 1971. Indian Amphibious
Group made an amphibious landing on 15 and 16 December at Cox’s Bazar to cut off the
line of retract of Pakistani troops.

War in Western Sea Front

28. In Western Theatre, till the war started between India and Pakistan, they could keep
their sea line of communication open with Persian Gulf. During the war large naval force
concentration could not save the Pakistan Navy to embrace defeat. They lost their
destroyer PNS KHAIBAR and minesweeper PNS MUHAFIZ. Replenishment ship PNS
DACCA was severely damaged. In retaliation they could sink only Indian frigate INS
KHUKRI by torpedo attack from submarine PNS HANGOR. With the missile attacks by the
OSA class missile boats, Indian Navy succeeded to destroy Karachi Port and naval
installation considerably, which had great effect to the ultimate surrender of Pakistan in
Eastern Sector.

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 INDIAN NAVY IN LIBERATION WAR

29. Considering all the factors Indian Navy made simple but effective plan which was as
follows:

a. Attack from sea on Karachi and Chittagong harbour to shake down enemy’s
morale and assets at the first instance.
b. Destruction’s of enemy ships at sea and port to cripple their mobility.
c. Amphibious landing.

Indian Navy In the Western Theatre

30. The Western Fleet of Indian Navy was equipped with the more powerful missile
fitted units. The aim of Western Fleet was to deliver a blow to enemy ships and
installations. The assets of western theatre were as follows:

1 x Cruisers.
2 x Destroyers.
8 x Frigates.
2 x Submarines.
2 x Large Patrol Craft.
8 x Missile Boats.

31. On 04th December the Indian missile boats with speed in excess of 28 knots
approached Karachi in darkness and launched the Styx missile in the enemy positions and
ships. Pakistani officer on duty in the control room at Karachi failed to realise that it was a
seaborne attack. It led the fleet a biggest success. The Pakistani Destroyer PNS
KHAIBAR, Mine sweeper PNS MUHAFIZ was sunk and Karachi harbour and several
strategic installations was ablazed. Later on this historic attack was commemorated as
Navy day. After the attacks on Karachi, the sinking of the GHAZI and the exploits of the
VIKRANT, the first major blow to the Indian Navy came in the fateful night of 09
December. The INS KHUKRI was hit by more than one torpedo, possibly three, fired from
one of the Pakistan Navy’s Daphne-class submarine, the Hangor. The ship went down to
the Sea within few minutes.

Indian Navy in the Eastern Theatre

32. The task force of Eastern Naval Command formed as shown below:

a. Striking Task Gp
(1) 01 x Aircraft Carrier (INS VIKRANT).
(2) 02 x Frigates.
(3) 02 x Gunships.

b. Sub-surface Force
(1) 01 x Submarine.

c. Amphibious Gp
(1) 02 x Landing Ship.
(2) 01 x Aux Ship.

d. Local Defense Gp
(1) 01 x Gunship.
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33. Against all those force Pakistan had only 4 Gunboats in the Eastern Theatre. So
Pakistan Navy could not make any resistance to Indian Navy of Eastern Theatre.

Beginning of Operations

34. On 3rd December 1971, operation begins with the following famous FLASH signal:

FLASH FLASH FLASH

FM : FOCINC EAST
TO : ALL UNITS

// COMMENCE HOSTILITIES AGAINST PAKISTAN //

35. Just on the outbreak of hostilities by the aircrafts of INS VIKRANT started bombing
Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. In fact Indian Navy waged all out offensive operation against
Pakistani forces at sea, harbour and on land. The Eastern Navy’s great surprise was that
the Pakistan Navy’s only one long distance submarine was exploded near Vishakhatanam
on night 03/04 December.

36. On the other hand Indian Navy could apprehend one Pakistani merchant ship near
Pussur river entrance carrying Pakistani troops. Then Indian aircraft started bombing on
almost all of the Pakistani merchant ships. At one stage Indian Navy intercepted few
messages released by Pakistani troops to escape through sea under the cover of 7th fleet
of USA. As per that plan a Camouflaged Convoy, a tug with a couple of barges were
carrying the troops to escape, were completely destroyed by bombing.

37. Finally, Indian Navy carried out an amphibious operation at Cox’s Bazar on 15
December 1971. A well co-ordinated naval blockade was established. Continuous air
attack on gunboats, merchant ships at harbours, oil tankers, strategic installations, air
fields eventually brought down to a point where Pakistani forces had no other option but to
surrender.

COMMANDO OPERATIONS

38. Naval Commando Operations created an unimaginable significant step during

liberation war towards confirmation and acceleration of independence. Before and at the
beginning of liberation war Pakistan used to transport men and materiel to the then East
Pakistan for strengthening their force by sea and air. Once India put ban on Pakistani over
flights, Pakistani flights had to fly then via Colombo to reach Dhaka, which was almost
three times the distance they flew before. So, the best way of Pakistan was the sea route
because sea is a universal regime and sea route is free from guerrilla forces.

39. Commander-in-Chief of the Freedom Fighting Force, General M A G Osmani

realized the significance of naval operation against Pakistan. He divided the whole of war
field into eleven sectors. Among them sector 10 was naval sector. It covered all water-
ways, river ports, Coastal areas, Sea ports and Sea Territory. The prime objective of this
formation was to disrupt the communication system of occupying Army through our water-
ways. The initiatives to serve this purpose first came from 8 Bengali Sub-mariners. These
8 Submariners were undergoing training onboard Pakistani Submarine PNS MANGRO,
which was under construction in dockyard near Tolon in France. On 27 March 1971, when
they learnt about the declaration of liberation war from SHADHIN BANGLA BETER
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KENDRA through BBC, they decided to join Liberation War. They took the challenge of life
and after overcoming many difficulties finally they reached Delhi on 10 April 71.

40. General Osmani with the consent of Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed took the
decision of forming Naval Commandos. The training began with the first batch of Naval
Commandos consisting of 8 submariners, 357 freedom fighters and 8 other naval persons
who escaped from Pakistan Navy. That Commando Force was mainly a SUICIDAL
SQUAD. A total of 499 commandos were trained by the end of November.

41. For conduct of effective operations naval sector was divided into four task groups.
Those were:
a. Chittagong.
b. Chalna and Hiron Point.
c. Chandpur.
d. Narayonganj and Daudkandi.

42. Each task group was sub divided into four task units. Again each task unit was
further divided into 10 task elements and every task element consisted of three frogman.
All members of the then Naval Force were freedom fighter frogman.

43. On completion of first batch commando training and without wasting time the
commandos were divided into four groups:

a. Ahsan Ullah, ME-I led a group of 60 commandos to attack Mongla and Hiron
point.
b. A W Choudhury, RO(G)-I, at present retired Cdre A W Choudhury led a
group of 60 to attack Chittagong.
c. Badiul Alam, ME-I, led a group of 60 to attack Chandpur river port.
d. Abedur Rahman, Wtr-I, led group of 20 to attack Narayanganj river port and
Daudkandi.

44. On 15 August 71, it was a dark and deep night, there was silence all around. The
sentries were half asleep or dozing on the decks of ships. The current of rivers were in
their usual flow. In such natural moment, commandos fastening LIMPET MINES with their
chests, taking risk of own life, struck the mines with the targets. On that night they
destroyed and sank:

a. 5 sea going ships at Mongla.

b. 5 Vessels at Narayanganj.
c. 2 Ferry and 1 pontoon at Daudkhandi.
d. 10 Ships at Chittagong.

45. Remarkable success of Chittagong port was the sinking of M V ABBAS with 10,418
tons of war materials and M V ORMAZED with 9,910 tons of war materials on board.

46. This commando operation on night 15 August is known as OPERATION JACKPOT,

after this incident foreign news and broadcasting media circulated it worldwide. Naval
commando operations were highly effective. The Dainik Purbadesh circulated by Pakistan
Government was bound to publish flash news admitting the heavy loss done by the
destructive operations of commandos. The news of this operation was even published as
headlines on the first page of almost all distinguished newspapers of the West. New York

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Times published "Naval Commandos have sunk more than a dozens of ships, Seven
British ships have stopped all activities."

47. Before JACKPOT Operation the world communities were not much aware of our
Liberation War. Pakistan convinced the world communities that the condition was as
normal as it should be. But JACKPOT Operations of few hours of 15 August caused a
heavy shake in the world community. Then Liberation War took an extensive turn. It
brought great confidence to Bengali freedom fighter but on the other hand the morale of
Pakistani broke into pieces.

48. On 05 October 1971, representative of Pakistan Government appraised UN

Secretary General that "India is also trying to create conditions in East Pakistan by aiding
and encouraging the destruction of lines of supply for transportation of food grains into
Pakistan. As a result of operations against saboteurs who damaged the American food
ship "USS LIGHTNING" at Chalna anchorage recently, Pakistan authorities have
apprehended frogman trained in India and launched near Chalna and Chittagong port for
sinking ships".

49. Inspired by Operation JACKPOT, Naval Commandos subsequently carried out

more successful operations all over the country. They damaged/sunk ships, vessels,
pontoons, bridges, etc and severely disrupted Pakistan forces with their line of supply.

EMERGENCE OF BANGLADESH NAVY

50. “The importance of maritime power was never appreciated adequately and little
could be spared from the expenditure of the army and the air force to provide for the navy”,
said by Major General Fajal Muqueem Khan while evaluating by the role of Pakistan Navy
after the Liberation War of Bangladesh. It clearly indicates that Pakistan has always given
less importance to build up a strong navy in general and naval forces to protect East
Pakistan in particular. Our political leaders have always demanded to have Naval
Headquarters in the East Pakistan along with a strong naval fleet. These demands were
included even in the 21 points election manifesto of United Front in 1954 and also in 6
points demand of Awami League in 1966. But the Pakistanis never fulfilled these
demands. They had virtually kept 4 patrol crafts in Chittagong after the war against India in
1965 as a symbolic presence of navy. There were two small bases in Chittagong and
Khulna named respectively PNS BAKHTIAR (BNS ISSA KHAN) and PNS TITUMIR.

51. Lack of naval presence in the East Pakistan led the people of this country to carry
out naval commando operations which caused major setback for the occupation force.
Unlike army and air force no Bengali Navy Officer used to serve in the eastern part of the
country and there was no effective Naval Ship stationed in East Pakistan. So the
emergence of Bangladesh Navy during the liberation war was not by carrying out proper
tactical naval operations rather by commando actions and effective guerilla fight in the
river routes. The main concept of constituting a naval force came into being when 8
defected Bengali sailors joined the Liberation War. They planned to form a Naval
Commando Force and materialized it through Cdr M N Shamanta of Indian Navy. A good
number of naval sailors fought guerilla war. But these 8 sailors were always enthusiastic
and aimed to achieve greater success by incorporating water based warfare. As such Md
Jalaluddin a L/S proposed Cdr Shamanta to provide a gunboat for navy men to fight the
occupation force in the water ways of East Pakistan. Cdr Shamanta listened to this
proposition with astounding surprise. Demanding a patrol craft was very easy but it was
too difficult to provide. In international arena third party assisting a guerilla force is a secret

87
practice. Providing combat vessel to a guerilla force involves great risk of the disclosure of
third party’s identity to suffer diplomatic harassment. Cdr Shamanta satisfied the sailors
with word to discuss the matter with Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed of Bangladesh
Government but they had to successfully carry out Commando Operations first. On
completion of first successful organized commando operation on the night 15/16 August
1971 i.e. “OPERATION JACKPOT” it was formally decided to form Bangladesh Navy by
Mujib Nagar Government at the end of August 1971.

52. This decision, thereafter, was implemented by collecting two old pilot boats from
Indian government and was converted to riverine patrol craft from Garden Reach Shipyard
Calcutta. These 105 feet long, 35 feet wide boats having a speed of 15 knots were fitted
with 2X40/60 Canadian Bofors gun and provision was made to carry MK-II British ground
mine having pay load of 500 lbs on either side of the craft. Both the craft costed around
Taka 80 lacs of Bangladesh Government. On completion of renovation, these craft were
named as PADMA and PALASH in an unceremonious function at Netazi Subash Basu
Jetty, Calcutta. 49 Bangladeshi crew boarded the craft, off them 24 on board PADMA and
25 on board PALASH. Lt Cdr Roy Chowdhury of Indian Navy was entrusted with the
responsibility of operating PADMA and PALASH respectively as no Bengali Naval officer
was available at that time. These vessels were deployed for operation after some training
and exercise on basic naval tactics and gun firing at Sandhut, Calcutta.

53. PADMA and PALASH started their maiden voyage for carrying out real operation on
09 Nov 71 from Haldia Port to lay mine in Pussur river channel. At first PADMA and
PALASH went up to Hiron Point. Then both the ship/craft were turned back and went up to
Fair Way Buoy. Since Fair Way Buoy to Hiron Point – the navigable channel was marked
with 8 buoys so both craft dropped 4 mines each on the way back. Abreast to each buoy
one mine was dropped by the crafts. On completion of mining both craft steered towards
Haldia port. On the way they encountered a Mongla bound British Flag carrying ship City
of Alabans”. This ship was warned of mines in the channel. While she continued making
way for Mongla in defiance of the warning, she was fired upon and forced to follow the
wake of PADMA. On 10 and 11 Nov 1971 five ships were hit by mines and sunk in the
channel. Besides an EPR vessel named TOFAEL also sunk in the channel with 5 X
officers and 35X sailors of Pakistan Navy onboard. Success of PADMA and PALASH
together with commando operation could draw the attention of the world media at the first
instance. It also spread over the world that the channel leading to the ports of East
Pakistan were infested by mines.

54. To annihilate the enemy at PNS TITUMIR in Khulna, PADMA and PALASH along
with INS PUNVAIL and CHITRANGADA sailed towards Mongla under the tactical
command of Cdr M N Shamanta. On 10 Dec 71 at 0900 hours the Convoy INS PUNVAIL
CHITRANGADA, PADMA and PALASH reached Akram Point. Shortly before the arrival of
the Convoy, Indian aircraft carried out bombing over Mongla Port. It was decided earlier
that the ships will not enter Khulna before 1400 hours and while entering all ships will have
yellow clothes spread over it to assure the aircrafts as friendly vessel. But suspicious
enthusiasm of Cdr M N Shamanta led the ships enter before the planned time and PADMA
and PALASH were abreast to Khulna Shipyard at 1230 hours. Ships also did not spread
yellow clothes on them. So Indian aircrafts being allied force, bombed PADMA and
PALASH and sunk these ships. A Bengali ERA-IV Ruhul Amin sacrificed his life in
intrepidity while extinguishing fire on board PALASH and was awarded with “BIR
SHESHTRA”. To commemorate the day 10 December was declared as ‘Navy Day’ by
Bangabandhu SK Muzibur Rahman on 10 Dec 74 and awarded Bangladesh Navy its
Naval Standard. Virtually PADMA and PALASH were first naval fleet of BN and these

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crafts were engaged in a real war scenario. These crafts and its Bengali Naval Sailors
were the source of inspiration to build an organized naval force and its outcome is the
present Bangladesh Navy.

PRESENCE OF SUPER POWER

55. During the liberation war much naval tactical maneuvering did not take place in the
Eastern Theatre due to the dominance of allied navy. However in the Western Theatre few
engagements took place between Indian and Pakistan Navy while the allied force tried to
cut down reinforcement in support of the Liberation War of Bangladesh. As such at sea the
liberation war of Bangladesh turned to Indo - Pak naval war. Since America was tilted
towards Pakistan as stated by Admiral Zumwalt (Chief of the operation, US Navy) on 10
Dec 71 with a direct order of President Nixon, Task Force 74 was created consisting of US
Aircraft Carrier USS ENTERPRISE and few other appropriate escorts and supply ships.
These ships were stationed at Gulf of Tonkin and ordered to make way for Singapore.
Likewise the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean was raised the stakes in the game of
naval diplomacy. Up to 03 Dec both super powers had only a nominal presence. The
Soviet moved first by deploying 2 X SSM equipped ships from Vladivostok on 06/07
December to support the SSM equipped ships already deployed there. On 10 Dec Task
Force 74 consisting of USS ENTERPRISE, Amphibious Assault Ship TRIPOLI, 3 X Guided
Missile Escort, 4 X Destroyers, 1 X Submarine were sent to Andamans. In apparent
response to US Task Force the Soviet’s deployed another Task Group consisting of a
Kresta class Cruiser and a Kashin class Destroyer and 2 X Submarine on 12 to 13
December. The deployment of both sides can be seen as an attempt to convince the both
allies and adversaries of the strength of the respective commitment to the area. The
presence of super power’s naval forces at the last stage of our liberation war though posed
some threats of a massive war but could not so happen because of the balance of power
within the super powers. Moreover since the occupation force surrendered and East
Pakistan was freed from Pakistan so the super power found no more interest to go for
unnecessary war.

CONTRIBUTION OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

56. Naval operations, consists of commando actions and few riverine tactical naval
actions achieved great success towards the liberation war. Though all the operations were
carried out directly or indirectly in support of Indian Navy yet the main striking force or the
personnel engaged on those operations were the gallant Bengali Naval Commandos.
Among the huge contribution of Naval operations towards independence the salient aspect
are appended below:

a. During the ongoing liberation war all on a sudden the massive destructive
action by naval commandos surprised the occupation force to the extreme limit.
Therefore, West Pakistan lost lots of ships, crafts, logistic support and personnel.
b. The guerilla attacks by the naval commandos in the riverine routes created
tremendous deterrence among the occupation force which ultimately handicapped
them from free movement.
c. Successful Commando operation in the mid August caught the attention of
the whole world for the first time though Liberation War started since March 1971.
Reputed international daily's like 'New York times', ‘Daily Telegraph’, 'Hindustan
Standard', ‘Washington Post,’ etc largely published those operations and thereby
brought them to the notice of international agencies. This ultimately created fear
against the foreign shipping agencies and severely discouraged them to come to
Chittagong and Mongla Port.
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 d. Naval blockade imposed by the allied navy in the Eastern Theater broke the
sea lines of communication. So occupation forces were isolated and could not come
out from the Western Theatre.
e. Frequent effective commando actions seriously restricted the free movement
of occupation force inside east Pakistan through land and riverine routes.
f. Active involvement of Indian Navy in the Western Theatre did not allow PN to
launch offensive actions in Eastern Theatre and carry out reinforcement.
g. Operation Jackpot, sinking of PNS GAZI, massive operations by Indian Navy
on 03 & 04 December, amphibious landing and other successful naval commando
operations crumbled down morale of occupation forces.
h. In all around the successful naval operation jointly by our naval commandos
and Indian Navy disarrayed the command and control of occupation forces which
ultimately led to their surrender.

LESSON LEARNT

57. The lesson we have derived from the naval aspect of our liberation war are:

a. Guerilla warfare and covert commando actions can render highest

achievements than that of a conventional warfare in a country like our topographical
condition.
b. Strong naval force is required to protect and maintain uninterrupted sea lines
of communication for a country hugely extended towards sea like Bangladesh.
c. To derive a war strategy in general and naval strategy in particular,
maximum emphasis to be given for using of water/river routes for movement of any
occupation forces in a country which is criss-crossed by hundreds of rivers and
canals.
d. For handling of commercial transport trained and expertise naval person can
play vital role in wining a war which may takes place in a country like Bangladesh.

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 NAVAL ASPECTS OF ARAB – ISRAEL WAR 1973

“All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,

but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.”

“He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent

and thereby succeed in wining, may be called a heaven – born captain.”
- Sun Tzu

INTRODUCTION

1. The seed of traditional enmity between the Arabs and the Jews inflamed with the
born of Israel in 1948. The Arab Israel wars were natural consequence of this enmity. The
Sinai Campaign in 1956 marked the first war between them. This resulted to a series of
conflict later days that culminated to the third war in 1967. This was the first large scale
offensive war by Israel where superpowers also played vital role. In this war Israel proved
her military superiority in an anticipatory strike against Arab countries. Israel extended her
territory seizing the strategic Golan Height, West Bank of river Jordan and the Sinai desert
upto Suez Canal. Finally, UN imposed the cease-fire after 6 days of war in consultation
with the super powers. This defeat of Arabs shuttered the moral of the Arab Countries
when they realized that the might of Israel was invincible.

2. The war of 1967 generated the strain that lasted for 6 years in the Middle East. The
Arab states continued to reclaim lost frontiers through diplomatic efforts. Simultaneously
the conflicting states enhanced their capabilities in terms of quality and quantity with the
assistance of superpowers. On the other hand, the loss of Israeli destroyer Eilat by the
Egyptian missile boat forced the Israeli military thinkers to adopt the new strategy of
warship design and electronic warfare technology. The defeat of 1967 expanded the
Arab’s awareness of Israeli military superiority and caused a revision of established ideas
as regards objectives and the means for achieving them. Finally, in search of identity on
30 November 1972 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat took firm decision to go to war in
1973. This decision was based on the basis of statements of the state of readiness of the
Egyptian armed forces supplied to him by the new minister of the war and C-in-C General
Ahmed Ismail Ali, it was decided that Egypt has reached a sort of tactical military similarity
with Israel. Egypt and Syria planned a combined attack on Israel.

3. It was Saturday, 06 October 1973 and 10th of Ramadan when Egypt and Syria
launched a surprise attack on Israel which marked the beginning of the 4th war between
the Arabs and Israel. This war is known as the ‘War of Ramadan’ to the Arabs, since the
war commenced in the holy month of Ramadan. However, the Egyptian President Sadat
selected the code name ‘Sharara’ – meaning ‘spark’ – for the war, because his intention
was to use the war to rouse new initiatives in the Middle East. The code name for the
crossing operation was ‘Operation Badar’, named after the first battle of Islam fought by
the Prophet Hazrat Mohammed (SM) on 10th of Ramadan. To the Israelis, the war is
known as the ‘Yom Kippur War’, because it was not only a Sabbath day, it was also the
Yom Kippur day, the most solemn day of the Jewish religion when the war commenced.
Finally, to non supporter in the West, the war is known as the ‘October War of 1973’. The
defeat or the victory of this war is debatable, but it left lot of lessons for the world to learn.
Arab – Israel war is a massive 18 days war where all the 3 dimensions, ie land, air and sea
battles were evident.

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 STRATEGIES

4. Arab’s War Strategy. The Strategic aim of Arabs was to use the military force
to secure success in an offensive attack to break the political stalemate. The initial aim of
the Egyptian Armed Forces was to cross the Suez Canal, establish a limited bridgehead
on the eastern bank and exploit the situation further according to development. Likewise,
the Syrian forces aimed at capturing the Golan Heights and then exploit the situation for
further political solution. In both the cases the aims of the naval forces were to support the
operation on land by shore bombardment, commando operation.

5. Egyptian Strategy. Admiral Ahmed Fuad Zekry, the Commander of the

Egyptian Navy, had the naval war plan approved by President Sadat in January 1973. As
per the strategy of the plan, few submarines were sent to Safaga harbour in the Red Sea.
Egyptian valuable destroyers were sent to Libya and Aden harbour in-groups. The task of
Libyan group was to threaten the Mediterranean routes and that of Aden group was to put
blockade in Bab-El-Mandab to disrupt the shipping lines to port Eilat. To perform the naval
bombardment for supporting ground forces, Admiral planned to deploy some light vessels
fitted with multiple rocket launchers. The advantage of absence of minesweeper by the
Israeli Navy was fully exploited by planning a minefield near Sharm-El-Sheikh, at the
entrance of the Gulf Suez. The most vital element of the plan was secrecy and was
maintained very effectively till the outbreak of war on 6 Oct 1973.

6. The scanty composition and lack of war experience of the Syrian Navy, comparing
with that of Egypt and Israel probably did not demand any strategic consideration by the
naval planner during this war.

7. Israeli Strategy. The strategy was to hold the Sinai desert on the south and Golan
Heights on the north, which they captured in 1967 war. Holding of Sinai would deprive the
Egyptian to use these areas as forward bases for launching attack against Israel. At the
same time, they would be able to enjoy unlimited trade possibilities controlling Gulf of
Aqaba and the port of Eilat. The controlling of Sinai and Gaza strip would give better
access to the Mediterranean and Red sea, thereby establishing strengthened relations
with African and Asian countries. These would definitely isolate Egypt from the rest of the
Arab countries. On the north, occupied Syrian areas including Golan Heights would
deprive any Syrian initiative to launch any offensive attack against Israel. The Israeli
leaders sensed the Arab potentials for a counter attack in due course. But they did not
take the initiate to attack to earn the world’s politically sympathy; thereby maintaining a
defensive posture.

8. The Israeli Navy had undergone a total re-shaping taking the lessons of 67 war.
The Saar and Reshef class fast attack craft fitted with indigenous Gabriel surface to
surface missiles, along with co-ordinated air support, they developed a terrifying naval
strategy.

DEPLOYMENT PLAN

9. Arab’s Deployment. The Egyptian President called Admiral Ahmed Fuad Zekry
back to navy from retirement and appointed him as Chief of the Naval staff. Admiral Zekry
carried out extensive evaluation of situation and also analysed the developments of Israel
Navy. He carried out number of sea exercises in the Red Sea and in the Mediterranean.
Finally, Admiral Zekry prepared a comprehensive war plan which was approved in January
1973. As per the plan, few submarines were deployed to Safaga harbour in the Red Sea.

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Egyptian destroyers were sent to Libya and Aden harbour in groups. The task of Libyan
group was to threaten the Israeli interest in the Mediterranean routes. The Aden group was
assigned to effect blockade in Bab-El-Mandeb to disrupt the shipping lines to Israeli port
Eilat. The plan earmarked some light vessels fitted with multiple rocket launchers for shore
bombardment. A minefield near Sharm-El-Sheikh, at the entrance of the Gulf of Suez was
planned. The most striking element of the plan was secrecy, which was planned with
remarkable efficiency and maintained very effectively till the outbreak of war. The Syrian
Navy lacked in experience and training. Its deployment plan was basically tactical in
nature.

10. Israeli Deployment. Israel did not have any naval deployment plan. Her only
aim was to hold the Sinai desert on the south, Golan Heights on the north and Gaza strip
against enemy offensive. Israel deployed her forces as and when required to counter
enemy at sea.

COMPOSITION AND COMPARISON OF THE FORCES

11. The composition and comparison of the two forces is attached as Annex A to this
service paper.

APPLICATION OF NAVAL STRATEGY

12. Command of the Sea. The absolute command of the sea could not be
established by any of the belligerents. Both geographical disadvantages and the
composition of the naval forces were not in favour to have full command of the sea. The
common land boundaries of the contestants were another strategic hindrance to the
command of the sea. The fear of super power’s direct involvement also prevented both
sides not to aspire any ambitious level of command at sea. But both Egyptian and Israeli
navies enjoyed sufficient degrees of command the sea. However, the Israeli Navy
dominated the sea at the end of the war. For instant, from 18 Oct onward, the Israeli Navy
could go very near to the Syrian coastline launching attacks on various installations at
Latakia, Tartus and Banias with their 76-mm guns.

13. Sea Lines of Communication. The rapid consumption of war materials was to be
replenished for the both sides. Thousands of ton equipment reached the belligerents
during the war. It was the maritime task to ensure the safe and timely arrival of these
materials. Some supplies were reached by air but these also required the naval supports.
For example, to feed the Israel with air supply from Azores, 3 of the US carriers were
strung in the Mediterranean to render navigational assistance and defense against
possible threats.

14. Sea Denial. The sea line of communication was important for both the contestants,
but none directly challenged the military shipping of the opposition’s large ally. But both
sides were active in use of the sea but the Israelis were more active in sea denial, sinking
Egyptian ships which had disrupted the Israeli shipping.

15. Blockade. The inadequate composition, limited range capabilities of both the
contestants and the geographical configuration did not allow to establish formal blockade
in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, Israel considered the war to be very short and a
blockade would hardly have any effect on the war. However, the Egyptian had the
sufficient capacity to implement military blockade against Israel. In the first week of Oct 73,
a group of ships was sent to Libya to threaten the Israeli supply routes in the

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Mediterranean. But the Egyptian commerce blockade at Bab-El-Mandab established from
11- 13 Oct, was very effective. Three of the destroyers were stationed near Aden harbour
and were supported by the smaller ships for these purposes. These were also assisted by
two submarine Chasers, two minesweepers and three landing craft of South Yemen Navy.
As good as 2 ships were stopped and searched for any strategic materials needed for
Israeli war effort. Some of them were turned back including one US freighter La Salle. This
blockade was further strengthening by a minefield near the state of Tiran. An Israeli
Tanker was reported to be sunk in that minefield. The Israeli oil sector was known to be
effected most badly owing to the Egyptian blockade at Bab-El-Mandab. At the end of the
war the 42-inch oil pipe line from Eilat to Ashdod, on the Mediterranean was reported
empty, as no oil could reach to Israel through Bab-El-Mandab. This blockade totally cut off
the Israeli trade through the Mediterranean.

16. Protection of SLOC. Traditionally Israel had two sea lines of communication
(SLOC); one in the Red sea and the other in the Mediterranean sea. During the war Israel
could enjoy partially the Mediterranean port Haifa. But the port Eilat in the Gulf of Aqaba
was totally closed throughout the war due to effective blockade imposed in the Bab-El-
Mandab by the Egyptian Navy. The Israeli Red sea fleet could not reach up to the
blockade area due to their limited range capabilities.

17. Naval Diplomacy. Both the Soviet and US fleets took various dispositions and
manoeuvred to influence the maritime activities of each other. Soviet Navy deployed their
th
carrier based surface attack group to deter the possible US intervention by US 6 fleet’s
amphibious assault helicopter carrier IWO JIMA.

NARRATIVE OF THE ENGAGEMENTS

18. None of the combatants had sufficient naval forces or opportunity for a major naval
engagement during the Arab - Israel war. The record of their activities is replete with
claims and counterclaims and the exact toll paid by the combatants is impossible to
determine. However, the following naval engagements were evident during the war.
Details of weapons and sensors used by the belligerents are attached as Annex C to this
service paper.

Missile Boat Engagements

19. A number of missile boat engagements were encountered during first six days in
the war. Among those, Battle of Latakia and Battle of Damietta were prominent.

a. Battle of Latakia. This was the first missile boat engagement in the naval
history. On the night of 6/7 October, a force of 5 Israeli missile boats set out to
patrol the coast of Syria and move north past the Lebanese coast, parallel to the
Syrian coast. A Syrian torpedo boat to the north was identified and opened fire by
Israeli Navy and the Syrian torpedo boat sunk. After that Israel deployed their forces
to carryout sweeping towards the Syrian coast opposite of Latakia. As the force
closed in on the coast, it sighted a minesweeper which was engaged by Israeli ship
Reshef with missile and the minesweeper sunk. Another engagement south of
Latakia developed when the Syrians opened fire with missiles at 37,000 meters. But
they could not hit the targets. The Israeli boats fired and continued to advance to
achieve their maximum Gabriel missile range. The Israelis claimed that one Syrian
OSA, two Komar, one K-123 torpedo boat and one T-43 minesweeper were sunk,

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 all by Gabriel missiles. The battle of Latakia was the first missile boat engagement
in naval history, had been won by the Israeli Navy without sustaining any casualties.

b. Battle of Damietta. An Israeli flotilla consisting of six Saar missile

boats arrived off Damietta at 1846 hours on 08 October. They cruised around and,
supported by helicopters, identified an Egyptian group of four OSA missile boats at
2100 hours. After some manoeuvring, the first Egyptian salvo, of 12 missiles, was
fired at 0015 hours from a range of 40,000 meters, but none could hit their targets.
The Israelis quickly closed to 20,000 meters, the maximum range for their Gabriels,
and fired the missiles. Two of the Egyptian vessels were sunk by missiles within the
first ten minutes, and 25 minutes later the Gabriels claimed a third Egyptian craft as
it attempted to escape westward to Alexandria. The fourth successfully evaded the
Israelis and reached Alexandria. Egyptians claimed to have sunk four Israeli
targets, among them three they believed were motor torpedo boats and one missile
boat. As a result of this engagement, the Egyptians became duly respectful of the
combination of Israeli missile boats and Israeli helicopters.

c. Missile Boat Engagement on 10 October. Two missile boat clashes

occurred on the night of 10 October. In one incident, a group of Israeli Saars
bombarded installations at Tartous. Syrian missile boats suddenly emerged from
the harbour to attack the Israelis. After firing some missiles, the Syrians quickly
broke off the engagement and returned to the shelter of their harbour and the cover
of their coastal guns. The Israelis, who had fired back, claimed to have sunk two
Syrian missile boats. The same night six Saar missile boats ran into a group of
Egyptian missile boats off Damietta. The Israelis claimed to have sunk three
Egyptian boats in the exchange of fire, but the Egyptians denied this.

d. Missile Boat Engagement on 11 October. There were two missile boat

clashes at sea on the night of 11 October. An Israeli missile boat task force was
moving toward Latakia harbour. Syrian missile boats suddenly emerged, fired their
missiles, and then escaped back to the shelter of their coastal batteries, taking
refuge among the freighters of several nationalities at anchor. The Israelis
continued firing and hit three of the merchant ships. The Israelis claimed to have
destroyed four Syrian missile boats in this engagement, but the Syrian countered
with a claim of sinking eight Israeli craft. The second missile boat engagement was
off Tartous, wherein the Syrian navy employed similar tactics. As soon as the Israeli
Saars were sighted, the Syrian missile boats would rush out of the harbour at full
speed, fired their missiles, and then withdraw into the shelter of the International
merchant ships at anchor. After the twelfth there were no more missile boat clashes
at sea. The idea of overall engagement can be viewed from Annex B to this service
paper which contains the map of Egypt, Syria and Israel.

Amphibious Operation

20. On 22 October the Israel launched an amphibious attack on Gharghada harbour in

the Red Sea. Their purpose was to destroy the last Egyptian Komar missile boat still
operated in that area. Two Israeli commando boats managed to manoeuvre undetected
into a roadstead between reefs and sighted the Komar at anchor near the quay. The
Israelis fired at the Komar with antitank rockets from a distance of 50 meters. They did not
hit it, but this alerted the Egyptians, who opened fire on the Israeli boats from the shore,
causing one to go aground on a reef near the Komar missile boat. Meanwhile, an Israeli
antitank rocket struck the Komar, which caught fire and exploded. The Israeli boat was

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levered from the reef, and both the craft returned to their base near Sharm el Sheikh.
There were few Commando operations and Naval Gunfire support took placed during this
war. These are stated below:

a. After darkness on the 07 October, a group of Egyptian naval commandos in

five ordinary fishing boats landed to the east of the Israeli Budapest fort on the
coastal road. In the south of the Gulf of Suez, the Egyptians landed a number of
fishing boats near El Tur. They claimed the action was a feint.

b. On the night of 08 October, Egyptian commandos mounted a raid on the

Balmein oil rig, which was set in the sea near Abu Rodeis. They crossed the 16 mile
wide gulf after 1800 hours. They discovered that instead of having only four sea
legs, the rig had eight. So, the sabotage task took more time, and it was
accomplished by dawn.

c. Early on October 12, an Israeli commando group attempted a landing at

Hurghada. However, their boat was sunk by artillery fire near Geiftan Island, and
most of the Israelis drowned.

d. Early on October 14, the Egyptian Navy, in conjunction with the major
offensive from the Sinai bridgeheads, landed commando units on the north Sinai
coast, east of the north most Bar Lev Line stronghold, Budapest. The attack on the
stronghold failed, and the Israelis claimed that all the commandos were killed or
captured. The Egyptians, however, claimed that most of their commandos returned,
bringing five POWs with them.

e. In the morning of October 15, the Israelis mounted a commando raid on Ras
Gharib in the Gulf of Suez. They claimed that munitions dumps were blown up, and
about 20 commando landing craft destroyed. However, the Egyptians insisted that
the ‘landing craft’ were all fishing boats, and that were no armaments dumps at Ras
Gharib to be destroyed.

f. On the 16 October, the Israelis launched a large frogman raid on Port Said
harbour, which ended disastrously. They lost at least 19 men.

g. On the night of 18 October, the Israeli frogmen caused an underwater

explosion just off Beirut, which served two submarine cables, one of which went to
Alexandria and the other to Marseilles. This put out of action both the telex and
telecommunications from Damascus to the West.

h. On the last week of the war there were three or four raids on Eilat by
Egyptian frogmen. They caused little damage, but some alarm.

j. From 1800 hours on 06 October, the Egyptians carried out fire missions on
control targets and radar posts in the Sinai, thereby providing artillery ground
support. At 0100 hours, because of this bombardment, Israeli aircraft had to be
deployed against Egyptians ships.

k. During the night of 15 October, Israeli missile boats supported by helicopters

conducted naval gunfire missions against Egyptian radar stations and military posts.
Egyptian missile boats in Aboukir responded. When the Israelis attempted to close,
they were also engaged by coastal defense guns, which drove them away. The

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 Egyptians claim that one Israeli vessel, stuck on a sandbar, was destroyed by air
attack the following morning.

l. The Israeli Navy was busy in both the Mediterranean and Red Seas during
the night of October 17, shelling coastal defense command centers at Port Said and
at Ras Zafrana in the Gulf of Suez. Israeli gunboats raked the Nile Delta coast with
gunfire between Damietta and Rosetta during the night of October 19. During the
night of 21-22 October, Israeli Saar and Reshef boats patrolled off Aboukir Bay and
Alexandria harbour, taking Egyptian shore installations under fire and claiming that
two Egyptian reconnaissance boats were sunk.

Mine Warfare

21. Only the Egyptian Navy displayed mine warfare, because she was the only navy
who had mine sweepers. On 03 October 73, before the commencement of the war, an
announcement was made that the higher command had been dissatisfied with the fleet-
wide mining maneuvers, and that the minelayers were going to practice again. During the
night of 5 - 6 October they laid their minefields near Sharm el Sheikh, at the entrance to
the Gulf of Suez. They also laid minefield near the strait of Tiran, which reportedly sank an
Israeli tanker. Another Liberian oil tanker Sirus, under charter to Israel, was sent from Eilat
to take on oil at Abu Rodeis. When nearing its destination, it hit a mine and sank.

Electronic Warfare

22. Electronic warfare played a vital role in this war. The Israelis had superior ECM on
their missile boats than that of the Arabs. This electronic advantage was the sole reason
none of the Israeli craft was hit by Styx missile. It accounts for the fact that the Israelis
could steam safe and sound for 20,000 meters toward the Arab missile boats until their
Gabriel missiles were within reach of the enemy craft, and why the Israelis achieved so
many kills, and the Arabs none, by missile fire. In the face of advanced and superior ECM
on the Israeli missile boats, the Soviet OSA and Komar missile boats with their Styx
missiles were impotent. The Gabriel missile carried ECM equipment, which was able to
jam the Styx missile on its ballistic curve. Moreover, it also had an automatic homing
device that operated in rough seas and weather without loss of accuracy or technical
efficiency. On the other hand, Soviet ECM were inferior in effectiveness because rough
weather and seas caused a clutter that affected their performance. Both missiles were
deadly and efficient in their own way, but there was a distinct ECM gap on the Arab. Their
ECM could not counter the Israelis’ Gabriels, but the Gabriels could deflect the Styx
missiles.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

23. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. There should not be any second thought to
compromise with the main aim in a war. As per the principles of war is concerned the aim
has to be maintained whatever the cost. The aim of the Arab navies was to provide
support to the operations on land and to cut off the supply line of the Israel. But they could
not maintain their aim in the aggressive attack of the Israel especially for the fear of the
Israeli air attack close to the coast.

24. Maintenance of Moral. The Israeli had the high morale emanated from the
victory of the 1967 war. Again, since it was the question of Israeli survival and setting up a
separate state for them, so they were ready to give up their all out effort to win the battle.

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This was reflected from their offensive actions at sea from the very beginning of the naval
engagements. Though, Arabs could not maintain their morale after the Israeli had
recovered from the initial thrust of surprise attack, but initially they had the high morale to
recapture the lost territory for the following reasons:

a. United efforts by all Arab Nations.

b. Possession of sophisticated Armament and Equipment.

c. Dynamic Leadership of Sadat, General Ismail and Admiral Zekry.

d. Well orientation with the newly procured Equipment.

25. Offensive Action. The Arabs offensive actions worked very well on land at the
initial stages and put the Israeli in disastrous condition. But despite this defeat, the Israeli
took offensive actions at sea. It was the Israelis who initiated the offensive action at the
Syrian coast and went up to the Egyptian waters maintaining offensiveness in their
operations. The Israelis adopting search and attack mission conducted total six missile
engagements. Only in one mission at Haifa, the Egyptians took offensive action. After 3rd
day of war the Syrian Navy was almost crippled and never came out of the harbour
anymore. The Egyptians also were confined within the harbour at the final stage of war for
the fear of Israeli offensive attack.

26. Security. The heritage of shame and bitterness caused by the defeat in 1967
war, created an urge to launch counter attack on Israel. This started gaining ground since
1970 after President Sadat took over as the President of Egypt. The final decision to attack
on 6 Oct 73 was decided 4 weeks earlier. In fact Sadat decided for this attack 1 year
before but things remained secret till the time the actual attack was triggered. Arabs were
successful in this respect. The Egyptian had the opportunity to utilize the secure bases at
Libya and Aden but the Israeli did not have such facilities.

27. Surprise. The Arabs had the strategic surprise but they did not achieve
complete tactical surprise. The strategic surprise was achieved by maintaining secrecy in
their planning. The Egyptian preparation was very secret. The missiles were deployed in
secrecy despite sophisticated surveillance system of Israel. Units, ships and other
equipment were moved into the strategic or tactical disposition in secrecy. The training
was also conducted under various realistic conditions. Because of this, the deployment
before actual war was misinterpreted with regular training. This strategic surprise gave
them some tactical surprise also. The Israeli could sense the Arab attack but they could
not anticipate exact time of attack. But the surprise is that Israeli gave the first surprise
attack to the Syrian Navy at Latakia.

28. Concentration of Forces. Because of the inadequate strength none of the

belligerents had required concentration of force in any operation. They conducted only
isolated engagements in a very limited scale.

29. Economy of Effort. Israelis were found more economic in use of weapon for
the purpose. They deployed required number of ships commensurating with the purpose of
the operation. They have reshaped their Navy with smaller ship fitted with maximum
firepower. On the other hand, unsuccessful hit after 52 missile fired by the Egyptians was
a genuine example of misuse of efforts.

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30. Flexibility. Flexibility in different dimension is mentioned below:

a. Deployment. Egyptian Navy had some flexibility in terms of

employment of force. They deployed ships at Bab-El-Mandab and at the North
African coast to threaten the Israeli SLOC in the Mediterranean.

b. Weapon. The Israeli had Gabriel missiles with about half of the range
Arabians’ Styx missile. But the Israeli enjoyed superiority because they had the
weapon flexibility with options of using chaff and missiles. On the other hand,
Egyptians did not have any other options to play when their missiles failed to hit
Israeli ships.

31. Co-operation. Though the Egyptians and Syrians fought together against
Israel but they could not co-operate each other because of the geographical separation
and inadequate strength to extend assistance to each other. However, Arabs could obtain
sufficient cooperation from other Arab nations and USSR. Arab cooperation helped the
Egyptians to deploy their forces at Aden and Libya. On the other hand, Israeli Navy had
full assistance from USA.

ANALYSIS

32. The 1973 Arab-Israel war has received the greatest amount of analytical attention.
Many prominent analysts have evaluated and re-evaluated the lessons of this war. Still this
war remains important because it gives the baseline for the analysis of the later wars
especially in terms of use of technologies.

33. Effectiveness of Strategies/Tactics. Effectiveness of various strategies or

tactics used by both the belligerents is analyzed below:

a. Deployment at Libya. Egyptian strategy of deploying force at Libya

worked very well, because it diverted some part of the Israeli force to be dedicated
for this group. But this group could not affect the Israeli SLOC because of US
presence.

b. Blockade at Bab-El-Mandab. The inadequate composition, limited range

capabilities of both the contestants and the geographical configuration did not allow
to establish formal blockade in the Mediterranean Sea. On the other hand, Israel
considered the war to be very short and a blockade would hardly have any effect on
the war. However, the Egyptian had the sufficient capacity to implement military
blockade against Israel. In the first week of Oct 73, a group of ships was sent to
Libya to threaten the Israeli supply routes in the Mediterranean. But the Egyptian
commerce blockade at Bab-El-Mandab established from 11 - 13 Oct, was very
effective. Three of the destroyers were stationed near Aden harbour and were
supported by the smaller ships for these purposes. These were also assisted by two
submarine Chasers, two minesweepers and three landing craft of South Yemen
Navy. Some of them were turned back including one US freighter La Salle. This
blockade was further strengthening by a minefield near the state of Tiran. An Israeli
Tanker was reported to be sunk in that minefield. The Israeli oil sector was known
to be effected most badly owing to the Egyptian blockade at Bab-El-Mandab. At the
end of the war the 42-inch oil pipe line from Eilat to Ashdod, on the Mediterranean

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 was reported empty, as no oil could reach to Israel through Bab-El-Mandab. This
blockade totally cut off the Israeli trade through the Mediterranean.

c. Deception Plan. The deception plan technique was followed in the

following way:

(1) Chaff. Israeli fired chaff to confuse the enemy targets and also
to misguide the seeker of styx. This plan was very successful to deceive the
styx missile.

(2) Helicopter as False Target. Israeli used helicopter to represent

a ship’s radar echo.

(3) Apart from Placement of Ships. By avoiding single jammed

beam width, they used to generate false targets in between ships.

34. The political aim could be achieved by organizing an offensive-defense in a series

of planned engagements to neutralize the Israeli mobility. President Sadat was successful
in infusing the Arab countries to render united efforts.

35. Effectiveness of Leadership. The outcome of this war was a great success for
the Arab leaders. The unique crystallization of Arab countries like Morocco, Algeria, Tunis,
Sudan, Libya and Jordan who rushed to assist Egypt and Syria during this war, was the
correct vision of Arab leadership as they could foresee before the war. This war effectively
isolated Israel severing diplomatic relations with 21 African countries, which was
considered as a serious Israeli setback to their economic and global interests. Re-
appointing of Admiral Zekry as Commander of Naval force was a farsighted vision of
President Anwar Sadat. Admiral’s assessment about Israeli joint naval and air assets was
perfect. His plan to blockade the Israeli was very successful.

36. President Sadat turned out to be a successful leader in the higher direction of war.
His definite political aim gave clear-cut military aim to the armed forces leaving absolutely
no scope for confusion. The dynamic leadership of Sadat could combine the Strategic,
political and manpower resources of Egypt and other Arab countries according to their
capacities.

37. General Ismail was a sound and capable leader. His planning and direction to
achieve surprise was the fundamental basis for Arab success. He knew his men and got
maximum out of them. On the other hand, initially the Israeli leadership fails to assess the
Arab attack which caught them by surprise. Immediately after that Israel came back with
confidence and successfully repelled the Arabs in the war fronts. To launch offensive
action on the Syrian front at the beginning was a correct decision by the Israeli
commander. Success in this front gave much confidence to launch attack on the Egyptian
front.

Analysis of After Effect

38. In Arab Israel war 1973 it was a tactical win for Israel. But it was a strategic win for
the Arab countries. Till today no Muslim countries have any diplomatic relation with Israel
including Bangladesh. This war brought about national harmony within the various ranks of
Egyptian, which was not witnessed before. The other after effects are as follows:

a. Egyptian regained their confidence and salvaged their lost prestige.

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 b. This war brought an intimate relation between the Western and Arabs
because of oil crisis. The oil production all over the world was threatened and lives
of millions of people were affected. The price of each barrel oil increased from 3 to
5 Dollars.

c. This shaken the USA, Europe and Japan to turn their eyes for a peaceful
solution. This was a great political success.

d. Arab countries realized that their unity of power in terms of military,

economy, weapons and oil are the important assets to maintain peace in the Middle
East.

e. Though, Israel faced major difficulties at the initial stage of war because of
tactical surprise by Arabs, but soon Israeli recovered and achieved superiority
because they had:
3
a. Superior C I.
b. Superior ECM.
c. FAC tactics.
d. Air superiority.
e. Offensive Action.

39. Combination of Air Arms. None of the Arab allies planned to combine their
air power to support the naval operation at sea. On the contrary, the Egyptian destroyer
could not go close to the Israeli coast for the fear of air attack by Israel.

40. Israeli Invincibility. Though Israelis faced major difficulties at the initial stage
of war because of tactical surprise by Arabs. But soon Israelis recovered and achieved
superiority in many tactical encounters because they had:

a. Superior command, control, communication and Intelligence.

b. Superior mobilization system.
c. Design of the ship.
d. Electronic Warfare capability.

41. Coordination. The advantage of surprise achieved by the Arabs diminished

because of their lacks in coordination between Egypt and Syria. Only scattered and
isolated engagements took place. They could never carry out any simultaneous attack.

42. Israelis were aware of the Egyptian force maneuvering but they thought it to be the
part of exercise. Israeli intelligence failed to analyze that the Egyptian movement was part
of the planned attack. The other reason was that the Israeli did not consider the Arabs as a
threat only because of the qualitative superiority of Air Force of the Arab nations.

43. Electronic and Signal Intelligent. The Israeli could not exploit the electronic
and signal intelligence. Their communication discipline was also not very good. Egyptian
could exploit more signal intelligence than the Israelis. Though Israelis received lot of
intelligence from the US sources but they could not exploit these intelligence for tactical
targeting purposes. Its air reconnaissance assets were poorly trained and photo data took
far too long to process. It was the missile power rather than the size of the ship, which was
the determining factor in the naval battle.

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44. Impact of New Technology. Technology has direct or indirect effect on a war.
Advance technology always supports to win or victory. In Arab-Israel war Israel got the
support of new technology especially in the field of electronic warfare. She was indirectly
supported by USA.
3
45. C I. This war reflected the need for command, control, communication and
3
intelligence. The attack of both Egypt and Syria could not be coordinated because of C
problem. There was lack of communication with the various forces deployed at different
ports and bases. The Israeli got information from US sources but they did not have the
capability to evaluate that intelligence to derive information. That was the reason, the
Israeli could not determine the exact time of Arab invasion. Both Egypt and Syria did not
plan to combine their air support to the naval forces. On the other hand, the Egyptian
destroyers could not be deployed close to the Israeli coast for the fear of ground based air
attack by Israel.

LESSONS LEARNT

46. This war projected the Arab unity to the notice of the world. The most important
focus of this war was:

a. This war persuaded the third world countries to review and re-organize their
navies to a cost effective and purpose oriented force.
b. It is the weapon capability rather than the size of the ship, which determines
the fate of naval battles.
c. Supporting bases like the location of depots and repair units are to be
considered while planning the operations.
d. Air support can play havoc in naval operation. Syrians avoided the
subsequent naval engagements because of Israeli air attack.
e. Offense is the best defense — Israel proved it.
f. 76 mm and 40 mm shore guns of Egypt could not be utilized to hit any of the
Israeli ships.
g. Israeli aircraft attacked Syrian Naval Command Center and other Coastal
installation. This indicated that SAM and AA guns should be installed to defend
against enemy air attack.
h. Blockade strategy is very effective to reduce enemy war effort.
j. Ships with longer endurance are an essential element in naval warfare for
effective protection of SLOC.
k. Syria used the Merchant ship as shadow to attack the Israeli war ships.
l. Sinking of 3 merchant ships reflected the requirement of defending the
merchant ships during war.
m. Secrecy is a vital element of surprise attack.

CONCLUSION

47. This write-up so far offered an extensive study of Arab – Israel War with a view to
learn some lessons which can be employed in subsequent naval warfare. October 73 war
was the 4th consecutive war between Arabs and Israel. Arabs took the initiative in this war
but the outcome remained inconclusive. Both sides had number of successes and failures,
but none could completely overwhelm the other. Forces were deployed as per the strategy
of both the contestants. Egyptians had some difficulties in deploying their forces in Red
Sea because of closure of Suez Canal. Though the Arabs had the superiority of naval
forces in terms of quantity, but Israeli overcame this superiority by using technology.
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48. At the outbreak of war Israeli Navy had series of engagements with the Syrian
Naval forces. Syrian Naval forces could not survive long in the face of Israeli Navy and
substantial air potentials. The only choice of Syrian Navy was to mostly confine close to
the harbour and avoid conflicts with the opponent. On the other hand, Israel and Egypt
played entirely different sorts of war against each other. There was no major confrontation
between the navies. Egyptians conducted number of hit-and-run raids against Israeli
coastal installation, and established effective blockade against Israeli SLOC. It could not
carry out any offensive engagement in the coastal water for the fear of Israeli air attack.
On the side of Israel, they could not intercept the Egyptian blockading force because they
did not have surface force strong enough to reach the distant blockade. Israel also did not
have any missile boat in the Red Sea. The Electronic capability of Israel gave a surprising
blow to the Arabs’ Styx missiles. A number of commando operations, mine warfare and
naval gunfire support were also took place.

49. Both Egyptian and Israeli navies displayed some aspects of naval strategies. Both
had sufficient degrees of command of the sea to protect SLOC and to make effective use
of sea. The establishment of blockade and analogy of fleet-in-being were also evident by
the Egyptians. In the war the Arabs had the strategic surprise whereas, the Israeli had
tactical surprise. The other principles of war e.g. offensive action, economy of effort,
flexibility, morale, selection and maintenance of the aim etc also were exploited.

50. There is no doubt that this war had the impact of technological breakthrough. Quite
a good number of lessons came out of this war, which are very important for the future
naval planner. The concept of FAC and EW is a very good lesson to be taken by
Bangladesh Navy.

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 FALKLAND WAR 1982

INTRODUCTION

1. In April 1982, Argentine forces invaded Falkland Islands and South Georgia in a
gamble based on the United Kingdom’s limited deterrent posture in the South Atlantic. The
Anglo-Argentine dispute over the possession of the islands, brewing for years, finally
escalated into the largest sea-air conflict since the World War II.

2. The Falklands War of 1982, though a short conflict, was seen by both British and
Argentine governments as a critical test of will and had broad political ramifications. In
Argentina, it brought about the fall of the military junta and the restoration of democracy; in
the United Kingdom it helped strengthen the government of Margaret Thatcher while
demonstrating the strength (or weakness, by other interpretations) of Britain’s continuing
military presence on the world stage.

3. The Falklands campaign was in many respects unique. One must be cautious,
therefore, in deciding which lessons of the campaigns are relevant. The basic ingredients
for success were present from the outset; a firm resolve; flexibility of forces; equipment
and tactics; human ingenuity; and well-trained forces.

4. The campaign provided the Royal Navies first experience of battle in the missile
age. At San Carlos British forces undertook the first large-scale amphibious operation for
many years and in the land battles for Port Stanley they experienced an infantry battle at
brigade strength in extreme weather conditions. In the analysis of the campaign some of
the new lessons that have been learned and many more old lessons that have been
reinforced will be analysed.
AIM

5. The aim of the presentation is to analyze the Falkland war 1982 in light of the
principal lessons and their relevance to the modern warfare. the study will be mostly
restricted to the naval aspects without elaborating much on the land battles.

BACKGROUND

6. Historical Background. The Falkland Islands lie about 8000 miles south-west of
the United Kingdom but only 400 miles to the east of main land of Argentina and spreads
over 150 by 75 nautical mile area. The conflict on the possession of the island dates back
to 1690 when British Captain Strong marked the first recorded landing on the island. The
British settlement was established in 1776. However, till 1833 possessions of these islands
were contested by France, Britain and Spain at different times but none endured for long
and therefore left it uninhabited. After the independence of Argentina from Spain in 1816,
they took possession of Falklands and ruled till 1831, when their governor was evicted by
an US naval landing party from USS LEXINGTON and Falklands again were considered
available for claim. Finally the British took them over in 1833 and from that time they had
been in continuous, effective and peaceful possession till the war in 1982. The South
Georgia lies about 1000 miles to the Southeast and South Sandwich by another 300 miles
in the same direction. British Government annexed them in 1908.

7. Argentine Claim. After a period of Argentine lobbying, the United Nations passed
Resolution 2065 in 1965 specifying the Falklands/Malvinas as a colonial problem, and
calling on Britain and Argentina to find a peaceful solution. Talks continued on and off for

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the next seventeen years under both British Labour and Conservative Governments.
Britain initially appeared flexible over the question of sovereignty, and by 1971 the
Argentines agreed to concentrate on economic development and support, but thereafter,
both side's position hardened. The Argentines did not want to accept anything less than
full sovereignty. In late 1980 the islanders rejected the one remaining solution of lease-
back for a fixed period. On the road to war, in 1976, Argentina set up a scientific base on
Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. In 1982 Argentina prepared her forces to
land on South Georgia and to invade and hold the Falklands.

8. British Position. In contrast to the Argentinean claim that the Islander’s were
second class citizens under the British domain, the inhabitants of Falkland Islands were
free and democratic. The inhabitants had gradually moved towards a system of self-
government. The population had indicated its desire to remain British, and not to become
independent or part of Argentina.

9. Strategic Interest. In 1945, Argentina formally reopened the question of

sovereignty over Falklands motivated by a combination of factors. Strategically these
islands completely dominate the Argentine coast. They are the key to other islands
especially to the future claims to large portion of inhospitable but mineral rich Antarctica.
Oil may be another important resource. Moreover Falklands also dominate the far south
Atlantic and the eastern approaches to Cape Horn and Strait of Magellan. This is a very
important issue, as the modern super tankers do not fit through the Panama Canal.

10. The Invasion. On 02 April 1982, Argentinean forces launched operation

ROSARIO and invaded the Falkland Islands. These invasions were launched despite
urgent calls upon the Argentine government from the President of USA, the president of
the UN Security Council and the secretary general of the UN to desist from military action.
The invasion was immediately condemned by the UN Security Council in its resolution
502. The resolution went on to call for an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces
occupying the Falkland Islands. Ignoring all calls the Argentineans proceeded to reinforce
the occupying troops. Eventually 12000 officers and men of Argentinean armed forces
were occupying the Falkland Islands.

OPERATION

11. British Objective. British objective was to ensure that Argentina complied with UN
resolution 502 of withdrawing troops from the Falklands. British strategy concentrated on
three areas namely diplomacy through UN, economic sanctions and use of force if
necessary. Unfortunately the British had to resort to last option.

12. British Operation Plan. The British aimed to achieve their objectives through a
three phase joint operation. In the first phase the nuclear Submarines would affect the
blockade of Argentine Navy. During the 2nd phase the British battle group would secure
working command of the sea and air superiority. Finally the amphibious force would mount
landing operation to recapture the island.

13. British Deployment. The Falkland Islands lie 8000 miles SW of the UK and
over 3500 miles from Ascension Island. The task force needed to be self sufficient in food,
water, fuel, ammunition and all other military equipment. British forces established a joint
forward operating base at Ascension Island. This island played a very important role in
operation. It was valuable as a staging post, communication center, exercise area and a
military air base for the operation of long-range reconnaissance aircraft and Vulcan

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bombers. For deployment of a task force of 28,000 men and over 100 ships staging
through Ascension Islands, it took 7 weeks.

14. Argentine Deployment. The Argentinean task force sailed from Puerto
BELGRANO on 15 April. The main force including the Carrier VENTICINQUE DE MAYO
and her escorts were deployed about 150 miles NE of Falklands covering both main land
and island. The task group comprising of GENERAL BELGRANO and few other surface
units were deployed SW of the island covering straits of Magellan and Cape Horn. On 04
May after the sinking of BELGRANO the Argentinean fleet withdrew to the continental
shelf where water was considered too shallow for British Nuclear Submarine to operate.
From then on Argentine Navy operated along the main land coast for defence of the ports
and vital coastal targets. The Super Ettendards, Mirage and A-4s aircraft of the naval air
arm were located at Rio Grande, Rio Gallegos and Puerto Desado on the main land
operating from there. This is because the Carriers slow speed precluded her aircraft from
being able to take off. Argentine Submarines were hardly used.

WAR NARRATIVE

15. The naval aspect of Falkland war was mainly a conflict between Royal Naval
surface and air units and the Argentinean Air Force and Naval Air arm. However isolated
submarine attacks did take place. The naval war culminated into a successful amphibious
landing.

16. The carrier group sailed from Portsmouth on 05 Apr. On 12 April the British
declared a 200 miles Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falklands. The nuclear powered
attack submarines proceeded at 30 knots, twice the speed of surface units, to arrive off
Falklands by 12 April. Submarines SPARTAN took station off Port Stanley. One submarine
was deployed to cover the entrance to the Falklands Sound. Others were deployed
between the mainland and the islands.

17. The lead elements of the British Task Force comprising of the Carrier group and the
principle fighting units sailed from Ascension Island on 16 April. On 21st April the
Argentine carrier was deployed 150 miles north east of Falklands, when Argentine long
range reconnaissance aircraft sighted the task force 1600 miles north east and beyond
reach.

18. South of Ascension a small task group comprising of one destroyer, two frigates,
one RFA and one ice patrol ship was detached by British to head south east and capture
South Georgia. The nuclear powered submarine CONQUEROR was ordered to patrol off
the island to prevent any Argentine reinforcement. The first action at sea took place off
South Georgia on 25 April. The Argentine submarine SANTA FE was attacked on surface
by a British helicopters 5 miles from the island. She was badly damaged and subsequently
beached. South Georgia was recaptured by Marines on the same day without any
resistance.

19. On 26 April the British declared a 200 miles defensive envelope around all units of
task force. On 30 April the British declared a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ). Any ship or
aircraft within 200 miles of Falkland Island would be considered hostile and liable to attack
from British forces. The Argentine recce aircraft detected lead elements of British Task
Force 300nm north-east of AC carrier De Mayo. The Carrier could not launch attack due to
slow speed and fog. She returned to harbour. On 01 May Britain announced naval and air

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blockade off Argentine mainland. Argentine was warned that any warship or aircraft over
12 miles from the Argentine coast would be regarded as hostile.

20. By 01 May a picket line 200 miles west of the island, in between the mainland
Argentina and the Falkland had formed up. The picket line comprised of nuclear powered
submarines and destroyers. The carrier task force was in position 100 miles east of
Falklands, steaming on a north-south race track course of about 150 miles. The carrier
task force had to close the islands at night to launch Harrier ground attacks. The Frigates
and Destroyers were employed for providing close escorts, blockade patrol, gunnery
support and ASW screen. The Argentines had mined the approaches to Stanley with some
moored contact mines.

21. On 01 May Vulcan bombers flying from Britain by way of Ascension and refueled by
Victor tanker aircraft carried out attack on Falklands. This was followed by Sea Harrier
attacks on the Argentine position on islands. The 21,000 pounds of bombs dropped did not
have much effect on the Stanley airfield and Goose green. Argentine commenced it’s air
attack on the task force and pickets. On 02 May the British nuclear powered submarine
HMS CONQUEROR made the first major kill of the war. CONQUEROR torpedoed the
cruiser GENERAL BELGRANO just off the mainland’s southern tip. Though BELGRANO
was outside TEZ, the British claimed hot pursuit stating that she was a clear threat to the
Task Force. There after major Argentine warships remained closed to Argentine coast and
took no part in the campaign.

22. The task force suffered its first major loss on 04 May. HMS Sheffield a type 42
destroyers, while on radar picket duty was hit by an Exocet missile launched from
Argentine super Etendard aircraft and sank. The Argentine submarines continued to pose
a serious threat, but no task force ships were successfully attacked. On 05 May,
reportedly, Argentine submarine SAN LUIS attacked INVINCIBLE firing wire guided
torpedo. None of the torpedoes fired ever exploded, for unknown reasons. During her
escape SAN LUIS was tracked by ASW ships and helicopters for 72 hours. Lot of ASW
ordinance was fired. The submarine returned undamaged to port.

23. By mid-May the task force had accomplished two of its main tasks. The movement
of the troops to the south Atlantic and the establishment of control of the seas around the
Islands. The large amphibious group had gathered on the northeastern edge of the 200
mile TEZ waiting for others to join them. The carriers provided the air defence and the
means for attacking enemy ships and ground positions, while the helicopters and surface
units provided constant ASW protection.

24. It was now necessary to put land forces ashore. San Carlos was chosen for the
amphibious landing. San Carlos offered a good anchorage, which could be protected
against submarine attack and was an area lightly defended by the enemy. The low hills
surrounding the inlet afforded good protection against the risk of Exocet attack. On 14 May
the SAS and SBS assisted by Naval gunfire support raided Argentine installation on
pebble Island and destroyed radar station, air defence guns and 11 air crafts on ground.
The north entrance to the Falkland sound was secured. The mines in the deep approaches
to Stanley were swept using five 1200 ton deep sea fishing trawlers converted for
mechanical sweeping.

25. On the night of 20/21 May, the 20 ship British amphibious group and escorts
assembled well to the north of the Falkland sound entrance. The carrier group moved in to
their southeast, to give them close support. Under cover of darkness the amphibious group

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steamed towards San Carlos waters, passing Cape Dolphin. Escorts bombarded targets
ashore at Fanning head as they passed into the sound. Meanwhile Special Forces
mounted series of diversionary raids at various points around East Falkland. Under cover
of naval gunfire support, beachhead was established at San Carlos. On 21 May San
Carlos landing began. The main threat to the concentration of the ships in San Carlos
roadstead was from air attack.

26. The Argentine aircraft were operating over Falklands, 400 miles from the mainland,
at almost extreme radius of action. British never assembled enough air power to establish
air superiority of their own over Falklands. For the amphibious landing, the British
established air defence utilizing the standard technique of defence in depth. The outer ring
was held by the harriers flying combat air patrol (CAP). The second line of defence was
provided by a strong picket-a pair of escorts known as the “missile trap”, stationed in the
north entrance to Falkland sound and south of Pebble Island. This was usually a Type 22
and Type 42 combination. The Type 42 armed with sea Dart long range (20 miles) area
defence SAM and Type 22 with Sea wolf short range (4 miles) point defence SAM. The
CAP was directed by the picket. The next ring, the “gun line” comprised three to four ships
off the entrance to San Carlos water, using every available missile and gun system.
Finally, within the anchorage itself, in “bomb alley”, were the assault troops and store
ships’ Sea Cats, small caliber guns, and notably the shore based Rapier fire units.

27. Several losses were still sustained in general San Carlos area by air attacks.

a. May 21 Frigate HMS Ardent was sunk on the gunline.

b. May 23 Frigate HMS Antelope on gunline was crippled. She sank on 24 May.
c. May 25 Destroyer HMS COVENTRY on picket duty was sunk by bombers
and Ro-Ro ship ATLANTIC CONVEYOR was hit by Exocet. ATLANTIC
CONVEYOR sank on 28 May.

28. Eight men of war and one RFA suffered varying degree of damage, but these
incidents were never quite that critical. By 28 May Darwin and Goose Green were
recaptured. Meanwhile landing of reinforcement continued at San Carlos till 01 June. The
land forces pressed on advance towards Port Stanley. On the night of 5/6 June and 6/7
June the assault ships HMS FEARLESS and HMS INTREPID successfully inducted Scots
guards and Welsh guards at Fitzroy. On the night of 7/8 June RFA Sir GALAHAD and Sir
TRISTRAM were dispatched with support units and remaining Welsh guards. They were
discovered without adequate air cover, or surface support and were attacked by Argentine
aircraft. GALAHAD sank and TRISTRAM was severely damaged with massive casualty to
troops.

29. The British advance from Fitzroy to port Stanley was supported by heavy and
ceaseless pounding from the 4.5-inch guns of escorts lying offshore. On 11 June HMS
GLAMARGON the destroyer after completing a spell of shore bombardment was hit by
shore based Exocet. She was the final casualty of the naval war. Argentine forces on the
Island surrendered on 14 June. Argentine lost 62 aircraft during the amphibious
operations.

ANALYSIS OF WAR

30. Falkland war is unique in many respects and also the first war in the missile age.
However, it was not a total war, rather a carefully contained conventional war with limited
means and limited objectives.

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31. Command and Control. The British established war management machinery
namely the British War Cabinet, which worked extremely well. A small group of most
concerned ministers and defence officers, chaired by the Prime Minister formed this group.
They gave grand strategic direction, co-ordinated diplomatic, economic and military
aspects of the policy but leaving the final decision of timing and tactics on the On Scene
Commander. They also set the strategic mission and approved the rules of engagement.
Operational Command was vested to the CINCFLEET, Admiral Fieldhouse at the joint
Headquarters. He commanded two British Task Force; namely Carrier and Amphibious
Forces (TF 317) and Nuclear Power Submarines (TF 324). But the most important
personality was Rear Admiral Woodward as on scene commander and CTG 317.8 of the
carrier group. On the other side Argentine command and control was not effective because
the distinctions between the levels of command were not clear cut and as a result caused
inter-service jealousy.

32. Technology. It was a quantum jump in terms of the weapons and platforms
used from the last naval battle of this scale. Some of the conspicuous aspects were:

a. Of all the naval weapon systems employed by the British in the Falklands
affair, the short legged, subsonic VSTOL Sea Harriers were proved to be the most
outstanding. Without it, the British would certainly have lost the war. They flew over
2000 sorties under extremely demanding weather condition. On the other hand,
Argentine Super Etendard with deadly Exocet AM 39 sea skimming anti-ship missile
created concern among the British Task Force. SHEFFIELD was sunk by the same
missile launched from a Super Etendard aircraft, in a textbook standoff attack. The
British did not have a radar contact until the fatal missile was already launched,
then it was too late. Damage control proved almost impossible.

b. For the air defence in general, missiles were more effective in the Falklands
than the guns. Among the British missiles, area Defence Sea Dart, point Defence
Sea Wolf and helicopter launched Sea Skua performed well. Accordingly valid
claims, Sea Dart missiles destroyed at least 8 Argentine aircraft. On the other hand,
Sea Wolf missiles although only mounted on two ships had 5 or more kills proving
outstandingly effective against aircraft at high speeds and low level sea skimming
heights, virtually without any radar warning.

c. Following shortfalls in the technological aspects were also revealed during

this war:

(1) Absence of Close in Weapon System was badly felt.

(2) Absence of air borne early warning was a handicap.

(3) Type 21 frigates suffered badly from fire due to aluminum

superstructure, which was found to melt under intense heat. Moreover, RN
ships were found vulnerable to fire and damage.

(4) There were mutual technical problems on both sides. Unexploded

bombs were found in the hulls of at least 6 British vessels. On the other hand
many British bombs and shells found unexploded as well. There were reports
that even British torpedoes had problems.

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 (5) A number of serious questions were raised concerning several
aspects of British combatant ship construction, damage control, and fire
fighting techniques. Ships tended to be cramped and on balance still fragile
with too little redundancy of systems. Older ships withstood battle damage
better than newer ones. The unavoidable fragility of modern ships and the
power of modern weapons is not an excuse for poor damage control, but a
reason for increased attention in this area.

33. Principles of War. Both the countries applied the principles of war as
enumerated below:

a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. The British had clear aim retaking
the islands. On the other hand the Argentine aim was not well defined.
b. Maintenance of Moral. Argentine troops were mostly conscripts cadets
and were ill trained, ill equipped with low moral. British had the international opinion
in their favour with war correspondents continuously providing encouraging picture
to boost up their moral.
c. Offensive Action. The British always remained on the offensive while the
Argentine Navy adopted the most passive means of fleet in being strategy.
d. Security. Argentine not paid much attention to the security on the
garrisons on Falklands, where as British Task Force and beachhead was partially
secured.
e. Surprise. Argentine achieved strategic surprise by operation ROSARIO
and anti-ship missiles. On the other hand, British achieved partial technological
surprise by nuclear submarine, VSTOL aircraft and surface to air missiles.
f. Concentration of Force. It could not be much achieved by any side.
Specially the British carrier group was always dispersed for security purpose.
g. Economy of Effort. It could not be fully achieved by any side. Specially
Argentine loss of air crafts was too heavy.
h. Flexibility. Argentine flexibility was limited and not achieved. But British
showed required flexibility in terms of mobility, use of ships and helicopter for
different purpose and even changing the initial landing plan.
j. Cooperation. Due to inter service jealousy, Argentine Navy did not co-
ordinate their Super Etendard mission with Air Force. On the other hand British
enjoyed excellent inter services co-operation.
k. Administration. Argentine administration was poor. But British troop
management, welfare, medical evacuation and logistics were well arranged.

34. Logistics. During the whole campaign, no weapon system ran out of
ammunition, no ship out of fuel and equipment and spares were maintained at high level.
The men had to be provided with six hundred tons of food and one thousand tons of fresh
water each week, fighting or not. To cover all these a tri-service organization called logistic
support cell was established in UK Ascencion Island provided major contribution for the
stopover of the Task Force and became a vital air head for shore based aircraft operating
in support of fleet. Further south, a major Tug, Repair and Logistic area or TRALA was
established on the north eastern edge of Exclusion Zone where preliminary battle damage
repair was also carried out.

35. STUFT. For logistics support ships were taken up from trade. About 45
merchant vessels, as some of them are shown on the slide, were used. Moreover, five
trawlers were converted in to mine sweepers. Those ships sailed by some 330 officers and
1170 men of merchant navy who were often in to position of danger. For this reason Jim

110
Slater, leader of the seamen’s union remarked, ‘Quite simply, if it was not for this back up
force provided by merchant navy, Royal Navy vessels might have stayed in port.’

36. Tactical Mistakes. It is pertinent at this stage to have a look at the tactical
mistakes of Argentina that led to her defeat in Falkland and rehoisting of the Union Jack at
the Falkland Island.

a. Firstly, they totally failed to predict the real magnitude of British military
reaction.
b. Secondly, they clearly underestimated the fighting effectiveness of the British
Task Force.
c. They adopted most passive fleet in being strategy. Dispersal of assets and
active fleet in being could have made Royal Navy’s tasks difficult.
d. They could not use their submarines effectively to deter the British ships off
San Carlos.
e. To deny shipping approach to the British, they could have laid more effective
mine fields around the islands.

LESSONS LEARNT

37. The lessons derived from our study are:

a. Adherence to the principles of war is a vital war winning factor.

b. Though the British navy was also affected by the global trend of downsizing,
it was still a formidable sea power possessing the required elements. It confirms the
validity of the elements of sea power in a war.
c. The campaign also shows that command of the sea is relative and not an
absolute thing. The British had workable Command of the Sea; however the control
of the airspace was challenged by the Argentine air arm.
d. A single miscalculation be strategic, tactical or diplomatic may cost a country
very dearly.
e. Poor command and control and inter service jealousy may lead to disaster at
war.
f. Offensive action is a must requirement to win the war.
g. Rules of engagement can be adjusted during the war as necessary to own
benefit.
h. Though UK and France formed part of NATO and EEC, but the same arms
exported earlier by them to Argentina were used against UK. It indicates that the
arms may very well be first used against the exporters by the buyers.
j. Well planned logistics ensure sustenance in war.
k. The British have shown that proper training does not have any alternative.
l. Technology gives definite advantage to win the war.
m. Deterrence of nuclear submarine expedites blockade.
n. Amphibious assault is possible even against potential enemy, if well planned
and supported.
p. For a ship, early warning radar and CIWS along with effective defence in
depth is mandatory for air defence.
q. Exhaustive fire fighting and damage control training is essential.
r. Aluminum superstructure deteriorates with fire on board.
s. While constructing new ships, all the systems should have redundancy.

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 CONCLUSION

38. This writing covered the historical background, strategic interest and the
international efforts for the solution. Then discussion was made about the conduct of the
campaign and finally carried out an in-depth analysis deriving the lessons there from. Both
countries attempted to use their forces as instrument of diplomacy, where many things
could go wrong and most of them did for both sides it was a costly affair militarily,
politically and economically. Probably Argentina found themselves in far worse situation
and British significantly less. To conclude we can say by this self explanatory quotation,” It
is frightening how easily men and nations go to war. If leader of nations knew what war
was really like, perhaps they would take more troubles to avoid it. But each generation
seems to have to learn for itself.”

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 NAVAL ASPECTS OF GULF WAR – 1991
INTRODUCTION

1. At about 0200 hours (Bagdad local time) on 02 August 1990, three Iraqi Republican
Guard Divisions invaded Kuwait. First one proceeded down a coastal road to Kuwait city,
the second one seized the inland oil fields and the third proceeded to Saudi Arabia
boarder. Kuwaiti A-4 aircraft and Chieftan tanks fought for three days until their fuel and
ammunition were exhausted. The small Kuwaiti Navy also made a valiant showing with the
last two fast attack craft escaping while firing at pursuing Iraqi tanks. Iraqi forces quickly
captured Kuwait city and the Emir’s Palace, while the Kuwait ruler Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed
Al Sabah fled to Saudi Arabia and established a government in exile. On 03 August 1990,
the remainder of Kuwait was captured and on 04 August 1990, Iraqi forces were amassed
along the Kuwait-Saudi border for possible invasion of Saudi Arabia.

2. World became surprise to see Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait at that night.
USA saw her economic interest in the oil-rich Gulf is threatened. An extension of this
threat to its allies could create undesirable and possibly unmanageable repercussions and
escalation of prevailing turbulence in the region. However, as the crisis brewed, the USA
began to perceive an even more dangerous trend, which would seriously erode her
conceptualised position as the singular super power, on whom rested the responsibility of
providing credible leadership to influence global relations in the manner she felt was fit.
That is why; she came to the limelight to save Kuwait from Iraqi aggression by declaring
th
war against Iraq. It was most advanced weapon technological war ever fought in 20
century. It was the multidimensional war which affected military, economical, political and
technical environment all over the world. The war displayed by the world most powerful
military forces forming allied forces under the dynamic leadership of USA against Iraq only.

3. U.N Resolution 661 was passed to establish embargo and the Allied Forces started
building up troops around Kuwait under the code name ‘Operation Desert Shield’. The
main offensive action against Iraq started at 0300 hrs local time on 17 January 1991 under
the code name ‘Operation Desert Storm’. The campaign finished on 27 February 1991 with
the liberation of Kuwait. The Navy was the first force to appear in the troubled area and
played a major role in the air, sea and land battle. There was a massive Naval deployment
including numerous Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, Battle Ships, Cruisers, Destroyers,
Frigates and other forms of logistics, MCM and Amphibious ships.

4. This write-up will cover geographical location, background of war, international

response, forces deployed, command and control, naval aspect of the war, technological
involvement, war losses, application of the principles of war and lessons learnt.

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

5. Persian Gulf, which is also known as Arabian Gulf covers a surface area of 92,500
square miles between the Arabian Peninsula and south western Iran. The Gulf States are
located surrounding this Persian Gulf. The small water flows into the Gulf, is mostly from
the Tigris, Euphrates and Karun River.

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 BACKGROUND OF WAR

Historical Background

6. Kuwait was a part of Iraq during Ottoman era. The World War-I ended in favour of
Britain. After the First World War, the League of Nations formalized the British control by
entrusting Iraq to Britain as a mandate. Though Iraq got independence in 1932, Kuwait
remained under control of the British till 1961.

7. The Sheikh of Kuwait was given the status of an independent ruler. From 1921 to
1950, Sheikh Ahmed–Ibne–Jabir ruled over Kuwait. Kuwait was not handed over to Iraq.
Britain was never interested in solving the claim of Iraq on this small principality.

8. Before oil was discovered in 1932, Kuwait was a poor country. In 1933 the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company and Gulf Oil Company entered into an agreement on equal basis to
exploit oil in Kuwait. With this, Kuwait started its dramatic rise. Kuwait had oil reserves of
94.5 billion barrels in the ground. In 1961 Kuwait gained its independence. In 1973 Iraq
invaded and declared its sovereignty over Kuwait. But Britain’s intervention saved Kuwait;
Iraq withdrew. After independence Kuwait joined the Arab League and the United Nations.

Political Background

9. One of the basic reasons for this military offensive lay in Saddam Hussein's aim to
become the pivotal figure in the Arab and to ensure his very own political survival. Iraq's oil
revenues of $13 billion per annum were not even sufficient to cover the after war
expenditures of $230 billion. The occupation of Kuwait appeared to him as a cost effective
means. In arriving at the political aim, two crucial issues were born. The first was Iraq's
belief that her military power would smother any military response from the Gulf and the
Arab states. The second was the belief that she could divert the anger of the Gulf States
from Iraq to Zionist Israel.

Causes of War

10. Iraq invaded Kuwait for the following reasons:

a. Iraq could not repay about $ 80 billion that had been borrowed from Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia to finance Iran – Iraq war.
b. Kuwaitis were incredibly rich and had huge investment abroad. Access to
this wealth could resolve Iraq’s financial problems.
c. Kuwaiti oil drilling in the Rumaila oil field which lay in disputed border
territory.
d. Warba & Bubian island of Kuwait confines the Iraqi bound oil tankers
movement to reach Iraq’s port of Umm Qasr through Persian Gulf. That’s why Iraq
asked these islands on lease for its safe passage of oil tankers but Kuwait didn’t
agree.
e. Kuwaiti over production and under pricing of oil, caused $ 14 billion loss in oil
revenue of Iraq. Saddam suggested face to face peace talk with Emir of Kuwait but
he instead wanted Arab league as a media of peace talk.

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 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

11. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was a total shock to the whole world. There were some
quick responses against this. 12 UN resolutions were passed between 02 August 1990 to
16 January 19991.

a. On 02 August 1990, UN passed resolution 660 condemning Iraq’s invasion

and demanding unconditional withdrawal.
b. On 06 August 1990, UN passed resolution 661 imposing sanction on Iraq.
c. On 07 August 1990, 40 US warships, including three aircraft carriers with
250 aircraft on board, converged on the Gulf. In addition fourteen F-111 B fighter
bombers were redeployed in Turkey.
d. On 08 August 1990, US’s 18th Airborne Corps, 82nd and 101st Airborne
Division, and 24th Infantry Division moved for Saudi Arabia. Simultaneously B-52
bombers were being redeployed in Diego Garcia.
e. On 09 August 1990, UN passed resolution 662 declaring the annexation of
Kuwait by Iraq ‘null and void’.
f. On 12 August 1990, US announced further troops deployments for Operation
Desert Shield.
g. On 13 August 1990, US moved Apache attack helicopters and Sheridan
tanks up to Saudi border with Iraq and Kuwait.
h. On 18 August 1990, UN passed resolution 664 directing Iraq to release all
foreign national in Kuwait and Iraq.
j. On 25 August 1990, UN passed resolution 665 authorising necessary
measures including military action to enforce sanctions.
k. On 29 November 1990, UN resolution 678 authorises the use of all
necessary means to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait if Iraq does not withdraw by
15 January 1991.
l. On 17 January 1991, US lead multinational military offensive to end Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait.

FORCES DEPLOYED

12. Iraq was pitched against 28-nation coalition. Those countries are: USA, UK, France,
Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Morocco, Oman, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Qatar, Senegal, UAE, Canada, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and USSR.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Central Command

13. The coalition’s force operated under both administrative and operational chains of
command, and General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief, Central Command
(CENTCOM) commanded both. The CENTCOM had 7 subordinate headquarters. Joint
Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) headquarters was in Dharhan.

NAVCENT

14. In Oct 1990 Vice Admiral Stanley Arthur, Commander of the US Seventh Fleet
aboard the USS BLUE RIDGE, took over as Commander NAVCENT. The USN controlled
all naval forces in the northern half of the Gulf and in the Red sea. The southern Gulf was
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placed under the command of the Western European Union, at the time under French
presidency.

NAVAL ASPECT OF THE WAR

Economic Embargo

15. UN Resolution 661 placed a trade and financial embargo on Iraq. After that US
went about deploying naval forces from the Indian Ocean and from the Mediterranean Sea
to enforce that embargo. The Royal Navy ships and helicopters assisted in implementing
the embargo. France, Australia and Italy also joined the blockade. By the 01 May 91 more
than 29,700 merchant ships had been challenged, about 1200 boarded and inspected, and
at least 67 diverted for carrying prohibited cargo.

Sea Control Campaign

16. During Gulf War, US deployed more than 165 ships, including six Carriers in the
Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Red sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. Other nations of the
coalition deployed more than 65 ships in South West Asia. As a result, their control of the
seas was strong. As a part of the sea control campaign, US carrier borne air craft crippled
three Iraqi patrol craft in the opening stages of the war and also sank an Iraqi mine
sweeper, hovercraft and patrol crafts later. US carrier aircraft attacked the naval base at
Umm Qasr and mined the channels leading to it, thus forcing out the small craft, while
confining large ships. RAF Nimrod operated well north of Saudi-Kuwaiti border and located
many targets. The Iraqi ships had to confront direct attacks by US and British aircraft,
Royal Navy destroyers and frigates, Lynx helicopters etc once they were in the waters off
Bubiyan Island. Sea Skua anti-ship missiles were used effectively by Royal Navy Lynx
helicopters and they sunk or crippled 17 Iraqi ships. Within three weeks, the Allied Naval
Forces destroyed the Iraqi Navy and secured control of the Northern Persian Gulf. This
control allowed allied forces to establish operating areas further north which permitted
amphibious operation and increased their striking power.

Sea Lift

17. The main contribution of maritime forces towards the Gulf War was in the field of
logistics. About 90% logistic support, such as deployment of the allied forces troops and
armaments of war lifted through sea. Logistics were carried by numerous logistics and
amphibious ships. Without the Sea Lift operation it would be difficult to react so quickly by
the allied forces against Iraqi occupation.

Sub Surface Operations

18. The US and its allies had a formidable line up of submarines. Some of these were
used to launch long range missile attacks (Tomahawk) against strategic targets in the Iraqi
hinterland. However, nothing is known about the substantial anti submarine warfare
assets. It can be assumed that these were deployed to:

a. Patrol the combat zone to secure the carrier groups from sub surface
attacks.
b. Patrol the sea lines of communication to ensure a free flow of logistic.

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 c. Blockade and shadow hostile forces such as those of Libya.
d. Continue to patrol traditional enemy assets of the USSR.

Missile Warfare

19. At the beginning of the war, naval missiles played a vital role in the destruction and
neutralization of strategic targets specifically against those targets that were secured by
formidable air defences. The Navy’s Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) and Standoff
Land Attack Missiles (SLAM) were launched from surface ships operating in the Persian
Gulf and from submarines in the Red Sea. The target of Tomahawk missiles were military
headquarters, communication links, power distribution centres, air defence radars and
nuclear facilities.

20. It is admitted that total 300 Tomahawks were fired from 9 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 2
battle ships and 2 nuclear powered attack submarines. Tomahawk proved to be an
extremely reliable weapon.

Electronic Warfare

21. General Jhon Galvin the Supreme Allied Commander Europe said, ‘Schwarzkopf
was able to dismantle the electromagnetic spectrum so that he effectively closed
Saddam’s eyes and ears. He therefore made Saddam less mobile, less able to react, less
able to gain intelligence - basically, less able to orchestrate and put the air, land, and sea
elements together’.

22. Electronic Support Measures. The coalition’s ESM effort was extensive and
yielded a comprehensive intelligence picture. ESM aircraft RC-135s and U-2Rs were used
to collect communication intelligence (COMINT). At sea 8 US submarines conducted
surveillance and reconnaissance operations. Iraqi ESM was proved difficult to be totally
destroyed during the air campaign. Iraq used COMINT information to protect its mobile
Scud missiles and radar system.

23. Electronic Counter Measures. ECM was made an integral part of the naval and
aerial offensive. The Navy and Marine Corps did not launch strikes without EA-6B aircraft
support and this prevented Iraqi SAMs to lock on strike aircraft. Iraq’s ground based active
jammers had little effect on coalition air strike.

Mine Warfare

24. It was necessary for the allies to clear a channel of minefields in the approaches to
Kuwait Bay and the offshore island of Faylakah. On 16 February, Royal Navy Mine
Counter Measure Vessels (MCMV) and US Navy minesweeping helicopters began to clear
a route towards the Kuwaiti coast initially to provide a secure area from which U.S.
battleships could bombard Iraqi positions. Iraq laid over 1200 mines in 10 separate areas,
the allied MCM forces found a total of 225 mines of which 133 were destroyed. By Iraqi
mining USS Princeton and USS Tripoli were severely damaged.

Naval Gunfire Support

25. The battleship USS MISSOURI, New Jersey and USS WISCONSIN fired their
vintage 16-inch guns in to fire 1.2 ton armour piercing shells on Iraqi coastal targets and
later for NGFS to advancing coalition units. All these ships fired a total of 1083 rounds. US
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Navy effectively fired Tomahawks against Iraqi strategic targets at the start of the war. The
total value of the ordnance they delivered was about 2,166,000 pounds. The coalition
forces engaged and destroyed 17 Artillery targets, 13 small boats, 10 AAW sites,10
bunkers, 8 engagements against Inf, 6 Ammo storage sites, 5 SAM/SSM rocket launchers,
5 Radar/COMINT/SIGINT site, 4 Command/observation posts, 4 engagements against
troops, 3 logistic sites, 3 tanks, 2 minefields of Iraq.

Amphibious Operations
th th
26. By mid of January 1991, about 17000 mariners and forces of 4 and 5 Marine
Expeditionary Bridged, and amphibious task groups deployed onboard various ships in the
Gulf and Arabian Sea. They took less than a month after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to
reach Gulf of Oman from Norfolk, Little Creek and San Diego. The amphibious force was
consisted 8 amphibious ships inside the Gulf and another 25 in the northern Arabian Sea,
just outside the Gulfs entrance. This amphibious operation never came to an actual
operation. But it worked as a high quality deception. Six of Iraq’s 42 divisions were massed
along the Kuwaiti coast in anticipation of a Marine amphibious assault. It wasted resources
that could have considerably bolstered Iraqi defences along the Kuwaiti Saudi border and
have made the coalition ground assault more difficult.

Maritime Air Operations

27. 7 Navy & 8 Marine Corps comprising 334 combat aircrafts operated low level
mission over land under naval air campaign. One third of the total air effort was provided
by Naval & Marine air elements. The six carrier groups of US Navy contributed at least 200
strikes & 140 interceptors. Each day approximately 15000 air sorties in 150 missions were
flown from each carrier. In addition, naval aviation was employed to search & destroy Iraqi
Naval units and to provide tactical air reconnaissance & surveillance of the enemy ground
forces.

TECHNOLOGICAL INVOLVEMENT

Coalition Force

28. Jammer. Iraqi early warning radar were totally jammed by US air borne jammer.
It facilitated the anti radar missiles to destroy the targets without being jammed. This
jammer also jammed Iraqi radio communications between Ground control interceptors and
aircrafts.

29. Laser and Radar Designator. Laser and Radar Designator with miniature
computers and GPS delivered war heads to pin point targets even beyond the line of sight.

30. Thermal Imagers. Thermal Imagers with infrared devices provided the ability to
execute accurate engagements even in poor visibility.

31. ECM & EPM. ECM with homing guidance system provided the Patriot misiles to hit
the targets successfully. The EPM system was used extensively which deceived the Iraqi
military Commanders at both strategic and tactical level.

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32. Array of Computer System. The total management of logistics was controlled
by this system. The entire operation was electronically controlled by this powerful system.

33. Precision Guided Munitions. Precision guided munitions (PGM) reduced the
combat pressure on pilot. It could successfully identify and destroy specific targets.

34. Smart Bombs. The 15,000 pound smart bombs were dropped on Iraq and
these could disintegrate everything within hundreds of yards.

35. Patriot Missiles. US military claimed Patriot Missiles were used for the first time
in combat operation & shot down many Iraqi Scud rockets in flight.

Iraq

36. Light Armored Vehicles. Iraqi Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), the successful long
range suppressing firepower were provided in the logistics command centers, logistics
posts and mortar positions.

37. Scud. Scud is a low-technology rocket bomb that Iraq launched against both Saudi
Arabia and Israel caused extensive casualties. Possibility of chemical or biological
warheads on these rockets were raised.

WAR LOSSES

Human Casualties

38. Coalition. Total 1211 Allied troops were killed and more 646 were wounded.

39. Iraq. 60000-100000 Military personnel were killed. Around civilian 2000-
3000 were killed and 500-7700 were wounded.
Ships Damaged or Destroyed

40. Coalition. None destroyed; USS Tripoli (LPH-10) and Princeton (CG-59)
damaged by mines on 18 February 1991.

41. Iraq. 2 minesweepers, 15 patrol boat, 1 tanker, 1 hovercraft, 1 salvage ship, 2

minelayers, 6 ships, 17 small ships, 8 attack boats, 2 missile boat and 1 gun boat were
bombed, damaged or destroyed.

APPLICATIONS OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Principles of War Applied by Iraq

42. Iraq could not exploit all the principles of war due to lack of intelligence, air
superiority and superior technology weapon systems. However, Iraq had adopted the
following principles of war:

a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. The primary aim of Iraq was to

capture Kuwait and her oil resources. Failing to maintain that aim Iraq tried to
convert it to an Arab Israel conflict. She failed here too in front of coalition force.
b. Surprise. Iraq adopt huge deception plan, thereby surprised the coalition
from the beginning of the war.

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 c. Economy of Effort. Due to geographic location Iraq did not built a strong
navy. Ultimately they went for extensive mine lying from their shore to 40 kilometres
towards sea. These mines damaged two US carriers and finally the coalition had to
suspend their amphibious landing.
d. Co-operation. Iraqi forces did not have real co-operation or co-
ordination among themselves. The coalition took that chance and destroyed Iraqi
observation posts against a small resistance.
e. Maintenance of Morale. Iraq tried to raise the morale of troops by
propaganda but could not resist till end.
f. Concentration of Forces. Iraq was deceived by the huge naval deployment
of coalition force in the Gulf. Iraq decentralized her forces over the whole coastal
area and could not mobilize in time.

Principles of War Applied by Coalition

43. Coalition had adopted the following principles of war:

a. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. The coalition selected their aim to

liberate Kuwait, restore the legitimate government of Kuwait and international peace
and security.
b. Security. The coalition put their carriers out of the Iraqi missile range.
Iraqi Navy was confined at outbreak of the campaign so that their threat does not
arise later on.
c. Concentration of Force. About 6,00,000 troops were concentrated with
modern weapon and 165 ships.
d. Co-operation. CENTCOM Maintained good cooperation between all
subordinate headquarters.
e. Offensive Action. The coalition was offensive from the beginning. It
confined the weaker Iraqi Navy in her base from the very outset.
f. Surprise. The coalition continually and successfully adopted new
deceiving methods by using unconventional and new types of weapons and
technologies.
g. Maintenance of Morale. Superiority in weapons, technologies and strength
kept the coalition morale high since outset.

LESSONS LEARNT

44. The Gulf War a combined support of Army, Navy and Air power of the coalition
force. There were enormous lessons to be learnt. Some of the important lessons are as
follows:

a. US General Schwarzkopf with his sound military fighting strategy organized

the coalition force in different commands such as CENTCOM, ARCENT,
NAVCENT, CENTAF & commanded successfully. Lesson has been learnt from his
efficient and effective Command and Control.
b. The utilization of new high-tech systems like Tomahawk, SLAM, satellites
and EW systems gives us a good lesson regarding the requirements of modern
technology in the war,
c. The use of electromagnetic spectrum like ESM, ECM, EPM effectively
weakened the Iraqi radar and communication system. Lesson has been learnt on
the integration of EW into the weapon system which leads to a success.

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 d. Iraq had the option to carry out attack on US High Value Asset (HVU) like air
craft carrier which would cause large casualties in manpower & assets including
cost penalties. Thereby duly foresightedness is emphasized upon findings of the
weaknesses of the enemy.
e. The coalition force was supplied from all over the world which helped to
defeat the world’s fourth largest army successfully. It is learnt that in multi-national
warfare it is best if one nation controls logistics to support other participants
f. The coalition force could motivate and control the worldwide media. Just only
utilizing this media coverage the force could earn the world's opinion in favour of
them in uplifting the actions of the allied forces against Iraq. It is now crystal clear,
how important the media coverage is.

CONCLUSION

45. The economic aspects were the most important point to be considered in the Gulf
War. To have a control over the oil rigs of the Middle East was the point of interest of both
Iraq and US. The whole war took place on a single point.

46. Dominance of regional politics has a slow but sure far reaching implication in the
entire world community. As the third world countries develop, the gap between them and
the developed world reduces. The increment in their power potential begins to have a
direct influence on the global power equation. In most cases, the slight change goes
unnoticed, and those countries continue to formulate and operate their national policies
based on their perception of regional imperatives. Iraq was one such state. Iraq’s policies
were designed on Saddam’s perception of his country’s role in the Middle East. While he
understood the incremental potential of Iraq’s power on the regional scene, he failed to
appreciate the consequences of his policies had on the global balance. Therefore, when
he suddenly found himself confronted by a worldwide reaction to his invasion of Kuwait, he
was caught in a situation beyond his political concept.

47. After Vietnam War, the Gulf War provided the first major demonstration of the
modern weapons and technology. The “smart” weapons and laser guided bombs used in
the Gulf war shown their accuracy. US Navy carried out offensive actions against Iraqi
force with the newly incorporated Tomahawk missile. In the modern age the US TLAM,
precision guided and high tech munitions have demonstrated a revolution in present
warfare technique. Thereby the success of the joint campaign came into being beyond the
optimistic expectations.

48. So far the paper has covered the aspect of Iraq and Coalition forces intention of
War, geographic and historic background, political aim of Iraq, naval strategy of Iraq and
coalition forces, involvement of modern technologies and lessons derived. To sum up, it
can be said that, the disadvantages of Iraq’s geographic location and inaccessibility to the
open seas also made herself sufferer. Apart from the fighting capacity in comparison with
the coalition forces, the above mentioned disadvantages would not be wholly applicable to
other third world countries in such conflict situation. Despite this, a good number of
lessons have been experienced from the Gulf conflict between both Iraq and the coalition
forces. Obviously this experience will enable us in formulating our future security plan.

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 ELECTRONIC WARFARE - GULF WAR
The Gulf War was a war where an ounce of silicon in a computer may have had more
effect than a ton of uranium
- Alan D. Campen

Introduction

1. Iraq possessed a sophisticated AD artillery network which included as many as

17,000 SAMs and between 9,000 and 10,000 AAA pieces, these were linked by a series of
modern radar system which were fully integrated by a data-link communications net. Many
primary C2 nodes were buried underground in hardened bunkers. Despite this impressive
capability, the Coalition was able to dismantle the EM spectrum so effectively that it closed
Saddam’s “eyes and ears”. This was achieved through the use of a combination of EW
tactics in Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) and
Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM). The French research ship BERREY was
also used against Iraq with her full of EW outfit.

Electronic Support Measures (ESM)

2. The Coalition ESM effort was extensive, including three specialized RC-135 RIVET
JOINT ac for SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) collection and U-2Rs and TR-1As for the
collection of COMINT (Communications Intelligence). Other air assets, including British
Nimrod R1s, the US Navy’s EA – 6B PROWLER and the USAF’s EF-111A RAVEN were
used to refine the electronic order of battle before the war began. Additional information
was also provided from the US Army’s Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI)
Battalions and Naval ESM assets, including eight submarines. In space three US ELINT
satellites, two Magnum and a Vortex, completed the whole EW picture in real-time to field
commanders. The ESM information allowed the Coalition to exploit the EW spectrum by
optimizing their ECM /ECCM systems to counter any Iraqi threat.

Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)

3. Almost every fixed-wing tactical ac that crossed Iraqi lines had either an internal
jammer. Specialized “jammers”, such as EF –111s and EA –6Bs would often escort large
packages; equipped with the powerful ALQ-99 jamming system they enabled tactical ac
to penetrate deep into Iraqi SAM engagement zones with relative impunity. In addition,
specialized communications jamming was carried out by EC-130H COMPASS CALL ac,
which were able to permeate enemy communication nets and effectively shut them down.
At the end of the war an Iraqi AD battery commander revealed that he had not heard from
his superiors for the last three weeks of the war. Other passive measures included the use
of Tactical Air Launched Decoys (TALD); USN and USMC tactical ac made extensive use
of them and they are widely believed to be responsible for Iraq’s inflated claims of downed
Coalition ac. In addition, the Coalition made extensive use of hard- kill SEAD (Suppression
of Enemy Air Defence) systems such as USAF F-4G “ Wild Weasels” and USMC F/A18s,
both equipped with HARM ( High Speed Anti -Radiation Missile) and the British Tornado
armed with ALARM ( Air Launched Anti – Radiation Missile). In the first ten days of the air
war alone the US fired over 600 HARMs and the RAF fired 100 ALARMs.

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Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM)

4. Iraq had some Soviet-made ECM systems in her possession. However, these were
rendered totally ineffective by the frequency agile radar and communication systems
employed by the Coalition forces. Although Iraq possessed some ECCM capability it was
rendered ineffective by the Coalitions superior ECM.

Psychological Warfare

5. Central to the Coalition Psychological war was the EC-130E RIVET RIDER
Hercules (codenamed Volant Solo). These ac were flying broadcast stations of great
sophistication and complexity, and by the end of the war they were beaming their special
Psychological War programs at Iraqi troops 24 hours a day. The ac’s primary mission was
to conduct Psychological operations utilizing electromagnetic transmissions, covering
commercial AM and FM radio bands, VHF and UHF television bands and military VHF, HF
and FM frequencies. Modulation sources included cassette tape, reel-to-reel tape, video
playback and also facilities for live broadcast.

Conclusion

6. It was the winning of the EW war that to limit Coalition forces Casualties in the air
and on the ground so effectively.

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 LOGISTIC LINKAGE WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES - GULF WAR

Introduction

1. In the early morning of 02 Aug 1990 Iraqi ground troops invaded and captured
Kuwait. Over the next five months the buildup of the coalition forces in the Gulf was to be
unprecedented and the largest military build-up since 1945.

2. On 16 Jan 91, the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passed without any
movement of Iraqi forces. So, began a war that was to be unlike any other, a war that was
fought using all the military technology that the Western World could muster.

Planning Consideration

3. Following factors were considered before logistic buildup in the Gulf:

a. Distance. All heavy Cargos/Equipments, Armaments were to be carried

by sea at a distance of 40,000 miles from USA to Middle East.
b. Availability of Suitable Craft. Strategic sealift design was up to NATO
countries.
c. Time. Offensive action (against the Iraq) depended upon the timely
arrival of logistic.
d. En Attack En-route. Possibilities of enemy attack on the logistic chain.
e. Resource. Resources had to be generated and mobilized.

Logistic Operation

4. Pre-positioning Ship. On 02 Aug 90 USA had CVBG USS INDEPENDENCE

at Diego Garcia and USS EISENHOWER at Red Sea. RN had Armilla1 patrol in the area.
They were ordered to move in the theatre of operation.

5. Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). US had 14 RRF at Diego Garcia at 20 days

notice. These were activated soon after the Iraqi invasion. Each ship carried up to 300
containers of ammunition, 100 containers of general stores, 30 refrigerated containers with
additional Roll on Roll off (RO RO) space for 1400 vehicles.

6. Strategic Sealift. Transportation of dry and liquid cargo from Western world,
mainly from USA to Saudi Arabia was a major task undertaken by the US Sealift
command. In a record time of 21 weeks about 376 ships transported 8.3 billion tons of
cargo. The operation was carried-out in two phases.

a. Phase 1: SURGE Phase commenced on 07 Aug 90.

b. Phase 2: SUSTAINMENT Phase commenced on 08 Nov 90.

1
Six months deployment of the ship.
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Types of ships used for Logistic Linkage

7. Following types and number of ships were used:

Types Number
Dry cargo ships 179
Fast sealift 8
Ro Ro ships 53
Merchant ships (USA) 25
Merchant ships (Coalition & foreign) 73
Tankers (USA) 24
Tankers (Chartered) 14

Cargo Handled

8. Cargo handled was as follows:

Cargo Amount
Dry cargo 2.9 Billion tons
Liquid cargo 5.4 Billion tons

9. Strategic Airlift. The coalition airlift amounted total 482,000 people and 513,000
tons of cargo.

10. Tactical Airlift. Within the theatre, the C 130 HERCULES was the workhorse
of the tactical airlift transporting over 209,000 troops and 300,000 tons of cargo during the
conflict.

Conclusion

11. The buildup of logistic linkages for the conflict mainly carried out by the coalition
maritime prowess – no other force can match this inherent capability of a maritime force,
either in term of speed or in term of cargo it can transport. Besides sealift, there was also
airlift, which made good contribution for the effective logistic linkage.

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 COALITION OBJECTIVES IN GULF WAR

Strategic Objective

1. Strategic objectives of Coalition Forces were as follows:

a. Liberation of Kuwait and re-establish of the Kuwait Emir.

b. Punish the aggressor.
c. Economic Embargo by UN.
d. Strategic Sealift and Airlift.
e. To destroy Iraqi’s war fighting capabilities.

Tactical

2. Tactical objectives of Coalition Forces were as follows.

a. Shore Bombardment/ Missile Delivery.

b. Air Attacks on KP’s & VPs of Iraq.
c. Cut off Iraqi SLOC.
d. Keep Gulf free of mine.
e. To effect embargo imposed by UN.

Political Objective

3. As follows:

a. Politically ruin Saddam regime.

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 EW OF ARAB ISRAAEL WAR – 1973
(FIRST MISSILE BATTLE)

Electronic Counter Measure

1. Deception. This technique was followed in the following way:

a. Chaff. Israeli fired chaff to confuse the enemy gadgets and also to
misguide the seeker of Styx.

b. Helicopter as False Target. Israeli used helicopter to represent a ships

radar echo.

c. Apart Placement of Ships. Avoid single jammed beam width. They used to
generate false targets in between ships.

2. Jamming. Israeli used the jamming system to jam seeker radar frequency to
mislead the missile from its actual homed target.

Electronic Support Measure

3. Israeli missile (Gabriel) range was only 20 KM. To overcome this range
disadvantage they located and tracked Syrian ships by adopting ESM and they were
successful to go to their missile release range and fired missile effectively.

Intelligence

4. SIGINT & ELINT. Israeli could not exploit SIGINT & ELINT in their favour.

Evaluation on Israeli ECM Techniques

5. The Israeli Gabriel had only half of the effective range than that of Syrians SSN-2
Styx. Therefore, to reduce the enemy MER advantage they did not have any other option
other than ESM.

6. The Gabriel missile carried ECM equipment, which was able to jam the Styx missile
on its ballistic curve. It had an automatic homing device that operated in rough seas and
weather without loss of accuracy or technical efficiency. On the other hand Soviet ESM
was inferior in effectiveness in rough weather at sea.

7. Both missiles (Styx & Gabriel) were deadly and efficient in their own way, but there
was a distinct ECM gap on the Arab. Arabs ECM could not counter the Israeli’s Gabriel,
but the Israeli’s ESM could do.

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 ARAB ISRAEL WAR 1973 – LESSONS FOR BANGLADESH

1. Following lessons are worthy of consideration in Bangladesh perspective:

a. Electronic Warfare. Electronic warfare played a vital role in this war. The
electronic advantages were the sole reason to make the Syrian Styx missile’s score
nil. After this war the military planners have given a series of thought on EW aspect.

b. Missile. By knowing the effectiveness of Styx missile of Arabs, Israel

indigenously made Gabriel and ECM which worked very effectively.

c. FAC.

(1) FAC proved her worthiness as an effective missile platform.

(2) FACs (missile boats) without advanced and superior ECM were
impotent.

d. Tactics. Israeli used the better tactics by using helo and radar decoy to
deceive Arabs Styx that made the Arabs task difficult.

e. Technology. The Israeli innovations in the use of helo, chaff and radar
jammers set a precedent in the way ships defend themselves still to this day.

f. Super Power. Involvement of super power can influence outcome of

the war.

g. Surveillance. It played important role in that war.

h. Cost Effectiveness. FAC proved as a cost effective platform in this war.

j. Air Support. Arabs avoided few naval engagements due to Israeli air
power which played havoc in support of naval operation.

k. SLOC. SLOC is subjected to blockade during war.

l. C3l. This war reflected the need for command, control, communication and
intelligence.

m. Weapon Capability. It is the weapon capability rather than the size of

the ship, which was determining factor in the naval battles.

n. Co-ordination. Coordination is very important for utilizing resources

effectively which was absent between Syria and Egypt.

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 GULF WAR - LESSONS FOR BANGLADESH

1. The Following lessons are worthy of consideration in the Bangladesh context:

(a) Military Doctrine and Force Structures. For any military planning it is vital to
balance doctrine with capability.

(b) Research & Development (R&D). R&D programmes not only give rise
to high-tech military systems, but also benefit the civil sector with the resulting boost
to a country’s economy and industrial base.

(c) Deterrence. Conventional precision weapons demonstrated that they are

capable of destroying high-value strategic targets.

(d) Unity of Command. The unity of command and the minimum

requirement for coordination between civil and military agencies are the key
concern for any combine/joint operation
Precision guided munitions
Airborn warning and control system
(e) Force Multipliers. Defence procurement is not wastage of cost but one of
cost effectiveness. Systems such as AWACS, PGMs and AAR must be considered
in terms of long-term saving, not as short-term expense. The argument for future
investment must be emphasized by defence planners and accorded the necessary
priority. After action review

(f) Logistic Support. Ability to identify requirements early ensures their timely
delivery and preparation.

(g) Training. NATO forces, of all combat arms, were trained to fight Soviet
equipped troops, in highly realistic exercises for decades which proved successful.

(h) EW. The ability to exploit the Electromagnetic Spectrum, whilst denying the
enemy use of the same was amply demonstrated in the Gulf War.

(j) FAC. FAC without sufficient air coverage proved totally ineffective for
support of force.

(k) Mine Warfare. Proved cost effective and vital for which coalition forces
had to abandon the amphibious landing plan.

(l) Strategic Alliances. Coalition proved to be very effective. BD should

go for strategic alliance for the interest of her security.

(m) Communication. Good and secure communication is essential for the

success in any joint campaign.

(n) Role of the Media. “War by television” had a profound impact on political,
and to a certain extent, military decisions which were made with the impact of the
media in mind. Commanders of the future will have to be trained how media can
change the war result.”

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 MISSILE BOAT ENGAGEMENTS: ARAB - ISRAEL WAR

1. A number of missile boat engagements were encountered during first six days in
the war. Among those, battle of Latakia and battle of Damietta were prominent.

a. Battle of Latakia. This is the first missile boat engagement in the naval
history. On 06 October, the very first day of the war, the Israelis anticipated a Syrian
missile boat task force might attack Haifa or other targets on the northern part of the
Israeli coastline. So, an Israeli flotilla consisting of four Saar class and one Reshev
class missile boats was sent northward on an offensive patrol. First contact was
made at about 2230 hours with a Syrian K-123 torpedo boat and one T-43
minesweepers. Leaving one Saar to deal with the Syrian torpedo boat, the Israeli
craft changed direction towards the Syrian ships which were detected and identified
positively at 40,000 meters range. After doing some manoeuvring Syrian torpedo
boat was attacked by a Israeli Saar and after gunfire it was sunk. Then the Israelis
detected a T-43 mine sweeper and three missile boats to the east of the Israeli task
force. An engagement south of Latakia developed when the Syrians opened fire
with missile at 37,000 meters. But they could not hit the targets. The Israeli boats
continued to advance until they were within 20,000 meters, the maximum range of
their Gabriel missiles, and they opened fire with Gabriel missiles. The Israelis
claimed that one Syrian OSA, two Komar, one K-123 torpedo boat and one T-43
minesweeper were sunk, all by Gabriel missiles. On the other hand, the Syrians
said that in this engagement, which began about 0100 hours on the seventh and
lasted for two hours, their coastal batteries took part and sank four Israeli boats. So
the first missile boat engagement in naval history ended cloudily.

b. Battle of Damietta. An Israeli flotilla of six Saar missile boats arrived

off Damietta at 1846 hours on 08 October. They cruised around and, supported by
helicopters, identified an Egyptian group of four OSA missile boats at 2100 hours.
After doing some manoeuvring, the first Egyptian salvo, of 12 missiles, was fired at
0015 hours from a range of 40,000 meters, but none hit their targets. The Israelis
quickly closed to 20,000 meters, the maximum range for their Gabriels, and fired
the missiles. Two of the Egyptian vessels were sunk by missiles within the first ten
minutes, and 25 minutes later the Gabriels claimed a third Egyptian craft as it
attempted to escape westward to Alexandria. The fourth successfully evaded the
Israelis and reached Alexandria. Egyptians claimed to have sunk four Israeli
targets; three they believed were motor torpedo boats and one a missile boat. As a
result of this engagement, the Egyptians became duly respectful of the combination
of Israeli missile boats and Israeli helicopters.

c. Missile Boat engagement on 10 October. Two missile boat clashes

occurred on the night of 10 October. In one incident, a group of Israeli Saars
bombarded installations at Tartous. Syrian missile boats suddenly emerged from
the harbour to attack the Israelis. After firing some missiles, the Syrians quickly
broke off the engagement and returned to the shelter of their harbour and went
under the cover of their coastal guns. The Israelis, who fired back, claimed to have
sunk two Syrian missile boats. The same night six Saar missile boats ran into a
group of Egyptian missile boats off Damietta. The Israelis claimed to have sunk
three Egyptian boats in the exchange of fire, but the Egyptians denied this.

d. Missile boat engagement on 11 October. There were two missile boat

clashes at sea on the night of 11 October. An Israeli missile boat task force was
130
moving toward Latakia harbour. Syrian missile boats suddenly emerged, fired their
missiles, and then escaped back to the shelter of their coastal batteries, taking
refuge among the freighters of several nationalities at anchor. The Israelis
continued firing and hit three of the merchant ships. The Israelis claimed to have
destroyed four Syrian missile boats in this engagement, but the Syrian countered
with a claim of sinking eight Israeli crafts. The second missile boat engagement
was off Tartous, wherein the Syrian navy employed similar tactics. As soon as the
Israeli Saars were sighted, the Syrian missile boats would rush out of harbour at full
speed, fired their missiles, and then withdrew into the shelter of the international
merchant ships at anchor. After the twelfth there were no more missile boat clashes
at sea.

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 3D - ATTACK IN FALKLAND WAR

Introduction

1. On the surprise invasion by the Argentine Her Majestry’s Government announced to

form up the Task Forces by 03 & 04 April 1982. British Government assembled 60 to 70
ships of all kinds. Those were:
a. VSTOL A/C carriers – 2.
b. Destroyer.
c. Frigates.
d. Submarines.
e. Mine sweepers.
f. Assault Transport.
g. Improvised Auxiliary carrier.
h. Hospital ships.
j. Converted landing ships.

Three Dimensional Attack

2. The naval aspect of Falkland war can be divided as follows:

a. SM Attack. The nuclear powered attack submarines were the first to be

deployed (12 April) in the theatre to affect MEZ and later on TEZ, as well as to
collect intelligence and surveillance of the Argentine naval force. Other RN units
were deployed between the mainland and the islands. HMS CONQUEROR nuclear
power SM patrolled off the Island to prevent any Argentine reinforcement. During
the whole campaign submarines were deployed with other surface elements for
picket duties and establishing the Blockade. First major kill of the war was done by
nuclear power submarine HMS CONQUEROR which torpedoed GENERAL
BELGRANO on 02 May and was sunk. Virtually after that Argentine surface force
did not take part and remained within their TS.
b. Surface Engagement. By mid May the task force had accomplished two
of its main tasks i,e, movement of the troops to the south Atlantic and the
establishment of the sea control of the seas around the Islands. Although there was
no surface engagement but Naval Gunfire Support were provided on 14 May while
SAS (Spl Air Svc) & SBS (Spl boat Sqn) raided on Pebble Island. During
Amphibious operation surface elements provided effective gunfire support to
establish beach head at San Carlos. Defence in depth concept was adopted for
amphibious landing where surface ships provided missile trap and gun line. Frigates
and destroyers provided close blockade, escorts, patrol, gunfire support and ASW
screen.
c. Air Operations. The Argentine SM SANTA FE was attacked on surface
by British helo 5 miles from the island. Vulcan bombers and sea Harriers attacked
on the Argentine position on islands. The carriers provided the air defence and the
means for attacking enemy ships. During amphibious landing outer ring of defence
was provided by the Harriers flying CAP. Helo conducted operations for ASW and
surface engagement effectively. On 4 may HMS SHEFFIELD was hit by two
Exocet AM 39 of Argentine Super Etendard ac.

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 LOGISTIC IN FALKLANDS WAR
Introduction

1. With long lines of support and a campaign of uncertain duration logistic were
inevitably dominant concerns of operational and tactical commanders.

Planning Constraints

2. Following were the logistics planning constraints:

a. Distance. All heavy Cargoes/equipments and armament needed to be

carried by sea at a distance of 8000 miles from UK to Falkland.

b. Generation and Mobilization of Resources. Emergency procurement/

production of resources were planned by mobilizing all available means with the
help of civil industrialist and business community.

c. Enemy Attack En-route. Possibilities of enemy attack on the logistic chain.

Logistics Operation

3. The entire logistics build up for the campaign was carried out in following manner:

a. Logistics Support Cell. To cover all logistics services a tri-service

organization called logistics support Cell (LSC) was established in UK.

b. Resource Generation. Emergency procurement/production by mobilizing

all available means was undertaken with help of civil industrialist/business
community.

c. STUFT. Some 45 Merchant ships including 330 officers and 1170 men
of merchant navy were taken up from trade starting from passenger liner to trawler.

d. ALSS. Advanced Logistics Support Site was established at

ASCENSION Island. This Island was used as an airhead for LRMP and Vulcan
Bombers, command center, exercise area, fueling station and joint operational
logistics pipe line.

e. TRALA. A major tug repair and logistics area (TRALA) was established
on the north eastern edge of exclusion zone where preliminary battle damage repair
was also carried out.

f. Allies Support. Resources were generated from NATO and other allies.

Conclusion

4. During the whole campaign, no weapon system ran out of ammunition, no ship out
of fuel, equipment and spares were maintained at high level. The man had to be provided
with six hundred tons of food and one thousand tons of fresh water each week, fight or not.
To cover these, a tri-service organization called logistic support cell was established in UK.
133
Q. What was the effect of weather on Falklands war?
1. Weather played significant part in this war.

Effect on Argentine Op

2. Unable to Attack RN Elm. Argentina planned to attack the detected British

units from their carrier VENTICINQUE DE MAYO after they were detected some 300 nm
to the NE of Falklands on 01 May by the carriers recce ac S-2. But she could not launch
her A-5 ac due to slow speed owing to bad weather.

3. No Op after Sunset from 02 May Onward. Bad weather continued for next few
days and no op could be conducted after sunset.

4. Air Op Affected. During the last few days of the conflict, Argentine ac could not
operate in the sky due to the fog and mist.

5. Undetected Amph Op by the British. Low cloud and poor visibility persisted from
19 May and onward which provided the British force an excellent opportunity to conduct
‘OPERATION CORPORATE’, the amph op in South Georgia. The amph gp landed after
midnight of 20/21 May under the cover of poor visibility. The RN mariners were almost
invisible to the Argentines.

Effect on RN Op

6. Unable to Provide TASMO. On 02 May the British force could not send air
support to one of their recce party ashore near Port Stanley due to bad weather. The recce
party consisted four SAS men, who were pinned down by the Argentine ground patrol.
Deteriorating sea state, poor visibility, low cloud, sea mist and strong wind prevented the
OTC to send TASMO.

7. Air Crash. Two Sea Harriers took off in poor visibility for a routine CAP from HMS
INVINCIBLE. They detected a radar contact at low alt on the south of the battle gp. The ac
dived towards the contact to investigate, but were never found again. It was assumed that
the ac crashed in air due to poor visibility.

8. Collision Imminent. On 07 May HMS BROADSWORD was about to collide

with ac carrier HMS HERMES due to dense fog. Picture compilation and Su plot were
difficult because of lot of unidentified contacts, which could not be visually identified due to
poor visibility.

9. Mistakes of RN. Because of poor visibility, the British force chased a whale
thinking it as an en SM.

10. Successful Amph Op. But the bad weather helped the RN in some way as they
could successfully land their marine troops on South Georgia on 20/21 May midnight for
‘OPERATION CORPORATE’ without being detected by the Argentines due to bad
weather.

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Q. Describe the significance of technology in Falkland war.
1. It was a quantum jump in terms of the weapons and platforms used from the last
naval battle of this scale.

a. Of all the naval weapon systems employed by the British in the Falklands
affair, the short legged, subsonic VSTOL Sea Harriers were proved to be the most
outstanding. Without it, the British would certainly have lost the war. They flew over
2000 sorties under extremely demanding weather condition. On the other hand,
Argentine Super Etendard with deadly Exocet AM 39 Sea Skimming anti-ship
missile created concern among the British Task Force. SHEFFIELD was sunk by
the same missile launched from a Super Etendard aircraft, in a standoff attack. The
British did not have a radar contact until the fatal missile was already launched, then
it was too late. Damage control proved almost impossible.

b. For the air defence in general, missiles were more effective in the Falklands
War than the guns. Among the British missiles, area defence Sea Dart, point
defence Sea Wolf and helicopter launched Sea Skua performed well. Accordingly
valid claims, Sea Dart missiles destroyed at least 8 Argentine aircraft. On the other
hand, Sea Wolf missiles although only mounted on two ships had 5 or more kills
proving outstandingly effective against aircraft at high speeds and low level sea
skimming heights, virtually without any radar warning.

c. Following shortfalls in the technological aspects were also revealed during

this war:

(1) Absence of Close in Weapon System was badly felt.

(2) Absence of air borne early warning was a handicap.

(3) Type 21 frigates suffered badly from fire due to aluminum

superstructure, which was found to melt under intense heat. Moreover, RN
ships were found vulnerable to fire and damage.

(4) There were mutual technical problems on both sides. Unexploded

bombs were found in the hulls of at least 6 British vessels. On the other hand
many British bombs and shells found unexploded as well. There were reports
that even British torpedoes had problems.

(5) A number of serious questions were raised concerning several

aspects of British combatant ship construction, damage control, and fire
fighting techniques. Ships tended to be cramped and on balance still fragile
with too little redundancy of systems. Older ships withstood battle damage
better than newer ones. The unavoidable fragility of modern ships and the
power of modern weapons is not an excuse for poor damage control, but a
reason for increased attention in this area.

135
 STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL DECISION MADE IN THE FALKLAND CAMPAIGN

Strategic Decision

1. Following Strategic decisions were made by both Argentina and British in the
Falkland Campaign:

British Strategic Decision Argentine Strategic Decision

a. Re-establish the political control of the a. Invade and establish
Falklands Island. sovereignty in the Malvinas Island.

b. Punish the aggressor. b. Prevent British attack.

c. Establish political regions in Argentina by c. Surrender to the British on 12th

frustrating their efforts and capturing Falklands June 1982.
Island.

d. Formation Deployment of British Maritime d. Formation of TF 40, TF 60 and

Forces CTF 317 and CTF 324 in the theatre of TF 20.
operation.

e. Prove the British might in the ego of the

international community.

F. Mobilizing the national resources to support

task force.

g. Diplomatic persuasion for immediate

withdrawal of Argentina.

Tactical Decision

3. Tactical decisions of both the countries are given below:

British Tactical Decision Argentina tactical Decision

a. Establishment of ALSS at ASCENSION a. Conduct of OPERATION ROSARIO
Island to use it as airhead and STUFT to capture the Falklands Island on 02
tanker base. April 1982.

b. Declaration of TEZ/ MEZ 200 nm b. Operational deployments to support

around the Island. extended defence of Malvinas.

c. Amphibious landing in Falklands Island. c. Decision to withdraw surface

combatants in shallow water.

d. Sinking of GENERAL BELGRANO on d. Passive Fleet -in-being strategy.

02 May 1982.

136
Question: Bangla could be another Vietnam, if Indian Fleet would not
have come to Bay of Bengal, comment.
Introduction

1. Bangladesh and Vietnam, both the ill-fated nations have many things in common.
Bangladesh the then East Pakistan, after the departure of British colonial ruler fall under
the suppression of her new ruler west Pakistanis. On the other hand, South Vietnam fell
under the assault of communist North soon after their independence from France in 1954.

2. Following are the Token incidents in 1964, USA entangled itself with the internal
affairs of the Vietnam in the name of prevention of communist aggression. Thus, conflicts
for two decades of guerrilla warfare followed by civil war continued. Similarly in the night of
25/26 March 71, Bangladesh started a guerrilla war against the Pakistanis and won
independence after only nine month due to the direct assistance from India.

Vietnam War

4. For the US, they fought Air-land battle coupled up with their innerve land assault. It
is recorded that the US navy alone complemented the air attack by providing 2,00,000
sorties against Vietnam land targets. In reply Vietnam choose a war of attention the
guerrilla warfare, taking advantage of their hilly terrain and fought. The Vietnam could not
disruption the SLOC of the Americans due to the absence of a balanced.

a. US landed before Russia

b. Ended as a guerrilla.

Liberation War

5. For the Pakistan Army they were well-equipped regular forces who had assaulted
the civilian citizens to suppress the demand of independence. This brutality led the ill-
equipped freedom fighters to choose the same art of war from their SE Asian brethren
fighting:
a. India came first supported by the fleet. Thus US did not enter and was
returned to doing so.
b. Ended as a conventional war.

Deduction

6. The war of Vietnam so to say the sufferings of lasted long due to the absence of
Vietnamese named resistance. Whereas the Indian Naval engagement which resulted to
the disruption of SLCO of Pakistan, forced the Pakistanis to surrender in absence of
adequate war waging materials.

Impact of the Presence of Indian Fleet in Bay of Bengal

7. Presence of US soldiers did not take place in the soil of Bangladesh. Therefore, the
war did not escalate into total war.
a. Blockaded successful all the supply lines.
b. US Fleet did not come to the theatre of OPS foam pacific.

137
Question: U-boat operation was declined at the final stage of WW II-discuss?

Introduction

1. U-boat of German High Sea Fleet was the most important against the sea power of
Britain during WW II. Its strength, however, was inadequate to win decisive success
against the enemy's supply lines. By 1942, number of U-boats increased enough to be
deployed in packs. They encountered an enemy now rich in expertise, and from 1943
onwards superior in power ultimately the result was unavoidable defeat.

Selection and Maintenance of Aim of High Sea Fleet

2. C-in-C Donitz constantly stressed the need to concentrate the whole force
exclusively against the vital Atlantic convoys to stop reinforcement. But it was depleted
time and again in favour of secondary theatres of war like the Mediterranean and the
Arctic.

Concept of Deployment of U boat

3. German success was depended on increased sinking rate of allied ships than that
of produced.

What Happened Actually

4. Followings revealed from war diary:

a. Initially U-boat claims were exaggerated.

b. Allied production even at the worst period nearly kept pace with the sinking
rate.
c. By mid -1942 new tonnage of allied was already exceeding than sink rate.
d. So, It is understood that Germans had prospect of winning was in the first
two years but not after.

Cause of Defeat

5. Though U-boat commanders had outstanding individual successes in the earlier

part of the war. Such success was halted by the allied. The victory was shifted to the allied
convoy defence forces in the spring of 1943 due to their tactical use of technical
equipment as shown in following table:

Equipment of Impact on U Boat of High Sea Fleet

Allied
Radar U-boat tactics of attacking by night lost their effectiveness
owing to the enemy's constantly developing radar and radar-
equipped aircraft.
Huff-Duff direction Obligatory signal procedure on sighting reports was all
finders through vectored by mobile 'Huff-Duff' direction finders.
Allied used to get bearing of U-boat transmission and
instantly attack on the direction.
This sensor was so effective and equally beneficial to allied
as Germans failed repeatedly to find the evidence of its
existence.
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Conclusion

7. The U-boats' adversaries outmatched them in versatility and adjusted themselves to

the conditions of the convoy battles with superior technical resource. In 1943 the Germans
were fighting with the same types of U-boats and armaments as early in the war. Though
Donitz always pressed for new developments such as electrically propelled U-boats which
were fast even under water, these all came too late. By the time the crucial importance of
the U-boat arm was recognized, the war was already lost. Actually, in the evaluation in can
be said that radar and huff-duff direction finder are the main reason of defeat in U-boat
war. More sympathetically to say that excessive loss of U-boat in this war created the
havoc among the German sailors and in one stage they mutinied to sail for war with U-
boat. Therefore, myth of U-boat declination takes its position in the history at the end of
WW II.

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 ANALYSIS OF WARS

NAVAL ASPECTS OF LIBERATION WAR 1971

1. Operations in Eastern Theatre. The Eastern fleet of India based at

Visakhapatnam virtually faced no threat from the Pakistan Navy in the Eastern theatre
during the 1971 war. Therefore apart from the main mission of enforcing a complete
blockade of East Pakistan and cutting off its lines of communication from the west, it had
following additional mission:
a. Destruction / Neutralisation of airfields at Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar.
b. Bombardment of East Pakistani’s ports to destroy or damage port
installations and ships.
c. Bombardment of riverine traffic to disrupt logistic supplies of dispersed
Pakistan Army units largely dependent on water transport.
d. Bombardment of troop concentrations in support of army operations in
coastal areas.
e. Amphibious landing, if required, to support army operations.

2. Fleet Composition of Indian Navy. The Eastern fleet of India consisted with
the Aircraft Carrier INS Vikrant, her escort Frigates INS Brahmaputra and INS Beas. Petya
Patrol Vessels INS Kamorta and INS Kavaratti. These ships were nominated as the “Strike
Task” Group. The submarine INS Khanderi/Kalvari formed the subsurface force and the
Landing Ships INS Magar, Gharial and Guldar were nominated for transportation and
amphibious role. The Destroyer INS Rajput and the patrol crafts INS Panvel, Pulicat and
Akshay were the local defence group with DESH DEEP a light vessel tanker ad been
requisitioned and commissioned for afloat support. The fleet was commanded by Rear
Admiral S H Sharma.

3. Fleet Composition of Pakistan Navy. The Pakistan Navy had never maintained
in East Pakistan more than a gunboat squadron and few riverine craft as the repair and
logistic facilities for large ships had not been developed at Chittagong. Only in addition,
Submarine PNS GAZI was despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of
locating the carrier VIKRANT as it was operating in that area.

140
4. Operations in the Bay of Bengal.

a. On the night of 03/04 Dec VIKRANT sailed out of the North Andamans and
took station off Cox’s Bazar. The first sortie of 8 sea hawks catapulted and
screamed off the deck at about 1100 hours for Cox’s Bazar airfield and at the
afternoon they screamed again to wreck the well-fortified Chittagong air field. Using
Seahawks by day and Alizes by night, on the first day, the Indians succeeded in
inflicting considerable damage to ships and shore installations. The gunboat
COMILLA was sunk and RAJSHAHI severely damaged during an air attack on the
outer anchorage.

b. On 05 and 06 Dec carrier-borne aircraft carried out attacks on Chittagong,

Khulna and Mongla harbours and at ships in the Passur River. The oil installations
at Chittagong caught fire and a Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie was sunk at the
outer anchorage. On 07 Dec they again attacked over airfield and oil installations of
Chittagong. On 08 and 09 Dec, the carrier aircrafts carried out attacks over troops
concentrations in Barisal, Bakarganj and Patuakhali. The attacks were challenged
by the Anti aircraft fire of Gunboats and Shore batteries and the Indians accepted
the loss of few aircrafts. On 11 to 14 Dec the aircraft from VIKRANT pounded
Chittagong, Barisal and Rajapur. Sortie after sortie were flown throughout 11 and
12 Dec. Ships went close taking a calculated risk against the mines reported to
have been laid by the enemy. Seeing the warship so close to the town, the enemy
became panicky and thinking that a troops landing was imminent. Therefore the
whole garrison left for Burma in a convoy of trucks and the liberated Cox’s Bazar fell
into the hand of freedom fighters. During the attacks on Chittagong, Khulna,
Chalna, Mongla and Passur River, 3 Pakistani Gunboat namely PNS JESSORE,
and SYLHET were wrecked, 6 other Gunboats surrendered and Pakistani Merchant
Ships Karnaphuli (GRT 6876), Surma (GRT 5890), Al Abbas (GRT 9142) and Anis
Baksh (GRT 6273) were damaged. Only PNS RAJSHAHI escaped. On 14 Dec at
midnight INS VIKRANT sailed for Madras for refuelling.

5. Sinking of Submarine GHAZI

a. In early Nov 71 PN Submarine GHAZI was deployed in the Bay of Bengal in

order to put counter threat to the Indian Ships particularly aircraft carrier VIKRANT.

141
 Its presence was disclosed when a signal message addressed to Chittagong Naval
Authorities was intercepted by the Indians. It was also known that Ghazi during her
earlier refit in Turkey had modified her torpedo tubes to carry mines. On 03 Dec 71
in late evening Ghazi was positioned off Vishakapatnam and laying mines in that
area. Meanwhile the Destroyer RAJPUT along with the Patrol craft AKSHAY was
ordered to carry out cross over patrols at the entrance to the harbour and roll out
depth charges as there was sufficient depth of water for mine laying operations.
She picked up the sonar transmissions and/or propeller noise of the two patrolling
vessels and therefore got out of the area to the safety of deeper waters.

b. At about midnight when the patrolling vessels returned to harbour, the

submarine presumably approached the partly mined area to complete her
assignment and probably made the cardinal error of inadvertently recrossing her
previous track positively as strong tides occur in the post monsoon period off this
cost. At about midnight there were two simultaneous explosions heard in the naval
coastal battery. In the early hours of 04 Dec, a thorough search was carried with the
enlisted fishermen and two of them could pick up a life jacket and other debris.
Search continued on the following days and three bodies and a lot of flotsam and
jetsam were found. From the evidences, it was established that the submarine
destroyed is none save PNS GHAZI.

6. Amphibious Landing in Cox’s Bazar. To encircle the retreating Pakistani

forces, the Indian Navy made a hastily plan for amphibious landing south of Cox’s Bazar
with the landing ships MAGAR, GHARIAL and GULDAR embarking clearance divers for
beach reconnaissance. A battalion of Ghurkhas were readily available embarked on a
merchant ship Vishwa Vijaya and sailed from Calcutta on 12 Dec to rendezvous with the
eastern fleet of Cox’s Bazar. The beach was bombed on 14 Dec and the landing took
place at forenoon on 16 Dec. Initially the deep water gap between the beach and the
ships created a setback with the death of two Ghurkhas. Yet under the difficult
circumstances, and with the help of the locals, the navy commandeered boats and the
landing was made successful.

7. Operations in Western Theatre. A plan for a counter offensive against

India, in the west was presented to the President of Pakistan on 30 Nov and all the
preparations of readiness were going on accordingly. On 1845 on 03 Dec, by a general

142
message, Pakistan Naval Headquarters announced the outbreak of war. Indian Navy was
prepared to counter them at sea.

8. Fleet Composition of Pakistan Navy. By 03 Dec most of the Navy ships

were operational. The flotilla consisted with flagship PNS Babur, Destroyer PNS Badr,
Khaibar, Shahjahan, Alamgir and Jahangir. There were 3 Frigates, PNS Tipu Sultan,
Tughril and Zulfiqar, 3 Submarines, PNS Hangor, Mangro and Shusuk, Mine Sweeper
Squadron consisting with PNS Muhafiz, Mujahid, Moshal, Momin, Mukhtar, Mubarak,
Mahmood and Munsif and 2 Gunboats PNS Sadaqat and Rafaqat. There were also 2
Auxiliary ships PNS Dacca, the Tanker and a Salvage Tug Madadgar. Rear Admiral M A
K Lodi commanded the flotilla.

9. Fleet Composition of Indian Navy. Indian Navy Flotilla consisted with Flagship
INS Mysore. 15th Frigate Squadron, INS Trisul and Talwar, 14th Frigate Squadron, INS
Kukri, Kirpan, Kuthar, 31 Patrol Squadron INS Kiltan, Katchall and Kadmat. There were
other frigates, INS Cauvery, Kistna and Tir, Destroyer INS Ranjit and Submarine INS
Karanj and Kursura. There were also Osa Class Patrol Boats INS Nashak, Nipat, Nirghat,
Nirbhik, Vinash, Veer, Vijeta and Vidyut. The Fleet Commander was Rear Admiral E C
Kuruvilla.

10. Operations in the Arabian Sea. On the outbreak of hostilities all the
Pakistan navy ships were put to sea. The surface ships were operating off Makran coast
and the submarine in their allocated areas off the Indian coast. On the other side, Indian
fleet sailed out of Bombay on 02 Dec to attack on Karachi. Many of those ships had
restrictions on fuel, speed and sea state, although they could arrive at R/V in darkness by
04 Dec.

11. Missile Attacks

a. The Indian Commander in Chief executed the missile attack on Karachi as

the code name “Operation Trident”. In this operation OSA Class missile boats were
tasked. The ships approached close to the Saurashtra Coast on 04 Dec at
1812(IST) and launched a number of Styx missiles on the enemy position and
ships. First two missiles from Nipat struck Khaibar, which was patrolling off Karachi
harbour and by 2330(IST) she was abandoned. In the evening, on the same day
Muhafiz sailed out from harbour and arrived near Khaibar to witness the missile

143
 attack. At 2335 (IST) she altered course on 210 and a missile from Nirghat hit on
her port side abaft the bridge giving no time for transmission of a distress message.
Some missiles were also fired at Karachi harbour from Nipat. After their successful
attack, the Indian missile boats headed for the R/V position off the coast of Mangrol
for refuelling.

b. After the first missile attack, the Pakistan fleet manoeuvred along the coast
mostly in anti-submarine formation, deeply conscious of the missile threat. On
much discussion and debate, by afternoon of 08 Dec all the major surface units
except DACCA were recalled to harbour. On the same day, the second missile
attack code name a single missile boat INS VINASH supported by two frigates
TRISHUL and TALWAR carried out “Operation Python”. On approaching towards
Karachi from southwesterly direction, INS TALWAR engaged and sunk a Pakistani
Patrol Craft, which was reporting about the approach. The missile boat VINASH
came close to Karachi to a range of 12 miles and fired missiles in succession at 4
different ships chosen at random among a dozen ships at Manora anchorage. The
first missile flew over the ships and crashed into an oil tanker at the Keamary oil
farm. The other 3 missiles homed on to ships at Manora anchorage and hit a
British merchant vessel Harmattan, SS Gulf Star registered in Panama and PNS
DACCA. The Harmattan sunk immediately, but Gulf Star survived. PNS DACCA
also miraculously survived as the Commanding Officer boldly brought the fire on the
upper deck under control.

12. Sinking of INS Kukri. Pakistan Navy Submarine PNS HANGOR sailed on 22
Nov for a patrol off the Indian Kathiawar coast. In the early hours of the morning on 09
Dec, two contacts were picked up and identified as warships. A pursuit of the enemy
began. By the evening, she could make out their pattern of movement with her sensor as
they were carrying out an anti-submarine search. At 1930(IST) the Submarine came to a
position to launch an attack. At 2027 she fired a homing torpedo and no explosion was
heard. Subsequently she fired another torpedo and a tremendous explosion was heard at
2049 (IST). She again fired the third torpedo and turned away at maximum speed. A
distant explosion was heard subsequently. INS KURI was the ship hit by the torpedo in
her magazine compartment and sunk within two minutes with her 18 officers and 176
sailors including the Commanding Officer.

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13. Super Power Involvement. The 9 months Bangladesh crisis is not limited
only within the magnitude of killing and human miseries. The episode also influenced on
the consequences of world politics. During the later part of the crisis when India and
Pakistan were in direct confrontation, US President directed carrier USS Enterprise into
the Bay of Bengal. In response, the former Soviet Union also sent its fleet to the Indian
Ocean. China on its part also mobilized her troops along Sino-Indian border. These
manoeuvers could lead the world to the outbreak of major global war.

a. US Involvement. The US policy over the crisis of 1971 was titled “The Tilt:
India-Pakistan crisis of 1971” as Henry A Kissinger, the then Foreign Secretary of
US devoted a 77- page chapter of his memories to this episode. There he
explained about the US policy as Pakistan was their only Channel to China and
they had no other means of communication with Peking. In-fact US was trying to
ease their stained relation with China. However as per the “tilt” policy, on 10 Dec,
White House directly ordered a Navy Task Group 74 consisting of carrier Enterprise
alongwith other escort and supply ships to enter Bay of Bengal steaming from the
Gulf of Tonkin, Singapore without informing their mission of entering. Although it
was clear that, their presence in the Bay was a move to restrain the Indians from
their involvement and to safeguard the integrity of Pakistan.

b. Former Soviet Involvement. With the fear of outside intervention,

particularly from China, India was invoking as per Indo-Soviet peace treaty which
provided for consultation in the event of an attack or threatened attack upon either
party. As a result, Soviet Union vetoed the security council resolution for an
immediate cease-fire on the ground that it placed the India and Pakistan on the
same footing, where the Pakistan was the aggressor. On 12-13 Dec, in response to
the US Task Force, Soviet also deployed another task group consisting of one
Cruiser, one Destroyer and 2 Submarines. The mission of this deployment was to
convince US that their militarily involvement in the Bay would be very costly.

c. Involvement of China. The first Chinese response to the crisis was on the
Indian interference with the Pakistan’s internal affairs. It did not publicly condemn
the Pakistani military repression. Also Chinese military aid to Pakistan during the
crisis was not significant. However, Chinese verbal support for Pakistan took an

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 aggressive tone when the war broke out. She accused the Soviet Union and India
of their evil design to establish Indian hegemony in the region.

14. Operation Jackpot. To achieve maximum success, the first co-ordinated

attack code named OPERATION JACKPOT by 176 naval Commandos was launched on
the dark night of 15/16 August 1971 against sea ports of Chittagong, Mongla and the river
ports of Narayangonj, Chandpur and Barisal. The Commandos entered into the port in
broad daylight with the limpet mines and the fins hidden in baskets of jackfruit, which they
carried on their heads like a vendor and carried out reconnaissance to identify the target
visually. In order to launch co-ordinated attack final clearance was required from India,
which was ensured by playing two popular Bangla songs on Akashbani, Calcutta on 13
and 14 August 1971. The operation was carried out simultaneously in all the ports with
great success. In Chittagong, MV OHRMAZD with 9910 tons, MV AL ABBAS with 1041
tons and a barge named ORIENT BARGE NO 6 with 276 tons of military cargo went to the
bottom by the limpet mines. Few other coasters, tugs ferries and harbour boats were also
badly damaged or sunk. At Mongla, 6 ships and barges including 7000 ton Somalian
freighter SS LIGHTNING were sunk or damaged. One collier and three coasters at
Chandpur and 3 river steamers, 6 mechanised barges 2 motor launches and 4 pontoons
were destroyed at Narayangonj, Khulna and Daudkandi. The Commandos suffered only 2
casualties in Chittagong. The underwater attacks by Mukti Bahini frogmen had serious
impact on foreign shipping lines that increased their war risk insurance from five shillings
to one pound sterling as also an additional 20 percent risk pay for the crew. Further, 1000
dollars per day was paid to each ship that dared to remain in port for a period of more than
one week as risk money .The traditional exports from East Pakistan such as jute tea and
coir lay piled up at the Mongla and Chittagong ports. Till liberation the frogmen sank or
damaged over 1, 00,000 tons of shipping, which no navy had ever achieved in any ocean
and in such a short period.

15. Lessons Learnt. The lessons derived from the naval aspect of our
liberation war are appended below:

(1) Even a single submarine can create havoc in a much superior enemy fleet

(2) FAC operation can be deadly for the enemy if surprise can be achieved
before actual attack.

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(3) Guerrilla warfare and covert Commando actions can render highest
achievements then that of a conventional warfare in a country like Bangladesh.

(4) Strong naval force is required to protect and maintain uninterrupted Sea
Lines of Communication.

(5) Emphasis to be given for exploiting the inland riverine routes for effective
defence of the homeland while occupied by enemy forces.

(6) Trained and expertise naval person for handling of commercial

transportations can play vital role in winning a war that takes place in a country like
Bangladesh.

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 BATTLE OF CORAL SEA

1. Introduction. The Battle of Coral Sea was a very short but significant battle in
tactical and strategic point of view. The world’s first battle to be fought entirely by carrier
borne aircraft was the battle of Coral Sea. It is evident from the scene of the battle that this
indecisive battle brought serious losses and casualties to both Japan and the US. It is
clear that the Japanese had a tactical victory, but for the US, it was definitely a strategic
victory because the Japanese intention to capture Port Moresby and Solomon islands was
not achieved and the Japanese had been stopped in their attempt to extend their
defensive perimeter and isolate Australia.

2. One of the sheer truths of the history is that though it repeats itself, nobody takes
any lesson from it. If we probe into the history of wars we will come across the repetition of
this truth. War is like gambling where both sides think that they will win. It is the most
commonly applied strategy of winning supremacy over others. And the proverb goes
nothing is wrong in war. But a man is different from wild beings because of his rationality.
So anything done by a human being should be governed by principles of well being of
others. But if we probe in to the history of wars what took place over the decades we will
come to see that instead of common interest, the ego of an individual under the veneer of
state had been the main reasons of war. Battle of Coral Sea also was not any exception of
this truth in this respect.

3. Lessons learnt. The lessons we learnt from the battle of Coral Sea are:

a. Selection of Aim. Japanese gave equal importance for landing at Tulagi

and Port Moresby and in neutralizing enemy carriers at the same time. Japan
having stronger fleet could not win the battle due to wrong selection of aim.

b. Security. Due to break of security neither US nor Japan achieved a

surprise, which was essential particularly for Japanese invasion forces.

c. Concentration of Force. Lack of concentration of forces on the port of both

US and Japan brought devastation to each other rather than making it a decisive
battle.

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d. Over confidence. With series of victory in the past Japanese became so
over confidant that it ultimately brought a catastrophe to their force.

e. Importance of Air Power. This battle proved the effectiveness of air power
as striking element over any other power. Thereby from this way onward the
supremacy of battleships was by gone.

f. First Sighting the Enemy. Despite possessing a superior force Japanese

failed to neutralize their enemy as their surveillance aircraft repeatedly failed to
sight the enemy and gave wrong description of enemy sometimes. On the other
hand the Americans availed the opportunity in earlier sighting of their enemy.

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 PEARL HARBOUR

1. The attack on Pearl Harbour takes a very important place in the history of Naval
Warfare. It was peculiar in nature of its own. US and Japan came into conflict, which
revealed the ultimate fate of capitalistic imperialism. It is worth noting that all efforts to
avoid the conflict went in vain. It is also interesting to look into the political scenario that
was developed between the states and led to the ultimate attack. Japan, under the cover
of inter-state negotiation, went on preparing a devastating attack on USA. On the other
hand, USA being fully aware of what Japan was going to undertake kept paradoxically
silent and left the fate of their vital war ships and lives to the hand of Japanese bombers.
The effect of the attack did not just end with the killing of unprepared leisuring US soldiers
and civilians, rather it gave birth to many subsequent wars and the most infamous act of
human civilisation—the Atomic Bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So the attack itself
cannot be viewed just as a separate incident, rather it was the mother of all incidents. It
was indeed the turning point of human history.

2. December 7th, 1941,at 0750, Hawaiian time, the first wave of Japanese aircraft
began to attack Pearl Harbour. Along with the ships in the harbour, the air stations at
Hickam, Wheeler, Ford Island, Kaneohe and Ewa Field were attacked".

3. For two hours and twenty minutes Pearl Harbour were bombed and shot at by the
Japanese pilots. When the second wave returned to their carriers, 2403 people had been
killed and 1178 were wounded. Eighteen ships of different sizes had been sunk or
damaged and 77 aircrafts of all types had been destroyed. There were only 29 Japanese
pilots who had been shot down by American return fire, most during the attack of the
second wave. This number of planes who had crashed is small but if the defences had
been more prepared the number had been much greater.

4. After analysing the important aspects of the attack on Pearl Harbour, following
lessons can be drawn:

a. The attack was an unimaginable thrust to US, which crippled the US Pacific
Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbour without any resistance. That was a complete
achievement to Japan’s desired aim.

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b. They did not destroy the oil reservoirs though it was included in their plan.
Why they did not is still a mystery. There was storage of huge quantity of oil, the
destruction of which could have crippled the Pacific Fleet for prolonged time.

c. Japan’s primary plan was to destroy the US Aircraft Carriers. At the same
time they wanted to avoid encountering the US main Pacific Fleet consisting of 3
Aircraft Carriers. Finally they bombed on the harbour in absence of the Carriers.
This indicates existence of ambiguity between their plan and execution.

d. Admiral Yamamoto persuaded the attack plan through his personal influence
on higher echelon of the government and against the opinion of Navy’s General
Staff. Though it was an instant success but it brought disaster for Japan later on.

e. Through this attack Japan involved herself in the scenario of global war.

f. President Roosevelt and his associates manipulated the sentiment and

opinion of US Congress and general mass towards the war by keeping the nation in
darkness about the actual scenario. For this he did the following indifferent acts:

(1) Ignoring vital intelligence reports.

(2) Sending confusing messages to Hawaii about the attack.

(3) Feeding false information to Hawaii about the location of Japanese

fleet.

(4) Removing senior officials and thereby suppressing expert’s opinions.

g. Provoking Japan to attack Pearl Harbour was totally an act of President

Roosevelt himself and few of his associates. It is a clear reflection of conspiracy on
their part.

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 BATTLE OF MIDWAY

1. A whirl of air strike and counter strikes of two devastating powers, combined with an
intense flow of events, characterize Midway, the most decisive battle of Second World
War, the battle in which in the space of fifteen minutes on 04 June 1942, the US fleet
effectively ended Japanese mastery of the Pacific.

2. The following important lessons can be learned through the study of this war:

a. Intelligence can play a vital role in the war. Thus in modern warfare, the use
of surveillance devices is a prerequisite to gain early warning of enemy movement
and preparation.

b. Security of information must be maintained at all cost. It is also a very

important factor to achieve surprise. It is more demanding in present context, as
achievement of surprise is a must to win over a superior force.

c. Overconfidence may lead any superior force to lose the battle. We must not
outweigh the enemy and should consider their strength and capability with due
importance.

d. Offensive action is not the only way to win a war rather a defensive force
with offensive posture can play more destructive. It is therefore important for us to
know about the utilization of forces prudently.

e. Timely action is a must to achieve surprise. Development of battle scenario

would be much faster in the modern wars. It is therefore significant for us to grow
the ability to judge the situation and take prompt action to obtain maximum result.

f. Possession of air supremacy over enemy is an essential factor in naval

warfare. It has become more effective in the context of modern warfare since it has
become an integral part of navy and its use is essential to gain mobility, early
information and above all it has a great firepower and destructive capability.

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 BATTLE OF ATLANTIC

1. The Battle of the Atlantic was unique in many ways. Firstly, the magnitude of the
losses inflicted in terms of lives and material was unprecedented in modern maritime
warfare. Secondly, the battle raged over an extended period of time. Thirdly, it brought to
the forefront, a new and dangerous weapon- the U boat, which has greatly impacted
maritime warfare ever since. The U boat was vitally important aspect of World War II, for it
came closer to gaining victory for Hitler, than almost any other weapon in his vast armoury.

2. It was to the Atlantic that ships from the seven seas came, laden with weapons,
munitions, raw materials and fuel. It was in the Atlantic, therefore, that Germany had the
best chance to deliver a mortal blow. Every phase of the war against Germany was
dominated by the necessity to bring Britain’s laden ships safely to her port. Following
paragraphs discusses the lessons from this long campaign:

3. Failure to Learn from the Past.

a. The British Government’s failure to learn from history resulted in no ocean

escorts for convoys being built in the 30s. Even after the WW II broke out, no formal
convoying was resorted to till such time heavy losses forced the Admiralty to form
convoys.

b. The Germans were no better at learning their lessons. Admiral Reader’s plan
for building aircraft carriers and battleships despite the failure of High Sea fleet
and the success of the U- boat campaign in the previous war was found faulty.

4. Leadership. On the German side Admiral Doenitz failed to influence Hitler’s

decision to divert his U-boat forces to the Norwegian and Mediterranean theatre, despite
the unprecedented success and strategic significance of his Wolf Packs in the Atlantic. On
the other hand British Prime Minister Winston Churchill by his mastery in diplomacy could
pursue the USA to provide US $ 5 billion worth of military hardware to Britain, including 50
destroyers and 14,000 aircraft in exchange of British possessions of West Indies. This
huge hardware supply reinforced the British efforts in convoy escort duties successfully.

5. Necessity of Aligning National and Maritime Strategy. In this battle Britain

successfully aligned her national and maritime strategy to keep SLOC open. However,

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Hitler failed to appreciate that the centre of gravity for Britain was her sea route to her
colonies and the USA. If these could be detached, Britain would be brought to her knees.

6. Necessity for Integral Air/ Shore Air Support. Atlantic campaign

shows that the sinking of allied ships reduced considerably with the introduction of radar
equipped MR aircraft. These Aircrafts forced the U- boats to remain submerged, thereby
decreasing their effectiveness. Today, with the advent of integral helicopters equipped with
radar and dunking sonar and improvements in shore based MR aircraft, this factor is
perhaps even more applicable for Bangladesh.

7. Importance of the Geography of a Nation. The continental geography of

Germany prevented free access of her warships to the Atlantic to disrupt British SLOCs.
This caused the powerful German surface fleet to remain inactive almost throughout the
WW II. The utilization of Germans U-boat base facilities from the French Atlantic coast
dramatically enhanced the operating range of the German Navy. These results were
immediately evident in the Battle of Atlantic.

8. Need for a Secure Submarine Base. The allies knew the locations of the U- boat
bases almost since the time they were constructed. The allied efforts at bombing the U
Boat bases were correct as far as they wanted to destroy the threat at source. In the
present day context, with the advent of PGMs and special weapons, these bases would
have been easily destroyed. Thus effective means for passive and active air defence of
these bases are of paramount importance today.

9. Necessity of Secure Communications. The Germans and the Allies were

able to break into each other’s codes used for communicating with submarines and ships.
Thus the fortunes of the U- boats and the convoys fluctuated. The allies were also able to
locate the wolf packs and take effective measures.

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