We humbly ask for peace

in our hearts, our bodies, our minds, and our

souls, as we wait patiently and confidently.

Not once did you leave us despite our failures and sins.
We recognize and accept the death of your Son, Jesus on the
cross, as a symbol of your unconditional love for us. We thank
you for the assurance of eternal life upon acceptance of Jesus
as our Savior.

Father, we humbly come before you as one family to ask that for your
Divine providence we implore the help of the Holy Spirit to work in
the hearts of those who are preparing for the 2021 Bar
Examination, especially members of our Bedan family.
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 LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS

I. LEGAL ETHICS………………………………………………………………………………………1
A. PRACTICE OF LAW…………………………………………………………………………….1
1. BASIC CONCEPTS…………………………………………………………………………………………..1
(a) DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW…………………………………………………………...1
(b) PRACTICE OF LAW AS A PRIVILEGE, NOT A RIGHT……………………………….………………1
(c) LAW AS A PROFESSION, NOT A BUSINESS OR TRADE………………………….………………..1
2. QUALIFICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (BAR MATTER NO. 1153)………….…………….1
3. CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR…………………….……………….2
4. APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS……………………………………………………….………………2
(a) LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE (RULE 138-A, AS AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 19-03-24-SC)..…..2
(b) NON-LAWYERS IN COURTS AND/OR ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS……………………….....2
(c) PROCEEDINGS WHERE LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED TO APPEAR AS COUNSELS………..…..2
5. PROHIBITED PRACTICE OF NON-LAWYERS AND APPEARANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY…..……3
6. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW…………………………………………………..….3
(a) PROHIBITIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS OF FORMER GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS…..….3
(b) PUBLIC OFFICIALS WHO CANNOT PRACTICE LAW OR CAN PRACTICE LAW WITH
RESTRICTIONS……………………………………………………………………………………..…3
7. LAWYERS AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT………………………………..……..4
8. THE LAWYER’S OATH………………………………………………………………………………..……4
B. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER UNDER THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY…………………………………………………………..4
1. TO SOCIETY…………………………………………………………………………………………………4
2. TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION……………………………………………………………………...……...7
3. TO THE COURTS…………………………………………………………………………………..….……9
4. TO THE CLIENTS…………………………………………………………………………………………..11
C. SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT, AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS……………………….19
1. PROCEEDINGS (RULE 139-B OF THE RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED)…………………………..19
D. NOTARIAL PRACTICE (A.M. NO. 02-8-13-SC AS AMENDED)………………………….24
1. QUALIFICATIONS OF A NOTARY PUBLIC…………………………………………………….………...24
2. TERM OF OFFICE OF A NOTARY PUBLIC………………………………………………………………24
3. POWERS AND LIMITATIONS…………………………………………………………………………….24
4. NOTARIAL REGISTER………………………………………………………………………….………….26
5. JURISDICTION OF NOTARY PUBLIC AND PLACE OF NOTARIZATION………………….………….26
6. COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY………………………………………………………..………..27
7. SANCTIONS……………………………………………………………………………………..…………27

II. JUDICIAL ETHICS………………………………………………………………………………..28

A. SOURCES……………………………………………………………………………………..28
1. NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY………………………….28
2. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT………………………………………………………………………..28
B. QUALITIES……………………………………………………………………………………28
1. INDEPENDENCE…………………………………………………………………………………………28
2. INTEGRITY………………………………………………………………………………………………..28
3. IMPARTIALITY……………………………………………………………………………………………29
4. PROPRIETY……………………………………………………………………………………………….29
5. EQUALITY…………………………………………………………………………………………………29
6. COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE………………………………………………………………………..30
C. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS…………………………………………..30
 1. COMPULSORY………………………………………………………………………………………….30
2. VOLUNTARY……………………………………………………………………………………………30
D. DISCIPLINE AND ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER MEMBERS OF THE
JUDICIARY………………………………………………………………………………….30
1. SUPREME COURT……………………………………………………………………………………..30
(a) IMPEACHMENT…………………………………………………………………………………...30
2. LOWER COURT JUDGES AND JUSTICES……………………………………………………………31
(a) SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE SUPREME COURT ON ERRING MEMBERS OF
THE JUDICIARY…………………………………………………………………………………...31
 1

I. LEGAL ETHICS
A. Practice of Law
BASIC CONCEPTS
Definition of Practice of Law
Practice of Law as a Privilege, Not a Right

(1) P filed an administrative complaint charging Atty. R with negligence in the performance of his duties
as a lawyer because he did not verify the identity of the person he was dealing with prior to filing the
civil complaint. P asserted that Atty. R engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in
violation of the CPR. In his defense, Atty. R denied any participation in the preparation and the filing
of the complaint. He even disowned the signatures affixed therein and claimed that his signature was
forged. Atty. R further admitted "that he learned about the case thru a disbarred lawyer with whom he
had previous collaborations, and that his details were still being used by T’s office because before, he
allowed them to sign for him on 'minor' pleadings." However, he reversed himself and said that he was
the one who filed the civil complaint. Is Atty. R liable for allowing another person who has no license
to practice law, to sign pleadings and file a suit before the court using his signature and details?
Yes, Atty. R is liable for allowing another person who has no license to practice law, to sign pleadings and file
a suit before the court using his signature and details. He abused a privilege that is only personal to him. By
allowing a non-lawyer to sign and submit pleadings before the court, Atty. R made a mockery of the law practice
which is deeply imbued with public interest. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions and is
reserved only for those who meet the twin standards of legal proficiency and morality. It is so delicately imbued
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of this Court to control and regulate it in order to protect
and promote the public welfare” (Hernando Petelo v. Atty. Socrates Rivera, A.C. No. 10408, October 16, 2019).

Law as a Profession, Not a Business Trade

(2) Complainants T and E filed a disbarment case against Atty. S alleging that the latter notarized the
spurious documents despite the death of their parents and/or the non-personal appearance of the
affiants. In 2015, the Supreme Court suspended Atty. S from the practice of law for 1 year and was
further disqualified as a notary public. However, despite the suspension, Atty. S continued serving as
a notary public for 2016-2017. Is Atty. S considered to be in practice of law?
Yes, Atty. S engaged in the practice of law despite the suspension order. He remained as a notary public
despite the release of the 2015 resolution suspending him. The practice of law includes any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It
comprises the performance of acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of
service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Notarizing documents constitutes
practice of law and a notary public must be a member of the bar in good standing (Teodoro Cansino v. Atty.
Victor Sederiosa, A.C. No. 8522, October 6, 2020).

QUALIFICATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (BAR MATTER NO. 1153)

(3) What are the qualifications for admission to the bar?

Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must: (CAG-RSM)
1. A Citizen of the Philippines.
2. At least 21 years of Age.
3. Possess Good moral character.
4. A Resident of the Philippines.
5. Produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character.
6. Have no charges against them, involving Moral turpitude, that have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines (RULES OF COURT, RULE 138, Sec. 2).

(4) What are the academic requirements for the admission to the bar?
The following academic requirements must be complied with: (UA-4)
 2

1. Had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized University or college which
requires for admission the completion of a 4-year high school course;
2. The course of study prescribed therein for a Bachelor’s degree in Arts or Sciences; and
3. A 4-year bachelor’s degree in law with completed courses in civil law, commercial law, remedial law,
criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor law and social legislation, medical
jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics (RULES OF COURT, RULE 138, Secs 5 & 6, as amended by Bar
Matter No. 1153).

CONTINUING REQUIREMENTS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR

(5) What are the continuing requirements for the practice of law?
The following are the continuing requirements for the practice of law: (TIP-SM-GC)
1. Payment of Professional Tax (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 139);
2. Membership in the IBP (RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 1; BY-LAWS OF THE IBP, Art. II);
3. Payment of IBP dues (RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-A, Sec. 10, BY-LAWS OF THE IBP, Sec. 24; Santos
v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4739, January 20, 2000);
4. Good and regular Standing (RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 1);
5. Compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Requirements (B.M. No. 850,
October 2, 2001);
6. Possession of Good moral character (In Re: of the Admission to the Bar and Oath-Taking of Successful
Bar Applicant Argosino, B.M. No. 712, (Resolution), July 13, 1995); and
7. Compliance with the Citizenship requirement (Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, B.M. No.
1678, December 17, 2007).

(6) T filed a complaint against Atty. C, charging him with failure to take the MCLE seminars for the MCLE
II and III compliance periods as required, under BM No. 850. Atty. C averred that he had taken several
units for the MCLE I Compliance Period but was unable to complete the required units. He contended
that he supposedly completed the required units for MCLE II Compliance Period; however, the MCLE
supervising officer erroneously applied said units to his MCLE I instead. Subsequently, he paid an
“exemption fee” of PhP1,000.00 for his uncompleted MCLE I. A Certificate of Compliance was issued
to Atty. C for his completion of MCLE I. Upon verification, Atty. C was informed that he still had some
units left to complete his MCLE II. He then paid non-compliance fees in the amount of PhP2,000.00 for
his MCLE II and III. Does the payment of the non-compliance fees for not meeting the MCLE
requirements amount to an exemption?"
No, the payment of non-compliance fees for failing to comply with the MCLE requirements does not constitute
an exemption. Section 12 of the MCLE Implementing Rules, which outlines the compliance procedures clearly
show that a non-compliant lawyer must pay a non-compliance fee of PhP1,000.00 and still comply with the
MCLE requirements within a 60-day period, otherwise, he/she will be listed as a delinquent IBP member after
investigation by the IBP-CBD and recommendation by the MCLE Committee. The non-compliance fee is simply
a penalty imposed on lawyers who do not meet the MCLE requirements within the designated compliance
period and does not grant any exemption from compliance to those who have paid it (Turla v. Atty. Caringal,
A.C. No. 11641, March 12, 2019).

APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
Law Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A, as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC)
Non-lawyers in Courts and/or Administrative Tribunals
Proceedings Where Lawyers are Prohibited to Appear as Counsels

(7) A seeks the disbarment of Atty. B for violation of Notarial Rules and the CPR. A is the appointed
administrator of the subject property while Atty. B notarized the Extrajudicial Settlement executed by
the heirs of the decedent of the subject property where A and his siblings purportedly personally
appeared and subscribed therein. Atty. B asserts that sanctions cannot be imposed upon him as he is
not in the active practice of law by reason of his election in the House of Representatives as a party-
list representative of 1-Ang Edukasyon Party-List in the 2016 National elections. Can respondent Atty.
B escape liability on the ground that he is not in the active practice of law?
No, respondent Atty. B cannot escape liability on the ground that he is not in the practice of law. To begin with,
no law or statute provides that the penalties against an erring lawyer cannot be imposed if said lawyer is
 3

inactive in the practice of law by any reason such as election in public office. Despite his being inactive in the
practice of law, the fact remains that he is still a member of the legal profession. Hence, the Court is not
precluded from conducting disciplinary investigations against him or imposing disciplinary sanctions if so
warranted. It is in accordance with the Court’s power to call upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court in order to preserve the purity of the legal profession and the proper honest
administration of justice (Ang v. Atty. Belaro, A.C. No. 12408, December 11, 2019).

PROHIBITED PRACTICE OF NON-LAWYERS AND APPEARANCE WITHOUT

AUTHORITY

(8) What are the exceptions to the rules that only those who are members of the bar can appear in court?
As exceptions to Rule 138, Sec. 1, the following are instances wherein those who are not members of the bar
can appear in court:
1. Appearance of law students pursuant to the Law Student Practice Rule (A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC);
2. Appearance of non-lawyers in courts when expressly allowed by the Rules of Court (RULES OF COURT,
Rule 138, Sec. 34; Rule 116, Sec. 7);
3. Appearance of non-lawyers in administrative tribunals when expressly allowed by law;
4. Appearance by a person authorized to appear for the Government (RULES OF COURT, Sec. 138, Sec.
33);
5. Appearance of non-lawyers before the Labor Arbiter and/or the National Labor Relations Commission
(2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, Rule III, Sec. 6); and
6. Appearance of non-lawyers before the Cadastral Court (Act. No. 225, otherwise known as “The Cadastral
Act”, Sec. 9).

PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Prohibitions and Disqualifications of Former Government Attorneys

(9) Who are the public officials PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law?
The following public officials are specifically not allowed to practice law: (J2CLOGS-P2-C)
1. Judges and other officials or employees of the superior court (RULES OF COURT, RULE 138, Sec. 35);
2. Members of the Judicial Bar Council (CONST., Art. IX-A, Sec. 2);
3. Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions (CONST., Art. IX, Sec. 2);
4. Those who, by special Law, are prohibited from engaging in the practice of their legal profession, but if so
authorized by the department head, he may, in an isolated case, act as counsel for a relative or close
family friend (Noriega v. Sison, A.C. No. 2266, October 27, 1983).
5. Ombudsman and his deputies (CONST. Art. IX, Sec 8);
6. Governors, city, and municipal mayors (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 90);
7. Official and employees of the Office of the Solicitor General (RULES OF COURT, RULE 138, Sec. 35);
8. Government Prosecutors (People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-19450, May 27, 1965);
9. President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants (CONST. Art. VII, Sec.
13); and
10. Civil service officers or employees whose duties require them to devote their entire time at the
disposal of the government (Catu v. Rellosa, A.C. No. 5738 (Resolution), February 19, 2008).

Public Officials Who Cannot Practice Law or Can Practice Law With Restrictions

(10) Who are the public officials who have RESTRICTED right to practice law?
The following are public officials who are allowed to practice law with restrictions: (SM-RC)
1. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives (CONST., Art. VI, Sec. 14);
2. Members of the Sanggunian (LGC, Sec. 90, par. (b));
3. Retired Justices or Judges (R.A. 9946); and
4. Civil Service officers or employees whose duty does not require his entire time to be at the disposal of the
government with written permit from their respective department heads (REVISED CIVIL SERVICE RULES,
RULE 18, Sec. 12). However, officials who by express mandate of the law are prohibited from practicing law,
may not, even with the consent of the department head, engage in the practice of law (Zeta v. Malinao, A.M.
No. P-220, December 20, 1978).
 4

Lawyers Authorized to Represent the Government

Lawyer’s Oath

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of any lawyer’s obligations and its violation is a ground for the lawyer’s
suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action. Without stating your name and other circumstances that
will identify you, substantially write down the Lawyer’s Oath that a person who has passed the bar examinations
is required to take and subscribe to before the Supreme Court.

I, _______ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

Note: In the Bar Examinations, indicating one’s name or any other name in the lawyer’s oath would be
considered as markings.

B. Duties and Responsibilities of a Lawyer Under the Code of

Professional Responsibility
TO SOCIETY (CANONS 1 TO 6)

(11) While driving on his way home, M, a taxi driver, overtook a car. As it turned out, the car was owned by
Atty. G. Incensed, Atty. G tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn. An altercation
ensues, which escalated to the point that Atty. G fired and shot M on the neck using an unlicensed
firearm. M fell onto Atty. G's thigh, prompting Atty. G to push him away and speed off. Consequently,
a complaint for frustrated homicide was filed by M against Atty. G. The trial court eventually found Atty.
G guilty, and despite four years having passed since the filing of the administrative complaint, he
refused to pay the civil liabilities. This led to the filing of a disbarment complaint against him. Atty. G
argues that the crime of frustrated murder does not involve moral turpitude.
(a) Is the contention of Atty. G correct?
No, Atty. G’s contention is untenable. When lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances — not the mere fact of their conviction — would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of Atty. G
clearly shows his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar (Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792, January
25, 2006).
(b) Is Atty. G administratively liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Yes, Atty. G is administratively liable for violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through
his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. He has thus
violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. In fine, Atty. G’s acts are contrary to his
attorney’s oath and in the Code of Professional Responsibility (Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792, January 25,
2006).

(12) P was the original owner of a certain parcel of land. Several years after P’s death, M, his son, discovered
that the title to the subject parcel of land was transferred to Atty. R through a Deed of Sale. M pointed
out that said Deed of Sale was clearly falsified because at the time of its supposed execution, P had
already passed away. The IBP found Atty. R unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney and
recommended his suspension. Is the recommendation appropriate?
Yes, the IBP recommendation is appropriate. Falsification of a document is an act reprehensible under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer’s Oath. Moreover, the lawyer’s oath enjoins
every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court
or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Hence, Atty. R should be suspended
(Valin v. Ruiz, A.C. No. 10564, November 7, 2017).
 5

(13) X was the owner of CG Restaurant. He invited Atty. Y to join the restaurant business with both agreeing
to invest Php200,000.00 each. They signed a Memorandum of Agreement to formalize their
arrangement. However, not long after, X and Atty. Y had a falling out, prompting X to offer Atty. Y the
option to withdraw from the restaurant operations, on the condition of returning the initial investment.
Unknown to X, however, Atty. Y has already incorporated the restaurant business with the SEC as CG-
S Food Corporation, excluding X from the business without refunding his capital. Consequently, X filed
an administrative case against Y. Will the case prosper?
Yes, the case will prosper. Atty. Y violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
engaged in unlawful and deceitful conduct in incorporating the CG Restaurant into CG-S Food Corporation. In
Guillen v. Arnado, the Supreme Court held that the employment of a lawyer of his knowledge and skill of the
law to secure undue gains for himself and to take advantage and inflict serious damage on other people is
reprehensible. In this case, Atty. Y took advantage of his knowledge of the law when he surreptitiously eased
out X from the business by registering CG Restaurant as a corporation under a different but similar name and
style as CG-S Food Corporation, in the same line of business, and using the same trade secrets. Atty. Y has
certainly fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him (Guillen
v. Amado, A.C. No. 10547, November 8, 2017).

(14) M filed a complaint for estafa, breach of contracts and damages against Spouses B at the Lupon of
Barangay. Subsequently, Atty. S later appeared as counsel for Spouses B during the hearing at the
Barangay. Following this, M filed a complaint against Atty. S before the IBP, accusing him of violating
Section 9 of PD 1508, which prohibits lawyers from appearing as counsel in barangay hearings. Does
Atty. S’ alleged violation of PD 1508 constitute a violation of the CPR?
Yes, the violation of Atty. S of PD 1508 constituted a violation of the CPR. Canon 1 clearly mandates the
obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. A lawyer, to the best of his ability, is expected to
respect and abide by the law, and thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary to the same. Rule 1.01 states
the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers. Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. In this case, Atty. S
appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Punong Barangay. This constitutes a violation of such
law, therefore, Atty. S violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR (Malecdan v. Baldo, A.C. No. 12121, June 27,
2018).

(15) RF Inc. participated in a public bidding conducted by the National Printing Office (NPO). EP Corp,
represented by Atty. C, filed a Petition for Blacklisting with the NPO against RF Inc. and submitted the
audited financial statements of RF Inc. to prove that it understated its net sales for several years.
Subsequently, the NPO suspended and blacklisted RF Inc. for 5 years. Thereafter, RF Inc. filed a
disbarment complaint against Atty. C due to allegedly violating Canon 1 of the CPR. RF Inc. raised an
issue regarding the mention of its ITR in the Petition for Blacklisting and later in the Position Paper
submitted by Eastland. It contended that such was in violation of Section 4 and 278 (Procuring Unlawful
Divulgence of Trade Secrets) of NIRC. Atty. C averred that what was submitted only was RF Inc.’s
audited financial statements which were acquired from the SEC. Is Atty. C’s act of attaching RF Inc.’s
audited financial statements constitutes a violation of Section 4 and Section 238 of the NIRC and,
consequently, a violation of the CPR?
No, Atty. C did not violate any law by attaching a copy of RF Inc.’s audited financial statements in the Petition
for Blacklisting he filed with the NPO, thereby, no violation of the CPR was committed. There is a judicial notice
of the fact that audited financial statements submitted by corporations, as required by Section 141 of the
Corporation Code, are made available to the public by the SEC. RF Inc. did not, however, offer proof to
substantiate its claims that its ITR was attached to the Petition for Blacklisting despite the clear and express
statement therein that only its audited financial statement, which is available to the public through the SEC,
was attached thereto. Hence, Atty. C did not violate any law.

Moreover, an individual should not be allowed to claim relief just because a lawyer is aiding or was hired by
an opponent. To do so would create more injustice and lead to an even more erroneous practice. While courts
will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn
duties, they will on the other hand, protect them from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants (Ready
Form, Inc. v. Castillon, Jr., A.C. No. 11774, March 21, 2018).

(16) S, a seafarer, suffered severe injuries when he fell into the elevator shaft on the vessel where he was
stationed. While confined in the hospital, he met Atty. D who convinced him to engage the services of
their firm to file a suit against his employers for indemnity, which proved to be successful after due
proceedings. However, Atty. D allegedly withheld the award for payment of his attorney’s fees.
Consequently, S lodged an administrative case with the IBP, asserting, among other claims, that Atty.
 6

D engaged in ambulance chasing.. Atty. D countered the allegation, arguing that he provides free legal
advice to the public, and that it was in the course of this public service when he met the complainant.
(a) Define Ambulance Chasing.
Ambulance Chasing is the solicitation of almost any kind of business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent, in order to gain employment (Linsangan v. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009).
(b) Given the factual circumstances, was Atty. D engaged in ambulance chasing?
Yes, Atty. D is engaged in ambulance chasing. In encouraging S to file a lawsuit against his employers, Atty.
D indirectly solicited legal business and encouraged the filing of suit. Such act constitutes malpractice which
calls for the exercise of the court’s disciplinary powers and warrants serious sanctions (Linsangan v. Tolentino,
A.C. No. 6672, September 4, 2009).

(17) You hold the position of managing partner at a law firm. A new foreign airline company recently granted
rights by the Civil Aeronautics Board at the NAIA is scouting for a law firm to handle its cases in the
Philippines and provide legal services to the company and its personnel. After discussing the extent
of the necessary legal services required from your firm, the general manager gives you a letter-
proposal from another law firm in which its time-billing rates and professional fees for various legal
services were indicated. You were asked to submit a similar letter-proposal stating your firm’s
proposed fees. The airline company’s general manager also tells you that, if your proposed fees would
at least be 25% lower than that proposed by the other firm, you will secure them as your client. How
would you respond to the proposal of the airline company’s General Manager?
I will emphasize to the General Manager that the practice of law is a profession and not a trade. Practice of
law is not a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration
(Brunet v. Guaren, A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014).

Thus, I will not propose a lower fee just for the sake of competing with another firm because such practice
smacks of commercialism. Moreover, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
Hence, I will charge fees that will be reasonable under the circumstances.

(18) Can Atty. Alberto Celestino B. Reyes II use the following aliases in his legal practice: a) Alberto II
Celestino B. Reyes; b) Alberto Celestino Borbon Reyes II; c) Alberto Celestino B. Reyes II; d) Alberto
II Borbon Reyes; e) Alberto II Celestino Borbon Reyes; f) Alberto Celestino Borbon Reyes Jr.; and g)
Alberto R. Reyes II?
No, the use of aliases or pseudonyms is not permitted in the legal profession unlike in other professions such
as those engaged in literary works and the entertainment industry. Canon 3 provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. As such, in his legal practice, a lawyer must only use his name as indicated in the Roll of Attorneys. Not
only will this avoid confusion to the Court and the public, but more importantly it is the true and dignified
information which he has stated as a member of the Bar. Further, in using his name as it appears on the Roll
of Attorneys, the lawyer will avoid causing any injury or damage to his clients, the public, and the Court (Carlos
v. Reyes, A.C. No. 11764, September 23, 2020).

(19) A, B, C are majority stockholders of Emerald Corporation, which was ordered liquidated by the Court.
Before the RTC, lawyers under the firm YRG & M entered their appearance as counsels for the
liquidator. An Opposition was filed against the appearance of YRG & M law firm on the ground that R,
had already been disbarred. Can the name of a disbarred lawyer be included in the name of a law firm?
No, a disbarred lawyer’s name cannot be part of a firm’s name. A lawyer who appears under a firm name that
contains a disbarred lawyer’s name commits indirect contempt of court. Maintaining a disbarred lawyer’s name
in the firm name is different from using a deceased partner’s name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02 allows
the use of a deceased partner’s name as long as there is an indication that the partner is deceased. This
ensures that the public is not misled. On the other hand, the retention of a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm
name may mislead the public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to practice law (Kimteng v. Young,
G.R. No. 210554, August 5, 2015).

(20) The shingles of a sole law practitioner Bartolome D. Carton, who inherited the law office from his
deceased father, Antonio C. Carton, carries these names: “Carton & Carton Law Office.” Is that
permissible or objectionable? Explain. (2002 Bar Question)
The firm name “Carton & Carton Law Office” is not permissible; it is objectionable. Atty. Bartolome D. Carton
is a solo practitioner and his firm name gives the impression to the public that it is a partnership where in truth
and in fact it is not. The firm name is misleading considering that his father Atty. Antonio C. Carton is deceased.
Canon 3, Rule 3.02 of the CPR provides that in the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed
name shall be used, the continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm
 7

indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased. In the case at bar, he was never a law partner
of his father so even if he indicates in all his communications that his father is already dead it would still be
misleading, hence, contrary to the CPR and objectionable.

(21) Former Solicitor General Cazzie assisted the Central Bank in liquidating Mon Bank, which was bought
by Dragon Corp., when she was still in government service. Cazzie is now a private practitioner and is
representing Dragon Corp. in a case filed by PCGG.
(a) How is the term ‘intervene’ in Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility defined?
The term “intervene” in Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only includes an act of a person
who has the power to influence the subject proceedings (PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April
12, 2005).
(b) What is the difference between “Adverse-Interest Conflict” and “Congruent-Interest Conflict?”
Adverse-interest conflict exists where the matter in which the former government lawyer represents a client in
private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and the interests of the current and former are adverse. On the other hand, congruent-interest representation
conflict is unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to former government lawyers (PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005).
(c) Does the present case violate the prohibition on lawyers who have left the government service from
accepting engagements in connection with any matter he had intervened in while in the said service?
No, there is no violation of the prohibition. The “matter” referred to in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. Former Solicitor General Cazzie had no
adverse interest when he acted as such and later as counsel of Dragon Corp. because the alleged intervention
while holding such position is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the case initiated
by the PCGG (PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005).
(d) Explain the Revolving Door Doctrine.
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court defined the Revolving Door Doctrine as an area of concern
in the United States involving ethical considerations applicable to former government lawyers. It is the process
by which lawyers temporarily enter government service from private life then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service. To
address this, the disqualification of a former government lawyer who has entered private practice may be
sought based either on “adverse-interest conflict” or “congruent-interest representation conflict” (PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005).

(22) Gatong Gang was a former Presiding Judge of the MTC in Tangub City and was the judge who heard
a forcible entry case between complainant Gretchie Barreta and respondent Marjorie Echosverri.
Another civil complaint was filed by Barreta against Echosveri, where she was surprised that the
defendants are now being represented by Gang, the former judge who once presided over the same
case.
Barreta alleged that the appearance of former Judge Gang is illegal and immoral. Gang raised the
defense of absolute neutrality and that he did the acts complained of due to extreme poverty and
absence of adequate income as he has no source of livelihood. Should Gatong Gang be held
administratively liable?
Yes, Gatong Gang should be held administratively liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He cannot accept work or employment from anyone that would involve or relate to any matter
in which he had intervened as a judge except on behalf of the body or authority that he served during his public
employment. The defense of poverty is untenable as his actuations cannot be overlooked for contravening the
express letter and spirit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Pasok v. Zapatos, A.C. No.
7388, October 19, 2016).

To the Legal Profession (Canons 7 to 9)

(23) While A is married to O, she had been sharing the same bed with Atty. F for an extended period.
Despite Atty. F's denial of engaging in immoral relations with A, several witnesses (who happen to
be A’s children with O) affirm instances where Atty. F would enter, wearing only a towel around his
waist, and request everyone except A to leave the room. In one instance, Atty. F chased down O,
who was riding his motorcycle along the highway, and challenged him to a fistfight and even
threatened to kill him.
 8

(a) Do Atty. F’s acts constitute grossly immoral acts?

No, F’s acts do not constitute grossly immoral acts. In Fabugais v. Faundo Jr., grossly immoral conduct is that
which must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree. Here, the witnesses have only seen that Atty. F is clad only with a towel, but they did not witness
the actual sexual act. Therefore, the explicit sexual immorality was not established as a matter of fact, and F’s
acts do not amount to grossly immoral acts (Fabugais v. Faundo, Jr., A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018).

(b) Is Atty. F administratively liable for his acts?

Yes, Atty. F is administratively liable. In Fabugais v. Faundo Jr., the Supreme Court enunciated that lawyers
are mandated to do honor to the bar at all times and to help maintain the respect of the community for the legal
profession under all circumstances. In this case, Atty. F can be held administratively liable under Rule 7.03 of
the CPR, which states, “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession” (Fabugais v. Faundo, Jr., A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018).

(24) Atty. B held an account in Galante Bank Inc., with a balance of 5 million pesos. Being a highly valued
client, he was issued an emerald credit card with a limit of Php900,000.00, Atty. B lambasted and
slapped the cashier in front of a long queue of people because the latter informed him that his credit
card was not working anymore as it had exceeded its limit. Atty. B also refused to pay Galante bank
the monthly charges of the card as they fall due. Aside from the collection suit, Galante Bank also filed
a disbarment case against Atty. B. In his comment on the disbarment case, Atty. B insisted that he did
not violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, since his obligation to the bank was personal in
nature and had no relation to his profession as a lawyer. Is Atty. B Correct?
No, Atty. B is not correct. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to discredit the legal profession. In this case, Atty. B’s excessive shopping,
rudeness to the cashier and refusal to pay the monthly charge is a scandalous behavior which may affect his
fitness to practice law. Therefore, Atty. B’s argument is untenable.

(25) C alleges that Atty. P appeared in court and directed discourteous and inappropriate remarks towards
both the prosecutors and the judge. Atty. P uttered “Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki siguro bayad
sa inyo” to the two prosecutors and has made a statement calling the judge biased. C further claims
that Atty. P called her private counsel, Atty. T, “bakla” in open court. Did Atty. P's actions constitute a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Yes, Atty. P violated the CPR. As against the public prosecutors, Atty. P made the following statement: “Bakit
2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki siguro bayad sa inyo”. Such remark was clearly unprofessional by nonchalantly
accusing the prosecutors of having been bribed or otherwise acting for a valuable consideration, Atty. Puti
overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness, and candor which he owes to the opposing counsels as required
by Canon 8 of the CPR. Rule 8.01 also states that a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper.

As against the judge, Atty. P accused him of being biased. While a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the
right to criticize the acts of courts and judges, the same must be made respectfully and through legitimate
channels. In this case, Atty. P violated Canon 11, Rules 11.03 and 11.04 of the CPR.

As against Atty. T, Atty. P called him “bakla” in open court. The term “bakla” itself is not derogatory as it is used
to describe a male person who is attracted to the same sex. Thus, the term itself is not a source of offense as
it is merely descriptive. However, when “bakla” is used in a pejorative and depreciating manner, then it
becomes derogatory. Such offensive language finds no place in the courtroom or in any other place for that
matter. Atty. P ought to be aware that using the term “bakla” in a derogatory way is no longer acceptable. Thus,
he violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the CPR (Canete v. Puti, A.C. No. 10949, August 14, 2019).

(26) B engaged the services Atty. T to represent him in an amicable proceeding with the labor arbiter. The
purpose of the appearance of Atty. T is only to raise that the notarized amicable settlement made by B
and A was invalid. A, the employee of B, claimed that during the proceedings before the labor arbiter,
he opposed the appearance of Atty. T as the lawyer should have just encouraged them to settle
amicably. This had irritated Atty. T and he consequently menacingly replied: “Even if you bring ten
lawyers here, you will not get what you want.” Thus, A filed an administrative case against Atty. T.
(a) Did Atty. T violate any provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
Yes, Atty. T violate any provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to employ respectful and restrained language in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession. Feelings between litigants may exist, but they should not be allowed to
 9

influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor towards each other or towards suitors in the case (Canlapan
v. Balayo, A.C. No. 10605, February 17, 2016).
(b) May Atty. T represent B in this case?
Yes, Atty. T may still represent B in this case. It is the right of every lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper
advice to those seeking relief. Atty. T only made an honest effort to protect the interest of his client. It does not
amount to obstruction of the administration of justice. Atty. T assertiveness in espousing with candor his client’s
cause was merely in accord with his duty to act in the best interests of his client (Canlapan v. Balayo, A.C. No.
10605, February 17, 2016).

(27) Atty. M represents AT for a case of Annulment of Contract filed with the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) against BC and the latter’s filming business. After notice of appearance of
both the lawyers of the parties in the said case, BC, with his counsel, Atty. JB invited AT for dinner at
Dang Inasal restaurant. During the dinner, Atty. JB managed to convince AT to execute an affidavit of
desistance to which AT heeded with his assistance and subsequently notarized the said document.
Because of this, Atty. M filed an administrative complaint against Atty. JB, for encroaching upon the
professional employment of another lawyer. Atty. JB argued that the affidavit of desistance of AT was
freely executed by him. Did Atty. JB commit a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
this case? Explain.
Yes, Atty. JB violated the CPR. Canon 8, Rule 8.02 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer. Moreso, a lawyer should not in any
way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel, and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law. In this case, Atty. JB knew that AT was
represented by his counsel, Atty. M. His act of assisting in the execution of the affidavit of desistance and
notarizing the same has nonetheless encroached upon the legal functions of Atty. M (Binay-an v. Addog, A.C.
No. 10449, July 28, 2014).

(28) Atty. P entered into an agreement with T. The agreement states that Atty. P will give to T a 20%
commission of the attorney’s fees which the former would receive in representing Spouses A whom
the latter referred for a case of partition of estate. Did Atty. K commit a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in this case? Explain.
Yes, Atty. P violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 9, Rule 9.02 of the CPR prohibits a lawyer
from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except
in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar (Tumbokon v. Pefianco, A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012).

(29) What are the exceptions where a lawyer may divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law?
The following are the exceptions (PUN):
1. Where there is a Pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death, money
shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or
2. Where a lawyer Undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
3. Where a lawyer or law firm includes Non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even if the plan is based in
whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement (CPR, Canon 9, Rule 9.02).

To the Courts (Canons 10 to 13)

(30) Atty. X serves as counsel for the accused in a criminal case pending before the Sandiganbayan. Atty.
X allegedly provided Y, a security guard at the Sandiganbayan, with twenty thousand pesos intended
for the Security team’s Christmas Party. This fact was discovered by Y’s superior, and an investigation
was conducted. During the investigation, Atty. X refused to comment or cooperate about the matter.
Later on, the findings of the investigation showed that Y has received money from Atty. X. Did Atty.
X’s refusal to comment or cooperate with the investigation constitute a violation of his duty to the
courts?
Yes, Atty. X’s refusal to comment or cooperate with the investigation constitutes a violation of his duty to the
courts. In Security and Sheriff Division, Sandiganbayan v. Cruz, which bears the same facts, it was held that
as a lawyer, respondent is an officer of the court who has the duty to uphold its dignity and authority and not
promote distrust in the administration of justice. He is therefore under obligation to shed light on the truth or
falsity of the issue, considering that he is at the center of the controversy. Here, Atty. X is directly involved in
the issue involving Y, and his act of refusing to give a statement impedes the administration of justice.
Therefore, Atty. X has violated his duty to the courts (Security and Sheriff Division, Sandiganbayan v. Cruz,
A.M. No. SB-17-24-P, July 11, 2017).
 10

(31) Atty. A filed a motion for reconsideration on behalf of her clients where she quoted a portion of a
Supreme Court decision which she claimed to have reflected the legal basis for a judgment to support
her cause of action. However, it was found that the quoted portion was just a part of the memorandum
of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision. Would Atty. A’s act warrant administrative sanction?
Yes, Atty. A’s act warrants administrative sanction. By citing the memorandum of the Court Administrator as a
Supreme Court decision, Atty. A violated Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
Therefore, she may be held administratively liable and admonished for her utter carelessness in the present
case (COMELEC v. Noynay, G.R. No. 132365, July 9, 1998).

(32) Atty. X was the counsel for a civil case pending before Judge P. Atty. X filed a Motion for Inhibition
which contained the following remarks: “Finally, in my 30 years of law practice, I never encountered a
Judge who appears to be as corrupt as you are, thereby giving me the impression that you are a
disgrace to the Judicial System of this land who does not deserve to be a member of the Philippine
Bar at all.”
Judge P filed a complaint of disbarment against Atty. X for violation of Canon 8 of the CPR for the
language employed by Atty. X in his motion for inhibition. Atty. X countered that his allegations of
bribery against Judge P was grounded on the fact that Judge P allegedly solicited from him
Php1,000,000.00 in exchange for the issuance of a TRO. In addition, Atty. X wrote a news article
detailing the events that precipitated the bribery charge against complainant Judge P.
(a) Should Atty. X be held liable for his slanderous remarks against Judge P despite the truthfulness of
the allegations?
Yes, Atty. X be held liable for his slanderous remarks against Judge P. As counsel for the plaintiffs in a civil
case, it was incumbent upon Atty. X to observe and maintain respect towards the judicial office. Instead of
insisting on similar conduct from his clients, Atty. X was the first to cast doubt on the impartiality and
independence of the court (Pantanosas, Jr. v. Pamatong, A.C. No. 7330, June 14, 2016).

(b) Was he correct in divulging his grievance to the press against a judge?
No, resorting to the press was highly irresponsible and is contrary to a lawyer's duty to submit grievances
against judges to the proper authorities only. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
a lawyer to “observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist
on similar conduct by others.” Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer “shall submit grievances against a
judge to the proper authorities only.” While lawyers have the right, both as officers of the court and as citizens,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges, such
criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety (Pantanosas, Jr. v.
Pamatong, A.C. No. 7330, June 14, 2016).

(33) Judge A filed a complaint against Atty. W alleging that she received a letter from the latter threatening
her with an administrative and criminal complaint for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment if the
writ of possession/writ of demolition would be implemented. Atty. W also stated that Judge A may be
“stubbornly pursuing” the demolition operations “because of her desire to please and gratify” the
Mayor of Parañaque City. In his comment, Atty. W stated that his letter was to “courteously warn” and
prevent Judge A from “committing a judicial act which would be a transgression” of his (Atty. W)
clients’ right to due process, and which would make her “truly vulnerable to criminal as well as
administrative” complaints. Was Atty. W’s act in sending the letter proper?
No, Atty. W’s act of sending the subject letter to Judge A was highly improper. Atty. W is guilty of violating
Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR for his menacing language that imputes ill and corrupt motive to a
member of the judiciary. These statements demonstrate how Atty. W had failed to observe the respect due to
the Courts and to judicial officers. In Pantanosas, Jr. v. Pamatong, the Court reiterated that while lawyers have
the right, both as officers of the court and as citizens, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges, such criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety (Macapagal v. Young, A.C. No. 9298, July 29, 2019).

(34) When may a lawyer testify on behalf of his client?

Rule 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of
his client, except: (FS)
1. On Formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like; or
2. On Substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he
must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
 11

(35) Atty. C accused Atty. B of dilatory tactics when, after 8 years of court trial, Atty. B asked for the
inhibition of the presiding Judge F. After the latter’s inhibition, it led to 5 more inhibitions from all the
subsequent presiding RTC judges to whom the case was raffled. Atty. C also alleged that Atty. B filed
numerous administrative, civil, and criminal cases against him which were all malicious and
unfounded. However, Atty. B clarified that it was not him who personally filed or instituted several
cases adverted to by Atty. C, but his clients M and E. Atty. C further alleged that Atty. B exhibited his
immaturity on two occasions by deliberately misspelling his first name: (1) in a previous demand letter
drafted by Atty. B addressed to Atty. C, the latter’s name had been misspelled as “Honest”; and (2) in
an Omnibus Motion filed by Atty. B in which he misspelled the first name of Atty. C, Honesto, as
“HONESTo” which had consistently appeared in all 14 pages of the omnibus motion. Did Atty. B violate
the CPR?
Yes, Atty. B violated the CPR. It is imperative to consider the unfortunate timing of the filing of the motion,
which was after the trial of the case had taken eight years to conclude. The inhibition of Judge F led to five
more inhibitions of the other judges to whom the case was re-raffled, which thus ultimately presented the
problem of unavailability of a judge who would try and hear the case and caused delay in the resolution of the
case to the prejudice of Atty. C’s client. Atty. B violated Canon 12, Rule 12.04 of the CPR, to wit: A lawyer shall
not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.

As to the filing of multiple complaints against Atty. C. A counsel is given the liberty to defend his client’s cause
with utmost zeal. This obligation, however, is not without reasonable limitations. The filing of frivolous suits
against his opposing counsel manifests, at the very least, his gross indiscretion as a colleague in the legal
profession and his malicious desire to vex Atty. C and exhibits his intent to paralyze Atty. C from exerting his
utmost effort in protecting his client’s interest. Herein, the act of filing multiple complaints against Atty. C
constitutes bad faith and is in violation of Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.03, Canon 1, Canon 12, Rule 12.02, and
Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the CPR.

As to the deliberate misspelling of the first name of Atty. C, such method is a subtle way of name-calling, and
improperly offensive to Atty. C. By spelling the first six letters of Atty. C’s first name in capital letters and leaving
the last letter in lowercase, the impression given to the reader is that the author is attempting to illustrate an
irony at the expense of Atty. C. Such act of Atty. B in deliberately misspelling the first name of Atty. C is in
violation of Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the CPR, to wit: a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper (Cabarroguis v. Basa A.C. No. 8789, March 11, 2020,
Caguioa Case).

(36) Atty. D wrote in Manila Times that the decision of the Supreme Court in a highly publicized land case
is incorrect and shows the Supreme Court’s bias. The decision is not yet final. Atty. M filed an
administrative case against Atty. D for violation of the sub judice rule. Is Atty. D administratively liable
for his article?
Yes, he is administratively liable. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the
judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the
administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d),
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon
evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice,
or sympathies (Marantan v. Diokno, G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014).

Atty. D having written an article criticizing the decision of the Supreme Court, which is pending and not yet final
has violated the said rule. Therefore, he is administratively liable, and may be liable for indirect contempt.

(37) What is the Principle of Open Justice?

The Principle of Open Justice refers to the public right to scrutinize and criticize court proceedings. It is justified
on the ground that if the determination of justice cannot be hidden from the public, this will provide:
1. A safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy; and
2. The maintenance of the public’s confidence in the administration of justice (In Re: The Allegations
Contained in the Columns of Macasaet, A.M. No. 07-09- 13-SC, August 8, 2008).

To the Clients (Canons 14 to 22)

(38) Under Rule 14.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, what are the two instances when a lawyer
may refuse to accept the representation of an indigent client?
A lawyer may refuse representing an indigent client in any of the following instances stated in Rule 14.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility: (NL)
 12

1. If he is Not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently; and

2. If he Labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a present client
and the prospective client.

(39) Disbarment cases were filed against Atty. M. In the first complaint, AM alleged that Atty. M represented
his brother L during regular government hours which consisted of at least 86 court appearances in
connection with 30 cases while employed as Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City. In another
complaint, Atty. O, representing Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), averred that Atty. M did not
inform ALECO’s old Board of Directors that he was employed as Provincial Legal Officer at such time.
Atty. O raised that after the National Electrification Administration (NEA) deactivated the old BOD on
the ground of mismanagement, Atty. M served as retained counsel of the NEA-appointed team which
took over the management of ALECO.
In his defense, Atty. M claimed that when he served as Provincial Legal Officer, he engaged in private
practice pursuant to the 3 written authorities issued by Governor B, and the written authority of the
Secretary of DILG issued during his 1st term which he reasoned out that it is effective until revoked
and therefore effective in his second and third term. Atty. M also argued that no conflict of interest
existed between ALECO’s old BOD and the NEA management team, since he was engaged as retained
counsel of ALECO as an institution, not its management teams.
(a) Did Atty. M violate the conditions of his DILG authorization when he engaged in a sheer volume of
cases?
Yes, Atty. M violated the DILG authorization prohibiting him from utilizing government time for his private
practice. Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires government officers and employees of all departments and
agencies, except those covered by special laws, to render not less than 8 hours of work a day for 5 days a
week, or a total of 40 hours a week. The number of required weekly working hours may not be reduced, even
in cases where the department or agency adopts a flexible work schedule. Atty. M’s appearance as counsel
for at least 86 court appearances in connection with at least 30 cases clearly indicates that government time
was necessarily utilized in pursuit of his private practice. This is in clear violation of the DILG authorization and
Rule 6.02 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position
to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties (Monares v.
Muñoz, A.C. Nos. 5582, 5604 & 5652, January 24, 2017).
(b) Is the grant of authority by the Secretary of DILG considered to be perpetual authority to engage in
private practice?
No, the grant of authority by the Secretary of DILG should not be considered as a perpetual authority to engage
in private practice. Atty. M should have requested for authority to engage in private practice from the Secretary
of DILG for his second and third terms. His failure to request for such authority rendered him liable for
unauthorized practice of his profession and violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR, to wit: a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct (Monares v. Muñoz, A.C. Nos. 5582, 5604 & 5652,
January 24, 2017).
(c) Did Atty. M represent conflicting interests when he acted as counsel for ALECO under the
management of the old BOD and thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction
of the NEA management team?
Yes, Atty. M represented conflicting interests. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. Atty. M acted as counsel for ALECO under the management of the
old BOD. He thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction of the NEA management
team. Atty. M could have easily anticipated that his advice would be sought with respect to the prosecution of
the members of the old BOD, considering that the latter was deactivated due to alleged mismanagement. The
conflict of interest between Atty. O’s board on one hand, and NEA and its management team on the other, is
apparent. By representing conflicting interests without the permission of all parties involved, Atty. M violated
Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR (Monares v. Muñoz, A.C. Nos. 5582, 5604 & 5652, January 24, 2017).

(40) Vea Alonso engaged the services of Atty. C, an associate at the XYZ firm where Alonso was eventually
able to secure a writ of execution in a civil case for sum of money. Atty. A composed a letter addressed
to the Department of Justice (DOJ), formally requesting a preliminary investigation for the estafa case
filed against B.
The Sheriff and her husband went to Alonso’s house to harass her into executing an affidavit of
desistance in the administrative case. This led Alonso to file criminal cases against Gil and her
husband. Notwithstanding the pendency of the execution of the judgment in the civil case, Atty. C
represented Gil and her husband in the criminal case filed by Alonso. Alonso thus sued Atty. C for
disbarment for violating the lawyer-client relationship.
 13

Atty. C argues that there is no conflict of interest in this case, as the civil case handled by their law
firm where Alonso is the complainant and the criminal cases filed by Alonso against the Gil spouses
are not related.
(a) Explain the “use of prior knowledge” test to determine the existence or non-existence of conflict of
interest.
The “use of prior knowledge” test inquires into the matter of whether the lawyer would be called upon in the
new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment (Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr., A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012).
(b) Is conflict of interest present in this case?
Yes, there is conflict of interest in this case when Atty. C represented Alonzo in the civil case for sum of money
and when he subsequently represented Gil and her husband in the criminal case filed by Alonso. A lawyer is
barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of facts. Atty. C’s contention deserves no merit, for it is well-settled that the representation of
opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites
suspicion of double-dealing which the Court cannot allow (Gonzales v. Cabucana, A.C. No. 6836 (Resolution),
January 23, 2006).

(41) Atty. A composed a letter addressed to the Department of Justice (DOJ), formally requesting a
preliminary investigation for the estafa case filed against B. This prompted B to file a case for
disbarment against Atty. A, alleging that there is conflict of interest when the latter sought for the said
preliminary investigation. According to B, Atty. A was his counsel in a prior civil case. In his answer,
Atty. A averred that there is no conflict of interest since there was no formal written agreement entered
by him and B and no acceptance fee was paid to him by the latter. Is the contention of Atty. A correct?
No, the contention of Atty. A is not correct. A lawyer is forbidden from representing conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The absence of a written contract
will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship between the parties. To establish the
lawyer-client relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession. Therefore, by representing B in the previous civil case and by subsequently
requesting a preliminary investigation against him, Atty. A is guilty of representing conflicting interests (Yumang
v. Alaestante A.C. No. 10992, June 19, 2018).

(42) R filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. G. R alleged that he is the President and Chairman of IAK
Corp. R extended loans to Atty. G on six different occasions which were evidenced by promissory
notes and an acknowledgement/agreement which were all duly signed and executed by Atty. G.
However, Atty. G failed to pay to R and to IAK Corp. In his answer to the complaint, Atty. G claimed
that he was employed by the IAK Corp. and retained as Legal Consultant and Special Assistant to the
Chairman and President, and claimed that he handled R’s numerous personal cases. Atty. G further
averred that he and R agreed that the amounts stated therein would set off against the former’s
compensation and professional fees for services rendered to R and to IAK Corp.
(a) Did Atty. G violate the CPR by borrowing and refusing to pay the loans?
Yes, Atty. G violated the CPR. The loans, which were evidenced by promissory notes and an acknowledgment/
agreement, appear to have been contracted during the existence of a lawyer-client relationship among the
parties, when Atty. G was employed by the IAK Corp. and retained as legal consultant and special assistant to
the president. Consequently, he violated Rule 16. 04 which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Further, in unduly borrowing money from R and IAK Corp. and refusing to pay the same, Atty. G abused the
trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients. In doing so, he failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, in contravention of Canon 7 of the CPR (Reyes v. Gubatan, A.C. No. 12839, November
03, 2020).
(b) Can the IBP order the return of the money borrowed by Atty. G from R and IAK Corp. in the same
administrative case?
No, the IBP cannot order the return of the money borrowed by Atty. G from R and IAK Corp. in the same
administrative case. The IBP Board was correct in not including an order for the return of the money borrowed
by Atty. G from R and the IAK Corp. since these loans were contracted in his private capacity. In the case of
Tria- Samonte v. Obias, the SC held that the findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no
bearing on the liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature — meaning, those liabilities
which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement — as the same should be threshed out in
a proper proceeding of such nature. Hence, IBP cannot order the return of the money borrowed by Atty. G
from R and IAK Corp. in the same administrative case (Reyes v. Gubatan, A.C. No. 12839, November 03,
2020).
 14

(43) S alleged that he gave Atty. G Php200,000.00 as full payment of the latter’s legal services in his case
before the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, S claims that Atty. G requested pocket money for his travel
to the US, mentioning that he wouldn't attend the hearing or continue serving as counsel if the funds
weren't provided. The next day, Atty. G harshly asked him about the pocket money but S could not
give the same. Then, Atty. G filed a letter informing the Sandiganbayan of his withdrawal as S’s
counsel. S is now praying for the refund of a portion of the amount paid to Atty. G in order that he
might hire a new lawyer. The IBP found that Atty. G violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 16.01, Canon
16 of the CPR and ordered Atty. G’s suspension from the practice of law and to return all documents
and money in his possession. Is Atty. G guilty of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the CPR for his failure to
return, despite demand, the complainant’s document after he withdrew as his counsel?
Yes, Atty. G’s failure to return, despite demand, the legal fees and the documents after he withdrew as his
counsel is in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 which provides that a lawyer shall account for and hold in trust
the money or property from the client (Sorongon, Jr. v. Gargantos, Sr., A.C. No. 11326, June 27, 2018).

(44) AD initiated a disbarment case against Atty. A. AD alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. A and
gave the latter Php10,000.00 for filing fees. However, Atty. A failed to file the case and did not exert any
effort to contact her and to obtain documents needed for the case. Moreover, Atty. A obtained several
loans from AD during the existence of their lawyer-client relationship which remain unpaid.
Furthermore, it was alleged that Atty. A induced AD to open a joint bank account for a bracelet
business. Did Atty. A violate the CPR when she failed to file the case on behalf of AD and when she
obtained several loans from the latter?
Yes, Atty. A violated the CPR when she failed to file the case and when she obtained several loans from AD.
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant’s case and
subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the CPR which provides that a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 thereof emphasizes that a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Atty. A also violated Canon 16 when she obtained loans from a client. Pertinently, Canon 16 of the CPR states
that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Moreover, Rule 16.02 provides that a lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him. Finally, Rule 16.04 thereof commands that a lawyer shall not borrow
money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client (Aguilar-Dyquiangco v. Arellano, A.C. No.
10541, July 12, 2016).

(45) The children of the late Dr. KM filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. L for selling a parcel of land
in cahoots with complainants’ estranged mother. Atty. L, who acted as counsel for their late father in
several cases, one of which involved the recovery of the land in issue, does not deny having received
the down payment for the property sold and also does not deny failing to give complainants’ share.
Atty. L reasoned out that he applied said payment as his share in the property, but stresses that he
only took it upon himself to sell the property because complainants were unfamiliar with real estate
transactions. Will the case against Atty. L prosper?
Yes, the case will prosper against Atty. L. In Heirs of Carlos v. Linsangan, it was held that a lawyer is not
entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him
attorney’s fees. The failure of an attorney to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality,
as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. When Atty. L determined all by himself that the down payment accrues to him and immediately
appropriated the same, without the knowledge and consent of the complainants, this constituted a breach of
his client’s trust. Therefore, his unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this case, warrants
the imposition of disciplinary action (Heirs of Carlos v. Linsangan, A.C. No. 11494, July 24, 2017).

(46) Atty. J was the counsel of L for an unlawful detainer case against M. M claimed that while the case was
pending before the Supreme Court, L sold one of the properties in litis pendentia to Atty. J’s son, K. M
filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. J contending that he committed malpractice when he
acquired, through his son, an interest in the property subject of the unlawful detainer case in violation
of Article 1491 of the Civil Code. Did Atty. J violate the said provision of the Civil Code and his ethical
duties as a lawyer?
No, Atty. J did not violate the Civil Code or his ethical duties as a lawyer. Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
prohibits justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of court, other officers and employees connected with
the administration of justice, and lawyers, to acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon execution before
 15

the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions. Concededly, Article 1491
provided that “the following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another” (Santos v. Arrojado, A.C. No. 8502, June 27, 2018).

Here, M failed to adduce any evidence that K acted or mediated on behalf of his father, Atty. J, or that Atty. J
was the ultimate beneficiary of the sale transaction. Therefore, Atty. J did not violate the Civil Code, and his
ethical duties as a lawyer.

(47) SKL Bank engaged the services of Atty. N in a case for injunction and damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a TRO filed by the Tutubig Water District (TWD) against the Bank before the RTC. Atty. N
attended the hearing on behalf of SKL Bank where he promised to file a comment on the application
for Injunction within 10 days. However, Atty. N failed to do so, which eventually led the RTC to declare
SKL Bank in default. The claim of TWD was granted and eventually led to the issuance of a writ of
execution against the bank. SKL Bank subsequently filed a disbarment complaint with the IBP against
Atty. N, alleging culpable negligence on the part of the lawyer. Was the allegation of the bank correct?
Yes, SKL Bank was correct. Canon 17 of the CPR provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Canon 18, in turn, imposes upon a lawyer
the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence. Further, Rule 18.03, Canon 18 expressly states
that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. In the instant case, Atty. N grossly neglected his duty as counsel to the extreme detriment
of his client. He willingly and knowingly allowed the judgment in this case to become final and executory. He
failed to assert any of the defenses and remedies available to his client under the applicable laws. This
constitutes inexcusable negligence warranting an exercise by this Court of its power to discipline him (United
Coconut Planters Bank v. Noel, A.C. No. 3951, June 19, 2018).

(48) Atty. G is the lawyer of Mr. W in a case for annulment against the latter’s wife. However, during the
pendency of the case, Mr. W’s wife died. Mr. W then asked Atty. G to represent him in a succession
case as regards his wife’s properties. Atty. G agreed. However, Atty. G knows for himself that Wills
and Succession is not his expertise. Without informing Mr. W, he then entered into an agreement with
Atty. A. In the agreement, it was stipulated that Atty. A would prepare the pleadings and Atty. G would
be the one to appear in court. They also agreed to divide the professional fees in half. Did Atty. G
violate any provision in the Code of Professional Responsibility? Explain.
Yes, Atty. G committed a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under Rule 18.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, it is provided that a lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows
or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of
his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter. In this case, Mr. W
was not informed by Atty. G that he would collaborate with Atty. A in handling the case which is a clear violation
of the CPR.

(49) D engaged the services of Atty. G to represent him in an illegal dismissal case against AMMG
Company. A few months after the hearing of the case, D called Atty. G to follow up the status of the
case. To his surprise, Atty. G informed him that the case was dismissed and that he did not appeal the
same since he knew the D did not have any money nor properties for the appeal. Aggrieved, D filed a
disbarment case against Atty. G for the latter’s negligence. Atty. G contended that he exerted his best
efforts in defending D’s case. Will the case against Atty. G prosper?
Yes, the case against Atty. G will prosper. The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary.
Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases entrusted to
them. They commit not only to review cases or review legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the
best of their ability without the need to be reminded by either the client or the court (De Leon v. Geronimo, A.C.
No. 10441, February 14, 2018).

In this case, Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR were violated. While it is true that it is
not the decision of the lawyer to appeal the case, Atty. G’s failure to inform his client of the status of his case
cost D his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. Atty. G failed to exhaust all possible remedies
to protect his client’s interest, which would warrant his disbarment.

(50) Atty. X discovered his client’s fraud against the adverse party. What steps should he take so that his
client will secure only that which is legally and justly due him?
Atty. X should call the attention of his client and ask him to rectify the wrong his client has done. Under Rule
19.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer who has received information that his client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
 16

client to rectify the same, and failing in which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance
with the Rules of Court.

(51) What is quantum meruit?

In the absence of the written agreement, the lawyer’s compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which
means “as much as he deserved.” The determination of attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also
authorized when the counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion. Moreover,
quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of
the engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the parties› expectation to deprive the attorney of all
compensation (Sanchez v. Aguilos, A.C. 10543, March 16, 2016).

(52) What are the factors to guide a lawyer in determining his fees? (TNIS-PCAC2P)
As accorded by Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall be guided by the following
factors in determining his fees:
1. The Time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
2. The Novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
3. The Importance of the subject matter;
4. The Skill demanded;
5. The Probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
6. The Customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
7. The Amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
8. The Contingency or certainty of compensation;
9. The Character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
10. The Professional standing of the lawyer (CPR, Rule 20.01, Canon 20).

Differentiate acceptance fee from attorney’s fee.

Attorney’s Fee Acceptance Fee

Definition Attorney’s fee is understood both in its Acceptance fee refers to the charge
ordinary and extraordinary concept. In its imposed by the lawyer for mere
ordinary concept, attorney’s fee refers to acceptance of the case.
the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for legal services
rendered. While, in its extraordinary
concept, attorney’s fee is awarded by the
court to the successful litigant to be paid
by the losing party as indemnity for
damages.

Rationale Once the lawyer agrees to represent a Since acceptance fee compensates the
client, he is precluded from handling lawyer only for lost opportunity, the same
cases of the opposing party based on the is not measured by the nature and extent
prohibition on conflict of interest. The of the legal services rendered
opportunity cost of mere acceptance is
thus indemnified by the payment of
acceptance fee.

(Ignacio v. Alviar, A.C. No. 11482, July 17, 2017).

(53) Ms. D engaged the services of Atty. L for purposes of handling the case of her daughter for a
stipulated acceptance fee of Php100,000.00. After Atty. L received the initial payments, he conferred
with Ms. D’s daughter once for 20 minutes, and then after receiving the balance, he filed his notice
of appearance and accomplished the same. Thereafter, Atty. L reneged from his responsibilities to
Ms. D and her daughter. Because of this, Ms. D requested that the respondent remit back to her the
acceptance fee that she paid the latter, but also asked him to retain a portion of it to fairly compensate
for the preparatory legal services he rendered. Atty. L refused to return the acceptance fee, claiming
that the same shall serve as his compensation. Is Atty. L entitled to attorney’s fees?
Yes, Atty. L is still entitled to attorney’s fees. Nevertheless, his acceptance fee must be reduced and
determined on the basis of quantum meruit, Section 24, Rule 138, and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the CPR and
that the remainder should be restituted to Ms. D. Be that as it may, the Court had not shied from ordering a
return of acceptance fees in cases wherein the lawyer had been negligent in the handling of his client’s case.
 17

In this regard, the principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may serve as a basis for determining
the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on
the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without working for it (Ignacio v. Alviar,
A.C. No. 11482, July 17, 2017).

Distinguish the two kinds of attorney’s lien.

Retaining Lien Charging Lien

As to Nature Passive Lien. It cannot be actively Active Lien. It can be enforced by

enforced. It is a general lien. execution. It is a special lien.

As to Basis Lawful possession of papers, documents, Securing of a favorable money judgment

property belonging to the client. for the client.

As to Coverage Covers papers, documents, and Covers all judgments for the payment of
properties in the lawful possession of the money and execution issued in
attorney by reason of his professional pursuance of such judgments; proceeds
employment. of judgment in favor of client; proceeds of
compromise settlement.

As to Effectivity As soon as the attorney gets possession As soon as the claim for attorney’s fees
of the papers, documents, or property. had been entered into the records of the
case.

As to Notice Client need not be notified to make it Notice must be served upon client and
effective. adverse party.

As to Applicability May be exercised before judgment or Generally, exercisable only when the
execution or regardless thereof. attorney had already secured a favorable
judgment for his client.

As to extinguishment
When possession lawfully ends, as when
the lawyer voluntarily parts with the funds,
documents and papers, but NOT when
the documents have been improperly or
legally taken from lawyer’s custody.
When the client loses the action as the
lien may only be enforced against a
judgment awarded in favor of the client,
the proceeds thereof or executions
thereon.

(PINEDA, Legal Ethics Annotated (2009), p.388; AGPALO, Legal Ethics (2009), pp.450, 459)

(54) M engaged the services of Atty. D to prosecute his annulment of marriage case in the RTC. After a
long- drawn trial, Atty. D was able to secure a favorable judgment from the court. Unfortunately, M
failed to pay in full the stipulated attorney’s fees of Atty. D. How can Atty. D collect his fees from M?
Discuss fully.
Atty. D can allot his fees either by filing a motion in the annulment of marriage case that he handled, and to
order M to pay the same, or he can file a separate action for the recovery of his attorney’s fees. Of the two, the
first is preferable because the judge in the annulment case will be in a better position to evaluate the amount
and the value of his service. In the meantime, he may avail retaining lien, which is to retain the moneys and
properties of M in his possession until he is paid for his services, or a charging lien, which is to charge the
money judgment in the case for the payment of his fees (2014 Bar).

(55) SP engaged the services of Atty. M. Their seemingly smooth relationship suddenly turned sour after
countless misunderstandings, which made SP consider hiring a new counsel. She now demands the
records of the case from Atty. M. However, the lawyer refused to do so contending that he is entitled
to a retaining lien and would only turn-over the documents upon satisfaction of the said lien. SP filed
an administrative case against Atty. M contending that he is guilty of malpractice. Is Atty. M’s refusal
to return the said documents valid?
Yes, Atty. M’s refusal to return the documents subject to retaining lien is valid. An attorney’s retaining lien is
fully recognized if the presence of the following elements are present:
1. Lawyer-client relationship;
 18

2. Lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and

3. Unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees (Spouses San Pedro v. Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440, December 10,
2014).

Here, it was established that SP has hired Atty. M as counsel, and the latter came into possession of the
documents, in order to prepare the necessary legal documents for SP’s case, and such service remained
unpaid by SP. Therefore, Atty. M has satisfied all the elements of a valid retaining lien, and his refusal to return
the documents is valid.

(56) C alleged that he had a handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee with Atty. J to represent him
in an illegal dismissal case wherein the evidence is clearly in C’s favor. Eventually, C won the illegal
dismissal case. When C was about to withdraw the amount granted to him, Atty. J claims that 50% of
this grant belongs to him as attorney’s fees and maintained that he only accepted the case on a 50-50
sharing arrangement. C now brings a complaint against Atty. J for demanding an exorbitant
contingency fee. Will the complaint prosper?
Yes, the complaint will prosper. In Cortez v. Cortes, it was held that generally, the amount of attorney’s fees is
that stipulated in the retainer agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyers’ compensation.
In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed based on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the
reasonable worth of the attorney’s services. Here, the contingent fee claimed by Atty. J is grossly excessive
and unconscionable, because the issue involved in C’s illegal dismissal case is hardly novel, since it is a simple
labor case wherein the evidence is clearly in C’s favor. Atty. J hardly provided any service that will justify such
an exorbitant amount, but instead a reasonable amount worth the services he rendered is in order. Therefore,
the complaint should prosper (Cortez v. Cortes, A.C. No. 9119, March 12, 2018).

(57) BB initially engaged the services of Atty. RR, but because of health reasons, he engaged the services
of Atty. HH to handle his claim to a sizeable parcel of land on a contingent fee basis. Atty. HH, in taking
over the case from Atty. RR, agreed to defray all of the litigation expenses in exchange of 50% of the
land would be registered in Atty. HH’s name upon securing a favorable judgment. Consequently, they
won the case. However, BB refused to transfer the land to Atty. HH and he insisted to merely pay Atty.
HH a certain sum of money. Is the refusal justifiable?
Yes, BB’s refusal is justifiable. The contract is champertous and prohibited as it is against public policy. Any
agreement by a lawyer to conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his
client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law. To
permit these arrangements is to enable the lawyer to acquire additional stake in the outcome of the action
which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client or to accept a settlement which
might take care of his interest in the verdict to the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided
fidelity to his client’s cause (Cadavedo v. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014).

(58) G, a mayor, revealed to Atty. L that he was involved in a case of bribery and therefore sought the latter’s
services to represent him to which Atty. L agreed. G again comes before Atty. L and told him about his
plan of malversing the city’s public funds and would like the same lawyer to represent him if ever he
faces another charge. If Atty. L is called before the court to testify against G as a state witness, are all
declarations made by G covered by privileged communication?
No, not all declarations made by G are covered by privileged communication. Only the details disclosed
regarding G’s involvement in the bribery case are privileged. In People v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that
statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party
who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken
stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the
client’s contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges
ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 115439-41, July 16, 1997).

(59) L engaged the services of Atty. C to be his counsel in a civil case. Atty. C required the payment of an
acceptance fee of Php35,000.00. The RTC required the parties to file their respective position papers.
However, Atty. C failed to file despite knowledge thereof and misrepresented to L that she filed their
position paper. Atty. C also did not attend the hearings and she deliberately refused to communicate
with L. L informed Atty. C of his decision to stop her engagement as his counsel and demanded to
prepare and file her withdrawal of appearance, and to return the acceptance fee of Php35,000.00. Atty.
C did not file her withdrawal as counsel of L, hence, L filed a verified complaint against Atty. C praying
that she be disciplined. In her defense, Atty. C claimed that her failure to prepare the position paper is
because of L’s refusal to pay her attorney’s fees. Did Atty. C fail to perform her duties as a lawyer when
she failed to file the position paper and to withdraw from the case?
 19

Yes, Atty. C failed to perform her duties as a lawyer and violated Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canons 18 and
Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the CPR. Canon 18 mandates that a lawyer is duty-bound to competently and
diligently serve his client once the former takes up the latter’s cause. Meanwhile, Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the
CPR provides that an attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by
permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name
of the new lawyer is recorded in the case (Lopez v. Cristobal, A.C. No. 12146, October 10, 2018).

Atty. C did not even make a move to properly withdraw from the case. Also, Atty. C’s defense that her attorney’s
fees were not paid cannot justify her failure to prepare and file the required position paper. After receiving the
amount of Php35,000.00 as acceptance fee, Atty. C failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of
L. Therefore, Atty. failed to perform her duties and violated the CPR.

(60) When may a lawyer validly withdraw his services? (IVIM-FEO)

According to Rule 22.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may withdraw his services in any
of the following cases:
1. When the client pursues an Illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is
handling;
2. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct Violative of these canons and rules;
3. When his Inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
4. When the Mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
5. When the client deliberately fails to pay the Fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement;
6. When the lawyer is Elected or appointed to public office; and
7. Other similar cases (CPR, Rule 22.01, Canon 22).

(61) Ms. O engaged Atty. G's services to pursue a criminal case against multiple suspects implicated in her
mother's death. However, on the scheduled date of the hearing, Atty. G failed to attend the hearing that
eventually led to the grant of bail of all accused. Because of this, Ms. O accused Atty. G that he
jeopardized the case and demanded that the records of the case be forwarded to her. Feeling hurt,
Atty. G wishes to withdraw his services for the complainant. Is Atty. G allowed to withdraw his services
from the complainant at any time?
No, Atty. G cannot validly withdraw his services anytime. Unlike the client-complainant which has the absolute
right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause, the right of an attorney to
withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted. Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises
only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause as enshrined in Section 26 of Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Atty. G being hurt by his client’s comments is not a valid ground for withdrawing from
the case. Therefore, he cannot validly withdraw as counsel (Orcino v. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773, September 24,
1997).

C. Suspension, Disbarment, and Discipline of Lawyers

Proceedings (Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended)

(62) Discuss the nature and characteristics of disbarment proceedings: (SC-DMPD-SP3-RM-IJR)

The nature and characteristics of disbarment proceedings are as follows:
1. Disbarment proceedings against lawyers are Sui generis, or a class of its own. They are:
a. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, because they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers;
b. Not a criminal prosecution because they do not intend to inflict punishment. The real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
There can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor;
c. Not a civil action because there is neither a plaintiff nor respondent. Public interest is its primary
objective and involves no private interest. Hence, a real party-in-interest is not required and there is no
redress for private grievance; and
d. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein (Tan v. Alvarico, A.C. No. 10933, November 3,
2020).
2. Disbarment proceedings are Confidential until its final determination (RULES OF COURT, Rule 139,
Sec.10);
 20

3. Double Jeopardy is inapplicable in a disbarment proceeding against an attorney since a disbarment case
does not partake of a criminal proceeding (AA Total Learning Center for Young Achievers, Inc., v.
Caronan, A.C. No. 12418, March 10, 2020);
4. Can be initiated Motu proprio by the Supreme Court or by the IBP;
5. Can Proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant,
the complainants are merely witnesses and not a direct party thereto (Ylaya v. Gacott, A.C. No. 6475,
January 30, 2013);
6. It is itself a Due process of law;
7. Whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a Source of right that may be enforced in
another action;
8. Penalty in disbarment case cannot be in the alternative;
9. No Prejudicial question in disbarment proceedings;
10. In Pari delicto rule NOT applicable;
11. No Res judicata in disbarment cases;
12. Monetary claims cannot be granted, except restitution and return of monies and properties of the client
given in the course of lawyer-client relationship;
13. An administrative complaint against a member of the bar is Imprescriptible (Frias v. Bautista-Lozada, A.C.
No. 6656, May 4, 2006);
14. The removal or disbarment of an attorney is a Judicial act; and
15. The Court may disbar a lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering his actions based
on records, under the principle of Res ipsa loquitur (Prudential Bank v. Castro, A.C. No. 2756, November
12, 1987).

(63) Does the filing of an affidavit of desistance by a complainant have an effect on the disbarment
proceeding?
No. An Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings in view of the public
service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern.
A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil
case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect
the public and the court. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his
conduct as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar (Ventura v. Samson, A.C.
No. 9608, November 27, 2012).

(64) Mr. R asserted in his complaint-affidavit that Atty. L rented a house from him in Quezon City. However,
as the months went by, Atty. L failed to comply with his obligation. To pacify Mr. R, Atty. L assured Mr.
R that he will be receiving a big amount from his client and that he will thereafter pay his unpaid rent.
Relying on his promise, Mr. R allowed him to stay in the premises. However, Atty. L left the premises
after Typhoon Maymay flooded the area without paying the accrued rentals.
This led Mr. R to file an administrative complaint with the IBP. However, the same proved futile as Atty.
L did not file his verified answer and was absent during the scheduled mandatory conference despite
due notice, letting the case proceed ex parte. Was the recourse of the IBP in hearing the case ex parte
correct?
Yes, the IBP was correct. Under Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, the non-appearance at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory hearing shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to participate in the proceedings. Hence, Atty. L’s failure to file his verified answer
and to attend in the scheduled mandatory conferences amounts as an admission of the allegations in the
complaint.

(65) Atty. MP, the counsel for Halili, a showbiz personality involved in a video scandal with Dr. HM, recently
became the subject of a pending administrative case before the IBP. One day, he was shocked to find
two articles published in Tektek, and the Philippine Bituin stating that he was already suspended from
the practice of law for one year after due proceedings before the IBP. The articles were written by
showbiz columnists CP and RL.
In response, Atty. MP filed a petition to hold CP and RL for contempt, alleging that the latter clearly
violated the confidentiality rule in proceedings against attorneys as provided by Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court due to the publication thereof. May such publication of matters relating to disbarment
proceedings be the subject of a contempt charge?
Yes, such matters may be the subject of a petition to cite a particular person in contempt. The malicious and
unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers
by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes contempt of court,
punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the Court. In the absence of a legitimate
public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings during its pendency (Palad v. Solis, G.R. No. 206691, October 3, 2016).
 21

Note: As a general rule, disciplinary proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the
final decision of the Supreme Court. However, in this case, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner
became a matter of public concern considering that it arose from his representation of his client on the issue
of video voyeurism on the internet. The interest of the public is not in himself but primarily in his involvement
and participation as counsel of Halili in the scandal. Indeed, the disciplinary proceeding against petitioner
related to his supposed conduct and statements made before the media in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility involving the controversy (Palad v. Solis, G.R. No. 206691, October 3, 2016).

(66) What are the instances for disbarment or suspension? (DMG-CV-WCD-PA2H)

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any:

1. Deceit;
2. Malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office;
3. Grossly immoral conduct;
4. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5. Violation of oath of office;
6. Willful disobedience of a lawful order of a superior court (RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 27);
7. Corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so
8. Disbarment in foreign jurisdiction;
Note: The judgment of a foreign court only constitutes prima facie evidence of the lawyer’s unethical acts
as a lawyer (In Re: Maquera, B.M. No. 793, July 30, 2004);
9. Lawyer’s misconduct in his Private capacity;
10. Misconduct before or incident to Admission (In Re: Diao, A.C. No. 244, March 29, 1963);
11. Acts contrary to honesty or good morals; and
12. Acts that do not approximate the Highest degree of morality and integrity expected of the members of the
bar (Sta. Maria v. Tuazon, A.C. No. 396, July 31, 1964).

(67) CM has a sister named MM. CM finished college in MT University with a degree of AB Legal
Management while MM only finished high school. MM then used the college credentials of CM and
enrolled in DM College of Law. She eventually graduated and passed the Bar examinations. She used
the name “Atty. CM” throughout her practice as it is her indicated name in the Roll of Attorneys basing
on her credentials. The real CM then filed a disbarment case against MM alleging that the latter is taking
advantage of her name. Will the case prosper?
Yes, the disbarment case against MM will prosper. Good moral character is one of the requirements before
one may be admitted to the Bar and it requires at least common honesty. The practice of law, after all, is not a
natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character. In this case, MM lacks good moral character. MM committed a
dishonest act and, thus, is stripped of the good moral character requirement when she used the credentials of
her sister in order to enter law school and take the bar examinations. Her false assumption of her sister’s name,
identity, and educational records renders her unfit for admission to the Bar (Caronan v. Caronan, A.C. No.
11316, July 12, 2016).

(68) Dr. S bought a parcel of land from H on an installment basis. For purposes of verification, Dr. S
borrowed the title of the land from H. Subsequently, H learned that Dr. S was able to transfer the title
of the land to his name. H then hired Atty. I to enforce his right to collect. Atty. I sent Dr. S demand
letters for the full payment of the land, threatening the doctor that administrative charges would be
filed against him for the revocation of his license as a doctor if he would not adhere to the demand. Dr.
S then filed a case of disbarment against Atty. I stating that the latter is blackmailing him. Should Atty.
I be disbarred?
No, Atty. I should not be disbarred. Rule 19.01 thereof states that “a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest
means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under this
Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the
adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their
own cases against the lawyer’s client (Malvar v. Feir, A.C. No. 11871, March 5, 2018). Atty. I was simply acting
in compliance with his lawyer’s oath to protect and preserve the rights of his client.

(69) Atty. M, a Filipino lawyer, was admitted to the practice of law in Guam. A disciplinary case was filed
against Atty. M for his alleged misconduct. The District of Guam ordered his suspension from the
practice of law for 2 years. Does his suspension from the practice of law in Guam automatically result
in his suspension in the Philippines?
 22

No, the suspension of Atty. M from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically lead to his suspension
in the Philippines. A foreign court’s judgment ordering the suspension of a Filipino lawyer from the practice of
law in that foreign country does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised ROC, the acts which led to his suspension in said foreign country
are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. The judgment of said foreign court only
constitutes prima facie evidence of the lawyer’s unethical acts as a lawyer (In Re: Maquera, B.M. No. 793, July
30, 2004).

(70) Z, representative of PJH Corp, is the plaintiff in an action for forcible entry. MeTC Judge M decided in
favor of PJH Corp and a motion for execution was granted. Atty. M, lawyer of the opposing party, filed
a motion for reconsideration. Z claimed that in the MR filed by Atty. M, he enumerated facts threatening
the judge with an administrative complaint if he would not grant the motion, which are: “(e) By
provision of law, jurisprudence and specific provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct, this Honorable
Court cannot be partial to the party which Atty. Lim represents” and “Defendants are furnishing a copy
of this motion to the Court Administrator, as they reserve to upgrade their above perceived violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct to a formal administrative complaint.” Hence, Z filed a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. M for violation of Canon 11, Rule 11.03 of the CPR. Atty. M maintained that
there was nothing disrespectful in the MR that he filed. Did Atty. M violate the CPR when he crafted the
said MR?
No, Atty. M did not violate the CPR when he crafted the MR. It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in
administrative cases, such as disbarment proceedings, is substantial evidence. The very pleading itself is the
best piece of evidence to prove whether Atty. M had, indeed, violated the CPR, however, this proffered
evidence failed to reach the threshold of the quantum of proof required. The pertinent portions of the MR merely
enumerated facts, which in the opinion of Atty. M and his clients, the trial court was duty bound to consider.
The language used in the MR is not offensive, abusive, or intemperate in any way. It did not spill over the walls
of decency or propriety. Atty. M did not unfairly criticize or disrespect Judge M in any way. Atty. M might have
been overzealous in defending his clients’ cause, but this is not necessarily bad. Therefore, Atty. M did not
violate the CPR when he made and filed the subject MR (Zamora v. Mahinay, A.C. No. 12622, February 10,
2020).

(71) T criminally charged K, S, and R with estafa. City Assistant Prosecutor R recommended the dismissal
of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to which approved by Prosecutor O and City Prosecutor
A. Prosecutor General C found no reversible error. Former Secretary of Justice L denied T’s motion
for reconsideration. Then, T filed a disbarment complaint against Prosecutors R, O, A, and C, and
Former Secretary of Justice L for gross violation of the canons of the legal profession or for
unprofessional conduct that casts serious doubts upon their mental and moral fitness as members of
the Bar and as prosecutors. Who has jurisdiction over a disbarment complaint filed against
Prosecutors R, O, A, and C, and Former Secretary of Justice L?
In the case of Prosecutors R, O, A and C, since the acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the
performance or discharge of official duties as prosecutors of the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority
to discipline Prosecutors R, O, A, and C exclusively pertained to their superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the
case of Former Secretary of Justice L, the authority to discipline pertained to the President. In either case, the
authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction
over them as public officials pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1, of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).
Indeed, the accountability of respondents as officials performing or discharging their official duties as lawyers
of the Government is always to be differentiated from their accountability as members of the Philippine Bar.
The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate them as such lawyers (Trovela v. Robles, A.C. No. 11550 , June 4,
2018).

(72) Atty. B resigned from her position as the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila. Subsequently, within the
one-year period prohibition of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases
before the RTC branch, where she previously worked as clerk of court. A letter-query questioning Atty.
B’s violation of the one-year prohibition was submitted to the Supreme Court. The SC through an En
Banc Resolution required the Executive Judge in the RTC of Manila to verify Atty. B’s appearances.
The records provided by the Executive Judge duly showed that Atty. B did appear as private counsel
during the one-year prohibition. The same resolution was furnished to Atty. B, and she submitted a
manifestation, wherein she admitted that she immediately engaged in the practice of law within the
one-year period of prohibition. But she believes that her only limitation is in matters where a conflict
of interest exists. Should Atty. B be held administratively liable despite the absence of a formal
investigation?
Yes, Atty. B should be held administratively liable despite the lack of formal investigation. In Query of Atty.
Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, it was held that in ready admission of a violation of law, the principle of res ipsa loquitur
finds application. In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers where the facts on record sufficiently
 23

provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability. The records of appearance provided by
the Executive Judge, as well as Atty. B’s clear admission in her manifestation of her appearance as private
counsel provided there is sufficient basis that she really did violate the one-year prohibition to engage in private
practice of law from the time she resigned as clerk of court. Therefore, Atty. B should be held administratively
liable without need of formal investigation (Query of Atty. Karen M. Sliverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC,
August 19, 2009).

(73) Does the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the IBP have the power to
impose disciplinary action on members of the Bar?
No, the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the IBP do not have the power to impose
disciplinary action on members of the Bar. Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated
October 13, 2015. The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only the Supreme Court has the power
to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are
recommendatory, subject to review by the Supreme Court (Vasco- Tamaray v. Daquis, A.C. No. 10868
(Resolution), January 26, 2016).

(74) P filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. S alleging, among others, that she and Atty. S were live-
in partners for three years; that Atty. S induced her to advance the funding of his proposed law office;
and that they entered into an agreement wherein P would solicit clients for Atty. S and they would
evenly divide the attorney’s fees. Atty. S argued that the case should be dismissed for forum shopping
because P already raised the same issues in her Sinumpaang Salaysay in the earlier disbarment case
filed by B against Atty. S. In the earlier disbarment case filed by B which was decided by the SC, Atty.
S was already admonished for the same acts being raised in this case. Should the instant disbarment
complaint be dismissed because of the ruling in the earlier disbarment case filed by B?
Yes, the disbarment complaint filed by P should be dismissed. The allegations of P in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay in the earlier case and in the instant case are the same. Also, among the allegations of B in the earlier
case, it is the allegation specific to P that became the basis for Atty. S’ suspension. The IBP should have
dismissed the disbarment complaint filed by P. Hence, having already imposed a punishment on Atty. S in the
earlier case involving the same set of facts, the instant disbarment complaint must be dismissed (Pabalan v.
Salva, A.C. No. 12098, March 20, 2019).

(75) Gerald Understand hired Atty. M for the latter to represent him in a civil action to change his name to
“Gerald Misunderstood.” In the course of the proceedings, Gerald gave Atty. M Php1,000,000.00 as
acceptance fee. Atty. M was also able to acquire a loan worth Php10,000,000.00 from Gerald during the
course of the proceedings, which the former used to furnish his office. However, Atty. M was negligent
in handling the case as the necessary files were all in disarray. The said case was dismissed in the
lower court and Atty. M was not able to file the memorandum required to interpose an appeal. Due to
this, the relationship got strained and Gerald was not able to change his name. Gerald filed a case of
disbarment against Atty. M.
(a) May Gerald be allowed to present evidence to recover the debt in the disbarment proceedings?
No, Gerald is not allowed to present evidence to recover the debt in the disbarment proceedings. The quantum
of evidence in a disbarment case and in a civil action for collection of sum of money to recover debts are
different from one another, deterring the court from ruling on the merits in the issue of recovery of the sum of
money. The administrative complaint requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of liability, while a civil
action requires a greater evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. Thus, Gerald cannot adduce evidence to recover his
debt during the disbarment proceedings of Atty. M (Sosa v. Mendoza, A.C. No. 8776, March 23, 2015).
(b) May Gerald be allowed to present evidence to recover the acceptance fee in the disbarment
proceedings?
Yes, Gerald is allowed to present evidence to recover the acceptance fee in the disbarment proceedings. If
the money is acquired by virtue of the professional relationship of the lawyer to his client and not in his personal
or private capacity, the same may be recovered in the administrative case (Foster v. Agtang, A.C. No. 10579,
December 10, 2014).
 24

D. Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended)

Qualifications of a Notarial Public

(76) What are the qualifications of a notary public? (CARGC)

The following are the qualifications of a notary public:
1. Must be a Citizen of the Philippines;
2. Must be over 21 years of Age;
3. Must be a Resident in the Philippines for at least 1 year and maintains a regular place of work or business
in the city or province where the commission is to be issued;
4. Must be a member of the Philippine Bar in Good standing with clearances from the Office of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court and the IBP; and
5. Must not have been Convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude (A.M. No. 02-8-
13-SC, Rule III, Sec. 1).

Term of Office of a Notary Public

(77) What is the term of office of a notary public?

A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in
which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules
and the Rules of Court (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule III, Sec. 11).

Powers and Limitations

(78) What are the powers of a notary public? (NoCES)

A notary public is empowered to perform the following:
1. Notarial acts, such as: (JACOSA)
a. Jurat;
b. Acknowledgment;
c. Copy certification;
d. Oaths and affirmation;
e. Signature witnessing; and
f. Any other act authorized by these Rules.
2. A notary public is authorized to Certify the affixing of a signature by thumb or other mark on an instrument
or document presented for notarization if:
a. The thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the notary public and of two (2) disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
b. Both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the thumb or other mark;
c. The notary public writes below the thumb or other mark: “Thumb or Other Mark affixed by (name of
signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of witnesses) and undersigned notary
public”; and
d. The notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark through an acknowledgment, jurat,
or signature witnessing.
3. A notary public is authorized to Sign on behalf of a person who is physically unable to sign or make a mark
on an instrument or document if:
a. The notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his behalf;
b. The signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two (2) disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument or document;
c. Both witnesses sign their own names;
d. The notary public writes below his signature: “Signature affixed by notary in presence of (names and
addresses of person and two [2] witnesses)”; and
e. The notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule IV,
Sec. 1).

(79) When is a notary public prohibited to perform a notarial act? (OS)

Notaries public cannot perform notarial acts:
1. Outside his regular place, or business. Otherwise, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act
(Guerrero v. Bihis. G.R. No. 174144. April 17, 2007); or
2. If the person involved as Signatory to the instrument or document: (PreK)
 25

a. Is not in the notary’s Presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
b. Is not personally Known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule IV, Sec. 2(b)).

(80) When is a notary public disqualified to perform a notarial act? (PReS)

A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
1. Is a Party to the instrument or document;
2. Will Receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash,
property, or other consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law; or
3. Is a Spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the
principal within the fourth civil degree (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule IV, Sec. 3).

(81) E alleged that he and her mother live on a portion of a parcel of land owned by B. A complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed against them. One of the complaint's annexes is an Extrajudicial
Settlement/Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. This document was notarized
by Atty. C where his wife M, was one of the principal parties in the document. Atty. C argues that "an
attorney-in-fact is not a principal but merely an agent whose powers are defined by the instrument
granting such authority and the provisions of the Civil Code on Agency. Is Atty. C liable for violating
the rules on disqualification of a notary public?
Yes. Rule IV, Section 3 of the Notarial Practice Rules states that a notary public is disqualified from performing
a notarial act if he is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the 4th civil degree. Rule II, Section 10 of the Rules on Notarial Practice
states: SEC. 10. Principal. — "Principal" refers to a person appearing before the notary public whose act is the
subject of notarization.

In the present case, it is M who personally appeared before the notary public who happens to be her husband,
Atty. C. Likewise, it is M's act which is the subject of notarization, being properly authorized to represent
someone else. Thus, we hold that M is a principal insofar as the Rules on Notarial Practice are concerned
(Edgardo Arellano-Singson v. Atty. Edgardo Cordeño, A.C. No. 12817; March 9, 2022).

(82) Complainants averred that respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale which transferred ownership
of their property to respondent’s paternal uncle and an Affidavit confirming the said sale. They also
averred that under said Rules on Notarial Practice, respondent was disqualified from notarizing the
Deed of Absolute Sale because the vendee in the sale is a relative of respondent within the fourth civil
degree. Moreover, they never appeared nor signed the documents before the respondent since it was
the uncle of the respondent who prepared the documents and persuaded them to sign it under the
pretense that they would use the documents to facilitate his loan application. Respondent countered
by saying that the complainants presented to her a signed Deed of Absolute Sale and the Affidavit
confirming the sale without the signature of her uncle which does not constitute a violation of the
Rules on Notarial Practice. Did respondent violate Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice?
Yes. Notarizing a document where one of the contracting parties was her relative within the fourth civil degree
is a clear circumvention of the Rules on Notarial Practice. Furthermore, it is immaterial that her uncle’s
signature did not appear on the sale documents since it does not alter the fact that respondent’s uncle is a
principal party to the sale (Spouses Antonio and Josefa Perla Tan v. Atty. Maria Johanna Vallejo, A.C. No.
11219; March 16, 2022).

(83) A disbarment case was filed by Complainant L against Atty. P who was the legal counsel of the
plaintiffs in a civil case against L. The plaintiffs (Atty. P’s clients) argued that L failed to deliver the
copy of the title of subject lot to them. L redeemed the lot from the DBP and argued that the plaintiffs
did not reimburse them. The RTC ordered plaintiffs to reimburse L. However, Atty. P notarized the real
estate mortgage without knowledge and consent of L. He further received attorney’s fees and the
amount for redemption that was paid by L. Did Atty. P violate the Rules on Notarial Practice by
notarizing the real estate mortgage?
Yes, Atty. P violated the Rules on Notarial Practice by notarizing the real estate mortgage. Under the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he will receive, as a
direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash, property, or other
consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by law. In this case, Atty. P violated the rules in notarizing
the real estate mortgage and receiving a portion of the proceeds thereof. It is clear that he benefited from the
said transaction (Lourdes Elanga v. Atty. Rutillo Pasok, A.C. No. 12030, September 29, 2020).
 26

Notarial Register

(84) What is a notarial register?

A notarial register refers to a permanently bound book with numbered pages containing a chronological record
of notarial acts performed by a notary public (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule II, Sec. 5).

(85) Who are required to sign or affix a thumbmark on the notarial register? (PCW)
At the time of notarization, the notary’s notarial register shall be signed or a thumb or other mark affixed by
each:
1. Principal;
2. Credible witness swearing or affirming to the identity of a principal; and
3. Witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or to a sigining by the notary public on behalf of a person
physically unable to sign (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule VI, Sec. 3).

Jurisdiction of Notary Public and Place of Notarization

(86) What is the extent of the jurisdiction of a notary public?

The jurisdiction of a notary public is any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court (A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule III, Sec. 11). The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with
the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No
notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction (REV. ADM. CODE,
Section 240).

(87) When can a notary public perform notarial acts outside his regular place of business? (OAHA)
On certain exceptional occasions or situations, notarial act may be performed at the request of the parties in
the following sites located within his territorial jurisdiction:
1. Public Offices, convention halls and similar places where oaths of office may be administered;
2. Public function Areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of instruments or documents requiring
notarization;
3. Hospitals and medical institutions where a party to the instrument or document is confined for treatment;
and
4. Any place where a party to the instrument or document requiring notarization is under detention (A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC, Rule IV, Sec. 2, Par. A)).

(88) Where is the place of notarization?

A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction
of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in
which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules
and the Rules of Court (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule III, Sec. 11).

(89) Atty. M filed a disbarment case against Atty. R on the ground, among others, that the latter notarized
the Answer to the complaint without the personal appearance of the affiants, and worse, without a
notarial commission. Atty. R was the legal counsel of the defendants in a case wherein not all of them
received a copy of the complaint. Nevertheless, an Answer to the complaint was filed which appeared
to be signed by all of the parties. It was prepared and notarized on the same date by Atty. R. However,
Atty. R was not commissioned as a notary public for and in the Province of Cagayan at the time he
notarized the Answer. Did Atty. R violate the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice?
Yes, Atty. R violated the 2004 Rule on Notarial Practice. Under Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, only a person who is commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of
January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. In this case, it was sufficiently proven that Atty. R was not
commissioned as a notary public at the time he notarized the Answer that was filed by the defendants. The
Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan duly showed
that Atty. R was not commissioned as a notary public for and in the Province of Cagayan in 2014. Thus, Atty.
R is indubitably liable for gross violation of the notarial rules which should not be dealt with lightly by the Court.
Atty. R's act of making it appear that he was a duly commissioned notary public is in blatant disregard of the
Lawyer's Oath to obey the laws, i.e. the Notarial Law, and to do no falsehood. It likewise constitutes a
transgression of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which states that: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
 27

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Therefore, Atty. R is perpetually disqualified from being
commissioned as a Notary Public due to the violation of 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Atty. Antonio
Manzano v. Atty. Carlos Rivera, A.C. No. 12173, November 03, 2020).

Competent evidence of identity

(90) What constitutes competent evidence of identity?

The phrase “competent evidence of identity” refers to the identification of an individual based on:
1. At least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, driver’s license, Professional Regulations
Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter’s ID,
Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System
(SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID,
OFW ID, seaman’s book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government
office ID, certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP), Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or
2. The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible
witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows
the individual and shows to the notary public documentary identification (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule II,
Sec. 12).

Sanctions

(91) Who can revoke a notary’s notarial commission?

A notarial commission may be revoked by the following:
1. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court who issued the commission (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule
XI, Sec. 1, Par (a)); and
2. The Supreme Court may also revoke such commission in the exercise of its general supervisory powers
over lawyers (A.M. No. 02-08-SC, Rule XI, Sec. 1).

(92) How is the notarial commission revoked?

The Executive Judge may motu proprio initiate administrative proceedings against a notary public and impose
the appropriate administrative sanctions on the grounds mentioned in Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-
8-13-SC, Rule XI, Sec. 1, Par. (d)).

(93) What are the grounds for the revocation and imposition of administrative sanctions upon a notary
public? (KE-10-ASMR-PFAD)
The Executive Judge shall revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon,
any notary public who:
1. Fails to Keep a notarial register;
2. Fails to make proper Entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts;
3. Fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge within the first ten (10) days of the month
following;
4. Fails to Affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission;
5. Fails to Submit his notarial register, when filed, to the Executive Judge;
6. Fails to Make his report, within a reasonable time, to the Executive Judge concerning the performance of
his duties, as may be required by the judge;
7. Fails to Require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial act;
8. Fails to identify a Principal on the basis of personal knowledge or competent evidence;
9. Executes a False or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV;
10. Knowingly performs or fails to perform Any other act prohibited or mandated by these Rules; or
11. Commits any other Dereliction or act which in the judgment of the Executive Judge constitutes good
cause for revocation of commission or imposition of administrative sanction (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule XI,
Sec. 1).

(94) What are the punishable acts under Rules on Notarial Practice?
The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any person who:
1. Knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public;
 28

2. Knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the seal, notarial register, or official records of a notary
public; or
3. Knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary public to commit official misconduct (A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC, Rule XII, Sec. 1).

II. JUDICIAL ETHICS

A. Sources
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

B. Qualities

(1) Identify and briefly explain the canons under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary.
Canon 1 – Independence. Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a fundamental
guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual
and institutional aspects.

Canon 2 – Integrity. Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

Canon 3 – Impartiality. Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only
to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

Canon 4 – Propriety. Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities.

Canon 5 – Equality. Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance
of the judicial office.

Canon 6 – Competence and Diligence. Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance
of judicial office.

INDEPENDENCE

(2) What are the aspects of judicial independence?

1. Individual judicial independence - focuses on each judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide
cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law.
2. Institutional judicial independence - focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of
government and projects judges as a class (In Re: The Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr.
Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, AM. No. 07- 09-13-
SC, August 8, 2008).

INTEGRITY

(3) Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Judges, who are those considered as the Judge's family?
A Judge's family includes his: (S2DI2RCE)
1. Spouse;
2. Son/Daughter;
 29

3. Son-In-law, daughter-In-law;
4. Any other Relative by consanguinity or affinity within the 6th civil degree;
5. Any person who is a Companion or Employee of the judge and who lives in the judge's household (A.M.
No. 03-05-01-SC Definitions).

IMPARTIALITY

(4) Judge W has in his sala a complaint filed by Y, the son of his wife in her previous marriage. This fact
was known by the defendant, but the latter did not file a motion to inhibit Judge W. Is Judge W justified
in not inhibiting himself from trying the case?
No, the judge is not justified. It is mandatory for judges to inhibit themselves from a case if he is related to any
of the parties either by consanguinity or by affinity within the sixth civil degree (Canon 3, New Code of Judicial
Conduct). In this case, the complainant was the stepson of Judge W, the former being the son of his wife from
a previous marriage. The Judge is related to the complainant by just one degree. Hence, he should inhibit
himself from the case to avoid impartially or the appearance of it.

(5) What is the rationale for the mandatory disqualification of a judge?

The rationale of the rule on disqualification of judges springs from the long-standing precept that a judge should
not handle a case where there is a perception, rightly or wrongly, that he is susceptible to bias and partiality
because of relationship or some other ground (Palon, Jr. v. Vallarta).

PROPRIETY

(6) Judge L has in his sala a complaint filed against C and E. During the preliminary conference, Judge L
called them ‘bading’, showing obvious bias and partiality against the sexual orientation of C and E. He
said that God hates homosexuality. His acts made C and E suspicious of his judgments in the
complaint filed in his sala. Does Judge L’s acts or remarks show impropriety?
Yes, the Judge’s acts or remarks show impropriety. He fell short of the Court's repeated and consistent
admonition to judges to not only act impartially but to also appear impartial as an added assurance to the
parties that his decision will be just. While judges are not completely stripped of their freedom to express,
exercise, or uphold their religious beliefs and convictions, it goes without saying that in doing so, their foremost
duty to obey the rule of law should not stand to suffer (Espejon v. Lorredo, A.M. No. MTJ-22-007, March 9,
2022).

(7) Atty. RK, a rich and sociable lawyer, loves to host parties for her friends. On multiple occasions, she
invited many government officials including members of the judiciary to hang out with her. Comment
on the propriety of the members of the judiciary who attend the parties and hang around with Atty. RK.
The members of the judiciary who attend and hang around her violate the provisions of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct. Their actions do not promote public confidence but erode the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary. Indeed, it may convey an impression that Atty. RK is in a special position to influence the members
of the judiciary in their judicial duties. Propriety and the appearance of propriety is essential to the performance
of all the activities of a judge (Canon 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct). Hence, judges shall avoid situations
which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal
relations with the individual members of the legal profession.

EQUALITY

(8) What is equality before the courts?

It essentially means that no party shall have undue advantage over the other (Arcega & Dechavez , Legal
Ethics (2020), pg. 577). Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due
performance of the judicial office (A.M No. 03-05-01-SC, Canon 5).

(9) How can a judge maintain equality of treatment?

1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising from various
sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital
status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes (A.M No. 03-05-01-SC, Canon
5, Sec. 1).
 30

2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice
towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds (A.M No. 03-05-01-SC, Canon 5, Sec. 2).
3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as the parties,
witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties (A.M No. 03-05-01-SC, Canon 5, Sec. 3).
4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence, direction or control to
differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge on any irrelevant ground (A.M No.
03-05-01-SC, Canon 5, Sec. 4).
5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by words or
conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in
proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy (A.M No. 03-05-01-SC, Canon 5, Sec. 5).

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

(10) What is the responsibility of every judge?

A member of the bench must continually keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments and
show acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules, and authoritative doctrines (Macalintal v. Teh, A.M. RTJ-
19-1375, October 16, 1997).

(11) What activities are judges prohibited to engage in?

A judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political
office or participate in other partisan political activities (Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 5.10).

C. Disqualification of Judicial Officers

COMPULSORY

(12) When is a judge subject to compulsory disqualification?

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity
or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has been presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record (Rules of Court, Rule 137, Sec. 1).

VOLUNTARY
(13) When can a judge voluntarily disqualify himself from sitting in a case?
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above (Rules of Court, Rule 137, Sec. 1).

D. Discipline and Administrative Jurisdiction Over Members of the

Judiciary
SUPREME COURT
Impeachment

(14) Where can complaints against the members of the Supreme Court be filed?
Complaints involving graft and corruption and violations of ethical standards against members of the Supreme
Court shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court and shall be consequently referred to its Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards. The said committee shall be responsible for preliminary investigating and
submitting its findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court en banc, in accordance with its own internal
rules (A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC).
 31

If the complaint is filed directly with the Judicial Integrity Board, the same shall be referred by the Judicial
Integrity Board to the Supreme Court as if it was originally filed before it, reckoned from the date the Supreme
Court receives the complaint.

(15) How can Impeachment proceedings be initiated against members of the Supreme Court?
By the filing and subsequent referral to the Committee on Justice of: a) a verified complaint for impeachment
filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or; b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof; or c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed
by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House (Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings).

(16) What is the procedure when sufficient grounds for Impeachment exist?
If the Committee on Justice finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment exist, the Committee shall conduct
a hearing. The Committee, through the Chairperson, may limit the period of examination and cross-
examination by members of the Committee. The Committee shall have the power to issue compulsory
processes for the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and other related evidence.
Hearings before the Committee shall be open to the public except when the security of the State or public
interest requires that the hearings be held in executive session. After the submission of evidence, the
Committee may require the submission of memoranda, after which the matter shall be submitted for resolution
(Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings).

LOWER COURT JUDGES AND JUSTICES

Sanctions Imposed by the Supreme Court on Erring Members of the Judiciary

(17) What is the basis of the Supreme Court’s authority to discipline justices and judges?
The 1987 Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have administrative function over all courts and
the personnel thereof (CONST., Art. VIII Sec. 6). The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon (CONST., Art. VIII Sec. 11).

(18) What is the remedy of an aggrieved party for an erroneous ruling or decision rendered by judges of
regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals?
A judge is not administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision rendered provided he acts
in good faith and without malice. The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is not an administrative charge
against the judge but an appeal or petition for review of his decision (Equatorial Realty Development Inc. v.
Anunciacion, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-91-562, Oct 16, 1997).

(19) What is the exception to the general rule that a judge is not administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision rendered provided he acts in good faith and without malice?
Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be visited on him only when the error is so gross, deliberate,
and malicious, or is committed with evident bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the standards
and norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or fixed and defined
by pertinent jurisprudence (In Re: Ongjoco, A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012).

(20) How are disciplinary proceedings against judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court
of Appeals and Sandiganbayan instituted?
Proceedings may be instituted, motu proprio, by either the Supreme Court with the Judicial Integrity Board, or
by the Judicial Integrity Board itself on the basis of records, documents; or newspaper or media reports; or
other papers duly referred or endorsed to it for appropriate action; or on account of any criminal action filed in,
or a judgment of conviction rendered by the Sandiganbayan or by regular or special courts. Disciplinary
proceedings can also be instituted with the Judicial Integrity Board by any interested person either by way of
verified complaint supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein
or by authentic documents which may substantiate the allegations; or by way of anonymous complaint,
provided, that its material averments may be readily verified and/or substantiated by competent evidence,
including public records (A.M No. 21-08-09-SC Sec. 1).

(21) What is the effect of death, retirement and separation from service of judiciary personnel to the
disciplinary proceedings?
Disciplinary proceedings may not be instituted against members of the judiciary who have already died, retired,
or otherwise separated from service. If such proceedings have been instituted notwithstanding the foregoing
 32

circumstances, the administrative case against said Member, official, or employee of the Judiciary shall be
dismissed. However once disciplinary proceedings have been instituted, the respondent supervening
retirement or separation from service shall not preclude or affect the continuation of the same, provided that
the supervening death of the respondent during the pendency of such proceedings shall result in the dismissal
of the administrative case against him or her (A.M No. 21-08-09-SC Sec. 2).

(22) Can the Supreme Court preventively suspend judges?

Yes. The court may motu proprio, or upon recommendation of the Judicial Integrity Board, may order the
preventive suspension of the respondent without pay and other monetary benefits for a period not exceeding
90 calendar days, unless earlier lifted or further suspended by the Supreme Court (A.M No. 21-08-09-SC Sec.
5).