Manju Jain Is Collaborating With JSTOR To Digitize, Preserve and Extend Access To Indian Journal of Asian Affairs

INDIA'S ROLE IN THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER : AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
Author(s): Stephen P. Cohen

Source: Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1/2 (1993), pp. 1-24
Published by: Manju Jain
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INDIA'S ROLE IN THE NEW GLOBAL
ORDER : AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE*
Stephen P. Cohen
I. What New Global Order
There has been considerable discussion in the United States

of an emergingera of cooperative diplomacy,of a national stra-
tegybased on "what we are for" as opposed to containment,
whichwas a strategyof "what we were against."1 The adminis-
tration,still gropingfor a national security strategy in a world
wherethe termhas become increasinglyirrelevant, has produced
a veryunevenseries of think-piecesand projections. None seem
to ring true : none appear to capture the complexity of the
emergingworld.
However, those of us with a professional interest in South
Asia have a significantadvantage as we attempt to understand
theemergingglobal system. The inequalities of power, status,
and wealththat have dominatedSouth Asian regional and domes-
tic politics are more clearly seen now as the real material of
internationalpolitics,not the exception. I have, for ten years,
been arguingthat much of the world will come to resemble the
strategic structure of South Asia (minus the Afghanistan
conflict): a shiftingbalance of alignments and arrangements,
hostilitiesand ambiguities, involving both significant regional
powersand outside states that have the capacity to influencelocal
events. Further,the spread of advanced military technologies,
theemergenceof new environmentaland ecological issues and the
* TheEditoris immensely
gratefulto Prof. StephenP. Cohen and the
to publishthispaper.
fortheirpermission
NationalDefenceUniversity
2 ofAsianAffairs
IndianJournal
search for cooperation on the regional level are increasinglyseen

as central,not peripheralissues.
South Asia was, formanyyears,a region where Cold War
concernswere not centralto the policie« of any state (again, with
the exceptionof American and Soviet actions in Afghanistan).
Regional strategiststhoughtthat therewas a "second Cold War,"
but theyfailed to understandthat for many years, both super-
powers were behavingtowards the region in quite non-super-
power terms.2 Now, with the removal of the scaffold of super-
power confrontationthe realitiesof the global order are apparent
for all to see.3
The world is characterizedby a series of regional conflict/
cooperation systems,most withdeep historicalroots.
□ The spread of advanced militarytechnology frommiddle-
level suppliers adds an inter-regional dimension to regional
conflict.* In some cases, the technologythat is being transferred
fromone region to another has implications forthirdregions
(e.g., the implicationsforIndia of the emplacement of Chinese
missilesin Saudi Arabia);
□ Because communismis no longera plausible Wayof addre*

ssing injustice,older ideologies and beliefs are returning. These
include militant Islam, sub-nationalism, and ethftic separatist
movements. This trendis especially virulentin countries Which
never had a serious democraticmomevent or those who bungled
democracy;
□ The multi-ethnicstate is in special difficultybecause of
the rise of separatism, the emergence of global human rights
movements challenging the moral authorityof the state vis-
a-vis its own citizens,the spread of arms (fuelledby neighbours,
greed and narcotics),and the spread of new technologiesthat
undercut the state's control over informationflowing to its
citizens. South Asia has three such multi-ethnicstates- India,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka- thus the problemof state coherence
and integrityis not only an Indian problem,but a regionalone.
India'sRole in theNew GlobalOrder 3
Indeed,it affectsChina as well, especiallyin those parts of China

thatabut South Asia;
New economic,environmental,and ecological concerns cut

acrosstraditionalstrategic lines. All states are increasingly
dependent on international investments,multi-nationals,and
foreigntechnologies. At the same time, new concerns about
environment and ecologychallengethe way in which they conduct
theirinternationalaffairs. While that has made it somewhat
easierforstatesto extractmilitarytechnologies from the inter-
nationalmarketplace,it has also placed new constraints on the
use of forceacross bordersexcept in the most unusual circum-
stances;
New regionswill emergeand the bordersof old ones will

shift. We will have to junk obsolete geo-psychologicalconstructs
(suchas "Asia") and come to terms with new blusters of
economic,strategic,and cultural interactions that will, loosely,
be called regions. One region,Central Asia, has been reborn; it
willhave especiallyimportantties to South Asia.5 New techno-
logiescan create regions, especially in the Indian Ocean area.
And, as states such as India acquire enhanced power projection
capabilities,and theireconomies expand beyondtheir immediate
borders,theybecome multi-regional powers.
The new global order is going to be an era of region-by-

regiondisorder,a period of extraordinarily complicated diplo-
macy,wherethe notion of vital national interestsis replaced by a
shiftingseries of alliances and arrangements, patched together
issue-by-issue. These alliances and arrangementswill be stronger
betweenstates that share something else besides expediency.
Indeed,we are enteringan era where states have permanent
friends,not permanentinterests.
What will be the buildingblocks of this new global order ?

Thinkof a parallel foundin the computer industry. A "super-
4 Indian
Journal
ofAsianAffairs
computer" is simplythe most advanced current computer being

manufactured;but among supercomputerssome are specialized
machines and are configuredto performcertainkinds of compu-
tations,othersare more versatile,but cannot do anythingbest.
In this new global order,a whole range of countrieswillcommand
the militaryand economic power possessed by the then-super-
powers of twentyyears ago. Two of these nations, the United
States and Russia, retain significantmilitarypower (or at least
the power to destroyothers),but are relatively weaker economi-
cally than theywere two decades ago. Japan and the European
Communityare economic giants, and Iran is an ideological super-
power, at least in the Islamic world.
In this emergingworld, India stands out, along with China

and perhaps South Korea, Brazil, and some of the European
states, forits balanced power. Like a versatile computer, India
does nothingbest but does manythingsreasonably well. Unlike
Korea, any European state, Iraq, Brazil or China, India is domi-
nant withinits own geographical region. While the definitionof
that region is increasingly elastic (it may yet include parts
of Central Asia as well as a portion of the Indian Ocean littoral)
no serious challengersto Indian cultural,military,and economic
pie-eminenceare likelyto emerge.6
The regional systemsthat will constitute the international

order will assume differentforms. Some will be based on co-
operation to resolve regionaldifferences,
some will be shaped by
outside powers,othersby regional hegemons,7 and in some cases
regional balances of power will emerge.
In Southeast Asia, regional cooperation is likelyto be the

mechanismfor resolvinglocal differences, albeit with some linge-
ring American presence to ensure that China or Japan do not
play too a
great role; Europe has also entered an era of regional
cooperation,accommodatingand engulfingseveral major military
powers (France, Germany,and hopefully,Ukraine and Russia),
perhaps without any significant American involvement. In
IndiďsRoleintheNewGlobalOrder 5
NortheastAsia peace will have to be kept by an outside balancer,

theUnited States. In the Persian Gulf therewill likelyremain a
regionalbalance of power among Iran, Iraq, and the conservative
Gulfstates,with cach side drawingon external arms producers.
To the West,Israel has attained the position of regional domi-
nantpower by virtueof its conventionaland nuclear superiority.
South Asia followsits own path. India is pre-eminentwhen

comparedwithmostof its smallerneighbours. It behaves towards
themlike a regional dominant power, intervening politically,
militarily and economically and dominates theirculturallife.
India can also veto their relations with large external powers.
But none of this applies to India's relationswith Pakistan, which
(alone) has ihe power to deter India, and even to challenge Delhi
through small-scale military confrontation and low-intensity
conflict. There is an imbalanced balance of power between India
and Pakistan, and no matter how much India might wish it,
Pakistan is unlikelyto become a Bangladesh or Bhutan.
Finally, to again invoke the computer metaphor, some

machines can be linked for the parallel processingof certain
kindsof information. The UN will sometimes serve as a net-
workthat multipliesindividual state power by channeling and
coordinatingthe actions of several states. The containmentof
Iraq by a coalition patched togetherby Washingtonand sanction-
ed by the UN was a remarkableaccomplishment. On the face of
it, thiswas an implausible event, but having been done once, it
mightbe attemptedagain, althoughit would be foolish to specu-
late whereand when. However, in some regionalcrises UN action
will be blocked,and we are likelyto see some regional dominant
powersengaged in strategiccooperation,perhaps joined by one
or moreoutside states. Again, I am loath to predict when and
where,or even why,but the complexity and unpredictabilityof
thefutureglobal order is exactlymy central point. It may be
foolishto plan for internationalcooperation to deal with a speci-
ficevent,but it is unwise not to be ready fora whole rangeof con-
6 IndianJournal
ofAsianAffairs
tingencies. Strikinga balance betweenpreparedness and a self-

prophecyis going to be a major task confrontingall
fulfilling
would-beregional and global peace makers in a world characte-
rized by uncertainty.
II. India's Regional and Global Role(s)

In 1990 we circled the question of India's future regional
and global role, looking at it fromIndian, American,and regional
perspectives.® It was clear to me, at least, that both sides in
this dialogue needed to be remindedof the differentconclusions
about Indian power that could be derived from vantage points.
There is no need to repeat this exercise, the remainder of this
chapter takes an unashamedlyAmerican approach to the question
of India's role in the emergingglobal order.
It is importantto disaggregatethat global order. India, like

China, is so vast, and so complex that its domestic politics and
the great Indian experimentin democracyhave a security com-
ponent of some importance. Second, we must consider India's
likelyrole at the regional level (althoughin this case the region
we are talking about is itself being transformed by events in
Central Asia). Finally,there is India's global role- or more
precisely,India's policies on issues that have global ramifications.
At each of these levels- national, regional,and global- what are
reasonable American expectations concerning Indian policy?
In brief,what does America want fromIndia ?
India : Developmentas a Security Interest

First and foremost,Washingtonmust be concernedwith the
success of the process of state and nation building underway in
India. Many years ago, American strategists saw that a great
experimenthad been launched : whethera society that was, by
any measure,one of the most unequal and unbalanced in the
world,could reduce these inequalities and achieve development
by democraticmeans. It is not poverty (or more accurately,
India'sRoleintheNewGlobalOrder 7
enormousdisparitiesbetweenthe manypoor, the manywho have

something,and the fewwho have a great deal) that is India's
problem, forgingintegrativeinstitutions while simultaneously
but
promotingeconomicgrowthunder conditionsof political demo*
cracracy. This is a featthat no other large state except the
UnitedStates has attempted(and then,under much more favou-
rablegeopoliticaland economic circumstances). It is a task of
awe inspiringmagnitude. It is also the strongestbasis for an
Indianclaim on Americansupport,sympathy,and resources.
The United States still has everyreason to supportthis goal,

althoughtheremay be differencesamong Americans- and bet-
ween Americans and Indians- as to the means of support, and
whethersupportforIndia's domesticobjectivesmust also trans-
late into supportfor specificIndian foreignpolicies. The success
of the Indian democraticapproach to state and nation-building
shouldbe the centralregional strategicgoal of the United States;
If India were to lapse into militarism, dictatořship, or break
apart,the strategicconsequences for Americaninterestswould all
be Negative.It is hard to imaginewhat would be worse : a region
dominatedby an extremistIndian government,thrashing about,
crushingits neighbors,or a regionof five,ten, or twenty states*
each in conflictwitheach other-^-and many within reach of a
nuclearcapability.
This is the strategic Undeřpinňing öf the rhetoric about

shareddemocraticvalues; The success of the Indian democratic
experimenthas these hard, practical implications, as well as
beinga matterof some ideological importance^
Interestingly,manyAmerican policies-carried oiit ih good

faith---areperceivedby Indiatis as undercutting this process of
Stateand nation-building. To ati Indian policy-maker, beset bý
probletìisof staggeringmagnitude,outside critics are sometimes
seenas having more sitiister iftotiVes. Êorïïmetits ön India's
humanrightsrecord,its actions in Kashmir, its řeštrictiVefeconõ*
8 Indian
Journal
ofAsianAffairs
mie policies, and even intellectualpropertyrights are dismissed

as "anti-Indian" (or when voiced by Indians, as anti-national).9
Americansshould continuethesecomments and criticisms, but
should not be surprised by hostile Indian reactions. But it is
bizarre to conclude that such criticisms are directed against the
Indian state itself.
The Region : What Structure?

India's regional strategicobjectivesderive from three main
sources : the firstwas the 1947 partition that leftIndia and
Pakistan as each other's major threat. The second was the residue
of imperialconcerns : protectingthe subcontinent from outside
penetrationand advancing legitimate South Asian interestsin
adjacent regions,especiallythe Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and
Southeast Asia. The third stems from the human, ecological,
and economic problemsthat spill over regionalboundaries, espe-
cially betweenIndia and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, India
and Sri Lanka, India and Nepal, Afghanistanand Pakistan, and
Burma, Bangladesh and India.
Any American approach to South Asia must be constrained

by two ironies. The firstis that one consequence of partitioning
the Britishempire(the enduringIndia-Pakistan conflict),under-
cuts any sustained attemptto pursue shared regional strategic
intereststhat survivedthe departureof the British. The second
is that the biggestof the successor states, India, is ambivalent
about the existence of such empire-derived interests. During
the freedomstruggle,in opposing an empire,Indians also came to
oppose the imperial idea rejecting the relevance of the Raj,
even as theywield militarypower greaterthan that commanded
by the British.10
Thus, while American policy towards South Asia has always

supportedthe idea of India-Pakistan cooperation (most notably
in 1947,then again after the 1962 China-India conflict), such
cooperationremains an abstract idea ratherthan a live possibility.
This is seen most clearlyin the trauma of Kashmir. Nearly ten

yearsago, at one of the firstIndia-Pakistan strategic conferences
at Urbana, Indians and Pakistaniswere urgedto address themain
unfinished business of the subcontinent - Kashmir. Both sides
responded that Kashmir was an "American obsession, not a
South Asian one", and both said that the problem was best left
to anothergeneration.11 Looking ahead, the Kashmir problem
and relatedissues may be more, not less difficult. There is a
failureof imaginationin both Delhi and Islamabad concerning
thismid-20thcenturyissue; but then,thereis not much imagina-
tivethinkingbeing shown on clearingup those 19th century dis-
putesthat still plague the subcontinent (those that arose out of
conflictsbetweenthe Britishempireand its neighbors- especially
theIndia-China border cum territorial dispute. For a region
thatis about to be swamped by the conflictsof the 21st century,
thereseems to be a psychological obsession with in the problems
of the past.
Failing any bold diplomacycomingout of Delhi or Islama-

bad, America can only expect the present formof crisis-to-crisis
relationsto continueto dominate India-Pakistan relations. Re-
centconversations in both countriesindicate strongresistanceto
even restoring scholarly, journalistic,and otherculturalties to
their pre-1965level. While businessmenin both statesprofessan
eagerness to gain access to a broader regional market, the
politiciansand bureaucrats (who have the strongestinterest in
maintainingthe presentstate of sub-war tension) seem uninteres-
tedwhen theyare not hostile.
These attitudescircumscribeany American or outside effort
to supporta South Asian regional strategic entity that would
achieve serious regional cooperation. At best, theremightbe
bettermanagementof the ethnicand environmentaldisputes that
is
spillover regionalborders,and for this the vehicle of SAARC
to
nowavailable. America should continue supportSAARC, and
shouldexpect India to do the same, but SAARC is no substitute
forrethinkingregionalstrategicpriorities.
10 Indian ofAsianAffairs
Journal
This is a pity. Had India and Pakistan cooperated afterthey

achieved independencethe region would have been spared consi-
derable grief. There would not have been a Soviet invasionof
Afghanistan, the Chinese probably would not have dared
appropriate Indian-claimed territory,the two states together
could have emerged as the dominant power in the Gulf,and
India-Pakistan cooperation would have dampened the impact of
the Cold War competitionon South Asia (in particular,by reduc-
ing the need fora wastefuland riskyarms race, which has now
acquired a nuclear dimension). Realistically, Americans should
not expect such cooperation to emerge,nor is it withinour power
to induce the two states to cooperate on vital security issues, but
assistance at the margins- CBMs and otherarms control techni-
ques- mighthelp avert a disaster that would engulf the entire
region.
The UniversalisticCompulsion
Indians have theirown vision of a just international order.
The global Indian agenda is quite differentfromthat of the Uni-
ted States. For New Delhi, colonized and exploitedforcenturies,
the centralinternationalissue has been (and for many Indians
remains) the disparities between have and have-nots. India
has pursued three strategiesto reduce these gross international
disparities: it had minimalcooperation with the West- especially
Westernmulti-nationalcorporations (only enough to ensure a
continuingflowof loans and necessarytechnology), it pursueda
modified Soviet economic model,12and it associated itself with
the Third World and non-alignedmovement.
All threestrategiesare shattered,but Indian wariness of the

dominantWest remains. The United States can persuade and
argue, but Indians themselveswill have to reassess not the goal
of a morejust internationalorder,but the means to achieve that
order.
For theirpart, Americans should reassess their commitment
to professedgoals ofjustice among states and equality between
them. Americans too often dismiss Indian pronouncements

concerning global disarmament,or a new international economic
or information order with a "now, let's get serious, let's get prac-
tical,"or more recently: "no one could seriously hold the views
youadvocate unless there was some sinister plan to sabotage
Americaninterests."
Taking the NPT as an example, no one takes seriouslythe
Indianargumentthat the Non-ProliferationTreaty is discrimina-
tory: it does discriminatebetweenstates that have nuclear wea-
ponsand those that do not- and do not want to acquire them.
If India feelsthat nuclear weapons should be more widely spread,
thenit should act on that belief; if it believes that thereis another
"non-discriminatory" way to controlnuclear weapons, it ought
to suggestit.13 In the meantime, American policy should con-
centrateon extractingcommitmentsfromNew Delhi with regard
to non-proliferation(and other global issues) that advance our
interestswithoutinfringingupon Indian principles.14
One way of doing thisis to patch together a series of sub-
agreementsthat collectivelyconstitutea regionalNPT (or-willat
least freezeregionalnuclear programmes). The NPT itslefencou-
ragesregionalagreements. This is the best that can be achieved
overthe nextfiveyears,and it would be counter-productivefor
Washingtonto seek more fromNew Delhi and Islamabad. While
proliferationis important,it is not the most importantcomponent
of the evolvingstrategicrelationshipbetween the United States
and both South Asian powers. It is particularlyfoolish to lump
India and Pakistan into the same categoryas such genuine rouge
Statesas Iraq and North Korea (and China, forthat matter,
whenit comes to spreading a number of technologiesof mass
destruction).The followingstatementis particularlymisguided:
Weapons proliferation is "a risky business," the ACDA
directorsaid, adding that moremust be done to ensure that
"weapons of mass destructiondo not fall into irresponsible
hands", especially in the Middle East, the Korean peninsula,
and South Asians
12 Indian
Journal
ofAsianAffairs
On the proliferationquestion, we want stability, nontrans-

ferability,and partnership. As for stability, an India-Pakistan
agreement,outside the NPT but compatiblewith NPT principles
is attainable. Such an agreement would have to include, tacitly
or explicitly,pledges from existingnuclear weapons states,inclu-
ding China.
Transferabilitypledges are just as important. India could be

a major source of nuclear technology,fissilematerial,and nuclear
expertise. No one has suggestedthat India would engage in such
activity,but it has acquired material outside the context. On the
NPT, it is not an NPT signatory,and is under no legal obligation
not to transfersuch materials or technology. The United States
has been contentwith Indian assurances that it shares our non-
proliferationobjectives, but these mightbe put into treatyform
outside the NPT.
Finally, India could become a non-proliferationpartner. To

the degree that it is also threatened by proliferation,whetherby
Pakistan, Iran, some of the Central Asian states, terroristand
separatist groups, or even some of its smaller neighbours,India
and the United States mightengage in private discussionsabout
eventsaround India. Here a degree of intelligencesharingcould
take place regardlessof India's otherproliferationpolicies.
For America, however, the question is how badly we want

these thingsfromIndia. What price are we willing to pay for
Indian adherence to the NPT, a regional NPT, forIndian coope-
ration on the other proliferation matters, or in exchangefor
Indian actions that would stabilize the regionalnucleararms race ?
Would the US be willing to sponsor India as a memberof the
SecurityCouncil on the same (non-nuclearweapons status) terms
as it mightsponsor Japan and Germany? How badly do we want
non-proliferation ? Badly enough to share some of the power
associated with SecurityCouncil membership?
índiďsRoleintheNewGlobalOrder Î3
IIL WhichStrategy?
At the second indo-US strategic symposium,I outlined three
possible relationships:a formal alliance, an implicit or informal
agreement, and partial or limitedconsultation. My paper ended
somewhat ambiguously and pessimistically,reflectingthe uncer-
taintiesthenevidentin the US-India relationship.
The interveningtwo years have removedsomedoubts on both

sides, but no clear, strong,strategicties are apparent,despite the
fleetingcooperationduringtheGulf wan Indeed,the operations
against Iraq reminded many Indians of their deepest fearsof
uncheckedAmericanpower, and the end of the Cold War seemed
to many, to introduce an era of unrestrained American domi-
nance. This view is fundamentallywrong, and underestimates
the powerfulurge to isolationismnow apparent in America, but it
is widelyheld. Thč following analysis goes back over some old
ground,but also widens the range of altenativepolicies.
The United States can choose among five strategic alter-

natives in dealing with India. These are; apathy, containment,
appeasement, alliance* or cooption. Cooption will be more fully
defined below, but it falls somewhatshort of alliance, while it
does not irrevocablyclose the door on containment- should worst
cases come about. Cooption is cooperation with a tougherface;
For many years (approximately1965 to 1971, and 1972 to

1984) American policy towards India was one of sheer apathy
(or to give it more purposive labels, a policy of disengagement,
benignneglect, or "lettingthe regionreach its oWhnatural stra-
tegic balance"). When not motivated by the global strategic
competition(involving firstthe containment of China and the
Soviet Union, then onlythat of the Soviets), American policy
drifted. The principle of American policy during those years
was: "when all else fails, do nothing.'* Doing nothingwas low*
cost, but not cost-free» Doing nothingmeant that the SoVkts be*
Journal
came a regionalpeacemaker,that a strongpositionin Afghanistan

was abandoned, that leverageover Islamabad's nuclear program-
me and strategicambitionswas non-existent,and that India's non-
alignmentpolicy could become corrupted into a de facto allia-
nce with the Soviet Union. Doing nothingalso contributedto the
view that Iran could be a regional stabilizer, even in South Asia
(a view which was brieflyand oddly shared by India). A policy
of apathy was not the worstof all policies, but the regional record
indicatesthat a degree of American engagement in South Asia is
essentialto preserve important regional and American strategic
interests.
Still, apathy does have its attractions. If the United States

were to forsake the opportunity to influence regional develop-
ments, its resources- human and material- could be spentelse-
where- or not spent at all. This was an importanttheme in the
1992 presidentialprimarycampaign.1®
There is also an informedIndian perspectivewhich favoursa

policy of American disengagement from South Asia. Such a
disengagement would force India and Pakistan to face up to
regional realities without an American crutch. It would make
both states more realisticabout their own regional interestsand
theirown relationship. They might also need time, in view of
the intellectualtrauma of the end of the Cold War, to come to an
understanding of what might be a proper American role in the
region. Finally, since the major task facing both India and
Pakistan (as well as the United States) is internal,economic and
political reform, all threestates need timeto focus on these prob-
lems and should not rush prematurelyinto strategiccooperation.
This argument is attractive but not compelling. Ideally,

America would be instructed and guided in its regional policy by
cooperatingwitn regional powers. They would set the termsfor
American military aid, cooperation, and mediation. Our role
ÍndiďsRoleintheNewGlobalOrder 15
wouldhi limited,but helpfulto regional powers themselves. But

thedanger may be that America mightlurch too far in the direc-
tionof disengagement. It would furtherreduce America's scanty
regionalexpertise. If we were to re-enterthe region,would we do
so on the basis of an understanding of regional realities, fami-
liaritywith regional strategists and officials,and a clear under-
standing of our own interests? The experience of the 1970s is
cautionary: America's re-entryinto South Asia (in the Carter
Administration)was highly destructiveto its regional position
because policy was driven by a single issue, non-proliferation.
Indeed,the excesses of the Carter policyled to subsequent laxness
on proliferationmatters. A policy of strategic disengagement
runsthe risk of becominga policy of strategicirrelevance.
If a state pursues objectives in conflict with American

interests,or if a regionis threateningto the United States then a
policy of containmentis obviously suggested. We will not
consider the case of a threatening region- where two or more
regional states are pursuing policies hostile to American
- then a policy of regional balance mightbe attempted.
interests
This was Americanpolicy in the Persian Gulf for the past decade*
whereneitherIraq nor Iran was perceived as friendly,and that
the victory of either would be ruinous to American interests.
However, theirdisparityin size and the improbabilityof India or
Pakistan turning hostile, makes a balance of power strategy
unlikelyforSouth Asia.
America has followeda containment policy in the case of the

formerSoviet Union and a number of reginal powers- Vietnam,
Libya,Iran, and Cuba. Containmentwas also once the dominant
policies in the case of Beijing. But India is not a revolutionary
state,nor is it anti-democratic,nor is it a close ally of any threa-
tening power now that the Soviet Union is no more. Indeed,
Americansoften misjudgedthe Soviet-Indianrelationship, which
probably worked more to Delhi's benefit than Moscow's.
ï6 ofAsíanAffairs
îndianJournal
America has never pursued a policy of containment towards

India. While theremay be conflictsof interest betweenour two
countries, these are unlikelyto be of great importance of long
duration. The same considerationsapply to Pakistan. On the
other hand, things change-they did in Iran and Iraq. The
failure of India's great domestic experiment in democratic
developmentmightproduce a regimethat was angryand vengeful.
So, one should not completleyclose the door on containment,as
implausibleas it mightseem now.
A policy of appeasement is suggested when a state is known

to have limited ambitions, and satisfyingthese ambitions will
produce a status quo power. RecognizingIndia as the "regional
dominantpower," or "regional hegemon" and supporting Indian
ambitions- or at least not opposing them strongly-would con-
stitutea policy of appeasement. There are two problems with
this policy: first,Washingtondoes not know the directionsof and
limits on Indian ambitions. Second, the Indians themselvesdo
not know what theirlong-termgoals should be. Should the United
States grant India a freehand over much of what Indian hawks
defineas theirintendedsphereof influence? This includes part of
Pakistan, parts of China, and much of the Indian Ocean.1'
Washington has strategic interestsin these countriesand in the
Indian Ocean. Since these interestsdo not threatem India, the
US is under no incentiveto break offwith such states, pull out
of Diego Garcia and the Indian Ocean, or subcontractto India
a regional peace keeping role. On the other hand, if Indian
ambitionswere limited and did not conflict with American ties
to other regional states,appeasementmightbe appropriate.
A policy of strategic alliance can only rest upon strong,

enduringand shared interestsand friendships - a degreeof t^ust
and identityof goals between strategic elites that cuts across the
spectrumin both states.
The United States does have a shared interest with both
Indian and Pakistani leaders in working towards orderlychange
and a peaceful region,but we disagree with both on how to bring

thisabout, and what policies to pursue towards China. Slowly,
ourpolicies are again moving closer to those of Delhi, although
from1979 to 1989,we were in harmonywithIslamabad's benign
view of Beijing. We have also disagreed with elements of the
Pakistanistrategiccommunityon our Gulf policies and relations
withIran. We do share important cultural and ideological pre-
miseswith India and Pakistan, but these need not be framedby a
militaryalliance.
There are otherobstacles to a policy of alliance with Delhi.

India has not been comfortablein the kind of alliances favoured
bythe United States in the pastes Washingtonis accustomedto
alliances(outside of Europe) with dependent states. Both sides
wouldhave to finda model that fitstheiridiosyncraticstyles,that
wouldwithstand the pressures of parliamentarydemocracy,and
thatwould meet their respective strategicinterests beforethe
term alliance can be uttered between them. Even then, in a
worldof regions- a world that lacks acore strategic contest-
theremay not be any commonpermanentinterestsbetweenmem-
bers of differentstrategic regional groupings, only permanent
friendships.
Finally, a policy of cooption combines elements of contain-

ment,appeasement and alliance. Cooption is suggested when
dealingwith a state that (a) has significantmilitary or political
resources,(b) could use those resourcesin a way harmfulto
Americaninterests-or in support of American interests,and (c)
is close enough or moderate enough to be influenced. India fits
thisprofile. Cooption will be the most effectiveway to advance
our India-relatedinterestsover the next fewyears. It recognized
thatwe have shared interests with India but acknowlegdesthat a
formal alliance may be excessive, and containment actually
destructive to the pursuit of those interests. Cooption was
pioneeredwith Yugoslavia and later applied to once hostile states
18 IndianJournal
ofAsianAffairs
such as Egyptand Indonesia. India is biggerthan any of these

states (and in the long run more important).
The Reagan administrationundertooka strategyof cooption,

althoughthe phrase then invoked in the corridorsof the Seventh
floorwas that we could "wean" India from the Soviet embrace,
i.e., offerinducementsthat encouraged Delhi to reduce its depen-
dence upon Moscow. Of course, the Indians promptlyused these
inducementsto extractbettertermsfromthe Soviets, but in the
end American interestswere advanced. This strategyenabled us
to talk to India about a whole range of issues and led to a num-
ber of changes in Indian policy. It also led to changes in
American policy as we learned more about Indian realities and
ambitions.
A cooptionstrategytowardsIndia wouldincludeseveral elements.

Stiuctures. A strategy of cooption should create useful
entanglements. The leaders of the coopted country must have a
stake in good relationswiththe United States. This stake will
in part be strategic,in part economic, in part ideological. Fur-
ther,it mustbe evidentthat good relationsare politically sustai-
nable withineach state. To achieve this there needs to be an
increasednumberof formaland informalmechanismsthat would
allow Americans to effectivelypresent their case to Indian
counterparts. A cooption strategyworks slowlyand indirectlyby
changingthe termsof debate in the other country-this requires
are
repeatedand persistentcontact. A fewunofficialpolicy talks
now under way, these should receivecontinuedhigh level support.
The two predecessorconferences to this were successivelymore
effectiveand helpful. These meetingsshould be continued, but
mustbe broadened in two directions:
□ There mustbe equivalent State or NSC-sponsored counter-

thinkers if they
parts, involvingplanningstaffsand long-range
can be found. Private sector initiatives have also been helpful.
Since both states are susceptibleto democratic and populist pres-
sures, enhanced contacts between journalists and politicians-
discussingstrategicmatters- is necessaryto ensure that govern-

ment-to-government discourse does not out-racepublic opinion.
□ Defence-related eontacts should not focus entirelyon

military-to-military exchanges. In the Indian system,civilian
officialsare far more influentialthantheir uniformed colleagues.
It would be a grave errorto treat India like a Korea, a Thailand,
or even a Pakistan,and assume that men in uniformmake all the
importantdecisions.
Goals. Second, a strategyof cooption should have a set of

goals or targets. Since a cooption strategy is necessarily long-
term,and mightextendover more than one administration, it
would be usefulto be able to measure progress, or its absence.
Whatissues are most importantto the United States, and where
do we think we have the best chance of success ? Clearly,
the Uai ted States cannot remove the basic causes of conflict
and hostilityin South Asia, but it might:
□ Convince the Indians to accept a limited, responsible

Americanrole in Pakistan, using that influence to encourage
morenormalIndo-Pakistan relations,and even a settlement of
keyoutstandingdisputes;
□ Encourage the Indians to continue their dialogue with

China but share with India our increasingdoubts about China's
disruptiverole in Burma, as an uninhibited arms seller,and as a
dictatorship;
□ Persuade India to accept a modified,or regional non-pro-

liferationagreementthat would accommodate Delhi's security
concernswhileadvancingAmerican non-proliferationinterests;
□ Come to a betterunderstandingon issues importantto one

sidebut trivialforthe other(relations with Cuba ?) as opposed to
issuesthat are either bilateral (intellectual property rights?
technologytransfer?) or that separatelyengage both countries,
Journal
and might cause conflict (relations withRussia, withPakistan,

or with China ?).
Diplomacy. Third, a long-termstrategyof cooption will draw

upon the resourcesof otherstates. In pursuingour India-related
objectiveswe can work with Russia, severalEuropean allies, and
(on economic and non-proliferationissues), Japan. Indeed, in
some cases it will be other states that will be the more effective
partners. Tokyo has a special interestin non-proliferationissues,
it has significantinvestmentsin India and Pakistan, it is an Asian
state*and it is vitallyinterestedin the maintenanceof sea lanes
and a tranquilIndian Ocean/SoutheastAsian region.
MilitaryImplications.A keyassumptionof a strategyofcoop-

tion is that India will not pose any significant threat to current
or futureAmerican strategicinterests.Except in the veryunlikely
cases of an American intervention in South Asia, or a hostile
Indian interventionin a countryimportantto the United States,
it is unlikelythat American and Indian forceswill ever come into
directconflict. Therefore,US-Indian military relations should
be keyed towards three objectives: avoiding misunderstanding
betweenthe two countries,laying the groundwork for possible
futurestrategiccollaboration,and providingwarning timeabout
possible changes in Indian policy.
IV. Conclusion
Having a firein your house is unlikelybut not implausible.
Having India turninto a hegemon or aggressor that confronts
impoitantAmerican interestsis unlikelyand implausible. Having
India turn inward,losing both its democratic direction and its
coherenceas a state is unlikelybut plausible- and this,ratherthan
some fancifulrogue India, is the most significant threat to
American regional interests.
A series of studies has apparentlybeen searchingfor a new

threat,a new cause for alarm. In this sense, the American de-
fenceestablishmentis in the same position as the Indian Navy :
India'sRoleirttheNewGlobalOrder 21
it is a capabilitylooking for a justification. However, in South

Asia, exceptfor the proliferationproblem (which has been exag-
gerated,in my view), thereare no direct threats to American
interests. The chiefthreatis that the countries of the region,
especially India, will fail in their effortto gain coherenceas
statesand nations. This failurewould be devastatingto America's
ideological,economic,and even strategicinterests,since it would
have consequences forCentral Asia, the Gulf, and Southeast
Asia.
A strategyof cooption- a mixtureof cooperation, pressure,

and persuasion--recognizesthe heavy non-militarycomponent of
our regional security interests. Enhanced military-to-military
ties are usefulin avoiding misunderstanding,and might provide
earlywarningof hostile changes in Indian policy,but theirreal
value lies in showingthe larger political communities in both
statesthat the United States and India do not fear each
other,and that they can cooperate on sensitivematters. If
theycan do this, they should be able to discuss coordinationof
theirpolicies on a broad range of political, economic, and regio-
nal issues that lack the immediate photogenic attraction of
manoeuvresat sea, but are far more central to the securitycon-
cernsof a fifthof the human race.
References& Notes
1. A recentquote froma memberof the Policy Planning Staff,
see also currentwork on "cooperative diplomacy" being done
at a Harvard/StanfordBrookings consortium.
2. For a full-scalestudyof how the superpowers cooperated

duringthe Cold War in various regional contexts see Roger
Kanet and Edward Kolodziej, eds. The Cold War as Coope-
ration(Baltimore : JohnsHopkins, 1991).
3. The followingis elaborated more fullyin "The State is Dead:

Long Live the Armed Ethnic Group !" Chicago Tribune,
February22, 1992; a fullerverson will appear in the July-
Augustissue of Bulletinof the AtomicScientists.
Journal
4. For the finestbrief survey see Kathleen Bailey, Doomsday

Weapons in the Hands of Many (Urbana : University of
Illinois Press, 1991).
5. Indeed, if the Departmentof State is serious about the new

Bureau of South Asian affairs, it will add Central Asia to
South Asia and Iran, forminga coherent collection of sub-
regions,and includingfourpotential nuclear weapon states.
6. Pre-eminence,not, as the New York Times, continuingits

series of gaffeson South Asia would have it, paramountcy
(editorial,March 22, 1992). Paramountcy was a term the
Britishused to describe the ultimate dominance of British
India over the princelystates in matters of foreign affairs,
defence,and even internalsecurity. The doctrine of para-
mountcyenabled the British to intervene in the princely
states and, when theyfeltit necessary,to absorb them into
the Raj. To use this termto describe India's relations with
its South Asian neighboursreveals a spectacularlevel of igno-
rance-compounded by numerousothererrors in the same
editorial.
7. Surely,one of our Indian participantscan offer a Sanskrit

phrase to replace the Greek-derived, Chinese-invoked
"hegemon" ?
8. See StephenP. Cohen, "The futureIndian Security Role in

the Asia-Pacific-IndianOcean Region, "in Jasjit Singh, ed.,
Indo-US Relationsin a ChangingWorld: Proceedings of the
Indo US StrategicSymposium (New Delhi : Lancers Publi-
shers, 1992).
9. See the acid remarksof an influentialIndian intellectual,who

cautions against the lure of America, and especially by
Americanstatementsabout India as a "great" or "emerg-
ing" power. Nikhil Chakravartty points out that the same
American governmenthas attacked India in human rights
fora,on groundsof intellectualpropertyrights,and on non-
proliferationand otherissues. He detectsa coordinatedstra-
tegy of carrot and stick,praise and threat;I am out of the
governmentnow, but feelcertainthat such a clever strategy
remainsbeyond the capacity of U.S.
"
Government. Chakra-
"
vartty, Dealing WithAmerica Mainstream, March 21,
1992.
10. For a sustainedpolemic against the -'Raj," especially the

notionof an empire"essentiallybased on force" that had
to be maintained,if necessary,"by bruteforce" see Subhash
Chakravarty,The Raj Syndrome: A Study in ImperialPercep-
tions(rev. ed., New Delhi : Penguin,1991), p. 19.
11. For an allusion to this interchangesee my summary chapter

in StephenP. Cohen, ed. The Securityof South Asia : Asian
and AmericanPerspectives (Urbana : University of Illinois
Press, 1984).
12. A numberof core Indian assumptionsabout the global order

have been shatteredby the end of the Soviet Union. The
Soviet model was not only a socialist economic model and
an ideological construct,it was (formost of its non-Western
emulators)a way in which poor states could catch up with
the west- it was modernisation model. It showed how the
state could be a vehicle of social, economic, and ultimately
strategicchange. Now, just as there is a former Soviet
Union, thereis a formerThird World, a clusterof states, led
by India, whichare searchingfor other ways to reduce the
gap betweenthemand the West. In fact, although no one
has noticed it thereis also a "formerWest," since the unity
of the NATO powers and Japan vis-a-vis a central strategic
threathas long since dissipated. The Russians have the
optionsof becoming Europeans and joining the West- it
remainsto be seen whetherthis is an option open to India.
If India wanted to become a "Western" state in its political,
economic,and even cultural orientation, would it be wel-
comed into a Euro Japanese club ?
13. Actually,Rajiv did in 1988, and slightly modified India's

earlier proposals for universal disarmament. The U.S.
governmentmissed an opportunityto engage Delhi in a use-
fuldialogue that would smoke out Indian intentions and
ideas (if any). The recentexperience with the "five party
talks," while frustratingto American diplomats,is one way
of determininghow serious is the Indian commitmentto
arms control.
14. For a fullstatementof this strategysee Stephen P. Cohen,

"Policy Implications." in Cohen, ed., Nuclear Proliferation
in South Asia : The Prospects for Arms Control (Boulder :
Westview,1991).
24 Journal
Indian ofAsianAffairs
15. JacquelynS, Porth, quoting Ronald Lehman, "All Tools

Should be used to Control Proliferation,"recentUSIS press
release.
16, ContemporaryAmerican isolationism,as in the past, draws

its supportersfromthe rightand the left. The formerbelieve
that the world is evil, and that America should avoid its
corruptinginfluenceby having as littleto do with it as possi-
ble; the latter believethat the United States is an evil coun-
try,and that only a policy of isolationismcan protectthe
world from its rampages. Both believe that distant and
fractiousregions,such as South Asia, do not deserve our
attention.
17* To my knowledge,India still supports Mauritius' claim to

Diego Garcia.
18. In Indian domesticpolitics,the dominât Congress party has

not been accustomed to rulingin a coalition at the centre,
and did so in the states only grudgingly,untilit could attain
a parliamentarymajority. Coalitions were unnecessary in
Nehru years,and during Indira and Rajiv's rule, Congress'
strategytypicallywas to swallow up one or more of its coali-
tion partners,or divided the opposition to enable it to keep
power. The presentsystem,under Narasimha Rao, is un-
usual for its tranquillity.

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INDIA'S ROLE IN THE NEW GLOBAL ORDER : AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Author(s): Stephen P. Cohen

There has been considerable discussion in the United States

search for cooperation on the regional level are increasinglyseen

□ Because communismis no longera plausible Wayof addre*

Indeed,it affectsChina as well, especiallyin those parts of China

New economic,environmental,and ecological concerns cut

New regionswill emergeand the bordersof old ones will

The new global order is going to be an era of region-by-

What will be the buildingblocks of this new global order ?

computer" is simplythe most advanced current computer being

In this emergingworld, India stands out, along with China

The regional systemsthat will constitute the international

In Southeast Asia, regional cooperation is likelyto be the

NortheastAsia peace will have to be kept by an outside balancer,

South Asia followsits own path. India is pre-eminentwhen

Finally, to again invoke the computer metaphor, some

tingencies. Strikinga balance betweenpreparedness and a self-

II. India's Regional and Global Role(s)

It is importantto disaggregatethat global order. India, like

India : Developmentas a Security Interest

enormousdisparitiesbetweenthe manypoor, the manywho have

The United States still has everyreason to supportthis goal,

This is the strategic Undeřpinňing öf the rhetoric about

Interestingly,manyAmerican policies-carried oiit ih good

mie policies, and even intellectualpropertyrights are dismissed

The Region : What Structure?

Any American approach to South Asia must be constrained

Thus, while American policy towards South Asia has always

This is seen most clearlyin the trauma of Kashmir. Nearly ten

Failing any bold diplomacycomingout of Delhi or Islama-

This is a pity. Had India and Pakistan cooperated afterthey

All threestrategiesare shattered,but Indian wariness of the

them. Americans too often dismiss Indian pronouncements

On the proliferationquestion, we want stability, nontrans-

Transferabilitypledges are just as important. India could be

Finally, India could become a non-proliferationpartner. To

For America, however, the question is how badly we want

The interveningtwo years have removedsomedoubts on both

The United States can choose among five strategic alter-

For many years (approximately1965 to 1971, and 1972 to

came a regionalpeacemaker,that a strongpositionin Afghanistan

Still, apathy does have its attractions. If the United States

There is also an informedIndian perspectivewhich favoursa

This argument is attractive but not compelling. Ideally,

wouldhi limited,but helpfulto regional powers themselves. But

If a state pursues objectives in conflict with American

America has followeda containment policy in the case of the

America has never pursued a policy of containment towards

A policy of appeasement is suggested when a state is known

A policy of strategic alliance can only rest upon strong,

and a peaceful region,but we disagree with both on how to bring

There are otherobstacles to a policy of alliance with Delhi.

Finally, a policy of cooption combines elements of contain-

such as Egyptand Indonesia. India is biggerthan any of these

The Reagan administrationundertooka strategyof cooption,

A cooptionstrategytowardsIndia wouldincludeseveral elements.

□ There mustbe equivalent State or NSC-sponsored counter-

discussingstrategicmatters- is necessaryto ensure that govern-

□ Defence-related eontacts should not focus entirelyon

Goals. Second, a strategyof cooption should have a set of

□ Convince the Indians to accept a limited, responsible

□ Encourage the Indians to continue their dialogue with