Acknowledgements

UNICEF wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of

senior staff of the three water supply institutions of Libya,
namely, the MMRA, the GDC and the GCWW as well as those
of the four focus/IDP impacted municipalities (Benghazi,
Abu Saleem, Az-Zintaan and Tawergha) in granting access
and providing data and information on water supply
infrastructures as well as in facilitating meetings and field
visits to company sites/ infrastructures. Special thanks are
extended to all of them.
July-2019

Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors
and editors and do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of
UNICEF, nor of any particular Division or Office

Prepared by: AlKasaba Consulting, Technical Services and Training

ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS
GAWR General Authority for Water Resources
GDC General Desalination Company
GCWW General Company for Water and Wastewater
GECOL General Electricity Company of Libya
GWA General Water Authority
GPC General People’s Committee
GZZ Ghadames/ Zawia/ Zwara Man-made River System
HH Household
J/HS Jefara -Haswan System (Phase II of the MMRP)
LYD Libyan Dinar
MMRP Man-made River Project
MMRA Man-made River Project Execution and Management Authority
Mm
3
Million cubic meters
PCCP Pre-stressed Concrete Cylinder Pipe
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System
UNICEF United Nations Fund for Children
WHO World Health Organization
HFO Heavy Fuel Oil
HIB Housing and Infrastructures Board
IDP Internally Displaced Person
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IMO International Migration Organization
LFO Light Fuel Oil
LS Lump Sum
MoLG Ministry of Local Governance
MoP Ministry of Planning
MSF Multi-stage Flash Distillation
NDP National Development Program
NPWS National Program for Water and Sanitation
O & M Operation and Maintenance
RO Reverses Osmosis
SPC Supply per Capita
QA/QC Quality Assurance/Quality Control
TDS Total Dissolved Solids
TQO Training and Qualification Office
UFW Unaccounted for Water
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WDN Water Distribution Network
FOREWARD
LIBYA’S WATER SUPPLY INSTITUTIONS

The Assessment Project’s success was a result of the special assistance

and enthusiasm of the three water supply institutions ( MMRA,
GDC, GCWW) which are under the supervision of the GAWRs and
focus municipalities ( Benghazi , Abu Saleem /Tripoli , Azzintaan and
Tawurghaa) under the supervision of the Ministry of Local Governance.
As such, a new experience was made in cooperation between the
UNICEF, an international organization, AlKasaba, a national consultant,
and the management, staff, and field experts of these institutions and
municipalities. The experiences, expertise, and capacities of the GAWR,
MMRA, GDC, GCWW, and municipalities were demonstrated strongly
throughout the Projects phases. Common strengths and challenges
were identified making it clear that a national integrated management
of the sector and means to overcome its challenges is the base for
sustainable water supply for Libyans.
The investment / development plans prepared within this project should
be translated into a pipeline of projects to be implemented urgently
and within a short and medium term period but within a national plan
that considers the long term needs as well. Sustainability of water
supply can only be assured through implementing these plans with
the urgent plans being considered a national priority. The state of the
water supply infrastructures is poor in many places and time is critical
to keep it in a satisfactory level of operation.

Engineer Abdalla Taher Elsonni

Chairman of Administrative Council- General Authority of Water Resources

FOREWORD
UNICEF

Libya is considered one of the most water-scarce countries in the world,

with a renewable water amount of 108 m3 per person per year. The
internationally required minimum threshold is of 1000 m3 per person
per year. In comparison, in the region, Jordan is 165 m3, Egypt 827 m3,
Algeria 458 m3 and Tunisia 472m3. The country relies almost entirely
on groundwater, which represents 97% of the total volume of water
used for agricultural, industrial and domestic purposes.
Libya is also an arid sparsely populated urban country. Water demand
is considered highest along the 1000 km coastal strip where 87% of
population and most of the agricultural and industrial activities are
concentrated.
The Emergency Water Program of The United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) in Libya started in 2015 to respond to the emerging needs after
the 2011 crisis. Since then UNICEF has increasingly focused on water
scarcity and has recently developed a Country Programme Document
(2019-2020) with the government in accordance with identified needs
of children and women in Libya. In March this year, the first Water
and Sanitation Annual Work Plan-AWP was signed with governmental
counter part of General Authority for Water Resources(GAWR).
This outstanding partnership will advance and support the Libyan
institutions on achieving national priorities in the field of water and
sanitation.
Recognizing the importance of the water sector as the base to all of
Libya’s productive and social activities while also recognizing the
challenges this sector has been facing in the last few years, UNICEF
has made special efforts in Libya towards ensuring access to water
supply and sanitation services, with a focus on the most affected people
including children. These efforts have been undertaken in cooperation
and coordination with national stakeholders with generous funding
from partners.
As part of the agreement to bridge the data gap in the water sector,
UNICEF supported this assessment of Libya’s Water Supply Systems
and Institutions. The assessment was undertaken by the Libyan Firm
of al-Kasaba Consulting Engineers, with the participation of relevant
institutions under the overall leadership of the GAWR. The state of
water supply in four conflict affected municipalities which have a large
number of Internally Displaced Persons, namely Benghazi, Abu Saleem,
Zintan, and Tawergha was also assessed. The overall objective of the
assessment is to:
1 - Provide reliable and updated information on the status of the water
systems and institutions in Libya
2 - Provide immediate, medium and long-term investment and
development plans for these institutions and the four focus
municipalities.
This kind of assessment is a first in Libya. The findings of this project will
facilitate the development of a national database for the water supply
institutions. It will be key step towards strengthening the capacity of
the relevant stakeholders to plan and implement activities contributing
in enhancing the performance of water institutions. Ultimately, it will
help ensure sustainable access to an adequate quantity of safe water
to the over 7 million people living in Libya today, out of which around
40% of them are children.

Abdel-Rahman Ghandour
Special Representative- UNICEF Libya CO
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OFLIBYA’S WATER
SUPPLY INSTITUTIONS
INTRODUCTION
Domestic water is supplied to Libya’s cities by three institutions, namely, the Man-made
River Project Execution and Management Authority (MMRA), the General Desalination
Company (GDC) and the General Company for Water and Wastewater (GCWW). Water
sources include groundwater from well fields operated by the MMRA and others operated
by the GCWW and seawater desalinated by the GDC. Distribution of this water is undertaken
by the GCWW that purchases water from the MMRP and the GDC to supplement its own
supplies thus meeting the water demands of its residential, commercial and small industrial
users.

These water supply institutions have been providing water for a long period of time with
varying levels of success depending on many factors. Lately, they have been facing serious
challenges that limited considerably their abilities to meet their obligations regarding the
provision of water in ample quantities and of good quality.

Objectives and Scope of the Report

The overall objective of the assignment is to prepare a phased developed plan for restoration
of the drinking water supply services together with the corresponding investment plan in
focus areas in Libya with the detailed engineering documentation (i.e. bills of quantities,
technical specifications, etc) for the immediate phase of development. This shall be
achieved through assessing the condition of MMRP, GDC and GCWW water systems
through undertaking comprehensive assessment of the water supply systems. It will help
demystify and prioritize the technical gaps facing the sector. The specific objectives include:

•To assess the extent of damages to MMRP, GDC and GCWW water supply systems;
•To assess current network coverage rates with drinking water supply services;
production, consumptions, per capita shares, connection rates, etc.;
•To map human resources capacities, identify gaps and capacity strengthening needs;
•To provide specifications and bill of quantities of goods and services necessary to
continue operate, and/or rehabilitate the water supply systems for the immediate phase
of development;
•To prioritize the needs in four municipalities which are highly affected and populated
with IDPs (including Tripoli and Al-Jabal Al-Gharbi (Az-Zintaan)) and as per inception
report findings.

This report was prepared as the final deliverable of a UNICEF sponsored Project for the
Assessment of Water Supply Institutions in Libya. The ultimate objective of this Project was
to assess the water systems status and the institutional (legal, administrative/ organizational,
financial, human and technical) capacities of the three water supply institutions (MMRA, GDC,
and GCWW) and identify gaps, and consequently, propose investment and development
plans for sustainable water supply services. A secondary objective – complimentary to the
assessment of the GCWW - was the assessment of the state of water supply systems in four
focus/ IDPs impacted municipalities, namely, Benghazi, Abu Saleem in Tripoli, Az-Zintaan
and Tawergha.
The specific objectives of the Project were as follows:
• To assess the extent of damages to the MMRP, GDC and GCWW water supply
systems;

1
• To assess current network coverage rates with drinking water supply services,
production, consumptions, per capita shares, connection rates, etc.;
• To map human resources capacities, identify gaps and capacity strengthening
needs;
• To provide specifications and bills of quantities of goods and services necessary
to continue to operate, and/or rehabilitate the water supply systems for the
immediate phase of development;
• To prioritize the needs in four municipalities which are highly affected and
populated with IDPs.

The scope of work of this report consisted of three interdependent parts: 1) Assessment
of the water systems and institutional capacities of the MMRP, GDC and GCWW and
identification of gaps and challenges impacting its performance, 2) Identification of the
situation and needs to fill the gaps and overcome the challenges and 3) Preparation of
corresponding urgent, short and medium-term investment/ development plans.
The scope for the assessment of the state of water supply systems in the focus/IDP impacted
municipalities included sources, uses, infrastructures supplying water to the municipalities
as well as those supplying IDP camps.

Implementation Methodology
The report’s scope was implemented in phases, each consisting of several activities, as
follows:

Data Collection
Data and information on the MMRP, GDC and GCWW institutional, financial, technical, and
human capacities were collected from several sources including:
• Literature surveys and reviews of studies, articles, reports, plans and programs
prepared on the MMRP, GDC and GCWW;
• Reports on water supply and quality data prepared by the MMRA, GDC and GCWW;
• Meetings, communications and interviews with senior MMRA, GDC and GCWW
staff;
• Comprehensive baseline questionnaires filled by the MMRA, GDC and GCWW
branches;
• Media coverage and the official websites of the MMRA, GDC and GCWW;
• Field visits to the MMRA, GDC and GCWW’s headquarters;
• Field visits to MMRA, GDC and GCWW facilities /infrastructures (well fields, water
storage reservoirs along with pumping stations and control facilities, water quality
testing laboratories, information centers, etc.);
• Field visits to the four focus /IDP impacted municipalities (Benghazi, Abu Saleem,
Az-Zintaan and Tawergha).

Cost Estimates for Investment / Development Plans

Cost data utilized for preparation of bills of quantities (BOQs) for the urgent investment/
development plan for the MMRA, GDC, GCWW, and focus/ IDP municipalities were solicited
from several sources including the following:

• Recent offers, previous and present contracts;

• Suppliers of equipment and materials (pipes, pumps, valves, chemicals, etc.)
• Experts’ estimates;
2
• Local markets surveys.

Data Analysis and Validation of Results

The data collected were compiled, synthesized and analyzed for identification of the baseline
state of the MMRA, GDC, GCWW and focus/ IPD municipalities; assessment of its legal,
administrative/ organizational, financial, technical and human capacities; identification
of key findings, major challenges, and, accordingly, preparation of recommendations.
Subsequently, urgent, short and medium term investment/ development plans were
prepared.
The Assessment results were presented in special workshops held at the GCWW’s
headquarters in Tripoli and attended by concerned staff for review and validation. The
feedback from this workshop was documented and incorporated to produce the final
“officially approved” assessment report.
Significance of the Report
This baseline, assessment and needs report of the MMRA, GDC and GCWW along with
the four municipalities (Benghazi, Abu Saleem, Az-Zintaan and Tawergha) is the first
comprehensive report on the different aspects of this major water supply institution. It was
prepared by AlKasaba Consultants under the sponsorship of the UNICEF and combines the
results of efforts and contributions of many specialists including those of the water supply
institutions. The report forms a database that has been validated by the institutions and
municipalities experts making it a national water sector institutional reference. Although it
is a reliable and comprehensive document, there remains a large room for completeness,
improvement and continuous updating. Moreover, it should be subjected to further scrutiny
to improve the accuracy of the data presented and fill the data gaps that may exist within
the report.

Report Contents
Accordingly, the report contents were presented as follows:

Part TITLE/ INSTITUTION /MUNICIPALITY

I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (INTRODUCTION, MMRA, GDC, GCWW, Municipality of

Benghazi, Municipality of Abu Saleem, Municipality of Az-Zintaan, City of Tawer-
gha)

II MMRP REPORT

III GDC REPORT

IV GCWW REPORT

V MUNCIPALITIES REPORT

1. Municipality of Benghazi Report

2. Municipality of Abu Saleem Report

3. Municipality of Az-Zintaan Report

4. City of Tawergha Report

3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OF THE
MAN-MADE RIVER PROJECT
EXECUTION AND MANAGEMENT
AUTHORITY (MMRA), LIBYA

4
1.1 INTRODUCTION

The Man-made River Project (MMRP) is presently the major supplier of water for domestic
and agricultural purposes in Libya. Domestic water is provided through turnouts and tanks
connected to distribution networks belonging to the General Company for Water and
Wastewater (GCWW). The MMRP is managed by the MMRP Execution and Management
Authority (MMRA) headquartered in Libya’s second largest city, Benghazi.

The MMRA was established in 1983 with the ultimate objective of delivering water from
Libya’s southern regions where it is available in large quantities to the water short coastal
regions where demand is concentrated. To this end, the MMRA undertook planning,
designing and execution of the MMRP as well as operation and maintenance of the
completed phases of the project. To its credit, the MMRA has completed the major phases
of the MMRP - the world’s largest civil engineering project – and prides itself in supplying
water to almost 4 million end-users in over 90 cities throughout Libya.

The ultimate objective of this Project was to assess the legal, administrative/ organizational,
financial, human and technical capacities of the MMRA and identify gaps, and consequently,
propose investment and development plans for sustainable water supply. A secondary
objective was to provide a database on the state of the MMRP situation, infrastructures, its
evolution and practices as well as identify lessons learned and experiences gained.

1.2 KEY FINDINGS

1.2.1 Legal Framework
The MMRA’s establishment and mandate were specified in Law No. 11/1983. Its mandate
included planning, designing implementing, operation and maintenance of the MMRP
along with capacity building of its employees. Accordingly, the MMRA was established as
an administratively and financially independent public entity. Presently, the MMRA is under
the supervision of the General Authority for Water Resources (GAWR). The strong legal
basis granted the MMRA a leading position in providing Libyans with water for municipal,
agricultural and industrial uses.

1.2.2 Administrative/ Organizational Framework

The MMRA is headquartered in Benghazi. It has an approved extensive organizational
structure. The MMRP’s different phases are managed as three semi-independent branches
headquartered in Benghazi (Phases I) and Ben Ghashir near Tripoli (Phases II and IV).
The MMRA is managed by an administrative committee consisting of 5 full-time members.
The organizational structure of the MMRA – last updated in 2018 - consists of three centers,
six offices, five general administrations, and four branches for each of the project’s
completed phases. A career staff guide was prepared. Training, salaries, health, safety and
environment guides also exist. Separate organizational structures exist for Phases I-III.
Data/ Information Availability and Management
Information and data are given special consideration as is reflected by the inclusion of
dedicated Information and Documentation Center, Data Studies and Research Center, and an
Information Technology Department within the organizational structure of the MMRA. The
inclusion of a training center satisfies the needs of these information units for qualification
of their potential employees.

5
A central network links the MMRA’s units into an electronic archiving system. Accordingly,
all work activities are digitized; technical, financial and administrative reports are prepared
regularly and upon request based on data stored/ accessed from different units. There
are over 25 million documents. Backup storage ensures that data and information are
available in a sustainable way. Luckily, the MMRA’s archives were not touched during the
armed conflict takeover of the MMRP headquarters by vandalists, looter and outlaws on
15th October 2014.

FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE MMRA

To ensure funding is available amply and continuously for implementation and Operation
and Maintenance (O& M) of the MMRP, several laws were enacted in addition to law No.
10/1983; these laws are: Law No. 5/1986, Law No. 19/1991, Law No. 21/1423 and Law No.
18/1425. According to these laws, the MMRA was to be financed from several sources
including: 1) The General National Budget, 2) Loans, 3) Water sales tariffs, 4) Revenues
from projects or facilities/utilities executed by the MMRA, 5) Fixed and non-fixed (mobile)
assets belonging to the MMRA, 6) Donations and gifts, and 7) Taxes on tobacco products,
fuel, money transfers, tickets and license renewals.
Revenues were good under normal conditions. For the last few years, the financial resources
have declined significantly, however, for reasons that are beyond the MMRA’s control; these
reasons were as follows:
• The tariffs allocated to the MMRA from letters of credit opened by the Central Bank
of Libya in hard currency have not been transferred to the MMRA since 2011;
• The revenues from water “Sales” to the GCWW and farming projects have not been
paid since 2011;
• The decline in revenues from other sources such as tobacco and oil products due to
decrease in imports caused by lower oil production and prices;
Accordingly, the total revenues for the years 2015-2017 were only LYD 141, 150 and 150
million, respectively, with no revenues in hard currency during this period. These revenues
are only about one fifth of the revenues of 2010 and previous years.

Expenditures of the MMRA

Large amounts of local and hard currencies are expended annually on management,
construction and O & M of the MMRP. Expenditures for the years 2015-2017 totaled LYD
134, 144 and 171 million, respectively.

Revenues, Expenditures and Financial Constraints

Running costs of the MMRP accounted for about half of the expenditures with investment
costs accounting for almost one quarter, and O & M accounting for one eighth. No
expenditure was made on training. A small deficit existed for the last three years.

Production Costs and Supply Tariffs of the MMRP Water

The estimated MMRP water production cost for the period 2005-2008 averaged LYD 0.44 /
m3 (0.32 USD/m³), with operational and capital costs averaging LYD 0.336 /m3 (0.24 USD/
m³) and LYD 0.106 /m3 (0.08 USD/m³), respectively. These costs reflect under exploitation
of the MMRP infrastructures with actual flows reaching only about one third of the design
capacity;
The MMRP water supply tariffs for agricultural, urban and industrial uses were LYD 0.048,

6
0.080 and 0.796/m³, respectively.
The large disparity between water production costs and tariffs contributes to the financial
deficits faced by the MMRA.
Faced with increasing financial deficits, the MMRA has been unable to:
• Import necessary spare parts and materials needed for basic and urgent maintenance
operations;
• Continue with the implementation of major works such as the Ghadames/Zawia/Zwara
System and Kufra/Sarir Pipeline, reconstruction of damaged pipeline manufacturing
plant, fuel tanks, destroyed wells and to start the Ajdabia-Tobruk Conveyance System.

1.2.4 Human Resources

The MMRA conducts its functions through a workforce of 2472 persons with 70% occupying
technical positions as dictated by the nature of the MMRP. Administrative staff form27%,
with financial and legal staff forming 2.5 and 0.5%, respectively. The majority of MMRP
staff are employed at the headquarters and at the SS/BT system (33 and 32%, respectively);
the J/H System employs 27% of the total employees. These numbers, qualifications and
their geographic distribution appear to be appropriate as demonstrated by the MMRP’s
high level performance over its operational life.
Changes in the project’s functions from mainly construction to O & M will imply a shift in
the nature and size of the human resources. It is expected that this shift will be absorbed
readily through the existing work force.

1.2.5 Technical Capacities

The MMRP is mainly a technical project. Its design, construction and O & M employed
unique analysis, tools, utilities, equipment as well as astronomical quantities of pipe
manufacturing and fill materials. Pipe lifting cranes and transporting trucks were made
especially for the MMRP. Expectedly, the dimensions and size of its components were
very large and non-existent prior to and during the MMRP inception period. Prestressed
Concrete Cylinder Pipes (PCCPs) were 4 m in diameter and 7.5 m long.

MMRP Infrastructures
The major infrastructural components of the MMR Project are:
• Well fields with a total of 1121 wells, over 1300 km of well field collector pipe work and
well field balancing/header tanks;
• Pipelines totaling more than 4000 km;
• A total of 16 pumping stations and flow control stations;
• Regulating, pressure breaking and surge protection tanks;
• Many major balancing reservoirs with a total storage capacity exceeding 56.5 million
cubic meters;
• A total of 168 turnouts and feeding points;
• Water treatment plants;
• Haul roads totaling 3755 km in length;
• A total of 10 operations support and maintenance (O S & M) facilities;
• Two PCCP manufacturing plants (Brega and Sarir);
• Chlorination plants at Talhyia and Sidi AsSayeh Reservoirs;
• Power supply, transmission and distribution systems;
• Sarir Power Generation Station;
• Communication and control systems.

7
State of the MMRP Infrastructures
The MMRP infrastructures have been installed during the period 1990-2010. Prior to 2014,
these infrastructures were in a good condition having been designed and executed recently
to high quality standards, well operated and maintained thanks to availability of human and
financial resources, and escaping man-caused damage thanks to the tight security granted
to the MMRP. All imported equipment were new; some were manufactured specially made
for the MMRP;
Presently, reservoirs, tanks and buried pipes of the water supply lines are still in good
condition with the exception of those suffering illegal connections.
The state of some of the MMRP components declined after 2014, however, due to serious
damages sustained as a result of the armed conflict, lack of security, lawlessness as well
as economic, political and institutional instabilities. Examples of these damages are listed
below:

• Destruction of the PCCP factory in Brega;

• Destruction of fuel tanks of Sarir Power Station;
• Destruction of 96 wells in the J/ HS (Phase II);
• Destruction of numerous control chambers to make illegal connections.
Additionally, these infrastructures in general have been subject to accelerated deterioration
due to the lack of spare parts, consumables and lack of maintenance because of financial
constraints which appear to be long lasting.

1.2.6 Quality and Availability of the MMRP Waters

Quality of MMRP Waters

Phase I waters are withdrawn presently from Tazerboo and Sarir well fields. The water
quality of the Tazerbo and Sarir differ in some indicators; however, both waters as well as
the blended water meet the WHO and Libyan Drinking Water Standards.
Water quality of most Phase II wells is within the WHO and Libyan Drinking Water Standards
limits. However, partial treatment for the reduction of nitrates and chlorides will be needed
when the flowrate exceeds 1.454 Mm3/d;
Finally, the waters of Ghadames basin have high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide
rendering them corrosive to PCCPs. These waters are treated centrally;
Waters from the MMRP are disinfected using chlorine gas prior to transmission to the
GCWW balancing reservoirs. In the city of Benghazi, MMRP water is chlorinated at AtTalyia
reservoir. Similarly, Phase II water is disinfected at Sidi AsSayeh reservoir, Ain Zara and
Airport Reservoirs.

Availability and Reliability of MMRP Waters

Sources of water for the MMRP are reliable and sustainable as the volumes of water
available are very large and the water table declines at the source well fields were less than
predicted;
The quantities of water supplied increased gradually since the arrival of “first waters” from
Phases I and II in 1989 and 1996, respectively. In 2017, the total quantity supplied was 608.56
Mm3. Today, the MMRP water is supplied to over 4 million Libyans. The MMRA continues
to operate satisfactorily despite the multitude of threats it has been facing;
The amount of water conveyed by the completed phases of the MMRP is only half of their
design capacity;
The exact quantities of water supplied by the MMRP to its different end-users are not
known because they are not metered in many instances. Knowledge of such quantities is
8
essential for billing, computing of consumption rates and their temporal variations and for
the estimation of leakage and UFWs;
The MMRP groundwater basins are subject to human induced pollution and oil production
activities particularly produced water leakage;
Continuity and quantity supplied declined since 2014 because of frequent power shortages,
but mainly because of threats to the lives of MMRA staff, destruction and damages to the
projects infrastructural components caused by the armed conflict and lack of security. Such
threats, damages and destruction resulted in many complete closures of the MMRP water
supply systems with severe “prolonged water shortages”.
The MMRP has been operational for almost 25 years. It succeeded in addressing Libya’s
water gap thus achieving its objectives and demonstrating its technical and socio-economic
feasibility with no documented adverse environmental impacts. Maintenance of most of its
infrastructure is necessary requiring financial resources and time. The experience gained
and data compiled from construction, O & M of the MMRP contains many valuable lessons
to learn from.
The project can satisfy Libya’s domestic water needs for many decades to come if domestic
wastewaters are reused for agriculture, an obligation that should also be made a national
priority.
There appears to be no set basis for allocating the MMRP waters to the different users;
Tariffs for MMRP waters are quite low relative to production costs. Because they are less than
production costs, the difference is subsidized by the government. Such subsidies encourage
water use inefficiency (wastage) by users and financial inefficiency of institutions that will
not be enticed to reduce production costs. This is especially the case for agricultural uses
which account for most water uses.
The MMRP activities have shifted from construction to operation; while construction was
conducted mostly by non-Libyans, operation is conducted solely by Libyans. Such shifts
require a change in the nature and numbers of staff.

Threats and Damages to the MMRP

Staff, infrastructures and sites of the MMRP have been subject to serious threats caused
by armed conflict, lack of security and lawlessness. The threats included deaths, injuries,
kidnappings and forcing workers to leave worksites. Damages to property and infrastructures
included:
• Destruction of vital infrastructural components (wells, valve/ control chambers, vehicles,
workshops, premises);
• Serious damages to the cathodic protection and communications systems;
• Interruption of execution of on-going or planned projects due to the departure of
expatriate contractors and consultants as well as the destruction of pipe manufacturing
plants;
• Companies engaged in works with the MMREMA are suing the MMRA for failing to
make payments on services rendered.
The impacts ranged from minor to very severe causing total cuts of water supply for long
periods of time, losses of large quantities of water and associated revenues, in addition to
large costs of replacement, renovation and major maintenance works. Additionally, work
on on-going projects or planned ones has been interrupted due to departure of expatriate
contractors and consultants;
The intensity of the impacts is increased by the frequent power shortages;
If not addressed properly and immediately, these threats and damages could lead to
the complete failure of the MMRP with serious socio-economic consequences as no
viable supply source is available presently.
The MMRP is poorly appreciated if not misunderstood by most Libyans.
9
Costs of Conflict-caused Damages to the MMRP

The conflict-caused damages to the MMRP resulted in huge direct and indirect financial
losses; revenues from sales of water during shut downs or illegal connections are an
example of direct losses. Examples of indirect losses include replacement, repair and
reconstruction of damaged equipment, facilities, etc.
An exact calculation of the losses sustained by the MMRP has not been made, but they
are very large by any account. The total direct and indirect costs of damages to the
MMRP are estimated to reach USD 500 million.
These costs must be added the costs of lost work days, losses in water revenues,
costs of repairs of damages and replacement of parts, as well as the premature aging
of the infrastructures due to improper or lack of timely maintenance to the MMRP
components.

1.3 CHALLENGES
The damages sustained by the MMRP are due to serious challenges that are beyond
the MMRA’s mandate and capacities; the major challenges are as follows:
• Armed conflict, lack of security and weak - if not non-existent - law enforcement;
• Declining financial resources including hard currency and difficulty to open
letters of credit;
• Electric power interruptions and fuel shortages;
• The nature, size and function of the MMRP infrastructures’ components that
operate sequentially – in series - with a destruction in one component causing a
stoppage of service in all components downstream of it;
• The distribution of the MMRP infrastructures is located over large, remote and
non-inhabited areas, distributed over the whole country making them difficult to
protect;
• Difficulty to replace or procure destroyed components because they are unique
and cannot be bought off-the-shelf and must be specially manufactured;
• Inability to collect revenues for waters supplied for domestic and agricultural
uses;
• Potential corrosion of PCCPs especially in light of the damages to the cathodic
protects systems and stealing of its components;
• Unavailability of technical assistance due to departure of expatriates since 2011.

1.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
Immediate remedial measures to damages through the following actions:
• Provision of full protection of the MMRP infrastructures by a special force that
is part of the national security force as the MMRP is a national security priority.
• Treating acts by any person/entity which may cause damages to MMRP
components as treason and war crime;
• Enforcement of the MMRP funding laws and decrees;
Exempting the MMRA from the exchange rate increase as it is a public institution
“legally exempted” from such acts;
Replacement, maintenance and reconstruction of damaged MMRP infrastructures;
Expediting of opening letters of credit by the Central Bank of Libya for importing spare
parts and materials needed for O & M of the MMRP;
Reconsideration of the payment mechanism by the GCWW for the water supplied by
the MMRP in such a way that the supplied water revenues are transferred regularly
and fully;
10
Water service provisions subsidies should be reconsidered with the objective of
reducing water consumption and production costs;
Flow measuring devices must be used regularly with records utilized for billing and
other applications;
The basis for allocation of the MMRP water should be reconsidered within a national
integrated water resources strategy; priority should be given to domestic water supplies
and to full utilization of the MMRP systems to minimize costs;
Assessment of the effectiveness of the existing MMRA regulations to identify gaps and
update the legal framework including enforcement of the funding laws, tariffs values
and payment mechanisms by the GCWW and water supply allocations;
Preparation of a special emergency preparedness plan to counter major failure of the
MMRP system and provision of resources needed for implementation of this plan;
Management of water demand and effective use of MMRP waters by the different users
to decrease the water provision cost and ensure the project’s sustainability;
To optimize MMRP water use, end-users should execute the receiving/ distribution
infrastructures by the time the MMRP waters reach these infrastructures;
Continued search, for water sources that supplement the MMRP, is warranted to
overcome complete MMRP system shutdowns for extended periods of time;
Exploration of possibilities for reuse of wastewater for agricultural purposes should
be given a priority to free good quality MMRP waters for municipal and industrial
uses. This way, irrigation water is utilized for replenishing depleted coastal aquifers
and more revenues are made from municipal and industrial users because their tariffs
are notably higher. This practice will ensure the financial sustainability of the MMRP;
Raising awareness about the MMRP in general, its feasibility, its components, etc. so
that both lawpersons and decision makers appreciate the project’s significance in the
sustainability of Libya’s socio-economic development;
Raising awareness towards protection of the MMRP infrastructures and conserving its
waters as the resources are finite – although huge – and the costs are considerable;
moreover, for the near future, the MMRP continues to be Libya’s only viable domestic
water supply source;
Considering the size of investment made by all Libyans and the significance of the
project’s role as Libya’s most viable water supply institution, sustenance and protection
of the project must be given highest national priority.

1.5 URGENT INVESTMENT/

DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE MMRA

Needs of the MMR to continue operating successfully were assessed through

background data, baseline surveys, field visits, meetings and interviews. Criteria were
developed to classify these needs as urgent, short-term and medium-long term. The
primary criterion was the need for the activity, action, service to avoid or prevent
adverse health impacts to end-users or to guarantee the continuity of water supply,
which is a basic human need and right. Provision of funds is another criterion as less
costly items are more likely to be implemented in a short time. Finally, the nature of
the activity and, hence, the amount of time needed to implement it; some works and
activities require a short execution time while others require long times.

1.5.1 Urgent (6-12 months) Investment/

Development Plan for the MMRA
The urgent investment/ development plan for the MMRA is comprised of procurement/
supply, maintenance and construction activities. Most of these activities rely on
11
components that must be imported. The costs of these activities range from USD
100,000 to 60,000,000;
The total amount required to implement this plan was estimated to be USD 117.73million.
Most of this amount is needed for rehabilitation/ renovation of destroyed wells of the
H/JS and provision of protection to MMRP infrastructures. Completion of Benghazi
Water Supply System is also a prominent cost item.

Annex 2.2 Bill of Quantities and Activities for Urgent (6-12 months) Development/
Investment Plan for the MMRA

No. Item Description Unit Quantity Unit Price, $ Subtotal Price ,$

Maintenance and rehabilitation of 100 dam-

aged wells including Supply of electrical
1 transformers 0.4/3.3/33 for well heads, well No. 100 600,000 60,000,000
heads valves, flow meters and pumps for
Al-Hasawneh WellField

Provide electronic monitoring devices for

2 the sites of MMRP (well fields, pumping No. 150 20,000 3,000,000
station, electrical substations)

Rehabilitate cathodic protection systems 16,000,000 16,000,000

3 LS 1
for phases I and II of the MMRP

Provide chemicals, maintenance and cali-

4 bration of laboratory equipment and for LS. 1 500,000 500,000
water quality analysis

Supply and installation of 2.5 megawatt

trailer diesel electrical generators for wells,
5 No. 20 250,000 5,000,000
as a backup source of power at the main
power grid

Supply and installation of HR personnel 150,000 150,000

software for the Jefara -Haswan System
6 No. 1

Maintenance and rehabilitation of pumps 50,000 700,000

7 No. 14
of 14 wells in the Sarir Field

Maintenance and rehabilitation of pumps 50,000 500,000

8 No. 10
of 10 wells for Tazerboo Field

Replace of the chlorination plant in Tulai-

9 No. 1 100,000 100,000
heyia

12
 Activation/ Upgrading of the communi-
10 cations systems in the MMRP (wireless LS 1 280,000 280,000
nodes)

Construction of 120,000 m3 ground water

11 No. 1 11,500,000 6,000,000
storage concrete tank at Al-Hawari site

Supply and installation of isolation valves

12 chamber nodes 3 and 4 in Benghazi MMR No. 10 200,000 2,000,000
Water Supply System

Provide protection requirements of well

fields and facilities from outlaws/ terrorists
13 LS LS 12,000,00 12,000,000
in consultation and cooperation) with con-
cerned national authorities

Total (One hundred and seventeen million, seven hundred and thirty thousand) US
117,730,000
dollars

1.5.2 Short-term Development Plans

Short-term development plans consist of the following:

• Completion of the remaining projects in phases to reach the production targets
• Maintenance and rehabilitation of damaged operation and maintenance support
centers (Ajdabiya and Sirt)
• Implementation of a control system at the subsidiary Benghazi Pumping Station
• Replacement and maintenance of substation feeders (11KV) in a Slough Pump
Station
• Development of Tazerboo power stations
• Detection of seepage works and maintenance of Ajdabiya Water Storage Tank
• Connecting the optical fiber link between Slough and Ajdabia
• Supply and installation of a system of energy sources.
• Detection works on the engines of pumps in Slough Pumping Station
• Construction of 10 water irrigation tanks in the regions
• Removal of illegal connections, obstacles and remnants of armed conflict.
• Development of training programs for operational and maintenance staff.
The costs for implementing the short-term investment/ development plan could not be
estimated as they need to be based on relatively accurate data which are difficult to source
presently because contractors are not available for such activities due to insecurity problems.
They exceed USD 3 billion. Such an amount is clearly beyond the present capacities of the
MMRA.

1.5.3 Medium-Longer Term Development Plan

The medium-term plan fall generally within the MMRA strategic plans. They include the
following activities:
• Organization of training workshops for the maintenance of valves sites systems.
• Follow-up to the emergency plan approved by the authorized department.
• Follow-up service facilities maintenance of Sarir Pipe Factory.
• Develop strategic plans for the MMRP next period.
13
• Completion of remaining phases (short term portion).
The costs for implementing the medium-term investment/ development plan could not
be estimated as they need to be based on relatively accurate data which are difficult to
source presently because contractors are not available for such activities due to insecurity
problems. They approach USD 2 billion. Such an amount is clearly beyond the present
capacities of the MMRA.

14
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERAL
DESALINATION COMPANY (GDC),
LIBYA

15
2.1 INTRODUCTION
About 80%of Libya’s population live within 100 kilometers from the Mediterranean Sea
coastline. The water scarcity problems in some coastal towns were solved by desalination
as it was the only source of water supply available.

The General Company for Desalination (GDC) is presently the major supplier of desalinated
water for domestic uses. Desalinated water is provided through eight desalination plants
connected to distribution networks operated by the General Company for Water and
Wastewater (GCWW). The GDC manages these plants centrally.

The GDC was established in 2007 with the ultimate objective of providing desalinated water
for Libya’s coastal cities where no viable water supply alternatives exist (1). To this end,
the GDC undertakes management, execution, operation and maintenance of desalination
plants as well as proposing desalination strategies and standards.

The objective of this report was to assess the legal, administrative/ organizational, financial,
human and technical capacities of the GDC and to identify gaps and challenges affecting
its performance. The findings of this assessment were used to draw urgent, short and
medium-longer term investment and development plans for sustainable production of
desalinated water by the GDC.

2.2 KEY FINDINGS, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The GDC succeeded in supplying some of Libya’s coastal communities with desalinated
water for over 10 years thus demonstrating its ability to provide desalinated water and build
national capacities for desalination applications. The plants of the GDC employ the latest
desalination technologies and the best practices to supply water reliably, thus contributing
towards the improvement and general well-being of a large fraction of Libya’s population.
In so doing, the GDC faced serious challenges which continue to affect its performance
markedly.

This report provided an assessment of the GDC’s administrative, financial, human and
technical capacities based on desk studies, field surveys and visits, meetings and discussions
with senior GDC staff and desalination plant management among other data sources. Key
findings of this assessment, challenges and recommendations are provided below.

2.2.1 Key Findings

1. The GDC was established in 2007 to operate and maintain a total of eight desalination
plants along Libya’s coastline; these plants are planned to supply about 134 communities
along or near the coastal line, most of them having no alternative water supply sources;
2. The total installed capacity of these plants is 350,000 m3/day, a quantity that is sufficient
to satisfy the needs of about 1.4million persons or about one fourth of Libya’s population;
3. The quantity of water supplied declined notably in the last few years due to numerous
problems the GDC has been facing; the total quantity of water produced in 2017 averaged
only about 98,000 m3/d, implying a production efficiency of only 28%. Stated differently,
the served population had access to desalinated water only 28% of the time. The rest of
the “interrupted supply time”, they had to fetch it from other “more expensive private”
sources;
4. The organizational structures of the GDC seem to have been adequate as demonstrated
by the database, experience and performance under unfavorable conditions. With the
16
 passage of over a decade of operating desalination plants, a good database, knowledge
and experience in managing and operating desalination plants have been established
locally;
5. Some of the GDC’s plants have been operational for over two decades; these plants
have become obsolete; other “newer” plants are also in different stages of deterioration
due to operation and maintenance problems;
6. The GDC conducts its functions through a workforce of 847 persons with over 66%
technical professionals. The majority of this staff is employed at the desalination plants.
The GDC’s past experience demonstrates the adequacy of the numbers and capabilities
of its staff and the effectiveness of the training and human resources programs utilized;
7. Information and data are given special consideration as is reflected by the reliance on
daily reporting, monitoring and analysis;
8. According to the GDC data, operation costs declined from LYD 76.8 million in 2015
to LYD 52.6 million in 2017 with an average unit O & M cost of LYD 1.07 to 0.73 /m3
produced, respectively.
9. The depreciation costs of the desalination plants are reported by the GDC to average
LYD 34.8 million /year for the years 2015-2017. Taking depreciation costs into account,
the cost of production will be LYD 1.556, 1.496, and 2.097 /m3 for the years 2015, 2016,
and 2017, respectively.
10. Clearly, this cost is high due to under production. Secondly, while the operation cost
alone almost equals the water sales price, the total cost of production exceeds twice the
water price (tariff).
11. Desalinated waters are sold to the GCWW at a fee that is the cause of disagreement
between the GDC and the GCWW. Moreover, the amount paid is much less than due. As
a result, the GDC has been facing serious financial problems;
12. Electric power outages contributed to interruptions in desalinated water supply. They
caused 1.8 to 63.5% of desalination plant shutdowns; these outages cause losses in
productivity and accelerate deterioration to desalination equipment;
13. Energy cost plays a major role within the cost of desalinated waters; the highest cost
is light fuel oil (LFO) and the lowest one is natural gas. The relative difference between
these costs can be very large (LFO is 17 times larger than natural gas). Only Zliten
Desalination Plant is presently using natural gas; Zawia Desalination Plant is connected
to the gas supply line but can’t use gas for technical causes that can be overcome readily.
Zwara Desalination Plant is on its way to connect to the gas line soon. Other plants can’t
use natural gas because of its unavailability in their locations;
14. Utilization of desalination plants water is restricted at times by the absence of
complimentary infrastructures delivering water from the desalination plants to the end
users (storage reservoirs, transmission lines, pumping stations, etc.). Construction of
these infrastructures is the responsibility of the HIB;
15. The desalination technology is poorly appreciated if not misunderstood by most
Libyans; while some believe it is the only solution to Libya’s water scarcity problems,
many others think it is an over expensive and less reliable source of water compared to
existing alternatives, particularly the MMRP.

2.2.2 Major Challenges

The GDC has succeeded in supplying water continuously throughout the past ten years.
This task is becoming ever more difficult to achieve, however, due to a number of serious
challenges facing the GDC especially during the last few years. The main challenges are
listed below:

1. The GDC infrastructures consist of components that are numerous, different in nature,
17
 size and function. They operate under severe conditions (high temperature, salinity,
corrosivity, etc.). Their operation and maintenance are financially, technically and
administratively demanding. Moreover, they are not readily available locally and their
procurement requires time and hard currency;
2. Many of the infrastructural components of the GDC desalination plants are aging and
in a poor condition due to operation and maintenance problems requiring replacement,
renovation and major overhauls. The GDC is unable to address these requirements due
to serious financial constraints;
3. Lack of complimentary infrastructures to deliver desalinated water limits these plants
utilization. There is presently no direct coordination between the HIB, the GDC and the
GCWW;
4. Lack of funds has stood in the way of proper operation, maintenance and execution of
many contracts for construction and overhaul works. This problem is compounded by
the GDC’s inability to open letters of credit for importing spare parts and chemicals by
the rising prices of locally procured materials/ spares;
5. Five of the eight desalination plants cannot utilize natural gas as a source of energy
because it is not available at their locations; they are forced to use light fuel oil (LFO) or
heavy fuel oil (HFO); the first is expensive and the latter has adverse effects on equipment
and the environment. Moreover, the use of these types of fuel especially the LFO raises
the cost of desalinated water markedly;
6. The value of the desalinated water tariff is low; the fee does not cover the total water
desalination costs. Moreover, the GCWW falls short of paying its dues in time and
value. The present arrangement has caused the GDC serious problems that threaten its
existence.
7. Illegal connections draw large amounts of water causing technical problems and losses
of badly needed revenues. Control of such actions is difficult and beyond the capabilities
of the GDC;
8. Electric power outages and fuel shortages caused significant desalination plant
shutdowns in some plants (Zliten);
9. Security problems have forced expatriate contractors, consultants and service providers
to leave Libya, thus leaving major project and activities unfinished.

2.2.3 Recommendations
Based on the key findings and conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

1. The GDC’s financial challenges should be addressed immediately through strong

legislation and contracting agreements that oblige the end-users or the state to pay
for the quantities of desalinated water used/sold. Experience in this regard from other
countries relying heavily on seawater desalination should be utilized.
2. Zawia and Zwara Desalination Plants should be connected as soon as possible to the
natural gas supply line so that the use of LFO or HFO is discontinued; this practice
reduces the cost of desalinated water and minimized the environmental impacts of
desalination;
3. The causes for frequent and extended interruptions of desalination plants must be
addressed fully and immediately to increase productivity from its very low levels (28%)
which result in high water production costs;
4. The high cost of water desalination exceeds that of the sales price necessitating
additional sources of funding or a rise in the price;
5. The administrative, technical, financial and experience gained by the GDC over the last
decade should be assessed with the objective of upgrading the organizational structure
to enable it to respond to continuous technical, socioeconomic and legal changes and

18
 to shift its functions from solely operating desalination plants to planning, designing
and executing them according to local conditions, constraints and governing factors;
6. The experience of the human resources employed in the GDC and its desalination
plants is invaluable and must be preserved, enforced and expanded by continuous
development of human resources;
7. Major overhaul operations are needed immediately for the newer desalination
plants while the older ones must be replaced completely. Existing contracts must be
operationalized to realize this objective;
8. Power outages and fuel shortages need to be addressed seriously to put an end to
desalination plant shutdowns and equipment damages and fatigue. Such a task must be
coordinated with the GECOL and the Brega Petroleum Marketing company;
9. The information technology division in the GDC needs to be upgraded and equipped to
cope with the amount of data generated and with the advancements in the desalination
technologies. Moreover, the research and development division should be engaged in
all aspects of GDC management with a focus on solving problems and overcoming
challenges. Budgets should be allocated specifically for this purpose to address the
local problems faced by desalination plants;
10. To optimize the utilization of desalination plants, complimentary infrastructures
construction and operation must be coordinated with desalination plants construction
and operation. Such activities should be planned nationally with the participation of
the GDC, Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB) and the GDC and synchronized so that
construction is completed simultaneously;
11. Being a renewable resource readily accessible to most Libyans, desalination plants
should be given special consideration as a viable water source; it should be integrated
with other sources in an optimized way so that each source is made use of most
effectively within an integrated water resources management;
12. Raising awareness about its role as a sustainable resource and its feasibility for specific
applications are needed so that this role is better appreciated and consumption of
desalinated water is minimized.

2.3 URGENT, SHORT AND MEDIUM-TERM INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT

PLANS FOR THE GDC

The needs of the GDC to continue operating successfully were assessed through background
data, baseline surveys, field visits, meetings and interviews. Criteria were developed to
classify these needs as urgent, short-term, and medium-term. The primary criterion was
the need for the activity, action or service to avoid/ prevent adverse health impacts to end-
users or to guarantee the continuity of water supply, which is a basic human need and
right. Provision of funds is another criterion as less costly items and activities are more
likely to be funded/procured/ implemented in a short time. Finally, the nature of the activity
and, hence, the amount of time needed to implement it; some works and activities require
a short execution time while others require long times. Activities and works which can be
implemented within 6-12 months were considered urgent while those requiring 1-2 years
and 3-5 years were considered short-term and medium longer term plans, respectively.

2.3.1Urgent Development/ Investment Plan (6-12 months)

These plans address the urgent needs of the financial, administrative and technical units
of the individual desalination plants and those of the GDC headquarters. The total amount
required to implement this plan was estimated to be USD 96.2 million. Most of the money
is needed for renovation and rehabilitation of aged plants and maintenance requirements;
19
amount is to be used for the provision of essential operation and maintenance spare parts
and consumables, supply and installation of desalination units, preparation of engineering
documents for the desalination plants as planned by GDC for the cities of Tripoli, Benghazi
and Misrata, provision of chemicals and construction of a headquarters for the GDC.

2.3.3 Medium-longer Term Development Plan

The medium-term plan activities fall generally within the GDC’s strategic plans. The total
cost of implementing this plan was estimated to be USD 1.265 billion. This value will be
utilized for the construction of new desalination plants in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata and
AlMarsis plus chemicals and spares for operation of the existing desalination plants.

21
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERAL
COMPANY FOR WATER AND
WASTEWATER (GCWW), LIBYA

22
3.1 INTRODUCTION

Libya is an arid country with an area of 1,667,000 km2 and an estimated population of 6.5
million. About 87% of Libya’s population is urban. The country relies almost completely on
groundwater to satisfy its water needs. Water demand is high along the 100 km coastal strip
where population and most of the agricultural and industrial activities are concentrated.
Water supply to urban centers is the responsibility of the General Company for Water
and Wastewater (GCWW). The GCWW utilizes three supply water sources through Water
Distribution Networks (WDNs) throughout Libya, namely: 1) Its own wells, 2) The Man-
made River Project (MMRP), 2) The General Desalination Company (GDC).

The objective of this report was to assess the legal, administrative/ organizational, financial,
human and technical capacities of the GCWW and to identify gaps and challenges affecting
its performance. The findings of this assessment were used to draw conclusions and
prepare urgent, short and medium term investment and development plans for sustainable
water supply by the GCWW.

3.2 KEY FINDINGS

3.2.1 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1. The GCWW was first established in accordance with law No. 8/1997. It was
dissolved in2003 into companies at the level of 27 Shabia as (governorates). Four
years later, the GCWW was reestablished by Decree No. 923/for the year 2007 as
an administratively, legally and financially independent company with affiliation
to the General Authority of Water Resources (GAWRs).
2. According to its establishment decree, the GCWW undertakes all activities and
tasks needed to supply water to domestic and the major ones being: 1) Operation
and maintenance (O & M) of water transport and distribution networks, pumping
stations, water treatment plants and monitoring and control centers, 2) Installing
of water connections to consumers and conducting studies on development
of water and sanitation services in all regions, 3) Purchasing of water from its
sources; 4) Collection of revenues and proposing of values of tariffs for water
services, 5) Capacity building of its employees, 6) Execution of water transport and
distribution projects within the National Development Plan (NDP), 7) Participation
in the development of standards and regulations related to water supply, and 8)
Proposing long, medium and short-term strategic plans in the area of ​​water.
3. The GCWW is managed by a full time, executive council consisting of a chairman
and five members. The GCWW is subject to monitoring by a 3-member Board for
Monitoring of the GCWW representing the MMRP, Ministries of Finance and Justice.
External technical and financial auditing are conducted by the Administrative
Control Authority and the Financial Control Authority, respectively;
4. The GCWW has an Office for Laboratories and Water Quality Monitoring. The
function of this office, which employs 2 persons, is to monitor, document and
report water quality and its indicators. The GCWW, however, has no water quality
monitoring or follow-up program and no laboratories to monitor water quality;
5. The GCWW’s regulations and bylaws don’t address health, safety and environment
directly although a safety guide has been prepared. Moreover, they don’t address
emergency situations and emergency preparedness associated with water
23
 supply and pollution. Such issues are vital and need to be added to the existing
regulations and bylaws;
6. Emergencies related to water supply, wastewater and stormwater(floods) taking
place in Libya as a whole and in Greater Tripoli in particular are handled by two
national level emergency management committees formed by the Presidential
Council. These committees are multi-sectoral with representatives from water
sector institutions, security and health sectors.

3.3ADMINISTRATIVE/ ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

1. The GCWW organizational structure consists of seven offices reporting directly

to the head of the executive council along with two assistant heads: 1) Operation
and Maintenance (O& M) and 2) Resources and Services (R & S). The O & M Head
directs five General Administrations (planning and projects, water works, sewerage
works, works and emergency, operation in regions along with the Center for
central maintenance) and the R & S Head directs three General Administrations
(administrative and financial affairs, consumer services, and services). Training is
undertaken by the Training and Qualifications Office.
2. The GCWW is headquartered in Tripoli. It provides its services to the urban
centers through a total of 40 service offices managing 160 service centers located
in eight Operation Regions. A special General Administration for Operation in
Regions supervises operation and maintenance of the service offices and centers
in these regions. Four warehouses are utilized for O & M operations in Tripoli, Souk
AlKhamis, Sidi asSayeh and Azizia. Water supply infrastructures O & M are managed
by a special General Administration for Water along with the corresponding regional
offices and centers;
3. The structure is of the centralized top down type with highest power at top
management levels; direct contact is provided between a single head and followers
thus avoiding overlapping of managerial responsibilities. In some functions, the
organizational structure is not consistent with standard hierarchical structures as the
administrative unit (Office) is used at a high level (e.g. legal affairs office) and at a
lower level (e.g. training office, office for laboratories and water quality).
4. Communications between administrations in the headquarters and the
administrations in the regions can only be made indirectly;
5. Water supply utilities and infrastructures are managed by the General Administration
for Operation and Maintenance of Water Utilities. This administration is in charge of
O & M of all water supply operations and works including wells, pumping stations,
treatment plants, reservoirs/ tanks, transmission lines and distribution networks;
6. The assistant head of the O &M directs five general administrations, all of which
have broad responsibilities which is certainly challenging.
7. The functions of the General Directorate of Works and Emergencies, the General
Administration of Sewage Works, and the General Administration of Consumer
Services are very similar making it difficult to specify roles and responsibilities.
Despite its demonstrated functionality, the organizational structure of the GCWW
appears to be classic emanating from existing practices rather than being based
on a long term strategy and/or methodological approaches to service-provision and
resources development.
8. A dedicated Documentation and Information Office (DIO) exists for information
management. Computers are utilized, but on local administrative/ individual
employee levels with no central area networks. Intranet within the GCWW is not
available. Access to the internet is also limited due to financial constraints.
9. Data and information are handled manually and documented on paper with little
24
reliance on digital systems. Maps, plans and documents are difficult to retrieve,
upgrade, update and copy. Communications, information and data exchange with
other administrations, offices and spare parts stores are also made by letters or via
telephone. Data forms are not utilized frequently. Accordingly, data and information
are scattered, incomplete and difficult to access. As a result, GCWW activities
including planning and O & M are difficult to be prepared and executed;

3.4 FINANCIAL CAPACITIES

1. The GCWW was established with a capital of LYD 100 million. To ensure
sufficient funding is available to the GCWW, through collection of water and
wastewater service fees granted by Decrees No. 367/ 1428 (1998). The fees
varied for small, large, metered and not metered customers from LYD 0.25
LYD/m3 to 19.5 /month. These fees cover part of the O and M costs; the Public
Treasury provides a subsidy of LYD 0.35 /m3 to fill the gap between actual costs
and revenues from fees;
2. The national level of connected households with installed water meters –
known also as metering penetration - is estimated to be only 15%. The same
low penetration practice probably applies to non-domestic users served by
the GCWW networks. Data and access to WDNs, metered, and non-metered
users are limited, non-comprehensive and not updated. Moreover, there are
countless illegal connections to the WDNs. As a result, the actual number of
customers provided with water by GCWW is not known;
3. The total value of invoices issued for the years 2015-2017 ranged from LYD
62.3 to 91.7 million, while the total revenues collected ranged from LYD 9.9 to
12.0 million. The revenues accounted for only 10.8-16.8% of the total value of
invoices issued;
4. The GCWW purchases most of the water supplies from the MMRP and the
GDC at a price of LYD 0.08 and 0.86 /m3, respectively. While the MMRA prices
are lower than the water service fee, those of the GDC waters are higher;
5. The estimated annual expenditures of the GCWW average about LYD 450
million, while the GCWW’s “collected” revenues are estimated to be LYD 12
million and the Public Treasury subsidies averaged LYD 200 million. According
to the GCWW, the total debts of public organizations, small and large customers
for the period 2010-2017 exceed LYD 500 million. The GCWW’s debts to the
GDC are estimated to exceed LYD 100 million, but remain undetermined due
to differences on the price values while those to the MMRA exceed LYD 100
million. As MMRA and GDC rely completely on these revenues, delays in
payments have threatened seriously the reliability of these operations. Not
only is the GCWW’s credibility at stake, but also the availability of almost 70%
of the GCWW’s water supply.
6. The GCWW faces serious financial challenges including: 1) Difficulty to collect
revenues, 2) Inability to pay its large debts for the water supply and electric
power services, 3) Lack of data on actual water consumptions, 4) Lack of data
on actual costs of water delivery which have been increasing significantly
in recent times due to inflated prices of spares, consumables and services,
5) Unavailability of hard currency and difficulty to open letters of credit for
importing of equipment and spares that are essential to operation of wells,
pumping stations, etc., and, 6) A three-fold increase in the rate of exchange
by the Central Bank of Libya applied at the end of 2018.As a consequence of
financial challenges, the GCWW has been unable to: 1) Provide O & M services
adequately, 2) Pay its employees’ salaries, 3) Complete on-going or planned
25
 projects and 4) Pay its debts to the MMRP and the GDC thus creating serious
challenges to these institutions which can threaten the continuity of domestic
water supplies.

3.5 HUMAN RESOURCES

1. The GCWW employed a total of 15,770 persons as of May 2017. Tripoli region
employs 17% of this number with other regions employing almost equal fractions
(10-13%). There appears to be an accumulation of employees per population
served in some regions and conversely prompting an assessment of the needs of
the regions versus the numbers and qualifications of these employees.
2. Staffing requirements and placement within the different GCWW’s administrative
units have been finalized by a special committee and approved by the GCWW
management in2016. The committee allocated a total of 16,486 job assignments.
It appears that these allocations were dictated more by placement of the existing
number of staff in the company at the time than by the actual quantitative and
qualitative work needs. There is no guideline listing jobs within the GCWW, their
descriptions, qualifications and the selection criteria for occupying them. This
way, it becomes difficult to specify and direct a work assignment correctly and
follow its progress with time. About two thirds of the GCWW’s workers are under
45 years with the largest number (5729) in the 36-45 year range. Such a large
youth fraction with a good potential for skill improvement will reflect positively
on the GCWW’s performance and efficiency.
3. The GCWW’s employees perform different functions (administrative, financial,
technical, etc.). Operation related jobs constitute the highest fraction (31.6%) while
administrative and services occupations constitute 24.1% and 19.1%, respectively.
Clearly, administrative jobs form a large fraction in view of the technical nature
of the GCWW’s mandate. Employees with no academic qualification or basic
qualifications (high school or less) form 39.5% of the total workforce posing a
potential problem with the ability to perform GCWW functions efficiently. About
one fourth of the employees have higher institute diplomas and bachelor degrees.
Technically qualified employees (engineering, computer, science, high level
vocational training) comprise only 36%.
4. Capacity building and training plans of the GCWW are executed by the Training
and Qualification Office (TQO) of the Human Resources Administration. This office
employs two persons. Considering the training needs and number of employees
who should be trained continuously, this office is clearly understaffed;
5. Training courses were mostly in the technical fields (water and wastewater
networks design, pumps maintenance, electrical protection and control), English
languages, computer skills, AutoCAD financial and administrative short courses.
A total of 581 employees were trained in 2014, none in 2015, 72 in 2016, and only
24 in 2017.
6. The number of GCWW employees is high with many of them having only basic
qualifications. Training is urgently needed to upgrade the knowledge and skills
of most of the GCWW’s workforce with a priority to those with basic qualification
who form a large fraction of this workforce. A parallel and equally urgent step is
the continuous training of senior management staff as it improves directly and
26
 significantly the overall performance of the GCWW. Other employees also need
training to keep up with advancements in their fields of specialization;

3.6 TECHNICAL CAPACITIES

1. The GCWW manages a total of 2964 wells, 19 water treatment plants, 2054 reservoirs/
tanks with a total capacity of 377,500 m3, 806 pumping stations and about 16,000 km
of transmission and distribution lines. The state of these infrastructural components is
summarized below;
2. The largest numbers of wells are in the Tripoli, Green Mountain and Central Regions.
Of the total wells, only 1591 wells (53.7%) are operational; the remaining need to be
maintained. Because most of these wells are in cities where no alternative water sources
exist, the failure to maintain them translates directly into water shortages affecting large
numbers of consumers. In fact, difficulty to provide spare parts and/or replacements has
forced well shutdowns indefinitely.
3. The GCWW operates nineteen water treatment plants. Sixteen of these plants employ
RO Technology to remove salinity, while Ghaat and AlBerkit stations remove iron and
manganese. The Tawergha Water Treatment Plant removes hardness, sulfide and cools
the high-temperature artesian water. Only three of these plants are operational. The rest
requires major rehabilitation or replacement. The Tawergha plant has been destroyed
as a result of the armed conflict in 2011 and must be replaced or an alternate water
source must be provided.
4. The GCWW operates 53 chlorination systems in six of the operation regions. Only one
third of these systems were operational in 2014. The number is probably less presently;
as a result, the GCWW produced waters are not chlorinated presently implying a high
potential for microbial pollution.
5. Water transmission lines include those lines conveying water from well fields operated
by the GCWW, conveying desalinated water supplied by the GDC and conveying MMRP
waters. Most of these pipelines are made of ductile iron and pre-stressed concrete and
few are polyethylene pipes.
6. The condition of these transmission lines is variable; lines supplying MMRP waters
are in a relatively good condition as they were executed only a few years ago. Those
conveying desalinated water - laid with the desalination plants - are likely to be corroded.
The collection and transmission pipelines from well fields of the GCWW are also in a
fair to poor condition. To avoid major extended water shortages, the maintenance or
replacement of these lines must be placed among the GCWW’s top priorities;
7. Most of the pumping stations were constructed over 20 years ago with a few exceptions.
The premises are generally in good condition but a considerable fraction of the pumps
and the electrical and mechanical equipment are old and may be obsolete requiring
replacement or repair. Some pumping stations have been overtaken by outlaws
permanently to be used as housing or workshops, etc., and hence have become
inaccessible raising additional operational problems;
8. Water distribution networks are not subjected to regular and routine examinations,
assessments and maintenance operations. Little data and information are therefore
available on their physical state or on the hydraulic/ pressure/flow aspects of these
networks. Little effort has been made to understand the existing problems and/or
improve their performance. Networks are controlled at critical feed and supply points
from the MMRP or GDC. Pressure is low in most areas.
9. Pipe sizes and materials employed in water distribution networks vary notably as
does their age and condition. Most pipes and ancillaries are approaching 30-40 years
while those in some parts of Tripoli and Benghazi are much older. While galvanized
iron pipes persist in old networks, polyethylene and ductile iron are more common in
newer networks. Metal based pipes suffer serious corrosion due to high salinity of most
27
 waters. Subsequently, leakage was common in many networks and at rates estimated
to reach 40-50%. According to the GCWW estimates, about 30% of the water distribution
networks are in a good condition, 40% in a fair condition, while the rest are in a poor
condition.
10. Despite the company’s long operational period, the condition of networks has seen
little improvement; in fact, the state of these assets continued to deteriorate. It can be
said that the company’s efforts were practically limited to maintaining these assets in
an operating condition, i.e., struggling to keep the same level of service provision with
very little room for improvement, upgrading, renewal or expansion.
11. Water balancing storage is made available by the GCWW, the GDC and the MMRA. A
total of 2054 elevated tanks and ground reservoirs are managed by the GCWW; each
desalination plant has two product (desalinated) water tanks while the MMRP operates
5 large reservoirs (for domestic and agricultural demands), and there are several break
pressure and equalizing tanks in major cities (Tripoli, Benghazi, Abu Zayyan). The MMRP
and GDC reservoirs are generally in good condition while those of the GCWW are mostly
in fair to poor condition requiring major maintenance operations. The elevated tanks
located within cities are not in use; they should be removed.
12. The GCWW manages a large number of water supply infrastructures in most of Libya’s
cities with different types of components. Data on these infrastructures are scarce and
there are no databases for them. When data are available, they are outdated, incomplete,
inaccessible and/or inaccurate. The actual state of these infrastructural components
is unknown and has not been assessed by the GCWW. Most of these components,
especially buried ones, are old and likely to be in bad condition due to aging and poor
O & M practices. In fact, some components are deteriorated and obsolete. It can be
estimated that over two thirds of the WDNs, one third of the wells and groundwater
tanks, one half of pumping stations and most of the elevated water tanks are in bad to
poor conditions. These estimates need to be verified by field surveys, however.
13. Assessment of these infrastructures is of utmost importance and urgency in establishing
the baseline state and making rehabilitation, replacement or renovation plans. The
headquarters’ building is in good condition. Some of the tariff collection points are
rented. Their conditions are generally fair to good. Regional O & M offices are located
in each of the 8 regions; they are mostly owned by the GCWW. They are in mostly fair
to good condition. A total of 150 service offices are operated by the GCWW in the 8
regions. Most of these offices are located in separate premises either owned by the
GCWW or rented. Their conditions are fair to good.
14. Mechanical and electromechanical equipment including pumps, motors, generators,
pipes, valves, etc. and spare parts are imported/procured continuously by the GCWW.
Unfortunately, their technical data are not documented when entering the company’s
warehouses. Their operation and maintenance records are not documented, difficult
to access or not kept. Such equipment and spare parts are usually procured in good
conditions but may be subject to mishandling and misuse upon transportation and
operation.

28
3.7 MANAGEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY
1. The GCWW has no declared strategy presently.
2. Private and public companies execute water supply projects including the GCWW. The
GCWW’s share in implementing such projects has been very limited, however, in light of
the severe financial constraints faced by the county lately.
3. Presently, the GCWW activities are limited to routine and emergency O & M activities
associated with provision of water services to many cities in Libya;
4. The GCWW provides water to its customers from its wells/ well fields and the MMRP and
from eight desalination plants operated by the GDC. The total amount of water distributed
by the GCWW in 2017 was 575.0 million m3; the quantities supplied by the MMRP, the GCWW
and the GDC were 52.1, 339.0, and 183.8 million m3, respectively. Most of the MMRP water
is supplied to the Benghazi and Tripoli Regions while most of the GDC-produced water
was supplied to the Green Mountain, Central and Western Regions. Finally, the GCWW
produced water was supplied to all regions with larger fractions supplied to the Central,
Southern, Central Eastern, Western and Tripoli Regions.

5. The water supplied was used for residential, commercial and small scale industrial
purposes; the fractions were 80, 15, and 5%, respectively;
6. The quality of waters distributed by the GCWW differs according to the supply source(s)
utilized. Quality of the MMRP and the GCWW waters varies almost with each well. Water
quality of potabilized desalinated water differs slightly with desalination plants;
7. The GCWW waters have notably different characteristics; TDS range from 260 to over
1840 mg/L, hardness ranges from 60 to 1050 and chlorides range from 42.6 to 673.9 mg/L,
respectively. Waters in some regions contain high iron concentrations (AsShaati, Ghaat,
etc.). Many of these waters are of marginal quality and may violate the Libyan Drinking
Water Standards in one or more parameters;
8. The MMRA waters are mined from Sarir, Tazerboo, Hasawna well fields and the
Ghadames basin. The quality of Sarir/Tazerbo well fields is generally good and within the
Libyan Drinking Water Standards. The MMRA waters are disinfected prior to transmission
to the GCWW storage and distribution facilities;
9. Desalinated waters contain very little dissolved solid. Consequently, they are potabilized
and disinfected to make them suitable for domestic purposes and non-corrosive;
10. There is no approved plan or program by the GCWW to monitor the quality of water
supplied from its wells or that distributed to its customers. Water quality is analyzed in
public or private laboratories occasionally or when pollution is suspected. The company
does not own any analytical laboratories; there are no skilled technicians in the fields of
physical, chemical and biological analysis in most of the areas supplied;
11. Domestic water is supplied to households on a continuous basis (24 hours a day, 7 days
a week) although interruptions occur for many reasons;
12. Municipal water supply coverage rates are not available at the GCWW. The only reliable
data on household water supply sources are those reported in the 2006 National Census as
it included practically all households. According to these data, a total of 572,309 families
(households) were connected to the public water distribution networks; this number
comprises 64.5% of the total number of families. Privately owned wells supply 154,007
households (17.4%) while 139,911 households (15.8%) used water harnessed from rain
(or water transported by trucks). The remaining 2.3% of the households obtain water from
other un-identified sources.
13. There are no data on leakage and unaccounted for water (UFW). However, leakage is
estimated to be 30-50%. This value was calculated as the difference between total volumes
of water supplied to cities per capita and the water consumed in-house per capita. This
large fraction is indicative of the bad state of WDNs;
14. Many supply per capita (SPC) values have been reported ranging from 11 liters per
29
capita per day lpcd to 1391 lpcd with an average value of 390-450 lpcd. All SPCs values
included leakage and UFW. Water consumption inside residential premises was estimated
to range from 115-166 and 160- 220 lpcd for connected apartments, average houses and
luxury houses (villas) within the city of Tripoli with an average in -house consumption
of 190 lpcd. Assuming a typical commercial and industrial fraction of 15% and an UFW
fraction of 40%, the SPC is 422 lpcd which is comparable to SPCs reported above.
15. Meters are used in some cities in Libya to measure the quantities of water used by
customers; no data are available, however, on the extent of meter usage (penetration) at
the level of cities or within a given city. To date, the GCWW has contracted with 180,313
small consumers and 21,828 large consumer (non-residential, commercial and industrial),
i.e., a total of 202,141 contracts. The largest number of both domestic and non-domestic
contracts and total contracts were signed with consumers in Tripoli. The percentages were
92.2, 61.2 and 88.9%, respectively.
16. The quantities of water supplied by the MMRP and GDC are known to a reasonable
extent, but not exactly as meters are not calibrated regularly, not functional or none-existent
at some connection locations. Quantities of water supplied by the GCWW are not known
because they are mostly not metered.
17. This function is undertaken by the General Directorate of Consumer Services which is
also responsible for developing water sources. The tariffs are collected through 160 service
centers distributed throughout Libya.
18. Revenue collection was generally poor with only about 11-17% of billed invoices
being paid. Moreover, the customer information and billing system is modest with archaic
software of very limited capacity.
19. Generally, the level of service has been modest due to interruptions in supply, low
pressure and marginal water quality. This state is exacerbated by the fact that large number
of customers are not paying their bills, water meters are of limited use by households,
many water meters are not functional, illegal connections are high, leakage is high and
wastage is high;
20. Energy consumption is not monitored regularly and its costs are not tied to the cost
of water supplied. In recent years, power cutoffs and fuel shortages happened frequently
causing water supply shortages with adverse impacts on the GCWW’s revenues, equipment
and customer satisfaction.
21. The cost of supplying water by the GCWW to its customers is not known. Data on
assets condition, age and original cost are lacking. The only costs that can be calculated are
those of service provision, i.e., O & M, water purchase, salaries and energy costs (provided
they can be separated from wastewater service provision costs). Such a task has not been
undertaken yet, however.
22. For the year 2017, the cost of water/wastewater provision was LYD 0.78 /m3 excluding
depreciation of assets. This cost is higher than that used to determine the existing water
tariff and subsidy levels (LYD 0.65 /m3) indicating present and future financial problems.
Moreover, this cost is lower than average of previous years because the amount of water
supplied by the GDC was only 26% of its production capacity.
23. The GCWW operating wells produced 32% of the total domestic water supplied in 2017.
The well fields are normally close to the demand centers providing reliable and readily
accessible water sources. The number of wells developed provides flexibility and allows
for potential shut downs. Subsequently, these supply sources are quantitatively reliable.
24. Availability of these wells is affected mostly by operational problems caused by the
lack of spare parts, power shortages, armed conflict, lack of security and vandalism. The
quality is marginal affecting the reliability and sustainability of some of the source aquifers
that may be questionable in the long run as indicated by the large annual drawdowns.
Surprisingly, the GCWW has no central maintenance workshop to deal with recurrent
mechanical and electrical equipment failures. Such central workshops are urgently needed

30
in the three most populated regions (Tripoli, Benghazi and Central Regions).
25. While water quantity is sufficient, water quality in most wells is marginal necessitating
treatment. Almost all sources are not disinfected and require chlorination to prevent
microbiological pollution.
26. The MMRA water supply system was highly vulnerable because the system components
function linearly (in series). Additionally, frequent MMRA system failures have occurred as
a result of the threats and damages caused by armed conflict and lack of security. A total of
96 wells in the Phase II well fields were destroyed since 2015 along with the destruction of
the cathodic protection system of Phase I which inevitably will lead to serious shut-downs.
Remoteness of well fields and associated facilities and the absence of protection are strong
factors contributing to the vulnerability of the MMRP;
27. Reliability of the GDC plants is increased as some of the components are provided in
multiple parallel units, e.g., most plants consist of 4 desalination units; a failure of one unit
implies the loss of one fourth of the plant’s production. However, most of the GDC plants
are subject to failures due to the unavailability of chemicals, consumables, spare parts
and aging as most desalination plants have approached or exceeded their design lives.
In such cases, the vulnerability of the GDC desalination plants is high. As most spares,
consumables, equipment and chemicals are not available locally, so that plant failures last
for long times. This problem is compounded by lack of funds, high hard currency exchange
rates and slow procedures for procurement. Similarly, major overhauls or replacements
imply high costs which may not be afforded readily and high installation times during
which users are denied access to water.
28. Aging and corrosion of most WDNs components is an on-going process which causes
frequent failures. With the passage of time, these components will deteriorate at increasing
rates causing more serious and hard to maintain failures with extended water shortages
and large scale leakages and damages. This problem should be given special attention due
to its serious socioeconomic impacts.

3.8 GCWW PERFORMANCE

1. A dedicated Office for Monitoring and Performance is established within the GCWW
whose mandate includes performance assessment; it is under the supervision of the head of
the executive council. It is under-staffed and under-equipped. Accordingly, no assessment
has been made of the GCWW’s performance during its long period of existence and no key
performance indicators (KPIs) have been adopted

2. Two major indicators are employed to assess the performance of water supply and
wastewater companies’ personnel/expenditure and personnel/ 1000 connections. Personnel
expenditure ratio for the GCWW in 2017 is about 260% of revenue collected from water and
sewerage services; this indicator is considerably higher than the recommended value of
less than or equal to 30%. The lowest ratio achieved by the GCWW was 37% which is still
higher than the recommended ratio. The actual number of connections is not available. For
a total number of 572,309 families supplied and about 200,000 small and large consumer
connections, the ratio of personnel/1000 connections is 20; this indicator is 4 times higher
than the recommended value of less than or equal to 5. According to these two indicators,
the GCWW performance needs serious improvements.

31
3. Communication, coordination and cooperation with other stakeholders (suppliers,
the GAWR, Ministry of Health, Environmental General Authority and consumers) are
undertaken separately and unsystematically and with only some of these stakeholders.
Improvement in these fields, especially with the MMRA and the GDC, is necessary as it
affects positively the GCWW’s performance. The GCWW has conducted modest campaigns
on raising awareness mainly on water conservation; such campaigns were simple; not
designed to collect feedback and generate valuable statistics. Financial constraints have
limited the width and breadth of these campaigns significantly.

3.9 ARMED CONFLICT, LACK OF SECURITY AND INSTABILITYRELATED

DAMAGES
1. Libya has been facing serious challenges in the last few years due mostly to the
armed conflict and political instability which led to weak law enforcement, economic and
institutional instabilities;

2. The impacts on the GCWW ranged from loss of lives to illegal connections, vandalism,
looting, theft, damages, destruction and takeover of assets/infrastructures. GCWW staff
were denied access to operate and maintain infrastructures and to collect revenues. An
additional challenge was the water service demands exerted by the internally displaced
people (IDPs) in some cities;
3. Consequently, working days were lost along with large volumes of water and
corresponding revenues, leakage increased, aging accelerated, costs of O &M increased
tremendously, levels of water supply service declined with persistent water shortages and
customers were forced to buy “hauled” water at higher costs.
4. Modest subsidies due to national financial constraints coupled with poor revenue
collection and large operating costs made the GCWW unable to fund its daily operations
and to pay its large debts to the MMRA and GDC. These problems have been accentuated
by the recent rise in exchange rate by the Central Bank of Libya and slow procedure for
opening of letters of credit making the GCWW unable to procure spare parts urgently
needed for its daily operations.
5. Power interruptions, outages and fuel shortages occurred frequently with corresponding
partial to complete cuts in water supply resulting in revenue losses and damages to
electromechanical equipment causing more service interruptions and additional operational
costs.

3.10 MAJOR CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.10.1 Major Challenges

The level of service has seen little improvement in the last few years, however, due to many
serious challenges the GCWW has been facing; the major ones are:
1. Armed conflict, lack of security and lawlessness;
2. The geographical scope of its activities is extensive;
3. Its infrastructures are old and deteriorating rapidly;
4. The number of employees is large and a large fraction of these employees have only
basic qualifications and skills;
5. Financial resources are limited;
6. Debts to water suppliers (MMRA and GDC)are large;
7. Instability of power supply and fuel shortages.
32
3.10.2 Recommendations
Legal Framework

1. There is clearly a need to redefine the mandates of water supply institutions to eliminate
overlapping of planning, designing, execution, operation and maintenance mandates.
Planning of water supply infrastructures should be centralized. Synchronization of
implementation of different complementary water supply infrastructures and works
should be coordinated by all concerned parties;
2. Asset ownership and development mandates along with water supply sources
development and allocations need to be readdressed and redistributed clearly among
the different water supply institutions;

Administrative/ Organizational Framework

1. The GCWW needs to adopt an official vision and long term strategy as it forms the
foundation for short, medium and long term plans. Water conservation through elimination
of wasteful water consumptions practices and reduction of water supply costs should for
the ultimate objectives and drivers of this strategy;
2. Data and information management need to be digitized at all administration levels of the
GCWW along with a digital archiving system and networking. The Data and Information
Office should be staffed and equipped accordingly.A complimentary step will be the
establishment of an information center with a comprehensive database and GIS along with
the procurement of computer systems, software, equipment and training of staff to run this
center;
3. The GCWW organizational structure needs to be updated based on a centralized
management approach and a strategic action plan. The update should consider the
following:
a. The organizational unit termed “Office” should be used only in the traditional placement
under the head of the GCWW directly. Other “Offices” should be relocated according to
the nature of their functions. For instance, the TQO and the Office for Laboratories and
Monitoring should be promoted to administrations or offices under the head of the GCWW
directly;
b. Reducing the responsibilities of the assistant head for O & M;
c. Redefinition and redistribution of the functions of the General Directorate of Works and
Emergencies, the General Administration of Sewage Works, and the General Administration
of Consumer Services to prevent overlapping.
4. Water quality should be given a higher priority. A water quality monitoring program should
be developed urgently; waters should be treated according to drinking water standards
with continuous disinfection of distributed waters. Analytical water quality laboratories
should be established, properly equipped and staffed. Such activities should be undertaken
with the full engagement of the Water Quality and Monitoring Office;
5. The GCWW needs to adopt key performance indicators (KPIs) including the personnel/
expenditure and personnel/ 1000 connections indicators and seek to lower them to the
accepted levels in order to ensure cost effectiveness and service quality. Monitoring of
energy consumption as a performance indicator and cost element should be enforced
along with an energy conservation as standard GCWW daily practices;
6. To overcome its administrative and financial challenges, the GCWW needs to reorient
33
its activities and work philosophy towards a business oriented, profit making enterprise,
open to new practices and partnerships must form the basis for all company activities.
Action plans and budgets must spring from business plans that are assessed and updated
regularly;
7. The GCWW organizational structure is in need of upgrading to cope with the challenges
it has been facing. Consideration should be given to revenue collection, O & M, evaluation,
monitoring and reporting of performance along with water quality as well as establishment
of a strong database for the company. Equally important is the promotion of investment
and engagement of private sector into the GCWW’s activities;
8. The GCWW depends heavily for its water supply on the MMRA and the GDC. Its
relationship with them must be structured formally and monitored regularly to ensure
continuous payments for purchased waters and continuous supply. A special committee
should be formed for this purpose. Continuous communications and regular contacts must
be made to address any issues immediately;
9. Awareness raising programs should be upgraded and expanded because they are key
to the GCWWs reliability with its customers and their unlimited cooperation especially in
the areas of payment of water service tariffs and conservation;
10. As all of the challenges faced by the GCWW are beyond its capacity, national efforts
must be made to put an end to these threats permanently as their continuation will lead to
the failure of water institutions including the GCWW with detrimental socioeconomic and
security consequences.

Financial Resources

1. The GCWW’s debt problem should be tackled urgently; a first step in this direction is the
improvement of tariff collection with a focus on large consumers. A second step is to
determine the actual costs of water supply independently from the wastewater services
and: 1) Identify areas of cost reduction and 2) Increase the water service fee to cover
all water supply costs. The spirit of a self-supporting commercially managed company
must replace that of a traditional public service company;
2. The Central Bank of Libya should give special consideration to the urgent nature of the
GCWW services by establishing stable and speedy procedures for opening letters of
credit and by canceling the recent increase in the rate of hard currency exchange;

Human Resources

1. A job description and qualification criteria guide should be prepared to improve employee
recruitment, evaluation and promotion needs. An employee needs assessment is in
order for the GCWW to redistribute its workforce with the ultimate objective of reducing
the total number and/or reorienting them according to actual spatial and functional
needs;
2. To ensure continuous development and qualification of its employees, especially
those with basic qualifications only, the GCWW needs to establish a central training
center to cater for its needs and, preferably those of other water supply institutions. An
alternative is to utilize existing training centers within these institutions in such a way
that they provide training sectorially. Training of large numbers requires that the TQO to
be promoted to a higher organizational level and be well staffed and equipped;

34
Technical Capacities

1. Water quantities supplied from different sources as well as that used by consumers
should be monitored regularly to provide data for planning (billing, costing, determining
leakage and UFW, etc.). Remedial measures must be taken immediately to minimize
water leakage and UFW;
2. To ensure microbiologically safe domestic waters, the GCWW must install or rehabilitate
chlorination systems and procure chlorine gas or powder compounds in sufficient
quantities for routine and emergency applications;
3. Present water metering and tariff collection practices need to be reassessed and
improved significantly. Flow meters must be procured and used extensively for recording
purchased water quantities and for billing of customers. Billing mechanisms must be
improved along with consideration of joint billing with electricity, pre-payment cards,
etc. Legal means of enforcement should also be developed. The SPC for Libya is very
high being affected largely by leakage and UFW. It should be reduced for economic and
environmental reasons and incorporated into all water supply schemes by all water
institutions.
4. A central maintenance workshop along with regional ones should be established by
the GCWW to deal with recurrent maintenance of mechanical and electrical equipment.
Such central workshops are urgently needed in the three most populated regions (Tripoli,
Benghazi and Central Regions). A central workshop is also urgently needed to cope with
the daily O &M challenges;
5. Special attention should be paid to the rapidly deteriorating WDNs starting with an
assessment of their state and remedial measures;
6. Special consideration should be given to ensuring continuous and uninterrupted power
supply along with installation of standby generators wherever needed and installation
of solar power systems at remote difficult to access water supply areas. The recurrent
nature of this problem requires special remedial measures along with the continuous
communication and coordination with the GECOL;
7. The GCWW should get benefit from the experience accumulated internationally in
water supply management. International and regional organizations, not only have the
experiences, but also provide assistance tailored to the GCWW’s needs upon request.
Successful lessons by companies in neighboring states can also be shared through
conducting field visits to these countries.
3.11 INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE GCWW, LIBYA

1. The needs of the GCWW to continue operating successfully were assessed

through background data, baseline surveys, field visits, meetings and interviews.
Criteria were developed to classify these needs as urgent, short-term and medium-
term. Accordingly, activities which can be implemented within 6-12 months were
considered urgent while those requiring 1-2 years and 3-5 years were considered
short-term and medium long term plans, respectively. These plans were presented
in the form of a bill of quantities table including a description of the activity,
quantity, unit price and total price. As most items are procured from abroad, their
prices were quoted in US dollars.
2. The total amount required implementing the urgent investment/ development
plan was estimated to be USD 36.4 million. Most of this amount is needed for
the provision of flowmeters, water tanker trucks, power generators, chlorination
systems and chemicals. Such activities have been linked with water/ pressure/
35
 leakage losses, emergency water supply and disinfection/ public health.

Annex 4.1. Bill of Quantities for Urgent (6-12 months) Investment/ Development Plan for
the GCWW

Unit Subtotal
Unit Item Description Unit Quantity
$ ,Price Price

Setting strategy, action plans and upgrading of ex-

1 LS - 410000 410,000
isting organizational structure of the GCWW

Supply and installation of electromagnetic flow me-

3 ters for large non-domestic water (industrial and .No 11000 500 5,500,000
commercial) consumers: 100 mm diameter

4 Same as above but 150 mm diameter .No 6000 900 5,400,000

5 Same as item 1 but 200 mm diameter .No 5000 1100 5,500,000

6 Same as item 1 but 300 mm diameter .No 20 1500 30,000

7 Same as item 1 but 400 mm diameter .No 10 2500 25,000

Supply and installation of electromagnetic flow

8 meters to monitor flow from main feeding sources: .No 4 25000 100,000
MMRP 1000 mm diameter

Supply and installation of electromagnetic flow

9 meters to monitor flow from main feeding sources: .No 50 1300 65,000
Well fields 150-250 mm diameter

Supply of pumps or spares for wells and control

10 panels, etc. in cities with no alternative sources plus .No 10 5000 50,000
standby submersible

Supply of surface water pumps with a height of 200-

11 250 meters and a productivity of 100 m3 / hour, with .No 15 18000 270,000
operating panels

Supply of surface water pumps with a height of 150-

12 200 meters and a productivity of 100 m3 / hour, with .No 10 16000 160,000
operating panels

Supply of surface water pumps with a height of 100

13 - 150 meters and a productivity of 80 m3 / hour, with .No 20 14000 280,000
operating panels

Supply of surface water pumps with a height of 50

- 100 meters and a productivity of 70 m3/ hour, with .No
14 operating panels 50 12000 600,000

36
Annex 4.1. Bill of Quantities for Urgent (6-12 months) Investment/ Development Plan for
”the GCWW “continued

Unit Subtotal
Unit Item Description Unit Quantity
Price, $ Price

Supply of submersible water pumps with a height

15 of 300-350 meters and a productivity of 25 m3 / No. 20 25000 500,000
hour, with operating panels

Supply of water pumps with a height of 250-300

16 meters and a productivity of 25 m3 /hour, with oper- No. 25 20000 500,000
ating panels.

Replacement of rising piping of wells of API 4-inch

17 lm 14000 75 1,050,000
diameter for producing wells

Supply of 60 water tanker trucks equipped with a

18 No. 40 125000 5,000,000
10 m3 tank

Supply of 40 water tanker trucks with a capacity of

19 No. 20 150000 3,000,000
18 m3

Supply of standard basic workshops tools fully

20 equipped for the cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, Sebha, No. 6 50000 300,000
Misrata, Gharian, Az-Zintaan, and Tawergha

Supply of mobile water quality analysis labora-

tories, to be distributed in cities with populations
21 exceeding 50,000 persons, capable of conducting No. 12 4000 48,000
basic drinking water quality indicators (physical,
chemical and microbiological)

Supply and installation of computers with high

capacity and speed to support customer service
22 No. 200 2000 400,000
centers (collection centers) for large cities in order
to activate the revenues and services of consumers

Development, supply and installation of electronic

23 LS - 750000 750,000
archiving system at headquarters and 8 regions

37
 Development and supply of software for admin-
24 istrations or regions (administration, technical, LS - 150000 150,000
financial)

Development of information technology center (at

25 LS - 400000 400,000
headquarters with branches at regions)

Annex 4.1. Bill of Quantities for Urgent (6-12 months) Investment/ Development Plan for
the GCWW “continued”

Unit Subtotal
Unit Item Description Unit Quantity
Price, $ Price

Supply of safety equipment for GCWW technicians

26 (safety shoes, long rubber shoes, short rubber No. 1000 100 100,000
shoes, gloves, safety helmets, rubber clothes)

Supply of standby power generators for pumping

27 No. 50 80000 4,000,000
stations and well fields (0.25-1.0 MW)

28 Supply of chlorinators and chlorine gas detectors No. 100 10000 1.000,000

Supply of calcium hypochlorite for disinfection of

29 GCWW supplied waters ton 1000 1000 1,000,000

Conducting a pilot study for use of solar power as

an alternative source of electrical power to operate
30 ground water wells in selected areas in Libya, the Ls - 140000 140,000
work should include supplying and installation of
solar panels and accessories

Total (Thirty six million and three hundred and twenty eight thousand) US dollars 36,328,000

3. Short-term investment/ development plans implementation were estimated to

be USD 46.9 million. This amount will mostly be used to install a central communication
system, regional water quality laboratories as well as build and equip a training
center for employees and procure rising pipes for wells.
4. The costs of implementing the medium-term investment/ development plan
were estimated to be USD 8.18 million. They cover mainly operational needs such
as supply and installation of pumps, pump station ancillaries, well rising pipes
and training of GCWW employees. They exclude costs of new infrastructures or
renovation of major infrastructures (e.g. WDNs) which can only be estimated upon
detailed field survey assessments. Such costs will be in the order of one to several
billion dollars.

38
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE MUNICIPALITY OF
BENGHAZI

39
5.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The municipality of Benghazi is one of Libya’s most populated and economically developed
urban agglomerations. The forecast 2023 population for the municipality will be 841,550
indicating an increase of 71,814 inhabitants from 2018 with a corresponding increase in
water demand.

The municipality has witnessed extensive destruction resulting in displacement of large

numbers of its residents as well as losses of human lives and destruction of property. The
Municipality has also been host to a large number of IDPs from other parts of Libya with
the majority from the city of Tawergha.

With the return of peace to the city, most of those internally displaced returned to their
homes. Those internally displaced persons (IDPs) whose homes sustained serious damage
or destruction remain in rented apartments or houses indefinitely.

During the past decades, the municipality has grown to become the main urban center
that provides education and other services to the region. Unfortunately, the urban growth
witnessed by the municipality due to the increase in population and migration rates was
not met with the implementation of the 2nd Generation Masterplan thus resulting in urban
sprawl with no proper infrastructure services in place.

The launching of the National Water and Wastewater Program in 2004 which included
updating the water and wastewater masterplan as well as designing the networks which
was later followed in 2007– 2010 addressed the municipalities water supply problems to
some extent. All of these contracted projects were put on hold after Feb. 17, 2011 due to
financial and security reasons.

5.1.2 KEY FINDINGS

1. Domestic water for the municipality of Benghazi is supplied from 3 sources (GCCW
wells, desalinated water and the man-made river project (MMRP)). In the past, 97%
of the municipality water demand was supplied from the Benina and Sidi Mansour
groundwater well fields and 3% from the desalination plant.
2. Currently, around 93% of the water demand is provided by the MMRP thus making it the
main source of water supply. The total water quantity supplied to Benghazi municipality
from MMRP is around 277,000 m3 /day. Private wells and trucked water are also used by
a small fraction of the population;
3. Some of the GCWW well fields which provide 6.3% of the water supplies suffer from
system aging and water levels decline in addition to sea water intrusion in the wells
which are located close to the coastal area;
4. The Benghazi Desalination Plant was constructed in 1978 with a total design capacity of
48,000 m3day. The plant capacity has declined significantly because of aging; only one
unit is operating currently providing Al Kwefiya district with 1200 m3/day.
5. Benghazi Center zone has the highest water demand in comparison to the East and
West zones due to it being mainly comprised of built up areas served by the public
distribution network. Additionally, it has a surplus in the current supplies due to the
incompleteness of Node 5 project which is intended to supply the East zone;
40
6. The MMRP supplies the whole Center zone and 82% of the West zone; the East zone on
the other hand is supplied mainly from GCWW wells 92% and the remaining amount
from desalinated water 8%.
7. Private wells and trucked water (unimproved water source) supply a sizable number of
communities and districts while Al Kwefiya (East zone) is supplied by desalinated water.
8. Areas such as Abu Atni and Hayi Al Salaam which depend on private water wells suffer
from aquifer pollution as water wells are drilled in the same vicinity of the wells drilled
to dispose of untreated wastewater.
9. Access to the available supplies is still limited due to several factors including
incompleteness or interruption of execution of planned water supply infrastructure
projects, or urban expansion beyond the masterplan, illegal connections, obsoleteness
and deterioration of the existing network resulting in operation at low pressure and
leakages.
10. Sidi Mansour water quality is marginally acceptable for domestic uses with high
hardness, sodium, total dissolved solids (TDS) and nitrates. The Benina well field waters
are evidently saline with high sodium, chloride, hardness, TDS among other parameters;
this field’s water is inferior drinking water quality standards; it is mostly likely affected
by seawater intrusion making it a reliable in the future as its salinity will simply keep
increasing indefinitely.
11. The MMRP waters meet the WHO Drinking Water Guidelines. Chlorine residual also
exists. Clearly, the water quality is within the Libyan Drinking Water Standards and
WHO Drinking Water Guidelines.
12. The distribution networks consist of pipes of different sizes and materials. Maintenance
work has been carried out during August 2018 on 8 pipelines diameters 200 mm to 400
mm with a total length of 162 km; 52 minor pipes diameters 150-250 mm with a total
length of 401 km.
13. The water supplied within the municipality is not metered;
14. About 30% of the 354 wells are operational, a similar fraction is under maintenance, and
4% have been maintained. Those destroyed by force majeure constitute 38%;
15. About two thirds of the 11 chlorination systems are operational with one third non-
operational and two chlorinators damaged or lost due to force majeure. Chlorination is
not available in the Center zone;
16. A total of 36 pumping stations containing 99 pumps are employed in the water supply
system. Two thirds are operational, one fourth is non-operational, while 7% were lost
due to force majeure;
17. The MMRP Benghazi city and MMR transmission system infrastructures including main
control chambers (gate, washout, air release, pressure reducing) are in good condition
and operate well because of the follow up and the periodic maintenance conducted.
18. The GCWW well fields transmission system infrastructures and distribution system
infrastructures within the districts are obsolete, deteriorated or nonexistent.
19. The Water supply infrastructures within the city masterplan boundaries are either
obsolete and deteriorated or nonexistent, while outside the masterplan boundaries
infrastructures simply do not exist; rudimentary surface networks exist in small areas
executed by the residents in order to obtain water from the public network.
20. Obsoleteness of the water supply infrastructure can be attributed to aging, unplanned
or sprawl urban development which has resulted in illegal connections to the network,
adverse effects of supplying poor water quality supplied from the well fields over a long
period of time as well as sabotage, vandalism and damages caused by armed conflict.
21. Water supply distribution network within the city masterplan boundaries is either
obsolete or deteriorated or nonexistent while outside the masterplan boundaries
distribution networks simply do not exist; rudimentary surface networks exist in small
areas.

41
22. Distribution network coverage is poor within the municipality because of incompleteness
or interruption of execution of planned infrastructure projects or because of urban
expansion beyond the masterplan.
23. Obsoleteness of the network increases of leakage and losses which reaches up to 40%
of the water supplied.
24. Obsoleteness and deterioration of the existing network force operation to be only at low
pressure.
25. Unaccounted for agricultural and industrial uses of the water supplies through illegal
connections to the system in areas like Sidi Faraj and Abu Atni exist widely.
26. The Benghazi municipality receives currently 298,242 m3/day of water while its water
demand is forecasted to be 230,921 m3/day and 252,465 m3/day for the year 2018 and
2023, respectively. The total water supplies exceed the demand over the next five years.
However, in terms of the zones, both the Center and the West zone witnessed a surplus
in the supplies while the East zone witnessed a deficit.
27. The incompleteness of Benghazi city MMRP Water Supply System (NODE 5 and its
supplying pipeline) has resulted in Center zone significant surplus and East zone
significant deficit, i.e., the supplies intended for East zone could not be delivered and
were utilized by the Center zone.
28. Despite the calculated present and future surpluses demand is not satisfied completely
on the city level, causes for the gap between the demand and supply could be the illegal
connections to the network which resulted in low pressure and intermittent supplies as
well as the high level of leakages due to network aging and deterioration.
29. Concerns have been raised lately about MMRP supplies because of sudden shut downs
that have occurred lately due to either power cutoffs or emergency maintenance works
or armed conflict, sabotage and vandalism. In addition to MMRP issues, there are the
problems encountered in the well fields which include system aging, declines in water
levels, sea water intrusion as well as lack of funding and spare parts.
30. In 2009-2010, several projects were contracted or were ready to be contracted for
Benghazi city as well as nearby settlements. These projects included all infrastructures
(roads, power, water, sewerage, stormwater and communications) with a total contract
value of LYD 2.8 Billion. Projects for water supply from the MMRP were at the forefront
of these projects. All of these projects have stopped in 2011, however, because of the
armed conflict and insecurity.

5.1.3 DAMAGES AND IDPS/RETURNEES OF ARMED CONFLICT IN BENGHAZI

1. Benghazi is one of the most conflict affected cities in Libya. The armed conflict lasted 3
years (2014-2017); it ended early in the peripheral districts, but lasted until 2017 in the
districts of AlSabri, City Center, Busnab and Garyounus. In addition to loss of hundreds of
lives, injuries and psychological and social damages, armed conflict caused destruction
of buildings and severe damages to infrastructures with subsequent socio-economic
and environmental losses.
2. The damages due to the armed conflict in Benghazi were heaviest in the districts of
AlSabri, City Center, Al Leithy and Ganfouda where the conflict lasted almost 3 years.
Many buildings in AlSabri and City Center districts were destroyed completely and are
no longer useable for any purpose. These damages included the following:
1. Damages to buildings ranging from light to complete destruction;
2. Significant and widespread damage of the infrastructural components of the main
water, sewerage and electricity networks causing serious or complete water and power
outages;
3. Damages to water towers;
4. Damages to water supply pumping stations;
42
5. Damages to water distribution pipes;
6. Disappearance (stealing) of pumps, generators, copper wires constitutive of
electromechanical equipment and damaging of such equipment by looters, vandals and
saboteurs;
7. Inability of the GCWW and GDCOL teams to access and maintain damaged infrastructural
components. As a result, the electricity and sewage systems are reportedly dysfunctional
with accumulation of wastewater in the streets constituting a serious public health
threat;
3. The city of Benghazi has been host to the largest numbers of IDPs in Libya as well as
the largest numbers of returnees. It witnessed three waves of IDPs; the first wave came
in 2011 from several cities in western Libya but mainly from Tawergha. The second
wave came from movement of persons living in suburbs of Benghazi itself where armed
conflict took place to other districts within the city or to other cities in western Libya.
The third wave, numbering 2,990 IDPs, came mainly from Derna where heavy clashes
climaxed on May and June 2018.
4. A total of 29,699 Benghazi resident families were displaced; most of them fled
from AlLaithy, AlSabri, City Center, Gwarsha, Al Hawari, Ganfouda, SidiFeraj and Bu
Atni. These numbers are declining gradually with the settlement of the conflicts and
reconstruction of homes within Benghazi Municipality as well as the maintenance work
of the damaged infrastructure.
5. A large number of IDPs residing originally in the heavily damaged districts of AlSabri,
City Center and Garyounus/Busnaib could not return to their homes because of the high
level of destruction sustained or the lack of electricity and water services.
6. About 80% of the AlSabrid is placed households (5772) have returned to their homes
now. The City Center district has witnessed a much slower return rate due to the severe
damages sustained by the properties and the infrastructure as well as the environmental
pollution. The numbers of returnees on November 2018 for the city center families is
around 300 of 3044 displaced ones;
7. To accelerate the return of IDPs, the GCWW along with Benghazi municipality emergency
department and GECOL have carried out maintenance work of damaged infrastructures
at many locations in the City Center and AlSabri immediately following the end of the
conflict. As a result, more IDPs are returning more rapidly;
8. 8. The provision of security along with efforts to repair buildings and rehabilitate power
and water services have made it possible for thousands of IDPs to return. Electricity,
which is a basic driver for water supply, has reportedly been restored in most districts
relatively satisfactorily;

5.1.4 MAJOR CHALLENGES

Despite intense efforts, the municipality of Benghazi as a whole and the IDP impacted areas
in particular, continue to face serious challenges; the major ones are as follows:

1. Severe lack of funding to the municipality to address water supply problems including
rehabilitation, restoration, renovation of damaged or aging infrastructures and provide
O& M of the water supply infrastructures;
2. The parallel challenges facing the municipality in other service sectors (health, education,
etc.) which compete with the water supply sector requirements;
3. Cash availability crisis, hyperinflation and rising prices making O & M services and items
either unavailable or unaffordable;
4. Aging infrastructures and lack of data on most water supply infrastructures;
5. Illegal connections and ineffective law enforcement;
43
6. Lack of local technical capacities to effectively implement activities related to
water supply infrastructures construction and O & M with no foreign “specialized”
contractors and no materials available locally;
7. Lack of hard currency and higher exchange rates levied by the Central Bank of
Libya lately;
8. The challenges that face the MMRA, GCWW and the GDC which render them
unable to undertake new water supply projects, complete on-going ones or
operate effectively existing ones.
5.1.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REHABILITATION OF THE WATER SUPPLY
SCHEMES IN BENGHAZI

1. Protection of the current resources especially MMRP from terrorists, vandalism,

sabotage, illegal connections and power cutoffs as well as anthropogenic pollution;
2. Providing access to safe drinking water in some districts among conflict-affected and
most vulnerable displaced populations;
3. Improvement and maintenance of Benina and Sidi Mansor well fields in order to act as
a backup to MMRP supplies in case of sudden shut down;
4. Rehabilitation of electric power infrastructures and improving the reliability of electric
power supply services.
5. Rehabilitation of water supply infrastructures;
6. Review and reactivate the on-hold infrastructure and water supply projects
7. Provision of funding for rehabilitation or reconstruction, and reactivation activities as
well as for O & M services;
8. Development of desalination as a complement for MMRP supplies. The plan to supply
Benghazi from a desalination plant has been outlined in the Libya’s National Water
Strategy 2000-2025. The construction of a new plant has not been started yet, however.
Since the planning, designing and construction of large scale desalination plants
requires large funding and a lot of time, it is recommended to start work on this option
now in order to avoid any water scarcity for the community in the coming years. A
feasibility study must be conducted prior to such a construction, however, comparing a
new desalination plant to increasing protection and reliability of the MMRP waters.
9. Preparation of urgent, short and medium-longer term investment/ development plans
to put in place the recommendations above.

5.1.6 URGENT INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE

MUNICIPALITY OF BENGHAZI
The municipality of Benghazi has suffered extensive damages and destruction of large
parts of some of its suburbs as well as its infrastructures including water supply schemes.
As a result, these suburbs face water supply problems that are often acute. To overcome
these problems and restore water supply to the residents of the city/ municipality, urgent
interventions, short-term and medium-term action plans need to be implemented requiring
financial investments.

The cost of implementing urgent interventions/development plans for the Municipality of

Benghazi was estimated to be USD27.5 million. They include pipeline replacement, supply
of submersible and surface pumps, disinfection systems, completion of pipe installation
works and O & M supplies. This amount represents mostly supplies of disinfection materials,
pipes, pumps and spare parts for operation and maintenance of existing equipment which
has long been non-functional and needed minor or major maintenance or was destroyed,
stolen or obsolete and needed replacement. Although the interventions are urgent, their
causes are not all directly related to the armed conflict and insecurity.
44
The amount of funds may appear to be large for the municipality to be raised considering
the overwhelming financial constraints faced by the country. If this turns to be the case,
a phased intervention plan should be prepared with criteria based priorities whose
implementation will be governed by the amount of funds allocated for the rehabilitation
interventions.

5.1.7 WATER SUPPLY IN CAMPS OF IDPS FROM TAWERGHA RESIDING IN

BENGHAZI
Key Findings

1. The armed conflict forced all residents of the city of Tawergha (about 8500
households or over 35,000 persons) to flee to other safe locations, mainly Tripoli,
Janzour, Tarhouna, Bani Walid and Benghazi. Despite numerous reconciliation
efforts supported by official government decrees, Tawerghans have not been
allowed to return to their city which, presently, lacks all essential services including
electric power and water supply.
2. Tawergha IDPs residing in Benghazi consist of 1040 households which are
distributed within 9 camps (Table 19). The largest numbers of IDPs live in AlHalees,
AlRiayadhia and Garyounis camps, respectively.
3. The IDPs from Tawergha live in cramped collective public space, schools,
camps, abandoned contractor camps, unfinished buildings, apartments, houses,
makeshift houses and in some cases intents with a few living with relatives or
friends.
4. The IDPs Camps of Tawerghans in Benghazi are supplied with water from: a) The
public network, b) Water wells, or c) Trucks. The nature and state of water supply
systems in these camps vary from one camp to the other and with the source of
water. Based on these results, the water supply situation in these camps can be
summarized as follows:
• All of the camps lack engineered distribution systems. The existing water
supply systems are generally rudimentary with very basic components that
are unsatisfactory and barely meet the basic needs of the residents;
• The water supplied is not treated. Treatment units are needed for camps that
are not supplied from the public supply network. Such units are also needed if
public supply water is not disinfected. The potential for pollution is high and so
there will be public health risks as the living conditions within these camps are
conducive to the spread of epidemics in the presence of contaminated waters.
Powder or tablet chlorine compounds are sufficient to ensue disinfection of
water supplies;
• The reliability of the systems is low as the water supply systems are intermittent
and don’t provide the quantities required;
• All camps require pumps urgently; lack of pumps is a cause of interruption of
water supplies indefinitely;
• Due to the problems associated with materials, engineering, installation and
workmanship, these supply systems are in continuous need of maintenance
which is costly to camp residents;
• The water supply system at Garyounis camp has been upgraded since the initial
visits to these camps on May, 2018 while Abu Hadema (2)camp residents have
been requested to evacuate the site by the end of November;
• The numbers of households within the camps change continuously;
• The IDPs have expressed a strong desire to return to their hometown Tawergha;
45
 countless reconciliation efforts have been made at all official and social levels,
but no avail. At the same time, returning is associated with high security
risks and lack of electricity and water supply services due to almost complete
destruction of these infrastructures and the bad condition of education and
health facilities;
• The fact that the IDPs are residing in these camps temporarily makes it difficult
to execute costly permanent water supply works. At the same time, as long as
these IDPs are present in these camps, they must be provided with safe water
in sufficient quantity. This dilemma needs to be resolved through consultation
between the municipality of Benghazi, Tawergha IDPs representatives and the
GCWW. As the problem is national, involvement of central government bodies
in charge of IDPs is necessary.
Recommendations for Upgrading the Water Supply Systems in Tawergha
IDPS Camps in Benghazi

Several thousands of Tawergha IDPs have been residing in seven Camps in Benghazi since
2011. The living conditions in these camps are unacceptable. Water supply systems are
rudimentary as is sanitation.
1. Construction and rehabilitation of shelter;
2. Construction and rehabilitation of water supply infrastructures;
3. Rehabilitation of electric power infrastructures.

5.1.8 URGENT NEEDS OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS IN TAWERGHAIDPS

CAMPS IN BENGHAZI
The water supply systems in all of the Tawergha’s IDPs camps in Benghazi are in a poor to
bad condition generally. Costs of implementing urgent interventions for rehabilitation of
these systems were estimated to be USD 1.176 million. They varied from USD 57,000 for
Abu Hdaima Camp to USD 455,500 for AlHalees Camp. This amount can be made available
readily by the concerned national authority of donor states and organizations.

No. Item Cost, USD

1 Chlorination units supplies 105,005

2 Pipeline Replacement 9,103,718

3 Pipeline Works Completion 900,000

4 Submersible pumps supplies 8,880,000

5 Surface water pumps supplies 4,950,000

6 Operation and maintenance supplies for the damaged water network 3,579,125

46
7 Tawergha Camps 1,176,000

Total (Twenty eight million, seven hundred and one thousand, eight hundred and 28,701,848
forty eight) US dollars

47
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ABU SALEEM

48
5.2.1 INTRODUCTION
The municipality of Abu Saleem (MoAS) is one of the 13 municipalities comprising the
Greater Tripoli Region. It is the largest municipality in terms of population and area. It
has been ground for armed conflict since 2011 with extensive damages and destruction.
Moreover, it served as a host to thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) post 2011
from several other municipalities of Libya, especially Tawergha. As a result, the MoAS
continues to face infrastructural and socioeconomic challenges that require immediate
intervention.

The MoAS is located at the southern part of the Greater Tripoli Region. It is bordered from
the north by the Tripoli Center municipality, from the south by the municipality of Ben
Ghashier, from the east by Ain Zara municipality and from the west by the municipality of
Hay AlAndalus. It is the largest among Greater Tripoli’s 12 municipalities in terms of area
(7682 hectares) and population.
During the past decades, the population of the MoAS has increased rapidly because of
population growth and migration into the municipality where land prices were relatively low
due to conversion of agricultural lands at the periphery of the municipality into residential
settlements. Unfortunately, the urban growth within the MoAS was not regulated as it
outpaced planning and service provision which lagged considerably. Several infrastructures
projects were planned; execution of some projects was started in 2009-2010, but was soon
interrupted indefinitely in 2011as foreign contractors fled the country for security reasons.

5.2.2 IDPS AND RETURNEES OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN THE MOAS

The MoAS has been host to a large number of IDPs from several cities in Libya since 2011.
Residents of the municipality also were forced to leave their homes and become IDPs in
other parts of Libya because of several violent armed conflicts which took place in densely
populated parts of the municipality; the latest conflicts took place in August 2018.

The majority of IDPs in the municipality came from Tawergha, followed by Kikkla and Yefrin,
and Benghazi. The total number of IDPs according to the IMO Round 22 (Sept. -Oct., 2018)
was 15,000 persons while that of the returnees was 27,000 persons.
The conditions of the water supply systems in camps where Tawerghan IDPs reside are
incomparable, however.

5.2.3 KEY FINDINGS

1. There is no assessment of the state of water supply infrastructures in the Greater
Tripoli region including the MoAS. Lack of knowledge about this state represents a
major challenge to planning as well as executing institutions and service providers
including municipalities;
2. About half of the MoAS has been incorporated into the 2nd and 3rd Generation
Masterplans; this leaves the second half of the municipality in a “must-wait” position
until preparation and approval of new masterplans thus paving the way for random
development of water supply schemes;
3. The exact amount of water consumed by the MoAS residents is not known, but
the amount available from the MMRP exceeds markedly the demand based on
49
 a consumption of 300 LPCD; actual population data are also not available due
to boundary changes of the municipality and the influx of migrants/ IDPs to the
municipality;
4. The per capita water consumption is not known although it is estimated to be about
180 LPCD;
5. The water supply system in the MoAS is managed by the Abu Saleem Services
Center of the GCWW. Data available in this center on the water supply schemes are
very scarce due to its limited human, material and financial resources;
6. The technical and financial capabilities of the Abu Saleem Service Center/ GCWW
are limited; the staff numbers and qualifications are insufficient; these capacities
can be upgraded and increased from a large pool of GCWW employees and new job
seeking engineering and technical institutes graduates;
7. The MoAS relies almost completely on the MMRP for its water supply in the urban
“planned” areas while the rest of the municipality employs public “divisions” or
private groundwater wells and unauthorized taps on the MMRP transmission line;
8. The MMRP supply is adequate for meeting the present and future domestic water
demands of the MoAS;
9. The MMRP waters supplied to the MoAS along with other municipalities in the
Greater Tripoli Region is adequate for domestic uses, but there is no residual
chlorine in the distributed water creating a potential public health risk especially in
light of the deteriorating state of distribution pipes and wastewater collection pipes;
10. The quality of the waters supplied by private or “divisions” wells – located within
the MoAS - is poor with TDS concentrations exceeding 2500 mg/L; this level will
continue to rise due to seawater intrusion rendering the waters unsuitable for
domestic uses. Alternative sources including the MMRP or treatment of the existing
sources are inevitable in the medium-term;
11. The major source of water for the MoAS/ GCWW, the MMRP, is a reliable long-
term source because it is a national project, fully supported by official government,
financially independent, with a capable work force and long and successful O & M
experience;
12. The major source of water for the MoAS/ GCWW, the MMRP, is a national project,
fully supported by official government, financially independent, with a capable work
force, long and successful O & M experience;
13. The water supply is available at high pressure negating the need for pumping stations
that require continuous skilled operation, power and maintenance; pressure control
is not applied presently leading to large losses of water due to leakage;
14. The Swani wellfield, located within the MoAS, constitutes a supplemental water
source in case of emergencies. However, out of the 49 wells that are in the field,
5 wells were destroyed; 17 are un-functional, 23 are taken over by neighboring
farmers; one is too salty; leaving only two wells operational. Clearly, repossession,
redevelopment, installation of a treatment plant to reduce the high salinity of
the waters and connection to the WDN will be a formidable task unworthy of the
contribution of the well field which is estimated to be only 4900 m3/day;
15. Water sector institutions including the MMRP and the GCWW are cooperating well
with the local governance officials;

5.2.4 CHALLENGES

The GCWW/ MoAS water supply service provision faces many serious threats and
challenges; the major ones are as follows:
1. The absence of an integrated plan for municipal water supply or management;
2. The large population and area to be served and the high level of services
50
 expected;
3. About half of the area to be served is not included in any urban or water
masterplan; this part of the municipality is the fastest growing thus presenting
the most difficult challenges; the continuous expansion of urban sprawl has
adverse socioeconomic and environmental impacts;
4. There is an understanding and cooperation among the water supply institutions
including the MMRP and the GCWW and the local governance officials in the
MoAS of the challenges facing the water services provision in the municipality;
however, both face serious financial constraints which have been aggravated
by customers’ refusal to pay water service tariffs;
5. Financial constraints have been aggravated by rising prices, cash availability
crisis, hyperinflation making O & M services and items either unavailable or
unaffordable;
6. Reliance on one water supply source, the MMRP, has associated risks especially
in the absence of large scale storage and emergency backup source(s);
7. Frequent power cuts and fuel shortages causing prolonged water shortages
with adverse impacts on water supply service levels and on electromechanical
equipment as well as socioeconomic impacts;
8. Deteriorating water supply infrastructures requiring large financial resources
which are difficult to allocate due to the looming economic crisis; any
investments in this field should be preceded with a detailed survey of the state
of water supply infrastructures;
9. Increased water losses due to leakage and lack of pressure control;
10. Armed conflict and lack of security with adverse impacts on implementation
of projects and with severe damages and destruction to the water supply
infrastructures;
11. Weak law enforcement as reflected by the taking over of most wells in the
Swani field, unauthorized connections to the MMRP, etc.;

5.2.5 RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Allocation of standby or emergency water source and storage facilities as well as
the provision of redevelopment, rehabilitation and renovation, as needed;
2. Provision of means of transporting water to households and vital facilities in
cases of extended water shortages or emergencies;
3. Preparation of an urban plan including an integrated water supply masterplan;
4. Conducting a detailed survey of the state of water supply infrastructures within
the MoAS but in consortium with other municipalities as is technically required
to better plan for upgrading the water supply service levels in the municipality;
5. Providing access to safe drinking water in those areas of the MoAS which lack
this basic service “right”;
6. Completion of halted and interrupted water supply projects which address directly
supplying water to areas of severe shortages;
7. Installation of water meters and pressure gauges in critical locations to allow
understanding of network/ water supply hydraulics, and consequently, to improve
operation, service quality and minimize leakage losses and associated damages;
8. Improve the reliability of electric power supply services connected to water supply
systems to ensure continuity of services;
9. Investigate water supply reliability issues through the provision of alternate
sources and/or strategic storage;
10. Raise awareness on water conservation and water demand management;
11. Improve mechanisms for collection of revenues making use of internationally

51
 demonstrated technologies and practices;
12. Elaborate urgent, short-term and medium-term plans proposed in this report;
13. Expedite the implementation of these plans especially the urgent investment/
development plan;
14. Establish an information management system along with a database, equipment,
software, etc. including all aspects of the water supply in the MoAS in association
with other municipalities linked technically with it; this task should also include
training of staff and provision of material and financial means for its continuity;
15. Establish a water supply and quality monitoring program and provide all human,
material and financial means needed to ensure its continuity;
16. Provide security for all employees, infrastructures and other assets to ensure
safety and service provision.

5.2.6 URGENT NEEDS ANDINVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR WATER

SUPPLY IN THE MOAS

1. The total cost of rehabilitation is about USD 2 million. This amount represents
mostly supplies of trucks for water supply to households and vital facilities in case
of extended water shortages or emergencies. Although the interventions are urgent,
their causes are not all directly related to the armed conflict and insecurity.
2. The funds required are relatively small and can be managed readily within the
municipality’s budget or from emergency allocations by the state. In the event such
funds are not available, a phased implementation plan should be prepared with
criteria based priorities.

5.2.6 KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY IN THE
TAWERGHAIDPS CAMPS IN THE MOAS

Key Findings Regarding Water Supply in the Tawergha IDPs Camps in the MoAS

1. A total of 5000 IDPs from Tawergha have settled in three camps within the MoAS
since 2011;
2. These IDPs live mostly in dormitory constructed by ex-contractors to accommodate
their employees;
3. A few of the IDPs live in makeshift shelters that are of unacceptable quality;
4. The IDPs camps are supplied with water from the MMRP and from private wells;
the quality of the MMRP water is acceptable while that of the wells is marginal;
MMRP water supply shortages occur; storage is limited; water supply “network”
is rudimentary; the water supplied is not chlorinated; and pumps are in continuous
need for repair;
5. Desalination units are used in two camps but are not functional presently due to
lack of spares and consumables;
6. The IDPs have expressed a strong desire to return to their hometown Tawergha;
countless reconciliation efforts have been made at all official and social levels,
but no avail. At the same time, returning is associated with high security risks and
lack of electricity and water supply services due to almost complete destruction
of these infrastructures and the bad condition of education and health facilities;
7. The fact that the IDPs are residing in these camps temporarily makes it difficult
to execute costly permanent water supply works. At the same time, as long as
these IDPs are present in these camps, they must be provided with safe water
in sufficient quantity. This dilemma needs to be resolved through consultation
52
 between the municipality of Abu Saleem, Tawergha IDPs representatives and the
GCWW. As the problem is national, involvement of central government bodies in
charge of IDPs is necessary.

Key Priorities and Recommendations

for Rehabilitation of the Water Supply
Schemes in Tawergha IDPs Camps in the MoAS
1. Providing appropriate shelter;
2. Providing adequate indoor water supply and sanitation facilities;
3. Providing adequate water supply;
4. Reconstruction or rehabilitation of water supply pipelines;
5. Provision of water storage to overcome shortages;
6. Providing adequate sanitation services;
7. Improving the reliability of electric power supply services.

5.2.8 URGENT NEEDS AND INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE

TAWERGHA IDPS CAMPS IN THE MOAS

The estimated costs of rehabilitation of water supply systems in Tawergha IDPs camps in
the MoAS were LYD 200,500. The costs are similar for the different camps. These costs are
clearly low and funds can be obtained readily from several official and unofficial sources
or donors. Fortunately, most equipment and services for the rehabilitation are available
locally. To this cost should be added a total of USD 52,435 for rehabilitation of the water
supply systems of the IDP camps in the municipality.

Unit Subtotal
No. Description Unit Quantity
Price ($) Price ($)

Provision of trucks equipped with 12

m3 steel water tanks fully equipped
for transporting water from allocated
well fields/ sources to households and
1 No. 12 130,000 1,560,000
vital public utilities in cases of extend-
ed water shortages or emergencies.

Supply and installation of water quality

2 control laboratory fixed, with training of 8 No. 1 150,000 150,000
technicians

Supply of water quality control mobile labo-

3 No. 2 5,000 10,000
ratory, with training of users

4 Preparing an emergency water safety plan. L.S 1 60,000 60,000

Supply of mobile chlorination unit for
5 post chlorination of the pipe network No. 1 150,000 150,000
of the municipality

53
 Preparation of a scope of work (RFP)
for the masterplan to include the
south and south west counties of
the municipality as well as the de-
sign work of the infrastructure (Road
6 network, water distribution network, L.S 1 25,000 25,000
sewage and rainwater drainage net-
works, communication network, elec-
trical network and gas network)

Total (One million, nine hundred, and fifty five thousand) US

1,955,000
dollars

54
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE MUNICIPALITY OF
AZZINTAAN

55
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION
The municipality of Az-Zintaan (MoZ) is one of the 14 municipalities (pre-2011) comprising
the Western Mountain Region. It is one of the largest municipalities in terms of population
and area. It has been ground for armed conflict in 2011 and served as a host to thousands
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2014/2015 originating mainly from Tripoli.

Domestic water is provided by the General Company for Water and Wastewater (GCWW).
Armed conflict and IDPs impacted the water supply infrastructures to some extent, but not
significantly, posing additional loads and challenges. The MoZ infrastructural challenges
included availability and quality of water supply services with direct impacts on the
municipality’s population.

5.3.2 KEY FINDINGS

1. The MoZ is home to about 73,000 persons living in 10 counties; the number will increase
to about 80,000 in 2023. The municipality is also hosting about 2500 IDPs, most of them
live in the city of Az-Zintaan;
2. Data on actual water demand and supply situation within the MoZ are unavailable due
to the lack of monitoring, metering and documentation. Based on a per consumption
of 200 LPCD, the estimated water demands for the MoZ for the years 2018 and 2023 are
14,571 and 16,009 m3/day, respectively;
3. There is no assessment of the state of water supply infrastructures in the MoZ including
the city of Az-Zintaan. Lack of knowledge about this state represents a major challenge to
planning as well as executing institutions and service providers including municipalities;
4. The MoZ obtains water for domestic uses from two water sources; namely, well fields
and the MMRP. These sources provide sufficient quantities for the major parts of the
municipality. Other parts rely solely on groundwater which is not always available in
sufficient quantities thus constituting a serious supply problem;
5. Water quantities supplied by the Sauf AjJeen well field meet adequately the needs of the
city of Az-Zintaan up to 2020 , but such quantities are not available to the city presently
for the reasons stated above;
6. The amount of MMRP water allocated to the city of Az-Zintaan satisfies the city’s water
demand for many years to come;
7. The quality of waters from the MMRP, private wells and harvested rainwater is acceptable
conforming with the Libyan Drinking Water Standards;
8. The quality of the public well fields (Sauf AjJeen and Saru Zeinuba) is poor and
unacceptable for most domestic uses;
9. Chlorination facilities are not available at the well fields, storage tanks or at filling points;
the MoZ residents are thus exposed to potential public health risks;
10. Twelve of the 14-18 wells comprising the Sauf AjJeen well field are out of service thus
limiting severely access to potable water to the majority of the residents of the city of
Az-Zintaan and forcing them to purchase water at high prices;
11. The pumping station at the Sauf AjJeen well fields is inefficient because of inherent
and permanent design problems; moreover, its performance is reduced significantly
due to the failed state of its standby pumps and the obsoleteness of the standby diesel
generator;
12. As such, the reliability of the water supply from the field is compromised markedly;

56
13. The well field of Saru Zeinuba will not be available for some time to come because of
the lack of pumping and transmission facilities which will require time and funds to
execute;
14. The state of water storage facilities is mostly fair and poor to bad; all of these facilities
require some maintenance varying from minor to major maintenance while one elevated
tank requires replacement;
15. The WDN is generally in poor condition; moreover, its coverage is very limited. Water
losses due to leakage are high while operational pressure is low;
16. Replacement, renovation, rehabilitation and expansion into new areas are in order;
17. Designs of major water supply infrastructures are completed or near completion so
these works are ready to be executed promptly;
18. Planning, designing, implementation, operation and maintenance, monitoring and follow
up of water supply within the MoZ are conducted by different institutions with practically
no inter communication, coordination, integration, or sharing of data, experience and
expertise. As a result, water supply infrastructures are improperly planned, designed,
executed and operated;
19. Water supply and demand management are undertaken on a reactive, improvised, crisis
case-by-case basis not on a preplanned, coordinated, integrated long-term planned
scenario based basis. The outcomes of both practices are temporary, short lived and
costly solutions;
20. Operation and maintenance (O & M) of water supply works within the MoZ is the
responsibility of the GCWW; the human, financial and material capacities available for
these services are very modest and can hardly meet the rising demands of the residents
and the sustenance of the deteriorating infrastructures;
21. The MoZ has utilities office which overlooks the water supply issues; the role of this
office is not integrated well with that of the GCWW. It is at the same time understaffed
and overwhelmed with growing challenges and activities;
22. The technical and financial capabilities of the Az-Zintaan Service Center/ GCWW and the
Water Administration of the MoZ are limited; staff numbers are excessive but most are
under qualified;
23. Workforce in the water supply fields is available; large numbers of technical institutes
and universities graduates are seeking employment in the municipality. Some basic
training is necessary, however, to maximize their performance and efficiency;
24. Coordination between the GCWW Service Center and the Water Administration of the
MoZ is limited;
25. The MoZ is a host to a total of 2250 IDPs; 1250 IDPs live in Az-Zintaan city and the rest
live in AlQaryaah East. All of them live in rented houses or are hosted by relatives so
their water supply needs are identical to those of their host cities, i.e., they don’t need
special interventions; their impacts on the water supply systems of the guest cities are
negligible;
26. The local government represented by the staff of the MoZ understands the water supply
problems and challenges and is strongly committed to solving them;
27. There is a common understanding of the water supply challenges and commitment to
cooperate to overcome them among the water supply institutions (the GCWW and the
Water Administration/ the MoZ);
28. Many donor organizations (UN entities) are providing support especially in the service
sectors and humanitarian fields; water supply is one of these fields. Their support can
be counted on especially when required services are well defined as is the case for the
MoZ;
57
5.3.3MAJOR CHALLENGES
In view of the above, it can be seen that the GCWW/MoZ water supply service provision
faces many serious threats and challenges which have reduced significantly the GCWW/
MoZ capacity to effectively provide high level water supply services to the municipality’s
population; the major ones are as follow:

1. Armed conflict and lack of security with adverse impacts on implementation of projects
as well as the severe damages and destruction to the water supply infrastructures;
2. The financial, technical and human capacities available are limited restricting the GCWW
and the MoZ from adequately installing, operating and maintaining water supply
systems; consequently, services are limited in scope and at substandard levels;
3. The state of the water supply infrastructures ranges from fair to poor; the WDN covering
only about 60% of the city of Az-Zintaan, is in poor condition as is the Sauf AjJeen well
field pump station and some of the water tanks.
4. Big financial resources are needed to rehabilitate or renovate these infrastructures;
5. Frequent power cuts and fuel shortages causing prolonged water shortages with adverse
impacts on water supply service levels and on electromechanical equipment as well as
socioeconomic impacts;
6. Water users are reluctant to pay their service fees because of the unsatisfactory level
of service provided causing a considerable loss of badly needed revenues. Random
and unplanned urban growth of the city of Az-Zintaan complicates further the water
supply system planning, execution and operation; roads are narrow, ungraded with no
allowance for water, sewerage and rainwater infrastructures.
7. Communication and coordination between urban planners, GCWW, the MoZ and other
water supply stakeholders are limited;
8. Water supply services responsibilities and functions are shared between the GCWW
and the MoZ (Ministry of Local Governance); they are not clearly defined and overlap at
times with adverse effects on the water supply management and service levels.

5.3.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE WATER SUPPLY

PROVISION LEVELS IN THE MOZ

In view of the above, it is clear that water quantity is not a problem in the city of Az-
Zintaan; the municipality’s water demand center. It may be, however, in other parts of
the municipality, but data are lacking. It is therefore very important to take the following
short-term and long-term measures in order to address the water supply problems in the
municipality sustainably:

1. Short to Medium-term Actions

• Protection of the current water infrastructures from terrorists, vandalism, sabotage,

illegal connections as well as anthropogenic pollution;
• Preparation of an integrated masterplan for water and other utilities for the MoZ;
• Conducting a baseline survey of the state of water supply and its capacities (technical/
infrastructures, human and financial) within the municipality to identify gaps and then
set urgent short-term and long-term needs of the cities within the municipality including
water storage facilities and redevelopment, rehabilitation and renovation of water
supply infrastructures (as needed);
• Provision of means of transporting water to households and vital facilities in cases of
extended water shortages or emergencies;
58
• Providing access to safe drinking water in areas of the MoZ which lack this basic service
“right”;
• Completing works for receiving and delivering the MMRP waters while making and
implementing plans for maintaining and protecting the current resources so that they
remain viable alternatives in cases of emergency;
• Completion of halted or interrupted water supply projects which address directly
supplying water to areas of severe shortages;
• Installation of water meters and pressure gauges in critical locations to allow
understanding of network/ water supply hydraulics, and consequently, to improve
operation, service quality and minimize leakage losses and associated damages;
• Improving the reliability of electric power supply services connected to water supply
systems to ensure continuity of services and provision of standby power generators to
overcome electric power cutoffs;
• Improving mechanisms for collection of revenues making use of internationally
demonstrated technologies and practices;
• Raising awareness on water conservation and water demand management;
• Establishment of an information management unit with staff, equipment, software, etc.
along with application of electronic archiving system;
• Establishing a water supply and quality monitoring program and provide all human,
material and financial means needed to ensure its continuity including water quality
analysis laboratories;
• Installation of water treatment systems to improve the quality of groundwater sources;
demonstrated treatment technologies are readily available for such waters;
• Supply of chlorination systems for all MoZ waters to protect public health;
• The significance of water quality and its impact on public health and infrastructures
durability make it an essential element in these management practices. To this end,
assigning personnel, providing special administrative units, provision of analytical
laboratories with materials and training are a priority for the MoZ. Data generated from
this water quality management subsystem should be incorporated into the water supply
system information and archiving system for easy referencing, documentation, analysis
and reporting;
• Provision of security for all employees, infrastructures and other assets to ensure safety
and service provision;
• Institutionalizing water supply services within the MoZ through upgrading/ streamlining
of mandates of the Water Administration of the MoZ and the GCWW Service Offices and
clear identification of mandates;
• Completion of preparation of urban and infrastructures masterplans;
• Establishment of a capacity building program for water supply employees within the
MoZ.

2. Long-term Actions
• Execution of water pumping and transmission facilities for the Saru Zeinbua well field in
order to be used as a viable source of water supply for the city of Az-Zintaan;
• Updating of the water supply sector organizational structure to eliminate overlapping
and minimize numbers and duplication of roles and facilities;
• Provision of large scale balancing/ emergency storage for the city of Az-Zintaan to
overcome extended water cutoffs due to power failures and terrorist acts.

59
5.3.5 URGENT NEEDS ANDINVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR WATER
SUPPLY IN THE MOZ

The total cost of rehabilitation is about USD 3.6 million. This amount represents mostly
supplies of water supply infrastructures (pumps, pipelines, and ancillaries), rehabilitation,
repair and trucks for water supply to households and vital facilities in case of extended
water shortages or emergencies. Although the interventions are urgent, their causes are
not all directly related to the armed conflict and insecurity.
The funds required are not large and can be managed readily within the municipality’s
budget, emergency allocations by the state and donor organization. In the event such funds
are not available, a phased implementation plan should be prepared with criteria based
priorities.

Unit Price Subtotal

No. Description Unit Quantity
($) Price ($)

Supply of trucks equipped with 12 m3 steel

water tanks fully equipped for transporting
1 water from allocated well fields or sources to No. 12 130,000 1,560,000
households and vital public utilities in cases
of extended water shortages and emergencies

Preparation of a scope of work (RFP) for an

integrated infrastructures masterplan for
the counties of the municipality (Roads,
2 LS 1 25,000 25,000
water supply system, sewage and rainwater
drainage, communication, electrical and gas
networks)

Preparation of a scope of work (RFP) for the

design of the infrastructure (Roads, water,
3 LS 1 250,000 250,000
sewage and rainwater drainage, communica-
tion, electrical and gas networks)

Supply and installation of a 50 Hz, 380 v submersible

pump of stainless steel L316; capacity = 30 m3/hour
and a pumping head Hp = 355 m including electrical
4 No 8 25,000 200,000
cables and switch control panel with all protection
required. Most of the Wells diameters are 25 cm-30
cm. The item includes spares for one year

60
 Supply and installation of rising main (304L stainless
steel (AISA 304L); a 125 mm diameter; pressure
5 rating of 80 bar with threaded fittings (ZSM connec- m 2400 100 240,000
tion). The length of the pipe segment shall not exceed
6 meters as per technical specifications

61
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE CITY OF TAWERGHA

62
5.4.1 INTRODUCTION
Tawergha, a coastal town in Libya, was home to over 30,000 residents until August 11,
2011.As a result of the armed conflict, the city became a ghost town with all of its residents
being forced to become internally displaced persons (IDPs) throughout Libya’s different
regions. The present population of the city is estimated to be about 31,000.

Historically, the city relied on artesian wells for water supply; the productivities of these
wells were sufficient to meet the city’s present and long-term domestic water demands.
The water was treated to decrease temperature and oxidize high hydrogen sulfide which
was present in high concentrations. Domestic water was provided by the General Company
for Water and Wastewater (GCWW). The water supply infrastructures along with the city’s
superstructures suffered serious damages and destruction during the armed conflict in
2011 and as a result of looting, vandalism and theft afterwards which escalated in the
absence of the city’s residents.

Despite the numerous reconciliation efforts and agreements taking place since
2011, most of Tawerghans continue to live in substandard shelters in many make-
shift camps mostly within the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi; these camps lack
adequate water supply and sanitation services. Regrettably, these IDPs will face
similar challenges once they are allowed to return to their “long-deserted” homes.

5.4.2 Key Findings

1. Tawergha, a coastal town in Libya, was home to over 30,000 residents until the
August 11, 2011.As a result of the armed conflict, the city became a ghost town
with all of its residents being forced to become internally displaced persons (IDPs)
throughout Libya’s different regions. The majority of displaced Tawerghans have
been residing in the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi;
2. The population of the city was about 30,000 persons in 2011 with an estimated
water demand of 6,000 m3/day; its 2018 and 2023 populations and water demands
are 31,047 and 34,430 persons and 6,200 and 6,880 m3/day, respectively;
3. Historically, the city relied on 8 artesian (averaging 300 m3/hour) and 7 non-
artesian (avg. 50 m3/hour) groundwater wells for water supply. Moreover, 12,800
m3/day are allocated to the city from the MMRP and from the Tawergha turn-out;
4. Sufficient groundwater quantities are therefore available for the city’s residents
for a long time to come from two reliable sources, local wells and the MMRP;
5. Artesian and non-artesian groundwater has high sulfate concentrations and
hydrogen sulfides, high hardness and a high temperature; these waters require
treatment prior to domestic use while the MMRP waters are of suitable quality
and require only disinfection;
6. Uncontrolled flows from artesian wells have caused flooding and inundation of
surrounding areas resulting in settlements of land and buildings, backflow into
the wells with potential pollution and loss of large volumes of water over a period
of 8 years;
7. Data and information on the Tawergha water supply infrastructures are
non-existent; it is, therefore, very difficult to assess the exact state of these
infrastructures or propose and implement any activities related to rehabilitation,

63
 repair or renovation of these works correctly;
8. Most of the water supply infrastructures in Tawergha have sustained severe
or complete destruction, damages and deteriorations as a result of the armed
conflict and vandalism, looting and theft. Additionally, the WDN is comprised of
plastic and metallic based pipe works; the latter are corroded excessively. Based
on field visits, it can be safely concluded that most of the water supply works of
Tawergha are damaged and they are beyond repair. So, their restoration will be
a fruitless endeavor that is more costly and time consuming than renovation and
reconstruction;
9. Insecurity continues to keep most Tawergha residents away from their homes. The
solution to this human tragedy is urgent. The nature of this “reconciliation drawn”
solution will determine the nature of Tawergha water supply restoration project.
Three scenarios are foreseen: 1) Immediate mass return, 2) Slow return and 3)
Gradual return followed by a “faster return” depending on security and service
provision levels. Clearly, the water supply system rehabilitation and renovation
requirements will differ greatly form one scenario to the other especially the
financing and implementation tools;
10. The first scenario is the easiest to manage; smaller returnee numbers can be
supplied using water hauling trucks. Other scenarios require intensive planning,
designing and construction (excavation machinery, equipment, materials,
chemicals, contractors and workforce and ample time for design and execution);
11. Security is a prerequisite to the return of the city’s population and to the
implementation of all rehabilitation activities including those of restoration of
water supply to the city;
12. The need for water supply provision is urgent and will increase rapidly in response
to the rate of return of IDPs. Meeting such needs through traditional means is not
possible; non-traditional means must be developed to meet such urgent needs
while planning and implementing traditional water supply schemes based on
timely executed and financed plans;
13. The rehabilitation of the water supply works requires coordination with
other infrastructural works, namely, wastewater, stormwater, electricity, gas,
communication and roads. Integrated planning and synchronization of activities
by all stakeholders must be given special attention;
14. The Tawergha IDPs scattered throughout Libya’s regions live in unacceptably bad
conditions as was concluded from assessments of water supply conditions in the
municipalities of Abu Saleem and Benghazi. The plight of these IDPs will continue
indefinitely. Restoration of water supply services to Tawergha’s water supply will
undoubtedly encourage the return and put a happy end to their unjustifiable
sufferings;
15. The city’s residents have a strong desire to return as was demonstrated frequently
by organized efforts by hundreds of residents which were met with counter efforts
preventing such returns. This strong desire to return is coupled with enthusiasm to
rebuild the city and restart a new active and prosperous life as was demonstrated
by the volunteer works of the returnees;
16. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of the city’s structures and infrastructures will
provide work opportunities to large numbers of the city’s returnees and to others
from neighboring townships;
17. The towns of AlKarrarim and Tummina located near the city of Tawergha were
affected by the armed conflict.in the effects were in a very small scale compared
to Tawergha;
18. Many donor organizations (UN entities) are providing support especially in the
service sectors and humanitarian fields. Water supply is one of these fields.

64
5.4.3 Major Challenges

Provision of water supply services to Tawergha city residents faces extraordinary challenges
given the devastated state of the city’s infrastructures and superstructures and its having
been abandoned completely by its displaced residents for nine years. These challenges
vary from life threatening ones to capacity challenges caused by non-traditional technical,
financial, human and administrative constraints that may exceed the capacities of the
city. In view of the results of this assessment, report and its key findings, the following
challenges were identified:

1. Lack of security to the city’s potential returnees and to those individuals, institutions
and companies who will be engaged in rehabilitation and restoration of the city’s
water supply system as well as other infrastructures. To date, no official or non-
official body could provide any guarantees for security, safety and peace keeping
in the city and enforce the rule of law;
2. The city’s water supply infrastructures are in poor to bad “completely damaged”
conditions with practically no capacities to meet the demands of thousands of the
returnees. Unfortunately, there is no previous assessment of the state of water
supply infrastructures in the city of Tawergha. Lack of knowledge about this state
represents a major challenge to planning as well as executing institutions and
service providers including municipalities;
3. The financial, technical and human capacities needed for rehabilitation and
restoration of the water supply infrastructures are not available at the city
presently. Recruitment of national workforce may prove to be a challenge but can
be overcome partly by recruitment of local workforce;
4. The population is dispersed over large low density communities within the city’s
boundary making it difficult to plan and implement water supply infrastructures;
5. Restoration of water supply services is only possible in the presence of electric
power; so restoration of power supply must precede or take place concurrently
with the restoration of water supply infrastructures implying doubling of efforts
and costs.

5.4.4 Recommendations

1. A basic element of security is reconciliation and good neighborly relationships.

Special efforts should be made locally and nationally to expedite and perpetuate
the on-going reconciliation efforts leading to permanent peace and respect for
law;
2. These efforts must be concentrated and continued at a rapid pace to ensure the
return of Tawergha’s IDPs and their safety and security within their “long-deserted”
city. This step is also the key prerequisite to overcoming most of challenges that
face Tawergha;
3. The Tawergha Service Center of the Central Region Office of the GCWW should
have a leading role in the planning and management of the rehabilitation of the
water supply activities and projects. The Center needs to be restructured and
rehabilitated immediately as a priority step towards the restoration of water
supply services to the city of Tawergha;
4. The Center should be provided with mobile treatment units, water tankers,
drilling machinery, O & M workshop, spares, materials and chemicals especially
disinfectants.
65
5. The Center should strive to establish a water supply database to be accessible
to all stakeholders who will be engaged in planning, execution, O & M and
management of water supply in the city of Tawergha.
6. Implementation of the “Urgent” Investment and Development Plan for
Tawergha(Annex 1) which was prepared based on the first “returnees” scenario,
i.e., slow rate of return of IDPs to Tawergha;
7. Implementation of the “Short and Medium-Term” Investment and Development
Plans for Tawergha(Annexes 2 - 5) which were prepared to address the short and
medium-term water supply needs of the city of Tawergha sustainably;
8. Conduct a detailed assessment of the water supply infrastructures in Tawergha to
diagnose their actual conditions and level of damages sustained. The results of this
assessment should form the base for a comprehensive project for the restoration
of Tawergha water supply system and for the estimation of the size of funding
and time required for such a project. This assessment addresses the second and
third scenarios (short and medium- term Investment and Development Plans);
9. Good planning, joint efforts and sufficient human, financial and technical capacities
must be provided along with strong national commitments for undertaking the
rehabilitation of the city and, simultaneously, managing the successful return of
its residents. To this end, generous financial, administrative and technical support
must be provided urgently;
10. This national task must include an emergency preparedness plan that is fully
supported by specialized international organizations particularly those in the fields
of water supply and sanitation because these services are presently unavailable
and will be most needed and most in demand upon return of the residents;
11. In the meantime, it is advisable to establish a capacity building program for
water supply employees within the city of Tawergha to set a base for sustainable
management of water works in the city;
12. Use must be made of any existing data on planning (Urban and infrastructures
masterplans, design works, etc.) in the process of restoring water supply works
and interrupted water supply and other infrastructure schemes;
13. The enthusiasm of the returnees should be utilized in expediting certain citizen
and volunteer oriented activities especially in the water supply areas;
14. Development of the towns of AlKararim and Tummina, located near Tawergha,
should be planned and executed simultaneously with the rehabilitation of
Tawergha’s projects to ensure integration, inter-dependence and complimentarily
between them;
15. The support of national and international donor organizations should be solicited
especially in the areas of direct project funding and capacity building. The
rehabilitation and capacity building needs should be translated into projects that
will be made available to donors to select from based on the donors’ field activity
and funding capabilities.

66
5.4.5 URGENT, SHORT AND MEDIUM-TERMINVESTMENT/
DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR WATER SUPPLY IN THE CITY OF
TAWERGHA

Urgent Development / Investment Plan (6-12 months)

The total cost of rehabilitation is about USD 5 million. This amount represents mostly
supplies of water transport trucks, a desalination plant and equipment to ensure drawing
water from its sources and conveying it directly to consumers at delivery points and to vital
facilities until the WDN is rehabilitated or reconstructed in due time. These interventions
are urgent and must be made immediately so that returnees can have access to potable
water.
The funds required are small and can be managed readily within the national budget,
emergency allocations by the state and donor organization. In the event such funds are not
available, a phased implementation plan should be prepared with criteria based priorities.

Unit Price Subtotal

No. Activity Unit Quantity
($) Price, ($)

Supply and installation of a platform to

fill the truck tanks. The work includes
filling pipes and gate valves. The plat-
1 No. 4 5,000 20,000
form should accommodate two trucks
at a time and be equipped to fill the
trucks in a short time.

Supply and installation of water disin-

fectant powder of calcium hypochlorite
2 L.S 1 20,000 20,000
Ca (OCl)2 for disinfection of water prior
to filling of tanks mounted on trucks.

Supply and installation of standby

electrical generators for the operation
of wells and pumping station (60 KVA),
3 including automatic switch, cables, No. 6 8,000 48,000
electrical connections and steel tank of
5 m3for fuel storage as per appropriate
technical specifications.

Prepare a scope of work for the prepa-

ration of an urban plan and then to car-
ry out the design works of the Tawer-
4 gha city infrastructure including: roads, L.S 1 20,000 20,000
water distribution, sewerage and rain-
water, electricity, communications and
gas networks.

67
 Conduct a training needs assessment
5 and develop a training plan for Tawer- LS 1 50,000 50,000
ghaService Center of GCWW.

Construction and equipping of a cen-

tral workshop for the maintenance of
water supply, sewage and rainwater
work. The workshop should include
6 all tools, equipment and machinery LS 1 850,000 850,000
needed for works related to excavation
work, laying of pipes, maintenance and
repair of distribution networks, dis-
mantling and piping of pipes, etc…

Total (Five million and sixty two thou-

5,062,000
sand) US dollars

Short-term Development Plan

Short-term development plans are comprised of activities which require 1-3 years to be
completed. Such activities, works or services may start as early as urgent ones, but will
be completed in 1-3 years and may depend on corresponding urgent phase works. The
activities for this plan, implementation schedule and bill of quantities are specified in
Annexes 2 and 3, respectively. The total cost for implementing this plan is USD 11 million.
This amount is to be spent mainly on preparation of masterplans and design of integrated
infrastructures and utilities and the execution of two large steel water storage tanks.

Medium- Long term Development Plan

The medium-term plan lists those activities which require 3-5 years to be completed.
Such works fall generally within the GDC’s strategic plans. The activities for this plan,
implementation schedule and bill of quantities are specified in Annexes 4 and 5, respectively.
The estimated cost of implementing this plan is USD 70 million. This entire amount is to
be used for execution of integrated infrastructures and utilities (wastewater, stormwater,
water, roads, power and communications networks) within the city of Tawergha.

68
69
Acknowledgements
UNICEF wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of
senior staff of the three water supply institutions of Libya,
namely, the MMRA, the GDC and the GCWW as well as those
of the four focus/IDP impacted municipalities (Benghazi,
Abu Saleem, Az-Zintaan and Tawergha) in granting access
and providing data and information on water supply
infrastructures as well as in facilitating meetings and field
visits to company sites/ infrastructures. Special thanks are
extended to all of them.
July-2019

Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and editors and do not
necessarily reflect the policies or views of UNICEF, nor of any particular Division or
Office

Prepared by: AlKasaba Consulting, Technical Services and Training

ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

GAWR General Authority for Water Resources

GDC General Desalination Company

GCWW General Company for Water and Wastewater

GWA General Water Authority

J/HS Jefara -Haswan System (Phase II of the MMPR)

IDP Internally Displaced Person

LYD Libyan Dinar

MMRP Man-made River Project

MMRA Man-made River Project Execution and Management Authority

Mm3 Million cubic meters

PCCP Pre-stressed Cylindrical Concrete Pipes

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System

UNICEF United Nations Fund for Children

WHO World Health Organization

CONTENTS 1 Disclaimer
ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS
2
3 CONTENTS
5 FIGURES
7 TABLES
8 2.1 INTRODUCTION
8 2.1.1 Objectives and Scope of the Report
9 2.1.2 Implementation Methodology
10 2.1.3 Significance of the Report
10 2.1.3 Report Contents
10 2.2 BACKGROUND
10 2.2.1 Water Supply and Demand in Libya
2.2.2 Environmental Aspects of Large-Scale Wa-
11
ter Transfers
12 2.2.3 The MMR Project
13 2.3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK
13 2.3.1 Establishment and Mandate of the MMRA
2.3.2 Establishment of the MMR Water Utiliza-
15
tion Authorities
2.4 ADMINISTRATIVE/ ORGANIZATIONAL
15
FRAMEWORK
16 2.4.1 Organizational Structure of the MMRA
16 2.4.2 Vision and Strategy
19 2.4.3 Information Management
20 2.5 FINANCIAL CAPACITIES
20 2.5.1 Financing of the MMRA
21 2.5.2 Production Costs of MMRP Water
22 2.5.3 Tariffs for Water Supplied by the MMRP
23 2.5.4 Revenues and Expenditures
24 2.5.5 Financial Challenges and Consequences
26 2.6 HUMAN RESOURCES
26 2.6.1 Recruitment and Employee Evaluation
2.6.2 Training and Human Resources Develop-
27
ment
28 2.7 TECHNICAL CAPACITIES
29 2.7.1 MMRP Infrastructures
37 2.7.2 State of the MMRP Infrastructures
38 2.7.3 Leakage and Evaporation Losses
38 2.7.4 Quality of MMRP Waters

2.8 MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY BY THE MMRP:

44
AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY
2.8.1 Sustainability of the MMRP Water Sourc-
44
es
2.8.2 Availability of Water from the MMRP
44

2.8.3 Reliability and Vulnerability of the MMRP
49
Water Supplies
 2.9 ARMED CONFLICT, LACK OF SECURITY AND
INSTABILITY
50 RELATED DAMAGES
2.9.1 Damages Caused by Armed Conflict and
51
Lack of Security
56 2.9.2 Damages Caused by Illegal Connections
2.9.3 Damages Caused by Political, Economic
58
and Institutional Instability
1.1.4 Damages Caused by Electric Power In-
terruptions, Outages and Fuel
59 Shortages
60 2.9.5 Costs of Damages to the MMRP
2.10 KEY FINDINGS, CHALLENGESAND REC-
61
OMMENDATIONS
61 2.10.1 Key Findings
68 2.10.2 Challenges
68 1.1.2 Recommendations
2.11 INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR
THE MANMADE
RIVER EXECUTION AND MANAGEMENT AU-
69
THORITY, LIBYA
70 2.11.1 Introduction
2.11.2 Urgent Development/ Investment Plan (6-
71
12 months)
71 2.11.3 Short-term Development Plans
71 2.11.4 Medium-Term Development Plans
72 REFERENCES
LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN RELATION
TO REPORT
74 PREPARATION
75 ANNEXES
Annex 2.1 Cities and Towns Supplied and to be
76
Supplied by the MMRP
Annex 2.2 Bill of Quantities and Activities for Ur-
gent (6-12 months)
80 Investment/Development Plan for the MMRA
Annex 2.3 Activities and Time Schedule for
Short-term (3-5 years)
81 Development Plan for the MMRA
Annex 2.4 Activities and Time Plan for Medi-
um-term (3-5 years)
82 Development Plan for the MMRA
FIGURES 14 Figure 1. The MMR Project Phases and Major In-
frastructures
17 Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the MMRA
20 Figure 3. Information and Documentation Center
at the MMRP headquarters,

Benghazi
27 Figure 4. Training Center at the MMRA Headquar-
ters, Benghazi
34 Figure 5. A Producing Well and Header Tanks at
Sarir Wellfield
35 Figure 6. A Producing well at J/HS
35 Figure 7. Pumping Station at J/HS
35 Figure 8. Well at J/HS
35 Figure 9. Flow Control Station at J/HS
35 Figure 10. Regulating and Balancing Tank at J/HS
35 Figure 11. Power Control System at J/HS
36 Figure 12. Fuel Tanks at Sarir Power Station
36 Figure 13. Communication System Wirings
36 Figure 14.Ajdabia Reservoir Inlet Works
36 Figure 15. Grand Omar Mukhtar Reservoir
36 Figure 16. A Camel Water Point, J/H S
36 Figure 17. Water Treatment Units, J/H S
37 Figure 18. Pipe Manufacturing Plant at Sarir
37 Figure 19. Haul Road, Sarir Wellfield
39 Figure 20. Laboratory Equipment, MMRP
43 Figure 21. Chloride and TDS iso-concentration
Contours of the J/HS Waters
Figure 22. Variations in Selected Water Quality
Paraneters of Phase I
45 (1993-2014)
46 Figure 23.AtTalhyaTank & Chlorination Building
46 Figure 24. Chlorinators at Sidi AsSayh Tank
46 Figure 25. Chorine Residual Monitoring
46 Figure 26. Empty Chlorine Cylinders
46 Figure 27.MeasuredDrawdown Levels in the Je-
fara Haswna Wellfields
47 Figure 28. MMRP Total Water Quantities Produced
from Phases I and II
52 Figure 29. Destroyed Wells, J/HS
52 Figure 30. Destroyed Valve Chamber (Station 620)
near Bani Walid (Phase II)
52 Figure 31. Destroyed Valve Chamber on the Ajda-
bia -Sirt Pipeline
53 Figure 32. Destroyed Workshop: Ajdabia
53 Figure 33. Office Building Set Ablaze: Phase I
53 Figure 34. Destroyed Vehicles at Sarir Wellfield
53 Figure 35. Damaged Headquarters of MMRA
53 Figure 36.Number of Wells Destroyed Monthly in
J/HS: Aug. 2016-Feb. 2019
Figure 37. Total Number of Wells Destroyed
Monthly in J/HS: Aug. 2016-
 54 Feb. 2019
56 Figure 38. Blocking of Haul Road
56 Figure 39. Taking Over of Pipe Route Right of Way
Figure 40. Extended Water Shortage Forces Abu
Hadi Residents to Buy Bottled
57 Water
58 Figure 41. Illegal Connections
60 Figure 42. Destroyed Fuel Tanks of the Sarir Pow-
er Generation Station
60 Figure 43.Power Supply Irregularities Forcing Wa-
ter cut-off in Hasawna Wells

TABLES 11 Table 1. Hydrologic Characteristics of Major Ba-

sins in Libya
14 Table 2. Man-made River Project Phases and Ca-
pacities
14 Table 3. Allocations of MMRP Waters
22 Table 4. Estimated Costs and Production Capaci-
ties of the MMRP
22 Table 5. Actual Cost of Water Produced by the
MMRP
23 Table 6. Revenues for the MMRA during the Years
2015-2017
24 Table 7. Expenditures for the Years 2015-2017
26 Table 8. Human Resources Data of the MMRA
Table 9. Infrastructural Components Phase I: Sa-
rir-Sirt/Tazerbo-Benghazi
31 System
32 Table 10. Infrastructural Components of the Phase
II: Haswna-Jefara System
33 Table 11. Infrastructural Components Phase III:
Gurdhabia-Sdada
Table 12. Infrastructural Components of the Phase
IV: Ghadames- Zawia-
33 Zwara
34 Table 13. Infrastructural Components of the Phase
V: Kufra-Tazerbo System
40 Table 14. A Monthly Chemical Water Quality Re-
port, Phase I, MMRP
41 Table 15. A Monthly Biological Water Quality Re-
port, Phase I, MMRP
43 Table 16. Chemical Characteristics of J/H S (Phase
II) Waters
61 Table 17. Indicative Cases of Damages to the
MMRP and their Estimated Costs

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OF THE
MAN-MADE RIVER PROJECT
EXECUTION AND MANAGEMENT
AUTHORITY (MMRA), LIBYA

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OF THE MAN-MADE
RIVER PROJECT EXECUTION AND
MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY (MMRA),
LIBYA
2.1 INTRODUCTION

The Man-made River Project (MMRP) is presently the major supplier of water for domestic
and agricultural purposes in Libya. Domestic water is provided through turnouts and tanks
connected to distribution networks belonging to the General Company for Water and
Wastewater (GCWW). The MMRP is managed by the MMRP Execution and Management
Authority (MMRA) headquartered in Libya’s second largest city, Benghazi.

The MMRA was established in 1983 with the ultimate objective of delivering water from
Libya’s southern regions where it is available in large quantities to the water-short coastal
regions where demand is concentrated. To this end, the MMRA undertook planning,
designing and execution of the MMRP as well as operation and maintenance of the
completed phases of the project. To its credit, the MMRA has completed the major phases
of the MMRP - the world’s largest civil engineering project – and prides itself in supplying
water to almost 4 million end-users in over 90 cities and towns throughout Libya.

2.1.1 Objectives and Scope of the Report

This report was prepared as the final deliverable of a UNICEF-sponsored project for the
assessment of water supply institutions in Libya. The ultimate objective of this project was
to assess the legal, administrative/ organizational, financial, human and technical capacities
of the MMRA and identify gaps, and consequently, propose investment and development
plans for sustainable water supply. A secondary objective was to provide a database on the
state of the MMRP infrastructures, its evolution and practices, and identify lessons learned
and experiences gained.

The scope of work of this report consisted of three interdependent parts: 1) Assessment
of the legal, administrative/organizational, financial, human and technical capacities
of the MMRA and identification of gaps and challenges impacting its performance, 2)
Identification of urgent, short-term and medium-term needs to fill the gaps and overcome
the challenges and 3) Preparation of corresponding urgent, short, and medium-term
investment/ development plans.

2.1.2 Implementation Methodology

The report’s scope was implemented in phases, each consisting of several activities, as
follows:

Data Collection:

Data and information on the MMRP’s institutional, financial, technical and human
capacities were collected from several sources including:

• Literature surveys and reviews of studies, articles, reports, plans and programs
prepared on the MMRP;
• Reports on water supply and quality data prepared by the MMRA;
• Meetings, communications and interviews with senior MMRA staff;

1
• Comprehensive baseline questionnaires filled by the MMRA branches;
• Media coverage and the official website of the MMRA;
• Field visits to the MMRA’s headquarters in Benghazi and Tripoli;
• Field visits to MMRP wellfields and facilities in Sarir and Hasawna regions, Pipe
Manufacturing Plant at Sarir, water storage reservoirs (Ajdabia, Omar Mukhtar,
AtTalhya, Shwaerif, Sidi AsSayeh) along with pumping stations and control
facilities, water quality testing laboratories, information centers, etc.

Cost Estimates for Investment/ Development Plans

Cost data utilized for preparation of Bills of Quantities (BOQs) for the urgent investment/
development plan for the MMRA were solicited from several sources including the
following:
• Recent offers, previous and present contracts;
• Suppliers of equipment and materials (pipes, pumps, valves, chemicals, etc.)
• Experts estimates;
• Local markets surveys.

Data Analysis and Validation of Results

The data collected were compiled, synthesized and analyzed for the identification of
the baseline state of the MMRA, assessment of its legal, administrative/ organizational,
financial, technical and human capacities, identification of key findings, major challenges,
and, accordingly, preparation of recommendations. Subsequently, urgent, short and
medium term investment/ development plans were prepared.

The Assessment results were presented in a special workshop held at the GCWW’s
headquarters in Tripoli and attended by concerned staff for review and validation. The
feedback form this workshop was documented and incorporated to produce the final
“officially approved” assessment report.

2.1.3 Significance of the Report

This baseline, assessment and needs report of the MMRA is the first comprehensive
report on the different aspects of this major water supply institution. It was prepared by
AlKasaba Consultants under the sponsorship of the UNICEF and combines the results
of efforts and contributions of many specialists including those of the MMRA itself.
The report forms a database that has been validated by the MMRA experts making it a
national water sector institutional reference. Although it is a reliable and comprehensive
document, there remains large room for completeness, improvement and continuous
updating. Moreover, it should be subjected to further scrutiny to improve the accuracy of
the data presented and fill the data gaps that may exist within the report.

2.1.4 Report Contents

The report consists of the following sections:
1. Introduction and Background (Sections 2.1 and 2.2);
2. Legal, administrative/ organizational and financial frameworks (Sections 2.3 to
2.5)
3. Human resources and technical capacities (Sections 2.6 and 2.7)
4. Municipal water supply by the MMRA (Section 2.8)
5. Armed conflict and lack of security impacts (Section 2.9)

2
6. Challenges, conclusions and recommendations (Section 2.10)
7. Urgent, short and medium-long term investment/ development plans (Section
2.11).
2.2 BACKGROUND
2.2.1 Water Supply and Demand in Libya

Libya relies almost completely on groundwater to satisfy all of its water needs exploiting
groundwater from five major aquifers extending throughout the country’s vast area.
Overexploitation of local aquifers along Libya’s coastal areas – where over 80% of the
country’s population reside and where most of the its agricultural and industrial investments
are located– led to: 1) Sharp lowering of water tables, 2) A decrease of pressure in aquifers,
3) Drying of wells, 4) Seawater intrusion resulting in unacceptable salinity levels, and 4)
Land subsidence (1, 2). The compounded impacts of these problems have led to acute
water shortages affecting the daily life of most Libyans and constraining the countries
development with severe adverse socio-economic and environmental consequences.
Fortunately, good quality water is available in huge quantities in four major underground
basins spanning Libya’s south forming the world’s biggest reservoirs of fossil freshwater.
The quantities and qualities of waters in these basins are summarized in Table 1 (2, 3).The
amount of sustainably useable fossil water stored in these aquifers is estimated to be
10,000-12,000 cubic kilometers (4). The amount of water in the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer,
shared by Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Chad is estimated to be 373.3 x 1012 m3 (5). According
to a study by CEDARE, if this amount is divided equally between the sharing countries at a
withdrawal rate of 1380 Mm3/year, the water supply will last 4860 years (5)!

Although the quantities reported are only estimates, considering that Libya’s projected
water demands in 2025 are only 4000 Mm3/year (2), it is clear that Libya was facing water
supply problems, not water resources problems.

Table 1.Hydrologic Characteristics of Major Basins in Libya*

Sustainable yield withdrawal rate, Mm3/
Basin Area, km2 TDS, mg/L year
Renewable Non-renewable
Jefara 18,000 1000-1500 (> 5000) 200 25
Hamada 215,000 1000-5000 250 150
Jabal Akhdar 145,000 1000->5000 200 25
Sarir/ Kufra 700,000 200-1500 0 1,800
Morzuk 350,000 200-1500 0 1,800
Total 1,428,000 - 650 4,050
*Adopted from Ref. (2, 3)

The transportation of fresh water from the heart of Libya, where it is available in huge
volumes, to the coastal regions was thus “The only realistic option the Libyans has to cease
growing water problems” (6) which any high level person will regard as essential. Not only
will domestic, industrial and part of the agricultural demands be met satisfactorily, but the
transportation is also” seen to counter desertification, ameliorate social conditions, and
offer good possibilities to control and protect the environment (6)”. “With prudent water
resource management, this vast amount of water (of AlKufra/ Sarir basins alone) is more

3
than ample to support planned extraction of 5 Mm3 daily (against or compared to what is
used presently)and to allow the Libyans to sustain this rate indefinitely (6)”.

2.2.2 Environmental Aspects of Large-Scale Water Transfers

Contrary to common belief, the most important riches of Libya are not the oil wells, but
its groundwater aquifers. Transfer of large amounts of water from these reservoirs in
Libya’s south to the north across large areas of mostly barren lands and smaller areas of
mountainous and agricultural plains will have both favorable and adverse environmental
as well as socio-economic impacts. The major environmental issues are:
• Availability of water for domestic and agricultural uses will reduce excessive mining
and seawater intrusion in the northern “local” basins;
• By increasing the irrigated areas in Libya’s fertile plains, desertification will be reduced
and biodiversity will be preserved while food production is increased;
• Except for amounts consumed or evaporated, the water transferred is “expected to
enter the ground water system or enter the sea in those areas nearest to the sea to yield
positive results in recharging depleted aquifers and in dispelling salt wedges thereby
contributing towards the improvement of the state of water resources in localities
“which suffer groundwater depletion or seawater intrusion” (7);
• Because the extracted water is transported by means of closed conduits, there is no
significant consequence to the local environment and ecology;
• The impacts of water withdrawals on basin-sharing countries (Egypt, Sudan, Chad,
Algeria, Tunisia). To put such concerns to rest, “studies were conducted and these
studies confirmed that the groundwater reserves of the aquifers in the south of Libya are
of such immense volumes to dispel the worry (7)”. This conclusion is equally applicable
to concerns regarding impacts on local communities or near wellfields as there are no
significant size communities around the wellfields in the Sahara;
• Since most of the fossil water is not renewable, water sources will be depleted.
Hence, the impact of the project can briefly be summarized as one contributing to
developmental needs of Libya and to the overall improvement of social, economic,
environmental and ecologic conditions including the fight against drought and desertification.
Further investigation based on relevant data available presently is warranted to better
assess both positive and negative impacts of the project and put to rest claims and counter
claims made regarding it.

2.2.3 The MMR Project

The MMR Project was first conceived in the late 1960s with the discovery of oil in Libya;
based on the encouraging findings of the initial feasibility studies conducted in 1974, work
started in 1984. The Project was intended to overcome Libya’s water shortages and lay a
sustainable base for long term development in the country. Specifically, the Project was
intended to achieve the following objectives (8):

1. Provide safe and reliable water supply to support agriculture and satisfy domestic
demands of population in cities, towns and villages along the coastal corridor
and along the MMRP’s pipelines routes;
2. Provide water requirements for some industries located along the MMRP’s
pipeline routes;
3. Achieve food self-sufficiency in cereals or grains and meat;
4. Create employment opportunities through the development and expansion
of agricultural and industrial schemes, thereby, bringing about considerable
transformation in the social and economic sectors.

4
A special body was created to implement and operate this large project, namely, the
Man-made River Project Execution and Management Authority (MMRA). The MMRP was
designed in five phases which, upon completion, will convey 6.4 Mm3/day of water (Figure
1 and Table 2). Each phase is largely separated in its design and function, but all phases will
eventually combine to form an integrated water conveyance network.

MMRP Water Allocation:

The MMRP water is intended to supply water for agricultural, municipal and industrial
purposes. Planned MMRP water allocations for the different phases are summarized in
Table 3. It is clear that the MMRP waters are used mostly for agricultural purposes; the
fraction of municipal water has increased, however, since the Project’s inception.

Operation and Control of Water Supplied by the MMRP:

Phase I of the MMRP is operated on a continuous and constant flowrate with huge
reservoirs to balance the large differences between supply and demand rates especially
agricultural demands while Phase II is operated at a variable supply rate to meet the
varying consumer water demands with consideration to avoiding overstressing of the
system. This mode of operation minimizes the size of balancing storage. This mode
of operation is also implemented using the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
System (SCADA).
The water supply is therefore designed to respond to a minimum of 3-day plan prepared
by the consumer for water demand, provided that the total water demands are up to
system capacity.

2.3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

2.3.1 Establishment and Mandate of the MMRA
Driven by the urgent need to address Libya’s pressing water shortages and convinced of
the feasibility of water transport, the General Peoples’ Congress issued Law No. 10/1983
regarding the establishment and responsibilities of the MMRA (11). The MMRA was
created to undertake the National Development Plan with specific regard to the execution
of the MMRP, being the main body in charge of implementing this plan

Figure 1. The MMR Project Phases and Major Infrastructures

5
 Table 2. Man-made River Project: Phases and Capacitiesa
Phase Capacity, Mm3/day
I. Sarir-Sirt/ Tazerbo- Benghazi (SS/TB) 2.000
II. Jefara –Jabal Hasawna System (J/HS) 2.500
III. Sirt-Sdada (SS) 0.98
IV. Ghadames-Zawia-Zwara (GZZ) 0.246
V. Kufra-Tazerbob (K-T) 1.680
VI. Ajedabia- Tubrokb (A-T) 0.500
Total 6.426
aAdopted from Ref.9
bConsidered as different phases in some references

Table 3. Allocations of MMRP Waters*

Munici- Agricultur- Industri-

Target produc-
Phase pal Uses, al& animal al Uses,
tivity, m3/d
m3/d Uses, m3/d m3/d
I. Sarir/Sirt, Tazerbo/Benghazi 2,000,000 800,000 1,000,000 50,000
II. Hasawna/Jefara 2,500,000 1,200,000 1,250,000 30,000
III. Ghadames/Zawia/Zwara 250,000 250,000 0 0
IV. Ajdabia/Tobruk 0 140,000 0 10,000
V. Kufra/Tazerbo 1,650,000 0 1,500,000 0
Total 6,400,000 2,400,000 3,750,000 90,000
% of Total 100 37.50 58.50 1.40
*Adopted from ref. 10

and operating the Project’s components upon completion. The specific responsibilities
are as follows:

1. Collection, analysis and extraction of findings from available economic and technical
studies;
2. Conducting of economic and technical studies and research needed to complement
previous works;
3. Conducting of economic and technical studies and research, design, preparation of
technical specifications and contracting documents (independently or in cooperation
with others);
4. Contracting for the execution of projects and supporting facilities within the
authority’s/development plans and programs;
5. Management of the main project and supporting projects under execution;
6. Contracting for all works, activities and services needed to achieve the authority’s
objectives;
7. Management and operation of the main projects, subprojects and facilities and
conducting of all works needed for such tasks;
8. Building of administrative, financial and technical capacities needed for the execution
of the main project and subprojects and facilities and for management and operation
of these components.

6
Accordingly, the MMRA was established as an administratively and financially
independent public entity conducting its functions under the supervision of the General
People’s Committee for Agricultural Reclamation and Land Reconstruction (at the time of
its establishment). Presently, the MMRA is under the supervision of the General Authority
for Water Resources (GAWRs).
2.3.2 Establishment of the MMR Water
Utilization Authorities
During the period from 1995 to 1996, three geographically-based authorities were
established to manage the MMRP waters to be used for irrigation purposes (12, 13,
14), namely, the Utilization Authority of Phase I of the MMRP, Benghazi Plain Region
(1996), Utilization Authority for Phase II waters: The Jefara Haswana Plain (1995), and
the Authority for Utilization of the MMR Waters in the Central Region (1996). These
authorities were allocated 40% of the funds allocated to the MMRA from different sources
according to its establishment law and decrees.

2.4 ADMINISTRATIVE/ ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The MMRA is headquartered in Benghazi along with Phase I branch. Phases II and IV are
headquartered separately near Ben Ghashir; finally, Phase III is located in Sirt. Support
sites exist at Sirt, Sarir, Awjala, Ajdabia, Tazerbo and Slough.

2.4.1 Organizational Structure of the MMRA

The organizational structure – upgraded in June 2018 - of the MMRA is shown in Figure 2. It
consists of three centers, six offices, and five general administrations including one for the
Ajdabia, Tobruk Project, and four system branches for the four operational phases of the
MMRP. These branches are managed semi-independently, each having its separate head
offices, staff and facilities. A career staff guide was prepared. Training, salaries, health,
safety and environment guides also exist.

Separate organizational structures exist for Phases I and II. Phase II structure includes
14 administrations. Such a number is, clearly, too large to manage. An update of the
organizational structure of the MMRP was prepared in June 2018 pending final approval
by the executive committee. A similar action is underway for the Phase II structure. It is
essential that the new organizational structures should be dynamic, flexible and modern to
respond to continuous technical, socioeconomic and legal changes and to the shift of the
MMRPs activities from implementation to operation.

The MMRA is managed by an administrative committee consisting of 5 members; including

the heads of the MMRP phases II and IV. All members are full-time employees. This
arrangement is clearly the most efficient as committee members are most familiar with
work activities and challenges and in contact with other staff members and employees.

2.4.2 Vision and Strategy

The MMRA has prepared a long term strategy based on a vision, framework objectives, an
assessment of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats; this strategy is almost
completed and will be utilized upon official approval within a few months.

The MMRA’s vision and strategic framework reflect its unique role as Libya’s major water
supply institution. Its major strengths include the strong laws for its establishment and

7
accompanying bylaws and decrees or decisions which provide it with sustainable funding
from reliable sources, presence of a well-developed organizational structure, independence
in decision making and management, its comprehensive geographical level of coverage,
modern headquarters, maintenance workshops and facilities, a relatively robust and new
infrastructures, a well-trained and qualified staff with a long work experience and training,
well equipped training centers, documentation centers, and two analytical laboratories,
along with a strong legal framework providing sustainable financing sources. Water is
available in large quantities for many years; it flows by gravity throughout most of its
routes, and it is less expensive than other sources. Moreover, it is of good quality that is
within the WHO Drinking Water Guidelines.

a
SS/TB = Sarir Sirt/ Tazerbo Benghazi System
b
G-S = Gurdhabia – Sdada
c
G-Z-Z = Ghadames Zawia/Zwara System
d
H/ J= Hasawna Sahl Jefara System
Figure 2. Organizational Structure of the MMRA

Additionally, the MMRP is a national strategic project as it is the sole water supply source
for most Libyans; it is the cornerstone for sustainable development in Libya. Therefore, it
is supported by government institutions and the public at large.

Strong opportunities exist for the development of the MMRP. Potential revenues from water
sales are high and can cover a good portion of its capital and operation and maintenance
(O & M) costs. Being an internationally recognized project with extensive experience in
management of large scale water transfers, the MMRP can solicit and obtain international

8
support for such activities as research, data management, training, production and economic
improvements, application software, technology transfer and knowledge/ experience
sharing. The MMRP can benefit from many agreements with international organizations.
More support can also be granted from national sources (public and private) once the real
significance of the project is properly presented.

The MMRP faces several challenges, however, the major ones being the incompleteness
of the strategic action plan, the large organizational structure which has received little
upgrading since the establishment of the MMRA employing a centralized top-to-bottom
management approach.

Decision making is centralized through the Administrative Committee which, inevitably,

leads to delays in implementation of urgent activities and works due to large amounts of
activities including urgent ones to be undertaken daily. Moreover, considering the size and
extent of the MMRP activities, it will be difficult for the head of the authority to supervise
effectively all activities and improvise solutions to rapidly emerging problems. To overcome
this problem, the MMRP phases are administered as semi-independent entities by dividing
them into three operational branches (Phase I, Phase II, and Phase IV). This way much
of the work load is distributed “horizontally” to as many persons as possible at lower
administrative levels allowing senior management’s time to focus on priority issues.

Some of the general administrations are located at the headquarters in Benghazi while
others are located in Ben Ghashier and Tripoli. As such, communications are not direct
and access to the committee chairman or other senior staff is limited and vice versa.
Consequently, performance levels will be reduced.

It also faces very serious threats which have reduced markedly its efficiency; these threats
include armed conflict, lack of security, lawlessness, drying up of its funding sources,
power shortages and political, economic, and institutional instabilities. The impacts of
these threats are addressed in a separate section (2.9).

2.4.3 Information Management

The MMRA administrative units, centers and offices rely heavily on digital systems in
conducting their day-to-day activities. A central network links the MMRA’s units into an
electronic archiving system. Accordingly, all work and activities are digitized; technical,
financial and administrative reports are prepared regularly and upon request based on data
stored/ accessed from different units.

2.4.3.1 Information and Documentation Center

A dedicated Information and Documentation Center (IDC) and a Data Studies, and Research
Center (DSRC) – located within the MMRA’s premises (Figure 3) – receive data and
information from all units of the authority (data, information, documents, reports, maps,
photos, video tapes, etc.) on a continuous basis, archive it electronically (classify it, store
it, and make it available for further analysis, reporting, etc.) as needed. The IDC undertakes
also the translation of reports, contracts, memoranda of understanding and change orders.
It employs 60 persons. The IDC consists of the following subunits:

• Translation Section.
• Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Unit.
• Technical Support Section.
• Correspondence and Technical Documents Unit.
• Maps (scanning, storage, data entering, classification, retrieval, modification, etc.)

9
 Section.
• Archives Section.
• Incoming/outgoing Documents Registration Unit;
• Documentation and information for Hasawna/Jefara System Division;
• Information support Section for Hasawna/Jefara System;
• Documentation and information Section for Ghadames-Zawia-Zwara System;
• Technical Documentation Unit which specializes in video-taping and digitizing of
all activities associated with well drilling, maintenance, pipelines, reservoirs, etc.
as well as photographing of the MMRA’s activities.
The Information and Documentation Center (IDC) is equipped with the necessary hardware,
systems and software to carry out its work, and has highly qualified staff in their fields of
specialization.

The MMRA also has a special department for information technology which provides
technical support in terms of the maintenance of digital equipment, software and networks,
design, installation, and maintenance of networks, digital needs assessment, design of
software and networks, and information security management among other responsibilities.

Figure 3. Information and Documentation Center at the MMRP headquarters, Benghazi

All documents used in the MMRP are digitized. There are in excess of 25 million
documents. Backup storage ensures that data and information are available in a
sustainable way. Luckily, the archives were not touched during the armed attack and
overtaking of the MMRP headquarters which took place on 15th October 2014.

2.4.3.2 Data, Studies and Research Center

The Data, Studies and Research Center (DSRC) is charged with conducting studies and
technical and economic research on the MMRA’s projects and activities, collection,
classification of data collected so that results are utilized for upgrading of projects and
activities. The DSRC consists of two divisions: 1) Engineering Data, Studies and Research
and 2) Water Resources Studies.

2.5FINANCIAL CAPACITIES
2.5.1 Financing of the MMRA
To ensure funding is available amply and continuously for implementation, operation, and
management of the MMRP, several laws were enacted in addition to Law No. 10/1983; these

10
laws are:

• Law No. 5/1986, including alterations to some of the articles of Law No. 10;
• Law No. 19/1991, regarding additional aspects of the MMR Project and utilization of its
waters;
• Law No. 21/1423, regarding amendments to an article in Law No. 19/1991;
• Law No. 18/1425, regarding the amendment of some fees for the MMRP to allow for
financing of the MMRP water utilization authorities from the same sources as those for
the MMRA. Accordingly, 60% of the collected funds will be allocated to the MMRA and
40% to the Utilization Authorities.

• According to these laws, the MMRA is financed from the following sources:

Funds allocated from the General National Budget to be used to execute projects and
conducting studies for management and operation of the Project including LYD 100
million for the period 1996-2000;
• Loans from national and international entities;
• Revenues from water tariffs levied on municipal, agricultural and industrial water
users;
• Revenues from projects or facilities/utilities executed by the Authority;
• Fixed and non-fixed (mobile) assets belonging to the MMRA;
• Donations and gifts accepted by the MMRA;
• Taxes on tobacco products, fuel, money transfers, tickets and license renewals.

2.5.2 Production Costs of MMRP Water

Implementation of the MMRP started in 1984 and was scheduled to be completed in 25

years. To date, Phases I, II and III are complete while Phase IV is about 85% complete. Work
on Phase V was halted at very early stages due to force majeure. Phase VI is in the planning
and designing stages.

The estimated cost of the project upon completion of all phases is LYD 15 billion resulting
in a water production cost of LYD 0.214/m3 (15). In another study, the MMR project was
more cost-effective compared to the three other options of providing Libya with water:
importing water by ships, desalination of seawater, or laying a pipeline from Europe (16).

Total water production costs for the period 2005-2008 are shown in Table 4 (15). They
averaged LYD 0.44/m3 (USD0.32 /m³), with operational and capital costs averaging LYD
0.336/m3 (USD0.24 /m³), and LYD 0.106/m3 (USD0.08 /m³), respectively. The total “actual”
MMRP capital and operational costs until the end of 2017 were LYD 12.372 billion (Table
5) resulting in a unit production cost of LYD 1.232/m3. This relatively high cost reflects the
underutilization of the MMRP infrastructures to date as the quantities transported were
significantly lower than the design capacity, especially in the early years of production. The
unit cost decreased notably with the increase in quantities transported as is demonstrated
during the period 2005-2009 (Table 4).

11
2.5.3 Tariffs for Water Supplied by the MMRP

The MMRP waters are utilized by several end users, namely:

• Public agricultural projects fed from the MMRP and private farms located in depleted
areas of Swani-Ben Ghashier, Benghazi Plain Projects, and Sirt Central Region Projects;
upon completion of all projects and of all MMRP phases, the total amount of water to be
supplied is 3.75 Mm3/day (9);
• Domestic water supplied or sold to the General Company for Water and Wastewater
supplying water which distributes it to many urban communities along the MMRP route.
A total of 2.4 Mm3/day will be supplied to 90 cities and towns which are planned to be
supplied by the MMRP once all phases of the project are completed (10);
• Several industries located along the MMRP route with a total projected demand of 0.09
Mm3/day (10).

Table 4. Actual Cost of Water Produced by the MMRPa

Item description 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total

Water quantity produced, Mm3 398 430 484 519 603 2,434

Capital cost, LYD/m3 0.349 0.352 0.333 0.331 0.314 0.334b

Operation cost, LYD/m3 0.078 0.080 0.107 0.131 0.135 0.109b

Total Production cost, LYD/m3 0.427 0.432 0.440 0.462 0.449 0.443b

aAdopted from Ref. 15 bAverage 5 year cost

Table 5.Actual Production Costs of the MMRP Waters*

Item Description Value

Capital Cost of Phase I, billion LYDs 4.193

Capital Cost of Phase II, billion LYDs 4.123

)Capital Cost of Phase IV (Ghadames System 1.118

)Capital Cost of Phase V (Kufra-Tazerbo 0.945

Operation & Maintenance Costs, billion LYDs 0.868

12
 ).Other (Loans, insurance, guarantees, etc 1.125

Total Capital and Operational Costs, billion LYDs 12.732

Total quantity of water produced till end of 2017, BCM 10.043

Cost of water produced, LYD/m3 1.232

*Adopted from Ref. 15

Although the laws listed above granted the MMRA funding, they did not specify the tariffs of
MMRP waters for the different users. These tariffs were specified upon commencement of
water consumption almost a decade later in the GPC’s decision no. 218 dated 26th April1994;
they were LYD 0.048/m³ for agricultural use, LYD 0.080/m³ for urban use, and LYD 0.796/m³
for industrial use (17).
It is to be noted that the urban water tariff for the MMRP is notably cheaper than the price
of water supplied by the GDC to the GCWW (LYD 0.86/m3) and the water tariff levied by the
GCWW on its resident (domestic) water users (LYD 0.25/m3) (18). A proposed tariff to be
applied by the different domestic water suppliers, namely, the MMRP, GDC, and GCWW is
LYD 0.2, 1.1, and 1.07/m3, respectively.
Water tariffs applied in Libya, including those for MMRP waters, is quite low compared to
other countries (19). Because they are less than production costs, the difference is subsidized
by the government. Such subsidies encourage water use inefficiency (wastage) by users
and financial inefficiency of institutions who will not be enticed to reduce production costs.
This is especially the case for agricultural uses which account for most water uses. Subsidies
should, therefore, be discontinued to reduce water consumption and production costs.

2.5.4Revenues and Expenditures

The MMRA was unable to prepare its Annual Financial Closure Report for the years 2015-
2017 for reasons related to funding sources. The lack of funds specified in Laws 10/1983
and 18/1996 resulted in an interruption of the implementation of existing projects and to
strained O & M activities. The problem was exacerbated by the repeated attacks on the
MMRP’s infrastructures. A real threat thus exists to the continuation of water supply in the
absence of other alternative sources.
According to funding laws, revenues, fuel subsidies, Jehad tax, oil marketing companies,
oil and cigarette tariffs are collected through the Central Bank of Libya. Total revenues for
the years 2015-2017 were LYD 141, 150, and 150 million, respectively (Table 6).

Table 6.Revenues for the MMRA during the Years 2015-2017

Amount, Million LYDs for the Year

Funding Source

2015 2016 2017

13
Central Bank of Libya 0 0 0

Fuel Subsidies 110 120 120

Jehad Tax 30 30 30

Oil Service Companies 1 0 0

Oil and Cigarettes Tariffs 0 0 0

Total 141 150 150

It can be seen that the funds have all but stopped from three major sources and have
become limited to only fuel subsidies and Jehad tax. The total amount is considerably
small compared to typical values collected prior to 2011 and relative to the O & M and
implementation costs of ongoing and planned projects. About one fourth of the revenues
are not collected presently.

Expenditures for the years 2015-2017 totaled LYD 134 million, 144 million, and 171
million, respectively (Table 7). Running costs accounted for about half of the expenditures
with investment costs accounting for almost one quarter, O & M for one eighth. No
expenditure was made on training. A small deficit existed for the three years.

2.5.5 Financial Challenges

Based on the above, it can be seen that the MMRA is mostly people-financed. Its major
fund sources are those specified in the funding laws. Prior to 2011, it had reasonably
sufficient funds which ensured its high performance. For the last 5 years, these funds
have declined significantly constituting only a small fraction of the overall operation and
maintenance costs of the project. The drying up of funding resources can be attributed to
the following factors:
Table 7. Expenditures for the Years 2015-2017

Expenditure during the Year, Million LYD

Area of Expenditure

2015 2016 2017

Investments 38 48 46

Running Costs 70 74 93

14
 O&M 25 21 30

Fixed Assets 1 1 2

Training 0 0 0

Total 134 144 171

• The limited government contributions due to reduction of revenues caused by oil

production and prices declines;
• Allocating 40% of the funds to be gone to the utilization authorities which are involved
in agricultural production activities that can be self-funded through profit-making;
• The amount of collected funds decreased in proportion to declines in oil production
and prices and imports. This situation was exacerbated by the lack of enforcement of
customs regulations;
• The high rise in prices of spare parts, consumables, and services needed by the MMRP;
• The inability of the MMRP’s major client, the GCWW drawing about 40% of its domestic
water, to pay regularly for water withdrawn continuously for domestic purposes. The
GCWW’s debts to the MMRA are subject of difference as the amounts supplied are
not metered in many locations. With no regulations ensuring timely payments, the
MMRA is left at the mercy of its clients’ and their financial abilities. This dependence
has serious adverse impacts on this institution’s financial capabilities with direct effects
on the sustainability of water supplies.
• Financial constraints due to insufficient allocated and collected resources, inadequate
tariff rates, inability to collect revenues from end-users, and the difficulty of opening
letters of credit for imports in hard currency have led to serious delays and interruptions
of major MMRA activities; examples include the following:
•
• Inability to implement the training plans for the development of human resources during
the last three years;
• Difficulties in the provision of spare parts and materials needed for operation and
maintenance of water supply system’s components affecting directly the availability
and continuity of water supplies;
• Interruption of implementation of major works such as the Ghadames/Zawia/Zwara
System (Phase IV) and reconstruction of damaged assets (Pipeline manufacturing plant,
fuel tanks, destroyed wells, etc.);
• Inability to complete the Kufra-Tazerbo phase;
• Inability to start the Ajdabia-Tobruk conveyance system.
•
• Remedial actions are, therefore, necessary to overcome these challenges including:
•
• Enforcement of funding laws ensuring the collection and transfer of all funds to the
MMRA;

15
• Reconsideration of values of water tariffs so that they are increased in proportion to
actual water provision costs with due consideration to user types;
• Changing payment mechanisms by end-users to the MMRA, especially the GCWW, so
that dues are transferred directly from the National Budget without going through the
GCWW;
• Simplification of procedures for opening of letters of credit leading to timely opening by
the Central Bank of Libya of letters of credit in favor of the MMRAs for import of spare
parts and materials needed for O & M of the MMRP;
• Soliciting the help of international and UN organizations and donors for funding and
implementation of the MMRA’s capacity building programs;
• Rise in rate of exchange on imports enforced by the Central Bank of Libya in 2018 on
imports from LYD 1.4 to 3.19 for one US dollar.

2.6 HUMAN RESOURCES

The number of human resources needed by the MMRA is 3541. Presently, the MMRA
employs a total of 2475 persons (Table 8). Technical and administrative staff forms 27%
and 70%of the staff, respectively, with financial and legal staff forming 2.5 and 0.5%,
respectively. Most of the staff is employed at the SS/BT and MMRA headquarters in
Benghazi (33 and 32%); the J/H System employs 27%. The MMRA faces a shortage of
1066 persons mostly in technical fields (799) and administrative (200).

Table 8. Human Resources Data of the MMRA*

Type of Employment
Division/ System
Administrative Technical Financial Legal Total

Administration, Offices, Centers 425 306 56 13 800

Sarir-Sirt/Benghazi-Tazerbo 82 736 1 0 819

Hasawna/Sahl Jefara 85 586 4 0 675

Gurdhabia/Sdada 13 33 0 0 46

Ghadames/ Zawia/ Zwara 58 74 0 0 132

Ajdabia/ Tobruk 1 2 0 0 3

Total 663 1,735 61 13 2,475

*Adopted from Ref. 8

16
2.6.1 Recruitment and Employee Evaluation

Staff is recruited and appointed effectively based on work needs and applicant qualifications.
A general policy is to employ as many persons from the worksite region as possible to
provide work opportunities to local communities and ensure assets are protected effectively.
Job description cards containing a description and definition of each job, the definition of
its responsibilities and duties, and the conditions required to be met by those who occupy
it are available in the MMRA.

Moreover, individual employee performances are annually evaluated using a unified

“standard” evaluation forms. Such a traditional evaluation procedure overlooks differences
in the nature of work and of employees which reflect heavily on performance. The upgrading
of the evaluation system into an individualized job-specific one is, therefore, in order.

The MMRA has developed regulations and procedures manuals. Abiding to procedures
appears to be not to par, however. In this regard, it is necessary to:
• Develop a procedures manuals for all jobs to clarify the workflow within the
different administrative units and the steps to be followed to implement the work
with the speed and accuracy required;
• Conduct training courses in the preparation of such manuals for selective selected
staff from all administrative units.

2.6.2 Training and Human Resources Development

Training has been a major element and priority in the MMRA’s human resources
development policies; it has been undertaken by a dedicated semi-independent Training
Department within the Planning, Follow-up and Quality Administration with two
dedicated, fully equipped, and staffed training centers one in Benghazi and the other in
Tripoli (Figure 4). Training programs conducted locally and abroad included the following:

• Engineering and technical programs

• Administrative programs
• General programs (Seminars, Conferences, Workshops)
• Financial and computer programs
• Legal programs
• Industrial safety and security programs

17
 Figure 4. Training Center at the MMRA headquarters, Benghazi

The latest full scale training program implemented in 2013/2014 included 92 internal
courses, 75 external courses and 26 general programs (seminars and workshops). The total
number of participants in the courses and programs is 1577 employees. More training
programs have been implemented in the following years; the latest being in 2018. These
programs have excluded external training, however.

An integrated training plan, to be implemented locally, was developed for the year 2018
consisting of 48 training courses and targeting 562 employees of all levels.

Thanks to such programs, today, operation and maintenance of the MMRP components
are conducted by completely Libyan staff. The fact that water is supplied continuously to
domestic and agricultural users despite the very serious armed conflict, insecurity and
economic instability is the best proof of the discipline and high level of qualification of the
MMRP’s staff.
The MMRP has evolved from planning to designing and then to construction; with most of
its major phases having been completed; focus is presently on operation and optimization
of service provision. The nature of work conducted by the MMRP human resources changed
accordingly. Moreover, a large part of the work during the early stages of the development
of the project was done by non-Libyans with a heavy role of technical assistance. Today,
this role is almost non-existent.

Such changes in the nature of the MMRP’s activities require a corresponding change in
the numbers and qualifications of the MMRP staff. It is, therefore, necessary to reevaluate
the present staff numbers and qualifications in light of operation-focused requirements. It
is likely that some changes in staff number will be required along with some new training
programs.

2.7TECHNICAL CAPACITIES
The MMRP is mainly a technical project. In fact, it is “The largest civil engineering project in
the world”. Its design, construction, operation and maintenance employed unique analysis,
tools, utilities and equipment as well as astronomical quantities of pipe manufacturing
and fill materials. Pipe lifting cranes and transporting trucks were made especially for the
MMRP. Expectedly, the dimensions and size of its components were very large and non-
existent prior to and during the MMRP inception period. Prestressed Concrete Cylinder
Pipes (PCCPs) were 4 m in diameter and 75 m long. The MMRP’s technical capacities are

18
best reflected by its infrastructural components which are described briefly below.
2.7.1 MMRP Infrastructures
The major infrastructural components of the MMR Project are shown in Figure 1. They
consist of the following:
• Wellfields, wellfield lateral and collector pipe work, wellfield balancing/header
tanks;
• Pipelines;
• Pumping stations and flow control stations;
• Regulating, pressure breaking and surge protection tanks;
• Balancing and storage reservoirs;
• Turnouts and feeding points;
• Power supply, transmission and distribution systems;
• Communication and control systems.

A semi-quantitative inventory of the infrastructural components of phases I to V of the

MMRP is presented in Tables 9 to 12, respectively, followed by a short description of other
major components, namely:

• Water treatment plants;

• Chlorination units at tanks;
• Haul roads;
• Operation Support and Maintenance (OS& M) facilities;
• PCCP manufacturing plants.

Illustrative photos of these infrastructural components are shown in Figures 5 to 17. As

stated previously, Phase IV: Ghadames-Zawua -Zwara and Phase V: Kufra-Tazerbo are still
under construction while Phase V: Ajdabia-Tobruk is in the planning stage. The Ajdabia-
Tobruk system is intended to supply domestic water to the Green Mountain and Batnaan
regions which face serious water scarcity problems, but share in financing the MMRP. A
total of about 0.14 Mm3 will be supplied from the Tazerbo-Kufra system. A listing of the
infrastructural components of this phase is not possible as studies are in progress presently,
but they will include a pipeline, pumping stations, and balancing reservoirs.

Water Treatment Plants

Individual treatment units are installed on well heads of the Tazerboo Wellfield, 2 treatment
plants are installed at the J/HS Wellfield and one treatment plant is to be installed at the
Ghadames System.

Chlorination Units at Tanks

Two chlorination units were installed at the balancing Tanks at Sidi AsSayeh and one
chlorination unit was installed at AlQaryat.

Sarir Power Generation Station

The Sarir Power Generation Station is dedicated to supplying the Sarir Wellfield, Pipe
Manufacturing Plant and camp with electricity. It is rated at 90 MW. It consists of 6 units (15
MW each); presently, only 3 units are operational, 2 need maintenance and 1was destroyed
by fire. The station is integrated into the National Power Network. The interruption of gas
supplies during conflict times forced operation to use heavy fuel and intermittent operation.

19
The station’s fuel tanks were burned in an ISIS attack in March 2016 causing the loss of 5.5
million liters of kerosene stored in these tanks. Presently, the station uses gas which is not
available continuously.
Cathodic Protection System
A Cathodic Protection System for all MMRP pipes has been installed to protect all PCCPs
used in all of Phase I and parts of Phase II of the MMRP from corrosion.

Headquarters, Operations Support and Maintenance (O S&M) Facilities

The MMR Project headquarter is in Benghazi with a second location in Ben Ghashir near
the city of Tripoli. Operation and maintenance are accomplished employing operations
and maintenance stations at Tazerbo, Sarir, Ajdabia, Ghurdabya, Brega, Sirt and Benghazi,
Asdada, East Jabal Haswna, North East Jabal Haswna, Shwayrif, and Ghadames (at well
field). The Central Control Room and a further are located at the Headquarters Building at
Bin Ghashir.
Prestressed Concrete Cylinder (PCCP) Manufacturing Plants
The MMRP water is conveyed using 4-meter diameter, 7.5-m long PCCP pipes; these pipes
are manufactured at two large plants located at Brega and Sarir (Figure 18). The Brega
Plant consists of 3 production lines each producing 40 pipes/day; the Sarir Plant consists
of 2 production lines producing 80 pipes daily (Figure 19). Both plants are not functional
presently; Brega Plant was destroyed by NATO forces in 2011 while Sarir Plant was looted
and vandalized during tribal feuds in Jan. 2014 which forced the operating company to leave
the site which was exposed to more damage by ISIS attacks in March 2016. Additionally,
two wellfields were developed for the PCCP manufacturing plants; the Sarir Wellfield which
produces 10,000 m3/day and the Brega Wellfield which produces 14000 m3/d.
Haul Road to Access MMRP Infrastructures

The MMRP infrastructures are accessible through a network of 4255 km-long haul roads
which were also used to convey the pipelines (Figure 19). This network plays a vital role in
the operation and maintenance of the extensive infrastructural works.

Table 9. Infrastructural Components Phase I: Sarir-Sirt/Tazerbo-Benghazi System

Infrastructural component Description/ value

Productivity 2 Mm3/d

Wellfields Sarir + Tazerbo

Water end-users Jalu-Awjala-Ajdabia, Ajdabia- Benghazi, Coast-

al urban communities up to Sirt + agricultural
projects

Turnouts  80

Number of wells 234 production + 69 observation/testing

20
Well water collection at Tazerboo and Sarir fields 339 km

Water conveyance pipelines, 4 m diameter PCCP 1586 km

Above ground collection reservoirs 2 at Sarir + 1 at no. at 170000 m3 each 3

Tazerboo

Gurdhabia End Reservoir Mm3 6.8

Pumping Station: Slough m3/d 280,000

Pumping Station: Weshka/Sdada m3/d 980,000

Omar Mukhtar Reservoir, Slough Mm3 4.7

Collection/balancing reservoir, Ajdabia Mm3 4.2

Grand Gurdhabia Reservoir, Sirt (Agricultural projects Mm3 15.4

)balancing supply

Grand Omar Mukhtar Reservoir, Slough (Agricultural Mm3 24

)projects balancing supply

)Talheea Balancing Tank (supplies Benghazi m3 280,000

.Camel watering tanks, 25 no m3 180-280

Power generation station MW 90

Power transmission and distribution system

Communication and control system: contracts for main- Presently not operational
tenance are not made effective

Operation & Maintenance Support Centers at Hawari/ 7

Benghazi, Slough, Sirt, Sarir, Ajdabia, Tazerbo, Awjala

Table 10. Infrastructural Components of the Phase II: Haswna-Jefara System

Infrastructural component Description/ value

Design productivity 2-2.5 Mm3/d

21
Date operation started Aug. 1996, preliminary handover in
2006

Wellfields Hasawna North, SE & SW

Water end-users Central route, eastern route in-

cludes Tripoli-Terfas Agricultural
Route

Turnouts 60

Number of wells 473 producing + 37 observation &

testing

Pumping stations: East J/HS, NE J/HS (South), NE J/HS (North), Tar- 6

houna, Rabta 1, Rabta 2

Pumping stations on Tarhouna Abu Zayan Junction 2

Flow control stations at Shwaerif, Wadi Tamala, Junction of routes, 6

Sidi AsSayeh, Ain Zara, Airport Road

Well water collection pipe lines 0.3-4 m diameter 753 km

Water conveyance pipelines 3.6-4 m diameter 983 km

Regulating and break pressure tanks at Shwaerif, Tarhouna, Sidi 6

Said, 2 at Abu Aish, Gharabulli

Agricultural reservoirs on Tripoli Terfas Junction 9 at 86000 m3 each

Flow control stations at Shwaerif and Wadi Tamala 2

Power transmission and distribution system: 3 transfer stations 17 sub-stations

66/220 kV, 11 transfer stations 33/66 kV, 3 transfer stations 11/66 kV

J/HS east: 173,360 m3, NE J/HS (South): 37300 m3, NE J/HS (North): 12
96800 m3, Fezzan: 182390 m3, Shwaerif: 164330 m3, Tarhouna: 83070
m3, Gharabolli: 165000 m3, Sidi Asyaid: 83070 m3, Abu Aisha (1):
45000 m3, Abu Aisha (2): 45000 m3, Abu Zayyan: 300000 m3

Power transmission lines: 66 kV: 481 km, 33 kV: 792 km

Fiber optic communication and control system extending from 1470 km long
wellfields to central control at Ben Ghashier site. Connected to the
National Post Company network at Brak and Tripoli. Controls de- 30 amplification stations
mand supply balancing Ben Ghashier & branch control rooms at 4
pumping stations 3 digital switch board

SCADA system

Operation & Maintenance Support Centers at Ben Ghashier, Shwaer- 3

if and Hasawna regions

22
Water Quality Analysis Laboratory 1

Technical Center for Corrosion Protection 1

Technical Center for Groundwater Reservoirs Management 1

Table 11. Infrastructural Components Phase III: Gurdhabia-Sdada

Infrastructural component Description/ value

Design capacity Conveyance only 0.98 Mm3/d

Water conveyance pipelines 4 m diameter 189 km

Turnouts 60

Balancing tank at Weshka 82,000 m3

Header pressure breaking tank at Gurdhabia 82,000 m3

Gurdhabia Pumping Station (9 pumps at 3.1 MW each)

Sdada Pumping Station (11 pumps at 15.3 MW)

Installation of 17 pair (Wave Control Systems) near Gurdhabia

Pumping Station and 13 pair at Sdada Pumping Station (500 m3
each)

Power substation 220/66/11 kV at Sdada

Power supplementary substation for Gurdhabia 66/11 kV

Communication and Control System

Operation & Maintenance Support Centers at Gurdhabia

Table 12. Infrastructural Components of the Phase IV: Ghadames-Zawia-Zwara

Infrastructural component Description/ value

Productivity 0.25 Mm3/d

23
 Date operation started 2009

Wellfields Ghadames

Turnouts 26

Number of wells 106 production +14 observation/ testing

Water conveyance pipeline 821 km

Pumping stations at Jwaibia and Senawen 3

Break pressure tanks at Jwaibia and Nalut 2

Flow control station south of Aghrbia 1

Power transmission and distribution system

Communication and control system

Operation & Maintenance Support Centers at Gha- 1

dames wellfield

Table 13.Infrastructural Components of the Phase V: Kufra-Tazerbo System

Infrastructural component Description / value

Productivity 1.68 Mm3/d

Date operation started Construction started in 2006 and stopped in 2011; main
line about 70% complete, rest under contracting

End users Green Mountain and Batnaan region (Ajdabia-Tobruk

System) and Hasawna-Jefara region (Gurdhabia-Sdada)

Well fields Kufra

Number of wells 300 production + 14 observation/ testing

Water conveyance pipeline, 4 m diameter PCCP 385 km

24
Pumping stations 3

Break pressure tanks

Flow control station and regulating tank and a

control valve at Sarir

Cathodic protection system

Power substations, transmission and distribu-

tion system at wellfield

Communication and control system

Operation & Maintenance Support Centers at

Kufra wellfield

Figure 5. A Producing Well and Header Tanks at Sarir Wellfield

Figure 6.A Producing well, J/HS Figure 6.A Producing well, J/HS

25
 Figure 8. Well at J/HS Figure 9. Flow Control Station J/HS

Figure 10. Regulating/ Balancing Tank, J/HS Figure 11. Power Control System, J/HS

Figure 13. Communication System Wirings Figure 12. Fuel Tanks at Sarir Power station

26
Figure 14. Ajdabia Reservoir Inlet Works Figure 15. Grand Omar Mukhtar Reservoir

Figure 16.A camel water point, J/HS Figure 17. Water Treatment Units, J/HS

Figure 19. Haul Road, Sarir Wellfield Figure 18. Pipe Manufacturing Plant at Sarir

27
2.7.2 State of the MMRP Infrastructures
The MMRP infrastructures have been installed during the period 1990-2010 with work
being stopped completely on all on-going projects in early 2011. The design lives of the
infrastructural components differ according to their nature, function, execution, mode
of operation, frequency of operation and maintenance, and environmental conditions.
Design lives of mechanical equipment (pumps, etc.) are 15-25 years while electrical
equipment differs markedly with a typical design life of 15-25 years. Concrete structures
(including PCCPs) exceed 50 years.
Generally, prior to 2014, the MMRP infrastructures were in a very good condition having
been designed and executed recently to high quality standards, well operated and
maintained thanks to the availability of human and financial resources, and escaping
man-caused damage thanks to the tight security granted to the MMRP. All imported
equipment were new; some were manufactured and specially made for the MMRP.
The SS/TB conveyance system had a series of five ruptures on four-meter diameter
pipes while in service between 1999 and 2001. They were attributed to chloride-induced
corrosion of the pre-stressing wire of the PCCPs and were found to affect only some of
the uncoated pipes. These ruptures resulted in emergency unplanned shutdowns.
To mnimize the risk of occurrence of more rupture events and maintain the uninterrupted
flow of water, The MMRP adopted a full-scale rehabilitation plan that involved installing a
Cathodic Protection System on the entire SS/TB pipeline, and the pipes were coated with
coal tar epoxy and used in areas originally deemed as corrosive.
Problems associated with land settlement in Tazerbo Wellfield have been reported (20);
efforts to explain their causes are under way. Pump wear at some of the Sarir wells has
been observed due to problems of sand finding its way into the well. Remedial actions
are underway. In both situations, the productivities of the wellfields have not been
affected.
Leakage has been detected in the Ajdabia reservoir bottom; it has been diagnosed along
with the technical remedial measures needed.
The state of some of the MMRP components declined after 2014, however, due to
serious threats, namely, armed conflict, lack of security, lawlessness, economic, political
and institutional instabilities. The MMRP infrastructures have been sustaining serious
damages ever since. The nature and extent of these damages are described in a special
section 2.9. Examples of these damages are listed below:
1. Destruction of the PCCP factory in Brega;
2. Destruction of fuel tanks of Sarir Power Station;
3. Destruction of over 96 wells in the J/HS (Phase II);
4. Destruction of numerous control chambers / valve stations to make illegal
connections.
Reservoirs, tanks and buried pipes of the water supply lines are still in good condition
with the exception of those suffering illegal connections. However, the MMRP
infrastructures in general are subject to accelerated deterioration due to the lack of spare
parts, consumables and lack of maintenance for financial constraints which appear to be
long-lasting. Replacement, maintenance and reconstruction of the MMRP infrastructures
are a priority for the proper functioning of the MMRP, and therefore, the sustainability of
the water supply.

2.7.3 Leakage and Evaporation Losses

Water losses are expected due to leakage from pipelines and evaporation from open
“uncovered” reservoirs. Leakage losses for Phase I were estimated at 2% of the total

28
flowrate. No estimate was made for evaporation. However, due to the hot and dry
climatic conditions where the MMRP reservoirs are located (Ajdabia, Benghazi, and
Sirt), evaporation rates may be significant. For instance, evaporation losses from Omar
Mukhtar reservoir (4.7 Mm3) in 2004 were estimated to be 0.928 Mm3 (21).Reduction of
evaporation losses is clearly warranted for optimum management of MMRP waters.

2.7.4 Quality of MMRP Waters

2.7.4.1 Water Quality Analysis and Monitoring

Water quality characteristics are of significance in determining the water’s suitability

for different uses as well as its impacts on the conveying pipes materials. Water quality
in the main wellfields is monitored regularly by the by the MMRA. In both Phase I and
Phase II, there are specialized water quality administrations (Water Quality Monitoring
Administration) with well-equipped and staffed water quality laboratories (Figure 20).
Monitoring takes places routinely; samples are withdrawn from different points along
the MMRP components (wells, collector lines, reservoirs, turnouts and at regular
intervals along the pipelines) all the way to the points of delivery from the MMRP
tanks to the water supply networks GCWW). The analysis includes physical, chemical,
and microbiological indicators of significance to human health (drinking water quality
standards), irrigation and MMRP system operation. To ensure suitability of the waters for
human consumption, the WHO Drinking Water Standards (22) are included in the water
quality report templates for comparison and identification of indicators exceeding WHO
acceptable limits.

Figure 20. Laboratory Equipment, MMRP

Records are maintained and utilized to produce reports regularly. Collected data are
analyzed and significant indicators are presented in different formats for recording,
identifying short and long term changes in water quality (if any) and, accordingly, for
providing a basis for decision making regarding operation modifications, etc.

2.7.4.2 Water Quality and Treatment of Phase I Waters

Phase I waters are withdrawn presently from Tazerboo and Sarir wellfields. Specific
physical, chemical and microbiological quality indicators of waters supplied by Phase I
taken from Tazerboo/Ajdabia, Sarir/Ajdabia, Ajdabia reservoir, Ajdabia reservoir outlet,
AtTalhya Tank (to Benghazi), and at distribution feeding points to the distribution network
(Node 3 and Node 4) are listed in Tables14 and 15 (23). The total dissolved solids (TDS)

29
concentrations of the Tazerbo and Sarir fields are 314 and 890 mg/L, respectively. It can be
seen from this table that the water quality of the Tazerboo and Sarir differs in someTable
14. A Monthly Chemical Water Quality Report, Phase I, MMRP*

Table 14. A Monthly Chemical Water Quality Report, Phase I, MMRP*

Main Transporta- Ajdabia Water Holding AtTalhya Water Feeding Point (Turn-
tion Pipelines Reservoir Tank )out
WHO
**Parameter
Guide-
lines Tazer- AtTalhya Feeding
Sarir/ Main Storage Water Feeding Point
boo/ Point (Node
Ajdabia Reservoir Intake ) (Node no. 3
Ajdabia Tank )4

Temperature, ˚ C - 21.6 21.4 21.6 21.62 20.4 21.65

pH 8.5- 6.5 8.38 8.1 8.26 8.26 8.16 8.21

Electrical conductivi-
1500 485 1375 951 987 955 953
ty EC, µS/CM

TDS, mg/L 1000 314 890 615 639 618 617

Ca-hardness - 66 146 89 105 101 101

The station
-
Chlorides, Cl mg/l 250 77 214 141 138 139 140
is closed
due to
technical
reasons
Sulfates SO42- mg/l 250 - - - - -

Nitrates ,NO3- mg/l 50 1.04 8.6 3.7 3.6 4.7 3.37

+
Sodium, Na mg/l 200 61 248 150 151 146 149

+
Potassium, K - 23.5 15.6 21.34 22.1 21.6 21.7

Calcium, Ca2+ mg/l 200 - - - - - -

Magnesium, Mg2+ mg/l 50 - - - - - -

All values are in mg/L except pH and temperature**

Adopted from Refs. 23 and 26*

30
 Table 15. A Monthly Biological Water Quality Report, Phase I, MMRP*
*Adopted from Refs.23 and 26

AtTalhya
Ajdabia Water Hold- Water Feeding Points
Main Transportation Pipelines Water
ing Reservoir (Turnouts)
Tank

Indicator WHO
Node
Node 3
Guidelines Ajdabia Main Water Tazerboo/ 4
Sarir/ Ajdabia Inlet
Storage Reservoir Ajdabia

Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max. Min. Max.

Min. No Max. No. value
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No.

Total bacterial count No.

500colony 8 17 0 2 0 ˃300 0 17 0 13 -
col./1ml

T.C.F per 100ml Zero 4 727 0 0 0 0 0 866 0 0 -

Total No. of Temp. resisting

Zero 4 9.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
bacteria F.C.F

E. Coli, at 44oC per 100ml Zero +ve +ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -ve -

)Streptococci bacteria per

Zero 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
100ml )

indicators; however, both waters as well as the blended water meet the WHO Drinking
Water Standards. Tazerbo waters have high iron, manganese, potassium and CO2 (24). As
CO2 is corrosive and iron causes discoloration problems, the water is treated by stripping
towers installed on well heads. Moreover, blending of this water with Sarir Field Water
reduces the concentrations of critical parameters to well below the maximum allowable
levels.

2.7.4.3 Water Quality and Treatment of Phase II Waters

Phase II waters are withdrawn from North east and East J/HS wellfields. Water quality of
these fields varies spatially for the different water constituents (25). For example, chlorides
concentrations vary from 97 to 600 mg/L while TDS concentrations vary from 563 to 1973
mg/L (Figure 21). Specific maximum concentrations of selected chemical indicators found in
individual wells are presented in table 16 along with maximum allowable levels according
to the Libyan Drinking Water Standards. The corresponding “blended” concentrations
when all wells are operated are also shown in this table. It can be seen from this table and
figures that the water quality of some wells exceeds the Libyan Drinking Water Standards’
limits. However, the blended water quality meets these standards if good quality wells are

31
operated first leaving those of partially unacceptable quality for later operation stages, i.e.
when the system is operated at demands exceeding 1.454 Mm3/d (25). At this stage, partial
treatment for the reduction of nitrates and chlorides only will be needed employing the
most suitable “economically and technically feasible technologies”.
Another alternative is to instruct users to avoid using the water for drinking, but use it for
other purposes. This practice is already applied by practically all users who drink “bottled”
water only, thus negating the need for treatment. If not treated, the J/H waters have an
added value for irrigation due to the availability of nitrates!
The Phase II waters have high CO2 concentrations, however, which are corrosive to PCCPs.
Two water treatment plants are installed at the wellfields to strip the CO2 gas.

2.7.4.4 Water Quality and Treatment of Phase IV Waters

The waters of Ghadames basin, where the Ghadames-Zawia-Zwara wellfields are drilled
have high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide rendering them corrosive to PCCPs. To
prevent damage to the pipelines and control systems, while simultaneously securing
the quality standards for drinking water, the Ghadames waters are planned to be treated
centrally.

20
75

0
0

22
800

0
700

85
0
0
85 20 0 240
90
0 220
2400 22

20180
85
9000 700 260
280 3
950 260

0
0
0

10 950 0
75

800 1000
00
101

280
510

115 1050
300
0

0
31200
1150

3200

320
050

110
34
0

120 0
112

0
340
4033860
00
14 1 1
5040 35
0 0

300

1100 0
1050 950 50 32
383036400

400
260

11
50
131225050
11

300
1

13 20
280
000

90
0
1300
0 460
220
8 0

00
32000
32024
0

10
90

1115
122000
1350

26
105
11000

50

0
300
10050

85 480
1

0
00

0
900 30
00

950
0
10
950

380 40
360

11
1000

32

4420
4 0
340
11

950

0
900

00 30
32
50

.a
.b snoitartnecnoC edirolhC
.c snoitartnecnoC SDT .b
.d

Figure 21. Chloride and TDS iso-concentration contours of the J/HS Waters (Ref. 25)
Table 16. Chemical Characteristics of J/H S (Phase II) Waters*

Maximum allowable concen- Average concentration in

Maximum concentra-
Parameter tration, Libyan Drinking Water blended waters of all wells,
tion, mg/L
Standards, mg/L mg/L

Nitrate 1.22133 – 45 55.44

32
 Chloride 97600 – 250 299

TDS 5631973 - 1000 1028

Sodium 78430 – 200 188.9

Total Hardness 243725 – 500 398.7

Sulphate 79589.8 – 400 207.2

Adopted from Ref. 25*

The quality of waters produced from both Phases I and II (26) is relatively stable as
demonstrated by records obtained during about 20 years (Figure 22). Such stability
is characteristic of ground waters that are protected from pollution or in areas with
no sources of pollution which is the case for most locations of the MMRP reservoirs.
Potential pollution sources exist, however, in areas where produced waters are associated
with oil and gas production operations in some areas of the MMRP reservoirs as well as
in areas with highly pollutant anthropogenic activities. The seriousness of contamination
of ground water reservoirs must not be underestimated and all efforts must be made to
prevent their occurrence, especially those which may be taking place presently.

2.7.4.5 Disinfection of MMR Waters

Waters from the MMRP are disinfected using chlorine gas prior to transmission to the
GCWW storage / balancing reservoirs. In the case of Benghazi, MMRP water is chlorinated
as it leaves AtTalhya tank (Figures 23 and 26). Similarly, Phase II water is disinfected at
different points along the pipeline starting at Shwaerif (injection) and ending as water
exits Sidi AsSayeh tank, Ain Zara, and Airport Tanks where chlorine is fed continuously.
The chlorination buildings at AtTalhya and Sidi AsSayeh tanks are fully equipped with
chlorine (cylinders), chlorinators, feeding, chlorine residual testing and monitoring
equipment along with safety equipment, etc. Daily readings of flow rate, water stored,
chlorine residuals, etc. are recorded and documented for different uses.

2.8 MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY BY THE MMRP:

AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY
2.8.1 Sustainability of the MMRP Water Sources

Sustainability of the MMRP water sources for the project’s life of 50 years has been the
most controversial issue throughout the Project’s different development stages. As stated
in section 2.2 above, the MMRP draws its waters from infinitely large basins (Nubian
Sandstone, Murzuk, and Northwestern Sahara). The adequacy of the utilizable quantities
has been assured by many impartial studies and confirmed strongly be over 20 years of
operation. As can be seen from Figure 27, the drawdowns of J/HS Wellfield decreased
notably with time despite the large increase in withdrawal rates over the period 2002-
2010 averaging less than one meter per year. This sustainability may be compromised by
pollution mostly from man-made activities. Such a threat can be very serious and should
not be underestimated.

33
2.8.2 Availability of Water from the MMRP

Upon completion of all of its phases, the MMRP will supply over 90 cities and towns with
water for domestic use in addition to agricultural irrigation and industrial-use waters. A
list of these cities and towns is provided in Annex 2.1. To date, the MMRP has supplied
good quality water in sufficient quantities to about 60% of amount of water distributed
to Libya’s population through the public distribution networks (27), thus, substantially
improving their standard of living.
The quantities of water supplied increased gradually since the arrival of “first waters”
from phases I and II in 1993 and 1996, respectively (Figure 28) with a notable decline after
2014. In 2017, the quantities produced by Phase I and Phase II systems were 295.53 and
310.84 Mm3, respectively. Phase IV (Ghadames/ Zawia/ Zwara) supplied about 2.19 Mm3;
the total quantity supplied by the MMRP was thus 608.56 Mm3.

Alkalinity

a. TDS

34
 b. pH

Figure 22.Variations in Selected Water Quality Parameters of Phase I (1993-2014)

Figure 23.AtTalhya Tank & Chlorination Figure 24. Chlorinators at Sidi AsSayh Building
Tank

Figure 25. Chorine Residual Monitoring Figure 26. Empty Chlorine Cylinders

35
 Figure 27.Measured drawdown levels in the Jefara Haswna Wellfields (NEJH = north east Jefara
Hasawna Wellfield, EJH = eastern Jefara Hasawna Wellfield)

Figure 28. MMRP Total Water Quantities Produced from Phases I and II

The quantities supplied were used mainly for domestic and agricultural purposes. Although
precise data are not available, it is estimated that agricultural uses in 2017 were 200,000

36
m3/day. Assuming an equal quantity of the MMRP waters was withdrawn through illegal
connections and used for agricultural and domestic purposes, the net quantity supplied
through public “GCWW” networks is 462.56 Mm3. Consequently, assuming a municipal
per capita water demand of 350 lpcd (28), including leakage and unaccounted-for-waters
(UFW) estimated conservatively at 35%, the number of persons supplied by the MMRP is
about 3.62 million, i.e., over 55% of Libya’s population.
Based on the above assumptions, about 40% of the MMRP water is lost through illegal
connections and UFW. Such losses are certainly unacceptable considering the costs of
water provision as well as losses in revenues badly needed by the different water supply
institutions.
The exact quantities of water supplied by the MMRP to its different end-users are not
known because they are not metered in many instances or the flow meters are not regularly
calibrated. Knowledge of such quantities is essential for revenue calculation and for
determining consumption, use rates and variations diurnally, daily, weekly, annually and
for estimation of leakage and UFWs. Flow measuring meters must be used and calibrated
regularly with records utilized for billing and other applications.
Based on the above assumptions, about 40 % of the MMRP water is lost through illegal
connections and UFW. Such losses are certainly unacceptable considering the costs of
water provision as well as losses in revenues badly needed by the different water supply
institutions.
The exact quantities of water supplied by the MMRP to its different end-users are not
known because they are not metered in many instances or the flow meters are not regularly
calibrated. Knowledge of such quantities is essential for revenue calculation and for
determining consumption / use rates and variations diurnally, daily, weekly, annually and
for estimation of leakage and UFWs. Flow measuring meters must be used and calibrated
regularly with records utilized for billing and other applications.
It is also worth noting that both Phase I and Phase II are complete, but they convey only
about one half of their design capacities; operation costs are therefore high and the
infrastructures are underutilized while users are deprived of waters needed for different
purposes.

Water is supplied to the city of Tripoli on a continuous basis “on demand”. It is pumped at
a constant rate regardless of the large diurnal variations in demand. Consequently, large
quantities of water are lost due to leakage from the distribution network which is in a poor
condition and to overflows from rooftop tanks. Such wasteful practices should be stopped
to save water and minimize losses associated with leakage and overflows.
In the city of Benghazi, the network is not fully developed. About 300,000 m3/day of the
MMRP waters are supplied to the city through two nodes (Nodes3 and 4). About 50-60% of
this amount is lost as a result of leakage. It is essential that distribution networks are repaired
and that the infrastructures needed for distributing the MMRP waters be developed by the
time the MMRP waters reach the feeding nodes. This synchronization process should be
applied to all users to optimize the utilization of the MMRP infrastructures while satisfying
end-users’ demands.

The Sarir field consists of 126 wells, of which 74 are operational. The rest are either not
fully equipped or have operational problems with pumps, silt, etc. As of May 2018, 25 well
pumps needed to be maintained, but no reserve pumps were available. The maximum
number of wells operated was 97, producing 630,000 m3/day. The average productivity
of Sarir and Tazerbo fields is 850,000 m3/day. The wellfield control system is out of order
presently as maintenance works stopped because of armed conflict and the contractor
abandoned the site.

37
2.8.3 Reliability and Vulnerability of the MMRP Water Supplies
Reliability of MMRP waters depends primarily on the availability and reliability of its staff
and that of its individual components. Both must be available and fully functional for the
MMRP to be reliable. The overall reliability will depend directly on the nature and intensity
of the disturbances to the staff and/or the infrastructural components. Direct threats to
human life will force staff to abandon the worksite causing a complete interruption of water
supplies.
The impacts of infrastructural components on reliability differ with the nature of each
component and its location and significance within the water supply system and the nature
and extent of the disturbance (damage). For example, the failure of one well in a large
wellfield will have a minor impact on reliability, but the failure of one pipe or valve in the
main conveyance line will cause a complete interruption of water supply. Water supply
system vulnerability of the MMRP is high, simply because the system components function
linearly (in series). A failure in one component will cause a failure in all components
downstream. Installation of standby components is simply too expensive.

Threats and damages caused by armed conflict and insecurity led to many complete closures
of one of the MMRP water supply systems with severe consequences on the end users and
the system itself. Another cause of these damages is power interruptions and shortages
and fuel shortages. System failures due to technical or material failures such as corrosion
induced pipe damages caused water supply shut-downs. Remoteness of wellfield s and
associated facilities and the extensive number and diversity of infrastructural components
are strong factors contributing to the vulnerability of the MMRP. A case in point is the
repeated attacks on wells in the J/HS system leading to the destruction of 96 wells since
Jan. 2017 (29). Similarly, sabotage-caused destruction of control chambers led to water
shortages for several days (29). Work on the Ghadames – Zawia-Zwara system was stopped
completely in 2011 for lack of security; the contractor camp was looted and all equipment
and material were stolen (29). In 2014, the GZZ system headquarters were taken over and
looted during armed conflicts.

Killing, kidnapping and attacks of MMRA employees, if not stopped effectively and
completely, will force workers to leave work sites leading to a complete shutdown of
water supplies indefinitely. The continued destruction of wells will lead to losing the whole
wellfield and, subsequently, causing a complete shutdown of water supplies permanently.
The consequences of both cases will be a national disaster as there is no alternate source to
the MMRP waters presently or in the near future (the coming 10 years). Human and material
losses resulting from these damages are both considerable and extensive, affecting the
majority of Libyans.
The increasing number and complexity of maintenance problems, especially those arising
from armed conflict and lack of security, require special emergency preparedness plans and
resources with due consideration to the stocking of special spare parts in ample quantities
in response to unexpected damages anywhere anytime. This practice requires special
modifications of the traditional operation and maintenance procedures.

Problems associated with water quality can also contribute to the MMRP’s reliability and
vulnerability. For instance, shortages of chlorine, the traditional disinfectant, can expose
water users to serious potential health hazards. The destruction of the Cathodic Protection
System or the degasing system will inevitably lead to pipe corrosion and, hence, to serious
shut-downs of water supply systems. Unfortunately, the Cathodic Protection System has

38
been damaged and the chlorination systems are functioning below standards. Similarly,
the ultrasound monitoring system for the PCCP’s is not functional because the solar power
panels feeding it have been stolen.

More importantly, the damages continue to be perpetrated on a daily basis with practically
no efforts to stop them. The era of national “thirst” may not be too far!!!

An important aspect that should be assessed is the state of health, safety and environment
within the MMRP systems. The threats of armed conflict, lack of security, lawlessness and
lack of funds have caused damages in these fields as well; an example is the Sarir site
where the ambulance has been stolen and not replaced yet.
2.9 ARMED CONFLICT, LACK OF SECURITY AND INSTABILITYRELATED
DAMAGES

The staff of the MMRP have been subject to serious threats and its infrastructures have
sustained severe damages and complete destruction since 2011 and especially after 2014.
These threats and damages were direct results of one or more of the following causes:

• Armed conflict and lack of security (terrorism, sabotage, theft, looting, vandalism, etc.);
• Weak enforcement and disrespect of laws;
• Electric power instability, outages and fuel shortages;
• Political, economic and institutional instability;
• Financial constraints;
• Premature aging due to poor or absence of maintenance, lack of chemicals, spare parts,
consumables, etc.
• As a result, the functionality, and subsequently, the continuity and level of service
provision have declined markedly.

2.9.1 Damages Caused by Armed Conflict and Lack of Security

Many parts of Libya have suffered from armed conflict while practically all of Libya’s regions
have been suffering a serious lack of security especially since 2014. Armed conflict and lack
of security are inarguably the most damaging causes to the MMRP. Armed conflict led to
the direct loss of human lives and destruction of infrastructures and assets. Similarly, lack
of security: 1) Allowed terrorist groups as well as vandals, looters, etc. free access to vital
infrastructures with potential direct threats to life and physical damages to infrastructures
and 2) Allowed law-breaking persons to take over MMRP properties and to make illegal
connections, 3) Prevented MMRP staff from accessing infrastructures to conduct supervision,
monitoring, operation, maintenance, repair and reconstruction operations and emergency
interventions following direct damages.

The impacts of damages caused by armed conflict, terrorist attacks, vandalism and thefts
may be summarized as follows:
1. Death of more than 20 staff, threats to lives due to kidnapping (of expatriate Phase II
technicians), inflection of injuries and terrorizing of staff and bystanders;
2. Expulsion of personnel from offices, work sites and forcing some staff and families to
leave worksites; the impacts of these threats and damages have been worst in remote

39
 areas of Libya where most of the MMR Project’s infrastructures are located in Benghazi
and Ben Ghashier where the MMRP’s main administrative and control premises are
located. The MMRP headquarters in Benghazi were attacked and staff forced to leave
“to nowhere”. A few of the MMRP lost their lives in the attack;
3. Loss of working hours due to instability in worksites;
4. Destruction of vital infrastructural components such as wells, valve, control chambers,
vehicles, workshops, premises, etc. (Figures 29 to 35). A case in point the destruction of
96 wells in the J/HS wellfields since Aug. 2016 (Figures 36 and 37);
5. Loss of materials, spare parts, vehicles, etc. and destruction of workshops and property;
6. Partial to complete interruption of water supply for short to long periods of time with
the following consequences:
• Loss of services provision to customers (municipal, agricultural, and industrial);

(Station 620) near Bani Walid (Phase II) the Ajdabia-Sirt Pipeline

Figure 29. Destroyed Wells, J/H System

40
 Figure 30. Destroyed Valve Chamber Figure 31. Destroyed Valve Chamber on

Figure 32. Destroyed Workshop: Ajdabia Figure 33.Office building Set Ablaze: Phase
I

Figure 34.Destroyed Vehicles at Sarir Field Figure 35. Damaged Headquarters of MMRA

41
Figure 36. Number of Wells Destroyed Monthly in J/HS: Aug. 2016-Feb. 2019 (Ref. 29)

• Loss of revenues due to decreased quantities of water delivered; such significant losses
contribute to the institution’s inability to operate and maintain the WSIs effectively;
• Unstable operating conditions, which are almost always far from optimum, leading
to a decreased overall water sector efficiency, a high rise in costs of operation and
maintenance and an accelerated aging and deterioration of WSIs;
• Loss of agricultural productivity with detrimental large economic impacts;
• Loss of customer confidence and potential social unrest in reaction to increase in the
number of people deprived of water for extended periods with detrimental socioeconomic
and political impacts;

42
7. Potential for system failure and flooding due to sudden changes in flows and pressures
leading to serious malfunctioning, operational problems, declines in efficiency and high
rise in operation and maintenance costs;
8. Potential hydraulic failures due to sudden changes in flowrates due to destruction of
infrastructures;
9. Wastage of large quantities of non-renewable water leading to resource depletion,
flooding and revenue losses;
10. Delay in execution and/or maintenance of parts of the MMR Project due to destruction
of Brega Pipe Factory which translates into higher execution costs and delayed benefits
from Project utilization;
11. Rise in cost of running camps caused by remoteness and security factors and the need
to pay in cash which is difficult to secure nationwide;
12. Large increases in cost of providing water resulting from additional costs of repair,
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, reconstruction of WSIs and associated assets,
lost working hours, losses of revenues, unaccounted for water, large declines in
efficiency, delayed execution, etc.;
13. Rise in alternative water sources prices including bottled water and truck transported
water;
14. Severe water shortages to levels below minimum basic human requirements can have
adverse health impacts on the affected population.
15. Flooding of streets with water causing structural damages to roads, buildings and
infrastructures;
16. Destruction of communication “fiber optic” cables has forced manual operation/ control
of Phase II system leading to downgrading of operation’s efficiency;
17. Theft of the solar panels and cables of the Cathodic Protection System made it
ineffective thus accelerating corrosion of PCCP pipes with serious impacts on water
supply continuity;
18. Access to the MMRP infrastructures by terrorist groups, vandals, looters and outlaws
had the following impacts:

• Partial to total destruction of infrastructures causing partial or total water supply cuts
with adverse consequences specified above;
• Loss of office furniture and equipment, removal, disappearance, and at times burning of
documents containing important data and information or the relocation of these data;
• Departure of foreign companies and experts working in the water sector (consultants,
contractors, labor, etc.) which caused interruption of operation and maintenance
contracts, construction and supervision of ongoing projects;
• Inability to access the MMRP infrastructures particularly haul roads and pipe route
prevented staff from monitoring, repair, operation, maintenance, etc. of these
infrastructures (Figures38 and 39);
• The increased frequency of maintenance requires extra efforts, funds and leads to rapid
system aging and frequent water supply interruptions.
• Lack of access to infrastructures by operation and maintenance staff, on the other hand,
had the following impacts:
• Inability to operate and maintain the infrastructures as scheduled or needed with
extended damages and interruption in provision of water supply to users;
• Indefinite delays in the execution of a large number of water infrastructural projects,
resumption of execution or the start of new projects. A case in point is Phase IV (Ghadames-
Zawia-Zwara) system whose planned completion date was the end of 2011; the Project has
stalled after completion of about 85% of its works (29);
• Such delays will result in higher project execution costs and loss of intended project
benefits by the end users;
• Accelerated degradation of damaged infrastructures due extended exposure to severe
environmental conditions.

43
2.9.2 Damages Caused by Illegal Connections

• Many cities, towns and villages along the route of the MMR Project pipelines are not
connected to public water supply networks; they rely on private wells or on water
transported by vehicles with prices varying spatially and temporally exceeding USD1.27-
4.5 per cubic meter (30). Similarly, farmers, relying on wells which are running dry,
prefer MMR water which is “free”, in sufficient quantities and much more reliable.

Figure 38. Blocking of Haul Road

Figure 39. Taking Over of Pipe Route Right Of Way

Both domestic users and farmers make illegal connections to the MMR either by tapping
into the pipelines or through valve chambers. They are always made by unprofessional
workers with no consideration for technical aspects related to construction, operation and
maintenance of such connections and no regard to the impacts such connection might
have on the overall MMR Project functionality. This wide spread problem was aggravated
post 2011 due to lack of security and weak enforcement of the law. Illegal connections were
reported at every 600 meters of pipelines at some locations (30). Their number is increasing
continuously.
Serious declines in water quantities and pressures leave people downstream without water
for periods of time reaching months. For example, an illegal connection to the pipelines
in Al-Hasawna, south of Tripoli, led to a cut-off of water supply in some areas in western
Tripoli for more than seven months (30). A second case is the township of Abu Hadi near
Sirt (31) where people were forced to buy bottled water (Figure 40).

44
Illegal connections (Figure 41) cause physical destruction of pipes, valves and valve
structures, reservoirs and other ancillaries. These damages form a very serious but
underestimated threat to the MMR Project’s functionality, and subsequently, to its technical
and economic viability with sociopolitical implications.

The major impacts of illegal connections are summarized as follows:

1. Loss of large quantities of water during installation and un-installation of illegal

connection. Repair losses are estimated to exceed 70,000 cubic meters per illegal
connection. About 300,000 cubic meters are lost daily due to installing illegal
connections (30);

Figure 40. Extended Water Shortage Forces Abu Hadi Residents to Buy Bottled Water

Figure 41. Illegal Connections

2. The associated loss of revenue from the waters consumed illegally;

3. The high cost of repairing the damages caused by illegal connections; e.g. the cost of
repairing an illegal connection in Ajdabia exceeded US$ 77,000 (30);
4. The costs resulting from operational and maintenance problems associated with illegal
connections including wear and tear and aging of equipment, loss of overall system
efficiency, etc.;
5. Accelerated deterioration and aging of mechanical equipment such as valves, pumps,
etc.;
6. Illegal connections require longer time to repair as spare parts may not be readily
available. Moreover, the cost of repairing may prove prohibitive especially considering
that such repairs require urgent action;

45
7. Due to poor workmanship, water tightness is not possible and water leakage and
pollution may occur due to exposure to the atmosphere and contact with septic tank
effluents which are common in most rural areas.

2.9.3 Damages Caused by Political, Economic and Institutional Instability

Political, economic and institutional instability were a cause and byproduct of the ongoing
conflicts and insecurity problems. Faced with insurmountable security challenges and
dwindling revenues due to the sharp drops in oil production and prices, the consecutive
post 2013 governments gave infrastructures a lower priority especially as the oil revenues
dropped sharply. Simultaneously, the water sector underwent organizational structure
changes. These instability problems were reflected directly on the MMRA economic,
technical and human resources capacities. Examples of these impacts include:
1. The end-users of the MMRP waters were unable to pay the water tariffs; similarly,
water revenues collected from enforcement of the funding laws were insignificant relative
to the amounts collected in previous years. At the same time, opening of letters of credit
was difficult. Inability to collect tariffs and a large fraction of the allocated funds simply
means the drying up of the major financial resources of the MMRA. Drying up of fund
sources has many impacts including the following:

• Inability to procure materials and spare parts (or extended delay in procurement)
making the MMRA unable to operate and maintain many of its components and systems
satisfactorily and could even lead to shut down of the water supply until procurement
of material and spares;
• Companies engaged in works with the MMRA are suing the MMRA for failing to make
payments on services rendered;
• Inability to complete on-going projects; some of which were near completion and of
high significance nationally (e.g. the Ghadames/Zawia/Zwara System);
• Inability to start planned projects (Tazerbo- Srir, Ajdabia-Tobruk);
• Inability to provide technical assistance and training to MMRP employees.

2. Financial problems also led to institutional instabilities such as:

• Delay in payments of salaries with impacts on performance;
• Frequent replacements of staff or loss of qualified ones;
• Lack of discipline, absenteeism and lack of enforcement of disciplinary actions.

2.9.4 Damages Caused by Electric Power Interruptions, Outages and Fuel

Shortages
The MMRP infrastructures depend totally on power for their operation. Their functionality
was, therefore, directly impacted by the availability of electric power. The majority of the
water shortages that occurred during the conflict was a result of damages to the fuel and
electrical systems that support the operation of the MMRP rather than a failure of the water
system (32, 33).

Power outages were caused by armed conflict, terrorism and lack of security (vandalism,
looting, theft, etc.) along with lack of funds to operate and maintain electric power
infrastructures. Examples of damages to the power supply are presented below:

• The total destruction of the fuel tanks of the MMR Sarir Power Station fuel tanks (Figure
41) which put the station out of service (34).
• Power related water supply disruptions were responsible for the delay in maintenance
operations of Shwaeref reservoir and valves causing water cut to all cities fed from
Phase II water including Tripoli (34).

46
• The water wells in the Hasawna stopped as a power cut occurred on Oct. 18th, 2012,
leading to a major water cuts in various parts of Libya (34).
• Similarly, power irregularities forced the cutting off from service of all wells in the
northern and southern Hasawna wellfield s (104 wells) and 54 wells in the eastern
wellfield (figure 42) (34).

Figure 41.Destroyed fuel tanks of the Figure 42. Power supply irregularities
Sarir Power Generation Station forcing water cut-off in Hasawna wells

Thus, damages to the MMRP infrastructures caused by power and fuel shortages may be
summarized as follows:

1. Partial to complete cuts in water supply;

2. Delay in maintenance operations;
3. Financial and other losses associated with damages listed above.

2.0.5 Costs of Damages to the MMRP

The damages to the MMRP described above resulted in huge direct and indirect financial
losses; revenues from sales of water during shut downs or illegal connections are an
example of direct losses. Examples of indirect losses include replacement, repair and
reconstruction of damaged equipment, facilities, etc. An exact computation of the losses
sustained by the MMRP has not been made, but they are very large by any account. An
indication of the costs of such damages is shown in Table 18.The costs of the cases listed in
this table were estimated by the Consultant to exceed USD 300 million. Actual total direct
costs of damages to the MMRP can readily reach USD 600 million.

Indirect losses due to damages including loss of water revenues, repair, replacement and
maintenance costs of destroyed components and assets, and work days are also significant.
Considering that the attacks on the MMRP are recurrent, as is the case in the J/HS wells, the
costs will continue to rise indefinitely.

As most of the causes of the damages are beyond the capacity of the MMRA, countering
these causes must be addressed at the highest national level as an “urgent national security
priority”. Failing to eliminate these causes will lead to the complete shutdown of the MMRP
exposing two thirds of Libya’s population to a lasting state of thirst.

Table 17.Indicative Cases of Damages to the MMRP and their Estimated Costs

47
Cause of Damage Estimated Cost in millions of USD

Armed attack on MMRA headquarters in Benghazi 0.9

Armed attack on MMRA main offices in Ben Ghashier 0.7

Armed attack on MMRP facilities in Hasawna 0.7

Destruction of 96 wells in the J/HS 60

Destruction of 7 power substations and transformers 20

Armed attacks on Ghadames system construction works 10

Destruction of 120 valves on the Gurdhabia-Sdada line 12

Armed attacks on Sarir site 0.3

Armed attacks on Sarir Pipe Manufacturing Plant 0.4

Destruction of Sarir power station fuel storage tanks 0.6

Destruction of Brega Pipe Manufacturing Plant  200

Complete damage or theft of fiber, solar, OPDAS, communication

8.4
and safety equipment

Destruction and repair costs of the Cathodic Protection System of

19
the SS/TB system

Replacement of damaged “unused” pipes of Tazerbo Benghazi

 300
Pipeline

2.9 KEY FINDINGS, CHALLENGES AND CONCLUSIONS

2.10.1 KEY FINDINGS
2.10.1.1 Legal Framework
The MMRA’s establishment and mandate were specified in Law No. 11/1983. Its mandate
included the planning, designing, implementing, operation and maintenance of the MMRP
along with the capacity-building of its employees. Accordingly, the MMRA was established
as an administratively and financially independent public entity. Presently, the MMRA is
under the supervision of the General Authority for Water Resources (GAWRs). The strong
legal basis granted the MMRA a leading position in providing Libyans with water for
municipal, agricultural, and industrial uses.

48
2.10.1.2 Administrative/ Organizational Framework
The MMRA is headquartered in Benghazi. It has an approved extensive organizational
structure. The MMRP’s different phases are managed as three semi-independent branches
headquartered in Benghazi (Phases I) and Ben Ghashir near Tripoli (Phases II and IV).

The MMRA is managed by an administrative committee consisting of 5 full-time members.

The organizational structure of the MMRA – last updated in 2018 - consists of three centers,
six offices, five general administrations, four centers and four branches for each of the
project’s completed phases. A career staff guide was prepared. Training, salaries, health,
safety and environment guides also exist. Separate organizational structures exist for
Phases I-III.

Information and data are given special consideration as is reflected by the inclusion of
dedicated Information and Documentation Center, Data, Studies and Research Center,
and an Information Technology Department within the organizational structure of the
MMRA. The inclusion of a training center satisfies the needs of these information units for
qualification of their potential employees.

A central network links the MMRA’s units into an electronic archiving system. Accordingly,
all work activities are digitized; technical, financial and administrative reports are prepared
regularly and upon request based on data stored/ accessed from different units. There are
over 25 million documents. Backup storage ensures that data and information are available
in a sustainable way. Luckily, the MMRA archives were not touched during the armed
takeover of the MMRP headquarters on 15th October, 2014.

2.10.1.3 Financial Capacities

Financial Resources of the MMRA

To ensure funding is available amply and continuously for implementation, O& M of the
MMRP, several laws were enacted in addition to Law No. 10/1983; these laws are: Law No.
5/1986, Law No. 19/1991, Law No. 21/1423 and Law No. 18/1425. According to these laws,
the MMRA was to be financed from several sources including: 1) The General National
Budget, 2) Loans, 3) Water sales tariffs, 4) Revenues from projects or facilities executed by
the MMRA, 5) Fixed and non-fixed (mobile) assets belonging to the MMRA, 6) Donations
and gifts, and 7) Taxes on tobacco products, fuel, money transfers, tickets, license renewals.

Revenues were good under normal conditions. For the last few years, the financial resources
have declined significantly, however, for reasons that are beyond the MMRA’s control; these
reasons were:
• The tariffs allocated to the MMRA from letters of credit opened by the Central Bank of
Libya in hard currency have not been transferred to the MMRA since 2011;
• The revenues from water “sales” to the GCWW and to farming projects have not been
paid since 2011;
• The decline in revenues from other sources such as tobacco and oil products due to
decrease in imports caused by lower oil production and prices;

Accordingly, the total revenues for the years 2015-2017 were only LYD 141, 150 and 150
million, respectively with no revenues in hard currency during this period.

Revenues, Expenditures and Financial Constraints

Large amounts of local and hard currencies are expended annually on management,

49
construction and O & M of the MMRP. Expenditures for the years 2015-2017 totaled LYD
134, 144, and 171 million, respectively.

Running costs of the MMRP accounted for about half of the expenditures with investment
costs accounting for almost one quarter, and O & M accounting for one eighth. No
expenditure was made on training. A small deficit existed for the last three years.

Production Costs and Supply Tariffs of the MMRP Water

The estimated MMRP water production cost for the period 2005-2008 averaged LYD 0.44/
m3 (USD0.32/m³), with operational and capital costs averaging LYD 0.336/m3 (USD0.24/
m³), and LYD 0.106/m3 (USD0.08/m³), respectively. These costs reflect under exploitation
of the MMRP infrastructures with actual flows reaching only about one third of the design
capacity;

The MMRP water supply tariffs for agricultural, urban and industrial uses were LYD
0.048, 0.080 and 0.796/m³, respectively.

The large disparity between water production costs and tariffs contributes to the financial
deficits faced by the MMRA.
Faced with increasing financial deficits, the MMRA has been unable to:
• Import necessary spare parts and materials needed for basic and urgent maintenance
operations;
• Continue implementation of major works such as the Ghadames, Zawia, Zwara System
and Kufra/ Sarir pipeline, reconstruction of damaged pipeline manufacturing plant, fuel
tanks, destroyed wells and to start the Ajdabia-Tobruk conveyance system.

2.10.1.4Human Resources
The MMRA conducts its functions through a workforce of 2472 persons with 70% occupying
technical positions as dictated by the nature of the MMRP. Administrative staff form 27%,
with financial and legal staff forming 2.5 and 0.5%, respectively. The majority of MMRP
staff is employed at the headquarters and at the SS/BT system (33 and 32 %, respectively);
the J/H System employs 27% of the total employees. These numbers, qualifications and
their geographic distribution appear to be appropriate as demonstrated by the MMRP’s
high level performance over its operational life.

Changes in the project’s functions from mainly construction to O & M will imply a shift in
the nature and size of the human resources. It is expected that this shift will be absorbed
readily through the existing work force.

2.10.1.5 Technical Capacities

The MMRP is mainly a technical project. Its design, construction and O & M operations
employed unique analysis, tools, utilities, equipment as well as astronomical quantities
of pipe manufacturing and fill materials. Pipe-lifting cranes and transporting trucks were
made especially for the MMRP. Expectedly, the dimensions and size of its components were
very large and non-existent prior to and during the MMRP inception period. Prestressed
Concrete Cylinder Pipes (PCCPs) were 4 m in diameter and 7.5 m long.

MMRP Infrastructures

The major infrastructural components of the MMR Project are:

• Wellfield s with a total of 1121 wells, over 1300 km of wellfield collector pipe work,
wellfield balancing/header tanks;

50
• Pipelines totaling more than 4000 km;
• A total of 16 pumping stations and flow control stations;
• Regulating, pressure breaking and surge protection tanks;
• Many major balancing reservoirs with a total storage capacity exceeding 56.5 million
cubic meters;
• A total of 168 turnouts and feeding points;
• Water treatment plants;
• Haul roads totaling 3755 km in length;
• A total of 10 operations support and maintenance (O S & M) facilities;
• Two PCCP manufacturing plants (Brega and Sarir);
• Chlorination plants at AtTalhya and Sidi AsSayeh Tanks;
• Power supply, transmission and distribution systems;
• Sarir Power Generation Station;
• Communication and control systems.

State of the MMRP Infrastructures

The MMRP infrastructures have been installed during the period 1990-2010. Prior to 2014,
these infrastructures were in a good condition having been designed and executed recently
to high quality standards, well operated and maintained thanks to availability of human and
financial resources, and escaping man-caused damage thanks to the tight security granted
to the MMRP. All imported equipment were new; some were manufactured specially made
for the MMRP;

Presently, reservoirs, tanks and buried pipes of the water supply lines are still in good
condition with the exception of those suffering illegal connections.
The state of some of the MMRP components declined after 2014, however, due to serious
damages sustained as a result of armed conflict, lack of security, lawlessness, economic,
political and institutional instabilities. Examples of these damages are listed below:
• Destruction of the PCCP factory in Brega;
• Destruction of fuel tanks of Sarir Power Station;
• Destruction of 96 wells in the J/HS (Phase II);
• Destruction of numerous control chambers to make illegal connections.
Additionally, these infrastructures in general have been subject to accelerated deterioration
due to the lack of spare parts, consumables and lack of maintenance for financial constraints
which appear to be long lasting.

2.10.1.6 Quality and Availability of The MMRP Waters

Quality of MMRP Waters

Phase I waters are withdrawn presently from Tazerboo and Sarir wellfield s. The water
quality of the Tazerbo and Sarir differ in some indicators; however, both waters as well as
the blended water meet the WHO drinking water standards.
Water quality of most Phase II wells is within the Libyan drinking water standards limits.
However, partial treatment for the reduction of nitrates and chlorides will be needed when
the flowrate exceeds 1.454 Mm3/d;
Finally, the waters of Ghadames basin have high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide
rendering them corrosive to PCCPs. These waters are treated centrally;
Waters from the MMRP are disinfected using chlorine gas prior to transmission to the
GCWW balancing reservoirs. In the city of Benghazi, MMRP water is chlorinated at AtTalhya
Tank. Similarly, Phase II water is disinfected at Sidi AsSayeh Tank, Ain Zara and Airport
Tanks.

51
Availability and Reliability of MMRP Waters
Sources of water for the MMRP are reliable and sustainable as the volumes of water
available are very large and the water table declines at the source wellfield s were less than
predicted.
The quantities of water supplied increased gradually since the arrival of “first waters” from
Phases I and II in 1989 and 1996, respectively. In 2017, the total quantity supplied was 608.56
Mm3. Today, the MMRP water is supplied to over 4 million Libyans. The MMRA continues
to operate satisfactorily despite the multitude of threats it has been facing;
The amount of water conveyed by the completed phases of the MMRP is only half of their
design capacity;
The exact quantities of water supplied by the MMRP to its different end-users are not
known because they are not metered in many instances. Knowledge of such quantities is
essential for billing, computing of consumption rates and their temporal variations and for
estimation of leakage and UFWs;
The MMRP groundwater basins are subject to human induced pollution and oil production
activities particularly produced water leakage;
Continuity and quantity supplied declined since 2014 because of frequent power shortages,
but mainly because of threats to the lives of MMRA staff, destruction and damages to the
projects infrastructural components caused by armed conflict and lack of security. Such
threats, damages, and destruction resulted in many complete closures of the MMRP water
supply systems with severe “prolonged water shortages”.
The MMRP has been operational for almost 25 years. It succeeded in addressing Libya’s
water gap thus achieving its objectives and demonstrating its technical and socio-economic
feasibility with no documented adverse environmental impacts. Maintenance of most of its
infrastructure is necessary requiring financial resources and time. The experience gained
and data compiled from construction, O & M of the MMRP contains many valuable lessons
to learn from.
The project can satisfy Libya’s domestic water needs for many decades to come if domestic
waters are reused for agriculture, an undertaking that should also be made a national
priority.
There appears to be no set basis for allocating the MMRP waters to the different users;
Water tariffs for MMRP waters are quite low relative to production costs. Because they
are less than production costs, the difference is subsidized by the government. Such
subsidies encourage water use inefficiency (wastage) by users and financial inefficiency of
institutions who will not be enticed to reduce production costs. This is especially the case
for agricultural uses which account for most water uses.
The MMRP activities have shifted from construction to operation; while construction was
conducted mostly by non-Libyans, operation is conducted solely by Libyans. Such shifts
require a change in the nature and numbers of staff.

2.10.1.7 Threats and Damages to the MMRP

Staff, infrastructures and sites of the MMRP have been subject to serious threats caused
by armed conflict, lack of security and lawlessness. The threats included deaths, injuries,
kidnappings and forcing workers to leave worksites. Damages to property and infrastructures
included:
• Destruction of vital infrastructural components (wells, valve/ control chambers, vehicles,
workshops, premises);

52
• Serious damages to the Cathodic Protection and Communications Systems;
• Interruption of execution of on-going or planned projects due to departure of expatriate
contractors and consultants and to destruction of pipe manufacturing plants;
• Companies engaged in works with the MMREMA are suing the MMRA for failing to
make payments on services rendered.

The impacts ranged from minor to very severe causing total cuts of water supply for long
periods of time, losses of large quantities of water and associated revenues, in addition to
large costs of replacement, renovation, and major maintenance works. Additionally, work
on on-going projects or planned ones has been interrupted due to departure of expatriate
contractors and consultants;
The intensity of the impacts is increased by the frequent power shortages;
If not addressed properly and immediately, these threats and damages could lead to the
complete failure of the MMRP with serious socio-economic consequences as no viable
supply source is available presently.
The MMRP is poorly appreciated if not misunderstood by most Libyans.

Costs of Conflict-caused Damages to the MMRP

The conflict caused damages to the MMRP resulted in huge direct and indirect financial
losses; revenues from sales of water during shut downs or illegal connections are an
example of direct losses. Examples of indirect losses include replacement, repair, and
reconstruction of damaged equipment, facilities, etc.
An exact calculation of the losses sustained by the MMRP has not been made, but they are
very large by any account. The total direct and indirect costs of damages to the MMRP are
estimated to reach USD500 million.
To these costs must be added the costs of lost work days, losses in water revenues, costs
of repairs of damages and replacement of parts, as well as the premature aging of the
infrastructures due to improper or lack of timely maintenance to the MMRP components.

2.10.2 CHALLENGES
The damages sustained by the MMRP are due to serious challenges that are beyond the
MMRA’s mandate and capacities; the major challenges are as follows:
• Armed conflict, lack of security and weak - if not non-existent - law enforcement;
• Declining financial resources including hard currency and difficulty to open letters of
credit;
• Electric power interruptions and outages and fuel shortages;
• The nature, size and function of the MMRP infrastructures’ components that operate
sequentially – in series - with a destruction in one component causing a stoppage of
service in all components downstream of it;
• The distribution of the MMRP infrastructures over large, remote, non-inhabited areas,
distributed over the whole country making them difficult to protect;
• Difficulty to replace or procure destroyed components because they are unique and
cannot be bought off-the-shelf and must be specially manufactured;
• Inability to collect revenues for waters supplied for domestic and agricultural uses;
• Potential corrosion of PCCPs especially in light of the damages to the Cathodic Protection
System and stealing of its components;
• Unavailability of technical assistance due to departure of expatriates since 2011.

2.10.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Immediate remedial measures to damages through the following actions:

53
• Provision of full protection of the MMRP infrastructures by a special force that is part of
the national security force as the MMRP is a national security priority.
• Treating acts by any person/entity which may cause damages to MMRP components as
treason and war crime;
• Enforcement of the MMRP funding laws and decrees;
• Exempting the MMRA from the exchange rate increase as it is a public institution “legally
exempted” from such acts;
• Replacement, maintenance, and reconstruction of damaged MMRP infrastructures;
expediting of opening by the Central Bank of Libya of letters of credit for import of spare
parts and materials needed for O & M of the MMRP;
• Reconsideration of the payment mechanism by the GCWW for the water supplied by
the MMRP in such a way that the supplied water revenues are transferred regularly and
fully;
• Water service provisions subsidies should be reconsidered with the objective of reducing
water consumption and production costs;
• Flow measuring devices must be used regularly with records utilized for billing and
other applications;
• The basis for allocation of the MMRP water should be reconsidered within a national
integrated water resources strategy; priority should be given to domestic water supplies
and to full utilization of the MMRP systems to minimize costs;
• Assessment of the effectiveness of the existing MMRA regulations to identify gaps and
update the legal framework including enforcement of the funding laws, tariffs values
and payment mechanisms by the GCWW, and water supply allocations;
• Preparation of a special emergency preparedness plan to counter major failure of the
MMRP system and provision of resources needed for implementation of this plan;
• Management of water demand and effective use of MMRP waters by the different users
to decrease the water provision cost and ensure the Project’s sustainability;
• To optimize MMRP water use, end-users should execute the receiving/ distribution
infrastructures by the time the MMRP waters reach these infrastructures;
• Continued search for water sources that supplement the MMRP, is warranted to overcome
complete MMRP system shutdowns for extended periods of time;
• Exploration of possibilities for reuse of wastewater for agricultural purposes should be
given a priority to free good quality MMRP waters for municipal and industrial uses.
This way, irrigation water is utilized for replenishing depleted coastal aquifers and more
revenues are made from municipal and industrial users because their tariffs are notably
higher. This practice will ensure the financial sustainability of the MMRP;
• Raising awareness about the MMRP in general, its feasibility, its components, etc. so
that both lay persons and decision makers appreciate the project’s significance in the
sustainability of Libya’s socio-economic development;
• Raising awareness towards protection of the MMRP infrastructures and conserving of
its waters as the resources are finite – although huge – and the costs are considerable;
moreover, for the near future, the MMRP continues to be Libya’s only viable domestic
water supply source;
• Considering the size of investment made by all Libyans and the significance of the
project’s role as Libya’s most viable water supply institution, sustenance and protection
of the project must be given highest national priority.

54
2.11 INVESTMENT/DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE MANMADE RIVER
EXECUTION AND MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY, LIBYA

Needs of the MMR to continue operating successfully were assessed through background
data, baseline surveys, field visits, meetings and interviews. Criteria were developed to
classify these needs as urgent, short-term and medium-long term. The primary criterion
was the need for the activity, action and service to avoid or prevent adverse health impacts
to end-users or to guarantee the continuity of water supply, which is a basic human need
and right. Provision of funds is another criterion as less costly items are more likely to be
implemented in a short time. Finally, the nature of the activity and, hence, the amount of
time needed to implement some works or activities require a short execution time while
others require long times.

Activities or works which can be implemented within 6-12 months were considered urgent
while those requiring 1-2 years and 3-5 years are considered short-term and medium-long
term plans, respectively. The urgent investment/ development plan is presented in the form
of a bill of quantities table including items (activity, work, service, etc.), quantity, unit price
and total price. Prices are quoted in US dollars because procurement and supply constitutes
the major cost item and the Libyan dinar fluctuates against foreign currencies.
Due to time constraints and lack of updated unit costs, short-term and medium-term
development plans were limited to activities and execution timetables.

It is to be noted that the prices were quoted by manufacturers, contractors or suppliers

whenever possible. Reference was also made to offers submitted recently containing
identical or similar items. Finally, experience in the field and discussions with staff of the
MMRP were utilized. These quoted prices are subject to a large error margin, however,
due to the unique circumstances associated with the import, shipping, transport, and
implementation activities which can vary dramatically due to armed conflict, lack of security
and disrespect for the law among other factors. Such factors affect also the implementation
schedules for the three types of plans considerably.

2.11.1Urgent Development/ Investment Plan (6-12 months)

Urgent investment/ development plans are presented in Annex 2.2. The total amount
required to implement this plan was estimated to be USD 117.73 million. Most of this
amount is needed for rehabilitation and renovation of destroyed wells of the J/HS and
provision of protection to MMRP infrastructures. Completion of Benghazi water supply
system is also a prominent cost item.

It is to be stressed that the costs and implementation times are estimates at best for lack of
recent quotations for some items. Conversely, some costs are very accurate as they were
taken from quotations from bids or from signed contracts which are at different stages of
development. In fact, the MMR provided detailed lists and purchase orders with specific
trade names, vendors, costs, etc. These lists were not included in the report for brevity
as they will add little value to the contents. Execution times are also subject to changes
depending on the timely availability of skilled staff, spares, materials as well as security of
the worksites. When implementation is done with the help of expatriate experts, availability
becomes critical as most countries forbid their citizens from traveling to Libya for security
reasons.

55
2.11.3 Short-term Development Plan
Short-term development plans are comprised of activities which require 1-3 years to be
completed. Such activities, works or services may start as early as urgent ones but will
be completed in 1-3 years and may depend on corresponding urgent phase works. These
needs are specified in Annex 2.3.

2.11.4 Medium-term Development Plan

The medium-term plan lists those activities which require 3-5 years to be completed. Such
works fall generally within the MMRA strategic plans. These needs are presented in Annex
2.4.

56
REFERENCES

1. Zidan, A. M., “The Impact of the Great Man Made River Project on Libya’s Agricultural
Activities and the Environment”, MS Thesis, Universiti Teknologi Malaysi, Malaysia,
2007;
2. Brika, B., “Water Resources and Desalination in Libya: A Review”, Proceedings of the
3rdEWaS International Conference on “Insights on the Water-Energy-Food Nexus”,
Lefkada Island, Greece, 27–30 June 2018;
3. General People’s Committee, “State of the Water and Integrated Water Resources
Management Strategy: 2000-2025”, Dec. 1999;
4. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0823/Libya-s-Qaddafi-taps-fossil-water-
to-irrigate-desert-farms
5. Benidris, A. m. and Kumati, M. O., MANAGING TRANSBORDER OF GROUNDWATER
BASIN IN GREAT MAN MADE RIVER AUTHORITY - LIBYA Journal of Global Resources
Volume 2 January 2016;
6. The CIA, Office of Global Issues; Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, “Libya’s
Great Manmade River Project: Plans and Realities”, A Research Paper, Approved for
Release on 14/12/2011;
7. United Nations Economic Commission on Africa, “Study on Large-Scale Water Transfer
in Africa”, 1991;
8. “Support To NEPAD–CAADP Implementation TCP/LIB/2902 (I) (NEPAD Ref. 06/46 E)
Volume IV of V Bankable Investment Project Profile: Great Man–Made River Distribution
Facilities”, June 2006;
9. MMRA, “Situation Overview of Water and Sanitation Service Provision in Libya”,
Proceedings of Workshop, Tunis, 2017;
10. https://gmra.ly/index.php;
11. People’s General Congress, Law 10/1983 on the Establishment of the Manmade River
Project Execution and Management Authority, 10/1/1983;
12. General Peoples Committee, Decree no 246 year 1996 on Establishment of the Utilization
Authority for the Benghazi Plain, Nov. 3, 1996;
13. General People’s Committee’s Decree no. 230 year 1995 on the Establishment of “ The
Authority for the Utilization of  Jabel Hasawna – Jefara Water System of the Man-Made
River”, 1995;
14. General People’s Committee’s Decree no 247 year 1996 for the Establishment of the
MMR Water Unitization Authority for the Central Sirt Region, 29/8/1996;
15. Gehawi, A., “Cost Analysis of the MMRP Waters”, a paper presented during the Arab
Water Week, Benghazi, May 2017;
16. “Great Manmade River, Libya”, https://ejatlas.org/conflict/great-manmade-river-libya;
17. The General People’s Committee decision no. 218 year 1994; 26/4/1994;
18. The General People’s Committee decision no. 367 / 1997; 1997;
19. ///D:/AAA/WATER/Water%20Arab/IWA-2012-International-Statistics-for-Water-Services.
pdf;
20. Troy Sternberg, “Water megaprojects in deserts and drylands”, Journal of International
Journal of Water Resources Development, Volume 32, 2016 - Issue 2
21. Ikweiri, F. S., Gabril, H., Jahawi, M., and Almatrdi, Y., “Evaluating the Evaporation Water
Loss From the Omar Mukhtar Open Water Reservoir”, 12th Twelfth International Water
Technology Conference, IWTC12 2008, Alexandria, Egypt, 2008;
22. World Health Organization, “Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality”, 4th edition, 2017;
23. MMRA, Water Quality Monthly Report, Feb. 2018;
24. El-Mabrouk, F. A .and Sahli, N. I., “Water Quality Of The Great Manmade River Project
–Libya (Case Study: Tazerbo Wellfield), WATMED3 Third International Conference on

57
 Water Resources In Mediterrean Basin, Tripoli – Lebanon 1 – 3 November 2006;
25. Abu Fayed, A. A., ElKebir, A. A., and Rizgh, M., “Water Quality Management as a Base
for Operation of the Hasawna/ Jefara MMRP System”, Libya’s 1st International Water
Conference, Tripoli, Libya, April, 2018;
26. MMRA, Water Quality Report, 2017, unpublished;
27. GCWW, “State of the Water for the Different Regions Report”, 2017;
28. Ministry of Planning, “The National Program for Water and Sanitation”, 2006;
29. Personal Communication, MMRA, June 2018, Tripoli, Libya;
30. “Man-Made River under Man-Made Threats: People with no access to water create
illegal extensions, which pollutes the line and leads to even more shortages», http://
www.correspondents.org/ar/node/7643
31. “Water cut off from the town of Abu Hadi since over one month,” http://alwasat.ly/
news/libya/136434;
32. “Power Cuts and Water Shortages in Tripoli”, http://www.libya-analysis.com/power-
cuts-and-water-shortages-in-tripoli/;
33. “UNICEF responds to the emerging water crisis in Tripoli”, https://www.unicef.org/
media/media_59666.html
34. https://ar-ar.facebook.com/gmmra.ly.

58
 LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN RELATION TO REPORT PREPARATION

.No Name Title .Phone No

1 Abdul Naser Abu Bteina Head, Executive Committee 0912092849

2 Abdullah Ben Idris Member, Executive Committee 0913844268

3 Mohammad Hajjaji Member, Executive Committee 0925243797

4 Ahmad AdDeeb Head, Phase IV Branch 0912192628

5 Yonus Tellisi Production Dept. Manager, Phase II

6 Fathi Abu Hassouna Technical Affairs Department 0919089479

7 Tawfeeq Shwaihdi .Public Relations, Information Dept 0923090411

8 Mahmoud S. AlMaaddi Sarir Site Chief, Phase I 0913768981

9 Abdurrazaq Younus Technical Affairs Dept., MMRA

10 Mohammed Gumati Technical Affairs Dept., MMRA 0914941400

11 Mohammad AlAaghel Technical Affairs Dept., MMRA 0925024427

12 Mohamed A AlMawi Technical Affairs Dept., MMRA 0913820263

13 Mahamoud Abu Aisha Technical Affairs, Phase II

14 Othman AlGubtaan Planning Dept., Phase II

15 Seddigh AzZarzour Human Resources Dept., Phase II 0926469243

16 Salahuddin M AlHelaali Head, Planning and Evaluation Division 0925112933

17 Amjad M AlFadheel General Admin. Director, MMRA 0925103530

18 Ahmad AjGehaani Financial Dept., MMRA 0913768992

19 Hussain AbuShaala Executive Committee Affairs, MMRA 0926011896

20 Mohammad Dharrat Technical Consultant MMRA 0923579341

21 Mohammad Jaber Financial Dept., MMRA 0921523858

59
 22 Abdurrazagh Younus Water Treatment, Phase II 0925321363

23 AzZarrough AsSanusi South Region Manager, Phase II 0913549328

24 Salem AlHawwari Water Quality Division 0925978018

25 Jamal Abdullah North WellField Supervisor, Phase II 0913394631

26 Tariq AlMusatter Head of Laboratory Division, Phase II

27 Muhsen AlHammoudi Eastern Field Supervisor, Phase II

28 Ali Milaad Masoud Supervisor, Safety division, Phase II 0925401560

29 Bashir AlAjeli Buildings Maintenance Unit Head, Phase II 0926346012

30 Abu Bakr Hamed East Field Pumping Station Supervisor, Phase II

31 Ali Mohammad AlMawi Manager, SS/TB System

32 Ali B. AbdulHafeed Head, operations division, Phase II 0913467821

33 Ali Aghaab Brown Root NA 0913963335

34 Saeed Gherghab Brown Root NA 0915003431

ANNEXES
Annex 2.1 Cities and Towns Supplied (and to Be Supplied) by the MMRP

Annex 2.1.1 Cities and Towns Supplied by Phase I of the MMRP

.No City/Town .No City/Town .No City/Town

1 Benghazi 6 KhourGhida 11 Jalu, Jkherra, Nafoura Oil Field

2 Ajabia 7 New Brega 12 Oujela

3 Sidi Sultan 8 Sirt 13 Slough Western Mahallas

4 Beshir 9 Ben Jawwad 14 RasLanouf Residential

5 Zwaitina 10 Sultan

60
 Annex 2.1.2 Cities and Towns Supplied by Phase II of the MMRP

.No City/Town .No City/Town .No City/Town

1 Qasar Ben Ghashir 12 Azizia 23 Bani Waleed

2 Tripoli 13 Jandouba 24 Shwairef

3 Misrata 14 AlAsabaa 25 Zahra/Janzour

4 Tajoura 15 AlGwaleesh 26 Maya/Twaibia

5 AlQusbaat 16 Kikkla 27 Riyayna

6 Ghanima 17 Souq AlKhamis 28 Az-Zintaan

7 Funduq AlAllous 18 Khums 29 Rujbaan

8 QasrKhiar 19 Sileen 30 Jadu

9 Gharaboulli 20 Tawergha 31 Ruhaybaat

10 Sidi AsSayeh 21 Zliten 32 Yefrin

11 Spaiaa 22 Tarhouna

Annex 2.1.3 Cities and Towns Supplied by Phase III of the MMRP: Ghadames –Zawia-Zwara
.No City/Town .No City/Town .No City/Town

1 Sinaawin 10 Tigi 19 Zawia

2 Awlaad Mahmoud 11 Badr 20 Jmail

3 AlMajabra 12 AlJawsh 21 Zwara

4 Kabaao 13 AlAjelaat 22 Reghdaline

5 Tamzine 14 Sabrata 23 Zilten

6 Tandammira 15 Surman 24 Abu Kammash

7 AlHaraaba 16 Abu Isaa 25 AlAssa

8 Nalut 17 AlMutred

9 AlHawamed 18 AlHarsha

Annex 2.1.4 Cities and Towns Supplied by Phase IV of the MMRP: Ajdabia – Tobruk System

61
.No City/Town .No City/Town .No City/Town

1 Tobruk 5 AlKardhia 9 Imsaaed

2 AlGhaaraa 6 AlBurdi 10 Jamaal Abdun Naser

3 BirAlAshhab 7 Qasr AlJado 11 Kamboot

4 AlMursis 8 AlJaghboob 12 Shuhadaa AnNadhoura

Annex 2.2 Bill of Quantities (BOQs) and Activities for Urgent (6-12 months) Development/ Investment
Plan for the MMRA

Unit Subtotal Price

No. Item Description Unit Quantity
Price, $ ,$

Maintenance and rehabilitation of 100 dam-

aged wells including Supply of electrical
1 transformers 0.4/3.3/33 for well heads, well No. 100 600,000 60,000,000
heads valves, flow meters and pumps for Al –
Hasawneh Wellfield
Provide electronic monitoring devices for the
2 sites of MMRP (well fields, pumping station, No. 150 20,000 3,000,000
electrical substations)
Rehabilitate Cathodic Protection systems for
3 LS 1 16,000,000
phases I and II of the MMRP

Provide chemicals, maintenance and calibra-

4 tion of laboratory equipment and for water LS. 1 500,000 500,000
quality analysis

Supply and installation of 2.5 megawatt trailer

diesel electrical generators for wells, as a
5 No. 20 250,000 5,000,000
backup source of power at the main power
grid

Supply and installation of HR personnel soft-

6 No. 1 150,000 150,000
ware for the Al-Haswneh/ Jefara System

Maintenance and rehabilitation of pumps of

7 No. 14 50,000 700,000
14 wells in the Sarir Wellfield

Maintenance and rehabilitation of pumps of

8 No. 10 50,000 500,000
10 wells for Tazerbo Wellfield

9 Replace of the Chlorination Plant in AtTalhya No. 1 100,000 100,000

Activation/ Upgrading of the communications

10 LS 1 280,000 280,000
systems in the MMRP (wireless nodes)

Construction of 120,000 m3 ground water stor-

11 No. 1 6,000,000
age concrete tank at Al-Hawari site

62
 Supply and installation of isolation valves
12 chamber nodes 3 and 4 in Benghazi MMR No. 10 200,000 2,000,000
water supply system

Provide protection requirements of wellfields

and facilities from outlaws and terrorists in
13 LS LS 12,000,00 12,000,000
consultation and cooperation with concerned
national authorities)

Total (One hundred and seventeen million, seven hundred and thirty thousand) US
117,730,000
dollars

Annex 2.3 Activities and Time Schedule for Short-term Development Plan for the MMRA

)Implementation Schedule Time (in quarters of the year

Item Description
S.
No
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12

Completion of the remaining

1 projects in phases II - IV to
reach the production targets

Maintenance and rehabilita-

tion of damaged operation and
2
maintenance support centers
)(Ajdabiya and Sirt

Implementation of a control
3 system at the subsidiary Beng-
hazi Pumping Station

Replacement and maintenance

4 of substation feeders (11KV) in
a Slough Pumping Station

Development of Tazerbo Pow-

5
er Station

Detection of seepage works

6 and maintenance of Ajdabiya
Water Storage Tank

Connecting the optical fiber link

7
between Slough and Ajdabia

Supply and installation of a sys-

8
tem of energy sources

63
 Detection works on the engines
9 of pumps in Slough Pumping
Station

Construction of 10 water irriga-

10
tion tanks in the regions

Removal of illegal connections,

11
obstacles and remnants of war

Development of training pro-

12 grams for operational and
maintenance staff

Annex 2.4 Activities and Time Plan for Medium-term (3-5 years) Development Plan for the MMRA

)Implementation Schedule Time (quarters of the year

No Item Description
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20

Organization of training
1 workshops for the mainte-
nance of valves sites sys-

Follow-up with the emer-

2 gency plan approved by the

Follow-up service facilities

3 maintenance of Sarir Pipe
.Factory

Develop strategic plans for

4 .the MMRP next period

64
65
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OF THE
MAN-MADE RIVER PROJECT
EXECUTION AND MANAGEMENT
AUTHORITY (MMRA), LIBYA

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OF
THE GENERAL DESALINATION
COMPANY, LIBYA

66
ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

GDC General Desalination Company

GECOL General Electricity Company of Libya
GCWW General Company for Water and Wastewater
HFO Heavy Fuel Oil
HIB Housing and Infrastructures Board
LYD Libyan Dinar
LFO Light Fuel Oil
MMRP Man-made River Project
O & M Operation and Maintenance
UFW Unaccounted for Water
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
WDN Water Distribution Network
WHO World Health Organization

67
CONTENTS 1 DISCLAIMER
1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
2 ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS
3
CONTENTS
6 FIGURES
7 TABLES

8 INTRODUCTION 3.1
8 Objectives and Scope of the Report 3.1.1
9 Implementation Methodology 3.1.2
9 Significance of the Report 3.1.3
10 Report Contents 3.1.4

10 BACKGROUND 3.2
10 The GDC Desalination Plants 3.2.1
13 Population Served by the GDC Desalination 3.2.2
Plants

13 LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3.3

13 Establishment and Mandate of the GDC 3.3.1

14 ADMINISTRATIVE/ ORGANIZATIONAL FRAME� 3.44

WORK
14 Organizational Structure of the GDC 3.4.1
15 Organizational Structure of Desalination Plants 3.4.2
16 Vision and Strategy 3.4.3
17 Information Management 3.4.4

17 FINANCIAL CAPACITIES 3.5

17 Financing of the GDC 3.5.1
17 Production and Costs of Desalinated Water 3.5.2
19 Tariffs of Water Supplied by the GDC 3.5.3
20 Financial Status of the GDC 3.5.4
20 Financial Challenges and Consequences 3.5.5

21 HUMAN RESOURCES 3.6

22 Training and Human Resources Development 3.6.1

22 TECHNICAL CAPACITIES 3.7

23 GDC Desalination Plants 3.7.1
24 State of GDC Desalination Plants 3.7.2
26 3.7.3 Complimentary Desalinated Water Supply
Infrastructures
27 3.8 AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY OF WATER
SUPPLIED BY THE GDC

68
27 3.8.1 Availability of Water Supply from the GDC
Desalination Plants
31 3.8.2 Quality of Water Supplied by GDC Desalina�
tion Plants
34 3.8.3 Reliability of the GDC Desalination Plants

3.9 ARMED CONFLICT, LACK OF SECURITY AND

INSTABILITY
34 RELATED DAMAGES
35 1.10 ENERGY SUPPLY AND ECONOM�
IC IMPACTS FOR

35 3.10.1 Source and Types of Energy Used for

Desalination

36 3.10.2 Costs of Energy Types Used for Desalina�

tion
37 3.11 KEY FINDINGS, CHALLENGES AND REC�
OMMENDATIONS
37 3.11.1 Key Findings
39 3.11.2 Major Challenges
40 1.1.3 Recommendations
3.12 URGENT, SHORT AND MEDIUM-TERM
INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT
41 PLANS FOR THE GDC
42 3.12.1Urgent Development/ Investment Plan (6-12
months)
42 3.12.2 Short-term Development Plans
43 3.12.3 Medium-term Development Plan
44 REFERENCES
45 LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN RELATION
TO REPORT PREPARATION
ANNEXES
47 Annex 3.1 Urgent Investment/ Development Plan
for the GDC, Libya
Annex 3.2 Implementation Schedule for Short-term
(1-3 years) Development Plans
48 for the GDC, Libya
Annex 3.3 Bill of Quantities for Short-term (1-3
years) Investment/ Development
49 Plan for the GDC
Annex 3.4 Implementation Schedule for Medi�
um-term (3-5 years) Development Plans
50 for the GDC, Libya
Annex 3.5 Bill of Quantities for Medium term (3-5
years) Investment/ Development
51 Plan for the GDC, Libya

69
FIGURES 11 Figure 1. Locations of GDC Operated
Desalination Plants
11 Figure 2. Zwara Desalination Plant
11 Figure 3. Zliten Desalination Plant
11 Figure 4. Zawia Desalination Plant
11 Figure 5. Tobruk Desalination Plant
12 Figure 6. Derna Desalination Plant
12 Figure 7. Abu Traba Desalination
Plant
12 Figure 8. Sousa Desalination Plant
12 Figure 9. Bomba Desalination Plant
15 Figure 10. Organizational Structure
of the GDC
16 Figure 11. Organizational Structure
of a Desalination Plant
22 Figure12. Distribution of Manpower
in the GDC as Per Cent of Total
25 Figure 13. Corrosion of Zliten Desali-
nation Plant Works
25 Figure 14. Corrosion of Zwara Desali-
nation Plant Works
25 Figure 15. Corrosion of Bomba and
Old Sousa Desalination Plant Works
30 Figure 16. Per Cent of Shut-downs
of GDC Desalination Plants and their
Causes
32 Figure 17. Potabilization Plants at
Zwara (Left) and Sousa (Right) De-
salination Plant
32 Figure 18. Water Quality Analysis
Laboratory, Zwara Desalination Plant

70
TABLES 12 Table 1. GDC Desalination Plants Lo-
cations, Productivities and Operation
Dates
Table 2. Number of Communities and
Populations Served by the GDC Desali-
nation
13 Plants
18 Table 3. Cost Aspects of GDC Desalina-
tion Plants
19 Table 4. Expenditure Fields of GDC Op-
erated Desalination Plants
20 Table 5. Revenues of the GDC
23 Table 6. Operation Dates, Technologies
and States of GDC Desalination Plants
Table 7. Water Demands of Communi-
ties Served/ Planned to be Served by
the GDC
27 Desalination Plants
28 Table 8. Productivities and Water Quali-
ty of GDC Operated Desalination Plants
29 Table 9. Causes of Shut-downs of GDC
Desalination Plants
Table 10. Water Quality Parameters
Monitored in Zliten Desalination Plant
36 Table 11. Sources of Energy Employed
to Operate GDC Desalination Plants
36 Table 12. Costs of Energy Types Used
for Desalination in Libya

71
3.1 INTRODUCTION
About 80% of Libya’s population live within 100 kilometers from the Mediterranean Sea
coastline. Groundwater is used extensively and unsustainably at times to meet over 95% of
Libya’s agricultural, domestic and industrial water demands. The water scarcity problems
in some coastal cities made it necessary to turn to seawater desalination as the optimum
source of water supply.

Eight desalination plants have been constructed solely for domestic water production. A
special company, the General Desalination Company (GDC), was established to manage
these plants. The desalination plants are connected to distribution networks operated by
the General Company for Water and Wastewater (GCWW).The GDC is thus a main supplier
of domestic water.

3.1.1 Objectives and Scope of the Report

This report was prepared as one of the final deliverables of a UNICEF Sponsored Project
for the Assessment of the Capacities of Water Supply Institutions in Libya. The objective
of this report was to assess the legal, administrative or organizational, financial, human
and technical capacities of the GDC and to identify gaps and challenges affecting its
performance. The findings of this assessment were used to draw urgent, short and medium
term investment and development plans for sustainable production of desalinated water
by the GDC.

Subsequently, the data collected and generated will serve as a database on the present state
of the GDC legal, administrative or organizational, financial, human and technical capacities
which will form a reference to be consulted by the GDC and other water institutions and
stakeholders in Libya.

Accordingly, the scope of work of this report consisted of two parts: 1) Assessment of the
legal, administrative or organizational, financial, human and technical capacities of the GDC
and identification of gaps and challenges impacting its performance and 2) Preparation of
urgent, short-term, and medium-term investment/ development plans.

3.1.2 Implementation Methodology

The report’s scope was implemented in three phases; each consisting of several activities.
The phases and activities were as follows:

Phase I: Data Collection

Data on the GDC’s capacities were collected from several sources including:
• Literature surveys and reviews of studies, articles, reports, plans and programs
prepared on the GDC;
• Reports on desalinated water production and quality data prepared by the GDC;
• Media coverage and official website of the GDC;
• Meetings, communications and interviews with senior GDC staff;
• Comprehensive baseline surveys filled by the GDC staff;
• Field visits to the GDC’s headquarters in Benghazi and main office in Janzour;

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• Field visits to all desalination plants;

Phase II: Collection of Cost Data for Investment/ Development Plans

Cost data utilized for preparation of the investment/ development plans for the GDC were
solicited from several sources, including: 1) Recent offers, previous and present contracts,
suppliers of equipment and materials (Plant units, chemicals, etc.), local markets surveys
and experts’ estimates.

Phase III: Data Analysis and Validation of Results

The data collected were compiled, synthesized and analyzed for identification of the
baseline state of the GDC, assessment of its capacities, identification of key findings, major
challenges, and accordingly, preparation of recommendations. Subsequently, urgent,
short, and medium term investment/ development plans were prepared.

The assessment results were presented in a special workshop held in the GCWW’s
headquarters in Tripoli on 19th February 2019 and attended by concerned staff of the GDC,
MMRA, GCWW, GAWRs key staff and municipality representatives for review and validation.
The feedback form this workshop was documented and incorporated to produce the final
“Officially approved” assessment report.

3.1.3 Significance of the Report

This baseline, assessment and needs report of the GDC is the first comprehensive report
on the different aspects of this major water supply institution. It was prepared by AlKasaba
Consultants under the sponsorship of the UNICEF and combines the results of efforts and
contributions of many specialists including those of the GDC itself. The report forms a
database that has been validated by the GDC experts making it a national water sector
institutional reference. Although it is a reliable and comprehensive document, there
remains a large room for completeness, improvement and continuous updating. Moreover,
it should be subjected to further scrutiny to improve the accuracy of the data presented and
fill the data gaps that may exist within the report.

3.1.4 Report Contents

To achieve its objectives and comply with the Project TORs, the report contents were
presented as follows:
1. Introduction and Background (Sections 3.1 and 3.2);
2. Legal, administrative or organizational framework and financial frameworks
(Sections 3.3 to 3.5)
3. Human resources and technical capacities(Sections3.6 and 3.7)
4. Municipal water supply by the GDC (Section 3.8)
5. Armed conflict and lack of security impacts (Section 3.9)
6. Key findings, challenges and recommendations (Section 3.10)
7. Urgent, short, and medium-term investment/development plans (Section 3.11)

3.2BACKGROUND
3.2.1 The GDC Desalination Plants

The GDC operated eight plants distributed almost evenly along Libya’s coastline (Figures
1to 9). Basic data on these plants is presented in Table 1. The objective of these plants was

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to provide water to urban communities with no groundwater resources available or where
such sources are insufficient. These plants and several others belonged to the General
Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL) that operated desalination plants for the primary
reason of producing electricity but were handed over to the GDC, so that special attention
is provided for desalination for domestic water production.
It can be seen that:1) The total installed capacities of these plants is 380,000 m3/day, 2) Some
of them have new “larger” extensions, 3) And that some of these plants were constructed
long before the establishment of the GDC. The GDC was thus established to implement and
operate desalination plants producing water for municipal purposes.

Figure 1. Locations of GDC Operated Desalination Plants

Figure 2. Zwara Desalination Plant Figure 3.Zliten Desalination Plant

Figure 4.Zawia Desalination Plant Figure 5.Tobruk Desalination Plant

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 Figure 6.Derna Desalination Plant Figure 7.Abu Traba Desalination Plant

Figure 8.Soussa Desalination Plant Figure 9.Bomba Desalination Plant

Table 1. GDC Desalination Plants Locations, Productivities and Operation Dates

Installed
Installed capacity, Year operation Year opera-
Plant location Plant location capacity,
m3/d started tion started
m3/d

Tobruk 40000 1999 Abu Traba 40000 2007

Bumba 30000 1999 Zliten 30000 1992

Derna 40000 2009 Zawia 80000 2010

Sousa 1 10000 2002 Zwara 1 40000 2006

Sousa 2 40000 2009 Zwara 2 40000 Incomplete

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3.2.2 Population Served by the GDC Desalination Plants

A total of 134 communities are supplied presently or planned to be supplied in the near
future by the GDC desalination plants as shown in Table 2. The populations served in
2018 ranged from over 360,000 to 65,000 persons. Upon full utilization of the desalination
plants and development of associated infrastructures, a total of about 1.8 million persons
will be supplied in 2023.

3.3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

3.3.1 Establishment and Mandate of the GDC
As stated previously, the GDC was established in accordance with the General People’s
Committee (GPC) Decision No. 924 for 2007 as a financially and administratively independent
public company with a headquarter office in the city of Benghazi. Upon establishment, the
GDC was affiliated with the Ministry of Electricity, Water and Gas (MEWG), then to the
Renewable Energy Sector in 2011, the Ministry of Housing and Utilities in 2012, then to the
Ministry of Water Resources in 2013. Presently, the GDC is under the supervision of the
General Authority for Water Resources (GAWR).

Table 2. Number of Communities and Populations Served

by the GDC Desalination Plants

Desalination No. of communi-

Population 2018 Population, 2023
Plant ties supplied

Tobruk 18 210234 237861

Bomba 7 65062 70853

Derna 12 123455 134444

Sousa 25 263160 293123

Abu Traba 31 130625 142391

Zliten 4 121312 134531

Zawia 21 363213 402606

Zwara 16 352987 384406

Total 134 1630048 1800215

The responsibilities of the GDC were specified in the GPCs Decision No. 250 for 2009 and
modified by the Prime Ministers Council Decision No. 836 for 2012. The general objectives
of the GDC are to implement national plans and programs in the field of water desalination
in accordance with the latest scientific and technological advances. Specifically, the GDC’s
mandate includes the following (1):

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9. Management, operation, maintenance and rehabilitation of desalination plants;
10. Conducting technical and economic studies and research works in all fields of its activities
and developing future plans including construction and expansion of desalination plants
and dual purpose plants;
11. Exchanging information and technical and economic studies findings in relation to
the GDCs objectives and in association with specialized national and international
companies, institutions or bodies;
12. Proposing of implementation policies for desalination works and dual purpose plants
and guiding rules or bylaws;
13. Proposing of standards and criteria in the fields of water desalination and dual purpose
plants;
14. Implementation of development plans in the fields of water desalination and dual
purpose plants;
15. Proposing of short, medium and long term national strategic plans in the fields of water
desalination and dual purpose plants;
16. Execution and operation of brackish water plants;
17. Supervising and approving of establishment of water bottling plants;
18. Acting as agents for international bodies in its fields of specialization.

3.4ADMINISTRATIVE/ ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The GDC is headquartered in Benghazi along with two regional administrations: the eastern
region located within the Benghazi headquarters and the western region located in Janzour.
Both buildings are rented.

3.4.1 Organizational Structure of the GDC

The organizational structure of the GDC is shown in Figure 10. The governing bylaws of the
GDC were approved by the PMC on 12th March 2013. The GDC is headed by the Chairman of
the Executive Committee. It has three offices (Office of the Chairman of the Committee, Office
of Legal Affairs and Office of Financial Auditor) and five general administrations (General
Administration for Projects, General Administration for Planning, General Administration
for Operation and Maintenance, General Administration for Supplementary Services and
General Administration for Commercial Accounts).

Figure 10. Organizational Structure of the GDC

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A special division exists for information consisting of computer and systems office and
information technology office. A special human development administration exists with a
training office. Documentation is affiliated with the administration for research, studies and
development.

The vision, strategy and policies of the GDC and its organizational structures have been
updated along with work guidelines and rules. Due consideration has been given to such
factors as dynamism, flexibility and modernization in order to respond to continuous
technical, socioeconomic and legal changes and to the shift of the GDCs activities from
implementation to operation.

3.4.2 Organizational Structure of Desalination Plants

Separate organizational structures exist for desalination plants as well (Figure 11). It consists
of the plant manager, follow up offices, administrative affairs and services office, and four
divisions (operation, maintenance, laboratory and technical and efficiency).

Figure 11. Organizational Structure of a Desalination Plant

3.4.3 Vision and Strategy

The GDC has prepared a long term strategy based on a vision, mission and framework
objectives; this strategy has been announced for several years. It aims to satisfy Libya’s
desalinated water needs, partake in the socio-economic and industrial development, provide
efficient, highly reliable, cost effective and environment friendly desalination technologies.
Plans and policies were drawn to implement this strategy.

Strong opportunities exist for the growth and development of the GDC. Being a nationally
recognized company with extensive experience in management of desalination plants, the
GDC can solicit and obtain national support for expansion of its activities to become a
viable supplemental source of water. It can get benefit from the vast amount of knowledge
and experience in the fields of desalination and share experiences internationally. In so
doing, the GDC can get benefit and support from many international organizations.

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The GDC suffers from several weaknesses; however, the major ones are as follows:
1. The aging infrastructures which need major overhauls or total replacement;
2. Weak enforcement capabilities regarding collection of its revenues.
Although the GDC functions satisfactorily at present, the presence of administrations at
different locations has unfavorable impacts on communication and accessibility. This
problem is accentuated by the fact that the GDC does not own the buildings where it is
headquartered.

3.4.4 Information Management

The GDC desalination plants give special attention to data collection, documentation and
archiving. Such activities are affiliated with the administration for studies, research and
development. Information on individual desalination plants are collected and forwarded
daily to the headquarters. A central database exists for data management and decision
making. All work activities are digitized; technical, financial and administrative reports
are prepared regularly and upon request based on data stored or accessed from different
units. It is to be noted that each desalination plant has its own database which ensures
independence and complementarily with the GDC.

3.5 FINANCIAL CAPACITIES

3.5.1 Financing of the GDC
To ensure funding is available amply and continuously for implementation, operation and
management of the GDC plants, several decisions were enacted specifying the sources of
funding; these sources are:

• Revenues sourced from provision of services by the GDC to others;

• Loans and similar transactions approved by concerned bodies;
• Allocations from national budget;
• Revenues for other legally approved sources.

The decree establishing the GDC specifies that the Public Treasury pays the difference
between actual costs of desalinated water and the tariff collected for the supply of water to
the end-users through the GCWW.

3.5.2 Production and Costs of Desalinated Water

The cost of desalinated water varies with several factors including the desalination
technology, plant capacity, operation and maintenance practices, etc. The cost is site
specific.

Costs of desalination plant construction, operation and maintenance are shown in Tables 3
and 4. The capital and operational costs varied with plant size and over time. Operational
costs were incurred mostly in staff salaries followed by spares, maintenance, chemicals
and consumables. Training constituted a very small fraction that declined sharply between
2015 and 2017.
Operating the desalination plants below installed capacities affects tremendously the
production costs. It can be seen from Tables 3 and 4 that the capital costs for desalination
plants varied significantly from less than 500 USD/m3 to over 3600 USD/ m3 with an average
of about 2000 USD/m3. According to the GDC data, operation costs declined from 76.8
million LYD in 2015 to 52.6 million LYD in 2017 with an average unit O & M cost of 1.07 to

79
0.73 LYD/m3 produced, respectively.

The depreciation costs of the desalination plants are reported by the GDC to average 34.8
million LYD/year for the years 2015-2017. Taking depreciation costs into account, the cost
of production will be 1.556, 1.496 and 2.097 LYD/m3 for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017,
respectively. Clearly, this cost is high due to under production necessitating actions to end
idle plant periods. Secondly, while the operation cost alone almost equals the water sales
price, the total cost of production exceeds twice the water price (tariff). Again, all desalination
plants are operating below commercially cost effective limits which have implications for
existing and new plants. Reconsidering price or finding a supplementary funding source is
necessary for the sustainability of the GDC.

Table 3. Cost Aspects of GDC Desalination Plants

Operation and maintenance cost, LYD,

Plant Date Capital for the year
Plant Loca- Capital Cost,
capacity, operation Cost
tion USD
m3/day started USD/ m3
2015 2016 2017

Tobruk 40000 1/9/2008 25,727,572 643 584,825 4962819 8335427

Derna 40000 1/11/2011 146,609,262 3665 6382702 5747563 4010975

Sousa 10000 1/9/2008 7,943,757 794

6839607 6259416 5957141

Sousa Ex-
40000 1/11/2011 117,197,863 2930
pansion

Abu Traba 40000 1/9/2008 108,261,957 2707 6343424 4889710 4010975

Bomba 3000 1/9/2008 8,009,049 2670 1781669 25305 29201

Zliten 30000 1/9/2008 14,335,160 478 101885 722163 1171550

Zawia 80000 1/2/2012 198,864,243 2486 16547413 15599725 10108011

Zwara 40000 1/9/2008 107,835,265 2696

8870578 6642739 2213025

Zwara Ex-
40000 1/2/2012 100,643,630 2516
pansion

Total 363000 835,427,758 2058 47452103 44849440 35836305

The Operation and Maintenance (O & M) costs were mainly for spares, operation spares
and maintenance (48-54%) and salaries (28-33%); training expenditures comprised only
0.02-0.07% in 2015 and 2016, respectively with no allocations in 2017. Energy expenditures
ranged from 7 to 10%.

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3.5.3 Tariffs of Water Supplied by the GDC

The quantities of water supplied by the GDC desalination plants are metered continuously
and sold to the GCWW. The water price was set at 0.86 LYD/m3 (2). This price is unacceptable
to the GDC’s main water consumer (the GCWW), however. This disagreement reflects
heavily on the amount of revenues the GDC makes; moreover, the GCWW pays only a
small fraction of its dues because of financial constraints forcing the GDC to face serious
financial and hence operational problems.
The tariff value and payment conditions and scheduling are an issue of high significance
and priority to the GDC. No effort was made by senior authorities to resolve it. Resolving
this issue must be treated as a priority at the highest national legislative and executive
level.
Table 4. Expenditure Fields of GDC Operated Desalination Plants

Expenditures for the year

2015 2016 2017

Field of Expenditure

of % of % of %
Amount Amount Amount
total total total

Training 50950 0.07 15780 0.02 --------- ---

Energy 5415758 7.05 5332011.9 7.90 5044630 9.60

Chemicals 2509594.1 3.27 1989802.3 2.95 1557934 2.96

Consumables 2640752.4 3.44 1115232.9 1.65 1484223 2.82

Operation spares and

41553824 54.06 36470812 54.05 25393984 48.30
maintenance

Salaries 21710093 28.25 19346507 28.67 17389312 33.08

Asset renewal 294540 0.38 83073 0.12 25280 0.05

)Other (misc. services 2684691.6 3.49 3124855.6 4.63 1679154 3.19

Total 76860203 100.00 67478075 100.00 52574517 100.00

Amount of water pro-

71829817.5 68392023 41611095
duced, m3

O & M Cost, LYD/m3 1.07 0.99 1.26

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Moreover, water tariffs applied in Libya are generally low compared to other countries
(3). Because they are less than production costs, the difference is subsidized by the
government. Such subsidies encourage water use inefficiency (wastage) by users and
financial inefficiency of institutions that will not be enticed to reduce production costs.
3.5.4 Financial Status of the GDC
The GDC prepares budgets annually to guide its operations and expenditures. The values
of the budgets for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 were constant (81,620,578 LYD/year).
Expenditures for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 were 76.8, 68.4, and 41.6 million LYD,
respectively. Values of revenues for these years are shown in Table 5. The value of revenues
from water sales to individuals, public and private companies declined from about 50
million LYD in2015 to 39 million LYD in 2017. The GCWW pays part of its debts to the
GDC. The amount paid declined from 16.85 million LYD in 2015 to 12.00 million LYDs in
2017. The total value for waters supplied by the GDC to the GCWW in 2017 is 44.8 million
LYD implying an annual debt of 32.8 million LYD. The GDC collects only about 60% of its
revenues. Compared to the expenditures, the amount collected is insufficient to cover the
company’s operational costs.
Based on the above, it can be seen that the GDC relies almost completely on the GCWW-
for its revenues. Consequently, as elaborated above, any financial constraints faced by
the GCWW will strain the GDC. Clearly, this arrangement is unacceptable and a viable
alternative must be found to help the GDC retrieve its tariffs timely and at a rate that
compensates its production costs. Other challenges faced by the GDC include the limited
government contributions due to reduction of revenues caused by oil production and prices
declines and the high rise in prices of spare parts, consumables and services needed by
the GDC. This challenge is made more difficult because spare parts and chemicals must
be imported; both cost and time become critical in maintaining the desalination plants
working continuously.

Table 5. Revenues of the GDC

Value of Deserved Revenues in LYD for the Year
Source of Revenue
2015 2016 2017
Individuals, private and public compa-
50,129,704 45,922,934 39,408,746
nies
GCWW 16,847,344 16,409,645 12,000,000

3.5.5 Financial Challenges and Remedial Measures

The GDC faces serious financial challenges due to inability to collect revenues from the
main end-user the GCWW, high operation and maintenance costs, difficulty to open letters
of credit for imports in hard currency and the high rise in the rate of exchange of hard
currency against the Libyan dinar by about three fold. Frequent power shortages and
reliance of LFO and HFO instead of natural gas have also contributed to the challenges
facing the GDC. These constraints have resulted in extended stoppages of operation of
desalination plants. Additionally, they have led to delays and interruptions of major GDC
activities such as the implementation of major overhauls, replacement, expansion works
affecting practically all desalination plants, inability to execute new plants, and inability to
supply spare parts and materials needed for operation and maintenance of desalination
plants affecting directly the availability and continuity of water supplies. Finally, armed
conflict and lack of security forced foreign companies and consultants to quit Libya leaving

82
their contracts unfinished and unwilling to sign new ones.
Remedial actions are, therefore, necessary to overcome these challenges. Such actions
include the following:

• Reconsideration prices of desalinated water so that it reflects all costs;

• Exempting the GDC from implementing the new hard currency exchange
decree;
• Simplification of procedures for opening of letters of credit leading to timely
opening by the Central Bank of Libya of letters of credit in favor of the GDC for import
of spare parts and chemicals needed for (O & M) of the GDC.

3.6 HUMAN RESOURCES

Presently, the GDC employs a total of 874 persons about 76% of them are science technology
professionals (Figure 12). Other professions include administrative, financial and technical
assistants with very few administrative and financial personnel at the headquarters.
Almost two thirds of the employees hold a high institute diploma or a bachelor degree. The
numbers of staff in the plants are almost equal averaging about 60 persons. It is to be noted
that legal professionals are minimum despite their significance. Ages of GDC employees
vary from 18-65 with the larger number being 34-48 years old.

Staff are recruited and appointed effectively based on work needs and applicant qualifications.
A general policy is to employ as many persons from the worksite region as possible to
provide work opportunities to local communities and ensure assets are protected effectively.
Accordingly, the employee size is appropriate with proper qualifications and no excesses
or shortages. Moreover, individual employees performances are evaluated annually using
a unified “Standard” evaluation forms. Such a traditional evaluation procedure overlooks
differences in the nature of work and of employees which reflect heavily on performance.
The upgrading of the evaluation system into an individualized job-specific one is, therefore,
in order.

3.6.1 Training and Human Resources Development

The GDC has invested considerably in recruiting and training its human resources; special
training agreements were made for training abroad and on-the job with contractors

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executing the different desalination plants. Supplementary specialized short-term training
courses and sessions were implemented regularly until a few years ago. Thanks to such
programs, today, operation and maintenance of the desalination plants are conducted by
Libyan staff. Previously, technical assistance was employed, but such assistance ceased
with the forced departure of expatriate experts.
The GDC has no dedicated training center; it relies on training specialists locally and abroad.
Training is done through designed training programs with short and long term objectives.
The success of these programs is attributed to the high academic qualifications of the staff
of all desalination plants. Considering the large number and special skills needed to run
the desalination plants, the training program may need improvements with a special small
scale training center to cater the GDC’s needs and keep abreast of the technological and
training needs in desalination.

3.7 TECHNICAL CAPACITIES

The technical capacities of the GDC are composed of its human resources and its
infrastructures (Desalination plants and associated utilities or facilities). The GDC’s human
resources capacities were described above. The desalination plants infrastructures are
described in the following section.

3.7.1 GDC Desalination Plants

Basic data on the eight GDC desalination plants are shown in Table 6. It can be seen that
these plants employ the Multi-effect Distillation/thermal Vapor Compression (MED-TVC)
technology except for the Zliten and Bomba desalination plants which employ the Multi-
stage Flash Distillation (MSF) technology. The installed capacities are 30,000 to 80,000 m3/
day per plant resulting in a total installed desalination capacity is 350,000 m3/day.

Desalination plants consist of intake works, preliminary treatment units, desalination units,
post treatment units, storage tanks, pumping systems, fuel storage tanks and pipelines and
auxiliary facilities. These plants utilize several chemicals, materials, consumables to operate;
their components are subject to mechanical failure thus requiring sufficient stocks of spare
parts. Moreover, operation of these plants is done automatically, semi-automatically, and
when necessary, manually. Digital control systems are employed for operation of plant
units as well as chemical feeding and water quality monitoring or control. Desalination
plants are operated using natural gas, light oil and heavy oil. The latter is used only when
other sources are not available. As such, all plants are provided with fuel tanks.

Table 6. Operation Dates, Technologies and States of GDC Desalination Plants

Installed
Plant Loca- Year Opera- Desalination No. of No. of Evapo-
Capacity, Operation Status
tion tion Started Technology Boilers rators
m3/d

Tobruk 1999 40000 MED-TVC 3 3 Operational

Bomba 1999 30000 MSF 3 3 Idle

Derna 2009 40000 MED-TVC 2 2 Operational

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 Sousa 1 2002 10000 MED-TVC 1 2 Idle

Sousa 2 2009 40000 MED-TVC 2 2 Operational

Abu Traba 2007 40000 MED-TVC 3 3 Operational

Partially Operation-
Zliten 1992 30000 MSF 3 3
al

Zawia 2010 80000 MED-TVC 4 4 Operational

Zwara 1 2006 40000 MED-TVC 3 3 Operational

Zwara 2 40000 MED-TVC Incomplete

Desalination plants are operated on a continuous basis for efficiency and durability
considerations. Seawater is pretreated, desalinated and post treated to make it non-corrosive
to conveyance systems and suitable for domestic uses, and stored in reservoirs within the
plant’s boundaries. Stored potable water is pumped to GCWW tanks for distribution to
networks. Chemicals are added along all phases of desalination including biocides, anti-
foaming, anti-corrosion and anti-scaling agents; finally, chlorine is added as a disinfectant.
It is produced on site.

All desalination plants have analytical laboratory for testing and monitoring of water quality
changes as it passes through the different desalination stages. Daily reports are prepared
on significant quality indicators and productivities of desalination plant units; collected
data is documented and forwarded to the GDC headquarters for follow-up and archiving.

The design lives of the infrastructural components differ according to their nature, function,
execution, mode of operation, frequency of operation and maintenance and environmental
conditions. Design lives of desalination plants are taken as 25 years under normal operating
conditions with the need for major overhauls (Renovation/ replacements) afterwards.

The GDC desalination plants have been installed during the period 1999-2010 with work
being stopped completely on all on-going projects in early 2011. Some of these plants are
almost 18 years old (Bomba, Zliten) while others are around 8-12 years old.

3.7.2 State of GDC Desalination Plants

The GDC desalination plants have been subjected to abnormal operating conditions being
operated intermittently with long interruptions and without anti-scaling and anti-corrosion
chemicals at times. Subsequently, these plants are close to being in deteriorated conditions.
As a result, some plants are idle while most others operate partially with some units out of
service (Table 6). Accordingly, older plants have become obsolete and need to be replaced
while the rest of the plants need to undergo major overhauls.

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Problems faced by the different GDC desalination plants in relation to the state of their
infrastructures are site specific, but many are shared among all plants. The major problems
are as follows:
1. Corrosion of metallic components especially evaporators (Figures 13-15);
2. Corrosion of metallic parts of pumps, shafts, etc.;
3. Scaling of boilers;
4. Failure of chlorine generators;
5. Structural failures due to design, execution and corrosion problems;
6. Deterioration of parts and underutilization due to incompletion of contracts;

Figure 13. Corrosion of Zliten Desalination Plant Works

Figure 14. Corrosion of Zwara Desalination Plant Works

Figure 15. Corrosion of Bomba and Old Sousa Desalination Plant Works

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6. Electric energy shortages;
7. Shortages and high prices of fuel needed for evaporators forcing plants to use
heavy fuel which is least desirable for efficiency and environmental reasons;
Inability to use natural gas which is readily available at some desalination plants; a case
in point is the Zawia Desalination Plant whose gas feeding system is installed but has not
been commissioned and handed over by the contractor to date.

3.7.3 Complimentary Desalinated Water Supply Infrastructures

The function of the GDC is to produce desalinated water and sell it to the GCWW. This
function is restricted to the desalinated plant site and the infrastructures within the
boundaries of this site. Produced water is pumped to the GCWW receiving facilities via a
transmission line owned by the GCWW generally.
A major factor affecting utilization of desalinated water is the availability and state of
the receiving end (complimentary) infrastructures. Construction of these complimentary
infrastructures is the responsibility of the Housing and Infrastructures Board (HIB). The
GCWW is only responsible for operation and maintenance of these infrastructures once
they have been completed.
In many cases, these infrastructures are non-existent or in the stage of planning, designing,
contracting or construction; this depends on the plant location. The number, type and
complexity of the infrastructural components also depend on the plant location. A non-
exhaustive summary of the components associated with some desalination plants is
presented below for illustration purposes.
Tobruk Desalination Plant. The infrastructural components are composed of four lines
(eastern, northern, southern and western lines). These lines include a total of 20 balancing
storage tanks; most of which are not constructed, 8 pumping stations, transmission lines
and branches from the plant to over 20 communities supplied by the plant. Storage tanks
sizes range from 120,000 m3 to 1500 m3.
Derna Desalination Plant. The infrastructures include two existing storage reservoirs, a
pumping station, two planned storage reservoirs (10,000 m3 each), a transmission line and
branches.
Sousa Desalination Plant. The infrastructures of this plant are complex as it supplies a
large number of communities. It consists of three existing and three planned pumping
stations, four main conveyance lines with secondary mains and branches at different stages
of execution, three existing storage reservoirs, one reservoir under construction and 11
reservoirs planned to be constructed with capacities ranging from 1000 to 20,000 m3.
Abu Traba Desalination Plant. The Abu Traba water supply infrastructures compliment
the MMRP water supply system which starts at the Grand Omar Mukhtar Reservoir. They
include four pumping stations, two existing storage reservoirs and three reservoirs which
are under construction along with transmission lines.

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3.8 AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY OF WATER SUPPLIED BY THE GDC
3.8.1 Availability of Water Supply from the GDC Desalination Plants
Water demands for the communities served and planned to be served by the GDC
desalination plants presently and in 2023 are summarized in Table 7. These demands are
about 407,000 and 450,000 m3/day for the years 2018 and 2023, respectively.

It can be seen from this table that water deficits already exist in some of the areas supplied
by these desalination plants; namely, Tobruk, Sousa, Zliten, Zawia, and Zwara with demands
exceeding notably the installed design capacities. The total deficits in 2018 and 2023 are
57,500 and 100,000 m3/day, respectively. This deficit represents 16 and 29% of the total
installed capacity of the GDC plants.

Table 7.Water Demands of Communities Served/ Planned to be

Served by the GDC Desalination Plants

Water De-
Plant Design Water Demand in Water Balance Water Balance
Desalination Plant mand in
Capacity, m3/d 2018, m3/d in 2018 in 2023
2023, m3/d

Tobruk 40,000 52,559 59,465 -12,559 -19,465

Bomba 30,000 16,265 17,713 13,735 12,287

Derna 40,000 30,864 33,611 9,136 6,389

Sousa 50,000 65,790 73,281 -15,790 -23,281

Abu Traba 40,000 32,656 35,598 7,344 4,402

Zliten 30,000 30,328 33,633 -328 -3,633

Zawia 80,000 90,803 100,652 -10,803 -20,652

Zwara 40,000 88,247 96,102 -48,247 -56,102

Total 350,000 407,512 450,054 -57,512 -100,054

Availability of desalinated water from the GDC plants is, therefore, limited by the installed
capacities of some of the desalination plants dictating immediate increases in desalination
capacities of those facing deficits presently. Conversely, a factor that reduces the level of
utilization of desalination plants is that receiving utilities have not been constructed yet
as stated previously; such utilities include reservoirs, transmission lines and distribution
networks. Such utilities are under the domain of the GCWW. Accordingly, expansion of
desalination capacities should be synchronized with the completion of these end use
infrastructures.

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The quantities of water supplied by the GDC desalination plants to its different end-users
in 2017 are shown in Table 8. along with feed, brine and product salinities. It can be seen
from this table that: 1) Efficiencies of all desalination plants were very low ranging from 14
to 47% and 2) Although all GDC desalination plants are operational, the total quantity of
water produced in 2017 was only 97,943 m3/d, i.e., only 27% of the total installed capacity.
As a result, the fraction of population actually supplied by desalinated plants is only about
one fourth of the intended number. Stated differently, the served population had access to
desalinated water only 28% of the time. The rest of the “interrupted supply time”, they had
to fetch it from other “more expensive private” sources.

Table 8. Productivities and Water Quality of GDC Operated Desalination Plants

Quantity of Water Produced in 2017, m3/day Salinity (TDS), gm/L

Plant Loca-
tion
Product Feed Brine % ,Efficiency Product Feed Brine

Tobruk 11744 44928 33184 29.4 0.05 40 54

Darna 18712 66000 47288 46.8 0.05 40 56

Sousa 16030 66000 49970 40.1 0.05 40 53

Abu Traba 11038 44928 33890 27.6 0.05 40 53

Zliten 5677 14496 8819 14.2 0.05 40 66

Zawia 17494 66000 48506 21.9 0.05 40 54

Zwara 17248 66000 48752 43.1 0.05 40 54

Total 97943 388352 270409 27.0

The low productivities of all GDC desalination plants were due mainly to frequent and
at times extended plant shut downs; the causes of these shut downs and their relative
impacts on plant performance are summarized in Table 9 and Figure 16. These causes
are:
 Unavailability of chemicals and consumables;
 Unavailability of spare parts for routine and emergency
maintenance,
 Electric power outages and unavailability of heavy fuel.

The above causes are, in turn, due to factors such as lack of financial resources, inflated
prices of spares, consumables and services needed for plant operations, etc. Lack of
security has also forced many companies, consultants and service providers to leave the
country and prevented those willing to provide services from coming.

A total of 50,677 hours were lost in 2017 due to these causes; this translates into about
28% availability which is a very low availability. Maintenance and emergency shut downs

89
due to lack of spares accounted for most of the lost time (87.8%) followed by power
shortages (7.7%); then unavailability of chemicals (5.7%). The large demand for spares
is due to plants nearing their design lives and suffering excessive deterioration. Other
causes are plant-specific. For example, while power outages caused on 1.8% of Derna
Desalination Plant shutdowns, they caused 63.5% of shutdowns of Zliten Desalination
Plant.

Table 9. Causes of Shut-downs of GDC Desalination Plants

Total of Shut
Cause of Shut down
)down (in hours
Location of Desali-
nation Plant
Electric power Unavailability of Lack of spares for mainte-
50677
outage chemicals nance

4063 674 1548 1841

Tobruk
of total% 16.6 38.1 45.3

7378 136 1164 6078

Darna
of total% 1.8 15.8 82.4

4738 712 124 3902

Sousa
of total% 15.0 2.6 82.4

12815 501 0.0 12314

Abu Traba
of total% 3.9 0.0 96.1

2026.00 1287.00 0.0 739

Zliten
of total% 63.5 0.0 36.5

8645 256 0.0 8389

Zawia
of total% 3.0 0.0 97.0

11012 232 0.0 10780

Zwara
of total% 2.1 0.0 97.9

90
 50677.0 3901.9 2892.5 44482.7
Total
of total% 7.7 5.7 87.8

Figure 16.Per Cent of Shut-downs of GDC Desalination Plants and their Causes

Several important conclusions may be drawn from the experience gained from the
desalination plants’ operation and maintenance practices taking place in the last few
decades; namely,

1) Despite the high technologies employed in desalinating water and the unique challenges
faced especially in the last few years, plant operations were sustainable by properly
qualified and experienced Libyan operators provided that operation and maintenance
requirements were made available. Threats to the availability of these requirements
(Unavailability of funds needed to buy services, procure spare parts and chemicals) and
energy shortages can override staff capabilities and cause prolonged shutdowns;
2) The sustainability is threatened further by aging of the plants which have been accelerated
by lack of routine and emergency maintenance, operation under critical conditions and
neglect of monitoring and control of plant;
3) Emphasis has been placed traditionally on supply management through expansion
of desalination plant numbers and capacities with little attention to water demand
management (Consumption patterns and factors, etc.), losses and service provision
cost minimization;
4) Desalination plants problems have traditionally been recurrent and well-defined;
however, addressing them have been unsystematic and reactionary – due to many factors
– thus taking immense effort and time, but with minimum achievements. A long term
strategy, plans and capacities for reliable operation and maintenance of desalination
plants must be in place to ensure the sustainability of these important water resources.

An added factor which could aggravate the situation in the future is the inability to pay
staff salaries and staff absenteeism in response to inaction towards provision of plant
operation or overhaul needs and staff needs. The situation is rather critical in most of
the plants with vulnerabilities at many points along the desalination plant operation line

91
with failures likely with time. In fact, extended water shortages have been witnessed by
all communities fed by these desalination plants. Given the fact that some towns have no
alternate, supplementary or emergency sources of water, serious adverse impacts could
rise within impacted communities. Emergency preparedness plans are in order along
with short-medium term plans to overhaul, rehabilitate and expand existing desalination
plants, as needed. Such plans must include provision of funding to cover staff salaries and
operational requirements.

The quantities of desalinated water supplied to the GCWW are metered as indicated
previously. The actual amount supplied in 2017 was about 98,000 m3/day; this amount
accounted for about 9% of the total amount supplied by the GCWW through public water
distribution networks (WDNs) (4). As the proportion of households connected to the WDN
is about 65%, the proportion of households supplied by the GDC is 6% or about 373,600
persons. It is to be reiterated here that: 1) The per capita supply is much less than that
adopted by Libyan and international guidelines, 2) A large fraction of the desalinated waters
from some plants are diverted illegally and become Unaccounted for Water (UFW) along
with leakage which is large at times due to corrosion of conveyance lines. Consequently,
the actual numbers and per capita allocations are estimates at best. This problem can be
addressed readily through field surveys of water works for illegal tapping and leakage.

3.8.2 Quality of Water Supplied by GDC Desalination Plants

All the GDC desalination plants employ thermal distillation technologies. The desalinated
waters are distillates, i.e., they are practically devoid of any salts. Consequently, they
are not suitable for domestic or other municipal uses. Moreover, they are corrosive to
equipment, pipelines and storage tanks. To overcome this problem, a separate treatment
process “Potabilization” is employed (Figure 17);”Potable water” is then chlorinated to
ensure it is free of pathogenic organisms by maintaining chlorine residual.

The quality of water supplied by the GDC desalination plants is monitored routinely;
samples are withdrawn from different points along the desalination plant units (intake,
preliminary treatment, desalination units, post treatment units and final storage). The
analysis conducted at the plant includes physical, chemical and microbiological indicators
of significance to human health (Drinking Water Quality Standards) and desalination units
operation (hardness, oil and grease, etc.). As each desalination plant has an analytical
laboratory, water quality analysis is conducted in the plant (Figure 18). An example of the
daily analysis is provided in Table 10 for the Zliten Desalination Plant.

Records are maintained and utilized to produce reports regularly. Collected data are analyzed
and significant indicators are presented in different formats for recording, identifying short
and long term changes in water quality (if any) and, accordingly, providing a basis for
decision making regarding operation quality control and modifications, etc.

92
 Figure 17. Potabilization Plants at Zwara (Left) and Sousa (Right) Desalination Plants

Figure 18. Water Quality Analysis Laboratory, Zwara Desalination Plant

Table 10. Water Quality Parameters Monitored in Zliten Desalination Plant* *or the Zliten Desalination Plant
TU)shown in table ...rage tanks.) operated intermittently with long interruptions and without (9(
Boiler Boiler
Recir. Conden- Distillate Product Cooling
Description Sea water feed Drum
Brine sate water water water water
water water
**)pH (25 ºC 8.5≤ 1*9.0~8.5 9.0~7.0 10.8~9.8 7.5~7.0 7.5~6.7 8.5#~6.7 10.0#~8.5
/EC (25 ºC) µS
84000 ≤ 126000≤ 10~1 1200~100 8.0~1 50#~1 600#~200 1000~400
cm
DO - - 0.5~0.1 - - - - -

SiO2 - - 1.0≤ 50~2.0 - 0.5~0.04 - -

PO4 - - - 40~15 - - -

)Ca (as CaCO3 500≤ - - - - 75~22 -

)Mg (as CaCO3 1500≤ - - - - 3.7~0.2 30≤ -

Turbidity - - - - - - - 100#~30
T-hardness (as
7400≤ 11000≤ 1.0≤ - - - 90#~60 90~60
)CaCO3
Ca-hardness (as
1300≤ - - - - 2.75~1.5 75~50 -
)CaCO3
TDS 42000≤ 63000≤ 500~50 5≤ 25~1 200~110 -

93
Cl 24500≤ - - 150~0.6 - 18.0~0.6 150~50 -

Residual chlorine 0.1≤ - - - - 0.4#~0.2 -

Fe - - 0.3~0.02 0.3~0.02 0.05~0.01 0.3~0.03 0.3≤ -

Cu - - 0.2~0.02 0.2~0.02 0.05~0.01 0.2~0.05 0.2≤ -

M-Alkalinity (as
130≤ - - 2*130~20 - - - -
)CaCO3
p-Alkalinity (as
- - - 100≤ - - - -
)CaCO3
SO4 - - 20~10 20~10 - -
*From ref. 5 **All values in mg/L except pH and Turbidity (NTU)

3.8.3 Reliability of the GDC Desalination Plants

Reliability of the GDC desalination plants depends primarily on availability and reliability
of the staff managing or operating the individual desalination plants and on the reliability
of each plant’s different components. The overall reliability will depend directly on the
nature and intensity of the disturbances to the staff and/or the infrastructural components.
Direct threats to human life will force staff to abandon the worksite causing a complete
interruption of water supplies while lack of chemicals, spares and maintenance will cause
a partial or complete shut-down.

Loss of power has serious adverse impacts on desalination units in addition to the
interruption of water production. Materials are subject to severe working conditions due to
the high salinity, corrosiveness of the water and sea environment and high temperatures.
Failure chances are high as is fatigue and aging of equipment.
For the above causes which are mostly out of the GDC’s control, the reliability of the GDC
desalination plants is relatively low. A failure in one component or in the control system
or the laboratory testing equipment or the unavailability of one or more chemicals, critical
spares, materials, electric power outages or the unavailability of fuel will cause a failure of
the desalination plant. Most of the GDC plants experienced or will experience failures due
to the unavailability of chemicals, for instance. Operating the plant without such chemicals
causes serious irreversible damages.

3.9 ARMED CONFLICT, LACK OF SECURITY AND INSTABILITY

RELATED DAMAGES

Because of their location that is near urban communities, desalination plants have witnessed
minimum threats and damages because of armed conflict and lack of security. The only
damages reported are associated with illegal tapping (connections) on water transmission
lines. Such tapping is always made by non-professionals with no consideration to technical
aspects related to construction, operation and maintenance of such connections. This wide
spread problem was aggravated post 2011 due to the lack of security and weak enforcement
of the law. In addition to the technical problems, illegal connections cause losses of large
amounts of water, water pressure and associated revenues and inconvenience legitimate
end-users.

Significant indirect damages were sustained by the GDC plants. Many expatriate
contractors, consultants and service providers were implementing projects throughout

94
Libya in the different fields of desalination including construction and major overhauls of
desalination plants. All of these individuals, offices and companies were forced to leave
Libya with all activities not having been completed. These projects have been subject to
gradual deterioration and damages with no possibility for return of the original contractors
or substitutes. New problems in the desalination plants arising after 2011 have also not
been solved due to the lack of specialized expertise.

Economic instability, caused by lack of revenues and reduced government subsidies, have
also led to indirect damages due to the inability to provide operational requirements which,
in turn, led to persistent water supply interruptions.
Finally, electric power outages and fuel shortages have caused serious damages as well as
complete water interruptions. As shown in Table 7 and Figure 16, electric power outages
accounted for 7.7% of desalination plants shutdowns with a range of 1.8% (Derna) and
63.5% (Zliten). System failures due to technical or material failures are not uncommon.

3.10 ENERGY SUPPLY AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS FOR GDC DESALINATION

PLANTS
3.10.1 Source and Types of Energy Used for Desalination

Desalination plants were designed to operate by using electric power along with natural gas,
light fuel or heavy fuel to operate the evaporators. Natural gas is the optimum economically
and environmentally energy source in addition to operation simplicity advantages and
reliability; it is being available continuously.

The energy sources employed to operate the GDC desalination plants are summarized in
Table 11. Presently, all plants use electric power for non-thermal (evaporation/ distillation)
operations. Zliten Desalination Plant is the only plant using natural gas for thermal operations
while Zawia Desalination Plant employs Light Fuel Oil (LFO) for thermal operations as it is
significantly cleaner than Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO). The rest of the desalination plants utilize
HFO which is less expensive than LFO, but less desirable because of its adverse impacts on
equipment and the environment.

The western region desalination plants (Zawia and Zwara) are operating on the national
gas supply line. Zawia Desalination Plant is already connected to the gas supply line, but
the commissioning has not been undertaken yet as the contractor left the country due
to security reasons. The supply line to Desalination Plant Zwara is at advanced stages of
planning and route selection; the plant will shift to gas energy soon.

Table 11.Sources of Energy Employed to Operate GDC Desalination Plants

Plant Location Energy Sources Employed

Electricity Gas Light Fuel Oil Heavy Fuel Oil
)(LFO )(HFO
Tobruk Yes No No Yes
Bomba *PNO PNO PNO PNO
Darna Yes No No Yes
Sousa 1 PNO PNO PNO PNO
Sousa 2 Yes No No Yes

95
Abu Traba Yes No No Yes
Zliten Yes Yes No No
Zawia Yes No Yes No
Zwara 1 PNO PNO PNO PNO
Zwara 2 Yes No No Yes
PNO = Plant is not operational*

3.10.2 Costs of Energy Types Used for Desalination

Energy costs accounted for 7 to 9.6% of the total desalinated water. See O & M costs
(Table 4). Costs of the different types of energy utilized by the GDC desalination plants are
summarized in Table 12. It is clear from this table that gas is the least expensive source of
energy followed by electricity while HFO and LFO are most expensive; the factors ranging
from over three fold to 17 fold.

The impacts of fuel type on desalinated water cost were studied by the GDC for two plants:
Zawia and Zwara (6). Costs of fuels used presently to desalinate water (HFO and LFO) were
compared to using natural gas. Existing fuel costs were 1.376 and 0.643 LYD/m3 for Zawia
and Zwara Desalination Plants, respectively. Using natural gas, the costs were reduced
markedly to 0.084 LYD/m3 for each plant. Savings of over 1600 and over 700% will be
realized by these plants, respectively, notwithstanding additional benefits from equipment
preservation and reduced environmental impacts.

Table 12.Costs of Energy Types Used for Desalination in Libya

Source of Energy Electricity Gas LFO HFO

Cost, LYD/kWhr 0.031 0.0084 0.0143 0.00389
)Relative Cost (Gas = 1 3.69 1 17 4.635

3.11 KEY FINDINGS, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The GDC succeeded in supplying some of Libya’s coastal communities with desalinated
water for over 10 years; this demonstrate sits ability to provide desalinated water and build
national capacities for desalination applications. The plants employ the latest desalination
technologies and the best practices to supply water reliably, thus contributing towards the
improvement and general well-being of a large fraction of Libya’s population. In doing so,
the GDC faced serious challenges which continue to affect its performance markedly.

This report provides an assessment of the GDC’s administrative, financial, human and
technical capacities based on desk studies, field surveys and visits, meetings and discussions
with senior GDC staff and desalination plant management among other data sources. Key
findings of this assessment, challenges and recommendations are provided below.

3.11.1 Key Findings

1. The GDC was established in 2007 to operate and maintain a total of eight
desalination plants along Libya’s coastline; these plants are planned to supply
about 134 communities along or near the coastal line, most of them having no
alternative water supply sources;
2. The total installed capacity of these plants is 350,000 m3/day, a quantity that is

96
 sufficient to satisfy the needs of about 1.4million persons or about one fourth of
Libya’s population;
3. The quantity of water supplied declined notably in the last few years due to
numerous problems the GDC has been facing; the total quantity of water produced
in 2017 averaged only about 98,000 m3/day, implying a production efficiency of
only 28%. Stated differently, the served population had access to desalinated
water was only 28% of the time. The rest of the “interrupted supply time”, they
had to fetch it from other “more expensive private” sources;
4. The organizational structures of the GDC seem to have been adequate as
demonstrated by the database, experience and performance under unfavorable
conditions. With the passage of over a decade of operating desalination plants,
a good database, knowledge and experience in managing and operating
desalination plants have been established locally;
5. Some of the GDC’s plants have been operational for over two decades; these
plants have become obsolete; other “newer” plants are also in different stages of
deterioration due to operation and maintenance problems;
6. The GDC conducts its functions through a workforce of 847 persons with over 66%
technical professionals. The majority of this staff is employed at the desalination
plants. The GDC’s past experience demonstrates the adequacy of the numbers and
capabilities of its staff and the effectiveness of the training and human resources
programs utilized;
7. Information and data are given special consideration as is reflected by the reliance
on daily reporting, monitoring and analysis;
8. According to the GDC data, operation costs declined from 76.8 million LYD in
2015 to 52.6 million LYD in 2017 with an average unit O & M cost of 1.07to 0.73
LYD/m3 produced, respectively.
9. The depreciation costs of the desalination plants are reported by the GDC to
average 34.8 million LYD/year for the years 2015-2017. Taking depreciation costs
into account, the cost of production will be 1.556, 1.496, and 2.097 LYD/m3 for the
years 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively.
10. Clearly, this cost is high due to under production. Secondly, while the operation
cost alone almost equals the water sales price, the total cost of production exceeds
twice the water price (tariff).
11. Desalinated waters are sold to the GCWW at a fee that is the cause of disagreement
between the GDC and the GCWW. Moreover, the amount paid is much less than
required. As a result, the GDC has been facing serious financial problems;
12. Electric power outages contributed to interruptions in desalinated water supply.
They caused 1.8 to 63.5% of desalination plant shutdowns; these outages cause
losses in productivity and accelerate deterioration to desalination equipment;
13. Energy cost plays a major role within the cost of desalinated waters; the highest
cost is LFO and the lowest is natural gas. The relative difference between these
costs can be very large (LFO is 17 times larger than natural gas). Only Zliten
Desalination Plant is presently using natural gas; Zawia Desalination Plant is
connected to the gas supply line but can’t use gas for technical causes that can
be overcome readily. Zwara Desalination Plant is on its way to connect to the gas
line soon. Other plants can’t use natural gas because of its unavailability in their
locations;
14. Utilization of desalination plants water is restricted at times by the absence of
complimentary infrastructures delivering water from the desalination plants to
the end users (storage reservoirs, transmission lines, pumping stations, etc.).
construction of these infrastructures is the responsibility of the HIB;
15. The desalination technology is poorly appreciated if not understood by most
Libyans; while some believe it is the only solution to Libya’s water scarcity
problems, many others think it is an over expensive and less reliable source of

97
 water compared to existing alternatives, particularly the MMRP.

3.11.2 Major Challenges

The GDC has succeeded in supplying water continuously throughout the past ten years.
This task is becoming ever more difficult to achieve due to a number of serious challenges
facing the GDC especially during the last few years. The main challenges are listed below:

1. The GDC infrastructures consist of components that are numerous, different

in nature, size and function. They operate under severe conditions (High
temperature, salinity, corrosivity, etc.). They demand continuous monitoring
and observation. Their operation and maintenance are demanding financially,
technically and administratively. Moreover, they are not readily available locally
and their procurement requires time and hard currency;
2. Many of the infrastructural components of the GDC operated desalination plants
are aging and in a poor condition due to operation and maintenance problems
requiring replacement, renovation and major overhauls. The GDC is unable to
address these requirements due to serious financial constraints;
3. Lack of complimentary infrastructures to deliver desalinated water limits these
plants utilization. There is presently no direct coordination between the HIB (that
is charged with these infrastructures), the GDC and the GCWW;
4. Lack of funds has stood in the way of proper operation, maintenance and
execution of many contracts for construction and overhaul works. This problem
is compounded by the GDC’s inability to open letters of credit for importing spare
parts, chemicals and by the rising prices of locally procured materials and spares;
5. Five of the eight desalination plants cannot utilize natural gas as a source of
energy because it is not available at their locations; they are forced to use LFO
or HFO; the first is expensive and the latter has adverse effects on equipment
and the environment. Moreover, the use of these types of fuel especially the LFO
raises the cost of desalinated water markedly;
6. The value of the desalinated water tariff is low; the fee does not cover the total
water desalination costs. Moreover, the GCWW falls short of paying its dues in
time and value. The present arrangement has caused the GDC serious problems
that threaten its very existence.
7. Illegal connections draw large amounts of water causing technical problems and
losses of badly needed revenues. Control of such actions is difficult and beyond
the capabilities of the GDC;
8. Electric power outages and fuel shortages caused significant desalination plant
shutdowns in some plants (Zliten);
9. Security problems have forced expatriate contractors, consultants and service
providers to leave Libya, thus leaving major project and activities unfinished.

3.11.3 Recommendations
Based on the key findings and conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

1. The GDC’s financial challenges should be addressed immediately through strong

legislation and contracting agreements that oblige the end-users or the state to
pay for the quantities of desalinated water used or sold. Experience in this regard
from other countries relying mainly on seawater desalination should be utilized.
2. Zawia and Zwara Desalination Plants should be connected as soon as possible
to the natural gas supply line so that the use of LFO or HFO is discontinued; this
practice reduces the cost of desalinated water and minimizes the environmental

98
 impacts of desalination;
3. The causes for frequent and extended interruptions of desalination plants must
be addressed fully and immediately to increase productivity from its very low
levels (28%) which result in high water production costs;
4. The high cost of water desalination exceeds that of the sales price necessitating
additional sources of funding or a rise in the price;
5. The administrative, technical, financial, and experiences gained by the GDC
over the last decade should be assessed with the objective of upgrading
the organizational structure to enable it to respond to continuous technical,
socioeconomic and legal changes and to shift its functions from solely operating
desalination plants to planning, designing and executing them according to local
conditions, constraints and governing factors;
6. The experience of the human resources employed in the GDC and its desalination
plants is invaluable and must be preserved, enforced and expanded by continuous
development of human resources;
7. Major overhaul operations are needed immediately for the newer desalination
plants while the older ones must be replaced completely. Existing contracts must
be operationalized to realize this objective;
8. Power outages and fuel shortages need to be addressed seriously to put an end
to desalination plant shutdowns and equipment damages and fatigue. Such a
task must be coordinated with the GECOL and the Brega Petroleum Marketing
companies;
9. The division on information technology in the GDC needs to be upgraded and
equipped to cope with the amount of data generated and with the advancements in
the desalination technologies. Moreover, the research and development division
should be engaged in all aspects of GDC management with a focus on solving
problems and overcoming challenges. Budgets should be allocated specifically
for this purpose to address the local problems faced by desalination plants;
10. To optimize the utilization of desalination plants, complimentary infrastructures
construction and operation must be coordinated with desalination plants
construction and operation. Such activities should be planned nationally with the
participation of the GDC, HIB and the GDC and synchronized so that construction
is completed simultaneously;
11. Being a renewable resource readily accessible to most Libyans, desalination
should be given special consideration as a viable water source; it should be
integrated with other sources in an optimized way so that each source is made
use of most effectively within an integrated water resources management;
12. Raising awareness about its role as a sustainable resource and its feasibility
for specific applications are needed so that this role is better appreciated and
consumption of desalinated water is minimized.

3.12 URGENT, SHORTANDMEDIUM-TERM INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT

PLANS FOR THE GDC

Needs of the GDC to continue operating successfully were assessed through background
data, baseline surveys, field visits, meetings and interviews. Criteria were developed to
classify these needs as urgent, short-term and medium-term. The primary criterion was the
need for the activity, action or service to avoid adverse health impacts to end-users or to
guarantee the continuity of water supply, which is a basic human need and right. Provision
of funds is another criterion as less costly items or activities are more likely to be funded,
procured and implemented in a short time. Finally, nature of the activity and, hence, the
amount of time needed to implement it; some works and activities require a short execution

99
time while others require long times.

Activities and works which can be implemented within 6-12 months were considered urgent
while those requiring 1-2 years and 3-5 years were considered short-term and medium
longer term plans, respectively. The urgent investment/ development plan is presented in
the form of a Bill of Quantities (BOQs) table including items (activity, work, service, etc.),
quantity, unit price and total price. To make these BOQs acceptable officially, prices are
quoted in LYDs; original prices were in US dollars, but converted into LYDs at the official
rate of 1 US dollar = 1.4 LYD. Due to time constraints and lack of updated unit costs, short-
term and medium-term development plans were limited to activities, works and execution
timetables.

It is to be stressed that the costs and implementation times are estimates at best for lack of
recent quotations for some items. Conversely, some costs are very accurate as they were
taken from quotations from bids or from signed contracts which are at different stages of
development. In fact, the GDC desalination plants provided detailed lists or purchase orders
with specific trade names, vendors, costs, etc. These lists were not included in the report
for brevity as they will add little value to the contents. Execution times were also subject to
changes depending on the timely availability of skilled staff, spares and materials as well as
security of the worksites. When implementation must be done with the help of expatriate
experts, availability becomes critical as most countries forbid their citizens from traveling
to Libya for security reasons.
3.12.1Urgent Development/ Investment Plan (6-12 months)

These plans address the urgent needs of the financial, administrative and technical units of
the individual desalination plants and those of the GDC headquarters. They include tools for
information or documentation, technologies materials for daily operation of desalination
plants, routine and overhaul maintenance, disinfection chemicals for product water, and
training of desalination plants’ GDC staff. These needs are specified in Appendix 3.1.The
total amount required to implement this plan was estimated to be 96.2 US dollars. Most
of the money is needed for renovation and rehabilitation of aged plants and maintenance
requirements; such activities have been linked with loss of productivity of most desalination
plants. In the concise sense, most of these activities require implementation times which
exceed one year, but their urgency is justified by the extended delays in implementation
and the persistent water shortages faced by most served communities.

3.12.2 Short-term Development Plans

Short-term development plans are comprised of activities which require 1-3 years to be
completed. Such activities, works or services may start as early as urgent ones but will
be completed in 1-3 years and may depend on corresponding urgent phase works. The
implementation time table and Bill of Quantities (BOQs) are specified in Annexes 3.2 and
3.3, respectively.

The total cost of implementing this plan was estimated to be 54 million US dollars. This
amount is to be used for provision of essential operation and maintenance spare parts
and consumables, supply and installation of desalination units, preparation of engineering
documents for the desalination plants as planned by the GDC for the cities of Tripoli,
Benghazi and Misrata, provision of chemicals and construction of a headquarters for the
GDC.

100
3.12.3 Medium-longer term development plan
The medium-term plan lists those activities which require 3-5 years to be completed. Such
works fall generally within the GDC’s strategic plans. The implementation time table and
Bill of Quantities are specified in Annexes 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.

The total cost of implementing this plan was estimated to be 1.265 billion US dollars. This
value will be utilized for the construction of new desalination plants in Tripoli, Benghazi,
Misrata and AlMarsis plus chemicals and spares for operation of the existing desalination
plants.

REFERENCES
1. General People’s Committee, Decision No. 924, 2007;
2. General Desalination Company, Personal Communication with Finance Department,
2018;
3. Secretariat of Electricity, Water and Gas, “Water and Sewerage Strategy”, BHA
Consultants, 2007;
4. GCWW, Report on the State of Water Supply,2017;
5. Personal Communication, Field Visit, Zliten Desalination Plant Manager, 2018;
6. GDC, “The Technical State of GDC Desalination Plants and Major Problems Faced by
Individual Plants”, A Report issued on 2017.

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN RELATION TO REPORT PREPARATION

No. Name Title Phone No.

1 Naji Abu Shnaf Head, GDC 0918589403

2 Abdussalaam ArRwaimi Head, Follow-up Department, GDC 0912182784

3 AbdulMuhsen AlMnefi Head, O & M Eastern Region, GDC 0918787548

4 Wanis Ashour AlFarsi Eastern Region Operations Manager, GDC 0912204611

5 Tyseer Issa Legal Division, GDC 0922491732

6 Hamdan Sasi Anisr Operation Division Chief, GDC 0925675748

Mohammad Ammar Technical Affairs Division Chief, GDC 0915014668

7
Mansour

8 Abdullah AlAllous Western Region Projects Manager, GDC 0912204609

Mohammad Abbas Manager, Zliten Desalination Plant 0917911262

9
AlAbbasi

101
10 Fathi Saleh Ben Aisha Zliten Desalination Plant 0926839711

Mohammad Faraj Wara-

11
ith

12 Naji AlWaleed

13 Belghasem AtTaher Manager, Zawia Desalination Plant 0916462562

14 Zaidan Gharghab Manager, Zwara Desalination Plant 0925783501

Aaref Hussain Breko Maintenance Division Chief, Zwara Desalination

15
Plant

Annexes
Investment/ Development Plans for the GDC, Libya

Annex 3.1 Urgent Investment/Development Plan (6-12 months) for the GDC, Libya*

Unit Prce in Total Price

No Item Description Unit Quantity
USD in USD

Provision of chemicals for the operation of desalina-

1 tion plants (anti-foaming, anti-scaling, anti-corrosion, LS LS - 2,000,000
biocides, etc.).

Overhaul works for desalination units and auxiliary

2 No. 1 24,000,000 24,000,000
systems for Tobruk Desalination Plant

Maintenance and renovation of boilers at Tobruk De-

3 No. 2,500,000 5,000,000
salination Plant

Supply and installation of a 5000 m3/day seawater

4 reverse osmosis (Supplementary)desalination plants at No. 1 11,000,000 11,000,000
Bomba.

Routine maintenance including chlorination system

5 LS LS 2,200,000 2,200,000
and replacement of pipeworks

Overhaul maintenance of the first and second units of

6 No. 2 4,800,000 9,600,000
desalination plant in Sousa

Replacement of boiler and product pump at Abu Traba

7 LS LS 2,500,000 2,500,000
Desalination Plant

102
 8 Overhaul of auxiliary units in Zliten Desalination Plant LS LS 8,000,00 8,000,00

Completion of the operating tests on the gas supply

9 LS LS 200,000 200,000
systems for Zawia Desalination Plant

Execution and testing the gas supply systems for

10 LS LS 1,700,000 1,700,000
Zwara Desalination Plants

Maintenance and renovation of boilers at Zwara De-

11 No. 2 2,500,000 5,000,000
salination Plant

Provision of essential operation and maintenance

12 LS LS 25,000,000 25,000,000
spare parts and consumables

Annex 3.2 Implementation Schedule for Short-term (1-3 years) Development Plans for the GDC, Libya
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
No Item Description
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4

Provision and installation of an

electronic archiving system and ac-
1
cessories (scanners, printers, com-
.).puters ..., etc
Preparation of engineering docu-
ments for the desalination plants
2
planned for the cities of Tripoli,
.Benghazi and Misrata
Preparation of job descriptions for
3
the company’s employees
Preparation of procedures and op-
4
erations manuals
Preparation and implementation of
monitoring and evaluation program
5
and performance indicators for the
company
Supply and installation of a 20,000
m3/day seawater reverse osmosis
6
(expansion)in Zliten Desalination
Plant
Provision of a fourth 13,333 m3/ day
7 evaporator for the Tobruk Desalina-
.tion Plant
Training needs assessment and de-
8 velopment of an operator training
program for GDC operators
9 Operator training
10 Leadership training
11 Construction of GDC headquarters

103
Annex 3.3 Bill of Quantities for Short-term (1-3 years) Investment/ Development Plan for the GDC

Unit Price in Total Price in

No Item Description Unit Quantity
USD USD

Provision and installation of an electronic

1 archiving system and accessories (scanners, LS 1 300,000 300,000
printers, computers ..., etc.).

Provision of chemicals for the operation of

2 desalination plants (anti-foaming, anti-scaling, LS 1 2,000,000 2,000,000
anti-corrosion, biocides, etc.).

Routine maintenance including chlorination

3 LS 1 2,200,000 2,200,000
system and replacement of pipeworks

Provision of essential operation and mainte-

4 LS 1 25,000,000 25,000,000
nance spare parts and consumables

Preparation of engineering documents for the

5 desalination plants as planned by GDC for the No. 3 1,000,000 3,000,000
cities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata.

Preparation of job descriptions for the com-

6 pany’s employees, monitoring and evaluation LS 1 80,000 80,000
program and performance indicators.

Preparation of procedures and operations man-

7 LS 100,000 100,000
uals

Supply and installation of a 20,000 m3/day

8 seawater reverse osmosis (expansion) in Zliten No. 1 18,000,000 18,000,000
Desalination Plant.

Provision of a fourth 13,333 m3 / day evaporator

9 LS 1 250,000 250,000
for the Tobruk Desalination Plant.

Training needs assessment and development of

10 LS 1 50,000 50,000
an operator training program for GDC operators

11 Operator training LS 1 80,000 80,000

12 Leadership training LS 1 30,000 30,000

13 Construction of GDC headquarters No. 1 3,000,000 3,000,000

104
 Total (Fifty four million and ninety thousand) US dollars 54,090,000

Annex 3.4 Implementation Schedule for Medium-Longer term (3-5 years) Development Plans for the GDC,
Libya

Implementation Time
No Activity
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 .Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20

Preparation of engineering
documents for the desalina-
1
tion plants planned for the
.city of Tripoli

Preparation of engineering
documents for the desalina-
2
tion plants planned for the
city of Benghazi

Preparation of engineering
documents for the desalina-
3
tion plants planned for the
city of Misrata

Provision & installment of

three thermal units with a
4 capacity of 30,000 m3/day
for Bomba Desalination
)Plant (expansion

Construction of a 40,000
m3 / day desalination plant
5
in Al-Marasid area near
Tobruk

Annex 3.5 Bill of Quantities for Medium term (3-5 years) Investment/Development Plan for the GDC, Libya

Unit Price in Total Price in

No Item Description Unit Quantity
USD USD

Implementation of the desalination plant

1 LS 1 500,000,000 500,000,000
.planned for the city of Tripoli

Preparation of engineering documents for

2 the desalination plants planned for the city of LS 1 400,000,000 400,000,000
Benghazi

105
 Preparation of engineering documents for
3 the desalination plants planned for the city of LS 1 300,000,000 300,000,000
Misrata

Construction of a 40,000 m3/ day desalination

4 LS 1 40,000,000 40,000,000
plant in Al-Marasis area near Tobruk

Provision of chemicals for the operation of

desalination plants (anti-foaming, anti-scaling,
5 anti-corrosion, biocides, etc.) and provision LS 1 25,000,000 25,000,000
of essential operation and maintenance spare
.parts

Total (One billion, two hundred and sixty five million ) US dollars 1,265,000,000

106
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OF THE
MAN-MADE RIVER PROJECT
EXECUTION AND MANAGEMENT
AUTHORITY (MMRA), LIBYA

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
ASSESSMENT OF THE GENERAL
COMPANY FOR WATER AND
WASTEWATER, LIBYA

107
ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

GAWR General Authority for Water Resources

GDC General Desalination Company
GCWW General Company for Water and Wastewater
GPC General Public Committee
GZZ Ghadames /Zawia /Zwara Man-made River System
GWA General Water Authority
J / HS Jefara /Hasawna Man-made River System
IDP Internally Displaced Person
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
LYD Libyan Dinar
MMRP Man-made River Project
MMRA Man-made River Project Execution and Management Authority
Mm3 Million cubic meters
MoLG Ministry of Local Governance
MoP Ministry of Planning
NDP National Development Program
NPWS National Program for Water and Sanitation
O & M Operation and Maintenance
RO Reverses Osmosis
SPC Supply per Capita
QA/QC Quality Assurance/ Quality Control
TQO Training and Qualification Office
UFW Unaccounted for Water
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
WHO World Health Organization

108
CONTENTS 1 DISCLAIMER
1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
2 ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS
3
CONTENTS
5 FIGURES
6 TABLES
8 INTRODUCTION 4.1
8 Objectives and Scope of the Report 4.1.1
9 Implementation Methodology 4.1.2
10 Significance of the Report 4.1.3
10 Report Contents 4.1.4
10 LEGAL FRAMEWORK 4.2
10 Establishment and Mandate of the 4.2.1
GCWW
14 Vision and Strategy of the GCWW 4.2.2
14 ADMINISTRATIVE/ ORGANIZATION� 4.33
AL FRAMEWORK
14 Organizational Structure of the 4.3.1
GCWW
17 Main Features of the Organizational 4.3.2
Structure of the GCWW
18 Information Management 4.3.3
19 FINANCIAL CAPACITIES 4.4
19 Financing of the GCWW 4.1 .4
20 Revenues, Expenditures and Debts 4.4.2
of the GCWW
22 Financial Challenges to the GCWW 4.4.3
Impacts and Remedies of Financial 4.4.4
Challenges on the GCWW’s
22 Performance

23 HUMAN RESOURCES 4.5

23 Recruitment and Employee Distribu� 4.5.11
tion
24 Human Resources Placement and 4.5.2
Requirements
Jobs and Job Descriptions 4.5.3
25 Human Resources Characteristics 4.5.4
27 Training and Human Resources De� 4.5.55
velopment
28 Operation and Maintenance of Wa� 4.5.66
ter Supply Utilities
29 TECHNICAL CAPACITIES 4.6
29 State of GCWW Water Supply Infra� 4.6.11
structures

109
36 MANAGEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY 4.7
36 Implementation, O & M of Water 4.7.1
Supply Projects

36 Quantities of Waters Distributed by 4.7.2

the GCWW
39 Quality of Water Distributed by the 4.7.3
GCWW
45 Municipal Water Supply Coverage, 4.7.4
Leakage and Supply per Capita
49 Metering, Collection of Revenues 4.7.5
and Service Levels
52 Energy Availability and Impacts 4.7.6
52 Cost of Supplied Water 4.7.7
53 Reliability and Vulnerability of the 4.7.8
Water Distributed by the GCWW
55 GCWW PERFORMANCE 4.8
ARMED CONFLICT, LACK OF SECURI� 4.99
TY AND INSTABILITY
57 RELATED DAMAGES
57 Damages Caused by Armed Conflict 4.9.1
and Lack of Security
59 Damages Caused by Illegal Connec� 4.9.22
tions
59 Damages Caused by Economic and 4.9.3
Institutional Instability
Damages Caused by Electric Power 4.9.4
Interruptions, Outages and Fuel
59 Shortages
60 MAJOR CHALLENGES AND RECOM� 4.100
MENDATIONS
60 Major Challenges 4.10.1
60 Recommendations 4.10.2
64 INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT 4.11
PLANS FOR THE GCWW, LIBYA
Urgent Investment and Develop� 4.11.11
ment Plans (6-12 months) for
64 GCWW
64 Short-term Development Plans 4.11.2
65 Medium-long term Development 4.11.3
Plan

66 REFERENCES
LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN RELA-
TION TO REPORT
67 PREPARATION

110
 Annex 4.1. Bill of Quantities for Urgent (6-
/12 months) Investment
68 Development Plan for the GCWW
Annex 4.2 Activities and Implementation
Schedule for Short-term
71 Development Plan (1-3 years) for the
GCWW
Annex 4.3 Bill of Quantities for Short-term
/(1-3 years) Investment
74 Development Plan for the GCWW
Annex 4.4 Activities and Implementation
Schedule for Medium-longer term
76 years) Development Plan for the 3-5(
GCWW
Annex 4.5 Bill of Quantities for Medi-
/um-longer term (3-5 years) Investment
77 Development Plan for the GCWW

FIGURES 16 Figure 1. Organizational Structure of the

GCWW
17 Figure 2. GCWW Administrative Regions
for O & M
25 Figure 3. Age distribution of GCWW Em-
ployees
26 Figure 4. Functional Distribution of
GCWW Employees
31 Figure 5. Total Number of Wells in Re-
gions
Figure 6. RO Brackish Water Desalination
Plant in Kersas, Tummeina,
32 Misrata
34 Figure 7. Water Pumping Station in Good
Condition
34 Figure 8. Galvanized Pipe Replaced by PE
pipe
38 Figure 9. Percentages of Water Supplied
from Different Sources
38 Figure 10. Volumes of Water Distributed
by the GCWW to Regions in 2017
Figure 11. Quantities of Water Supplied by
the GCWW Wells to the
38 Regions
39 Figure 12. Municipal (Domestic) Water
Use Fractions
46 Figure 13. Sources of Household Water
Supply

111
 Figure 14. Number of Domestic and
Non-household Consumer Contracts per
50 Region
58 Figure 15. Destroyed Power Lines Supply-
ing a Well Field, Az-Zintaan
58 Figure 16. Destroyed Elevated Water Tank,
Tawergha

TABLES 15 Table 1. Regions, Service Offices and Ser-

vice Centers
19 Table 2. Values of Tariff for Water and Sani-
tation Services
Table 3. Values of Invoices Issued and Actu-
al Revenues during the Period
20 2015-2017
Table 4. Estimated GCWW Revenues and
Expenditures for the Period
21 2010-2017
Table 4. Number of Employees of the
GCWW and their Regional
24 Distribution
25 Table 5. Age Distribution of GCWW
26 Table 6. Distribution of GCWW Employees
according to Functions
26 Table 7. Employees Qualifications and Spe-
cializations
27 Table 8. Training Courses Implemented
through the Period: 2014-2017
30 Table 10. Basic Data on Water Supply Infra-
structures in the Regions
31 Table 11. State of Water Supply Wells in
Different Regions
32 Table 12. Basic Data and Condition of
GCWW Water Treatment Plants
Table 13. Condition of Chlorination Systems
in GCWW Wells and
33 Reservoirs
37 Table 14. Quantities of Water Distributed by
the GCWW in 2017
Table 15. Water Quality Characteristics of
Wells in Selected Regions of
40 Libya
42 Table 16. A Monthly Chemical Water
Quality Report, Phase I, MMRP
43 Table 17. A Monthly Biological Water Quali-
ty Report, Phase I, MMRP

112
44 Table 18. Water Quality Parameters Moni-
tored in Zliten Desalination Plant
Table 19. Sources of Household Water Sup-
ply
47 Table 20. Typical SPC Components for Libya
47 Table 21. SPC in Different Cities of Libya
48 Table 22. Per Capita Water Use Rates for
Different Regions
49 Table 23: Data on Meters Installed during:
2016– 2017
50 Table 24: Number of Household and
Non-household Contracts

113
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Libya is an arid and sparsely populated country. Its area is 1,667,000 km2 and its population
is estimated to be 6.5 million. About 87% of Libya’s population is urban. Population growth
for the period 1995-2006 was only 2% (1).

Libya relies almost completely on groundwater to satisfy most of its water needs. Water
demand is highest along the 100 km coastal strip where population and most of the
agricultural and industrial activities are concentrated. Domestic water is supplied to urban
centers by the General Company for Water and Wastewater (GCWW). The GCWW utilizes
three supply water sources through Water Distribution Networks (WDNs) throughout Libya,
namely: 1) Its own wells, 2) The Man-made River Project (MMRP), and 3) The General
Desalination Company (GDC).

Although the GCWW’s original mandate was limited to providing water and wastewater
services alongside the operation and maintenance of infrastructure, it was later charged
with the execution of water supply and wastewater projects.

4.1.1 Objectives and Scope of the Report

This report was prepared as one of the final deliverables of a UNICEF-sponsored Project for
the assessment of the capacities of water supply institutions in Libya. The objective of this
report was to assess the legal, administrative/ organizational, financial, human and technical
capacities of the GCWW and to identify gaps and challenges affecting its performance. The
findings of this assessment were used to draw urgent, short and medium term investment
and development plans for sustainable water supply by the GCWW.

Additionally, a specific assessment was made of the state of water supply in four focal
municipalities impacted with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); the results of this
assessment are presented in Reports V-VIII.

Subsequently, the data collected and generated will serve as a database on the present
state of the GCWW legal, administrative/ organizational, financial, human and technical
capacities which will form a reference to be consulted by the GCWW and other water
institutions and stakeholders in Libya.

Accordingly, the scope of work of this report consisted of three parts: 1) Assessment of
the legal, administrative/ organizational, financial, human and technical capacities of the
GCWW and identification of gaps and challenges impacting its performance, 2) Preparation
of urgent, short term and medium term investment/ development plans and 3) Assessment
of the state of water supply in the municipalities of Benghazi, Abu Saleem, Az-Zintaan and
Tawergha.

4.1.2 Implementation Methodology

The report’s scope was implemented in three phases; each consisting of several activities.
The phases and activities were as follows:

114
Phase I: Data Collection
Data on the GCWW’s capacities were collected from several sources including:
• Literature surveys and reviews of studies, articles, reports, plans and programs
prepared on the GCWW;
• Reports on water services provision, water supply and quality data prepared by
the GCWW;
• Media coverage and the official website of the GCWW;
• Meetings, communications and interviews with senior GCWW staff;
• Comprehensive baseline surveys filled by the GCWW staff;
• Field visits to the GCWW’s offices in Tripoli and to representative regional
municipalities (Benghazi, Abu Saleem, Az-Zintaan, and Tawergha);
• Field visits to some GCWW infrastructures (Wellfields, pumping stations, storage
reservoirs, conveyance pipelines, treatment plants);
• Quality analysis of water samples from different GCWW wells.
Phase II: Collection of Cost Data for Investment/ Development Plans

Cost data utilized for preparation of the investment/ development plans for the GCWW were
solicited from several sources including: 1) Recent offers, previous and present contracts,
suppliers of equipment and materials (pipes, pumps, valves, chemicals, etc.), local market
surveys and experts’ estimates.

Phase III: Data Analysis and Validation of Results

The data collected were compiled, synthesized and analyzed for the identification of the
baseline state of the GCWW, assessment of its capacities, identification of key findings,
major challenges and, accordingly, preparation of recommendations. Subsequently, urgent,
short and medium term investment/ development plans were prepared.

The assessment results were presented in a special workshop held at the GCWW’s
headquarters in Tripoli on Feb. 19, 2019 and attended by concerned staff, MMRA, GDC, and
GAWRs key staff and municipality representatives for review and validation. The feedback
on this workshop was documented and incorporated to produce the final “officially
approved” assessment report.

4.1.3 Significance of the Report

This baseline, assessment and needs report of the GCWW is the first comprehensive report
on the different aspects of this major water supply institution. It was prepared by AlKasaba
Consultants under the sponsorship of the UNICEF; it combines the results of the efforts
and contributions of many specialists including those of the GCWW itself. The report
forms a database that has been validated by the GCWW experts, making it a national water
sector institutional reference. Although it is a reliable and comprehensive document, there
remains large room for completeness, improvement and continuous updating. Moreover,
it should be subjected to further scrutiny to improve the accuracy of the data presented and
fill the data gaps that may exist within the report.

4.1.4 Report Contents

The report consists of the following sections:

8. Introduction (Section 4.1);

9. Legal, administrative/ organizational and financial frameworks (Sections 4.2 - 4.4)
10. Human resources and technical capacities (Sections 4.5 and 4.6)

115
11. Management of water supply and GCWW performance (Sections 4.7 and 4.8)
12. Armed conflict and lack of security impacts (Section 4.9)
13. Major challenges and recommendations (Section 4.10)
14. Urgent, short and medium-term investment/ development plans (Section 4.11).

4.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

4.2.1 Establishment and Mandate of the GCWW
Establishment of the GCWW. The GCWW was first established in accordance with Law No.
8 for 1997 issued by the General People’s Congress on March 3, 1997; this law specified
the company’s mandates as well as its assets. The GCWW was dissolved/ decentralized
in 2003 into companies at the level of 27 Shabiaas (governorates) with its affiliation to
the General People’s Committee for Housing and Utilities. Four years later, the GCWW
was revived by the General People’s Committee’s decree No. 923/ 2007, decree No. 1052/
2007 containing amendments/ addendums to decree 923, and decree 321/2010 giving the
GCWW additional planning and execution responsibilities (2). According to these decrees,
the GCWW is administratively, legally and financially independent with affiliation to the
General Authority of Water Resources (GAWRs).

GCWW Mandate. According to its establishment decree, the GCWW undertakes the
following tasks:

Operation and maintenance (O & M) of water transport and distribution networks,

sewage networks, pumping stations, water and wastewater treatment plants, and
monitoring and control centers;
Installing water and wastewater connections to consumers and conducting
studies on development of water and sanitation services in all regions;
Purchase of water from its sources;
Collection of revenues for water and sanitation services, and proposing of values
of tariffs for water supply and wastewater services;
Development and implementation of training programs and plans for the human
resources in coordination with the relevant authorities;
Participation in the development of standards related to the equipment and tools
of water and sewage systems and networks in coordination with the relevant
authorities;
Execution of water transport and distribution projects within the National
Development Plan (NDP);
Conducting technical and economic studies and research regarding the NDP in
areas of water transport and distribution systems, maintenance projects, and
drainage systems;
Proposition of operational policies and regulations for developing and expanding
water and wastewater activities;
Proposition of specifications and standards in the field of water and sanitation
services; and
Proposition of long, medium and short term strategic plans in the area of ​​water
and sanitation and submission them to the competent authorities for approval.
Accordingly, the GCWW is in charge of supplying domestic water for urban communities
in Libya, i.e., the development, O & M of water supply works (wells, treatm e nt plants,
transport pipelines, water pumping stations, water storage facilities and d i stribution
networks). These functions are implemented through the company’s long term strategies
which are adopted by its General Assembly. The daily management is conducted by a full
time, executive council consisting of a chairman and five members.

116
Monitoring and Auditing of the GCWW. The GCWW is subject to monitoring by a 3-member
Board for Monitoring of the GCWW representing the MMRP, Ministries of Finance and Justice.
This board is assigned by the General Assembly and continues to conduct its activities but
has difficulties visiting some of the GCWW worksites for lack of security. External technical
and financial audits are conducted by the Administrative Control Authority and the Financial
Control Authority, respectively.
Planning, Implementation and Operation of Water Supply Works. Responsibilities for
planning and implementation of water supply infrastructures are shared by several
institutions including the Housing and Infrastructures Board (HIB), Office for Development
of Administrative Centers (ODAC), Housing and Utilities Authority (HUA), Ministry of
Local Governance (MoLG) and its municipalities, and to a limited extent, the Real Estate
Investment Bank. Upon completion, these infrastructures are handed over to the GCWW for
O & M. The GCWW has faced many operating problems because of design, materials and
execution problems by these institutions. This is due to the absence of central coordination
between these institutions and the GCWW and the overlapping of mandates.
This problem is compounded by the absence of water polices and masterplans at national,
regional and local levels. Consequently, most urban communities are developed randomly
making it difficult to implement and operate water supply projects; operation problems
become an everlasting burden to the GCWW.
Other problems faced by the GCWW include the completion of transport lines before the
completion of water distribution networks, the completion of MMRA water supply turnouts
before transmission lines to cities (e.g. Ben Ghashier and Tajoura).

There is clearly a need to redefine the mandates of water supply institutions to eliminate
overlapping of planning, design, execution, operation and maintenance mandates. Planning
of water supply infrastructures should be centralized. Synchronization of implementation
of different complementary water supply infrastructures/ works should be coordinated by
all concerned parties.

Ownership of Water Supply Infrastructures. Ownership of the water supply infrastructures

(assets) is not defined in the GCWW’s establishment law, decrees, or its bylaws or other
relevant Libyan laws. Therefore, it has not been possible to inventory water works and
assess their state or asset values. It has also been difficult to hold anyone accountable for
the deterioration of such works. Such inventories and assessments are necessary for many
reasons such as forming partnerships for service improvement and salvaging of some
infrastructures, etc.

Responsibility for Public Water Supply. Libya has issued a set of laws regulating the
water sector (Law No. 106/ 1973 on public health with articles on the protection of water
resources from pollution, Law No. 3/ 1982 on the regulation of the exploitation of water
resources, Law No. 9 / 2003, and Law No. 15/ 2003 on the protection and improvement of
the environment). These laws collectively addressed the need to provide domestic water
with the required quantity and quality, and the required treatment, disinfection, quality
monitoring and protection of water resources from pollution.

However, these laws stopped short of defining the entity responsible for water supplies for
different uses, the quantity, and quality of water supplied, the water regulator and the tools
ensuring these provisions. Thus, strictly speaking, the GCWW is neither responsible for
drilling wells for water supply nor for the treatment of such waters. Its mandate is limited to
the O & M of the existing water supply infrastructures. Nonetheless, the GCWW has drilled
a large number of wells which continue to supply a significant fraction of Libya’s population
and installed a number of water treatment plants. Other entities, namely municipalities, also
drill wells to supply communities with domestic water. Moreover, water allocation between

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competing users was not addressed. This lack of clarity of mandates of domestic water
supply sources development has caused further confusion and overlapping of activities
with a potential for conflict between institutions.

Therefore, asset ownership and development mandates along with water supply sources
development and allocations need to be readdressed and redistributed clearly among the
different water supply institutions.

Monitoring of Supplied Water Quality. The organizational structure of the GCWW includes
an office for laboratories and water quality monitoring. This office is responsible for:
1) Analysis of waters from O & M administrations at the 8 regions, 2) Maintenance of
chlorination systems, and 3) Water quality monitoring. The function of this office, which
employs 2 persons, is to monitor, document and report water quality and its indicators. The
GCWW, however, has no water quality monitoring/ follow-up program and no laboratories
to monitor water quality.

Emergency Water Supply Preparedness. There are no specific emergency water supply
preparedness legislations. The National Safety Authority is charged with taking necessary
actions and procedures needed to counter disasters such as earthquakes, floods, fires,
collapsing structures, oil or gas spills, territorial waters and any disasters or emergency
risks that may cause damages to persons or properties. As such, water supply shortages
or pollution are not included. Recurrent water shortages exceeding one week in Tripoli
and many other Libyan cities prompted the creation by the Presidential Council of two wo
national level emergency management committees to address all emergencies related to
water supply, wastewater, and storm water/ floods taking place in Libya as a whole and in
Greater Tripoli in particular. These committees are multi-sectoral with representatives from
water sector institutions, security and health sectors. Their primary function is to manage
emergencies immediately upon their occurrence.

4.2.2 Vision and Strategy of the GCWW

Strategy preparation is the responsibility of the General Administration for Planning
and Projects of the GCWW. Although the GCWW has no declared strategy presently, it
is managed on the basis of a non-declared vision and strategy. Policies, organizational
structures, work guidelines and rules have been made accordingly. The need for adopting
of an official strategy remains a priority; however, as it forms the foundation for short,
medium and long term plans. The need to train specialists from the GCWW to partake in
preparation of the strategy is, therefore, a priority as well.

4.3 ADMINISTRATIVE/ ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK

4.3.1 Organizational Structure of the GCWW
The GCWW organizational structure is shown in Figure 1. This structure was approved in
2013. It consists of seven offices affiliated with the head of the administrative/ executive
council along with two assistant heads; one for operation and maintenance and the other
for resources and services. The two assistant heads manage a total of eight general
administrations; the assistant head for resources and services manages the following
general administrations:

• General administration for administrative and financial affairs;

• General administration for consumer services;
• General administration for services.

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Similarly, the operation and maintenance head manages the following general administrative
units:

• General administration for planning and projects;

• General administration for water works;
• General administration for sewerage works;
• General administration for works and emergency;
• General administration for operation in regions;
• Center for central maintenance and major overhaul at the Southern Benghazi “Region”.

The GCWW is headquartered in Tripoli. It provides its services to the urban centers through
a total of 40 Service Offices managing 160 Service Centers located at eight Operation
Regions (Table 1 and Figure 2). A dedicated General Administration for Operation in Regions
supervises operation and maintenance of the service offices and centers in these regions.
Four warehouses are utilized for O & M operations in Tripoli, Souk AlKhamis, Sidi AsSayeh,
and Azizia.

Table 1. Regions, Service Offices and Service Centers

Green Eastern Western

Region Benghazi Central Tripoli Western Southern
Mountain Central Mountain

No. of Service
5 4 5 5 5 6 5 5
Offices

No. of Service
17 16 19 24 20 20 24 20
Centers

As can be seen from the organogram, water supply infrastructures O & M are managed by
a special General Administration for Water along with the corresponding regional offices
and centers. Execution of operation and overhauls of projects, pipelines for water and
wastewater, preparation of designs, drawings and BOQs for projects and works, project
management and follow up, and maintenance of heavy equipment and generators are the
responsibility of the General Administration for Works and Emergency. It is to be noted here
that the emergency administration activities do not include crisis communication, health,
safety, and environment emergency preparedness and management plans and measures
needed in such situation as water cuts, water
pollution and water borne epidemics, etc.

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 Figure 2. GCWW Administrative Regions for O & M

4.3.2 Main Features of the Organizational Structure of the GCWW

Upon review and examination of the organizational structure of the GCWW, employing the
basic indicators of hierarchical systems (flexibility, function, specialization, work allocation,
leadership, scope of supervision, power delegation, power and accountability, centralization
vs. decentralization) it was found that:

• The structure is of the centralized top-down type with highest power at top management

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 levels; direct contact is provided between a single head and followers thus avoiding
overlapping of managerial responsibilities;
• In some functions, the organizational structure is not consistent with the standard
hierarchical structures as the administrative unit (Office) is used both at a high level
(e.g. legal affairs office) and at a lower level (training office, office for laboratories and
water quality). Communications between administrations in the Headquarters and the
administrations in the Regions can only be made indirectly;
• The assistant head for O & M directs five general administrations, all of which have
broad responsibilities which is certainly challenging. The functions of the General
Directorate of Works and Emergencies, the General Administration of Sewage Works,
and the General Administration of Consumer Services are very similar making it difficult
to specify roles and responsibilities;
• Despite its demonstrated functionality, the organizational structure of the GCWW
appears to be classic, emanating from existing practices rather than being based
on a long term strategy and/or methodological approaches to service-provision and
resource development. This structure clearly needs to be updated based on a centralized
management approach and a strategic action plan. The update should consider the
following:
• The organizational unit termed “Office” should be used only in the traditional
placement under the head of the GCWW directly. Other “Offices” should
be relocated according to the nature of their functions. For instance, the
TQO and the Office for Laboratories and Monitoring should be promoted to
administrations or offices under the head of the GCWW directly;
• The responsibilities of the assistant head for O & M should be reduced;
• Redefinition and redistribution of the functions of the General Directorate of
Works and Emergencies, the General Administration of Sewage Works, and
the General Administration of Consumer Services to prevent overlapping.

4.3.3 Information Management

A dedicated Documentation and Information Office (DIO) exists for information management.
Computers are utilized, but on local administrative/ individual employee levels with no
central area networks. Intranet within the GCWW is not available. Access to the internet is
also limited due to financial constraints.

Data and information are handled manually and documented on paper with little reliance
on digital systems. Maps, plans and documents are difficult to retrieve, upgrade, update
and copy. Communications, information and data exchange with other administrations,
offices, and spare parts stores are also made by letters or via telephone. Data forms are
not utilized frequently. Accordingly, data and information are scattered, incomplete and
difficult to access. As a result, GCWW activities including planning and O & M are difficult
to prepare and execute.

Data availability, Accessibility and Quality. Data and information on human resources,
administrative, financial and technical capacities were difficult to find as there are no
digital databases in the GCWW’s different administrative units. This is also the case for
the Regional Units where employee and technical data are kept (decentralized) with no
copies forwarded to the central administration in Tripoli. This decentralization poses real
difficulties when processing employee-related transactions such as promotions, training,
payments, transfers, etc. because the main data (hard copies) is in the Regional branch.
To overcome these challenges, it is necessary to digitize activities of all administrations
and offices starting with the provision of hardware and software for the major service
department and offices (Personnel, Training, Electronic Archiving, Salaries (Payroll),

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Warehouse and Procurement, Tariff Collection, and Contracting and Project Management).

4.4 FINANCIAL CAPACITIES

4.4.1 Financing of the GCWW

The GCWW was established with a capital of LYD 100 million. To ensure funding is available
amply and continuously for implementation of the GCWW activities, Decrees 367/ 1428
(1998) was issued allowing the company to collect water and wastewater service fees
and specifying the values of this fee according to the nature of the user (Buildings under
construction, administrative, industrial, tourist, recreational and commercial units that do
not use water meters).

According to this decree, water users are classified by the GCWW into two groups: 1) Small
consumers (Individual households) and 2) Large consumers; the large consumers group
includes: a) Public consumers (Hospitals, schools, universities, ministries, etc.), and b)
Large commercial consumers (Shops, cafes, restaurants, etc). The tariff for these users is
shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Values of Tariff for Water and Sanitation Services

Type of Service Type of Consumption Units of Tariff Rate

Domestic 0.25
Metered LYD/m3
Non- domestic 1.3

House 9.5

LYD/Month
Non-metered (Domes-
Apartment 11.25
tic)

Luxury House 19.5

The cost of water supply by the GCWW at the time of issuing the combined water and
wastewater service fee decree was estimated to be LYD 0.65 /m3. The estimated difference
between this cost and the service fee (LYD 0.35 /m3) was to be compensated by the Public
Treasury annually.
Water tariffs applied in Libya, including those for GCWW waters, are quite low compared
to other countries (3). Because it is subsidized, water is used inefficiently (if not wasted)
while water providers are less sensitized to production costs. Subsidies should, therefore,
be discontinued to reduce water consumption and production costs.
Revenue Collection. Based on a piped water access of 64.5%, the number of households
connected to public WDNs is about 572,309 households (1). The national level metering
penetration, i.e., the percentage of connected households with installed water meters
is, therefore, only 15% (6). The same low penetration practice probably applies to non-
domestic users served by the GCWW networks. Data on access to WDNs, metered and non-
metered users are limited, non-comprehensive and not up-to-date. Moreover, there are
countless illegal connections to the WDNs which increased lately due to the interruption of

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implementation of masterplans and of water supply schemes to newly developed suburbs
especially those lying in the outskirts of cities. As a result, the actual number of customers
provided with water by GCWW is not known.
The amount of revenues collected and values of invoices issued against water supply and
sanitation services for the years 2015-2017 are shown in Table 3 (4). The total value of
invoices issued ranged from LYD 62.3 to 91.7 million while the total revenues collected
ranged from LYD 9.9 to 12.0 million. The revenues accounted for only 10.8-16.8% of the
total value of invoices issued, implying that the majority of consumers do not pay their
water bills.

Table 3. Values of Invoices Issued and Actual Revenues during the Period (2015-2017)

Revenues to Invoices,
Year Total Value of Invoices Issued, LYD Total Revenues, LYD
%

2015 62,306,811.225 10,474,869.575 16.8

2016 91,729,061.087 9,947,456.568 10.8

2017 86,942,473.741 12,073,493.722 13.9

4.4.2 Revenues, Expenditures and Debts of the GCWW

The GCWW supplies part of the domestic water from its own wellfields spread in many
cities and towns in Libya. It purchases the imbalance water from the MMRP and the GDC at
a price of LYD 0.08 and 0.86/m3, respectively. The waters supplied from these three sources
are provided to customers at specified service provision fees. These fees cover part of the
operation and maintenance costs, but do not cover capital costs. It can be seen that the
water and wastewater service fee is notably lower than the cost of water supplied by the
GDC but higher than the cost of MMRP water.
The GCWW prepares budgets regularly based on needs and available funds (from the
treasury, public and private consumers) and tailors its expenditures according to these
budgets; budgets were closed routinely. The customer service revenues declined from LYD
61.25 million in 2010 to only LYD 12.07 million in 2017 with the decline rate increasing
significantly since 2014. Funds available were far less than the estimated budgets (forcing
the GCWW to limit its expenditures considerably; budget closures were no longer made.
The financial state of the GCWW is summarized in Table 4. It can be seen that the estimated
annual expenditures fall into two categories: 1) Running costs (salaries, O & M, energy)
and 2) Payments for waters purchased from the MMRA and the GDC. These expenditures
average about LYD 450 million per year. The GCWW’s “collected” revenues from public
organizations, small and large consumers are estimated to be LYD 12 million per year,
while the Public Treasury subsidies averaged LYD 200 million per year.

Consequently, the GCWW’s revenues total only LYD 112 million annually, i. e., about one half
of its total expenditures. Moreover, the water services revenues include also wastewater
collection, treatment and disposal costs; so effectively, the revenues for water supply are
less than those stated above.

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 Table 4. Estimated GCWW Revenues and Expenditures for the Period 2010-2017

Amount, LYD Annual Expenses and Amount, LYD

Annual Revenues of the GCWW
million Water Purchase Fees million

Small and large consumers and public 12 O&M 18

organizations

Salaries 260

MMRA 59*
Subsidy by the Public Treasury 200
GDC 105*

Electricity & fuel 8*

Total 212 Total 450

* Estimated/ computed by the Consultant based on quantity and unit price

In the absence of any data on the actual cost of service provision, it is difficult to assess
the sufficiency of the present level of revenue and its impacts on the GCWW. It is clear,
however, considering the high operating costs, the low tariff values and the high water
purchase costs, that the costs of water provision far exceed the revenues and subsidies
collected by the company. This conclusion has been stressed repeatedly during meetings
with the GCWW’s senior management officials.
According to the GCWW, the total debts of public organizations, small and large customers
for the period 2010-2017 exceeded LYD 500 million. The GCWW’s debts to the GDC are
estimated to exceed LYD 100 million, but remain undetermined due to differences on the
price values while those to the MMRA exceed LYD 100 million. As MMRA and GDC rely
completely on these revenues, delays in payments have threatened seriously the reliability
of these operations. Not only is the GCWW’s credibility at stake, but also the availability of
almost 70% of the GCWW’s water supply.

The GCWW’s debt problem can be solved readily if the GCWW improves its collection
efficiency, reduces its costs and reconsiders the value of its tariffs as the company’s debts
and uncollected revenues are almost equal.

“Unconventional” mechanisms should be developed to treat payments to the MMRP, GDC

and GECOL. Until such mechanisms are developed, government intervention is needed
to untangle these inter-institutional payment issues; otherwise all institutions will fail
collectively, and perhaps simultaneously, causing a national water crisis.

4.4.3 Financial Challenges to the GCWW

The GCWW faces serious financial challenges including: 1) Difficulty to collect revenues, 2)
Inability to pay its large debts for the water supply and electric power services, 3) Lack of
data on actual water consumption, 4) Lack of data on actual costs of water delivery which
have been increasing significantly recently due to inflated prices of spares, consumables,
and services, 5) Unavailability of hard currency and difficulty to open letters of credit for

124
importing of equipment and spares that are essential to operation of wells, pumping
stations, etc., and 6) A three-fold increase in the rate of exchange by the Central Bank of
Libya applied at the end of 2018.
These challenges are chronic due to inherent weaknesses in the company’s structural
organization regarding regular follow up and reporting of water supply costs, revenues,
expenditures, balancing, profit / loss and other commercial aspects of the GCWW
operations. The spirit of a self-supported, commercially-managed company must replace
that of a traditional public service company.

Moreover, some of these challenges are out of the control of the GCWW such as those
related to the Central Bank of Libya operations and the customers’ poor level of payment
of service tariffs.

4.4.4 Impacts and Remedies of Financial Challenges on the GCWW’s

Performance
As a consequence of financial challenges, the GCWW has been unable to: 1) Provide O &
M services adequately, 2) Pay its employees’ salaries, 3) Complete on-going or planned
projects, and 4) Pay its debts to other major water suppliers, namely the MMRP and the
GDC. Training and human resources development have also been curtailed. This inability
has had direct impacts on the availability of water supply services with serious water
shortages occurring frequently in many locations.

In spite of these serious challenges, efforts by the GCWW to overcome them appear to be
modest. For instance, there are many locations where collection units are not available;
moreover, computers are not made available for billing operations at many locations.
Consequently, the GCWW is deprived of urgently needed revenues. Other factors limiting
revenue collection efficiency include poor response of customers, lack of enforcement and
weak follow up practices symptomatic of traditional public sector institutions.
To overcome these challenges, the GCWW must focus on the collection of revenues from
its customers with a focus on large consumers because their tariffs are much higher than
smaller consumers. A second step will be to determine the actual costs of water supply
independently from the wastewater services and: 1) Identify areas of cost reduction and 2)
Increase the water service fee to cover all water supply costs.

The new tariff should be based on MMRP and GDC water tariffs, inflation and source
sustainability (i.e., an additional tariff reserved for development of renewable resources,
conservation, etc.). This issue should be addressed on a national level with participation
of the GCWW, MMRP, GDC, water users, and technical, socioeconomic, and environmental
specialists.

To this end, the GCWW proposed a new tariff of LYD 1.07/m3 taking into consideration
parallel increases in prices of water supplied by the MMRA and the GDC to LYD 0.2 and 1.1
/m3, respectively. This tariff has not been approved yet.

Other remedial measures are:

• Facilitation and timely opening by the Central Bank of Libya of letters of credit in
favor of the GCWWs for import of spare parts and materials needed for O & M of
the GCWW assets;
• Cancelation of the recent increase in the rate of exchange of hard currency.

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4.5 HUMAN RESOURCES
4.5.1 Recruitment and Employee Distribution
The GCWW employed a total of 15,770 persons as of May 2017 (Table 4); of whom 916
are employees of the central general administration of the GCWW at its headquarters in
Tripoli. The rest of the employees are distributed among the operation and maintenance
departments in the eight regions. Tripoli region employs 17% of the total workforce while the
other regions employ almost equal fractions (10-13%). There appears to be an accumulation
of employees per population served in some regions and conversely prompting an
assessment of the needs of the regions versus the numbers and qualifications of these
employees.

Non-Libyans are employed for unskilled temporary works (mainly in the wastewater sector
(cleaning manholes and co-assistants to drivers of vacuum WW trucks, and others are
electrical technicians). They account for about 3.8% of the total number of employees.

Table 4. Number of Employees of the GCWW

and their Regional Distribution

Administrative Unit Total % of Total

Headquarters, Tripoli 916 6

Tripoli Region 2720 17

Benghazi Plain 1977 13

Central 2090 13

Green Mountain 1588 10

Western 1440 9

Western Mountain 1579 10

Southern 1498 9

Eastern Central 1958 12

Total 15770 100

*Employed mainly on a temporary (daily) basis to perform unskilled works

4.5.2 Human Resources Placement and Requirements

Staffing requirements and placement within the different GCWW’s administrative units have
been finalized by a special committee and approved by the GCWW management in 2016.
The committee allocated a total of 16,486 job assignments. It appears that these allocations

126
were rather dictated by the placement of the existing number of staff in the company at
the time than by the actual work quantitative and qualitative needs. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that almost two thirds of the GCWW’s employees do not have a
secondary school certificate, and are, subsequently, unqualified for most of the company’s
jobs. Needless to say, this large fraction forms a heavy burden on the company’s running
costs.

Training is urgently needed to upgrade the knowledge and skills of most of the GCWW’s
workforce especially those of secondary school or lower education levels. Some regulations
regarding training exist; however, they are outdated and need to be revised thoroughly.

4.5.3 Jobs and Job Descriptions

There is no guideline listing jobs within the GCWW, their descriptions, qualifications and
the selection criteria for occupying them. This way it becomes difficult to specify and direct
a work assignment correctly and follow its progress with time. Moreover, work overlaps
and directing of assignments to non-specialists become quite common. Under such work
conditions, assessment of employee performance, selection of new recruits, evaluation
of existing ones and training needs assessment all become a daunting task. Preparation
of a job description and qualification criteria guide is, therefore, an urgent priority for the
GCWW.
4.5.4 Human Resources Characteristics
As stated previously, the GCWW employs 15,770 persons as of May 2017. The different
characteristics (age, function, qualification, etc.) of these employees are summarized below.

Employees Age Distribution. About two thirds of the GCWW’s workers are under 45 years
old (Table 5 and Figure 3) with the largest number (5729) in the 36-45 year range. Such a
large youth fraction with a good potential for skill improvement will reflect positively on the
GCWW’s performance and efficiency.
Functional Distribution of GCWW Employees. The GCWW’s employees perform different
functions (administrative, technical, operation, service, etc.) as shown in Table 6 and Figure 4.
Operation-related occupations constitute the highest fraction (31.6 %), while administrative
and services occupations constitute 24.1% and 19.1%, respectively. Clearly, administrative
occupations form a large fraction in view of the technical nature of the GCWW’s mandate. If
the GCWW should consider reducing its workforce or reorienting its staff, the administrative
units should be a good starting point.
Employee Qualifications. Educational backgrounds and qualifications of GCWW employees
vary from illiteracy to masters degrees (Table 7). Those with no academic qualification
form one ninth of the total workforce, while those with higher institute diplomas, bachelor
degrees form only about 25%. Technically qualified employees (engineering, computer,
science, high-level vocational training) comprise only 36%. There is evidently a serious
problem of qualification with a shortage of technical staff.

Table 5. Age Distribution of GCWW

Age Group Less than 25 35 – 26 -45 36 55 – 46 65 – 56 Total
Number of Employees 459 3803 5729 4297 1482 15770
of Total % 3 24 36 27 9 100

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 Figure 3: Age Distribution of GCWW Employees

Table 6. Distribution of GCWW Employees according to Functions

Number of %of Number of %of

Functional Group Functional Group
Employees Total Employees Total
Administrative 2119 13.4 Service 1477 9.4
Assistant Admin. 1683 10.7 Driver 1531 9.7
Technician 1520 9.6 Operator 1796 11.4
Assistant Techni-
2066 13.1 Technical operator 3191 20.2
cian
Craftsman 387 2.5 Total 15770 100

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 Figure 4: Functional Distribution of GCWW Employees

Table 7. Employees Qualifications and Specializations

Number of % of Number of % of
Qualification Total Total
Employees Specialization Employees
No qualification 1818 11.5 Engineering 1852 11.7
Primary 795 5.0 Science 156 1.0
Preparatory 2889 18.3 Management 962 6.1
High School 737 4.7 Accounting 496 3.1
High
Institute 1739 11.0 Computer 360 2.3
Diploma
Intermediate Insti-
3966 25.1 Total 15770 100.0
tute Diploma

4.5.5 Training and Human Resources Development

Employee Training: 2014-2017. Capacity building and training plans of the GCWW
are executed by the Training and Qualification Office (TQO) of the Human Resources
Administration. This office employs two persons. Considering the training needs
and number of employees who should be trained continuously, this office is clearly
understaffed.

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Training programs in the period 2014-2017 are shown in Table 8. The number of targeted
training courses locally and abroad and the number of trainees are almost constant.
Most of the training courses were in the technical fields (water and wastewater networks
design, pumps maintenance, electrical protection and control), English languages,
computer skills, AutoCAD, financial and administrative short courses. A total of 581
employees were trained in 2014, no one in 2015, 72 in 2016 and only 24 in 2017.

The trainees’ numbers declined notably since 2014. The reasons for this decline are many,
including the following:

• There are no in-house trainers in the GCWW;

• There are no training facilities and tools in the GCWW;
• Little coordination takes place between the training office, O & M, regions
and other units regarding training needs and plans;
• There are no training coordinators in the O & M departments in the regions;
• Lack of financial resources for implementation of training programs.

Table 8. Training Courses Implemented through the Period 2014-2017

Targeted number of trainees Number of training courses

Number of employees actual-

Year
ly trained
Internal train-
External training Internal External
ing

2014 970 380 53 10 581

2015 947 210 51 11 0

2016 947 210 51 11 72 (internally)

2017 944 210 50 11 24 (internally)

Employee Training Needs. The number of GCWW employees is high in comparison to

other similar institutions locally and internationally. As such, these numbers put a financial
pressure on the GCWW in terms of salaries, services, etc. The fact that many of them
have only basic qualifications. This limits their performance and chances for advancement
greatly. This limited performance also places additional financial burdens on the company.
Addressing the large number of employees should be a priority issue for the GCWW.
Upgrading their skills through an ambitious training and development program should be
the first step in that direction. A parallel and equally urgent step is the continuous training of
senior management staff as it improves directly and significantly the overall performance
of the GCWW. Other employees also need training to keep up with advancements in their
fields of specialization.
To activate the training programs, the following specific actions need to be taken:

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1. Updating of training regulations;
2. Promotion of TQO to a higher level under the direct supervision of the head of
the GCWW;
3. Providing the TQO office with personnel and technical capabilities including
documentation and archiving equipment, software and facilities;
4. Appointment of training coordinators in the Regional Administrations;
5. Establishment of a specialized training center for the GCWW’s employees.
Such training center should be properly equipped with classrooms, laboratories,
training workshops, models, etc. This center shall play a significant role in:

• Filling the large training gap faced by the GCWW;

• Preparing and implementing courses that are tailored to the needs of the different
GCWW units in a flexible and sustainable manner;
• Reducing training costs;
• Providing feedback and advice to the GCWW senior management.

To ensure sustainability of training, a core of 60 specialized trainers should be formed;

this core will, in turn, train the GCWW’s employees and act as advisor to the GCWW. The
priority training areas should be defined based on a training needs assessment.

4.5.6 Operation and Maintenance of Water Supply Utilities

Water supply utilities and infrastructures are managed by the General Administration for
Operation and Maintenance of Water Utilities. This administration is in charge of O & M
of all water supply operations and works including wells, pumping stations, treatment
plants, reservoirs, transmission lines and distribution networks. It is supervised by the
assistant head for O & M Affairs. Its responsibilities include the supervision of operation of
water production and distribution system as well as assisting Regional Administrations in
preparation and follow up of emergency plans, preparation of water supply plans ensuring
availability of ample quantities at Regions, follow up of water quality ensuring its suitability
for domestic consumption and studying of unaccounted for water (UFW) with the intention
of finding causes and solutions.

The organizational structure of this administration includes an office for water supply and
an office for laboratories and follow up of water quality. Reports are prepared quarterly,
semi-annually and annually. Daily O & M operations are not digitized so reference and
documentation of such operations are unsystematic.

The human resources of the administration consist of 43 employees; 79% of these employees
hold high institute certificates or university degrees (Table 9 and Figure 5).

Considering its mandate and the extensive area it serves, the diversity of its infrastructures
and activities, this administration is less than adequately prepared for this mandate. Its
performance will improve significantly with the provision of the following:

• Computers and ancillaries;

• Software for follow-up of (O & M) operations;
• Digital networking with other administrations, offices and regions;
• GPS and GIS;
• Analytical laboratories (mobile, local, central);
• Chemicals, spares and consumables for treatment plants at Weshka, Abu Njaim,
Wadi Bai, AlAssa, Jaghboub and Mrada;
• Technical guides for O & M operations in Arabic;

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• Training for employees.

4.6 TECHNICAL CAPACITIES

At the time of its establishment in 1997, the GCWW’s assets included 1800 wells, 30 water
treatment plants, 350 pumping stations, over 30,000 kilometers of distribution networks
pipelines, about 1000 ground and elevated water tanks, over 7000 kilometers of sanitary
and storm sewer lines, 110 sewage pump stations and over 40 wastewater treatment plants
(2). These numbers have increased in the last 20 years at different rates in response to the
urban growth caused by population increase during this period.

4.6.1 State of GCWW Water Supply Infrastructures

The GCWW water supply infrastructures include wellfields, pumping stations, ground and
elevated water reservoirs, transmission lines, treatment plants and distribution networks
(Table 10). The GCWW manages a total of 2964 wells, 19 water treatment plants, 2054
reservoirs with a total capacity of 377,500 m3, 806 pumping stations and about 16,000 km
of transmission and distribution lines. The state of these infrastructural components is
summarized below.
Table 10. Basic Data on Water Supply Infrastructures in the Regions*

No. of
No. of Treat- Tank Capacity
Region No. of wells No. of Reservoirs Pumping
ment Plants m3
Stations

Benghazi Plain 284 0 184 24,000 62

Green Mountain 589 1 350 50,000 198

Eastern Central 58 3 153 6,000 42

Central 510 1 442 1,000 213

Tripoli 710 0 248 280,000 37

Western 281 11 161 10,000 35

Western Mountain 178 0 266 6,000 112

Southern 354 3 250 5,000 106

Total 2964 19 2054 382,000 806

*Extracted from baseline survey data supplied by the GCWW

132
Wells. Wellfields are located in several cities within the eight regions, particularly those
which cannot be supplied by the MMRP or GDC waters. The largest numbers of wells are
in the Tripoli, Green Mountain and Central Regions (Table 11 and Figure 6). Of the total
wells, only 1591 wells (53.7%) are operational; the remaining number (1373) required to be
maintained. Most of the problems faced in wellfields are contributed to pump and control
system failures which are caused by vandalism, electrical power supply problems and
sometimes poor of selections of suitable pumps and protection equipment.

It is to be noted that some of these wells were not drilled by the GCWW, but were handed
over to the company by other entities, mainly the Ministry of Housing and Utilities, the
Housing and Infrastructures Board, and municipalities/ Ministry of Local Governance. The
GCWW operates and maintains these wells in accordance with its mandate.

It should also be noted that some of the wellfields are not utilized presently because they
require maintenance or they are no longer needed due to the presence of the MMRP waters
as is the case of wells located within the city of Tripoli. It can be seen from Table 11 and
Figure 5 that the fraction of wells requiring maintenance operations is quite high (1373
wells). Such a fraction is indicative of operational problems, availability of spares and low
water supply reliability/availability. Such a problem translates directly to water shortages
because most of these wells are in cities where no alternative water sources exist.

Table 11. State of Water Supply Wells in Different Regions

Number of Wells
Region
Total Wells (operational and non-opera-
Operational
tional)

Tripoli 224
710

Benghazi Plain 109

284

Green Mountain 338

589

East Central 74
58

Central 334
510

Western 191
281

Western Mountain 67 178

Southern 254
354

Total 1591 2964

133
 Figure 5. Total Number of Wells in Regions

Pump and control system failures have been frequent lately; difficulty to provide spare
parts and/or replacements has forced well shutdowns indefinitely. Such problems were
solved in few instances through the kind efforts of some international organizations
(WHO, UNICEF, UNDP).
Water Treatment Plants. The GCWW operates 19 water treatment plants. Basic data
and condition of these plants are shown in Table 12. Most of these plants employ RO
technology (Figure 6) to remove salinity, while Ghaat and AlBerkit stations are designed
to remove iron and manganese. The Tawergha Water Treatment Plant aims to remove
hardness, sulfide and to cool the high-temperature artesian water.
Only three of these plants are operational. The rest require major rehabilitation or
replacement. The Tawergha Plant has been destroyed as a result of an armed conflict in
2011; it is considered obsolete and must be replaced or an alternate water source must be
provided.

Table 12. Basic Data and Condition of GCWW Water Treatment Plants

134
 Capacity m3/
Service Center Plant Name Plant Type Technical Status
day

Surman RO 500 Idle

Surman
Surman RO 500 Idle

AlAssa RO 1000 Operational

Reghdaline RO 500 Idle

Jamail
Jamail RO 500 Idle

Zilten RO 500 Idle

Ajeelat Ajeelat RO 500 Idle

Sabrata (Aathar) RO 1000 Idle

Subrata
Telleel RO 500 Idle

AlBerkit Fe, Mn removal - Idle

Ghaat Ghaat Fe, Mn removal - Idle

Tahala Brackish water RO 600 Idle

Sirte Weshka RO 2000 Idle

Sirte Wadi Bey RO 1500 Idle

Sirte Abu Njaim RO 1500 Idle

Wahat Mrada RO 500 Operational

Tubrok Jaghboub RO 1500 Operational

Misrata Tawergha Cooling, softening 60,000 Idle

135
 Figure 6. RO Brackish Water Desalination Plant in Kersas, Tummeina, Misrata

Water Chlorination Systems. A summary of the state of the chlorination systems used in
GCWW wells is presented in Table 13. It can be seen that some regions have no chlorination
systems; only one third of these systems were operational in 2014. The number is probably
smaller presently; as a result, the GCWW produced waters are not chlorinated presently.
Consequently, there is no residual chlorine at the end-use point implying a high potential
for microbial pollution.
Water Transmission Pipelines. Water transmission lines include those conveying water
from wellfields operated by the GCWW, conveying desalinated water supplied by the GDC
and conveying MMRP waters supplied at turnouts to cities. Data on these lines are scarce
but lengths extend from several kilometers to over 50 km. Most of pipelines are ductile iron
or Prestressed Concrete Cylinder Pipelines and few are polyethylene pipes.

Table 13. Condition of Chlorination Systems in GCWW Wells and Reservoirs*

Calcium Hypochlo-
Condition of Chlorination System
rite
Region
Under mainte-
Total Working Maintained Amount used, ton
nance

Tripoli 5 1 4

Benghazi Plain 12 6 - 6 24

Green Mountain 1 1 - -

Eastern Central 13 7 - 6 990

Central 16 1 0 15 47.2

Western 6 2 - 4

Western Mountain none

Southern none

Total 53 18 0 35 1,061.20
*Condition in the year 2017

136
The condition of these transmission lines is variable; lines supplying MMRP waters are in
a relatively good condition as they were executed only a few years ago. Those conveying
desalinated water were laid at the same time desalination plants were constructed. They are
likely to be in a poor condition. The collection and transmission pipelines from wellfields
of the GCWW are also in a fair to poor condition. As these lines are pivotal in supplying
water to the cities, their maintenance or replacement must be placed among the GCWW’s
priorities to avoid major extended water shortages.
Water Pumping Stations. Most of the pumping stations were constructed over 20 years
ago with a few exceptions (Figure 7). The premises are generally in good condition but a
considerable fraction of the pumps and the electrical/mechanical equipment are old and
may be obsolete requiring replacement or repair. Some pumping stations have been
overtaken by outlaws, and hence have become inaccessible for visiting, assessment, and O
& M, raising additional operational problems.

Water Distribution Networks. Water distribution networks are installed at many urban areas.
However, the percentage of people connected to public WDNs is estimated to be 64.5%
(1). These networks are not subjected to regular and routine examinations, assessments
and maintenance operations. Little data and information are therefore available on their
physical state or on the hydraulic/ pressure/flow aspects of these networks. Little effort
has been made to model them in order to understand existing problems and/or improve
their performance. Networks are controlled at critical feed/ supply points from the MMRP
or GDC. Pressure is low in most areas forcing many customers to use booster pumps and
in-house ground and elevated storage tanks to ensure sufficient water supply at acceptable
pressure.
Pipe sizes and materials employed in water distribution networks vary notably as does
their age or condition. Most pipes and ancillaries are approaching 30-40 years while those
in some parts of Tripoli and Benghazi are much older. While galvanized iron pipes persist
in old networks, polyethylene and ductile iron are more common in newer networks. Metal
based pipes suffer serious corrosion due to high salinity of most waters (Figure 8). Water
distribution networks are poorly operated and maintained. Subsequently, leakage was
common in many networks and at rates estimated to reach 40-50% (5). According to the
GCWW estimates, about 30% of the water distribution networks are in a good condition,
40% in a fair condition, while the rest (30%) are in a poor condition. The effectiveness
of water networks to meet many communities’ needs was acceptable to poor in many
locations.

Figure 7. Water Pumping Station in Good Figure 8. Galvanized Pipe Replaced Condition

Ownership of water distribution networks is not clearly specified in the decrees establishing
the GCWW while maintaining them is. This situation is problematic as major network

137
overhauls require special budgets that exceed those typically allocated for the GCWW.

Despite the company’s long operational period, this condition has witnessed little
improvement; in fact, the state of these assets continued to deteriorate. It can be said that
the company’s efforts were practically limited to maintaining these assets in an operating
condition, i.e., struggling to keep the same level of service provision, with very little room
for improvement, upgrading, renewal or expansion. Today, it may be described as fair to
poor. An assessment of the conditions of water distribution networks is needed so that
interventions are made on time to prevent serious failures and costly consequences.

Water Tanks and Reservoirs. A total of 2054 elevated tanks and ground reservoirs are
managed by the GCWW (Table 10); each desalination plant has two product (desalinated)
water tanks while the MMRP operates 5 large reservoirs (for domestic and agricultural
demands), and several break pressure and equalizing tanks in major cities (Tripoli, Benghazi,
Abu Zayyan). The MMRP and GDC reservoirs are generally in good condition while those
of the GCWW are mostly in fair to poor condition requiring major maintenance operations.
The elevated tanks located within cities are not in use; they should be removed.

Aging Infrastructures. The GCWW manages a large number of infrastructures in most

of Libya’s urban centers with different types of components. The actual state of these
infrastructural components is unknown and has not been assessed by the GCWW. Most
of these components, especially buried infrastructures, are old and likely to be in bad
condition due to aging and poor (O & M) practices. In fact, some components are in a
deteriorated/ obsolete state. Assessment of these infrastructures is of utmost importance
in establishing the baseline state and making rehabilitation/ replacement/ renovation and
partnership plans. Although it presents a real challenge, the assessment of the GCWW
infrastructures should be conducted as soon as possible to limit on-going damages and
conduct well-planned and less costly rehabilitation works.

Headquarters, Regional O&M Offices, Service Centers and Tariff Collection Points.
Construction of the GCWW’s headquarters in Tripoli is almost complete; the buildings are
fully utilized by the company’s different administrative units. Several major components
have not been constructed yet including laboratories, workshops, warehouses and training
centers. The headquarters building is in good condition. Some of the tariff collection points
are rented. Their conditions are mostly fair to good.

Regional O & M offices are located in each of the 8 regions; they are mostly owned by the
GCWW. They are in mostly fair to good condition. A total of 150 service offices are operated
by the GCWW in the 8 regions. Most of these offices are located in separate premises either
owned by the GCWW or rented. Their conditions are fair to good.

Mechanical and electromechanical equipment including pumps, motors, generators,

pipes, valves, etc. and spare parts are imported and procured continuously by the GCWW.
Unfortunately, their technical data are not documented when entering the company’s
warehouses. Their operation and maintenance records are not documented, difficult to
access, or not kept. Such equipment and spare parts are usually procured in good conditions
but may be subject to mishandling and misuse upon transportation and operation.

138
Data on water infrastructures of the GCWW are scarce. Moreover, there is no database
for the GCWW’s infrastructures or assets (e.g., well data including location, geology,
hydrology, lithology, productivity, water depth, pump characteristics, casing, drawdown,
quality, operation history, etc.). When data are available, they are outdated, incomplete,
inaccessible and/or inaccurate. Therefore, an information center with a comprehensive
database, GIS and electronic archiving system must be implemented as a first priority for the
GCWW development along with procurement of computer systems, software, equipment
and training of staff to run this center.

4.7 MANAGEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY

4.7.1 Implementation, O & M of Water Supply Projects
The GCWW is authorized to implement water supply projects within the National
Development Plan (2008-2012) or similar projects. Private and public companies also
execute such projects. This role has been very limited, however, in light of the severe
financial constraints faced by the country lately.

Presently, the GCWW activities are limited to the provision of water services to many urban
communites and residential areas in Libya through service centers and O & M offices in the
eight regions as described previously. The GCWW services have been limited to routine
and emergency O & M activities.

4.7.2 Quantities of Waters Distributed by the GCWW

The GCWW is charged with supplying water to all Libyan urban communities. As stated
previously, the GCWW utilizes three sources to provide domestic water to its customers.
These sources are:
1. The GCWW wells/ wellfields located in many communities without access to waters
supplied by the MMRP or the GDC. Waters from some of these wells were treated;
presently, all GCWW waters are provided without treatment.
2. The MMRP waters supplied from the Sarir/Tazerbo, Hasawna and Ghadames wellfields;
3. The GDC waters supplied from eight desalination plants. The desalinated waters are
potabilized to render them suitable for conveyance and domestic use;
The total amount of water distributed by the GCWW in 2017 was 575,042,414 m3 (Table
14). These quantities were supplied mostly by the MMRP (59%), the GCWW (32%), and
the GDC (9%) as shown in Figure 9. Most of the MMRP water is supplied to the Benghazi
and Tripoli Regions with smaller volumes supplied to the Central Eastern, Central and
Western Mountain Regions while most of the GDC-produced water is supplied to the Green
Mountain, Central and Western Regions. Finally, as previously stated, the GCWW produced
water is supplied to all regions with larger fractions supplied to the Central, Southern,
Central Eastern, Western and Tripoli Regions.
Accordingly, the largest volumes were supplied to the regions of Tripoli, Benghazi, Central,
Central Eastern, Green Mountain, Western, Southern and Western Mountain, sequentially
(Figure 10).

The GCWW supplied 183.8 million m3 in 2017 from its wells to the eight operation regions
(Figure 11). Most of this quantity is supplied to the Central region followed by the Southern
and Central Eastern regions (38.6, 31.0, and 27.5 Mm3, respectively). No list is available of
the communities supplied by these wells, however.

139
 Table 14. Quantities of Water Distributed by the GCWW in 2017

Water volume Distributed in 2017 by Source,

m3 Estimated Popu-
Total Volume lation
Region
Distributed
of the Region
GDC MMRP GCWW

Benghazi Plain 5,625,494 113,669,979 17,985,213 137,280,686 967,255

Green Mountain 32,868,657 - 15,452,048 48,320,705 589,878

Central Eastern - 40,200,200 27,488,360 67,688,560 475,203

Central 3,335,464 28,751,817 38,560,797 70,648,078 979,437

Tripoli - 154,516,834 21,141,001 175,657,835 1,714,688

Western 10,270,331 - 23,420,196 33,690,527 663,435

Western Mountain - 1,956,000 8,828,180 10,784,180 424,550

Southern - - 30,971,843 30,971,843 452,424

Total 52,099,946 339,094,830 183,847,638 575,042,414 6,266,870

140
 Figure 10. Volumes of Water Distributed by the GCWW to Regions in 2017

Uses of Water Supplied by the GCWW. Water is used for domestic, residential,
commercial and industrial purposes. Based on the number of meters installed for
different uses, the GCWW estimates that municipal uses account for about 80% of the
total amount used with commercial and small scales (within the city) with industrial
uses forming 15 and 5% of the total consumption, respectively (Figure 12). The industrial
fraction is very small and no data are available regarding its quantities; it is considered as
part of the commercial uses.

141
4.7.3 Quality of Water Distributed by the GCWW

The quality of waters distributed by the GCWW differs according to the source(s) utilized
to supply a given city. As most cities depend on one source of water supply only, the water
quality will be simply that of the source. When more than one water source is used, the
quality will reflect the quality and quantity of the blended sources.

Quality of the MMRP and the GCWW waters varies almost with each well. Water quality
of potabilized desalinated water differs slightly with desalination plants. The quality of the
GCWW supplied waters, is described below along with representative characteristics of the
MMRP and GDC produced waters which are described in detail in volumes II and III of this
report.

Quality of Domestic Water Supplied from the GCWW Operated Wells. The quality of waters
supplied from the GCWW-operated wells varies with the source wells utilized which is
reflective of the groundwater reservoir/ aquifer. Typical water quality characteristics of
some wells utilized in different areas of Libya are shown in Table 15 (4). It can be seen that
these waters have notably different characteristics; TDS range from 260 to over 1840 mg/L,
hardness ranges from 60 to 1050 and chlorides range from 42.6 to 673.9 mg/L, respectively.
Waters in some regions contain high iron concentrations (AsShaati, Ghaat, etc.). Many of
these waters are of marginal quality and may violate the Libyan Drinking Water Standards
in one or more parameters. The characteristics of these wells are determined during drilling
operations normally, but regular follow-up analyses are conducted only occasionally.

142
 Table 15. Water Quality Characteristics of Wells in Selected Regions of Libya

City / Region
Concentrations allowed ac-
Az-Zintan/ Kufra/ AlAbya/ cording to Libyan Standard
Indicator*
No. 82/2015 for drinking
Western East Cen- Benghazi water **
Mountain tral

pH 7.33 6.89 8.21 6.5 – 8.5

Total dissolved solids, TDS 1846.6 260 1061 1000

Total hardness as CaCO3 1051.35 60 600 500

Calcium, Ca2+ 276.69 14.0 140 -

Magnesium, Mg2+ 87.73 7.6 61 -

Potassium, K+ 20.32 5.46 10 40

Sodium, Na+ 250.45 29.9 160 200

Iron, Fe - - - 0.3

Zinc, Zn - - - 3.0

Sulfates SO42- 449.00 42.2 156 250

Chlorides, Cl- 673.90 42.6 361 250

Alkalinity, HCO3- 87.24 42.7 305 -

Manganese, Mn - - - 0.05

Nitrates (NO3-) 0.80 - - 45

Not present Not pres- Not pres-

Free residual chlorine*** 0.5
ent ent

* All units are in mg/L except pH without units.

** The Standard, set the maximum limits for contamination of total coliform or E. coli
should not exceed 0/100 ml with untreated water resource and treated water into the
distribution network.
***The residual free chlorine concentration is set at 0.2 to 0.5 mg /L.

Quality of the MMRP Waters. The MMRA waters are mined from Sarir, Tazerbo, Hasawna
wellfields and the Ghadames basin. The quality of Sarir/Tazerbo wellfields is shown in
Tables 16 and 17 as an indicative example of MMRA water quality.

Quality of the GDC Waters. Desalinated waters contain very little dissolved solid.

143
Consequently, they are corrosive and devoid of taste; thus they are unacceptable. They
are potabilized and disinfected to make them suitable for domestic purposes and non-
corrosive. The typical water quality for the different stages of a desalination plant is
shown in Table 18.

Disinfection of Water Distributed by the GCWW. Disinfection is essential for protection

against microbial pollution and spread of infectious diseases and epidemics. The
MMRA waters are disinfected using chlorine gas at the balancing reservoirs at AtTalhya,
Benghazi and Sidi AsSayeh along with other reservoirs and shock chlorination along
the pipeline systems. Similarly, the GDC waters are chlorinated within the potabilization
plants as chlorine is produced within the plant.
In the past, GCWW-produced waters were chlorinated at reservoirs in wellfields using
calcium hypochlorite powder and chlorine gas at treatment plants. Presently, chlorine gas
(cylinders) and hypochlorite (powder) are unavailable at the GCWW’s warehouses and
most chlorination systems are not functioning; so presently water supplied by the GCWW
remains un-chlorinated.
Water Quality Analysis and Monitoring. There is no approved plan or program by the
GCWW to monitor the quality of water supplied from its wells. Water quality is analyzed
occasionally or when pollution is suspected. The company does not own any analytical
laboratories; there are no skilled technicians in the fields of physical, chemical and
biological analysis in most of the areas supplied. Water analyses are conducted in public
or private laboratories.
Public laboratories are available at the health sector, universities, research institutions,
the Environmental General Authority (EGA) and the MMRP. None of these laboratories is
accredited or nationally approved for water quality analysis. Moreover, these laboratories
generally suffer shortages of chemicals, equipment and instruments are not calibrated
regularly.

An important water quality indicator, residual chlorine, is monitored irregularly if not

rarely due to lack of sufficient analytical facilities and financial resources to buy analytical
services.

Table 16. A Monthly Chemical Water Quality Report, Phase I, MMRP* *From Ref. 6

Main Transportation Ajdabia Water Stor- AtTalhy- Water Feeding Point

WHO Pipelines age Reservoir aTank )(Turnout
Parameter
Guide-
lines Main Stor- AtTalhya Feeding Feeding
Tazerboo/ Sarir/ Water
age Reser- Point (Node Point
Ajdabia Ajdabia Intake
voir Tank ) no. 3 )(Node 4

144
Temperature,
- 21.6 21.4 21.6 21.62 20.4 21.65
˚C
pH -8.5 6.5 8.38 8.1 8.26 8.26 8.16 8.21
Electrical con-
µS/CM 485 1375 951 987 955 953
ductivity EC
1200
TDS 314 890 615 639 618 617
mg/L
The
Ca-hardness - 66 146 89 105 101 101 station
is closed
-
Chlorides, Cl mg/l 250 77 214 141 138 139 140
due to
Sulfates SO42- mg/l 250 - - - - - technical
problems
Nitrates ,NO3- mg/l 50 1.04 8.6 3.7 3.6 4.7 3.37
+
Sodium, Na mg/l 200 61 248 150 151 146 149
+
Potassium, K - 23.5 15.6 21.34 22.1 21.6 21.7
Calcium, Ca2+ mg/l 200 - - - - - -
Magnesium,
mg/l 50 - - - - - -
Mg2+
Table 16. A Monthly Chemical Water Quality Report, Phase I, MMRP*
*From Ref. 6

Table 17. A Monthly Biological Water Quality Report, Phase I, MMRP

AtTalhya
Ajdabia Main Transportation Pipe- Feeding Points
Reservoir lines )(Turnouts
Tank

WHO Tazerboo/
Parameter Sarir/ Ajdabia Inlet Node 3 Node
Ajdabia
Guidelines

Min. Min. Max. Min. Max. Max. Min.

Min. value
No .No .No .No .No .No .No
.No

Total bacterial count No.

colony 500 8 17 0 2 0 300˃ 0 17 0 13 -
col./1ml

T.C.F per 100ml Zero 4 727 0 0 0 0 0 866 0 0 -

Total No. of Temp. resisting

Zero 4 9.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
bacteria F.C.F

E.Coli, at 44oC per 100ml Zero ve+ ve+ ve- ve- ve- ve- ve- ve- ve- ve- -

Streptococci bacteria per)

Zero 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
100ml

*Adopted from Ref. 6

145
Table 18. Water Quality Parameters Monitored in Zliten Desalination Plant* *or the Zliten Desalination Plant
TU)shown in table ...rage tanks.) operated intermittently with long interruptions and without (9(

Recir- Boiler Boiler

Sea Conden- Distillate Product Cooling
Description culated feed wa- Drum
water sate water water water water
Brine ter water

pH (25 ºC)** ≤ 8.5 8.5~9.0*1 7.0~9.0 9.8~10.8 7.0~7.5 6.7~7.5 6.7~8.5 8.5~10.0

EC (25 ºC) µS/cm ≤ 84000 ≤126000 1~10 100~1200 1~8.0 1~50# 200~600 400~1000

DO - - 0.1~0.5 - - - - -

SiO2 - - ≤1.0 2.0~50 - 0.04~0.5 - -

PO4 - - - 15~40 - - -

Ca (as CaCO3) ≤ 500 - - - - 0.12~0.75 22~75 -

Mg (as CaCO3) ≤ 1500 - - - - 0.2~3.7 ≤30 -

Turbidity - - - - - - - 30~100

T-hardness (as CaCO3) ≤ 7400 ≤11000 ≤1.0 - - - 60~90 60~90

Ca-hardness (as CaCO3) ≤ 1300 - - - - 1.5~2.75 50~75 -

TDS ≤ 42000 ≤63000 50~500 ≤5 1~25 110~200 -

Cl ≤ 24500 - - 0.6~150 - 0.6~18.0 50~150 -

Residual chlorine ≤ 0.1 - - - - 0.2~0.4 -

Fe - - 0.02~0.3 0.02~0.3 0.01~0.05 0.03~0.3 ≤0.3 -

Cu - - 0.02~0.2 0.02~0.2 0.01~0.05 0.05~0.2 ≤0.2 -

M-Alkalinity (as CaCO3) ≤ 130 - - 20~130*2 - - - -

p-Alkalinity (as CaCO3) - - - ≤100 - - - -

SO4 - - 10~20 10~20 - -

*Source Adopted from Ref. 7 **All values in mg/L except pH and Turbidity (NTU)

There is a clear need for both chlorination systems rehabilitation and procurement of
chlorine gas or powder compounds in sufficient quantities for routine and emergency
applications. Similarly, there is an urgent need for analytical laboratories and monitoring.

The GCWW received eight mobile water quality laboratories as an aid from the International

146
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). These laboratories were placed in the eight regions;
GCWW technicians were trained to operate these laboratories.
The GCWW should adopt a water quality monitoring program, treat waters that don’t meet
drinking water standards, ensure continuous disinfection of distributed waters, provide
analytical water quality laboratories, and train employees to conduct water quality analysis.

4.7.4 Municipal Water Supply Coverage, Leakage and Supply per Capita

Municipal Water Supply Coverage. Water is supplied to households on a continuous basis

(24 hours daily, 7 days a week) although interruptions occur for many reasons. Municipal
water supply coverage rates are not available at the GCWW. The only reliable data on
household water supply sources are those reported in the 2006 National Census (1)
which was based on reliable, statistically designed surveys conducted by trained census
teams that included practically all households. According to these data, a total of 572,309
families (households) were connected to the public water distribution networks (table
19 and figure 13); this number comprises 64.5% of the total number of families which
was 886,978. Privately owned wells supply 154,007 households (17.4%) while 139,911
households (15.8%) used water harnessed from rain (or water transported by trucks). The
remaining 2.3% of the households obtain water from other un-identified sources.

Table 19. Sources of Household Water Supply

Source Number of Households %of Total Households

Public Water Distribution Network 572309 64.52

Private Well 154007 17.36

Harvested Rainwater/ Trucked Water 139911 15.78

Other 20751 2.34

Total 886978 100.00

147
 Figure 13. Sources of Household Water Supply
Leakage and UFW. There are no data on leakage and UFW. However, leakage is estimated
to be 30-50% (5). The UFW was calculated as the difference between total volumes of water
supplied to cities per capita and the in-house. Subsequently, the amount of water lost is
very large. Thus, a high fraction of badly needed revenue is lost, a precious, non-renewable
resource is wasted and indirect damage to surroundings and infrastructures requiring
more and costly (O & M) is sustained. Remedial measures must be taken immediately to
minimize water leakage and UFW.
Supply Per Capita. One of the major issues yet to be resolved is the average (national)
supply per capita (SPC), i.e. the average volume distributed “supplied from all sources”
daily per capita. The SPC consists of a domestic per capita consumption (DPCC), non-
domestic per capita consumption (NDPCC), and unaccounted for water (UFW). The DPCC,
in turn, consists of essential water use (EWU) and non-essential water use (NEWU).

A suggested breakdown of the SPC in Libya is shown in Table 20 (5). According to this
table, the SPC is 420 lpcd with the NEWU exceeding the EWU while the UFW is 38% of the
SPC. The SPC is almost 4 times the EWU.

Many other SPC values have been reported by different researchers, consultants as well
as water supply institutions. Based on data generated by the GCWW, the average daily per
capita SPC is 300 liters. On the other hand, the GDC employs a SPC of 350 lpcd for design
of its desalination plants. An average SPC of 450 lpcd was reported in the Water Sector
Water and Wastewater Strategy prepared by the General Peoples Committee for Electricity,
Water and Gas in 2007 for connected populations with significant variations across regions,
implying a high correlation between consumption and water availability (3). The SPC was
highest in the Wadi Shati (south region) exceeding 850 lpcd followed by the Benghazi Plain
(over 700 lpcd), about 450 lpcd in the Greater Tripoli region, and the lowest was in the
Green Mountain and Western regions (< 200 lpcd). A SPC of less than 50 lpcd was reported
for non-connected populations.

148
 Table 20. Typical SPC Components for Libya

DPCC
Component NDPCC UFW Total
EWU NEWU

Value, LPCD 110 120 30 160 420

An older GCWW report (2001) estimated a national average SPC of 304 lpcd with
averages of 249, 312, 303, and 741 lpcd for Tripoli, Benghazi, Central and Southern
regions, respectively. Similar findings were reported in another study conducted in 2000
(table 21) where the SPC ranged from 1391 lpcd in Tazerbo, 1010 lpcd in Shaati, and 947
lpcd in Wadi Haya to less than 100 lpcd in other cities with an average of 415.5 lpcd (8).
Another study reported values of 348-518 lpcd for the different regions of Libya (3). All
SPCs values included leakage and UFW which were estimated to range from 30% to 50%.
Table 21. SPC in Different Cities of Libya

City SPC, lpcd City SPC, lpcd City SPC, lpcd

Tazerbo 1391 Misrata 325 Tubrok 142

Shaati 1010 Jufraa 469 Harsha 111

Wadi Haya 947 Bani Walid 292 Tajoura 90

Murzoq 629 Zawia 195 Zwara 11

Sebha 507 Benghazi 429 Yefrin 16

Tripoli 474 Marj 117 Avg. 415.5

Sirte 537 Beidha 203

The Tripoli water masterplan (9) estimated SPC at 430 lpcd including 220 lpcd (residential)
and
40 lpcd (UFW). Finally, field studies conducted within the city of Tripoli in 2017 and 2018
surveying 35 and 159 households, showed a SPC inside the households (connected
apartments, average houses, and luxury houses (villas)) of 115-166 lpcd and 160-220 lpcd,
respectively (10, 11).

The national average SPC based on the total quantity of water supplied from different
sources in 2017 to the eight regions’ estimated present populations is 388 lpcd with
regional averages ranging from 390 to 70 lpcd (Table 22). The average consumption
inside residential premises was 190 lpcd. Assuming a typical commercial and industrial
fraction of 15% and an UFW fraction of 40%, the SPC is 420 lpcd, which is comparable to
SPCs reported above.

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 Table 22. Per Capita Water Use Rates for Different Regions

Region Consumption, lpcd Region Consumption, lpcd

Benghazi Plain 603 Tripoli 436

Jabal Al-Akhdar 347 Western 216

Central Eastern 605 Western Mountain 109

Central 307 Southern 291

Average = 388 lpcd

Finally, the National Program for Water and Sewerage (NPWSS) estimated a SPC of 420
lpcd including 259 lpcd for residential demand based on a field survey of 58 households
(12). The NPWS prepared a guide for per capita water allocations (including UFW);
these allocations were proportional to the population served ranging from 150 lpcd for
communities of 5,000 persons or less to 350 lpcd for cities of 500,000 or larger.

Understandably, the SPC in Libya’s cities and regions is quite variable; this is due to
many factors that typically affect such rates including climate, quality, availability, price,
income and education among other factors. It is clear that the rates are highest in cities
where water is abundant and vice versa; they are also higher generally due to leakage
and UFW. This observation confirms that water consumption in Libya is supply-driven,
i.e., it is proportional to availability with the typical SPC exceeding 400 lpcd. These SPCs
are higher than most Arab countries; e.g. Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, Oman, Tunisia and Yemen (3).

Based on the above observations, the following conclusions can be made:

1. All reported SPC values can be accepted and considered credible as they are drawn
from reliable field studies undertaken by official Libyan water institutions directly or
in cooperation with specialized Libyan and international water supply planners and
management consultants;
2. These SPC values represent actual amounts used, including UFWs; such quantities must
be distinguished from those required as basic needs by residents for different purposes,
i.e. minimum quantities for basic needs and NOT maximum amounts for any uses;
3. The large variation reflects strongly the fact that consumers use as much water as is
made available to them (exceeding 1100 lpcd). This practice is driven by a belief that
water is an infinite gift of God and a granted national right. The case is more difficult
for the MMRP waters as the project is funded by contributions (taxes) from citizens who
believe they are entitled to use any quantity they want in exchange for their contributions
to the MMRP;
4. This wasteful practice is also encouraged by the low water tariffs, very limited use of
water meters and lack of enforcement (poor collection/ payment of tariffs and no fines);
5. The guideline rates specified by the NPWS are not adhered to due to both oversupply
and undersupply practices of the GCWW dictated by water availability;
6. The management of the water service provision is inefficient as demonstrated by the

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 lack of demand management and leakage control along with limited revenue collection
efforts;
7. The reported SPC rates should not be used as a guide for setting a rational value for
per capita water needs. The rates specified by the NCWS seem more appropriate and
should be enforced nationwide.

4.7.5 Metering, Collection of Revenues and Service Levels

Metering. Meters are used in some cities in Libya to measure the quantities of water used
by customers. No data are available, however, on the extent of meter usage (penertration)
at the level of cities or within a given city. A total of 1701 meters were installed in the
eight regions in 2016 – 2017 (Table 23). No meters were installed in the Green Mountain
and Central Eastern Regions and only 8 and 7 meters were installed in the Western
Mountain and Western regions, respectively.
Table 23: Data on Meters Installed during 2016 - 2017

Meters Installed 2016 Meters Installed 2017

Consumer
Services Total
Office at Non Resi- Non Resi- Sub
Residential Sub Total Residential
dential dential Total

Benghazi
30 30 60 55 31 86 146
Plain

Green
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mountain

Central
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern

246

Central 47 180 34 214 507

293

Tripoli 267 135 402 519 112 631 1033

Western 0 0 0 6 2 8 8

Western
1 6 7 0 0 0 7
Mountain

Southern 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 544 218 762 760 179 939 1701

To date (Nov., 2018), the GCWW has contracted 180,313 small consumers and 21,828
large consumers (non-residential: commercial and industrial), i.e., a total of 202,141
contracts (Table 24 and Figure 14). The largest number of both domestic and non-
domestic contracts and total contracts were signed with consumers in Tripoli. The
percentages were 92.2, 61.2, and 88.9%, respectively.

Table 24: Number of Household and Non-household Contracts

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 No. of small No. of large % of total % of
% of total
Region consumers consumers con- non-domes- Total Grand
domestic
contracts tracts tic Total

Benghazi Plain 7314 4.1 1114 5.1 8428 4.2

Green Mountain 1024 0.6 947 4.3 1971 1.0

Eastern Central 1522 0.8 1152 5.3 2674 1.3

Central 841 0.5 4398 20.1 5239 2.6

Tripoli 166328 92.2 13359 61.2 179687 88.9

Western 1558 0.9 47 0.2 1605 0.8

W. Mountain 729 0.4 811 3.7 1540 0.8

Southern 997 0.6 0 0.0 997 0.5

Total 180313 100 21828 100.0 202141 100.0

Figure 14. Number of Domestic and Non-household Consumer Contracts per Region

Metering of waters distributed by the GCWW is also significant as it determines the exact
quantities supplied from each source (GCWW, MMRP, and GDC). The quantities of water
purchased from the MMRP and GDC are known to a reasonable extent but not exactly as

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meters are not calibrated regularly or none-existent at some connection locations while
those supplied by the GCWW to its different end-users are not known because they are
mostly not metered. Knowledge of the exact quantities supplied by the GCWW, MMRP and
GDC is essential for billing, computing of consumption rates and their temporal variations,
revenues, costs and for estimation of leakage and UFWs.
Collection of Revenues. A major activity of special importance to the GCWW is the collection
of water service tariffs from its clients. This function is undertaken by the General Directorate
of Consumer Services which is also responsible for developing water sources. The tariffs
are collected through 160 service centers distributed throughout Libya.

Revenue collection was generally poor as the GCWW has little control over its clients;
consumption data are very scarce as meter penetration is low and many of the meters are
stolen, broken or not functional. Moreover, the customer information and billing system is
modest with archaic software of very limited capacity.

Flow-measuring meters must be used and calibrated regularly with records utilized for
billing and other applications. Mechanisms must be developed to collect water service
tariffs; many alternatives are available (joint billing with electricity, deducting tariff from
salaries, incorporating tariffs into license renewals, etc.). Such alternatives should be
evaluated while making use of international expertise in this regard. Legal means of
enforcement should also be developed.
Customer Services. The level of service generally has been modest due to interruptions in
supply, low pressure and marginal water quality. Customers’ demand for improved services
is rising. However, customers are not paying their bills, water meters are of limited use by
households, many water meters are not functional, illegal connections are high, leakage is
high, wastage is high and bulk volumes supplied are not metered.

Costs of water production and distribution are not calculated, so actual water supply
costs are unknown. Expenditures are not categorized clearly and financial records are not
available or are not accessible. It is, therefore, difficult to compute actual volumes supplied,
and hence the real cost of unit water supplied.

Present water metering, and tariff collection practices need to be reassessed and improved
significantly. Tariff values need to be raised. Introduction of new technologies and software
is key to improving service and revenue collection levels.

Additionally, access to safe water supply sources nationally, and coverage rates need to be
determined accurately so that planning for sustainable water supply and for management
of water infrastructures can be undertaken properly. To this end, field surveys need to be
conducted nationwide.

4.7.6 Energy Availability and Impacts

Energy is necessary for operation of all mechanical equipment used to supply water (pumps,
motors, etc.) as well as for lighting of premises and to drive vehicles and other means of
transport. Both electricity and fuel (diesel and petrol) are used by the GCWW’s different
administrative units. Energy consumption is not monitored at the different operational or
geographic levels and its costs are not tied to the unit cost of water supplied.

The continuous availability of energy is essential for reliable water service provision. In
recent years, power cutoffs and fuel shortages occurred frequently causing water supply
shortages with adverse impacts on the GCWW’s revenues, equipment and customer
satisfaction. The recurrent nature of this problem requires special remedial measures along
with continuous communication and coordination with the GECOL.

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Special consideration should be given to ensuring continuous and uninterrupted power
supply along with the installation of standby generators wherever needed and installation
of solar power systems at remote, difficult-to-access water supply areas. The monitoring
of energy consumption as a performance indicator and cost element should be enforced
along with an energy conservation as standard GCWW daily practices.

4.7.7 Cost of Supplied Water

Knowledge of the actual cost of water distributed by the GCWW is essential for the
sustainability of the company’s cost-effective operations. It is the basis for setting the Public
Treasury’s subsidy levels and should form a base for setting the value of the water service
tariff. Determination of cost elements is also necessary for defining relative expenditures
and cost reduction areas.

Unfortunately, this cost is not available due partly to the fact that the GCWW provides both
water and wastewater services which are not completely separated financially. Additionally,
data on assets condition, age and original cost are lacking. The only costs that can be
calculated are those of service provision, i.e., O & M, water purchase, salaries and energy
costs provided that they can be separated from wastewater service provision costs. Such a
task has not been undertaken yet, however.

For the year 2017, the cost of water and wastewater provision were LYD 0.78 m3 excluding
the depreciation of assets. This cost is higher than that used to determine the existing water
tariff and subsidy levels (LYD 0.6 /m3) indicating present and future financial problems.
Moreover, this cost is lower than the average of previous years because the amount of
water supplied by the GDC was only 26% of its production capacity. The GCWW should
strive to reduce this cost through upgrading its structure and empowering the unit in charge
of collection and costing. Recommended actions in this regard include:

Reconsidering the functions and number of employees

while continuously upgrading their skills;
Increasing revenues through increased collection of
tariffs;
Reducing O& M costs;
Reducing leakage and UFW;
Reducing SPC to acceptable international levels;
Increasing meter penetration;
Introducing improved metering, billing, and collection
technologies;
Developing alternative payment options;
Metering supplied waters;
Monitoring consumption patterns and quality;
Determining water supply costs and cost elements;
Conducting field visits to other countries to share
successful experiences and practices;
Communicating, coordinating and cooperating with
water sector stakeholders on water conservation and
water supply cost reduction.

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4.7.8 Reliability and Vulnerability of the
Water Distributed by the GCWW
The GCWW distributes water from its own wellfields and waters transported to the WDN
by the MMRP and the GDC. The reliability and vulnerability of the water distributed is,
therefore, dependent on that of the three water supply sources.
Reliability and Vulnerability of the Water Supplied by the GCWW. As mentioned previously,
the GCWW operates about 1600 wells presently producing 32% of the total water supplied
to domestic and non-domestic users. The wellfields are normally close to the demand
centers providing reliable and readily accessible water sources. The number of wells
developed provides flexibility and allows for potential shut downs. Subsequently, these
supply sources are quantitatively reliable. One factor that could affect this reliability in the
long run is the sustainability of the source aquifers of the wells fields; such sustainability is
questionable for some of the aquifers as indicated by the large annual drawdowns reported
by the GWA (2).
The availability of the GCWW’s wells is subject to serious declines, however, due to system
failures caused mostly by operational problems (power shortages, sharp voltage changes,
phase change sequences, overheating/dry run). Additional causes include technical
problems associated with pump and ancillaries’ selection and water quality problems. These
problems are aggravated by lack of protective and routine maintenance, unavailability of
spare parts, vandalism/ armed conflict and lack of security.
As a result, complete interruptions for several months have occurred in some locations
where well depths exceed 300 m. Surprisingly, the GCWW has no central maintenance
workshop to deal with recurrent mechanical and electrical equipment failures. Such central
workshops are urgently needed in the three most populated regions (Tripoli, Benghazi and
Central Regions).
While water quantity is sufficient, water quality in most wells is poor necessitating
treatment; examples are shown in Table 16. Almost all sources are not disinfected and
require chlorination to prevent microbiological pollution.

Reliability and Vulnerability of the MMRP Water Supplies. Reliability and vulnerability of
the MMRA water supplies were analyzed in a special section of volume II of this report.
Based on this analysis, it was concluded that the MMRA water supply system was highly
vulnerable simply because the system components function linearly (in series). A failure
in one component will cause a failure in all components downstream, while installation of
some standby components is too expensive.

MMRA system failures are likely to occur as a result of threats and damages caused by
armed conflicts and lack of security as has actually been the case repeatedly since 2014;
many complete closures of one of the MMRP water supply systems have been reported
causing prolonged water shortages. Remoteness of wellfields and associated facilities
and the extensive number and diversity of infrastructural components are strong factors
contributing to the vulnerability of the MMRP. Work on the Ghadames – Zawia-Zwara (GZZ)
system was stopped completely in 2011 for lack of security; the contractor camp was looted
and all equipment and material were stolen. A total of 96 wells in the Phase II wellfields were
destroyed since 2015. The destruction of the Cathodic Protection System will inevitably
lead to pipe corrosion and, hence, to serious shut-downs of water supply systems.

Another cause of the MMRP failures is power interruptions and fuel shortages. System
failures due to technical or material failures such as corrosion-induced pipe damages have
also caused water supply shut-downs.

Reliability and Vulnerability of the GDC Water Supplies. Reliability of GDC water supplies

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was analyzed in a special section of volume III of this report. Reliability is increased as
some of the components are provided in multiple parallel units; the failure of one unit will
reduce the capacity proportionately, however. Most plants consist of 4 desalination units; a
failure of one unit implies the loss of one fourth of the plant’s production. Most of the GDC
plants have experienced or will experience failures due to the unavailability of chemicals,
consumables, and spare parts, for instance.

The vulnerability of the GDC desalination plants is, therefore, high. A failure in one of the
plant components (units), the control system, the laboratory testing equipment, and the
unavailability of one or more chemicals, critical spares or consumables will cause a failure
of the desalination plant. As most spares, consumables, equipment and chemicals are not
available locally, plant failures last long times. This problem is compounded by lack of
funds slow procedures for procurement.

Aging is another major cause of failure as most desalination plants have approached or
exceeded their design lives. Major overhauls or replacements imply high costs which may
not be afforded readily and high installation times during which users are denied access to
water.

Impacts of Failures of Water Supply Sources. Because the MMRP supplies the largest volumes
of domestic waters, its failures will impact the largest numbers of users. Similarly, failures
in the GCWW’s water supply sources will impact about one third of Libya’s population.
However, the impacts of these failures are limited to the cities where a failure takes place
with a low probability that multiple failures will occur simultaneously. Finally, failures of
desalination plants impact only the cities supplied solely by these plants. However, as most
of these plants are old, the probability of multiple failures is likely as has been the case
in the past few years. In all cases, the failures will have serious impacts on the end-users
because there are no alternative water sources to the MMRA, GDC and GCWW wells.

Reliability and Vulnerability of the Water Distribution Networks. About 65% of Libya’s
population rely on public water distribution networks as the primary source of domestic
water. Most water distribution networks have been installed several decades ago employing
mostly metallic pipe works. Aging and corrosion of components of these networks is
an on-going process which causes failures frequently. With the passage of time, these
components will deteriorate at increasing rates causing more serious and hard to control
or maintain failures with extended water shortages and large scale leakages and damages.
This problem should be given special attention due to its serious socioeconomic impacts.

4.8 GCWW PERFORMANCE

A dedicated Office for Monitoring and Performance is established within the GCWW. It is
under-staffed and under-equipped, however. Accordingly, no assessment has been made
of the GCWW’s performance during its long period of existence and no key performance
indicators (KPIs) have been adopted.

It is clear that the GCWW needs to set performance level targets and KPIs to monitor
progress towards achieving these targets. A prerequisite to this step is the collection of
valid, complete and sufficient data followed by analysis and performance evaluation. To
enforce such a practice, the General Administration for Planning and Projects should give
more attention to the follow-up unit in the areas of quality assessment/ quality control (QA/
QC) and to the adoption of KPIs in the work of all units of the GCWW.

Several indicators are employed to assess the performance of water supply and wastewater
companies (13). Two major indicators are personnel/expenditure and personnel/ 1000

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connections. Personnel expenditure ratio for the GCWW in 2017 is about 260% of revenue
collected from water and sewerage services; this indicator is considerably higher than the
recommended value of less than or equal to 30% (13). The lowest ratio achieved by the
GCWW was 37%, which is still higher than the recommended ratio.

Although the actual number of connections is not available, based on the latest national
census total number of 572,309 families supplied with piped water (1) and about 200,000
small and large consumer connections, the ratio of personnel/1000 connections is 20; this
indicator is 4 times higher than the recommended value of less than or equal to 5 (13).

The GCWW needs to adopt performance indicators including the personnel/ expenditure
and personnel/ 1000 connections indicators and seek to lower them to the accepted levels
in order to ensure cost effectiveness and service quality.

Reorientation of the GCWW activities and work philosophy towards a business oriented,
profit making enterprise open to new practices and partnerships must form the basis for
all company activities. Action plans and budgets must spring from business plans that are
assessed and updated regularly.

Communication, Coordination and Cooperation with other Water Sector Stakeholders.

The GCWW purchases water from the GDC and supplies it to residential, commercial and
small industrial water users. Other institutions are involved directly or indirectly including
the GAWR, the Ministry of Health, and the Environmental General Authority. Continuous
communication, coordination and cooperation with these stakeholder is essential for the
success of the GCWW and other institutions as well. Of special importance is the relationship
between the GCWW and its water suppliers, MMRA and the GDC.
Such a relationship must be structured formally and monitored regularly to ensure
continuous upgrading with the ultimate objective of providing collectively improved
customer services at lower costs while conserving water.
Public Relations and Awareness Raising. Raising awareness towards the role of the
GCWW, water shortages, conservation and tariff vs. actual costs of supplied water as well
as protection of the GCWW infrastructures and water resources are very important issues
that if presented properly will ensure timely tariff payments, customer satisfaction and
cooperation. Such actions will lead to revenue generation, water conservation and cost
effective operation. The GCWW is aware of this importance as reflected in its efforts in
these two areas. However, financial constraints seem to have limited the company’s scope.

The importance and impacts of public relations and awareness raising on the company’s
image and the customer practices including payment of water service tariffs and conservation
warrant more investment with proportionally higher returns. Special programs should be
initiated with the help of professional experts in these fields as these areas are key to the
GCWWs company’s success as Libya’s only domestic water distributer.

4.9 ARMED CONFLICT, LACK OF SECURITY AND INSTABILITY RELATED

DAMAGES
The staff of the GCWW have been subject to serious threats while its infrastructures have
suffered some damages and destruction as a result of one or more of the following:
• Armed conflict and lack of security (sabotage, theft, looting, vandalism, etc.);
• Economic and institutional instability;
• Electric power instability, outages and fuel shortages;
• Deterioration due to aging, lack of maintenance and lack of chemicals, etc.

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Subsequently, the functionality and, in turn, the water service provision levels have declined
consistently.
4.9.1 Damages Caused by Armed Conflict and Lack of Security

Many parts of Libya have suffered from armed conflict while practically all of Libya’s regions
have been suffering a serious lack of security, especially in the last few years. Armed conflict
and lack of security led collectively to the direct loss of human lives, looting, vandalism and
physical damages to infrastructures and assets. Violence and insecurity allowed outlaws to
take over GCWW properties, make illegal connections while denying GCWW staff access
to infrastructures to conduct supervision, monitoring, operation maintenance, repair,
reconstruction operations and emergency interventions following direct damages. Finally,
GCWW staff were prevented from accessing meters and contacting customers for the
payment of bills. An additional conflict-caused challenge was the water service demands
exerted by the internally displaced people (IDPs) in some cities.

The impacts of damages caused by armed conflict, insecurity and disrespect for the law
may be summarized as follows:

1. Loss of lives of staff, threats to lives due to kidnapping, inflection of injuries and
terrorizing of staff;
2. Loss of working hours due to insecurity at worksites;
3. Destruction of vital infrastructural components such as wells, valve/ control chambers,
vehicles, workshops, premises, etc. A case in point is the total destruction of the power
lines of Az-Zintaan Well Field and of the water supply system of the city of Tawergha
(Figures 15 and 16);
4. Partial to complete interruption of water supply for short to long periods of time with
the following consequences:
• Loss of services provision to customers;
• Loss of revenues due to decreased quantities of water delivered; Loss of customer
confidence with potential complaints and non-payment of bills;

Figure 15. Destroyed Power Lines Figure 16. Destroyed Elevated Water
Supplying a Well Field, Az-Zintaan Tank, Tawergha

5. Wastage of large quantities of non-renewable water leading to resource depletion,

flooding and revenue losses;
6. Large increases in cost of providing water resulting from additional costs of repair,
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement and reconstruction of infrastructures and
associated assets, lost work hours, losses of revenues, unaccounted for water, large
declines in efficiency, delayed execution, etc.;
7. Rise in alternative water sources prices, including bottled water and truck-transported

158
 water;
8. Severe water shortages to levels below minimum basic human requirements can have
adverse health impacts on the affected population.

4.9.2 Damages Caused by Illegal Connections

Many domestic and non-domestic users make illegal connections to the water transmission
lines or distribution networks. In fact, new housing estates not included within the approved
urban masterplan zones connect directly illegally to the nearest water transmission/
distribution pipelines. The number of such connections is expected to be large and continues
to increase indefinitely. Such connections are always made by unskilled craftsmen with
serious technical problems. The major impacts of illegal connections are:
8. Loss of revenue from the waters consumed illegally;
9. High water leakages and pollution due poor workmanship;
10. Decrease in amount of water and pressure available to “legal” customers because of
water used illegally.

4.9.3 Damages Caused by Economic and Institutional Instability

Economic and institutional instability were a cause and byproduct of the ongoing conflicts
and insecurity problems. Faced with dwindling revenues due to the sharp drops in oil
production and prices post 2011, the consecutive governments had no choice but to
limit spending on all sectors including the water sector. Simultaneously, the water sector
underwent organizational structure changes. Consequently, the amounts allocated to the
GCWW from the national budget decreased in response to the national financial constraints.
The economic challenges impacted directly the GCWW’s functionality as was described in
section 4.4.3 above.
4.9.4 Damages Caused by Electric Power Interruptions, Outages and Fuel
Shortages
Power interruptions, outages and fuel shortages occurred frequently in the last few years
causing damages to the GCWW infrastructures. These damages may be summarized as
follows:

4. Partial to complete cuts in water supply;

5. Delay in maintenance operations;
6. Financial and other losses associated with damages listed above.
As most of the threats listed above and those related to acute financial challenges are
beyond the GCWW’s capacity, national efforts must be made to put an end to these threats
permanently as their continuation will lead to the failure of water institutions including the
GCWW with detrimental socioeconomic and security consequences.

4.10 MAJOR CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The GCWW has been Libya’s only domestic water provider for over 25 years thus achieving
its objectives and demonstrating its ability to provide a vital service to about 65% of

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Libya’s population reliably. An assessment of the GCWW’s legal, administrative, financial,
human and technical capacities has been made. The results of this assessment were
presented above. Based on these results, the following major challenges were identified.
Simultaneously, the following recommendations were made.
4.10.1 Major Challenges
The level of service has seen little improvement in the last few years; however, due to many
serious challenges the GCWW has been facing; the major ones are:

• Armed conflict, lack of security and lawlessness;

• The geographical scope of its activities is extensive;
• Its infrastructures are old and deteriorating rapidly;
• The number of employees is large and a large fraction of these employees have only
basic qualifications / skills;
• Financial resources are limited;
• Debts to water suppliers (MMRA and GDC) are large;
• Instability of power supply and fuel shortages.

4.10.2 Recommendations

Legal Framework
1. There is clearly a need to redefine the mandates of water supply institutions
to eliminate overlapping of planning, design, execution, operation and maintenance
mandates. Planning of water supply infrastructures should be centralized. Synchronization
of implementation of different complementary water supply infrastructures/ works should
be coordinated by all concerned parties;
2. Asset ownership and development mandates along with water supply sources
development and allocations need to be readdressed and redistributed clearly among the
different water supply institutions;

Administrative/ Organizational Framework

1. The GCWW needs to adopt an official vision and long-term strategy as it forms the
foundation for short, medium, and long term plans. Water conservation through elimination
of wasteful water consumptions practices and reduction of water supply costs should for
the ultimate objectives/ drivers of this strategy;
2. Data and information management needs to be digitized at all administration levels of
the GCWW along with a digital archiving system and networking. The Data and Information
Office should be staffed and equipped accordingly; a complimentary step will be the
establishment of an information center with a comprehensive database, and GIS along
with procurement of computer systems, software, equipment, and training of staff to run
this center;
3. The GCWW organizational structure needs to be updated based on a centralized
management approach and a strategic action plan. The update should consider the
following:
a. The organizational unit termed “Office” should be used only in the traditional placement
under the head of the GCWW directly. Other “Offices” should be relocated according
to the nature of their functions. For instance, the TQO and the Office for Laboratories
and Monitoring should be promoted to administrations or offices under the head of the
GCWW directly;
b. Reducing the responsibilities of the assistant head for O & M;
c. Redefinition and redistribution of the functions of the General Directorate of Works

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 and Emergencies, the General Administration of Sewage Works, and the General
Administration of Consumer Services to prevent overlapping.
4. Water quality should be given a higher priority. A water quality monitoring program
should be developed urgently, waters should be treated to drinking water standards with
continuous disinfection of distributed waters. Analytical water quality laboratories should
be established, properly equipped and staffed. Such activities should be undertaken with
the full engagement of the Water Quality and Monitoring Office;
5. The GCWW needs to adopt performance indicators including the personnel/ expenditure
and personnel/ 1000 connections indicators and seek to lower them to the accepted levels
in order to ensure cost effectiveness and service quality. Monitoring of energy consumption
as a performance indicator and cost element should be enforced along with an energy
conservation as standard GCWW daily practices;
6. To overcome its administrative and financial challenges, the GCWW needs to reorient
its activities and work philosophy towards a business oriented, profit making enterprise
open to new practices and partnerships must form the basis for all company activities.
Action plans and budgets must spring from business plans that are assessed and updated
regularly;
7. The GCWW depends heavily for its water supply on the MMRA and the GDC. Its relationship
with them must be structured formally and monitored regularly to ensure continuous
payments for purchased waters and continuous supply. Continuous communications and
regular contacts must be made to address any issues immediately;
8. Awareness raising programs should be upgraded and expanded because they are key to
the GCWWs reliability with its customers and their unlimited cooperation especially in the
areas of payment of water service tariffs and conservation;
9. As all of the challenges faced by the GCWW are beyond its capacity, national efforts
must be made to put an end to these threats permanently as their continuation will lead to
the failure of water institutions including the GCWW with detrimental socioeconomic and
security consequences.

Financial Resources
1. The GCWW’s debt problem should be tackled urgently; a first step in this direction is
the improvement of tariff collection with a focus on large consumers. A second step is to
determine the actual costs of water supply independently from the wastewater services
and: 1) Identify areas of cost reduction and 2) Increase the water service fee to cover all
water supply costs. The spirit of a self-supporting commercially-managed company must
replace that of a traditional public service company;
2. The Central Bank of Libya should give special consideration to the urgent nature of the
GCWW services by establishing stable and speedy procedures for opening letters of credit
and by canceling the recent increase in the rate of hard currency exchange;

Human Resources
1. A job description and qualification criteria guide should be prepared to improve employee
recruitment, evaluation and upgrading needs. An employee needs assessment is in order
for the GCWW to redistribute its workforce with the ultimate objective of reducing the total
number and/or reorienting them according to actual spatial and functional needs;
2. To ensure continuous development and qualification of its employees, especially those
with basic qualifications only, the GCWW needs to establish a central training center to
cater for its needs and, preferably those of other water supply institutions. An alternative is
to utilize existing training centers within these institutions in such a way that they provide
training sectorially. Training of large numbers requires that the TQO be promoted to a
higher organizational level and be well staffed and equipped;

Technical Capacities
1. Water quantities supplied from different sources as well as that used by consumers

161
should be monitored regularly to provide data for planning (billing, costing, determining
leakage and UFW, etc.); remedial measures must be taken immediately to minimize water
leakage and UFW;
2. To ensure microbiologically safe domestic waters, the GCWW must install/ rehabilitate
chlorination systems and procure chlorine gas or powder compounds in sufficient quantities
for routine and emergency applications;
3. Present water metering and tariff collection practices need to be reassessed and improved
significantly. Flow meters must be procured and used extensively for recording purchased
water quantities and for billing of customers.; Billing mechanisms must be improved along
with consideration of joint billing with electricity, pre-payment cards, etc. Legal means of
enforcement should also be developed;
4. The SPC for Libya is very high being affected largely by leakage and UFW. It should be
reduced for economic and environmental reasons and incorporated into all water supply
schemes by all water institutions.
5. A central maintenance workshop along with regional ones should be established by
the GCWW to deal with recurrent maintenance of mechanical and electrical equipment.
Such central workshops are urgently needed in the three most populated regions (Tripoli,
Benghazi, and Central Regions);
6. Special attention should be paid to the rapidly deteriorating WDNs starting with an
assessment of their state and remedial measures;
7. Special consideration should be given to ensuring continuous and uninterrupted power
supply along with installation of standby generators wherever needed and installation of
solar power systems at remote difficult to access water supply areas. The recurrent nature
of this problem requires special remedial measures along with continuous communication
and coordination with the GECOL;
8. The GCWW should benefit from the experience accumulated internationally in water supply
management. International and regional organizations, not only have the experiences, they
also provide assistance tailored to the GCWW’s needs upon request. Successful lessons
by companies in neighboring states can also be shared by conducting field visits to these
countries.

4.11 INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT

PLANS FOR THE GCWW, LIBYA

Needs of the GCWW to continue operating successfully were assessed through background
data, baseline surveys, field visits, meetings and interviews. Criteria were developed to
classify these needs as urgent, short-term and medium-term. The primary criterion was
the need for the activity to ensure the sustainability of the supply, prevent the occurrence
of damage to the water supply system, and concurrently, avoid or prevent adverse health
impacts to end-users. The availability of funds was another criterion as less costly activities
are more likely to be provided and implemented in a short time. Finally, nature of the
activity and, hence, the amount of time needed to implement it; some activities require a
short execution time while others require long times.

Accordingly, activities which can be implemented within 6-12 months were considered
urgent while those requiring 1-2 years and 3-5 years were considered short-term and
medium long term plans, respectively. These plans were presented in the form of a bill of
quantities table including a description of the activity, quantity, unit price and total price. As
most items are procured from abroad, their prices were quoted in US dollars.

4.11.1 Urgent Investment and Development

Plans (6-12 months) for GCWW

162
Urgent investment/ development plans are presented in Annex 4.1. The total amount
required to implement the urgent investment/ development plan was estimated to be 36.4
million US dollars. Most of this amount is needed for provision of flow meters, water tanker
trucks, power generators, chlorination systems and chemicals. Such activities have been
linked with water/ pressure/ leakage losses, emergency water supply, and disinfection/
public health.

4.11.2 Short-term Development Plans

Short-term investment/ development plans implementation were estimated to be 46.9
million US dollars. This amount will be used mostly to install a central communication
system, regional water quality laboratories, build and equip a training center and train
employees and procure rising pipes for wells. The timetable and bill of quantities are shown
in Annexes 4.2 and 4.3, respectively.

4.11.3 Medium-longer term Development Plan

The timetable and bill of quantities of implementing the medium-term investment/
development plan are shown in Annexes 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Costs were estimated
to be USD 8.18 million. They cover mainly supply and installation of pumps, pump station
ancillaries, well rising pipes and training of GCWW employees.

163
REFERENCES

1. Public Information Authority, General Population Census 2006, published 2007;

2. General Peoples’ Committee, decree no. 923/year 2007, decree no. 1052/year 2007;
3. Secretariat for Electricity, Water and Gas, “ Water Sector and Wastewater Strategy”,
prepared by Booze, Hamilton and Allen Consultants, 2007;
4. GCWW unpublished data, 2018;
5. Rashed, K. A., “Towards a Sustainable Domestic Water Use Rate in Libya”, Journal of
Engineering Research (University of Tripoli) Issue (21) March 2016;
6. MMRA Water Quality Reports, 2017;
7. Zliten Desalination Plant, Personal Communication, 2018;
8. AlGaziri, S., Personal Communication, May, 2018;
9. Municipality of Tripoli, Tripoli Water Masterplan, Poleservice-Wadeco Consultants, 1977;
10. Salem, A., Survey of Water Consumption Rates in Tripoli, Libya, BS Project, Civil
Engineering Department, University of Tripoli, 2017;
11. AsSaid, Musaddag, Water Consumption Rates in the City of Tripoli, MSc. Dissertation ,
Civil Engineering Department, University of Tripoli, 2018;
12. Secretariat of Planning, National Program for Water and Wastewater, 2005;
13. EWURA (Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority), “Performance Benchmarking
Guidelines for Water Supply and Sanitation Authorities”, 2015.

164
LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN RELATION TO REPORT PREPARATION

No. Name Title Phone No.

1 Moatamed Sanusi Head, GCWW 0910717446

2 Gaddafi Dalu Deputy Head for (O & M) 0914569740

AbduSalaam Ali AbuRzaiza General Manager, Planning and Proj- 0925289835

3
ects

4 Zuhair alArbash General Manager, Water Supply

Isaam AlGhrew Head, Training and Development Divi-

5
sion

6 Khalid Saleh General Manager, Wastewater

7 Abdullah Ben Adam General Manager, Finance

8 Abdullah Naeeriah General Manager, Human Resources

9 Abdussalam Abu Shagour Manager, Wells Administration

10 Ibrahim Khetrish Manager, Emergency Administration

11 Yonus Mohd Suleiman Customer Service, Tripoli

12 Nabil Arebi Manager, (O & M), Tripoli Region

13 Ramadan Kalush Manager, (O & M) Central Region

Rafiq Abulsyin General Manager, Customer Service 0925409168

14
Administration

Tariq Eissa Manager, Large consumers Administra-

15
tion

16 Abdullah Abu Dahduh Tawergha Settlement Committee

17 Ashour Makhlouf Tawergha Service Office

18 Gheith Soula Tawergha Settlement Committee

19 Abdullah Rammah Service Office, Az-Zintaan

20 AbdulAziz Arubaa Networks Division

21 Hussain AlMuddahem Networks Division

165
 Annex 4.1. Bill of Quantities (BOQs) for Urgent (6-12 months) Investment/ Development Plan for the
GCWW

Unit Subtotal
Unit Item Description Unit Quantity
$ ,Price Price

Setting strategy and action plans and upgrading of

1 LS - 410000 410,000
existing organizational structure of the GCWW

Supply and installation of electromagnetic flow

3 meters for large non-domestic water (industrial and .No 11000 500 5,500,000
commercial) consumers: 100 mm diameter

4 Same as above but 150 mm diameter .No 6000 900 5,400,000

5 Same as item 1 but 200 mm diameter .No 5000 1100 5,500,000

6 Same as item 1 but 300 mm diameter .No 20 1500 30,000

7 Same as item 1 but 400 mm diameter .No 10 2500 25,000

Supply and installation of electromagnetic flow

8 meters to monitor flow from main feeding sources: .No 4 25000 100,000
MMRP 1000 mm diameter

Supply and installation of electromagnetic flow

9 meters to monitor flow from main feeding sources: .No 50 1300 65,000
Wellfields 150-250 mm diameter

Supply of pumps/ spares for wells and control

10 panels, etc. in cities with no alternative sources plus .No 10 5000 50,000
standby submersible

Supply of surface water pumps with a height of

11 200-250 meters and a productivity of 100 m3 / hour, .No 15 18000 270,000
with operating panels

Supply of surface water pumps with a height of

12 150-200 meters and a productivity of 100 m3 / hour, .No 10 16000 160,000
with operating panels

Supply of surface water pumps with a height of

13 100 - 150 m and a productivity of 80 m3 / hour, with .No 20 14000 280,000
operating panels

166
 Supply of surface water pumps with a height of
14 50 - 100 m and a productivity of 70 m3/ hour, with .No 50 12000 600,000
operating panels

Annex 4.1. Bill of Quantities (BOQs) for Urgent (6-12 months) Investment/ Development Plan for the
GCWW “continued”

Unit Subtotal
Unit Item Description Unit Quantity
$ ,Price Price

Supply of submersible water pumps with a height

15 of 300-350 meters and a productivity of 25 m3 / .No 20 25000 500,000
hour, with operating panels

Supply of water pumps with a height of 250-300 m

16 and a productivity of 25 m3 / hour, with operating .No 25 20000 500,000
.panels

Replacement of rising piping of wells of API 4-inch

17 lm 14000 75 1,050,000
diameter for producing wells

Supply of 60 water tanker trucks equipped with a 10

18 .No 40 125000 5,000,000
m3 tank

Supply of 40 water trucks tanker with a capacity of

19 .No 20 150000 3,000,000
18 m3

Supply of standard basic workshops tools fully

20 equipped for the cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, Sebha, .No 6 50000 300,000
Misrata, Gharian, Az-Zantaan and Tawergha

Supply of mobile water quality analysis laboratories

to be distributed in cities with populations exceed-
21 ing 50,000 persons capable of conducting basic .No 12 4000 48,000
drinking water quality indicators (physical, chemical
)and microbiological

Supply and installation of computers with high ca-

pacity and high speed to support customer service
22 .No 200 2000 400,000
centers (collection centers) for large cities in order
to activate the revenues and services of consumers

Development, supply and installation of electronic

23 LS - 750000 750,000
archiving system at headquarters and 8 regions

Development, supply of software for administra-

24 LS - 150000 150,000
)tions/ regions (administration, technical, financial

167
 Development of information technology center (at
25 LS - 400000 400,000
)headquarters with branches at regions

Annex 4.1. Bill of Quantities (BOQs) for Urgent (6-12 months) Investment/ Development Plan for the
GCWW “continued”

Unit Subtotal
Unit Item Description Unit Quantity
$ ,Price Price

Supply of safety equipment for GCWW technicians

26 (safety shoes, long rubber shoes, short rubber .No 1000 100 100,000
)shoes, gloves, safety helmets, rubber clothes

Supply of standby power generators for pumping

27 .No 50 80000 4,000,000
)stations and wellfields (0.25-1.0 MW

28 Supply of chlorinators and chlorine gas detectors .No 100 10000 1.000,000

Supply of calcium hypochlorite for disinfection of

29 ton 1000 1000 1,000,000
GCWW supplied waters

Conducting a pilot study for use of solar power as

an alternative source of electrical power to operate
30 ground water wells in selected areas in Libya, the Ls - 140000 140,000
work should include Supplying and installation of
solar panels and accessories

Total (Thirty six million and three hundred and twenty eight thousand) US dollars 36,328,000

168
 Annex 4.2 Activities and Implementation Schedule for Short-term Development Plan (1-3 years) for the
GCWW
Activity Implementation Schedule
No Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
Needs assessment, supply
and installation of a cen-
1 tralized Personnel Manage-
ment System (hardware
)and software
Needs assessment, design
and construction/ installa-
tion of 8 regional labora-
tories complete (buildings,
2 equipment, chemicals, etc.)
buildings to conduct rou-
tine water quality analysis
for different purposes with-
in the region
Needs assessment, design
and construction/ instal-
lation of a fully equipped
3
training center (classrooms,
models, etc.) complete with
.equipment, furniture, etc
Supply and installation
an electromagnetic flow
meters at selected locations
4 within distribution networks
in cities with populations
exceeding 20,000 persons
.including training of staff
Supply of leakage detection
equipment and tracking of
5
supply lines including train-
ing and spares
Needs assessment, supply
and installation of a nation-
al-level centralized commu-
nication system employing
6
GPS, GIS, and satellite
communications/ network-
ing (including a call center
)at the level of the 8 regions
Needs assessment and
7 development of a training
program/ plans

Annex 4.2 Activities and Implementation Schedule for Short-term Development Plan (1-3 years) for the
GCWW “continued”
Activity Implementation Schedule
No Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12

169
 Design and establishment
of a training center for the
company equipped with
classrooms, laboratories
8
and workshops with fur-
niture to train, qualify and
develop the company’s
.Employees
Training of GCWW staff on
administrative, legal, finan-
9
cial and technical priority
fields
Supply and install a moni-
toring and control system
10 employing SCADA in cities
with populations exceeding
200,000 persons
Preparing procedures man-
uals for the company’s em-
11
ployees functions in various
fields
Update existing financial
12
regulations and incentives
Replacement of rising pip-
ing of wells of API 4-inch di-
13
ameter for producing wells,
total length 32000 m
Supply of cabling and con-
14 trol/ protection systems, for
pumps
Preparing procedures
manuals for the company’s
15
(administrative, financial
and technical) activities
Supply of well loggers/
16
testers
Supply and install a solar
17 system panels as a power
.supply in wells field

Annex 4.2 Activities and Implementation Schedule for Short-term Development Plan (1-3 years) for the
GCWW “continued”
Activity Implementation Schedule
No Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
Conducting detailed study
for evaluation of all the
asset of GCWW includ-
ing water and wastewater
18
networks, pumping sta-
tions, water & wastewater
treatments plants, storage
facility

170
Annex 4.3 Bill of Quantities (BOQs) for Short-term (1-3 years) Investment/ Development Plan for the GCWW
Unit Subtotal
Unit Item Description Unit Quantity
$ ,Price Price
Needs assessment, supply and installa-
1 tion of a centralized Personnel Manage- LS 1 600,000 600,000
)ment System (hardware and software
Needs assessment, design and con-
struction/ installation of 8 regional
laboratories complete (buildings, equip-
2 .No 8 450,000 3,600,000
ment, chemicals, etc.) buildings to con-
duct routine water quality analysis for
different purposes within the region
Supply and installation an electromag-
netic flow meters at selected locations
3 within distribution networks in cities .No 300 2,500 750,000
with populations exceeding 20,000 per-
.sons including training of staff
Supply of leakage detection equipment
4 and tracking of supply lines including .No 50 800 40,000
training and spares
Needs assessment, supply and instal-
lation of a national-level centralized
communication system employing
GPS, GIS, and satellite communica-
tions/ networking (including a call cen-
5 .No 8 2,500,000
ter and evaluation of all the asset of
GCWW including water and wastewater
networks, pumping stations, water &
wastewater treatments plants, storage
)facility at the level of the 8 regions
Needs assessment and development of
6 LS 1 350,000 350,000
a training program/ plans
Needs assessment, design and estab-
lishment of a training center for the
company equipped with classrooms,
7 .No 1 3000,000 3,000,000
laboratories and workshops with fur-
niture to train, qualify and develop the
.company’s Employees
Developing and conducting Train the
Trainers Program of GCWW staff on
8 .No 100 50,000 5,000,000
technical, financial and administrative
priority fields

Annex 4.3 Bill of Quantities for Short-term (1-3 years) Investment / Development Plan for
the GCWW ”continued”
Subtotal
Unit Item Description Unit Quantity $ ,Unit Price
Price

171
 Supply and install a moni-
toring and control system
employing SCADA in a
9 LS 10,000,000 10,000,000
selected cities with popu-
lations exceeding 200,000
persons
Preparing procedures man-
uals for the company’s (ad-
10 LS 300,000 300,000
ministrative, financial and
technical) activities
Update existing financial
11 LS 100,000 100,000
regulations and incentives
Replacement of rising pip-
ing of wells of API 4-inch di-
12 ameter for producing wells Lm 32000 75 2,400,000
and providing well loggers/
testers
Supply of cabling and con-
13 trol/ protection systems for LS 150,000 150,000
pumps
Supply and install a solar
14 system panels as a power .No 32 20,000 640,000
.supply in wells field
Forty six millions nine hundred and
46,930,000
thirty thousand dollars

Annex 4.4 Activities and Implementation Schedule for Medium-longer term (3-5 years) Development Plan
for the GCWW
Implementation Time
No Item Description Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20
Supply of pumps and auxil-
1 iaries for pumping stations at
)regions (as needed
Supply of pumps and auxilia-
2
ries for wells at regions
Training of GCWW staff on ad-
3 ministrative, legal, financial and
technical priority fields
Replacement of rising piping of
wells of API 4-inch diameter for
4
producing wells, total length
34,000 m
5

Training of GCWW staff on administrative,

legal, financial and technical priority fields
Replacement of aged/ deterio-
6 rated water distribution net-
.works
Solar system (at 10 percent of
7
)locations

172
Annex 4.5 Bill of Quantities (BOQs) for Medium-longer term (3-5 years) Investment/Development Plan for
the GCWW
Unit Subtotal
Unit Item Description Unit Quantity
$ ,Price Price
Supply of pumps and auxiliaries
1 for pumping stations at regions LS 1,200,000 1,200,000
)(as needed
Supply of pumps and auxiliaries
2 LS 2,000,000 2,000,000
for wells at regions
Training of GCWW staff on tech-
3 nical, administrative, legal and .No 4500 300 1,350,000
financial priority fields
Replacement of rising piping
of wells of API 4-inch diameter
4 Lm 34,000 75 2,550,000
for producing wells, total length
34,000 m
Replacement of aged/ deteriorat-
6 Lm 1,000,000 1,000,000
.ed water distribution networks
Solar system (at 10 percent of
7 .No 4 20,000 80,000
)locations
Eight millions one hundred and eighty
8,180,000
thousand dollars

173
174
175
176
177
Acknowledgement

UNICEF wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of senior

staff of the Municipality of Benghazi, the GCWW, the HIB, General
Authority for Housing and Utilities - Benghazi, IDPs camps,
Public Project Authority, ACTED, City Center District and Al Sabri
Steering Committees, Benghazi Displaced Persons Union and
Libya Humanitarian Relief Agency teams and staff in granting
access and providing data and information on water supply
infrastructures as well as in facilitating meetings and field visits
to all municipality and IDPs camps. Special thanks are extended
to all of them.
July-2019

Disclaimer

The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors

and editors and do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of
UNICEF, nor of any particular Division or Office.

Prepared by: AlKasaba Consulting, Technical Services and Training

ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

GAWR General Authority for Water Resources

GDC General Desalination Company
GCWW General Company for Water and Wastewater
HH Household
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
IMO International Migration Organization
LYD Libyan Dinar
LS Lump Sum
MMRP Man-made River Project
MMRA Man-made River Project Execution and Management
Authority
Mm3 Million cubic meters
MSF Multi-stage Flash Distillation
NPWS National Program for Water and Sanitation
TDS Total dissolved solids
UNICEF United Nations Fund for Children
UNHCR United Nations High CommissionerforRefugees
WHO World Health Organization
CONTENTS 1 Disclaimer
2 ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS
3 Contents
5 Figures
6 Tables
8 5.1 MUNICIPALITY OF BENGHAZI
8 5.1.1 INTRODUCTION
8 5.1.2 BACKGROUND
8 5.1.2.1 Location, Boundaries and Metropolis

10 5.1.2.2 Planning and Administrative Boundaries

12 5.1.3 WATER DEMAND OF THE MUNICIPALITY

OF BENGHAZI
12 5.1.3.1 Growth of Benghazi Municipality Popula-
tion: 2018- 2023
12 5.1.3.2 Growth of Benghazi Municipality Water
Demand: 2018-2023
5.1.4 SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY FOR THE
MUNICIPALITY OF
12 BENGHAZI
14 5.1.4.1 Ground Water
15 5.1.4.2 The MMRP
17 5.1.4.3 Desalination
18 5.1.4.3 Coverage and Access to Water Supply

20 5.1.5 WATER QUALITY CHARACTERISTICS

20 5.1.5.1 Quality of GCWW Well Fields Waters

20 5.1.5.2 Quality of MMRP Waters

21 5.1.5.3 Quality of Desalinated Waters
21 5.1.5.4 Quality of Network Distributed Waters

23 5.1.6 WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUCTURES

23 5.1.6.1 Water Supply Infrastructural Components

24 5.1.6.2 State of Water Supply Infrastructures in

Benghazi
26 5.1.7 FUTURE WATER SUPPLY SOURCES
26 5.1.7.1 Water Demand and Supply Balance
27 5.1.7.2 Future Water Supply Sources and Infra-
structures
28 5.1.7.3 Masterplans and Infrastructure Projects

5.1.8 DAMAGES AND IDPS/RETURNEES OF

ARMED CONFLICT
32 IN BENGHAZI
 33 5.1.8.1 A Chronology of Armed Conflict in Beng-
hazi
5.1.8.2 Physical Damages Associated with the
Armed Conflict in
34 Benghazi
37 5.1.8.3 IDPs and Returnees of Armed Conflict in
Benghazi
5.1.8.4 Urgent Needs, Investment and Develop-
ment Plans for Water
39 Supply Systems in the Municipality of Benghazi

5.1.8.5 Water Supply in Camps of IDPsfrom Taw-

erghaResiding in
41 Benghazi
5.1.8.6 Urgent Needs of Water Supply Systems in
TawerghaIDPs
45 Camps in Benghazi
5.1.9 KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR
PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY IN THE MUNICI-
PALITY OF
48 BENGHAZI AND TAWERGHAIDPSCAMPS46

5.1.10 REFERENCE
50 LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
ANNEX 1. Bill of Quantities for Urgent Invest-
ment and Development
51 Plans for the Municipality of Benghazi
ANNEX 2. Conditions of Water Supply Systems
in Tawergha IDPs
59 Camps in Benghazi
ANNEX 3. Bills of Quantities and Costs for Ur-
gent Interventions
74 Needed for Tawergha IDPs Camps in Benghazi

FIGURES Figure 1.Administrative Boundaries for

Benghazi Municipality and
9 Branches
10 Figure 2. Categorized Groups in Benghazi
Metropolis
11 Figure 3. Settlements of Benghazi Metrop-
olis
14 Figure 4. Benghazi Municipality Water De-
mand per Zone for the Years
14 2018 and 2023
 Figure 5. Benghazi Municipality Main Wa-
ter Sources and Transmission
16 Pipeline
17 Figure 6. Omar Mukhtar Grand Reservoir
17 Figure 7. Benghazi Desalination Plant
18 Figure 8. Water Supply Sources for Beng-
hazi Municipality Zones
Figure 9. Benghazi Municipality WaterBal-
ance per Zone for the Year
27 2018 and 2023
29 Figure 10. Water Utility Masterplan for
Benghazi Agglomeration
30 Figure 11. Integrated Infrastructure Proj-
ects in Benghazi City
31 Figure 12. MMRP Water Feeding Projects
to the Western Coastline District
33 Figure 13. Benghazi Districts Most Affect-
ed by Armed Conflict
Figure 14. Extent of Damages Caused by
Armed Conflict in Benghazi
34 Suburbs
35 Figure 15. Buildings Destroyed during
Armed Conflict in Benghazi
Figure 16. Al-Sabri District Flooded with
Water and Wastewater during
36 Armed Conflict
37 Figure 17. Wastewater Pollution in Beng-
hazi City Center
Figure 18. Water Pipeline Repair Works,
Omar Ibn El Aas Street,
37 Benghazi City Center
38 Figure 19. % of IDPs per District during the
Conflict Period (2014-2017)
42 Figure 20. Examples of Shelters of Tawer-
gha IDPs in Benghazi

TABLES 13 Table 1. Population Forecast for Benghazi

Municipality in 2018 and 2023
Table 2. Benghazi Municipality Water De-
mand for the Year 2018
14 and 2023
19 Table 3. Water Sources for Benghazi Mu-
nicipality by Zone and Area
Table 4. Chemical Characteristics of Waters
of Sidi Mansour and Benina
20 Well Fields
21 Table 5. MMRP Water Quality at AtTalhyia
Reservoir and at NODE 3
22 Table 6. Typical Desalinated Water Quality
(MSF Plant)
Table 7. Physical Characteristics of Waters
from Three Areas of
22 Benghazi City
23 Table 8. Main Transmission Pipelines Sup-
plying Benghazi Municipality
24 Table 9.State of the Main Network durin-
gAugust 2018
24 Table 10.State of the Sub-network durin-
gAugust 2018
25 Table 11. State of the Well Fields during
August 2018
25 Table 12. State of the Chlorination Sys-
tems during August 2018
25 Table 13. State of Transmission Lines in the
Benghazi Municipality
25 Table 14. State of Pumping Stations during
August 2018
Table 15. Benghazi Municipality Water Bal-
ance per Zone for the Year
27 2018 and 2023
32 Table 16. Status of Benghazi Municipality
Main Infrastructures Projects
Table 17. Water Pipelines and Tanks Mainte-
nance Work Status in the
36 Post Conflict Districts
Table 18. Costs of Urgent Interventions for
Rehabilitation of the Water
40 Supply Schemes of the Benghazi Munici-
pality
Table 19. Tawergha IDPs Camps and
Households Hosted by
41 Benghazi Municipality
Table 20. A Summary of Conditions of Wa-
ter Supply System in

1
44 Tawergha IDP Camps, Benghazi
Table 21. Costs of Urgent Interventions for
Rehabilitation of
46 Tawergha IDPs Camps in Benghazi

2
ASSESSEMNT OF THE STATE OF
WATER SUPPLY AND URGENT
INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT
PLANS IN FOCAL/ IDP IMPACTED
MUNICIPALITIES

MUNICIPALITY OF BENGHAZI

3
5.1.1 INTRODUCTION
The municipality of Benghazi is one of Libya’s most populated and economically developed
urban agglomerations. It has witnessed extensive destruction post 2014 resulting in
displacement of large numbers of its residents as well as losses of human lives and
destruction of property. With the return of peace to the city, most of those Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) returned to their homes. Those Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) whose
homes sustained serious damage or destruction remain in rented apartments and houses
indefinitely. At the same time, IDPs from other regions, particularly Tawergha, found refuge
in several camps within the city.
Availability of water supply services affects the city’s residents, local and other IDPs to a
great extent with direct impacts on the quality of their lives. Domestic water is provided by
the General Company for Water and Wastewater (GCWW). The objective of this report is
to describe the state of water supply in the city of Benghazi with the intention of assessing
the GCWW’s water supply capacities with a special reference to IDP camps. This report
is prepared as part of a UNICEF sponsored project for the Assessment of Water Supply
Institutions in Libya.
To achieve its objective, a description of the state of water supply in the Municipality of
Benghazi is presented followed by an analysis of the water supply demand situation in
the municipality. The state of water supply infrastructures is described next. The results
from these sections are utilized to draw urgent, short and medium term investment/
development plans for sustaining water supply within the municipality. The impacts on
IDPs are discussed whenever needed within these sections. The finding, conclusions and
recommendations are presented in the last section of the report.

5.1.2 BACKGROUND
5.1.2.1 Location, Boundaries and Metropolis
The Municipality of Benghazi is located north-east of Libya with a coastline of 100 km
on the Mediterranean Sea, a total area of 106,485 hectares and 769,736 inhabitants. It is
considered to be the largest municipality in Libya in terms of area and population. The
center of the municipality is Benghazi City with its boundaries extending from Sidi Khalifa
in the east to the Western Coastline districts in the west and Al Almuqzaha in the south
(Figure 1).

4
 Figure 1. Administrative boundaries for Benghazi municipality and branches (Ref.4)

During the past decades, the municipality has grown to become the main urban center
that provides education and other services to the region. Unfortunately, the urban growth
witnessed by the municipality due to the increase in population and migration rates was
not met with the implementation of the 2nd Generation Masterplan (2) thus resulting in

5
urban sprawl with no proper infrastructure services in place.
In view of the above situation which persisted in many urban communities, the government
started in 2005 to recognize the importance of the provision of a reliable water supply
system by launching the National Water and Wastewater Program in 2004 which included
updating the water and wastewater masterplan as well as designing the networks. This
was later followed in 2007–2010 by signing contracts to execute water transmission and
distribution systems.
All of these contracted projects were put on hold after Feb. 17, 2011 due to financial and
security reasons. Faced with increasing water supply problems, the Benghazi Municipality
began recently to search for solutions to some of these problems before an updated water
masterplan is prepared which will provide a better understanding of the existing situation
and future plans
.
5.1.2.2 Planning and Administrative Boundaries
According to the 3rdGeneration Planning Project
(3) Benghazi Metropolis settlements are grouped
into three categories as listed below and
presented in Figures2 and 3:

1. Benghazi Agglomeration: It comprises the

areas within the 5thRing Road, which are
mainly the built-up areas of the metropolis;
2. Benghazi City: It consists of the peripheral
areas of Benghazi Shabiya which includes
Al Askan Al Sinai and AbuAtni regions as
well as the northern, southern and eastern
fringes within the 2nd Generation Planning
Project (2);
3. Benghazi Metropolis: It comprises the
settlements or districts located within the
Influence area of Benghazi CitY

6
Ganfouda, Tika, Al Guwarsha, Al Kwefiya and Budazera.

7
 Figure 3.Settlements in Benghazi Metropolis (Ref. 1)

Administratively, on the other hand Benghazi Municipality is divided into 14 municipal

branches and64 Mahallah (Districts), but excludes the settlements of Gamenes East, Al Hariz,
AlMagroun, Karkoorah, Shat Al Badeen, Al Ragtah, Salouk, OmarMukhtar, Al Taylamoon,
Masous, Benina and Al Khadra which were part of the Shabyia. Thus, a lower number of
inhabitants need to be supplied with water compared to the ones served before.

8
5.1.3 WATER DEMAND OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF BENGHAZI
5.1.3.1 Growth of Benghazi Municipality Population: 2018- 2023
Table 1 indicates projected population growth for the Benghazi Municipality for the period
2018 to 2023 based on the 2006 National Census assuming a geometric growth at a rate
of 1.8% (5). The forecast 2023 population for the municipality will be 841,550 indicating an
increase of 71,814 inhabitants with a corresponding increase in water demand.

5.1.3.2 Growth of Benghazi Municipality Water Demand: 2018-2023

Benghazi water supply is managed by the Benghazi Plain Region Operation and Maintenance
Administration - center, east and west service offices which are divided into several service
centers. Lack of accurate water supply data for those centers resulted in calculating the
water demand for the zones rather than for the centers using the daily consumption rate
per capita of 300 lpcd recommended by the NPWS (6). Table 2 and Figure 4illustrate the
water demand data for 2018 and 2023. It is clear from Figure 4 that the water demand
will increase in the next 5 years by about 9%of the current water demand. Additionally,
Benghazi Center Zone has the highest water demand in comparison to the east and west
zones due to it being mainly comprised of built up areas served by the Public Distribution
Network.

5.1.4 SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY FOR THE MUNICIPALITY OF BENGHAZI

Benghazi water supply systems consist of 2 main parts (Figure 5):
1. Sources (GCCW wells, desalinated water and the Man-made River Project (MMRP));
2. Deliveries (Transmission pipelines and distribution network).
3.
In the past, 97% of the municipality water demand was supplied from the Benina and Sidi
Mansour groundwater well fields and 3% from the desalination plant. However, currently
around 93% of the water demand is provided by the MMRP thus making it the main source
of water supply. Private wells and trucked water are also used by a small fraction of the
population. Below is a brief description of Benghazi Municipality water sources.

Table 1. Population Forecast for Benghazi Municipality, 2018 and 2023

No. Area Zone 2006 2018 2023

City Center ‫وسطالبالد‬ Center 30,940 38,326 41,902

Al Salmaani ‫السلماني‬ Center 33,834 41,911 45,821

Ras Abeida ‫راساعبيدة‬ Center 21,540 26,682 29,171

Sidi Hosain ‫سيديحسين‬ Center 19,884 24,631 26,929

Sidi Abeid ‫سيديعبيد‬ Center 15,288 18,938 20,704

Al Sabri ‫الصابري‬ Center 30,056 37,231 40,705

Al berkah ‫البركة‬ Center 76,186 94,373 103,178

Al Keesh ‫الكيش‬ Center 39,243 48,611 53,146

9
 Al Haadaiag ‫الحدائق‬ Center 28,314 35,073 38,345

New Benghazi ‫بنغازيالجديدة‬ Center 30,130 37,323 40,805

Al Hawari ‫الهواري‬ Center 31,666 39,225 42,885

Al Fwayhaat ‫الفويهات‬ Center 12,279 15,210 16,629

Al Thawra Shabiah ‫الثورةالشعبية‬ Center 29,202 36,173 39,548

Al Magaazha ‫المقزحة‬ East 1,989 2,464 2,694

Shuhada Al Salawi ‫شهداءالسالوي‬ East 21,101 26,138 28,577

Al Kwefiya ‫الكويفية‬ East 63,943 79,208 86,597

Al Mukhtaar ‫المختار‬ East 19,538 24,202 26,460

Al Oruba ‫العروبة‬ East 33,194 41,118 44,954

Bu Atni ‫بوعطنى‬ East 34,417 42,633 46,611

Sidi Khalifa ‫سيديخليفة‬ East 9,368 11,604 12,687

Al Guwarsha ‫القوارشة‬ West 13,616 16,866 18,440

Garyounis ‫قاريونس‬ West 13,889 17,205 18,810

Bu Fakhra ‫بوفاخرة‬ West 7,142 8,847 9,672

Al Nuwagia ‫النواقية‬ West 2,316 2,869 3,137

Western Coastline ‫الساحاللغربى‬ West 2,321 2,875 3,143

Grand Total 621,396 769,736 841,550

*Calculated by the consultant based on 2006 Census and growth rates (Ref.3&5)

Table 2. Benghazi Municipality Water Demand for the Year 2018 and 2023

2018 2023
Zone 2018 Population 2023 Population Water Demand Water Demand
Quantities, m3/d Quantities, m3/d

Center 493,707 539,769 148,112 161,931

East 227,367 248,580 68,210 74,574

West 48,662 53,201 14,599 15,960

Total 769,736 841,550 230,921 252,465

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 Figure 4. Benghazi Municipality Water Demand per Zone for the
Year 2018 and 2023

5.1.4.1 Ground water

Benina and Sidi Mansour well fields have been in operation for more around 45 years
and hence their production rate and quality have declined over time due to the system
aging, lack of periodic maintenance, decrease in water levels and high salinity. According
to the GCWW, both south Beninaand Sidi Mansour No.1 are currently not in operation and
only a part of North Benina and Sidi Mansour No.2 along with other small well fields are
augmenting the supplies from MMRP to Benghazi Municipality.

Benina Well Fields

These fields are located 18 Km east of the city of Benghazi; they are divided into North and
South fields. They consist of 37 wells with an operating capacity of 110,000 m3/day and only
3 wells are operational now with a production rate of 4050 m3/day. Water from these well
fields is collected in Benina ground storage tanks with a capacity of 36,000 m3. Then, it is
transported by gravity via 900 mm ductile pipeline. It supplies Benina and Abu Atni districts
as well as parts of Benghazi City.
Sidi Mansour Well Fields

Sidi Mansour Water Well Field No.1 is located 7 kilometers northwest of Benina Well fields;
it consists of 2 well fields. Part of the water collected from those fields is transported to
Benina storage tanks and the remaining part is used to supply Al Kwefiya district.

Well Field No.1is a horizontal tunnel 500 meters long and 85 meter deep with 6 installed
pumps in order to lift water to 3 ground tanks and then to Benina storage tanks. Its
design capacity is 14,400 m3/day but currently it’s not operational.
Well field No. 2 It consists of 20 water wells;only 2 wells areoperational now with a
production capacity of 2340 m3/day.

Al-DabieWell Field

It is a small field containing around 12 wells and only 6of them are operational with a
production capacity of 1584 m3/dayto supply the district of ​​Sidi Khalifa and some of the
neighboring areas.

Al Hawari Well Fields

11
Al Hawari Well Fields consist of 17 wells; only 7 of them are operational now with a production
capacity of 712 m3/day to supply parts of Al Guwarsha and the Pipeline Company. The remaining
wells however require rehabilitation.

Wells with Low Production Capacity

There are several small well fields with low productivity that feed different areas within the
municipality such as Al Nuwagia.However, it must be noted that these well fields cannot be
considered as a reliable source of water.

5.1.4.2 The MMRP

In 1993, Benghazi City started to receive water from MMRP Phase I: Sarrir Sirt -Tazerbo
Benghazi System by transporting water from Omar Mukhtar Reservoir (4.7 million m3)
to AtTalahiya tank (200,000 m3) after which water is conveyed by gravity to the Benghazi
Agglomeration (Figures 5 and 6). Initially, the MMRP was designed to supply the city
network at 3 nodes (Pressure reducing chambers) known to be node 3, 4 and 5. However, as
the construction works for Node 5 and its pipeline was not completed, the MMRP supplies
were limited to node 3 and 4. In addition to supplying Benghazi Agglomeration,

12
 igure 5.Benghazi Municipality Main Water Sources and Transmission Pipeline (Ref. 1)

the MMRP supplies western fringes of Benghazi city such as Al Guwarsha, Garyounis. The
total water quantity supplied to Benghazi municipality from MMRP is around 280,000 m3 /
day.

13
 Figure 6. Omar Mukhtar Grand Reservoir
5.1.4.3 Desalination
The Benghazi Desalination Plant (Figure 7) is located 15 km north of the city. It was
constructed in the 1978. This dual-purpose plant consists of 4 multi-stage flash distillation
(MSF) units with a total design capacity of 48,000 m3/day. The plant capacity has declined
significantly because of ageing; only one unit is operating currently providing Al Kwefiya
district with 1200 m3/day.

Figure 7. Benghazi Desalination Plant

5.1.4.4COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO WATERSUPPLY

As explained previously, Benghazi receives water from the MMRP, desalinated water and
GCWW wells with the center and West Zone being mainly supplied from MMRP while the
East Zone is being supplied from GCWW well fields (Figure 8). The MMRP supplies the
whole CenterZone and 82% of the West Zone; the East Zone on the other hand is supplied
mainly from GCWW wells 92% and the reaming amount from desalinated water 8%. The
sources used by the different areas (Quarters constituting each zone are listed in Table 3).

Figure 8. Water Supply Sources for Benghazi Municipality Zones (from Ref. 2)

14
It is clear from Table 3 that the majority of districts are supplied by improved water sources
(MMRP and GCWW wells) with private wells and trucked water (Unimproved water source)
supply a sizable number of communities anddistricts. Only Al Kwefiya(East zone) is
supplied by desalinated water. Due to the condition of the distribution network, access to
the available supplies is still limited due to the following factors:-
• Poor distribution network coverage of the city and its surrounding towns and districts
because of incompleteness or interruption of execution of planned infrastructure
projects or because of urban expansion beyond the masterplan. Examples of districts
with no network coverage include:
o AbuAtni
o University
o Shebna D
o Lebanon
o Population expansion outside Al Kwefiya masterplan up to Sidi Khalifa district.

Table 3. Water Sources for Benghazi Municipality by Zone and Area*

Zone Community MMRP GCWW Wells Desalinated Water

City center
 a

Al Salmaani


Ras Abeida


Sidi Hosain


Sidi Abeid


Al Sabri


Al berkah
Center 

Al Keesh


Al Haadaiag


New Benghazi


Al Hawari
a

Al Fwayhaat


Al Thawra Al Shabiah


15
 Al Magaazha


Shuhada Al Salawi


Al Kwefiya
 

Al Mukhtaar
East 

Al Oruba


Bu Atni


Sidi Khalifa


Al Guwarsha


Garyounis


Bu Fakhra
West 

Al Nuwagia


Western coastline


*From Ref. 3.

• Illegal connections to the existing distribution network by the residents.

• Obsoleteness and deterioration of the existing network resulting in operation at low
pressure and leakages.

5.1.5WATER QUALITY CHARACTERISTICS

5.1.5.1 Quality of GCWW Well Fields Waters
Chemical characteristics of Sidi Mansour and Benina Well Fields are listed in Table 4. It
can be seen that Sidi Mansour water quality is marginally acceptable for domestic uses
with high hardness, sodium, total dissolved solids (TDS) and nitrates. The Benina Well
Field waters are evidently saline with high sodium, chloride, hardness, TDS, among other
parameters; this field’s water exceeds drinking water quality standards; it is mostly likely
affected by seawater intrusion making it unreliable in the future as its salinity will simply
keep increasing indefinitely.
Table 4. Chemical Characteristics of Waters of Sidi Mansour and Benina Well Fields*

Sidi Mansour Benina Well Sidi Mansour Benina Well

Parameter Parameter
Well Fields Fields Well Fields Fields

16
 Sodium 210** 490 Bicarbonate 400 840

Potassium 8 19 TDS 1120 2220

Calcium 50 56 pH 8.28 8.32

Chloride 382.094 896.375 EC 1444 4600

Sulfate 128.603 183.1306 Chlorine 0.23 0.1

Hardness 448.403 584 Fluoride 0.4 0.4

Magnesium 93.285 127.870 Ammonia 0.00 0.00

NO-2 0.00 0.00 NO-3 10 3

*From Ref. 3.
**Concentrations are in mg/L, Hardness (total) as CaCO3, EC is in micro Siemens

5.1.5.2 Quality of MMRP Waters

The MMRP waters are a mix of the Sarir and Tazerbo well fields. A typical water analysis
of waters at AtTalhyia Reservoir and at NODE 3 is shown in Table 5. It can be seen that the
MMRP waters meet the WHO drinking water guidelines. Achlorine residual also exists.

5.1.5.3 Quality of Desalinated Waters

Quality of desalinated water from Benghazi North Plant isnot available. However, it can
be approximated based on water quality from southern Mediterranean plants of similar
capacity employing the same technology. An example is the water produced by the Zliten
Desalination Plant (Table 6). Clearly, the water quality is within the Libyan Drinking Water
Standards and WHO Drinking Water Guidelines.

5.1.5.4 Quality of Network Distributed Waters

Waters from the three supply sources (MMRP, well fields, and desalination plant) are fed
into the distribution network at different points with no blending prior to feeding. Some
mixing probably takes place inside the network; the degree of mixing is determined by
circulationandwater velocity. Assuming the network is interconnected with zones forming a
grid system, the least mixing is expected near the feed points. As most waters are supplied
from the MMRP, the quality of these waters will predominate.

Table 5. MMRP Water Quality at AtTalhyia Reservoir and at NODE 3*

Parameter AtTalhyia Reservoir NODE 3 WHO** Guidelines

Temperature, oC 20.4 21.65

17
 pH 8.16 8.21 6.5-8.5

EC 955 953

TDS 618 617 1200

Ca+2 Hardness 101 101

Total Hardness 181 185 500

Cl- 139 140 250

NO3- 4.7 3.37 50

Na+ 146 149 200

K+ 21.6 21.7

Total Coliform, per liter 0-17 0-13 0

FCF*** 0 0 0

Total Fecal Coliform Count*** 0-866 0 0

E. Coli*** , 44 oC Negative Negative Negative

Streptococus Feacales*** 0 0 0

Residual chlorine**** 0.3 0

*Adopted from ref. 7. **Ref. 8.

***per 100 ml ****Outflow from AtTalhyia Reservoir

Table 6.Typical Desalinated Water Quality, MSF Plant*

Parameter Value WHO Guidelines

pH 6.5-8.5 6.5-8.5

TDS 110-200 1200

Ca+2 as calcium carbonate 22-75

18
 Mg+2 as calcium carbonate =< 30

Total hardness as calcium carbonate 50-75 500

Cl- 50-150 250

Residual chlorine (varies with plant) 0.2-0.4

*adopted from ref. 9.

Physical parameters of waters collected from three different regions of Benghazi were
compared in the spring and summer seasons (10, 11). The results are summarized in Table
7. It can be seen from Tables 5 and 7 that the network waters quality is very similar to that
of the MMRP waters; such a conclusion is not surprising because the MMRP waters form
the largest fraction of the water supplied to the city and municipality of Benghazi.
Trace metals (Copper, zinc and manganese) were also detected in the waters from the three
areas (Table 7). Their concentrations were very low and below the maximum allowable by
the Libyan Drinking Water Standards (12) and the WHO Drinking Water Guidelines (9).
Table 7. Physical Characteristics of Waters from Three Areas of Benghazi City*

Area A Area B Area C

Parameter
Spring Summer Spring Summer Spring Summer

pH 8.14 8.14 8.24 8.13 8.05 8.03

Temp. o C 27.4 31.1 23.4 30.3 27.6 31.4

TDS, mg/L 571.63 513.5 578.8 545.2 609.63 609.9

Cu2+ 0.192 0.210 0.215 0.097 0.147 0.157

Zn2+ 0.176 0.192 0.165 0.173 0.198 0.177

Mn2+ 0.070 0.067 0.067 0.011 0.029 0.011

*Adopted from Refs 10 & 11.

5.1.6 WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUCTURES

5.1.6.1 Water Supply Infrastructural Components
Transmission Pipelines:

Several transmission pipelines exist in the vicinity of Benghazi Municipality. They are used
to convey water from the well fields or remote storage to the distribution storage tank or
pressure chamber reducing chambers or pumping stations or directly to the distribution

19
network. A list of the main existing transmission pipelines that supply Benghazi municipality
with water are summarized in Table 8. Benghazi Municipality main water sources and
transmission pipeline are shown in Figure 5.
Table 8. Main Transmission Pipelines Supplying Benghazi Municipality

Transmission pipeline

From To Dia., mm

Benina Well Fields Benghazi city distribution network and Benina and Bu Atni 900
Distribution Network

Sidi Mansour Well field Al Kwaifya Distribution Network 200

Al-Dabie Well Field Sidi Khalifa Distribution Network 200

Omar Mukthar Reservoir AtTalhyia Reservoir 1600

Node No.3, Benghazi City Distribution 2000

AtTalhyia Reservoir
network

Node No.3, Benghazi City Node No.4, Benghazi City Distribution Network 1600
Distribution network

Distribution Network:
During the period 1970-1985, Benghazi Municipality has witnessed the execution of several
distribution networks covering the 2nd Generation Masterplans for Benghazi city as well as
the nearby towns.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some parts of Benghazi city which are not
served by the public network. Following this period, the municipality expanded randomly
in contradiction with the Second and Third Generation Plans and hence new districts
evolved without any infrastructure in place. Consequently, the communities residing
in those districts started to find alternative water supply sources either through illegal
connections (By those living near the networks), from private wells or from trucked water.
Whenever possible, communities laid their own “Surface” networks and distributed illegal
connections water collectively.

5.1.6.2 State of Water Supply Infrastructures in Benghazi

The state of water supply infrastructures in Benghazi is summarized in Tables 9-14.
Generally, the state is as follows:
1. The distribution networks consist of pipes of different sizes and materials. Maintenance
work has been carried out during August 2018 on 8 pipelines diameters 200 mm to
400 mm with a total length of 162Km; 52 minor pipes diameters 150-250 mm with a
total length of 401 km (Tables 9 and 10).
2. About 30 % of the wells are operational, a similar fraction is under maintenance and

20
 4% have been maintained. Those destroyed by force majeure constitute 38% (Table
11);
3. About two thirds of the chlorination systems are operational with one third non-
operational and two chlorinators damaged and lost due to force majeure (Table 12).
Chlorination is not available in the Center Zone;
4. Transmission lines of the MMRP are in good conditions while those of the GCWW
are deteriorated (Table 13);
5. A total of 36 pumping stations containing 99 pumps are employed in the water supply
system. Two thirds are operational, one fourth non-operational, while 7% were lost
due to force majeure (Table 14).

Table 9. State of the Main Network during August 2018*

Zone No. of Pipelines Diameter, mm Length, km

Center 4 200-400 30

East 1 200 120

West 3 200-400 12

Total 8 162

*From Ref. 2.

Table 10. State of the Sub Network during August 2018*

Zone No. of Pipelines Diameter, mm Length, km

Center 23 1”-150mm 189

East 4 1”-150mm 44

West 25 1”-150mm 168

Total 52 401

*From Ref. 2.

Table 11. State of the Well Fields during August 2018*

Under Mainte- Force

Zone Total Operational Maintained
nance Majeure

Center -

21
 East 123 34 28 7 54

west 54 19 22 0 13

Total 177 53 50 7 67

*From ref. 2.

Table 12. State of the Chlorination Systems during August 2018*

No. of Chlorina- Force Ma-

Zone Total Operational Non Operational
tion Systems jeure

Center 0 0 0 0

East 7 4 2 1

west 4 2 1 1

Total 11 6 3 2

*From ref. 2.

Table 13. State of Transmission Lines in the Benghazi Municipality

Owner / Oper-
Description Status
ator

It is ingood condition and oper-

Benghazi City MMR Transmission system infrastructure
ates well because of the follow
MMRP includesmain control chambers (Gate, washout, air
up and the periodic mainte-
release, pressure reducing)
nance conducted.

Well fields transmission system infrastructure,

Obsolete, deteriorated or non-
GCWW Distribution system infrastructure for cities, towns and existent
districts.

Table 14. State of Pumping Stations during August 2018

No. of Pump Force Ma-

Zone No. of Pumps Operational Non Operational
Stations jeure

22
 Center 7 28 23 5 0

East 12 31 19 12 0

West 17 40 25 8 7

Total 36 99 67 25 7

Water supply infrastructures within the city masterplans boundaries are either obsolete
and deteriorated or nonexistent, while outside the masterplan boundaries infrastructures
simply do not exist; rudimentary surface networks exist in small areas executed by the
residents in order to obtain water from the public network.
Obsoleteness of the water supply infrastructure can be attributed to the following causes:-
1. Aging of the water supply system as it has well exceeded its design life;
2. Unplanned orSprawl urban development which has resulted in illegal connections to
the network which in turn had a negative impact on the network efficiency;
3. Supplying poor water quality from the well fields over a long period of time to the
systems has resulted in pipeline corrosion which in turn caused lots of leaks and
bursts;
4. Sabotage, vandalism and damages to the water supply system in some districts
caused by armed conflict.

5.1.7 FUTURE WATER SUPPLY SOURCES

5.1.7.1 Water Demand and Supply Balance

The Benghazi Municipality receives currently 298,242 m3/day of water while its water
demand is forecasted to be 230,921 m3/day and 252,465 m3/day for the year 2018 and 2023,
respectively (Table 15 and Figure 9). The total water supplies exceed the demand over
the next five years. However, in terms of the Zones, it can be observed from Figure 9 that
both the Center and the West Zoneswitnesseda surplus in the supplies while the East Zone
witnesseda deficit. It must be noted that the incompleteness of Benghazi City MMRP Water
Supply System (NODE 5 and its supplying pipeline) has resulted in CenterZone significant
surplus and East Zone significant deficit, i.e., the supplies intended for East Zone could not
be delivered and were utilized by the CenterZone.

Other causes for the gap between the demand and supply noted could be the illegal
connections to the network which resulted in low pressure and intermittent supplies as
well as the high level of leakagesdue to network aging and deterioration.

23
 Table 15. Benghazi Municipality Water Balance per Zone for the Year 2018 and 2023

Zone Water Supply m3/d 2018Water Demand, m3/d 2023Water Demand, m3/d

Center 258,408 148,112 161,931

East 15,692 68,210 74,574

West 23,715 14,599 15,960

Total 297,815 230,921 252,465

*From ref. 2.

Figure 9. Benghazi Muncipality Water Balance per Zone

for the Year 2018 and 2023

5.1.7.2 Future Water Supply Sources and Infrastructures

As noted previously, Benghazi Municipality is supplied mainly from MMRP and several well
fields located at different sites within the municipality boundaries. However, concerns have
been raised lately about MMRP supplies because of sudden shut downs that have occurred
lately due to either power cutoffs or emergency maintenance works or armed conflict,
sabotage and vandalism. In addition to MMRP issues, there are the problems encountered
in the well fields which include system aging, declines in water levels, sea water intrusion
as well as lack of funding and spare parts. This point has been greatly emphasized by
governmental bodies and institutions executives during the consultant’s visit to Benghazi
on March 2018.
In view of the above, it is very important to prepare plans for maintaining and protecting
the current resources as well as identifying alternatives that can complement the available
water sources especially the MRRP supplies and meet future demands. Proposed short and
long term alternatives are as follows:
1. Short-term Alternative
• Improvement and maintenance of Benina and Sidi Mansor Well Fields in order to

24
 act as a backup to MMRP supplies in case of sudden shut down;
• Protection of the current resources especially MMRP from terrorists, vandalism,
sabotage, illegal connections and power cutoffs as well as anthropogenic
pollution;
2. Long-term Alternative:
The utilization of desalination plants as a complement for MMRP supplies. The plan
to supply Benghazi from a desalination plant has been outlined in the Libya’s National
Water Strategy 2000-2025 (13). The construction of a new plant has not been started
yet, however. Since the planning, design and construction of large scale desalination
plants requires large funding and a lot of time, it is recommended to start work on
this option now in order to avoid any water scarcity for the community in the coming
years. A feasibility study must be conducted prior to such a construction, however,
comparing a new desalination plant to increasing protection and reliability of the
MMRP waters.

5.1.7.3Masterplans and Infrastructure Projects

The first preliminary masterplan for Benghazi Water Supply System was prepared in
1968 followed by a masterplan in 1970. This masterplan consisted of 7 phases which the
Libyan Government started to implement in 1980. However, this development plan was
halted at the beginning of its 2nd phase in 1985. The delay in implementing the plan as
scheduled as well as the lack of maintenance played a major role in the deterioration of the
system constructed during the early phases in addition to the impact of unplanned urban
expansions had on the system efficiency. Benghazi Water Utility Masterplan (Figure 10).

The water supply and wastewater problems nationwide and their impacts on the population
led to a new approach which divided Benghazi Agglomeration into 6 zones that needed
either infrastructure projects execution or completion (Figure 11).Following the approval of
the 3rd Generation Masterplans, other zones were added beyond Benghazi agglomeration
that needed water supply systems design and execution. As a result, several projects were
contracted or were ready to be contracted for Benghazi City as well as nearby settlements
in 2009-2010.These projects included all infrastructures (Roads, power, water, sewerage,
stormwater, and communications) with a total contract value of 2.8 Billion LYD. Projects
for water supply from the MMRP were at the forefront of these projects (Figure12). A list of
the main infrastructure projects for the Benghazi Municipality is presented in Table 16. All
of these projects have stopped in 2011, however, because of armed conflict and insecurity.

25
Figure10Water Utility Masterplan for Benghazi Agglomeration

26
ne 1 – Al Salawi District
Zone 2 – Ali Ibn Abi Talib District
Zone 3 – Al Leithy and Haaddaiag District
Zone 4 - Garyounis, Al Keesh, Julianna, Abu Hadema and East Al Fwayhaat District
Zone 5 - Al Sabri, Sidi Hosain and City Center District
Zone 6 - Al Berkah, AlHumeida, Al Zaytun,Al Ruwaisat, Hayi Almuhajirin Mohageren, Al Selmani
and Ras Abeida District

27
figure 12. MMRP Water Feeding Projects to the Western Coastline District (Ref. 3)

28
 Table 16. Status of Benghazi Municipality Main Infrastructures Projects*
Project Execution Sta- Execution
name tus %
Integrated infrastructures execution project - Zone1 On hold 24

Integrated infrastructures execution project - Zone 2 On hold

Integrated infrastructures execution completion project - Zone 3 On hold 30

Integrated infrastructures design and execution project - Zone 4 On hold

Integrated infrastructures design and execution project - Zone5 On hold

Integrated infrastructures project - Zone6 On hold

Integrated infrastructures execution completion project for Al Kwefi-

Ongoing slowly 75
ya district

Integrated infrastructures execution project for Al Guwarsha district On hold 31

Integrated infrastructures execution project for Benina District On hold 4.5

MMRP water supply to the Western districts On hold

Execution of 1200 mm water supply pipeline from Benina Well

On hold 37.5
Fields to the city network

Execution of 1000 mm water supply pipeline from Node 4 to Node 5 Started 80

*From ref. 17.

5.1.8 DAMAGES AND IDPS/RETURNEES OF ARMED

CONFLICT IN BENGHAZI

Libya underwent a violent political change which lasted from February to August 2011
which led to the displacement of large numbers of persons throughout the country. The
Municipality of Benghazi was host to thousands of IDPs, the majority of them coming from
the forcefully evacuated city of Tawergha. Three years later, the City of Benghazi itself
witnessed a large scale armed conflict creating more IDPs. Finally, armed conflict in Derna
in 2018 forced a new wave of IDPs; the majority of them chose to settle in the City of
Benghazi.

5.1.8.1 Chronology of Armed Conflict in Benghazi

On 16 May 2014,conflict erupted in the City of Benghazi lasting until July 2017 forcing new
waves of the city’s residents to become IDPs. The first such IDPs left the districts of BuAtni
and Benina at the outskirts of Benghazi (Figure 13); they were followed by more IDPs from
all of the conflict-affected districts throughout 2014 up to early 2015.
Fighting first ended in early 2015 in the District of Benina. In early 2016, conflict ended in
the districts of BuAtni, Al-Laithi, Hawari, and Busnaib. In mid-2016, clashes ended in the
District of Venicia. In late 2016, conflict ended in Garyounis and Guwarsha. It was only on
19 March 2017 that the district of Ganfouda, which was among the first evacuated areas,
witnessed the end of conflict. Lastly, on early July 2017 the downtown districts of Al Sabri
and Souq Elhoot were made accessible.

29
 Figure 13. Benghazi Districts Most Affected by Armed Conflict (Ref. 14)

5.1.8.2 Physical Damages Associated with the Armed Conflict in Benghazi

Benghazi is one of the most conflict affected cities in Libya. The armed conflict lasted 3
years (2014-2017); it ended early in the peripheral districts, but lasted until 2017 in the
districts of AlSabri, City Center, Busnab, and Garyounus. In addition to loss of hundreds
of lives, injuries and psychological and social damages, armed conflict caused destruction
of buildings and severe damages to infrastructures with subsequent socio-economic and
environmental losses.

To assess the state of water supply provision and determine the nature of interventions
needed to reinstate water services in the most damaged districts, a preliminary field survey
was conducted. Results of the survey confirmed that the damages due to armed conflict
in Benghazi were heaviest in the districts of AlSabri, City Center, Al Leithy and Ganfouda
where the conflict lasted almost 3 years. These results confirm findings made by ASOR
CHI organization (Figure 14) (15). Many buildings in AlSabri and City Center districts were
destroyed completely and are no longer useable for any purpose (Figure 15).

30
 Figure 14. Extent of Damages Caused by Armed Conflict in Benghazi suburbs (ref. 15)

Based on the results of this survey, the conflict-caused damages and impacts may be
described as follows:
1. Damages to buildings ranging from light to complete destruction affecting the
plumbing, water supply and electric power supply systems; these buildings are simply
uninhabitable forcing owners to stay as IDPs for long periods of time;
2. Significant and widespread damage of the infrastructural components of the main
water, sewerage and electricity networks causing serious or complete water and
power outages;
3.

Figure 15. Buildings Destroyed during Armed Conflict in Benghazi

31
 4. Damages to water towers, for instance, have led to interruption of water supplies to a
large number of returnee families;
5. Damages to water supply pumping stations;
6. Inability of the GCWW and GDCOL teams to access and maintain damaged
infrastructural components. As a result, some of the electricity and sewage systems
are not in function with accumulation of wastewater in the streets constituting a
serious public health threat (Figure 16);
7. Damages to water distribution pipes; this type of damage is best illustrated in the
critically damaged districts of AlSabri and City Center leakages from these pipes
when mixed with wastewater can constitute a potential public health hazard (Figure
17);concerted efforts are continuing to repair these damages and expedite resumption
of water supply services (figure 18);
8. Disappearance or stealing of pumps, generators, copper wires constitutive of
electromechanical equipment and damaging of such equipment by looters, vandals
and saboteurs;
9. Potential for water pollution from private wells used by returnees as an alternative to
public water supplies which were unavailable for extended periods of time.
The above problems were intensified by the poor conditions of some infrastructural
components prior to the eruption of the armed conflict and the serious financial constraints
facing the GCWW. Table 17 illustrates the maintenance work status of the damaged water
pipelines and tanks in the post conflict districts.

Figure 16. AlSabri District Flooded with Water and Wastewater during Armed Conflict

Table 17. Water Pipelines and Tanks Maintenance Work Status in the Post Conflict Districts*

Post Conflict Maintenance Status Maintenance Status

.No
District Pipeline Tank

1 Al Sabri Ongoing -

2 City Center Ongoing -

3 Al Leithy Completed -

4 Ganfouda Ongoing Completed

32
 5 Garyounis 7000 - Completed

6 Garyounis Old - Ongoing

7 AlHawari Well Field - Out of service

8 Benina Well Field - Ongoing

9 Al Guwarsha - Ongoing

*From Ref. 2.

Figure 17. Wastewater Pollution in Benghazi City Center

Figure 18. Water Pipeline Repair Works, Omar Ibn El Aas Street, Benghazi City Center

5.1.8.3 IDPs and Returnees of Armed Conflict in Benghazi

A major outcome of continuous armed conflicts in Libya’s different cities is the large numbers
of IDPs and, once conflicts subside or end the corresponding numbers of returnees. The
city of Benghazi has been host to the largest numbers of IDPs in Libya as well as the largest
numbers of returnees (16). It witnessed three waves of IDPs; the first wave came in 2011
from several cities in western Libya but mainly from Tawergha. The second wave came

33
from movement of persons living in suburbs of Benghazi itself where armed conflict took
place to other districts within the city or to other cities in western Libya. The third wave,
numbering 2,990 IDPs, came mainly from Derna where heavy clashes climaxed in May and
June 2018.
IDPs from Damaged Districts within the City of Benghazi

According to Benghazi Municipality IDP database (2015-2018), there area total of 29,699
displaced families. Most displaced Benghazi residents fled from AlLaithy, AlSabri, City
Center, Gwarsha, Al Hawari, Ganfouda, Sidi Feraj and Bu Atni (Figure 19). These numbers are
declining gradually with the settlement of the conflicts and reconstruction of homes within
Benghazi Municipality as well as the maintenance work of the damaged infrastructure.

Figure 19. % of Displaced HHs per District during the Conflict Period (2014-2017)

Benghazi IDPs Shelter:

IDP shelter settings included the following:

Public places;
Schools;
Health care facilities;
Rented accommodation– most common neighborhoods are Salmani east and west;
Hosted by families or friends and
Resettled temporarily in other cities and towns.

The number of HHs residing in public places, schools and health care facilities is small
totaling 496; they are mostly from the districts of the City Center and AlSabri with a few
from the other districts. It is important to note that the municipality of Benghazi has started
an evacuation process of all of these IDPs while providing them with accommodation rent
coverage for a period of 2 years. The remaining numbers of IDPs from conflict inflicted
districts are residing in different districts of Benghazi or in other Libyan cities.

Returnees from Benghazi Districts and from Other Cities

34
Following the end of the conflict, most of the IDPs from AlLeithy, AlGuwarsha, Al Hawari,
Ganfouda, Sidi Feraj and Bu Atni have returned to their homes with only few numbers who
were not able to return due to their homes being completely destroyed or heavily damaged
or they have decided to relocate in another city. A large number of IDPs residing originally
in the heavily damaged districts of AlSabri, City Center and Garyounus or Busnaib could
not return to their homes, however, because of the high level of destruction sustained or
the lack of electricity and water services.

To accelerate the return of IDPs, the GCWW along with Benghazi Municipality Emergency
Department and GECOL have carried out maintenance work of damaged infrastructures at
many locations in the City Center and AlSabri immediately following the end of the conflict
(Figure 17). As a result, more IDPs are returning more rapidly.

According to AlSabri Steering Committee, about 80% of the 5772 displaced households
have returned to their homes now. The City Center district has witnessed a much slower
return rate due to the severe damages sustained by the properties and the infrastructure
as well as the environmental pollution. The number of returnees in November 2018 for the
City Center is around 300 of 3044 displaced ones.

State of Water Supply in IDPs Shelters

As stated above, the IDPs from the different districts of Benghazi resettled in public places,
with families and friends, or in rented premises. The state of water supply for the IDPs
differed with the location of the shelter or IDPs. As such, it is not possible to describe this
state accurately; it can only be said that the water supply for IDPs was reflective of that
of the city of Benghazi in general and faced the same challenges associated with water
availability and quality during the conflict period.

5.1.8.4 Urgent Needs, Investment and Development

Plans for the Municipality of Benghazi

The municipality of Benghazi has suffered extensive damages and destruction of large parts
of some of its suburbs as well as its infrastructures including water supply schemes. As a
result, these suburbs face water supply problems that are often times acute. To overcome
these problems and restore water supply to the residents of the city, urgent interventions,
short-term and medium-term action plans need to be implemented requiring financial
investments.

The urgent interventions needed by the city have been identified based on: Meetings
with senior GCWW and Benghazi Municipality staff, review of water supply masterplans,
reports, programs and field visits to the municipality of Benghazi including the affected
areas. Prices for the items or services needed have been estimated from previous contracts,
offers, implemented projects and from suppliers directly, in addition to the consultant’s
experience. Because most of the items are not locally available and, therefore, need to be
imported, the original prices – in US dollars – were adopted. This approach was supported
by the unstable rate of exchange of the Libyan dinar against foreign currencies.

The bill of quantities and prices for the urgent interventions investment plan which is to

35
be implemented within 6-12 months are presented in Annex 1. A summary of the fields of
intervention and costs is presented in Table 18.
Table 18.Costs of Urgent Interventions for Rehabilitation of
the Water Supply Schemes of the Benghazi Municipality

Intervention Urgent Rehabilitation Cost, $

1 Disinfection 105,005

2 Pipeline Replacement 9,103,718

3 Pipeline Works Completion 900,000

4 Submersible Pumps 8,880,000

5 Surface Pumps 4,950,000

6 Operation and Maintenance Supplies 3,579,125

Total 27,517,848

It can be seen from Table 19 that the total cost of rehabilitation is 27.5 million US dollars.
This amount represents mostly supplies of disinfection materials, pipes, pumps and spare
parts for operation and maintenance of existing equipment which has long been non-
functional and needed minor or major maintenance or was destroyed, stolen or obsolete
and needed replacement. Although the interventions are urgent, their causes are not all
directly related to the armed conflict and insecurity.

The amount of funds may appear too large for the municipality to raise considering the
overwhelming financial constraints faced by the country. If this turns to be the case, a phased
intervention plan should be prepared with criteria based priorities whose implementation
will be governed by the amount of funds allocated for the rehabilitation interventions.

5.1.8.5Water Supply in Camps of IDPs

from TawerghaResiding in Benghazi

Armed conflict forced all residents of the city of Tawergha (About 8500 households or over
35,000 persons) to flee to other safe locations, mainly Tripoli, Janzour, Tarhouna, Bani Walid
and Benghazi. Smaller numbers resettled in other cities of Libya, mainly Ajdabia, Albrega,
AlKhums, Tarhouna and Sebha. Despite numerous reconciliation efforts supported by
Official Government Decrees, Tawerghans have not been allowed to return to their city
which, presently, lacks all essential services including electric power and water supply.
Consequently, they continue to live as IDPs indefinitely spread and separated through
Libya’s vast terrain under the worst living conditions.
Tawergha IDPs Residing in Benghazi
Tawergha IDPs residing in Benghazi consist of 1040 households which are distributed

36
within 9 camps (Table 19).The largest numbers of IDPs live in AlHalees, AlRiayadhia and
Garyounis camps, respectively.
Table 19.Tawergha IDPs Camps and Households Hosted by Benghazi Municipality*

No. Camp Name No. of Households

1 Abu Hadema (1) 53

2 Abu Hadema (2)** 16

3 Al Halees 310

4 Garyounis 204

5 Al Riyadia/ Ambulance & Response ** 125

6 Shebna Aggregation 1 13

7 ShebnaAggregation 2 11

8 Al Riyadia/ Red Crescent *** 230

9 Sidi Faraj 28

Total number of households 1040

* From Ref. 18.
**Requested by land owner to evacuate the camp by Nov., 2018 (Ref. 19)
***Also hosts 75 IDPs from Benghazi

The IDPs from Tawergha live in cramped collective public space, schools, camps, abandoned
contractor camps, unfinished buildings, apartments, houses, makeshift houses and in some
cases even tents with a few living with relatives or friends (Figure 20).

State of Water Supply Systems in IDPs Camps of Tawerghans in Benghazi

To assess the state of water supply systems in IDPs Camps of Tawerghans in Benghazi,
a field visit was made to these camps which focused primarily on water availability and
quality along with the adequacy of these systems. Visual observations were supported with
discussions with camp managers and concerned authorities in the municipality of Benghazi
and the GCWW, Benghazi Region Office. A summary of the results of this assessment is
presented below.

Figure 20. Examples of Shelters of Tawergha IDPs in Benghazi

The IDPs Camps of Tawerghans in Benghazi are supplied with water from: a) The public

37
network, b) Water wells or c) Trucks. The nature and state of water supply systems in these
camps vary from one camp to the other and with the source of water. A detailed description
of the water supply systems components in each IDPs camp and their conditions are
provided in Annex 2. A summary of the results of this assessment is presented in Table 20.
Based on these results, the water supply situation in these camps can be summarized as
follows:
1. All of the camps lack of engineered distribution systems. The existing water supply
systems are generally rudimentary with very basic components that are unsatisfactory
and barely meet the basic needs of the residents;
2. The water supplied is not treated. Treatment units are needed for camps not supplied
from the public supply network. Such units are also needed if public supply water is
not disinfected. The potential for pollution is high and so will be the public health risks
as the living conditions within these camps is conducive to the spread of epidemics
in the presence of contaminated waters. Powder or tablet chlorine compounds are
sufficient to ensue disinfection of water supplies;
3. The reliability of the systems is low as the water supply systems are intermittent and
don’t provide the quantities required;
4. All camps require pumps urgently; lack of pumps is a cause of interruption of water
supplies indefinitely;
5. Due to the problems associated with materials, engineering, installation and
workmanship, these supply systems are in continuous need of maintenance which
is costly to camp residents;
6. The water supply system at Garyounis camp has been upgraded since the initial
visits to these camps on May, 2018 while Abu Hadema (2)camp residents have been
requested to evacuate the site by the end of November;
7. The numbers of households within the camps change continuously;
8. The IDPs have expressed a strong desire to return to their hometown Tawergha;
countless reconciliation efforts have been made at all official and social levels, but to
no avail. At the same time, returning is associated with high security risks and lack
of electricity and water supply services due to almost complete destruction of these
infrastructures and the bad condition of education and health facilities;
9. The fact that the IDPs are residing in these camps temporarily makes it difficult to
execute costly permanent water supply works. At the same time, as long as these
IDPs are present in these camps, they must be provided with safe water in sufficient
quantity. This dilemma needs to be resolved through consultation among the
municipality of Benghazi, Tawergha IDPs representatives and the GCWW. As the
problem is national, involvement of central government bodies in charge of IDPs is
necessary.

Table 20. A Summary of Conditions of Water Supply System in Tawergha IDPs Camps, Benghazi

Al� Red Cres�

Camp AbuHdaima 1 Ambulance Sheba 1 Sheba 2 Sidi Faraj
Halees cent

No of families 53 310 175 13 11 230 28

Public Public net� Public net�
Water Source Well Public network Well
network work work

RO
Water Quality
treated

38
 suc� 1
tion + 1
distribu�
suction, 1
suction + 2 1 tion, need
not opera� ,1 suction, 1 1 2 distribu� distribu� 1
Surface Pumps 1 distribution; 1 a larger
tional distribution tion, 1 not tion
not working pump to
working
supply
whole
camp

Submersible from well to ,1

1
Pumps elevated tank

anoth� ,1 needs ,1
in ,8
er tank is mainte�
bad m3, in 50 ,1
Ground Tanks not in use ,3 needed nance; very 1
condi� good condition
in case of close to
tion
emergency septic tank

water flows ,1
by gravity
Elevated Tanks when the
pump is not in
operation

No.
Some
Yes, needs
people Yes, 20% of Yes, PPR
mainte�
con� shelter con� network
nance as it
Distribution struct� nection needs that
Yes Yes is a mixture Yes
Network ed their maintenance, needs
of PPR
own faucets & valves mainte�
& normal
net� shelter leak nance
hoses
work &
tanks
Public WC Yes Yes No No Yes No
By
Private WC No Yes Yes No By IDPs Yes
IDPs
Public Taps No Yes No No Yes No No
Private Taps Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Unacceptable
Acceptable Un-acceptable, Urgent action need-
Key condition, action
condition ed
needed

5.1.8.6 Urgent Needs of Water Supply Systems in Tawergha IDPs Camps in

Benghazi
The water supply systems in all of the Tawergha IDPs camps in Benghazi are in a poor to
bad condition generally. Urgent needs of these camps are specified in the form of a bill of
quantities (BOQ) in Annex 3. It is to be stressed here that both the quantities and prices are
estimated based on the field visit and discussions during the month of May, 2018. Access
to the camps was limited for many reasons including privacy, the camps are neither well
designed nor suitable for the installation of water supply systems, they are temporary so
any intervention will be tentative, and the IDPs were not always willing to accept strangers
due to the generally bad conditions and low morale. Prices of materials are also changing
as are costs of skilled labor. Some of the items such as private water closets (WCs) and

39
showers have been proposed because they are essential for hygienic purposes, privacy and
convenience of the IDPs, but their installation may not be possible due to administrative
reasons or local circumstances (land or premises owners/individuals, government or
municipality) may not accept such additions. Quantification is not possible at this stage.
Accurate quantities and costs can only be obtained upon an extensive assessment of the
water supply systems in all camps; an endeavor that requires both time and full cooperation
of all stakeholders. Such a task was out of the scope of this report.

The estimated costs of rehabilitation of all Tawergha IDPs camps in Benghazi were 1,176,300
LYDs (Table 21). The largest fraction is needed for AlHalees camp which is in the worst
condition of all camps. ArRiyadhia camps are second and third in costs because they have
the largest numbers of IDPs.

Table 21. Costs of Urgent Interventions for Rehabilitation of Tawergha IDPs Camps in Benghazi

Camp Urgent Rehabilitation Cost, LYD

AbuHdaima 57,000

AlHalees 455,500

ArRiyadhia Ambulance 175,700

Sheba 1 73,700

Sheba 2 71,600

ArRiyadhia Red Crescent 236,200

Sidi Faraj 106,600

Total 1,176,300

5.1.9KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROVISION

OF WATER SUPPLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF BENGHAZI,TAWERGHA IDPS
CAMPS
The Municipality of Benghazi is home to the largest numbers of IDPs and returnees in Libya.
It is also the municipality most damaged by armed conflict. A large part of the city has been
destroyed completely making it impossible for its residents to return in the foreseeable
future. IDPs who resettled within Benghazi faced the same water supply challenges
encountered by the districts they lived whether in public or private places.

Provision of security along with efforts to repair buildings and rehabilitate power and water
services have made it possible for thousands of IDPs to return. Electricity, a basic driver
for water supply, has reportedly been restored in most districts relatively and satisfactorily.
However, despite intense efforts, the municipality of Benghazi as a whole and the IDP

40
impacted areas in particular, continue to face serious conflict caused challenges. In addition
to the damages andimpacts listed in section 5.1.8.2, the following challenges still persist,
namely:

• Lack of funding to provide essential Operation & Maintenance (O & M) of the

water supply infrastructures. This problem is aggravated by cash availability crisis,
hyperinflation and rising prices making (O & M) services and items either unavailable
or unaffordable;
• Lack of local capacity to effectively address these problems urgently and completely.
Despite the water supply surplus estimated to be witnessed by Benghazi municipality in
2023, the public consumer might still encounter problems with the quality and quantity of
the water if the current water supply system was not rehabilitated and developed well. A
summary of the key findings about the system that need to be addressed are presented
below:

1. Benghazi Center Zone has the highest water demand in comparison to the East and
West Zones due to it being mainly comprised of built up areas served by the public
distribution network. Additionally, it has a surplus in the current supplies due to the
incompleteness of Node 5 Project which is intended to supply the East Zone.
2. Around 93.3% of the water supply is provided by the MMRP thus making it the main
source of water supply to the municipality. This source had experienced lately some
shut downs due to power cutoffs or emergency maintenance works or armed conflict,
sabotage and vandalism.
3. Some of the GCWW well fields which provide 6.3% of the water supplies suffer from
system aging and water levels decline in addition to sea water intrusion in the wells
which are located close to the coastal area.
4. Alternative water supply sources to the MMRP and water wells include private wells
or from trucked water.
5. Unaccounted for agricultural and industrial uses of the water supplies through illegal
connections to the system in areas like Sidi Faraj and Abu Atni exist widely.
6. Water wells nearby the coastal areas are heavily affected by sea water intrusion thus
rendering the water in those areas to be non-potable.
7. Areas such as Abu Atni and Hayi Al Salaam which depend on private water wells
suffer from aquifer pollution as water wells are drilled in the same vicinity of the wells
drilled to dispose of untreated wastewater.
8. Water supply distribution network within the city masterplans boundaries is either
obsolete or deteriorated or nonexistent while outside the masterplan boundaries
distribution networks simply do not exist; rudimentary surface networks exist in
small areas.
9. Distribution network coverage is poor within the municipality because of
incompleteness or interruption of execution of planned infrastructure projects or
because of urban expansion beyond the masterplan.
10. Obsoleteness of the network increases of leakage and losses which reaches upto 40%
of the water supplied.
11. Obsoleteness and deterioration of the existing network force operation to beonly at
low pressure.
12. Despite the decrease of irrigation water demand in the winter, it will still be difficult to
increase the flow for domestic purpose due to the network status which might result
in leakages or burst.
13. Benina Well Filed is most likely affected by seawater intrusion making it unreliable in
the future as its salinity will simply keep increasing indefinitely.
14. Supplying poor water quality from the well fields over a long period of time to the
systems has resulted in pipeline corrosion which in turn caused extensive leakage
and bursts.

41
 15. Lack of a water safety plan to manage any disruption to the water supplies.
16. Lack of HSE procedures for maintenance and operation of water supply systems
within post conflict zones.
17. Delay in the implementation of the well fields contracted or planned projects.
18. Delay in the implementation of the infrastructure contracted or planned projects.
19. Delay in the implementation of the water supply pipelines contracted or planned
projects.
20. Lack of public awareness on drinking water consumption and safety.
21. Lack of water metering systems.
22. There is no treatment of wastewater in Benghazi Municipality.
Based on these findings, the following key priorities and recommendations can be
highlighted for further planning and implementation of interventions needed to ensure the
return of services, particularly water supply, to pre-conflict conditions.

Key Priorities for the Municipality of Benghazi:

1. Providing access to safe drinking water in some districts among conflict-affected and
most vulnerable displaced populations;
2. Restoration of water supply services and
3. Improving the reliability of electric power supply services.

Recommendations for Rehabilitation of the Water Supply Schemes in Benghazi:

1. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged buildings;
2. Rehabilitation of water supply infrastructures;
3. Rehabilitation of electric power infrastructures;
4. Provision of funding for rehabilitation or reconstruction activities;
5. Provision of funding for O & M services;
6. Review and reactivate the on hold infrastructure and water supply projects;
7. Review and reactivate the on hold projects related to wastewater system and
8. Preparation of urgent, short and medium term investment/development plans to put
in place the recommendations above.
The above recommendations have been translated into an investment/ development action
plan to be implemented in three phases; namely, urgent, short term and medium term sub-
plans. These plans were provided in section 5.1.8.4.
Several thousands of Tawergha IDPs have been residing in seven Camps in Benghazi since
2011. The living conditions in these camps are unacceptable. Water supply systems are
rudimentary as is sanitation.
Key Priorities for the Tawergha IDPs Camps in Benghazi:
1. Providing appropriate shelter;
2. Providing indoor water supply and sanitation and
3. Improving the reliability of electric power supply services.
Recommendations for Rehabilitation of the Water Supply Schemes in Tawergha IDPs
Camps in Benghazi
1. Construction and rehabilitation of shelter;
2. Construction and rehabilitation of water supply infrastructures and
3. Rehabilitation of electric power infrastructures.

5.1.10 REFERENCES
1. Urban Planning Department, Benghazi Masterplan Report, 2009
2. General Company Water And Wastewater, Benghazi Plain Region Operation and
Maintenance Administration, 2018
3. General Company Water And Wastewater, Planning Department, 2018
4. Benghazi Municipality, Information Technology Department, May 2018;

42
 5. National Information Authority, Results of General Census-2006, 2007;
6. Benghazi City Water Utility Masterplan, 1978;
7. MMRA, Personal Contact, Jan. 2018;
8. Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality, 4th Edition, WHO, 2017;
9. Zliten Desalination Plant Operating Data, Personal Contact, June, 2018;
10. El Emani, A. A. et al., “An assessment of the Quality of Drinking Water in Benghazi
City, Libya (Determination of Physical Parameters), Pelagia Research Library, Der
Chemica Sinica, 2012, 3(4);
11. Asweisi, A. et al., “Determination of Some Trace Elements in Benghazi City Drinking
Water by Flame Atomic Absorption Spectrometry, Pelagia Research Library, Der
Chemica Sinica, 2013, 4(1);
12. Libyan National Center for Specifications and Standards, Drinking water standards.
No. 82, 1992;
13. General People’s Committee, State of Water and Integrated Water Resources Strategy
for Libya: 2000-2025;
14. ACTED and Civil Initiatives Libya, Benghazi Neighborhoods and Returnees Profile,
Findings from Workshops & Field Visits, August 2017
15. ASOR CHI, Damage Assessment to Benghazi, DigitalGlobe, 2018;
16. International Migration Organization (IMO), DTM, Aug. 2017;
17. Housing Infrastructure Board, Tender committee, May 2018 and
18. Tawergha Municipality, May 2018.

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN RELATION TO THE REPORT

No. NAME ORGANIZATION

1 Abdul Rahman Alabbar Benghazi Municipality, Mayor

2 M. Lamia Gharyani Benghazi Municipality

3 Omar Nashad Benghazi Municipality

4 Hakam Abdulmalik Benghazi Municipality

5 Nasser Al Mushaiti Benghazi Municipality

6 Muftah Al Sed Tawergha Municipality

7 Abdul Wahed Al-Kadiki Housing and Infrastructure Board

8 Mohammed Al-Gleab Housing and Infrastructure Board

9 M. Abubakr Al-Barghathi General Authority for Housing and Utility - Benghazi

43
10 Dr. Saad Al-Dursi General Authority for Housing and Utility - Benghazi

11 Mohammed Al-Aqili GCWW – Benghazi Plain

12 Zuher Al Arbesh GCWW

13 Abdul Salam Aburziza GCWW

14 Imsaad Al Awami GCWW – Benghazi Plain

15 Abubaker Gargoum GCWW – Benghazi Plain

16 Khaled Ben Amer Public Project Authority

17 City Center District Steering Committee

18 Milad Muzoghi Al Sabri District Steering Committee

19 Mohammad Mezoghi Housingand Infrastructures Board

20 Fouad Heiba Housingand Infrastructures Board

21 Fawzia Benghazi Displaced Persons Union

22 Fatma Gatish Acted

23 Ibrahim Al Tawergi Libya Humanitarian Relief Agency

24 Faraj Abd Elaziz Bohadema 1 Camp

25 Wanes Elhadad Bohadema 2 Camp

26 Gomah Elhady Helis Camp

27 Faraj Agadora Garyounis Camp

28 Shaban Elgaded Sport City Camp

44
 29 Faraj Imhemed Shebna 1 Camp

30 Matoug Hamed Shebna 2 Camp

31 Basheer Imhemed LRC Camp

32 Mohamed Khameis Sidi Ferag Camp

Annex 1.
Bill of Quantities for
Urgent Investment and Development Plans for the Municipality of Benghazi

1.1.1 Chlorination Units Supplies

Objective: Disinfect and improve water quality

Duration: 4-6 months

Unit Price Subtotal

No. Description unit Quantity
($) Price, ($)

1 Cylinder mounted chlorinator max flow 1 kg/h no 10 2000 20000

2 Cylinder mounted chlorinator max flow 2 kg/h no 10 2500 25000

3 Flexible connector ( 3 ), meters m 100 3 300

4 Full gas mask no 50 1000 50000

5 Personal chlorine indicator no 10 30 300

6 D-P-D 2 tablets Tab 2000 3 6000

7 Ammonia liquid 45% liters 10 0.5 5

8 Chlorine cylinder 50 kg capacity no 20 150 3000

45
9 .54 % ,Powderchlorine kg 200 2 400

Total 105,005

46
1.1.2Pipeline Replacement

Objective: The Return of IDPs to their Areas

Duration: 6 -12 months

No. Site Diameter mm Length, m Subtotal Price (LYD)

1 Military Hospital District 200 10,000 2,900,000

2 Julianna District 200 3,100 1,000,000

3 Garyounis District 150 3500 950,000

4 Ahmed Rafiq Al Mehdawai Street 400 - 2,700,000

5 Al Nejeela District 100 4000 700,000

From Benina Well Fieldto the New

6 300 8200 2,500,000
Airport

5th Ring Road - From Airport Road

7 300 6000 3,600,000
to Al Hawari District

From Al Andulus Street To 800

8 300 5000 1,680,000
housing unit

9 5th Ring Road 400 5000 2,400,000

10 Hay Al Andulus 100 10,000 1,750,000

11 Hay Al Andulus 150 8000 1,608,000

12 Hay Al Andulus 200 6000 1,338,000

13 Bu Atni District 100 4000 700,000

14 Bu Atni District 150 3500 735,000

15 Bu Atni District 100 6000 1,050,000

47
No. Site Diameter mm Length, m Subtotal Price (LYD)

16 Bu Atni District 150 2000 420,000

17 City Center District 150 3000 950,000

18 City Benghazi Network 100 5000 875,000

19 City Benghazi Network 150 3500 703,500

20 Garyounis Old Water Network 100 2000 350,000

From El Terria Well to the Ground

21 Water Tank including drilling and 150 3500 795,000
preparation of 3 wells

Cutting, transferringand linking

22 - - 400,000
existing pipes Al Oruba Street

23 Al Zariraiya District Network 750,000

24 Shebna District Network 650,000

25 University District Network 4,000,000

Total (LYD) 35,504,500

Total ($),at 1.0 $ equals 3.9 LYD 9,103,718

1.1.3 Pipeline Works Completion

Objective: Provide an alternative to the existing deteriorated water transmission pipelines and distri-
bution network line

Duration: 6 -12 months

No. Description Quantity Subtotal Price ($)

Completion of the main transmission pipeline diameter

1 1200 mm from Benina to Benghazi City Network execution LS 450,000
works

48
 Replacement of Al Wahayshi Distribution Network in order
2 to solve water shortages, pollution and the deterioration of LS 450,000
the existing network

Total 900,000

1.1.4 Submersible Pumps Supplies

Objective: Improve water supplies

Duration: 4-6 months

Pump
Power
Pump Head Unit Price Subtotal
No. Site Quantity
(m) (Kw) ($) Price ($)

Al-Salawi - Suwani Ward - Umm

1 70 7.5 6 80,000 480,000
Al-Hieran – Al Tiria

Budrisa - Ganboua - Qabr Ab-

2 80 5.5 3 90,000 270,000
dallah

3 Al Mabna- Al Tiria - Qsr Altawil 100 10 3 110,000 330,000

4 Al-Hawari - Al Nuwagia 130 10 20 120,000 2,400,000

5 Sidi Khalifa 130 15 10 130,000 1,300,000

6 Cirat Najem - Benina 150 35 5 150,000 750,000

Benina -Sidi Mansour 2 - Cirat 160,000

7 150 45 10 1,600,000
Najem

8 Sidi Mansour 2 - Benina 150 55 10 175,000 1,750,000

Total 8,880,000

49
1.1.5 Surface Water Pumps Supplies

Objective: Improve water supplies

Duration: 4-6 months

Pump Flow Rate Pump Unit Price

No. Pumping Station Site Quantity Subtotal Price ($)
(m3/hour) Head (m) ($)

1 7000 Garyounis 260 42 3 250,000 750,000

2 7000 Maggiore 100 42 3 200,000 600,000

3 602Housing Units 100 42 3 200,000 600,000

4 7000 Haadaiag 100 42 3 200,000 600,000

5 7000 Aljazeera 45 46 3 200,000 600,000

6 7000 Alkhaleej 45 46 3 200,000 600,000

7 7000 Al keesh 90 47 3 200,000 600,000

8 Al Dhaman 90 47 6 100,000 600,000

Total 4,950,000

*This type of pumps has been in operation since 1986 and there are spare parts available at GCWW Warehouse.

1.1.6Project Type: Operation and Maintenance Supplies for the Damaged Water
Network
Objective: The return of IDPs to their areas

Duration: 2-4 months

50
No. Description Dia, mm Quantity Unit Price,($) Subtotal Price ($)

1 Bolted Gland Collar 100 300 800 240000

2 Bolted Gland Collar 150 200 850 170000

3 Bolted Gland Collar 200 100 900 90000

4 Bolted Gland Collar 250 10 950 9500

5 Bolted Gland Collar 300 50 1000 50000

6 Bolted Gland Collar 400 50 1100 5500

7 Bolted Gland Collar 500 20 1300 26000

8 Bolted Gland Collar 600 30 1500 45000

9 Bolted Gland Collar 700 10 1800 18000

10 Bolted Gland Collar 900 20 2500 50000

11 Viking Johnson coupling 100 300 100 30000

12 Viking Johnson coupling 150 200 150 30000

13 Viking Johnson coupling 200 200 200 40000

14 Viking Johnson coupling 250 10 225 2250

15 Viking Johnson coupling 300 100 275 27500

16 Viking Johnson coupling 400 100 350 35000

17 Viking Johnson coupling 500 20 425 8500

18 Viking Johnson coupling 600 50 550 27500

19 Viking Johnson coupling 700 15 625 9375

51
 Dia, Unit Subtotal Price
No. Description Quantity
mm Price,$ ($)

20 Viking Johnson coupling 900 10 800 8000

21 Repair clamp Stainless Steel 100 500 650 325000

700 210000
22 Repair clamp Stainless Steel 150 300

750 150000
23 Repair clamp Stainless Steel 200 200

800 160000
24 Repair clamp Stainless Steel 300 200

850 85000
25 Repair clamp Stainless Steel 400 100

900 18000
26 Repair clamp Stainless Steel 500 20

950 47500
27 Repair clamp Stainless Steel 600 50

1000 20000
28 Repair clamp Stainless Steel 700 20

29 Repair clamp Stainless Steel 900 15 1100 16500

Resilient seated gate valve EN 1074- 2004 and IOS

30 80 100 1100 110000
7259

1300 195000
Resilient seated gate valve EN 1074- 2004 and IOS
31 100 150
7259

1800 180000
Resilient seated gate valve EN 1074- 2004 and IOS
32 150 100
7259

2800 280000
Resilient seated gate valve EN 1074- 2004 and IOS
33 200 100
7259

5000 50000
Resilient seated gate valve EN 1074- 2004 and IOS
34 250 10
7259

Resilient seated gate valve EN 1074- 2004 and IOS

35 300 50 6000 300000
7259

Resilient seated gate valve EN 1074- 2004 and IOS 17000 510000
36 400 30
7259

To-
3,579,125
tal

52
Annex 2.
Conditions of Water Supply Systems in Tawergha IDPs Camps in Benghazi

Table 2.1 Water Supply System: Abu Hadema (1) Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Item Description Condition

Source wells in the camp vicinity; only one is used to supply the 2 Acceptable
camp

Pumps Submersible pump –Pumping water from the well to ele� 1 Not Acceptable
vated tank
Maintnenace and(
Surface pump – Pumping water from elevated tank to the 1 )Supply
)camp network (It is not operational currently

Tanks Ground storage tanks –Not is use 3 Acceptable

Elevated water tank - Distributes water to the network by 1

gravity only in case the surface pump is not operational

Network Water is supplied to the public bathrooms of the housing sec- Not Acceptable
tions. Water is supplied via individual connections to each
housing unit for cooking and cleaning uses only )Maintenace (

Quality Supplied water is not suitable for drinking and bottled water Not Acceptable
is bought for drinking

Quantity Sufficient amount of water is supplied to the camp Acceptable

Key

Urgent Important but not urgent

53
 Figure 2.1 Water Supply Systems: Abu Hadema (1) Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Table 2.2 Water Supply System: Al HaleesTawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Condi-
Item Description
tion
Source Trucked water
There are water wells in the camp vicinity but their produc- Not Acceptable
tivity is low and the well water taste is bad andunacceptable

Pumps No pumps Not Acceptable

)Supply(
Tanks Ground storage tanks 8
Tanks: capacity of 10,000 l each 5 Not Acceptable
Tanks: capacity of 20,000 l each; the condition of one of the 3 )Maintenance(
tanks is bad

Network Some residents fill the containers and carry them to their
accommodation for cooking and cleaning purposes as well
as to the public bathroom as the camp does not have any
network. Other residents have their own private water tanks
which provide water for the bathroom, cooking and clean-
Not Acceptable
ing purposes. Sometimes the truck cannot reach the private
tanks and hence even the residents who have private tanks )Supply(
depend on transporting water in containers from the main
.tank to their housing unit

54
 Quality Supplied water is not suitable for drinking; residents
buy bottled water Not Acceptable

)Supply(

Quantity Water truck deliveries are made every 24 hoursto the

storage tanks; quantities supplied daily depend on the Acceptable
.availability of water and its demand
Key
Urgent Important but not urgent

Figure 2.2Al HaleesTawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

55
 Table 2.3 Water Supply System: Al Riyadhia,Ambulance Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Item Description Condition

Source Public network Acceptable
Pumps 1 Surface pump - Withdrawing water from the Public Not Acceptable
Network to the tank
(Maintenance & Supply)
2 Surface pumps - Pumping water from the tank into the
Camp Network(Currently one of the 2 surface pumps is
not operational)

Tanks One ground storage tank with a capacity around 50,000 Acceptable
liter
Network Water is supplied to the bathroom of each housing unit Not Acceptable
Water is supplied to each housing unit for cooking and (Maintenance)
cleaning use. 80% of the main network is in an accept-
able condition while 20% requires maintenance work for
housing units’ fittings and fixtures.

Quality Water is used for drinking and cleaning but some fami- Not Acceptable
lies buy bottled water
(Maintenance)

Quantity Supplied quantity is sufficient in case the surface pump Acceptable

is in operation and weak in case the pump is not opera-
tional.

Key
Urgent Important but not urgent

56
 Figure 2.3 Water Supply System: Al Riyadhia, Ambulance & Response Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Table 2.4Water Supply System: Al Riyadia,LRC Libyan Red CrescentTawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi
Item Description Condition
Source Public network Acceptable
Pumps 1 Surface pump - Withdrawing water from the public network to the Not Acceptable
tank
(Maintnenace)
2 Surface pumps - Pumping water from the tank into the camp net-
work (Currently one of the surface pumps is not operational)

Tanks One ground storage tank Not Acceptable

(Maintenance)
Network Water is supplied to the bathroom of each housing unit Not Acceptable

Water is supplied for cooking and cleaning purposes to each hous- (Maintnenace)
ing unit

Network is a mixture of normal water hoses and PPR

Quality Supplied water is not suitable for drinking and bottled water is Not Acceptable
bought for drinking
(Supply)

Quantity Supplied quantity is sufficient in case the surface pump is in opera- Acceptable
tion and weak in case the pump is not operational.

57
 Figure 2.4 Water Supply System: Al Riyadhia, Libyan Red Crescent Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Table 2.5 Water Supply System: Shebna, Aggregation (1) Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi
Item Description Condition
Source Public network Acceptable

Pumps Surface pump - Withdrawing water from the public 1 Not Acceptable
network to the tank
)Supply(
Surface pump - Pumping water from the tank into 1
the camp network
Tanks One ground storage tank Acceptable
Network Water is supplied to the bathroom of each housing Not Acceptable
unit
)Maintenance(
Water is supplied to each housing unit for cooking
and cleaning purposes
Quality Supplied water is not suitable for drinking and bot- Not Acceptable
tled water is bought for drinking
)Supply(
Quantity Supplied quantity is sufficient in case the surface Acceptable
pump is in operation and weak in case the pump is
.not operational
Key
Urgent Important but not urgent

Table 2.6 Water Supply System: Shebna, Aggregation (2) Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Item Description Condition

Source Public network Acceptable

Pumps 1 Surface pump - Withdrawing water from the public network to the Not Acceptable
tank
(Supply)
1 Surface pumps - Pumping water from the tank into the camp
network

Tanks One ground storage tank requires Acceptable

58
Network Water is supplied to the public bathrooms at housing sections Not Acceptable

Water is supplied to the public water taps from which residents

fill the water in containers and carry it to their accommodation for
cooking and cleaning uses.

Quality Supplied water is not suitable for drinking and bottled water is Not Acceptable
bought for drinking.

Quantity Supplied quantity is sufficient in case the surface pump is in opera- Acceptable
tion and weak in case the pump is not operational.

Figure 2.5 Water Supply System: Shebna, Aggregation Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Table 2.7 Water Supply System:Sidi Faraj, Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Item Description Condition

Source One well Acceptable

Pumps One submersible pump Not Acceptable

One surface pump (Supply)

Tanks Ground tank with suitable size Acceptable

Network Water is supplied to the bathroom of each housing unit Not Acceptable

Water is supplied for cooking and cleaning purposes to each (maintnenace)

housing unit

Quality Supplied water is not suitable for drinking and bottled water is Not Acceptable
bought for drinking.
(Supply)

Quantity Supplied quantity is sufficient in case of pump operation Acceptable

Key
Urgent Important but not urgent

59
 Figure 2.6 Water Supply System: Sidi Faraj, Tawergha IDPs Camp, Benghazi

Figure 2.7 Water Supply Network: Tawergha IDPs Camp Garyounis, Benghazi, March 2018 (The network has been

60
Annex 3.
Bills of Quantities for Urgent Interventions Needed for Tawergha IDPs Camps in
BenghaziTable 3.1 BOQ for AbuHdaima 1 IDPs Camp

Table 3.1 BOQ for AbuHdaima 1 IDPs Camp

Unit of Mea- Unit Price, Total

Camp No. Item Quantity
surement LYD Price

Provision of 1.5 kW submersible

pump for delivering water from
1 No. 1 1000 1000
well to groundwater storage res-
ervoir complete with fittings

Supply and installation of poly-

ethylene water storage tank,
2 No. 1 700 700
capacity = 2000 liters complete
with fittings
Supply and installation of sur-
face pump, 1.0 kW for pumping
3 water from water storage tank No. 1 600 600
to elevated tank complete with
fittings

Supply and installation of sur-

face pump, 1.0 kW for pumping
4 No. 1 500 500
water into camp distribution
Abu system complete with fittings
Hdaima
1 Supply of chlorine tablets mix-
ing tank, polyethylene, 20 liter
5 LS LS 200 200
capacity complete with mixer
and fittings
Supply and installation of chem-
ical solution mixing tank for
6 aquatabs (100 liter) including No. 1 250 250
mixer
Supply of disinfectant tablets
7 (Aquatabs 8.68 gm) 60 tablets Tub. 150 250 37500
per tub
Upgrading of water distribution
8 network within the camp com- LS LS 10000 10000
plete (pipes, fittings, etc.)
Supply of chlorine Test Strips –
3-in-1 Free Chlorine Test from Tube contain-
9 25 250 6250
0-10 parts per million (ppm) for ing 50 strips
1 year
Grand Total (fifty seven thousand) Libyan Dinars 57000

61
 Table 3.2 BOQ for AlHalees IDPs Camp

Unit
Unit of Mea- Total
Camp No. Item Quantity Price,
surement Price
LYD

Provision and installation of surface

1 pump, 1.5 kW for pumping water No. 1 600 600
into camp distribution system

Repair of existing surface water

2 No. 2 250 500
pump

Supply of potable water storage

3 No. 10 800 8000
tanks of 2000 L capacity

Upgrading of water distribution net-

4 LS LS 80000 80000
work within the camp

Al-
Halees Provision and installation of sani-
5 tary fixtures for bathrooms (faucets, LS LS 100000 100000
showers, tubs, etc.)

Aquatabs mixing solution tank

6 (polyethylene) of 20 liter plus mixer No. 1 150 150
for one year

Supply of disinfectant tablets (Aqua- Tube con-

7 tabs 8.68 gm.) taining 60 800 250 200000
tablets

Chlorine Test Strips – 3-in-1 Free Tube con-

8 Chlorine Test from 0-10 parts per taining 50 25 250 6250
million (ppm) for 1 year strips

Grand Total (Four hundred and fifty five thousand and five hundred) Libyan Dinars 455500

62
 Table 3.3 BOQ for ArRiyadhia, Ambulance IDPs Camp

Unit
Unit of Mea- Total
Camp No. Item Quantity Price,
surement Price
LYD

Provision and installation of

1 surface pump, 1.5 kW for pump- No. 3 600 1800
ing water into camp distribution
system

Upgrading of water distribution

2 LS LS 50000 50000
network within the camp

Provision and installation of

sanitary fixtures for bathrooms
3 (faucets, showers, tubs, etc.) LS LS 5000 5000
AlRi-
yadhia,
Ambu-
lance Aquatabs mixing solution tank
4 (polyethylene) of 20 liter plus No. 1 150 150
mixer for one year

Supply of disinfectant tablets Tube con-

5 (Aquatabs 8.68 gm.) taining 60 450 250 112500
tablets

Chlorine Test Strips – 3-in-1 Free Tube con-

6 Chlorine Test from 0-10 parts per taining 50 25 250 6250
million (ppm) for 1 year strips

Grand Total (One hundred and seventy five thousand and seven hundred) Libyan Di-
nars 175700

63
 Table 3.4 BOQ for Sheba 1, IDPs Camp

Unit of Mea- Unit Price, Total

Camp No. Item Quantity
surement LYD Price

Provision and installation of

1 surface pump, 1.0 kW for pump- No. 2 400 800
ing water into camp distribution
system

Supply of potable water storage

2 No. 5 800 4000
tanks of 2000 L capacity

Upgrading of water distribution

3 LS LS 50000 50000
network within the camp

Sheba 1
Aquatabs mixing solution tank
4 (polyethylene) of 20 liter plus mix- No. 1 150 150
er for one year

Supply of disinfectant tablets Tube con-

5 (Aquatabs 8.68 gm) taining 60 50 250 12500
tablets

Chlorine Test Strips – 3-in-1 Free Tube con-

6 Chlorine Test from 0-10 parts per taining 50 25 250 6250
million (ppm) for 1 year strips

Grand Total (Seventy three thousand and seven hundred) Libyan Dinars 73700

64
 Table 3.5 BOQ for Sheba 2, IDPs Camp

Unit of Mea- Unit Price, Total

Camp No. Item Quantity
surement LYD Price

Provision and installation

1 of surface pump, 1.0 kW for No. 2 600 1200
pumping water into camp
distribution system

2 Supply of potable water stor- No. 5 800 4000

age tanks of 2000 L capacity

3 Upgrading of water distribu- LS LS 50000 50000

tion network within the camp

Sheba 2

Aquatabs mixing solution

4 tank (polyethylene) of 20 liter No. 1 150 150
plus mixer for one year

Supply of disinfectant tablets Tube con-

5 (Aquatabs 8.68 gm) taining 60 40 250 10000
tablets

Chlorine Test Strips – 3-in-1

Tube con-
Free Chlorine Test from 0-10
6 taining 50 25 250 6250
parts per million (ppm) for 1
strips
year

Grand Total (Seventy one thousand and six hundred) Libyan Dinars 71600

Table 3.6 BOQ for ArRiyadhia, Red Crescent IDPs Camp

Unit of Mea- Unit Price,
Camp .No Item Quantity Total Price
surement LYD

65
 Provision and installation of surface
1 pump, 1.5 kW for pumping water .No 3 600 1800
into camp distribution system
Supply of potable water storage
2 .No 10 800 8000
tanks of 2000 L capacity
Upgrading of water distribution
ArRi- 3 LS LS 70000 70000
network within the camp
yadhia/
Aquatabs mixing solution tank
Red Cres-
4 (polyethylene) of 20 liter plus mixer .No 1 150 150
cent
for one year
Supply of disinfectant tablets Tube containing
5 600 250 150000
)(Aquatabs 8.68 gm 60 tablets

Chlorine Test Strips – 3-in-1 Free

Tube containing
6 Chlorine Test from 0-10 parts per 25 250 6250
50 strips
million (ppm) for 1 year
Grand Total (Two hundred and thirty six thousand and two hundred) Libyan Dinars 236200

Table 3.7 BOQ for Sidi Faraj, IDPs Camp

Unit of
Quan- Unit Total
Camp Item Measure-
tity Price, LYD Price
ment
Provision of 1.5 kW submers-
ible pump for delivering wa-
1 ter from well to groundwater .No 1 1000 1000
storage reservoir complete
with fittings
Provision and installation
1 of surface pump, 1.0 kW for .No 1 400 400
pumping water into camp
distribution system
Supply of potable water
2 storage tanks of 2000 L ca- .No 6 800 4800
pacity
Upgrading of water distri-
3 bution network within the LS LS 70000 70000
Sidi camp
Faraj Aquatabs mixing solution
4 tank (polyethylene) of 20 li- .No 1 150 150
ter plus mixer for one year
Supply of disinfectant tab- Tube con-
5 )lets (Aquatabs 8.68 gm taining 60 100 250 25000
tablets
Chlorine Test Strips – 3-in-1
Tube con-
Free Chlorine Test from 0-10
6 taining 50 25 250 6250
parts per million (ppm) for 1
strips
year
Grand Total (One hundred and six thousand and six hundred) Libyan Dinars 106600

66
67
ASSESSEMNT OF THE STATE OF
WATER SUPPLY AND URGENT
INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT
PLANS IN FOCAL/ IDP IMPACTED
MUNICIPALITIES

THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ABU SALEEM

68
ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

BOQ Bill of Quantities

GAWR General Authority for Water Resources
GDC General Desalination Company
GCWW General Company for Water and Wastewater
GIA General Information Authority
GWA General Water Authority
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
LYD Libyan Dinar
LS Lump Sum
lpcd liter per capita per day
MMRP Man-made River Project
NPWS National Program for Water and Sanitation
O & M Operation and Maintenance
RO Reverse Osmosis
TDS Total dissolved solids
UNICEF United Nations Fund for Children
WDN Water Distribution Network

69
CONTENTS 2 Disclaimer

3 ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

7 FIGURES

7 TABLES

8 5.2.1 INTRODUCTION

8 5.2.1.1 Objectives of the Report

9 5.2.1.2 Scope of Work, Data and Methodology

10 5.2.2 BACKGROUND

10 5.2.2.1 Location, Boundaries and Planning
10 5.2.3 WATER DEMAND OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ABU SALEEM
10 5.2.3.1 Population Growth in the MoAS: 2018-2023
12 5.2.3.2 Water Demand in the MoAS: 2018-2023
5.2.4 SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY FOR THE MU-
NICIPALITY OF
13 ABU SALEEM
13 5.2.4.1 The MMRP
13 5.2.4.2 Well Fields
14 5.4.2.3 Divisions Wells
14 5.4.2.4 Private Wells
14 5.2.5 COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO WATER SUP-
PLY
16 5.2.6 WATER QUALITY CHARACTERISTICS
16 5.2.6.1 Quality of the MMRP Waters
18 5.2.6.2 Quality of Public Well Fields Waters
18 5.2.7 WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUCTURES
18 5.2.7.1 Water Supply Infrastructural Components
20 5.2.7.2 State of Water Supply Infrastructures in the
MoAS
21 5.2.8 MANAGEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM
IN THE MOAS
22 FUTURE WATER SUPPLY SOURCES
22 5.2.9.1 Water Demand and Supply Balance
22 5.2.9.2 Future Water Supply Sources and Infra-
structures
24 5.2.9.3 Masterplans and Infrastructure Projects

70
 1.1.1.4 Armed Conflict Caused Damages to Water
Infrastructures in
24 the MoAS
5.2.10 IDPS AND RETURNEES OF THE ARMED
CONFLICT IN THE
24 MoAS
5.2.10.1 State of Water Supply in Camps of IDPS
from Tawergha
25 Residing in the MoAS
5.2.9 KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES AND RECOMMENDA�
TIONS FOR
PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY IN THE MUNICI-
PALITY OF
30 ABU SALEEM
5.2.9.1Key Findings Regarding the Water Supply in
the Municipality
32 Of Abu Saleem
5.2.9.2 Key Priorities and Recommendations for
the Municipality of
34 Abu Saleem
1.1.9 KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS
FOR PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY IN THE TAW-
ERGHA
35 IDPS CAMPS IN THE MoAS
5.2.10.1 Key Findings Regarding Water Supply in the Taw�
ergha IDPs
36 Camps in the MoAS
5.2.10.2 Key Priorities and Recommendations for Re�
habilitation of the
36 Water Supply Schemes in Tawergha IDPs Camps in the
MoAS
5.2.11 URGENT NEEDS AND INVESTMENT/ DE-
VELOPMENT
37 PLANS FOR WATER SUPPLY IN THE MOAS
5.2.12 URGENT NEEDS AND INVESTMENT/ DE-
VELOPMENT
PLANS FOR THE TAWERGHA IDPS CAMPS IN THE
38 MoAS
Annex A. Activities and Implementation Schedules
for the Investment/
41 Development Plans for the Water Supply Systems
in MoAS
Annex A.1 Bill of Quantities for Urgent Investment/
Development
42 Plan for Water Supply in the MoAS
Annex A.2 Activities and Implementation Schedule
for Short-term

71
 43 Development Plan (1-3 years) for Water Supply in
the MoAS
Annex A.3 Activities and Implementation Schedule
for Medium
-term (3-5 years) Investment/ Development Plan
for Water Supply
45 in the MoAS
Annex B. Bill of Quantities for Water Supply Sys-
tems, Tawergha IDPs
46 Camps, MoAS
Annex B.1 Bill of Quantities for Water Supply Sys-
tem: Airport Road,
47 Tawergha IDPs Camp, Abu Sleem/ Tripoli
Annex B.2 Bill of Quantities for Water Supply Sys-
tem: Fallah Road
48 Camp 1, Tawergha IDPs, Abu Sleem/ Tripoli
Annex B.3 Bill of Quantities for Water Supply Sys-
tem: Fallah Road
49 Camp 2, Tawergha IDPs Camp, Abu Sleem/ Tripoli

FIGURES Figure 1. Borders of the Municipality of Abu Sal-

eem and its Counties/
11 Mahallat
12 Figure 2. Boundaries of Planning Zones of MoAS
25 Figure 3. Locations of Tawergha IDPs Camps in the
MoAS
27 Figure 4. Shelter Types of Tawergha IDPs in the
Airport Road and MoAS
Figure 5. Water Supply of Tawergha IDPs in the
Airport Road Camp and
28 MoAS
28 Figure 6. Leaking Water Pipe and Pond at Airport
Road Camp
30 Figure 7. Water Well: Fellah Camp 1
30 Figure 8. Desalination Unit: Fallah Camp 1
31 Figure 9. Septic tank serving Tawergha IDPs, Fellah
2 Camp

TABLES Table 1. Water Quality Characteristics of the MMRP

Distributed in the
16 MoAS
Table 2. Water Quality Characteristics of Four
Sources Utilized in the

72
17 MoAS
22 Table 3. Staff Data at Abu Saleem Water Service
Center
25 Table 4. Numbers and Sources of IDPs in the MoAS
Table 5. State of Water Supply System: Airport
Road Camp, Tawergha
27 IDPs and MoAS
Table 6. Water Supply System: Fallah Road Camp
1, Tawergha IDPs and
29 Abu Saleem
Table 7. Water Supply System: Fallah Road Camp
2, Tawergha IDPs and
32 MoAS
Table 8. Costs of Urgent Interventions for Tawergha
IDPs Camps in the
32 MoAS

73
5.2.1 INTRODUCTION
The municipality of Abu Saleem (MoAS) is one of the twelve municipalities comprising the
Greater Tripoli Region and the largest both in terms of population and area. It has been
ground for armed conflict since 2011 with extensive damages and destruction. Moreover, it
served as a host to thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) post 2011 from several
other municipalities of Libya, especially Tawergha. As a result, the MoAS continues to face
infrastructural and socioeconomic challenges that require immediate intervention.

The MoAS infrastructural challenges include availability of water supply services which
affects both the municipality’s residents as well as the IDPs with direct impacts on the
quality of their lives. Domestic water is provided by the General Company for Water and
Wastewater (GCWW).

5.2.1.1 Objectives of the Report

The objective of this report is to describe the state of water supply in the MoAS with the
intention of assessing the GCWW’s water supply capacities with a special reference to
IDP camps. This report is prepared as an output of the second/ Final Phase of a UNICEF
sponsored project for the Assessment of Water Supply Institutions in Libya which includes
the state of water supply in four IDPs impacted focal municipalities including MoAS.

To achieve its objective, a description of the state of water supply in the MoAS as a whole is
presented followed by an analysis of the water supply demand situation in the municipality.
The state of water supply infrastructures is described next. The results from these sections
are utilized to draw urgent intervention (investment/ development) plans for sustaining
water supply within the municipality. The state of water supply in the IDP’s camps is
described in a special section along with the urgent interventions required to ensure proper
access to potable water in these camps. The key finding, priorities and recommendations
are presented in the last section of the report. It is hoped that the outcomes of this report
will be utilized as a basis for an emergency action plan to be financed and implemented
within a national emergency water supply plan.

5.2.1.2 Scope of Work, Data and Methodology

The scope of work of this report focused primarily on the state of water supply in the MoAS
and the assessment of the institutional capacities of the GCWW with regard to provision of
water supply services in this municipality with special consideration to: 1) Armed conflict
impacts and 2) The state of water supply in the IDPs camps.

The information and data utilized in this report were compiled from many sources, the
major source are listed below:

1. Extensive literature surveys and reviews of studies, articles, reports, plans and
programs prepared by water institutions, national and international organizations
on water supply issues in Libya, Greater Tripoli the MoAS and IDPs camps;
2. Meetings and communications with senior GCWW specialists in charge of the MoAS
water supply;
3. Meetings and communications with senior specialists from the Man-made River

74
 Project (MMRP);
4. Meetings and communications with senior MoAS staff. The first meeting was held
on 27/3/2018;
5. Meetings and communications with camp managers;
6. Conducting water quality analysis at specialized laboratories in Tripoli;
7. Field visits to water supply infrastructures;
8. Field visits to IDPs camps;
9. Consultations with local experts and
10. Media coverage and official websites of institutions and organizations.
Cost data utilized for preparation of bills of quantities (BOQs) for the urgent intervention/
investment/ development plan for the MoAS were solicited from several sources including
the following:
1. Manufacturers and suppliers;
2. Contractors, previous contracts;
3. Offers;
4. Experts;
5. Local markets.

The data compiled were synthesized and analyzed for validation, completeness and gap
identification. Subsequently, key issues/ priorities were identified, indicators were defined,
recommendations and urgent intervention plans were drawn.

Time constraints, the prevailing lack of security in some regions of the MoAS, and the
large number and aerial “Geographical” spread of the municipality made it very difficult
to conduct a comprehensive field survey of the water supply infrastructures and the IDPs.

5.2.2 BACKGROUND
5.2.2.1 Location, Boundaries and Planning

The MoAS is located at the southern part of the Greater Tripoli Region (Figure 1). It is bordered
from the north by the Tripoli Center municipality, from the south by the municipality of Ben
Ghashier, from the east by Ain Zara municipality, and from the west by the municipality of
Hay AlAndalus. It is the largest among Greater Tripoli’s 12 municipalities in terms of area
(7682 hectares) and population (1).
The commercial center of the municipality is at the Shuhadaa Abu Saleem district which
is home to AlKhadhra and the Trauma public hospitals, the Zoo and AlHadhba AlKhadhra
Wastewater Treatment Plant.
During the past decades, the population of the MoAS has increased rapidly because of
population growth and migration into the municipality where land prices were relatively low
due to conversion of agricultural lands at the periphery of the municipality into residential
settlements.
Unfortunately, the urban growth within the MoAS was not regulated as it outpaced planning
and service provision which lagged considerably. To overcome this problem, several of the
MoAS counties were included in the 2nd and 3rd Generation Master Plans (2, 3). However,
about half of the municipality’s area is still without a master plan (Figure 2). Moreover, they
were included in the National Program for Water and Sanitation (NPWS) initiated in 2005
(4). Several infrastructures projects were planned; execution of some projects was started
in 2009-2010 but was soon interrupted indefinitely in 2011as foreign contractors fled the
country for security reasons.

5.2.3 WATER DEMAND OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF ABU SALEEM

5.2.3.1 Population Growth in the MoAS: 2018- 2023

75
The population of the MoAS was estimated to be 301,893 persons in 2018. It will reach
330,059 in 2023 if the population growth rate of 1.8% proposed by the General Information
Authority (GIA) is adopted (5). The net increase of 28,166 inhabitants represents a growth
rate of 9.3%. The actual present and future populations are slightly

Figure 1. Borders of the Municipality of Abu Saleem and its Counties/ Mahallat (1)

76
larger due to the presence of a large number of IDPs from different municipalities/ regions
of Libya.

Figure 2. Boundaries of Planning Zones of MoAS (1)

5.2.3.2 Water Demand in the MoAS: 2018-2023

The MoAS water supply is managed by the GCWW Tripoli Region Operation and Maintenance
Administration- Service Offices which are divided into several service centers. Lack of
accurate water supply/ consumption data for those centers makes it impossible to determine
the actual water demand of the municipality. An estimate is possible, however, by adopting
the daily consumption rate of 300 LPCD recommended by the NPWS (4). Accordingly, the
water demand for the MoAS will increase from 90,570 m3/day presently to about 99,000 m3/
day in 2023 excluding the water demands of the IDPs.
According to the IMO report issued on Nov. 2018 (6), the number of IDPs residing in the
MoAS is 15,000; assuming a water use of 150 liters per day per IDP, the total IDPs water
demand in 2018 is 225 m3/day. It is likely that the number of IDPs will decrease by 2023
with prospects of stability and security improving although slowly. A sizable fraction will
choose to resettle in the MoAS due to better job opportunities and security. If an optimistic
assumption that half of these IDPs will return to their cities of origin, the IDPs water demand
in 2023 will be 112.5 m3/day. Consequently, the total water demand for the MoAS for the
years 2018 and 2023 is estimated to be 90,795 and 99,112.5 m3/day, respectively.

5.2.4 SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY FOR THE MUNICIPALITY OF ABU SALEEM

There are four sources for domestic water supply in the MoAS, namely; the MMRP, public
well fields, public “Division” wells and private wells.

77
5.2.4.1 The MMRP
The MMRP has been the main source of water for the city of Tripoli since 1996; its water
is transported through the eastern branch of Phase II (Hasawna/Jefara) system. The 40-km
long transmission pipeline extends from Sidi AsSyeh balancing reservoir (200,000 m3) and
bifurcates near Tripoli to two branches feeding balancing reservoirs and pumping stations
at Ain Zara and the Airport Road sites; both sites are within the MoAS boundaries. The
MoAS is fed from the western line (Airport Road Reservoir).

5.2.4.2 Well Fields

The MoAS is located within the Jefara basin where groundwater is available at depths of
20 to 250 meters with well yields of 20 - 50 m3/hour and water depths of 20 to 150 m. The
total dissolved solids (TDS) concentration is high (2,000 – 4,000 mg/L) due to sea water
intrusion. The Swani well field (located near the Tripoli Airport Road) was developed within
this basin over four decades ago to be a major supply source of water for the city of Tripoli.
It consists of 50 wells with depths ranging from 70 to 80 meters, productivities exceeding
10 m3/hour, and TDS concentrations exceeding 3,000 mg /L (7). The potential productivity
of the field exceeds12,000 m3/day. Clearly, this productivity is quite small compared to the
water demand of the MoAS.

The Swani wells are not connected to the distribution network. Moreover, some of these
wells are not operational while others have been overtaken by persons claiming ownership
of the well field site. Consequently, utilization of this well field is difficult if not impossible,
presently. This situation leaves the MoAS with only one viable public source of water supply;
namely, the MMRP. Nevertheless, this well field must be reactivated fully and connected
and integrated to the water supply scheme of Greater Tripoli to be utilized as an emergency
source in the case of an extended shutoff of the MMRP supplies due to force majeure.

5.4.2.3 Divisions Wells

There are 49 “Divisions” wells serving residential communities in public housing projects
distributed in around ten locations within the MoAS. These wells are around 100m deep
with productivities of 15 m3/hour; water quality is poor exceeding 2,500 mg/L (1). These
wells are not connected to the Public Water Distribution Network (WDN). Some of them
have been taken over by land owners near the well sites claiming ownership of the land in
which the wells are drilled. Despite their poor quality and low productivities, these wells
can be utilized as emergency sources upon connection of these “Divisions/ communities”
to a central water distribution network.

5.4.2.4 Private Wells

Finally, water is supplied through the drilling of private wells in areas where public water
supply is not available or is insufficient/ frequently interrupted. Drilling operations are
undertaken without the permission of the General Water Authority (GWA) and with little
compliance with regulatory or acceptable technical practices.

No data are available on the number of wells drilled/ used to supplement or replace public
water sources or on the quantities of water withdrawn. Similarly, there are no data on the
water quality of these wells. As illegal wells are drilled in areas lacking public water supply
and sewerage services, they are subject to contamination from nearby septic tanks used
within the same premises. As such, they constitute a public health hazard that increases
with the rise in the number of wells drilled.

78
The use of hauled water forms a last source of water for all residents of the MoAS and other
municipalities in cases of emergency, i.e., when other sources are unavailable for whatever
reason. Such a source is occasional and data on its use are scarce, but its existence is
demonstrated by the availability of haul trucks at set locations; water prices discourage the
frequent use of this source, however.

5.2.5 COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO WATER SUPPLY

The supply of water to the MoAS residents along with some districts of neighboring
municipalities (including Ain Zara, AlHani, and Arada) is the responsibility of the East Tripoli
Service Office of the GCWW zones. The total population served by this office is 582,854
persons. The service zone is supplied from the MMRP and wells; the amounts available
are 338,450 and 893 m3/day, respectively. The total quantity available is, therefore, 339,343
m3 while the total amount required based on a daily per capita consumption of 300 liters is
174,856 m3, an excess of 164,487 m3 is thus available (8).

The daily consumption inside residential dwellings within the MoAS was estimated to be 1
m3/household and 116 liters per capita (9). Addition of commercial consumption (20%) and
leakage (35%) will raise the consumption to 180 lpcd. This value is considerably below that
proposed in the NPWS implying availability of sufficient water quantities for the MoAS for
a long period of time.

The number of connections to the distribution network in the MoAS is estimated to be

30,000. Only a small fraction of these connections have installed water meters. Meter
penetration is very low (1).

Some counties (Mahallat), particularly those in the southern parts of the MoAS such as
AlHadhba Al-Khadra Project “Village”, with an estimated population of 15,000 persons,
are not connected to the WDN. They are supplied through unauthorized connections to the
MMRP transmission line.

Generally, the coverage of water supply to large parts of the MoAS is still limited due to the
following factors:-

• The exclusion of large areas of the MoAS from urban plans as they are considered
and classified as urban sprawl that cannot absorb readily major infrastructures;
• Some areas of the MoAS are not or have only been included in the infrastructural
plans because of their location outside approved plans;
• Interruption and incompleteness of execution of planned infrastructure projects.

Data on the geographic extent of the distribution network within the MoAS are not
available. Moreover, the quantities of water supplied to the MoAS are not known as no
flow measurements are made and no records are available of such quantities. Flow meters
are not installed at any point within the water supply scheme. Per capita consumption
rates are not known as metering penetration is very limited, a large fraction of meters
are malfunctioning, not functioning or bypassed. Little metering data are documented
and utilized to draw consumption rates and variations. Illegal connections also exist thus
increasing the chances of error when estimating actual network coverage. Finally, the
condition of the distribution network within the MoAS is not known, but it is likely to be
average-to-poor due to aging and lack of timely maintenance.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the MMRP is the main source of water supply
in the MoAS with public and private wells supplying a smaller fraction of population most

79
of whom reside outside the boundaries of the 2nd and 3rd Generation Masterplans.

5.2.6 WATER QUALITY CHARACTERISTICS

Water quality characteristics of random samples collected from the distribution network
were analyzed by the GCWW Tripoli Office during 2017 (10); the results of this analysis
are shown in table 1. Similar analysis was conducted by the Consultant on four samples
withdrawn randomly from wells and from the WDN in different areas in the MoAS; namely,
Abu Saleem poly-clinic (Public Distribution Network), Hay Alzhoor Distribution Network
(supplied from local well),well at a mosque in Hay Alzhoor, and a well in an agricultural
project in south Abu Saleem. The results of this analysis are shown in table 2.

Table 1. Water quality characteristics of the MMRP distributed in the MoAS

Permitted concentration ac-

Indicator Parameter* cording to Libyan Standard No.
82/2015 for drinking water **
pH 7.6 to 7.8 6.5 - 8.5
Total dissolved solids 1026 - 1050 1000
Total Hardness as CO3Ca 160-170 500
Calcium 55-65 -
Magnesium - -
Potassium - 40

Zinc - 3.0

Sodium - 200

Sulfates 28-35 250

Chlorides - 250

Manganese - 0.05

Nitrate 45- 48 45

Free chlorine residual 0.2 - 0.3 0.5

*expressed as mg/L except pH **The maximum limits for total coliforms and E. coli is 0/100
ml. The free residual chlorine concentration was set at 0.2 to 0.5 mg /L

5.2.6.1 Quality of the MMRP Waters

In 1993, the city of Tripoli started to receive water from Phase II of the MMRP via Sidi
AsSayeh reservoir from which it was pumped to Tripoli’s WDN from pumping stations at
the Airport Road and Ain Zara.

It can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 that the MMRP waters comply with the Libyan Drinking
Water Standard No. 82 of 2015 (11) with the analysis taken in 2017 showing a critical nitrate

80
concentration level. Available data from the MMRP/ Phase II over many years give nitrate
concentration below the allowable limit (12), this result being an objective of their water
quality management policies and practices. The more recent analysis shown in table 2 is in
full compliance with the standards.

If nitrate concentration rises above the allowable level in the future, nitrate removal
must be considered, and treatment units should be added to the existing water supply
infrastructures to make the water suitable for human consumption. If bottled water is used
for drinking and culinary purposes, then water treatment is not needed.

Table 2.Water quality characteristics of four sources utilized in the MoAS

Source of Water

Indicator
Distribution Net- Hay Alzhoor Net- Well in Well in agricultur-
work –supplied work – supplied Mosque at Hay al project south
by MMRP* from local well Alzhoor Abu Saleem

pH 7.23 7.04 6.89 6.71

TDS 995.70 2516.10 2422.90 1774

TH as CO3Ca 420.38 1070.96 950.86 1010

Calcium 132.25 308.58 252.48 288.55

Magnesium 21.87 72.91 77.77 70.48

Potassium 11.73 25.12 24.43 14.28

Sodium 170.31 470.37 450.86 200.11

Sulfate 272.65 672.65 799.19 539.12

Chlorides 129.00 774.20 633.10 523.23

Nitrate 16.30 24.40 19.80 16.40

Free chlorine residual 0.08 0.0 0.0 0.0

Total Coliform Bacteria Not detected No data No data 10

E. Coli Not detected No data No data Not detected

*expressed as mg/L except pH

81
Moreover, the MMPR water is usually managed so that nitrate concentration remains within
the acceptable levels. As the MoAS relies completely on the MMRP water, the quality of
the water distributed through public networks is simply that of the MMRP waters altered
slightly by the dissolution of networking piping materials and infusion of pollutants from
soils/ ground waters coming in contact with these materials. Such infusion will depend on
the state of the network materials and level of leakage it suffers. A significant impact of
leakage is the introduction of pathogenic organisms into the network and their spread to
large numbers of end-users.

5.2.6.2 Quality of Public Well Fields Waters

The quality of waters provided from three wells located at 3 different districts within the
MoAS indicate that the water quality from all sources is unacceptable for potable purposes
as many parameters do not comply with the Libyan standards. The parameters present
in excessive concentrations include: TDS, hardness, sodium, chlorides and microbial
indicators. Moreover, there is no residual in the network distributing these waters making
them a potential public health hazard.

A comparison between the different well waters shows that wells in Hay AzZuhoor are
clearly affected by seawater intrusion; the TDS, chloride, sodium and sulfate concentrations
are too high for wells located inland. These sources are inadequate for domestic purpose
and must be replaced as the impacts of seawater intrusion will continue to rise although
more rapidly with time.

In all samples tested, the distributed water had no chlorine residual. It is, therefore,
susceptible to microbial contamination, and subsequently, it is a potential public health
risk. Chlorination must be included as a necessary treatment process for all public supplied
waters.

It can be seen that water quality monitoring is seldom considered within the water supply
management practices. The significance of water quality and its impact on public health and
infrastructures durability make it an essential element in these management practices. To
this end, assigning personnel, providing special administrative units, provision of analytical
laboratories with materials and training are a priority for the MoAS. Data generated from
this water quality management subsystem should be incorporated into the water supply
system information and archiving system for easy referencing, documentation, analysis
and reporting.

5.2.7 WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUCTURES

5.2.7.1 Water Supply Infrastructural Components
Reservoirs and Storage Capacity

The MMRP water is conveyed from Sidi AsSayeh reservoir through a 40 km transmission
line to supply the city of Tripoli (including the MoAS). This feeder diameter is 1600-2400 mm.
Originally, the MMRP water was to flow into 3 existing reservoirs at Ain Zara and 4 existing
reservoirs at the Tripoli Airport Road sites belonging to the GCWW. The total capacities of
the reservoirs in Ain Zara and the Tripoli Airport Road sites were 120,000 m3and 160,000
m3, respectively. These waters will be pumped from each site to the specified points to feed
the Tripoli WDN.

The Tripoli Airport Road reservoirs were intended to store water that would supply the

82
western parts of the city of Tripoli including Hay Al-Andalus, Ghout Al-Shaal, Al-Daribi
and Abu Saleem. Because the pressure available at the site is 5 bar, use was made of
this pressure to supply these parts directly without the need for storage and pumping.
Subsequently, these reservoirs are not in use currently.

Seven large capacity elevated tanks were constructed throughout Tripoli to supply water
to the city’s different parts. It was not possible to utilize these tanks, however, because the
pressure in the network during the low demand periods was too low to raise the water to
these tanks.

To ensure water availability during MMRP cutoffs, a large number of households have
constructed storage tanks within their premises; the capacities of these tanks exceeding 20
m3; the number of these tanks is not available.

Transmission lines and water distribution network

The MoAS is supplied by the Tripoli Public Water Supply Network which is operated by
the GCWW. This network is hydraulically continuous; there are no points of separation or
control of flow volumes or directions between the MoAS and neighboring municipalities.

The MoAS grew gradually both in area and population; it is therefore not possible to
delineate boundaries for the WDN or to trace the evolution of the water supply scheme for
the municipality. The municipality evolved around the commercial center of a popular area
of Abu Saleem once considered a gate at the traditional periphery of historic Tripoli.

The WDN evolved in response to the growth of this densely populated area in the early
seventies. It was rehabilitated and expanded in the 1990’s. The water mains diameters vary
from 250 to 800 mm while sub-main sizes (sub-grids) diameters range from 75 to 200 mm.
Mains are made of ductile iron while sub-mains are made of galvanized iron or polyethylene.
Metal based pipes are susceptible to corrosion especially galvanized iron. As a result, these
pipes suffer serious damages causing high leakage losses with associated problems and
losses; the higher the pressure, the larger the losses. Scenes of water ponding and road
closure for maintenance are not uncommon in parts of the municipality. The large number
of illegal connections contributes to operation, maintenance and leakage because of the
poor workmanship employed in making them.

A considerable number of newly established communities located out of the approved

masterplan lack public distribution networks. They improvised alternative water supply
sources either through illegal connections (by those living near the networks or near
the MMRP transmission line) or from private wells. In some small settlements, residents
constructed their own distribution networks which were mostly poorly designed and poorly
executed causing additional problems to the public networks. An example of the illegal
connections is that supplying the AlHadhba AlKhadra Project community from the MMRP
transmission line. This community has evolved gradually as the agricultural settlement
project of the same name - based on reuse of wastewater effluent to irrigate farms was
transformed into a residential settlement. The project is now home to Abu Tharr AlGhefari
and AlHussain districts of the MoAS (Figure 1).

5.2.7.2 State of Water Supply Infrastructures in the MoAS

Information and data on the exact state of water supply infrastructures in the MoAS are
very scarce due to the lack of routine monitoring and documentation of technical activities
including execution, operation and maintenance. The problem is accentuated by the
absence of a central database. A general, subjective and qualitative description of this

83
state is given below based on discussions with officials in the service offices and in the
concerned departments in the GCWW:

6. The Swani Well Field is partly inaccessible while accessible wells are in a poor
condition technically requiring major overhauls or replacement of pumps and control
equipment;
7. The Swani Well Field is not connected to the public WDN and, therefore, cannot be
relied upon as a standby or emergency water source;
8. The quality of the Swani Well Field water is poor and unacceptable for most domestic
uses. Treatment for salinity reduction is necessary; as salinity will increase with the
advance of seawater intrusion, selection of the appropriate treatment technology is
critical;
9. The “Divisions” wells are in a poor condition with poor water quality;
10. The transmission line conveying MMRP water from Sidi AsSayeh reservoir to the
Airport Road and Ain Zara sites is in good condition;
11. The pumping station at the Airport Road site has been looted and vandalized;
new pumps, control equipment and other ancillaries are needed to restore it to its
operation state;
12. The equalization and storage tanks at the Airport Road site are in good condition and
can serve as an emergency storage despite their limited capacity;
8. Chlorination of water supplied to the MoAS residents is not practiced exposing them to
potential public health risks; operation and maintenance (O & M) of water supply works within
the MoAS is the responsibility of the GCWW; the human, financial and material capacities
available for these services are very modest and can hardly meet the rising demands
of the residents and the sustenance of the deteriorating infrastructures;
9. The MoAS has utilities office which overlooks the water supply issues; the role of this
office is not integrated well with that of the GCWW. It is at the same time understaffed
and overwhelmed with growing challenges and activities;
10. The older parts of the WDN in the MoAS employed metallic pipes while those of
the wastewater collection network employed asbestos cement. Corrosion of water
and wastewater pipes caused serious leakage and cross-connection between water
and wastewater in the area of Bab Ben Ghashier causing serious contamination
and potential public health risks in addition to losses of water supply and structural
damages;
11. The pressure available from the MMRP is not controlled and is highest during the
low demand “night” periods; during this period, the aging distribution network is
subjected to excessively high pressures causing further damages as well as wastage
of large quantities of water due to leakage;
12. The wastewater plant is presently not functional; untreated wastewater is collected
in large storage lagoons. It is subject to evaporation while a large portion percolates
into the soil potentially reaching and polluting the groundwater reservoir.
13.
5.2.8 MANAGEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM IN THE MoAS
The water supply system in the MoAS is managed by the Abu Saleem Services Center under
the direct supervision of the Tripoli Operation and Maintenance Region of the GCWW. The
center employs 35 persons; most of these employees are technicians (mostly drivers of
heavy machinery and trucks) while the rest are administrative and financial staff (Table 3).
There is a clear shortage of O & M technicians and engineers, information management,
legal services and customer relations. Moreover, the present employee numbers are
disproportionally low for the large size and population of the municipality. As a result, the
level of service provision is marginal. Not surprisingly, clients have been dissatisfied with
only about 10 % paying their service fees since 2011.
There is no established system for the periodic or major maintenance service for the water

84
supply scheme in the MoAS and no preventive maintenance plan. Similarly, there is no
emergency or contingency plan for force majeure, extended water cutoffs, the spread of
water borne epidemics, etc. Routine disinfection – which is a basic requirement of all water
supply systems – is not in use in the municipality. No emergency chlorination facilities
or mobile units are available at time to the municipality or to the GCWW. Finally, the
Service Center has no workshops, equipment, or maintenance tools, no leakage detection
equipment and no spares or materials for basic maintenance operations.
Table 3.Staff Data at Abu Saleem Water Service Center

Number Employed as
Total
Technicians Administrators Financial
25 7 3 35
*From ref. 10
The above water supply problems are complicated by the absence of a technical archive,
metering and gauging at critical points and at water use points, so it is not possible to
locate pipeline routes, valve types and locations, pipe data (diameter, material, length, age,
etc.), as-built-drawings, O & M records, etc. There is no central control system for any part
of the water supply scheme under the mandate of the GCWW. Consequently, the water
supply scheme operation is unsystematic relying mostly on the experience of a few local
operators and conducted on a reactive crisis-based management.

5.2.9 FUTURE WATER SUPPLY SOURCES

5.2.9.1 Water Demand and Supply Balance
The total estimated water demand for the MoAS for the years 2018 and 2023 was estimated
to be 90,795 and 99,112.5 m3/day, respectively (Section 5.2.3.2). The major part of the
present demand is provided by the MMRP with the remaining part supplied from public
and private wells. The exact amounts supplied are not known, however. Reports by the
GCWW confirm that the MMRP supply exceeded by large factors the demands of the MoAS
and other Tripoli municipalities based on a per capita demand of 300 l/d (4).

5.2.9.2 Future Water Supply Sources and Infrastructures

With no announced plans for the development of new water sources, it is very likely that
the MMRP will continue to supply the MoAS with its major water needs. The quantity to
be supplied will satisfy the demands readily. Other sources of water will also continue to
be used in the near future. Two points of concern will arise, however; first is the further
decline in water quality which may render the water unsuitable for most domestic uses
thus forcing users to seek alternate sources including hauling water personally, hauled
water or purchase of water treatment units.

Secondly, overexploitation may lead to source depletion; again forcing users to seek more
costly sources. Both concerns are likely to occur and should be granted proper attention
by the GCWW/MoAS to ensure user satisfaction. The issues should also be considered on
a regional scale within the integrated water resources and water supply strategies of the
Greater Tripoli Region. One viable alternative is to expand the coverage of the networks
supplied from the MMRP to these areas within a newly developed regional water masterplan.
Desalination is a second alternative that deserves consideration but requires longer time
to plan and execute as well as large financial resources which may not be available readily.

In view of the above, it is very important to prepare plans for maintaining and protecting

85
the current resources as well as identifying alternatives that can complement the available
water sources especially the MRRP supplies and meet future demands. Proposed short and
long term actions are as follows:
2. Short-term actions
• Restoring the ownership of the Swani Well Field taken over illegally;
• Protection of the current resources especially MMRP from terrorists, vandalism,
sabotage, illegal connections, and power cutoffs as well as anthropogenic pollution;
• Closure of all illegal connections made on the MMR pipeline;
• Improvement and maintenance of the Swani Well Field in order to be used mainly as
a backup to MMRP supplies in case of sudden shut down;
• Addressing water supply bottle-necks especially those in newly developed
communities/ sprawls.
3. Long-term actions
• Provision of large scale balancing and emergency storage for Phase II of the MMRP to
overcome extended water cutoffs due to power failures and terrorist acts;
• Installation of a desalination plant for the Greater Tripoli Region as a whole including
the MoAS to complement the MMRP supplies. Since the planning, design and
construction of large scale desalination plants requires large funding and a lot of time,
it is recommended to start work on this option now in order to avoid any water scarcity
for the community in the coming years. A feasibility study must be conducted prior
to such a construction, however, comparing a new desalination plant to increasing
protection and reliability of the MMRP waters.

5.2.9.3 Masterplans and Infrastructure Projects

The MoAS has historically been part of the municipality of Tripoli; as such, its water supply
masterplans were included as part of the Tripoli/ Region masterplans. Due to changes in
the boundaries of the Greater Tripoli municipalities, it is not possible to locate a water
masterplan for the MoAS. The existing water supply network was constructed in the
late 1960’s. Several Tripoli masterplans were developed in the 1970’s and 1980’s (13-15).
The deteriorating state of the network prompted the water authorities to implement two
Distribution Network Renovation Projects each costing 3.7 million LYD; these projects are
being executed by local contractors (1).
The larger area of the MoAS lacks public water supply schemes as stated previously because
it has not been incorporated into the urban masterplans of the Tripoli Region. Therefore, it
will not be possible to plan and execute such schemes until such plans are prepared and
approved, a process that will take several years given the priorities and conditions prevailing
presently in Libya. Therefore, reliance will continue on private sources and unauthorized
connections to the MMRP transmission lines.

5.2.9.4 Armed Conflict Caused Damages to Water Infrastructures in the MoAS

The MoAS was a battle ground to armed conflict during the period 2011, August- 2018; it
suffered losses of lives, destruction, damages, as well as the displacement of thousands of
its residents in Libya’s most violent clashes. Many destroyed buildings and infrastructures
bear witness to the level of material destruction and damages. Fortunately, the damages
to the water supply infrastructures were limited with insignificant direct impacts. Armed
conflict caused destruction of buildings and damages to infrastructures caused serious
psychological and social damages as well as socio-economic and environmental losses.

5.2.10 IDPs AND RETURNEES OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN THE MoAS

The MoAS has hosted a large number of IDPs from several cities in Libya since 2011.

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Residents of the municipality were also forced to leave their homes and become IDPs in
other parts of Libya because of several violent armed conflicts which took place in densely
populated parts of the municipality; the last conflicts took place last August.

The majority of IDPs in the municipality came in three waves and from three different
regions in Libya; the first wave came in 2011 from several cities in western Libya but
mainly from Tawergha. The second wave came from Kikkla and Yefrin in early 2014 almost
simultaneously with the third wave coming from Benghazi. The total number of IDPs
according to the IMO Round 22 (Sept. -Oct., 2018)was 15,000 persons while that of the
returnees was 27,000 persons (4).The majority of these IDPs are from Tawergha followed
by Kikkla with the smallest number being from Benghazi (Table 4).
Most IDPs from Kikkla found shelter in government apartments while those from Benghazi
rented apartments paid for by the state or by their own money. The water supply conditions
for Benghazi, Kikkla and Yefrin IDPs are simply those of the public water supply schemes
in the regions hosting them. Unlike other IDPs who came post 2014, those from Tawergha
came during the toppling of the previous regime and had to resettle in camps with poor
services. The conditions of the water supply systems in camps where Tawergha IDPs reside
are incomparable, however.
Table 4. Numbers and Sources of IDPs in the MoAS

Municipality of Origin Misrata Benghazi Kikkla Yefrin Total

Number 5,000 2,500 4,900 2,600 15,000

5.2.10.1State of Water Supply in Camps of IDPS from Tawergha Residing in the

MoAS
The earliest IDPs from Tawergha, the largest in numbers, were less fortunate being forced
to live in three camps: Airport Road Camp, Fallah Road 1 and Fallah Road 2 that lacked
most basic services (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Locations of Tawergha IDPs Camps in the MoAS (16)

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To assess the state of water supply systems in IDPs Camps of Tawerghans in the MoAS,
field visits were made to these camps which focused primarily on water availability and
quality along with the adequacy of these systems. Visual observations were supported
with discussions with camp managers and concerned authorities in the MoAS, the GCWW
and Abu Saleem Service Office. The results of this assessment are summarized below.

Airport Road Camp

Shelter. This camp is a dormitory for construction workers in an interrupted project.

According to the camp manager, this camp is home to a total of 370 families (1,700 persons).
The IDPs live in 46 subdivisions, each with 14 rooms (Figure 4). Toilets and showers are
shared. Each subdivision has 5 toilets and 5 showers. Additional makeshift housing was
added at the camp to accommodate those IDPs who could not afford to rent houses in Abu
Saleem (Figure 4). The camp has a basic science school with 218 students.

Water Supply and Distribution. The state of water supply system in the Airport Road Camp
is presented in Table 5. Originally, the camp was supplied with water from a specially drilled
well (Figure 5). Camp residents faced serious water shortages because of frequent power
outages. As a result, taps were made in the ventilation chamber of the MMRP Tripoli -
Western Region supply pipeline (Figure 5); three 1-inch diameter polyethylene pipes were
connected at these taps with a valve room of the chamber on the MMRP line which provided
a more sustainable water supply source (Figure 5). The well water was then used during
emergency periods when the MMRP faces shutdowns. Water is supplied directly from the
supply line to the points of use (toilets and kitchens) in the dormitory.

Three other wells exist at the site but are not functional due to pump and control system
electromechanical problems. A wastewater treatment plant exists but is not functional. The
waste is collected in a septic tank and hauled by trucks.

The camp water supply challenges facing the IDPs until August 2018 were as follows:

• Many of the half-inch polypropylene distribution network pipes supplying the camp
have deteriorated; leaking water in large quantities created ponds inside the camp
which are source of insects especially during the summer months (Figure 6). These
pipes require urgent replacement with larger pipes of 0.75 or 1 inch;
• Lack of an emergency source of electricity to supply the camp with water and
power during emergency situations (Power shortages);
o The school toilets are without water;
o The water quality, especially that of the well, is not suitable for human consumption;
o The camp generated wastewater is collected in an open un-engineered pond which is a
potential source of air and water pollution (Figure 6). This problem requires immediate
attention to avoid public health risks.
Table 5.State of Water Supply System: Airport Road Camp, Tawergha IDPs and MoAS

Item Description Condition

Source One well in the camp sometimes is used to supply Not Acceptable
the camp and MMRP through illegal connection

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Pumps 1 Submersible pump –Pumping water from the well Not Acceptable
to 2plastic ground level tanks.
(Maintnenace and Supply)
1 Surface pump – Pumping water from plastic ground
level tanks to the camp network (Currently it is not
operational)

Tanks 2 Ground plastic storage tanks – are in use. Receive Acceptable

water
from MMRP illegal connection - Distribute water to
the network by gravity only in case the surface pump
is not operational

Network Water is supplied to the public bathrooms of the Not Acceptable

dormitory sections. Water is supplied via individual
connections to each housing unit for cooking and ( Maintenace)
cleaning use only

Quality Supplied water is not suitable for drinking and bot- Not Acceptable
tled water is bought for drinking

Quantity Sufficient amount of water is supplied to the camp Acceptable

Dormitory Housing b. Makeshift Housing

Figure 4. Shelter Types of Tawergha IDPs in the Airport Road, MoAS

a. Water well and connections b. MMRP tap/ connection c. Water Supply Lines
Figure 5. Water Supply of Tawergha IDPs in the Airport Road Camp, MoAS

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The IDPs in this camp were forced to evacuate it during the conflicts that took place in
southern Tripoli during August and September 2018. They witnessed a second displacement
to other cities with a few returning back to Tawergha. Some of these IDPs have returned to
the camp although numbers are not available.

Leaking Pipe b. Wastewater Pond

Figure 6. Leaking Water Pipe and Pond at Airport Road Camp

Fallah Road Camp No. 1

Shelter. This camp is located at the intersection of Fallah Road with Al-Madina Al-Riyadhiya
Road. The camp is also a construction company workers dormitory. It hosts a total of 250
families (about 1,250 persons) living in 20 sections. Each section has 15 to 21 rooms.
Additional makeshift shelters were constructed at the camp to accommodate more IDPs
who could not afford to rent houses in Abu Saleem. The camp has a standby generator that
is maintained frequently. The camp has a basic science school with 240 students.

Water Supply and Distribution. The state of the water supply system in the Fallah Road
Camp 1 is summarized in Table 6. The camp supplied with water from the following sources:

o A 40-m deep well (Figure 7);

o The Public Network (MMRP).
Water is collected from these two sources in a concrete ground tank and pumped into the
camp’s internal distribution network. It is desalinated using 5 m3/day RO Unit which was
supplied by an NGO to provide camp residents with potable water (Figure 8). This unit’s
capacity is insufficient for the camp residents. Consumables for operation of this unit are
unavailable presently.

The surface pump lifting water from the ground reservoir to the elevated tank is out of
order. Many of the distribution network pipes are deteriorated causing leakage and ponding
inside the camp area.

Table 6. Water Supply System: Fallah Road Camp 1, Tawergha IDPs, Abu Saleem

Item Description Condition

Source One well in the camp sometimes is Acceptable

used to supply the camp and MMRP
connection with 4 - 5 m3/day of RO
treatment unit for drinking water.

90
 Pumps 1 Submersible pump –Pumping wa- Acceptable
ter from the well to ground level tanks
and then to elevated storage tank. (Maintenance and Supply)

1 Surface pump – Pumping water from

ground storage tank to elevated tank
and then to the camp network (current-
ly in good operational state). Standby
generator is needed.

Tanks Ground and elevated storage tanks are Acceptable

in use. Receive water from one well
and MMRP - Distribute water to the
network and feeding RO water treat-
ment unit by the surface pump.

Net- Water is supplied to the public bath- Acceptable

work rooms of the dormitory sections. Water
is supplied via individual connections ( Maintenance)
to each dormitory unit for cooking and
cleaning use only

Quality Supplied water from well is not suit- Acceptable

able for drinking and water from RO
unit is used for drinking

Quan- Sufficient amount of water is supplied Acceptable

tity to the camp

Key

Important
Urgent but not No action needed
urgent

Figure 7. Water Well: Fallah Camp 1 Figure 8. Desalination unit: Fallah Camp 1

Fallah Road Camp 2

Shelter. This camp is located at the junction of the second ring road with Fallah Road
(South of the Ring Road). The number of IDPs is 940 (155 families). They live in 13 sections,

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each with 15 to 21 rooms. The camp was used by a contractor to accommodate housing
project construction workers.

Water Supply and Distribution. The state of the water supply system in the Fallah Road
Camp 2 is presented in Table 7. The camp is provided with water from the following sources:
• Public Network (MMRP) which is used (unauthorized tap) as the main water source;
• A well which is used in case of emergency (cutoff of the MMRP water);
A desalination unit is used to produce potable water; its capacity is too little to satisfy the
camp IDPs requirements, however. Consumables and spares for this unit are not available.

Wastewater generated in the camp is collected in a septic tank and emptied regularly
(Figure 9).

5.2.10 KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES AND

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY
IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ABU SALEEM

The MoAS is one of Greater Tripoli largest municipalities both in population and in area.
About half of the municipality is included in the 2nd and 3rd Generation Masterplans with the
other half growing randomly with poor infrastructures and services. Incidentally, the MoAS
has been the subject of most tense clashes and damages with the highest numbers of
Returnees. It also hosted the highest numbers of IDPs from other impacted municipalities.
In addition to IDPs and Returnees challenges, the MoAS faced direct and indirect impacts
and challenges in the fields of basic service provision; the most important is water supply.

Table 7. Water Supply System: Fallah Road Camp 2, Tawergha IDPs and MoAS

Item Description Condition

Source One well in the camp sometimes is used to sup- Acceptable

ply the camp and MMRP connection, small RO
water treatment unit 1 m3/day is used for drink-
ing water.

Pumps 1 Submersible pump –Pumping water from the Acceptable

wells to ground level tanks.
Maintenance and Sup-
1 Surface pump – Pumping water from ground ply)
storage tank to the camp network (currently in
good condition)

Tanks Ground storage tank is in use. Receive water Acceptable

from wells and MMRP - Distribute water to the
network, and feeding RO water treatment unit
by the surface pump

Network Water is supplied to the public bathrooms of Acceptable

the dormitory sections via individual connec-
tions to each dormitory and used for cooking Maintenance
and cleaning use only

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Quality Supplied water is not suitable for drinking and Acceptable
water from RO unit is used for drinking

Quantity Sufficient amount of water is supplied to the Acceptable

camp

Key

Important
Urgent but not No action needed
urgent

Figure 9. Septic tank serving Tawergha IDPs, Fallah 2 Camp

This report presented an assessment of the state of water supply in the MoAS which
included an identification of gaps, and subsequently, a quantitative definition of the urgent
investment needs and the preparation of short-term and medium-term development plans
for rehabilitation and restoration of water supply services. The key findings, priorities and
recommendations of this assessment are listed below. The following section specifies the
urgent, short and medium range interventions (Investment and development plans).

5.2.10.1 Key Findings

1. There is no assessment of the state of water supply infrastructures in the Greater Tripoli
Region (Including the MoAS). Lack of knowledge about this state represents a major
challenge to planning as well as executing institutions and service providers including
municipalities;
2. About half of the MoAS has been incorporated into the 2nd and 3rd Generation
Masterplans; this leaves the second half of the municipality in a “must-wait” position
until preparation and approval of new masterplans thus paving the way for random
development of water supply schemes;
3. The exact amount of water consumed by the MoAS residents is not known, but
the amount available from the MMRP exceeds markedly the demand based on a

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 consumption of 300 lpcd; actual population data are also not available due to boundary
changes of the municipality and the influx of migrants/ IDPs to the municipality;
4. The per capita water consumption is not known although it is estimated to be about
180 lpcd;
5. The water supply system in the MoAS is managed by the Abu Saleem Services Center
of the GCWW. Data available in this center on the water supply schemes are very scarce
due to its limited human, material and financial resources;
6. The technical and financial capabilities of the Abu Saleem Service Center/ GCWW are
limited; the staff numbers and qualifications are insufficient; these capacities can be
upgraded and increased from a large pool of GCWW employees and new job seeking
engineering and technical institutes graduates;
7. The MoAS relies almost completely on the MMRP for its water supply in the urban
“planned” areas while the rest of the municipality employs public “divisions” or private
groundwater wells and unauthorized taps on the MMRP transmission line;
8. The MMRP supply is adequate for meeting the present and future domestic water
demands of the MoAS;
9. The MMRP waters supplied to the MoAS along with other municipalities in the Greater
Tripoli Region is adequate for domestic uses, but there is no residual chlorine in
the distributed water creating a potential public health risk especially in light of the
deteriorating state of distribution pipes and wastewater collection pipes;
10. The quality of the water supplied by private or “Divisions” wells – located within the
MoAS - is poor with TDS concentrations exceeding 2500 mg/L; this level will continue
to rise due to seawater intrusion rendering the waters unsuitable for domestic uses.
Alternative sources including the MMRP or treatment of the existing sources are
inevitable in the medium term;
11. The major source of water for the MoAS/ GCWW, the MMRP, is a reliable long -term
source because it is a national project, fully supported by official government, financially
independent, with a capable work force, long and successful O & M experience;
12. The major source of water for the MoAS/ GCWW, the MMRP, is a national project, fully
supported by official government, financially independent, with a capable work force,
long and successful O & M experience;
13. The water supply is available at high pressure negating the need for pumping stations
that require continuous skilled operation, power and maintenance; pressure control is
not applied presently leading to large losses of water due to leakage;
14. The Swani Well Field, located within the MoAS, constitutes a supplemental water
source in case of emergencies. However, out of the 49 wells in the field, 5 wells were
destroyed; 17 are non-functional, 23 are taken over by neighboring farmers; one is
too salty; leaving only two wells operational. Clearly, repossession, redevelopment,
installation of a treatment plant to reduce the high salinity of the waters and connection
to the WDN will be a formidable task unworthy of the contribution of the well field
which is estimated to be only 4900 m3/d;
15. Water sector institutions including the MMRP and the GCWW are cooperating well with
the local governance officials;
16. The GCWW/MoAS water supply service provision faces many serious threats and
challenges; the major ones are as follow:

• The absence of an integrated plan for municipal water supply/ management;

• The large population and area to be served and the high level of services expected;
• About half of the area to be served is not included in any urban or water masterplan;
this part of the municipality is the fastest growing thus presenting the most difficult
challenges; the continuous expansion of urban sprawl has adverse socioeconomic
and environmental impacts;
• There is an understanding and cooperation among the water supply institutions
including the MMRP, the GCWW and the local governance officials in the MoAS of

94
 the challenges facing the water services provision in the municipality; however, both
face serious financial constraints which have been aggravated by customers’ refusal
to pay water service tariffs;
• Financial constraints have been aggravated by rising prices, cash availability
crisis, and hyperinflation making O & M services and items either unavailable or
unaffordable;
• Reliance on one water supply source, the MMRP, has associated risks especially in
the absence of large scale storage and emergency backup source(s);
• Frequent power cuts and fuel shortages causing prolonged water shortages with
adverse impacts on water supply service levels and on electromechanical equipment
as well as socioeconomic impacts;
• Deteriorating water supply infrastructures requiring large financial resources which
are difficult to allocate due to the looming economic crisis; any investments in
this field should be preceded with a detailed survey of the state of water supply
infrastructures;
• Increased water losses due to leakage and lack of pressure control;
• Armed conflict and lack of security with adverse impacts on implementation of
projects and with severe damages and destruction to the water supply infrastructures;
• Weak law enforcement as reflected by the taking over of most wells in the Swani
field, unauthorized connections to the MMRP, etc.;
The above threats and challenges have reduced significantly the GCWW/ MoAS capacity to
effectively provide high level water supply services to the municipality’s population.

Based on the above findings, the following key priorities and recommendations can be
highlighted for further planning and implementation of interventions needed to ensure the
return of services, particularly water supply, to pre-conflict conditions.

5.2.10.2 Key Priorities and Recommendations for the Municipality of Abu

Saleem
4. Allocation of standby or emergency water source, storage facilities and redevelopment,
rehabilitation and renovation, as needed;
5. Provision of means of transporting water to households and vital facilities in cases
of extended water shortages or emergencies;
6. Preparation of an urban plan including an integrated water supply masterplan;
7. Conducting a detailed survey of the state of water supply infrastructures within the
MoAS but in consortium with other municipalities as is technically required to better
plan for upgrading the water supply service levels in the municipality;
8. Providing access to safe drinking water in those areas of the MoAS which lack this
basic service “Right”;
9. Completion of halted water supply projects which address directly supplying water
to areas of severe shortages;
10. Installation of water meters and pressure gauges in critical locations to allow
understanding of network/ water supply hydraulics, and consequently, to improve
operation, service quality and minimize leakage losses and associated damages;
11. Improve the reliability of electric power supply services connected to water supply
systems to ensure continuity of services;
12. Investigate water supply reliability issues through provision of alternate sources
and/or strategic storage;
13. Raise awareness on water conservation and water demand management;
14. Improve mechanisms for collection of revenues making use of internationally
demonstrated technologies and practices;
15. Elaborate urgent, short-term, and medium-term plans proposed in this report;

95
 16. Expedite the implementation of these plans especially the urgent investment/
development plan;
17. Establish an information management system along with a database, equipment,
software, etc. including all aspects of the water supply in the MoAS in association
with other municipalities linked technically with it; this task should include also
training of staff and provision of material and financial means for its continuity;
18. Establish a water supply and quality monitoring program and provide all human,
material and financial means needed to ensure its continuity;
19. Provide security for all employees, infrastructures and other assets to ensure safety
and service provision.
The above key priorities and recommendations have been translated into an investment/
development action plan to be implemented in three phases, urgent, short-term, and
medium-term sub-plans. These plans are provided in section5.2.11.

5.2.11 KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY IN THE TAWERGHA IDPs CAMPS IN THE MOAS

Armed conflict has forced the internal displacement of Tawergha’s population into many
cities of Libya since 2011. About five thousands of Tawergha IDPs resettled in three camps
in the MoAS. These are the Airport Road, Fellah Road 1, and Fallah Road 2 camps. In
August 2018, the Airport Road Camp IDPs were evacuated again. Living conditions and
water supply services in these camps are unacceptable in terms of sanitation and hygiene.

An assessment of the water supply conditions in these camps was undertaken starting
in March 2018. The key findings and priority recommendations are presented below. An
urgent intervention plan was prepared based on these findings and recommendations.
This plan is presented in section 5.2.12.

5.2.11.1 Key Findings Regarding Water Supply in the Tawergha IDPs Camps in
the MoAS
1. A total of 5000 IDPs from Tawergha have settled in three camps within the MoAS
since 2011;
2. These IDPs live mostly in dormitory constructed by ex-contractors to accommodate
their employees;
3. A few of the IDPs live in makeshift shelters that are of unacceptable quality;
4. The IDPs camps are supplied with water from the MMRP and from private wells;
the quality of the MMRP water is acceptable while that of the wells is marginal;
MMRP water supply shortages occur; storage is limited; water supply “Network”
is rudimentary; the water supplied is not chlorinated; and pumps are in continuous
need for repair;
5. Desalination units are used in two camps but are not functional presently due to lack
of spares and consumables;
6. The IDPs have expressed a strong desire to return to their hometown Tawergha;
countless reconciliation efforts have been made at all official and social levels, but to
no avail. At the same time, returning is associated with high security risks and lack
of electricity and water supply services due to almost complete destruction of these
infrastructures and the bad condition of education and health facilities;
7. The fact that the IDPs are residing in these camps temporarily makes it difficult to
execute costly permanent water supply works. At the same time, as long as these
IDPs are present in these camps, they must be provided with safe water in sufficient
quantity. This dilemma needs to be resolved through consultation among the

96
 municipality of Abu Saleem, Tawergha IDPs representatives, and the GCWW. As the
problem is national, involvement of central government bodies in charge of IDPs is
necessary.

5.2.11.2 Key Priorities and Recommendations for Rehabilitation of the Water

Supply
Schemes in Tawergha IDPs Camps in the MoAS
4. Providing appropriate shelter;
5. Providing adequate indoor water supply and sanitation facilities;
6. Providing adequate water supply;
7. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of water supply pipelines;
8. Provision of water storage to overcome shortages;
9. Providing adequate sanitation services;
10. Improving the reliability of electric power supply services.

5.2.12 URGENT NEEDS ANDINVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR

WATER SUPPLY IN THE MOAS
The MoAS has suffered extensive damages and destruction of buildings in some of its
suburbs with minimum damages to its water supply infrastructures, fortunately. However,
the municipality has experienced accelerating growth over a large area half of which has not
yet been incorporated into the urban masterplan of the Tripoli Region. The existing water
supply infrastructures are seemingly in a poor to bad condition although no extensive data
are available and a large of the municipalities’ population relies on private wells. The state
of water supply is, therefore, far from optimum.

To upgrade the level of water supply services and provide all residents of the municipality
with access to adequate “improved” water supplies, urgent investment interventions, short-
term and medium-term action plans have been proposed. The activities and implementation
schedules of these plans are presented in Annexes A.1, A.2 and A.3, respectively).

The urgent interventions needed by the municipality have been identified based on: 1)
Meetings with senior GCWW and the MoAS staff, 2) Review of water supply reports,
programs, and 3) Field visits to the municipality including the water infrastructures.
Prices for the items and services needed have been estimated from previous contracts/
offers, implemented projects, and from suppliers directly, in addition to the consultant’s
experience. Because most of the items are not available locally and, therefore, need to be
imported, the original prices – in US dollars – were adopted. This approach was supported
by the unstable rate of exchange of the Libyan dinar against foreign currencies.

The bill of quantities and prices for the urgent interventions investment plan which is to be
implemented within 6-12 months are presented in Annex A. It can be seen from this section
that the total cost of rehabilitation is about 2 million US dollars. This amount represents
mostly supplies of trucks for water supply to households and vital facilities in case of
extended water shortages or emergencies. Although the interventions are urgent, their
causes are not all directly related to the armed conflict and insecurity.

It is also clear that the amount of funds required is relatively small and can be managed
readily within the municipalities’ budget or from emergency allocations by the state. In the
event such funds are not available, a phased implementation plan should be prepared with
criteria based priorities.

97
5.2.12 URGENT NEEDS ANDINVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR THE
TAWERGHA IDPs CAMPS IN THE MoAS
The water supply systems in all of the Tawergha IDPs camps in Abu Saleem are in an
average to poor condition generally. The camp utilities were designed for workers, not
families; privacy is compromised. Urgent needs of these camps are specified in the form of
a bill of quantities in Annex B. It is to be stressed here that some of the quantities and prices
are estimates based on the field visit to the camps. Access to the camps was limited for
many reasons including privacy, and, the IDPs were not always willing to accept strangers
due to the generally bad conditions and low morale.

Prices of materials are also changing because of the costs of skilled labor. Some of the
items such as private water closets (WCs) and showers have been proposed because they
are essential for hygienic purposes, privacy and convenience of the IDPs, especially those
living in makeshift shelters; mobile units have been proposed because installation of fixed
units may not be possible due to administrative reasons or cost factors.

The estimated costs of rehabilitation of water supply systems in Tawergha IDPs camps in
the MoAS were 200,500 LYDs (Table 8). The costs are similar. These costs are clearly low
and funds can be obtained readily from several official and unofficial sources/ donors.
Fortunately, most equipment and services for the rehabilitation are available locally.
Table 8. Costs of Urgent Interventions for Tawergha IDPs Camps in the MoAS

Camp Airport Road Fallah Road 1 Fallah Road 2 Total

Rehabilitation Cost, in LYD 73,500 63,500 67,500 200,500

5.2.13 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
AlKasaba Consultants wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of senior staff of
the Municipality of Abu Saleem, the GCWW and the managers of Tawergha IDPs camps
in providing data and information and access to the camps and infrastructures. Special
thanks are extended to them.

5.2.14 REFERENCES
1. Municipal Council of the Municipality of Abu Saleem, Personal Communications,
Mar. – Nov. 2018;
2. Urban Planning Department 2nd Generation Masterplan, 2000;
3. Urban Planning Department 3rd Generation Masterplan, under preparation.
4. Secretariat of Planning, Libya, National Program for Water and Sanitation, 2005
5. General Information Authority, General Results Census-2006, 2007;
6. International Migration Organization (IMO), “DTM Libya- R22 IDPs and Returnees”,
Nov. 2018;
7. General Water Authority, Unpublished Report, 2009;
8. General Company for Water and Wastewater, State of the Water Report, 2017;
9. AnNawwari, H. S. A., “Estimation of Per Capita Residential Water Use in the Southern
Region of Tripoli,” a Bachelor of Science Project, Civil Engineering Department,
Faculty of Engineering, University of Tripoli, Libya, Spring, 2017;
10. General Company for Water and Wastewater, Tripoli Office, Water Quality Analysis

98
 on 2017, Personal Communication, April, 2018;
11. National Center for Standards and Metrology, Libyan Drinking Water Standard
82/2015;
12. Man-made River Project Execution and Management Authority, Unpublished Report,
2018;
13. The Municipality of Tripoli, Tripoli Integrated Plan, Tripoli1978
14. PoleService-Wadeco Consulting Engineering Companies, “The Integrated Report for
Tripoli”, 1985;
15. Engineering Consulting Office for Utilities, Updated Integrated Plan for Tripoli, 2005;
16. REACH, Libya Protection Monitoring: Tripoli and Al-Jifarah, December 2017;

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN RELATION TO REPORT PREPARATION

To be finalized upon approval of the Report as more information may be sought from
different experts, officials and staff.

No. Name Title Phone No.

1 Ali AbduNabi AlHrari Member, Municipal Council 0911348595

2 Hussairn AnNaaji Member, Municipal Council 0917234205

3 Ismaeel Tulaiba Head, Utilities Office

4 Mabrouk Abdullah Head, Projects Office

5 Mahmoud Sasi AlKikkli Head, Environmental Sanitation Office

6 Jamaal AlHrari Head, Urban Planning Office

7 Hishaam Zouagha Head, Hadhba Agricultural Project

Annex A.
Activities and Implementation Schedules for the Investment/ Development Plans for the
Water Supply Systems in
the Municipality of Abu Saleem

Annex A.1 Bill of Quantities for Urgent Investment/ Development Plan for Water Supply in the MoAS

Unit Price Subtotal

No. Description Unit Quantity
($) Price ($)

Provision of trucks equipped with 12 m3 steel water

tanks fully equipped for transporting water from al-
1 located well fields or sources to households and vital No. 12 130,000 1,560,000
public utilities in cases of extended water shortages
and emergencies

99
 Supply and installation of fixed water quality control
2 No. 1 150,000 150,000
laboratory, with training of 8 technicians

Supply of mobile water quality control laboratory,

3 No. 2 5,000 10,000
with training of users

4 Preparing an emergency water safety plan. L.S 1 60,000 60,000

Supply of mobile chlorination unit for post chlorina-

5 No. 1 150,000 150,000
tion of the pipe network of the municipality

Preparation of a Statement of Work (RFP) for the

preparation of a masterplan to include the south and
south west counties of the municipality, and the de-
sign work of the infrastructure (Road network, water
6 distribution network, sewage and rainwater drain- L.S 1 25,000 25,000
age networks, communication network, electrical
network and gas network)

Total 1,955,000

Annex A.2 Activities and Implementation Schedule for Short-term Development Plan (1-3 years) for Water Supply in the
MoAS

Implementation Schedule

No Activity Year 1 Year 2 Year 3

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12

Developing the existing water network

by maintaining the insulation valves and
1 replacing the damaged ones, in order to
ensure isolation of the network during the
maintenance work.

Preparation of a training plan for the reha-

bilitation of workers in the water sector, in-
cluding the implementation of training pro-
2
grams in various fields (Planning, design,
operation, maintenance, management and
development).

Establishment of a central workshop for

the maintenance of water supply systems
and the supply and provision of workshop
equipment, especially those related to ex-
3 cavation work, leakage detection, mainte-
nance and repair of distribution networks,
dismantling and piping of pipes, mainte-
nance of valves and operation and control
panels.

100
Annex A.2 Activities and Implementation Schedule for Short-term Development Plan (1-3 years) for Water Supply in the
MoAS “continued”
Implementation Schedule
No Activity Year 1 Year 2 Year 3

Preparation of a comprehensive plan for the ur-

ban planning of the Municipality of Abu Saleem
and the preparation of infrastructure plans for
basic services including the following schemes:
• Urban plan includes classification of resi-
dential, service, commercial and industri-
al land of the city.
• Planning and design of the municipal
road and transport network
• Designing the water supply system that
takes into consideration the integration
of the available water resources and their
4
treatment, transportation and distribution
within the municipality.
• Plan and design of drainage systems,
rainwater and sewage treatment plant.
• Plan and design of electricity and lighting
network
• Plan and design of gas distribution net-
work
• Plan and design of communication net-
works
• Design an integrated solid waste man-
agement system

101
 Annex A.3 Activities and Implementation Schedule for Medium-Term (3-5 years) Investment/ Development Plan for
Water Supply in the MoAS

Implementation Schedule

Activity

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20

Construction of infra-
structure projects in-
cluding road network,
water supply system,
distribution network,
reservoirs, pumping
1 stations, sewage sys-
tem, electricity and
lighting network, gas
distribution network,
communications and
solid waste transfer
stations

Review the training

plan for the rehabilita-
tion of workers in the
water sector, includ-
ing the implemen-
tation of advanced
courses and develop-
ment of the water ser-
2 vices company in the
region to provide ser-
vices at excepted in-
ternational standards
in the fields of (Strate-
gic planning, design,
operation, mainte-
nance, management
and development).

Annex B.
Bill of Quantities for Water Supply Systems, Tawergha IDPs Camps, Municipality of Abu
Saleem
Annex B.1 Bill of Quantities for Water Supply System: Airport Road, Tawergha IDPs Camp, Abu Sleem/ Tripoli

Unit Price, Total Price,

.No Item Description Unit Quantity
LYD LYD
1 Source Redevelop the water well in the
LS LS 1500 1500
;site

102
 2 Pumps Maintain submersible pump and
control/ protection system, elec-
trical and pipe connections to LS LS 500 500
ground water storage tanks
Maintain existing surface pump .No 1 100 100
Supply of 1 standby surface pump
.No 1 400 400

3 Tanks
4 Network Assess and rehabilitate water dis-
tribution pipes including replace-
ment of pipes, provision of valves, LS LS 6000 6000
.ancillaries, etc
5 Fixtures Assess and replace fixtures in
.kitchens, bathrooms, etc LS LS 10000 10000

6 Quality Supply and install one RO Unit,

5 m3/day including consumables .No 1 5000 5000
and spares for one year
7 Power Supply and install electricity gen-
erator, 40 kVA including consum-
ables and spares for one year 1 50000 50000
.No

Total (Seventy Three Thousand and Five Hundred) Libyan Dinars 73,500

Annex B.2 Bill of Quantities for Water Supply System: Fallah Road Camp 1, Tawergha IDPs, Abu Sleem/ Tripoli

Unit Price, Total Price,

.No Item Description Unit Quantity
LYD LYD
1 Source ;Redevelop the water well in the site
LS LS 1500 1,500

2 Pumps Maintain submersible pump and con-

trol/ protection system, electrical and
pipe connections to ground water LS LS 500 500
storage tanks

Maintain existing surface pump .No 1 100 100

Supply of 1 standby surface pump
.No 1 400 400

3 Tanks

4 Network

5 Fixtures Assess and replace fixtures in kitch-

.ens, bathrooms, etc LS LS 10000 10,000

6 Quality Supply of consumables and spares

for one year for RO Unit LS LS 500 500

7 Power Supply and install electricity gener-

ator, 40 kVA including consumables
and spares for one year .No 1 50000 50,000

103
 Total (Sixty Three Thousand and Five Hundred) Libyan Dinars 63,500

Annex B.3 Bill of Quantities for Water Supply System: Fallah Road Camp 2, Tawergha IDPs Camp, Abu
Sleem/ Tripoli
Unit Price, Total Price,
.No Item Description Unit Quantity
LYD LYD
1 Source ;Redevelop the water well in the site
LS LS 1,500 1,500

2 Pumps Maintain submersible pump and con-

trol/ protection system, electrical and
pipe connections to ground water LS LS 500 500
storage tanks

Maintain existing surface pump .No 1 100 100

Supply of 1 standby surface pump
.No 1 400 400

3 Tanks

4 Network

5 Fixtures Assess and replace fixtures in kitch-

.ens, bathrooms, etc LS LS 10,000 10,000

6 Quality Supply and install RO Unit, 5 m3/day

including consumables and spares for
one year for RO Unit LS LS 5,000 5,000

7 Power Supply and install electricity gener-

ator, 40 kVA including consumables
and spares for one year .No 1 50,000 50,000

Total (Sixty Seven Thousand and Five Hundred) Libyan Dinars 67,500

104
ASSESSEMNT OF THE STATE OF
WATER SUPPLY AND URGENT
INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT
PLANS IN FOCAL/ IDP IMPACTED
MUNICIPALITIES

THE MUNICIPALITY OF AZ-ZINTAAN

105
Abbreviations and Acronyms

BOQ Bill of Quantities

GCWW General Company for Water and Wastewater
GIA General Information Authority
GWA General Water Authority
HIB Housing and Infrastructures Board
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
LYD Libyan Dinar
LS Lump Sum
lpcd Liter per capita per day
MMRP Man-made River Project
MoZ Municipality of Az-Zintaan
NPWS National Program for Water and Sanitation
NPSHa Net Positive Suction Head Available
O & M Operation and Maintenance
RO Reverse Osmosis
TORs Terms of Reference
TDS Total dissolved solids
UN United Nations
UNICEF United Nations Fund for Children
WDN Water Distribution Network

106
CONTENTS 2 Disclaimer
3 Abbreviations and Acronyms
4 CONTENTS
7 FIGURES
8 TABLES
9 5.3.1 INTRODUCTION
9 5.3.1.1 Objectives of the Report
5.3.1.2 Scope of Work, Data and Meth-
10
odology
11 5.3.1.3 Report Contents
11 5.3.2 BACKGROUND
5.3.2.1 Location, Boundaries and Plan-
11
ning
5.3.3 WATER DEMAND OF THE MU-
12
NICIPALITY OF AZ-ZINTAAN
5.3.3.1 Population Growth in the MoZ:
12
2018- 2023
5.3.3.2 Water Demand in the MoZ:
12
2018-2023
5.3.4 SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY
FOR THE MUNICIPALITY OF
13 AZ-ZINTAAN
13 5.3.4.1 Wellfields
16 5.3.4.2 The MMRP
17 5.3.4.3 Trucked Public Water
5.3.4.4 Trucked Water from Private
17
Wells
18 5.3.4.5 Harvested Rainwater
5.3.5 COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO
18
WATER SUPPLY
5.3.6WATER QUALITY CHARACTERIS-
19
TICS
5.3.6.1 Water Quality Characteristics of
19
Public and Private Wells
21 5.3.6.2 Quality of the MMRP Water
22 5.3.6.3 Harvested Rainwater Quality
5.3.7 WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUC-
22
TURES AND THEIR CONDITIONS
22 5.3.7.1 Wellfields
5.3.7.2 Reservoirs, Tanks and Storage
23
Capacity
5.3.7.3 Pumping Station, Transmission
Lines and Water Distribution
24 Network
5.3.7.4Armed Conflict Caused Damag-
es to Water Supply Infrastructures
25 in the MoZ
5.3.8 MANAGEMENT OF WATER SUP-
PLY IN THE CITY OF
26 AZ-ZINTAAN
5.3.9 FUTURE WATER SUPPLY SOURC-
28
ES

107
 5.3.9.1 Water Demand and Supply
28
Balance
5.3.9.2 Future Water Supply Sources
29
and Infrastructures
5.3.9.3 Water Supply Masterplans and
30
Infrastructures Projects
5.3.10 IDPS AND RETURNEES OF THE
ARMED CONFLICT IN
31 THE MOZ
5.3.11 KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY IN
32
THE MUNICIPALITY OF AZ-ZINTAAN
32 5.3.11.1Key Findings
35 5.3.11.2 Major Challenges
5.3.11.3 Recommendations for Improv-
ing the Water Supply Provision
35 Levels in the MoZ
5.3.12 URGENT NEEDS ANDINVEST-
MENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS
37 FOR WATER SUPPLY IN THE MOZ
38 5.3.13 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
38 5.3.14 REFERENCES
LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN
RELATION TO REPORT
40 PREPARATION
ANNEXES
Activities and Implementation Sched-
ules for the Investment/
Development Plans for the Water Sup-
ply Systems in the City of
41 Az-Zintaan
Annex 1. Bill of Quantities for Urgent
Investment/ Development Plan for
42 Water Supply in the City of Az-Zintaan
Annex 2. Activities and Implementa-
tion Schedule for Short-term
Development Plan (1-3 years) for Wa-
ter Supply in the City of
45 Az-Zintaan
Annex 3. Activities and Implementa-
tion Schedule for Medium-Term
(3-5 years) Development Plan for Wa-
ter Supply in the City
47 of Az-Zintaan

Figure 1. Growth of Water Demand in

FIGURES
the Municipality and City of
13 Az-Zintaan
Figure 2. Location of Sauf AjJeen and
14
Saru Zeinuba Wellfields

108
 Figure 3. New Well Drilled by UNICEF
15
(Well head buried for protection)
Figure 4. Turnout Feeding Az-Zintaan
16
City
16 Figure 5. MMRP Filling Point Platform
Figure 6. Water Truck Tanker being
17
Filled from a Private Well
Figure 7. North Elevated Tank in a Poor
24
Structural Condition
25 Figure 8. Sauf AjJeen Pumping Station
25 Figure 9. Diesel generator, Sauf AjJeen
Figure 10. Private Trucks Leaving Fill-
ing Point Platform on the
26 Way to Sell Water to Users
Figure 11. Deteriorated Metal Pipes
27
and WDN of the City of Az-Zintaan
Figure 12. Destroyed Power Supply
27
Line Feeding Wellfield in Az-Zintaan

TABLES 12 Table 1. Population Growth of the

Municipality and City of Az-Zintaan
15 Table 2. Characteristics of Sauf AjJ-
een Wellfield
16 Table 3. Characteristics of Saru Ze-
inubaWellfields
Table 4. Water Quality Characteristics
of Sauf AjJeen and Saru Zeinuba
19 Wellfields
20 Table 5. Water Quality Characteristics
of Sauf AjJeen Wellfield
20 Table 6. Water Quality Characteristics
of Saru Zeinuba Wellfield
Table 7. Water Quality Characteristics
from Different Locations in
20 Az-Zintaan City
Table 8. Water Quality Characteristics
of the MMRP Distributed in the
21 MoZ
22 Table 9. Harvested Rainwater Quality
from Houses in Az-Zintaan City
24 Table 10. Capacities and Status of
Water Tanks in Az-Zintaan City
Table 11. Numbers and Classification
of Az-Zintaan Services Center
28 Employees
32 Table 12. Basic Data on IDPs in the
MoZ

109
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION
The municipality of Az-Zintaan (MoZ) is one of the 14 municipalities (Pre-2011) that
comprise the Western Mountain Region, and it is one of the largest municipalities in terms
of population and area. It has been ground for armed conflict in 2011 and served as a host
to thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 2014/2015originating mainly from
Tripoli.

Domestic water is provided by the General Company for Water and Wastewater (GCWW).
Armed conflict and IDPs impacted the water supply infrastructures to some extent, but not
significantly, posing additional loads and challenges. The MoZ infrastructural challenges
included availability and quality of water supply services with direct impacts on the
municipality’s population.

5.3.1.1 Objectives of the Report

This report was prepared as an output of the second/ Final Phase of a UNICEF sponsored
project for the Assessment of Water Supply Institutions in Libya which included the state of
water supply in four IDPs impacted focal municipalities including the MoZ.

The ultimate objective of this report was to describe the state of water supply system in
the MoZ with the intention of drawing plans for rehabilitation of this system so that it can
provide water services effectively. Specifically, the objectives of the report were as follows:

1. Collect data on the state of water supply in the MoZ, with special focus on the impacts
of armed conflict and IDPs;
2. Assess the state of water supply through analysis of data collected;
3. Assess the capacities of the water supply institutions within the municipality;
4. Propose urgent, short-term, and medium-term investment/ development plans for
rehabilitation of the water supply system in the municipality;
5. Provide a database and a baseline for water supply in the MoZ for future reference
and utilization.

5.3.1.2 Scope of Work, Data and Methodology

The scope of work of this report focused primarily on the state of water supply in the MoZ
and the assessment of the institutional capacities of the GCWW with regard to provision
of water supply services in this municipality with special consideration to the cities most
impacted by armed conflict and IDPs; namely, the Central Az-Zintaan city. Accordingly, the
scope is limited to the geographical boundaries of the parts of the city with water supply
infrastructures.

Information and data used to achieve the report’s objectives listed above were compiled
from many sources; the major sources are listed below:

11. Literature surveys and reviews of studies, articles, reports, plans and programs
prepared by water institutions, consultants, national and international organizations
on water supply issues of relevance to the MoZ;
12. Review of national and regional population and masterplanning data;
13. Review of design standards, water quality standards and guidelines;
14. Meetings and communications with senior MoZ staff;

110
 15. Meetings and communications with senior GCWW and Housing and Infrastructures
Board (HIB) specialists in charge of the MoZ water supply;
16. Meetings and communications with senior staff and specialists in charge of the
MoZ water supply including the mayor, council members and water management
engineers;
17. Field visits to water supply infrastructures including groundwater sources (Sauf
AjJeen and Saru Zeinuba WellFields), private wells, Man-made River Project (Abu
Zyyaan Ar-Ruhaybaat Transmission Line), collection and storage water tanks,
distribution network and water filling points;
18. Conducting water quality analysis on samples from the city of Az-Zintaan at
specialized laboratories in Tripoli;
19. Consultations with local experts;
20. Media coverage and official websites of institutions and organizations.
Cost data utilized for preparation of Bills of Quantities (BOQs) for the urgent intervention and
investment/ development plan for the MoZ were solicited from several sources including
the following:

6. Manufacturers and suppliers;

7. Contractors and previous contracts;
8. Offers;
9. Experts;
10. Local markets.

The data compiled were synthesized and analyzed for validation, completeness and gap
identification. Subsequently, key issue sand priorities were identified; indicators were
defined; recommendations and urgent, short, and medium term intervention plans were
drawn.

5.3.1.3 Report Contents

To achieve its objectives and comply with the Project TORs, the report contents are presented
as follows:

1. Introduction and Background (Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2);

2. Water demand, supply, coverage, quality, infrastructures, management and future
water supply sources (Sections 5.3.3 to 5.3.9)
3. Armed Conflict IDPs and Returnees in the MoZ (Section 5.3.10)
4. Key findings, priorities and recommendations (Section 5.3.11)
5. Urgent, short and middle term investment/ development plans (Section 5.3.12)

5.3.2 BACKGROUND
5.3.2.1 Location, Boundaries and Planning
The MoZ is located in the Western Mountain Region northwest of Libya. This region is
bounded by the Jefara Plain from the north and by the Hamada (It is a part of the Sahara
Desert from the south). Prior to 2011, the municipality was part of the Shaabiya of the
Western Mountain Region which consisted of 14 municipalities including the MoZ. At that
time, the MoZ consisted of ten counties (Mahallaat); namely, East, Center, Az-Zintaan, West,
North, South, Mizda, AlQaryat East and West and Fasanu. Presently, the MoZ is reduced to
the city of Az-Zintaan (Center, East, West, North, and South), AlQaryat (East and West) and
Tobqa. No official map is available delineating the boundaries of the new MoZ.

The municipality evolved around the city of Az-Zintaan, historically the most populous,
commercial and administrative center of the municipality. The city of Az-Zintaan is located
about 136 km southeast of Tripoli at an elevation of 714 m above mean sea level. The
municipality is connected to other parts of Libya through the nation road network and

111
through an airport.

The MoZ lies in the Mediterranean climate zone with mild winters and summers; the
average annual temperature ranges from 17 °C to 21 °C. Rainfall average is 350 mm per
year but drops suddenly to a minimum of 50 mm/year with the drop in elevation towards
the Alhamada Alhmra. Relative humidity is about 70% in August and September due to the
wet wind blowing from the Mediterranean Sea. The prevailing winds in the summer are
the eastern wind followed by the south-east, east and north-west winds. In the winter, the
north, north-west, western and southern sides predominate.

The municipality has oil and gas reserves, but water is scarce. As a result, economic
activities are limited to rain fed agriculture, livestock grazing, wholesale and retail trade
and some simple industrial activities such as workshops and building materials.
Like most other municipalities, the MoZ has grown in the last several decades despite
the large numbers of its residents living in other municipalities, mainly Tripoli. Urban
growth has been uncontrolled as it outpaced the development of national masterplans.
A masterplan for the municipality and the city is under preparation within the National 3rd
Generation Masterplan (1).

Several infrastructures projects were planned within the National Development Program
2008-2012 (2); execution of some projects was started in 2009-2010 but was soon interrupted
indefinitely in 2011as foreign contractors fled the country for security reasons.

5.3.3 WATER DEMAND OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF AZ-ZINTAAN

5.3.3.1 Population Growth in the MoZ: 2018- 2023
The population of the MoZ grew from 36,897 in 2006 to 46,247 inhabitants in 2018 based
on a growth factor of 1.9% (Table 1). It is expected to reach 50,810 inhabitants in 2023, i.e.
increasing by4,563 persons (10%).
Table 1. Population Growth of the Municipality and City of Az-Zintaan

Year 2006 2011 2018 2023

Total Population of the MoZ 36,897 40,538 46,247 50,810

Total Population of the City of Az-Zintaan 5,519 6,064 6,918 7,601

According to the 2006 “latest” national official census, the population of Az-Zintaan city was
27,597 (3); based on the growth rate of 1.9% which is adopted by the General Information
Authority, the 2018 and 2023 populations are estimated to be 34,590 and 38,003inhabitants,
respectively. An increase of 3,413 persons or about 10% is expected. Accordingly, Az-
Zintaan city population will constitute 47.5% of the total population of the municipality.

5.3.3.2 Water Demand in the MoZ: 2018-2023

There are no data on actual consumption rates in the MoZ or any of its urban centers.
Supply rates differed markedly within the MoZ. Water demand can, therefore, only be
estimated based on supply rates recommended or adopted nationally or internationally.
The National Program for Water and Sanitation (NPWS) set supply rates based on the
size of the community (4); supply rates ranged from 150 liters per capita per day (lpcd)

112
for towns of 5000 inhabitants to 350 lpcd for cities with populations of 500,000 or larger.
For Az-Zintaan city, the rate will be 200 lpcd; the rest of the cities will have lower rates. A
rate of 200 lpcd is recommended for the municipality as a whole. Accepting these rates,
the estimated municipality water requirements for the years 2018 and 2023 are 14,571 and
16,009 m3/day, respectively (Figure 1). The demands for the city of Az-Zintaan for the same
period are estimated to be 6918 and 7,600 m3/day, respectively.

Figure 1.Growth of Water Demand in the Municipality and City of Az-Zintaan

5.3.4 SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY FOR THE MUNICIPALITY OF AZ-ZINTAAN

The MoZ is supplied with water from three sources: 1) Local Wellfields, 2) The MMRP, and3)
Private wells. Local Wellfields are the main source presently with the MMRP providing water
intermittently. A description of the water supply potentials of these sources is provided in
this section.

5.3.4.1 Wellfields
There are two main groundwater sources for domestic water supply in the city of Az-
Zintan; namely, the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield and Saru Zeinuba Wellfield (Figure 2). Both of
the Wellfields’ aquifers are located within the Jefara– Alhamada AlHamra basin (According
to the General Water Authority (GWA) classification). This basin starts at the outcrop of the
Western Mountain and extends south to Alhamada AlHamra. The thickness of the water
bearing strata ranges from 100 to 200 meters and its depth is 400 to 600 meters from
ground surface; its productivity is estimated at 30-70 m3/hour. The depth of the water in it
ranges from 300 to 370 meters. The concentration of total dissolved solids (TDS) is 1,000 –
2,700 mg/L (5).

113
 Figure 2. Location of Sauf AjJeen and Saru Zeinuba Wellfields

Sauf AjJeen Wellfield

Az-Zintaan is currently supplied from the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield, which is 25 km south of the
city (Figure. 2). This Wellfield was developed in the 1980s. It consists of 14 wells; some of
the wells were drilled during the period 2007-2009, while others were drilled by the Local
City Council in 2018 through assistance provided by the UNICEF (Figure 3). Basic technical
data on the Wellfield is presented in Table 2. Well depths range from 550 to 660 meters;
average well productivity is 47.25m3/hour. Dynamic water levels (drawdown) ranged from
2 to 5 meters.

Four new wells were drilled within the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield without the authorization
and supervision of the GWA. Their locations, productivities and other technical data were
not available. Assuming these wells have similar hydrogeological characteristics, the total
potential productivity of the field is 20,412 m3/day.

114
 Figure 3. New Well Drilled by UNICEF (Well head buried for protection)

Table 2. Characteristics of Sauf AjJeen Wellfield*

No Well Head Level ASL Total Depth of Level of Static Productivity Water Drawdown
)Well (m Water Table
)m( m3/hour )m(

1 602.26 550 309 51 5.0

2 604.09 600 313 45 3.0

3 600.36 659 307 44 4.6

4 595.90 663 304 49 2.2

5 593.37 600 302 48 2.3

6 592.55 620 302 47 2

7 595.92 660 306 47 2.7

8 594.35 616 303 47 4

9 612.59 - - - -

10 592.33 - - - -

Average =47.25 Average = 2.9375

*Adopted from Ref. 6

Saru Zeinuba Wellfield

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This Wellfield lies 17 km south of the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield (Figure 2). It consists of four
wells which were drilled in 2007-2009. The average productivity of the wells is 45m3/hour
and the average water depth is about 630 meters. The hydraulic characteristics of this
Wellfield are shown in Table 3. They are similar to those of Sauf AjJeen Wellfield. The
average well productivity is 45 m3/hour resulting in a total field productivity of 4,320 m3/day.
Therefore, the combined potential production capacity of the Wellfields supplying the city
of Az-Zintaan is 24,732 m3/day.
Table 3. Characteristics of Saru Zeinuba Wellfield*

Well Well Head Level Total Depth Level of Stat- Productivity Water Drawdown
*No )ASL (m )of Well (m ic Water Table m3/hour )m(

1 598.28 613 307 47 1.5

2 613.73 633 323 47 6

3 608.94 630 319 43 4

4 618.68 635 329 43 6

Average = 45 Average = 4.375

*Adopted from Ref. 6

5.3.4.2 The MMRP

The Western Mountain Region is included in the water supply scheme of the Man-Made
River Project (MMRP). The Central Track of Phase II is designed to supply the urban centers
of this region extending from Gharyan to Ar-Ruhaybaat. The first part of this line, Tarhouna
Abu Zayyaan was completed in Sept. 2007; the second part (Abu Zayyaan Ar-Ruhaybaat) is
under construction; most of the main pipeline is executed.
Az-Zintaan is to be supplied from a turnout (Figure 4) on the Abu Zayyan Ar-Ruhaybaat
Transmission Line of the MMRP Phase II Central Track. The amount allocated at this turnout
is 23,000 m3/day. The receiving end infrastructures (Transmission pipeline from the turnout
to a balancing reservoir and a pumping station to pump the water to the network) are not
designed yet. Therefore, water is provided on intermittent bases only through a filling point
loading platform (Figure 5). The water will be supplied directly from the turnout once these
infrastructures are completed.

Figure 4.Turnout Feeding Az-Zintaan City Figure 5.MMRP Filling Point Platform

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5.3.4.3Trucked Public Water
About 40 % of Az-Zintaan city residents get water through the tankering system. Trucked
water is obtained from public or private sources. Water from sources managed by the
GCWW Service Office; namely, the MMRP and Sauf AjJeen Wellfield, is provided to users
not connected to the WDN or during emergencies using the GCWW water hauling trucks.
The price per truck load (10 m3) is 15 Libyan dinars (LYD).

5.3.4.4Trucked Water from Private Wells

The city of Az-Zintaan is also supplied from private wells located at the downhill side of the
mountain 2-3 km north of the city. These wells are generally drilled without the permission
of the GWA and with little compliance with regulatory or acceptable technical practices. No
data are available on the number of wells drilled or used to supplement or replace public
water sources or on the quantities of water withdrawn. Similarly, there are no data on the
water quality of these wells.
Water is transported from these wells by 10 m3and 18 m3 tanker trucks and sold upon
request to consumers during water shortages or to those not connected to the distribution
network (Figure 6). About 150 - 200 trips are made daily supplying 1,500 to 2,000 m3 per day.
Filling and emptying of transport truck is not regulated and no precautionary measures are
taken regarding the prevention of contamination. As such, they constitute a public health
hazard that increases with the rise in the number of wells drilled.
The use of hauled water forms a last resort but common source of water for all residents of
the MoZ and other municipalities in the Western Mountain Region especially in the summer
months and in cases of emergency, i.e., when other sources are unavailable for whatever
reason. Water provision costs can be considerable during this season varying from 4 to 5
LYD/m3 and exceeding these values during peak demands in the summer season. This cost
amounts to over 100 LYD per month for a typical family at a moderate consumption rate of
150 lpcd.

Figure 6. Water Truck Tanker being Filled from a Private Well

5.3.4.5 Harvested Rainwater

Az-Zintaan receives an average of 210 mm of rain annually (7). Most residents harvest
rainwater and store it in underground reservoirs in their houses for drinking uses mainly,
but for other uses during water shortages. For an average house roof area of 200 m2, the
volume collected per household is 42 m3 or 23 lpcd. Clearly, this amount is very small, but
does play a significant role as a supplemental water source as it did traditionally.

5.3.5 COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO WATER SUPPLY

The MoZ is located in the Western Mountain Service Region of the GCWW. It is served by
two service offices; Mizda Office serves the cities or towns of Mizda, Shwairef, Nesma,

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Shghegha, Topqa, East and West Ghariaat, Abu AlGhurab, and Fasanu. The Yefrin-Jadu
Office serves Yefrin, Jadu, Az-Zintaan city, ArRujbaan, ArRyayna, AlQalaa, and AlMashashya.
Therefore, the management of the water supply in the MoZ is shared between these two
offices.

The Mizda Service Office supplies a population of 40,038 persons with 10,900 m3/day of
water; this amount is supplied from the MMRP (6,535 m3/day) and ground water wells
(4,365 m3/day), respectively (8). This amount was supplied employing 16 wells (One is
under maintenance), 29 elevated tanks, 40 ground water tanks and 18 (operating) pump
stations. The per capita water supplied was 272 liters per day.

Similarly, the Yefrin-Jadu Service Office supplied a total of 11,538 m3/day to a population
of 113,826 persons, i.e., 101 lpcd; most of this quantity was supplied from groundwater
wells in the region (7938 m3/day) with the MMRP supplying 3600 m3/day. Clearly, there is a
water deficit within this service area. The water was supplied employing 23 wells (4 under
maintenance), 23 elevated tanks, 41 ground water tanks, and 20 working pump stations.
Clearly, water use rates are markedly different for the two service areas despite the similarity
in the geographic, socioeconomic and environmental conditions. While the Mizda Service
Office towns received 272 lpcd, those in the Yefrin-Jadu were supplied only 101 lpcd. This
implies that water use or consumption rate is supply controlled, i.e., there is no upper limit
to the consumption rate; all amount supplied will be consumed. This practice is encouraged
by lack of enforcement of tariff collection among other factors.

Data on the geographic extent of the distribution networks within the MoZ are not available.
Of the MoZ urban communities, only Az-Zintaan Center has a Water Distribution Network
(WDN). Moreover, the quantities of water supplied to the MoZ are not known as no flow
measurements are made and no records are available of such quantities. Flow meters are
not installed at any point within the water supply scheme. Actual per capita consumption
rates are not known as metering penetration is very limited, a large fraction of meters
are malfunctioning, not functioning or bypassed. Little metering data are documented and
utilized to draw consumption rates and variations.

5.3.6 WATER QUALITY CHARACTERISTICS

5.3.6.1 Water Quality Characteristics of Public and Private Wells
Water quality characteristics of Sauf AjJeen and Saru Zeinuba Wellfields are shown in
Table 4 (9) along with the maximum allowable limits specified in the Libyan Drinking Water
Standard 82/2015 (10). Additional TDS concentrations recorded in these two Wellfields are
shown in Tables 5 and 6 (11).

Based on these characteristics, it can be seen that the well waters are not in conformity with
the Libyan Standard No. 82/2015. Microbiological characteristics were not reported despite
their significance. Of particular consideration are the calcium, magnesium, hardness and
sodium because of their health and economic impacts. Current supply is not being treated
and there are no systems to purify the water, making it a danger to public health. Treatment
of these waters is, therefore, necessary prior to use.
Table 4. Water Quality Characteristics of Sauf AjJeen and Saru ZeinubaWellfields*

Libyan Drinking
Indicator Units Sauf-AjJeen Saru Zeinuba Water Standard
Limits**

8.5 – 6.5
pH - 7.17 7.29

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 TDS mg/L 1900 2038 1000

T.H as CaCO3 mg/L 977.80 900.18 500

mg/L 0.0 0.0

mg/L 177.39 244.08

mg/L 488.33 377.76 250

mg/L 640.41 575.38 250

NO3 mg/L 2.2 0.00 45

Ca+2 mg/L 208.05 200.05 -

Mg+2 mg/L 109.87 96.04 -

Na+ mg/L 234.00 185.00 200

K+ mg/L 12.00 7.00 40

*Adopted from Ref. 9 **Ref. 10

Table 5. Water Quality Characteristics of Sauf AjJeen Wellfield*

Well no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

TDS, mg/L 1760 1916 1984 1480 1758 2038 1900 1420 NA** NA

* Adopted from Ref. 11 **NA = not available

Table 6. Water Quality Characteristics of Saru Zeinuba Wellfield*

Well no. 1 2 3 4

TDS, mg/L 1734 1926 1888 2038

*Adopted from Ref. 11

Similar confirmatory analysis were conducted by the Consultant (12) on three samples
withdrawn randomly from a private well, elevated tank located at the south of the city
and from the distribution network. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 7. These
results indicate clearly that: 1) The quality of the water samples from the elevated tank
and distribution network mirror that of the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield, 2) These waters are not
suitable for domestic uses, and 3) The waters from the private well at the outskirts of the

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city are in conformity with the Libyan Drinking Water Standard except for chlorides. Again,
treatment of the public wells’ waters is necessary prior to domestic uses. It is to be noted
here that many important indicators are not reported (Microbial, heavy metals, etc.). A
complete water quality analysis should be conducted in order to assess confidently the
waters conformity to the standards.
Table 7. Water Quality Characteristics from Different Locations in Az-Zintaan City

Location of Sampling Point

Libyan Drinking
Indicator* Water Standard
Elevated Tank South of the Distribution Net- Private Well 3 km Limits**
City work North of the City

pH 7.33 7.06 7.34 6.5 – 8.5

TDS 1846.6 1778.00 1067 1000

Hardness* 1051.35 980.88 411 500

Ca2+ 276.69 256.49 120 -

Mg2+ 87.73 82.62 27 -

K+ 20.32 19.12 17 40

Na+ 250.45 230.45 200 200

SO42- 449.00 437.00 230 250

Cl- 673.90 660.50 368 250

Akalinity* 87.24 81.48 99 -

NO3- 0.80 1.6 2.70 45

Residual No chlorine
No chlorine added No chlorine added 0.5
chlorine*** added

*All units are in mg/L except pH without units. **as CaCO3 ***free residual

5.3.6.2 Quality of the MMRP Water

Water quality analysis of the MMRP at the turnout or filling platform is not available.
However, the quality of the MMRP Phase II waters is monitored regularly by the MMRP
Phase II Management staff. A typical analysis results is shown in Table 8.It can be seen from
this table that the MMRP waters comply with the Libyan Drinking Water Standard No. 82 of
2015 (13, 14) with the analysis taken in 2017 showing a critical nitrate concentration level.
Available data from the MMRP/ Phase II over many years give nitrate concentration below

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the allowable limit (15), this result being an objective of their water quality management
policies and practices. The more recent analysis shown in Table 8 is in full compliance with
the standards.
If nitrate concentration rises above the allowable level in the future, nitrate removal must be
considered and treatment units should be added to the existing water supply infrastructures
to make the water suitable for human consumption. If bottled water is used for drinking
and culinary purposes, then water treatment is not needed.
Table 8. Water Quality Characteristics of the MMRP Distributed in the MoZ

Value*
Libyan Drinking
Indicator Water Standard
Limits****
Ref. 13 Ref. 14

pH 7.6 to 7.8 7.23 6.5 - 8.5

TDS 1026 - 1050 995.70 1000

Total Hardness** 160-170 420 500

Potassium - 11.7 40

Zinc - 3.0

Sodium - 170 200

Calcium - 132.25

Magnesium 21.87

Sulfates 28-35 272.65 250

Chlorides - 129 250

Manganese - 0.05

Nitrate 45- 48 16.3 45

Free chlorine residual 0.2 - 0.3 0.08 0.5

*expressed as mg/L except pH ** as CO3Ca

The MMRP water is generally within the Libyan Drinking Water Standards limitation except
for nitrates and residual chlorine which is the responsibility of the service provider, the
GCWW. Nitrate levels are usually managed through operation by selection of the production
wells combinations based on nitrate concentrations so that nitrate concentration remains
within the acceptable levels.

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5.3.6.3 Harvested Rainwater Quality
Representative harvested rainwater quality characteristics are shown in Table 9for three
random samples from houses in Az-Zintaan city (16). It can be seen from this table that the
water quality is generally good meeting the Libyan Drinking Water Quality standards with
low TDS, hardness, sulfates, chlorides and very low metals in general. Expectedly, this
water is preferred by the municipality’s residents for drinking and cooking purposes.

Table 9. Harvested Rainwater Quality from Houses in Az-Zintaan City*

Rainwater Sample Number / Site

Libyan Drinking Water
Indicator
Standard Limits**
1 2 3

pH 6.85 7.61 8.26 6.5 – 8.5

Ca2+ 48 22 42 -

Mg2+ 25 17 18 -
21
Na+ 24 18 200

K+ 0.7 0.56 0.74 40

Cl- 60 58 62 250

SO42- 53 34 75 250

Akalinity** 76 65 72 -

NO3- Nill Nill Nill 45

TDS 288 218 289 1000

Total hardness** 224 125 180 500

*all concentrations are in mg/L except pH
**expressed as CaCO3

5.3.7 WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONDITIONS

The water supply infrastructures of the city of Az-Zintaan consist of Wellfields, storage
reservoirs, pumping station, transmission lines, elevated tanks and a WDN. A description
of these components is presented below.

5.3.7.1 Wellfields
Sauf AjJeen Wellfield and Pumping Station
Presently, only 2-4 wells comprising the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield are in use; the other 10
wells are out of service because of deterioration of well due to corrosions, pumps were
damaged with no spares to maintain them, or pump control and protection systems were
not functional, looting and theft of pumps, parts and cables. Another reason was the lack
of electric power due to destruction of power transmission lines.

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Consequently, access to potable water to the majority of the residents of the city of Az-
Zintaan is threatened with limited quantities available forcing the city residents to purchase
water at high prices.
Saru Zeinuba Wellfield

This Wellfield is not utilized presently because there is no pump station and pipeline to
convey the water from the fields to Sauf AjJeen pump station from which it is possible to
pump it to the city. Moreover, the capacities of the present pump station at Sauf AjJeen
Wellfield and the two transmission pipelines are insufficient.

Evidently, this Wellfield will not be available for some time to come because of lack of
pumping and transmission facilities which will require time and funds to execute.
5.3.7.2 Reservoirs, tanks and Storage Capacity
The city of Az-Zintaan water supply system includes 6 water storage reservoirs and elevated
tanks located at the Wellfields and within the city itself. Basic data on these reservoirs and
tanks are summarized in Table 10. The largest groundwater storage tank (Forebay tank),
with a capacity of 6,000 m3, is located in the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield; it is in good condition,
but needs minor maintenance of some of its components (Air vents, thermal isolation of
the roofs).

The second ground storage tank is also located in the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield; its capacity
estimated of 220 m3. This tank has been out of service since 2011; it requires cleaning and
minor maintenance of some components.

The elevated tanks are distributed inside the city are: The Southern (1000 m3)Tank delivers
water at sufficient pressure to the distribution network and serves as water delivery
points to transport trucks. The Northern Tank (500 m3) is fed from the Southern Tank and
delivers water to the network. The other two, Jassas (200 m3) and Hospital (150 m3) tanks
are out of service; they are in poor structural conditions (Figure 7).The total and working
storage capacities are, therefore, 8,070 m3and 7,500 m3, respectively. This capacity equals
approximately one day storage which is sufficient for operational purposes but certainly
insufficient under emergency operation.

Thus, the state of water storage facilities is mostly fair to poor or bad; all of these facilities
require some maintenance varying from minor to major maintenance while one elevated
tank requires replacement.
Table 10.Capacities and Status of Water Tanks in Az-Zintaan City

Reservoir/ Tank Tank Volume,

.No Type of Tank Operational Condition of Tank
Name m3

1 Sauf AjJeen Well- Ground 6,000 Condition is good; it needs thermal insulation
field and prevention of water leakage to the surface
of the tank

2 Sauf AjJeen Well- Ground 220 Out of service; it needs to be cleaned and
field maintained, maintenance of pumping station
serving the tank

3 Az-Zintaan South- Elevated 1,000 Condition is bad; it needs urgent and major
ern Tank maintenance of walls

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 4 Az-Zintaan North- Elevated 500 Out of service; condition is poor; it requires
ern Tank maintenance

5 Jassas Tank Elevated 200 Out of service; severely deteriorated; it needs

to be removed and replaced

6 Hospital Tank Elevated 150 Out of service; condition is poor; it needs es-
sential maintenance

Figure 7. North Elevated Tank in a Poor Structural Condition

Because of water unavailability and shortages, almost all residents of the MoZ construct
their own water storage tanks; the capacity is usually 20 m3 per house.
The city of Az-Zintaan, as the rest of the cities of the Western Mountain Region, is provided
with private ground water storage tanks in most of the houses of the city (20 m3/house). The
total house storage capacity is estimated to be 135,600 m 3 (17). House storage provides for
17 days consumption which is a good reserve for emergency situations.

5.3.7.3Pumping Station, Transmission Lines and Water Distribution Network

Pumping Station: Due to the large elevation differences between the Wellfield and the city,
a boosting pump station located at the eastern part of the Wellfield. Water is transferred
from the Wellfield through the pumping station via two parallel 30 km-long pipelines of
200 mm and 250 mm diameter to the 1000 m3(Southern Az-Zintaan)elevated tank. There
are 4 multi-stage surface pumps (including two standby wells) in this pumping station
(Figure 8); the current capacity of the pump station is about 100 m3/hour against a head of
150 m. Two of the pumps are out of service due to technical problems because of damages
caused by looting and vandalism which took place in 2011.

The pumping station was constructed about 3 m above the bottom of the ground storage
tank; this situation reduces the available net positive suction head in the system (NPSHa)
thus reducing significantly the amount of water pumped. Accordingly, about half of the
reservoir capacity is not utilized.

The pumping station was supplied with a standby diesel generator (Figure 9); this generator
is over 20 years old and has been out of service for a long period of time. As a result, the
city faced frequent water shortages due to electricity cutoffs. To overcome this problem,
the standby generator needs replacement urgently.

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 Figure 8.SaufAjJeenPumping Station Figure 9. Diesel generator, Sauf AjJeen

Consequently, the pumping station is inefficient; its performance is reduced significantly

due to the failed state of its standby pumps and the obsoleteness of the standby diesel
generator.

Transmission Lines: The transmission lines are made of ductile iron; they were executed in
the 1990’s and 2000’s. They are seemingly in good condition with no evidence of corrosion
or leakage.

The city of Az-Zintaan grew gradually both in area and population; this growth was
followed with growth in the distribution network although not concurrently. Expansion of
the WDN was slower in response to economic constraints. Consequently, it is not possible
to delineate boundaries for the WDN or to trace the evolution of the water supply scheme
for the municipality.

Water Supply Network: The WDN is supplied with water from the Southern elevated
tank by gravity flow. About 60% of the houses are connected to the WDN. The network
is subdivided into three parts; these parts are supplied employing 200 mm water mains.
Water is distributed to these areas sequentially (intermittently) each supplied once every
21 days. Areas that are not connected to the distribution network purchase water from
GCWW or private water tankers who fill at the Southern elevated tank or at the MMRP
filling points (Figure. 10); purchased water is stored it in ground tanks at each house. This
practice is well established within the city as well as almost all other urban communities in
the municipality. In fact, it is most common in smaller, more remote communities without
WDNs or with less developed WDNs and more severe water supply shortages.

Figure 10.Private Trucks Leaving Filling Point Platform on the Way to Sell Water to Users

125
Data on network layout, pipe diameters, materials, lengths, ages, valves, etc. are non-
existent as are planning, design, execution, as-built-drawings, etc. Based on visual
observation and discussions with water supply staff in the MoZ, it was clear that the WDN
in the city of Az-Zintaan: 1) It was implemented randomly with no reference plans, maps or
drawings, 2) Consisted of several materials (galvanized iron, ductile iron which was old and
deteriorated), and polyethylene, 3) Covered only about 60% of the city’s total population, 4)
It was generally in poor condition with high water losses due to leakage (Figure 11) while
operational pressure was low.

A significant impact of leakage is the introduction of pathogenic organisms into the network
and their spread to large numbers of end-users. This is especially likely as the water from
the different sources is not chlorinated.

Replacement, renovation rehabilitation, and expansion of the WDN into new areas are
certainly in order to ensure sufficient coverage of the whole city.

Figure 11. Deteriorated Metal Pipes, WDN of the City of Az-Zintaan

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the infrastructural components of the water
supply system in Az-Zintaan city are generally in fair to poor condition. As such, the
reliability of the water supply system is compromised markedly. Urgent interventions are
required with financial implications.

5.3.7.4 Armed Conflict Caused Damages to Water Supply

Infrastructures in the MoZ
The MoZ was a battle ground to armed conflict during the period 2011; it suffered losses of
lives, minimum visible physical damages to housing and public buildings and power supply
(19). The main source of water supply, Sauf AjJeen Wellfield, was partially destroyed during
the fighting, but was soon repaired. During the repair period, the water was provided from
a few wells located north of the city.
The most visible damages which had most impacts on the water supply system were those
associated with damages to power supply network. Power lines were destroyed and cables
were stolen (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Destroyed Power Supply Line Feeding Wellfield in Az-Zintaan

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5.3.8 MANAGEMENT OF WATER SUPPLY IN
THE CITY OF AZ-ZINTAAN
Upon review of the management procedures and discussions with both municipality and
GCWW staff, the following observations were made:

• Management of the water supply system in the city of Az-Zintaan is shared between
the Water Administration of the MoZ and the Service Center of the GCWW (the
Western Mountain Region and Operation and Maintenance (O& M) Administration).
• There is some unstructured coordination between the two institutions with almost
complete administrative independence. Expenditures and revenues on water supply
system operations are not well documented and it is difficult to obtain itemized
expenditures lists. Expenditures are made from the allocated emergency budget and
sometimes from allocations by the GCWW;
• Revenues are made solely from trucked water sales to residents; the official fee is 15
LYD per transfer (i.e., 15 LYD/10 m3). Those revenues or fees are collected by the City
Services Center.
• The total number of employees in the GCWW Service Center is 97 persons (Table 11).
About 70% of these employees occupy administrative functions while only 20% are
technicians. Clearly, there is an excess of administrators at the expense of technicians.
This imbalance undoubtedly impacts adversely the quality of services provided while
overburdening the budget by salaries of many non-productive manpower.
Table 11. Numbers and Classification of Az-Zintaan
Services Center Employees

Number Employed as

Technicians Administrators Financial Legal Total

20 68 6 3 97

*From Ref. 18

• There was no single body in charge of water supply issues in the MoZ; a duplication
of roles and activities existed between the MoZ Water Administration of the MoZ and
the GCWW Service Office of the Region;
• While the mandate of the Service Office was well specified in the GCWW’s
organizational structure, that of the Water Administration of the MoZ, a subordinate
of the Ministry of Local Affairs, has not been defined yet;
• Water supply services within the MoZ were shared between two offices: Mizda
Service Office and Yefrin-Jadu Service Office. This division complicates further the
water supply management;
• There were no defined water supply masterplans for the MoZ or the city of Az-Zintaan;
• Staffing of the GCWW Service Office in Az-Zintaan city was unbalanced being
understaffed technically and overstaffed administratively;
• Qualifications of the staff in general were not adequate; the technical staff were
clearly in need of qualification and training;
• There was no approved plan for the training and capacity building of workers that
will raise the level of services in the city;
• There was no program for monitoring and follow up of water supply system
performance; no archiving and documentation and no program for maintenance as
well;
• The non-human management, operation and maintenance capacities of the water
supply system were also poor; there were no maintenance workshops, no materials

127
 or spares, no analytical laboratories, no leak detection equipment and no archiving
and tracking data base or information management system;
• Revenue collection was poor being limited to trucked water sales while ignoring
residential, commercial and industrial users tariffs;
• Despite the poor water quality, no steps were taken towards treatment of water or
chlorination to prevent microbial contamination;
• Routine disinfection – a basic requirement of all water supply systems – was not
practiced in the municipality. No emergency chlorination facilities or mobile units
were available at time to the municipality or to the GCWW;
• There were no emergency water storage facilities and no contingency plan for force
majeure, extended water cutoffs, the spread of water borne epidemics, etc.;
• Despite the high leakage rates, little effort was made to prevent leakage and conserve
water;
• The absence of a technical archive, metering and gauging at critical points and at
water use points, so it was not possible to locate pipeline routes, valve types and
locations, pipe data (Diameter, material, length, age, etc., as-built-drawings, O & M
records, etc.;
• There was no central control system for any part of the water supply scheme under
the mandate of the GCWW. Consequently, the water supply scheme operation was
unsystematic relying mostly on the experience of a few local operators and conducted
on a reactive crisis-based management.

5.3.9 FUTURE WATER SUPPLY SOURCES

5.3.9.1 Water Demand and Supply Balance
The total estimated water demand for the MoZ for the years 2018 and 2023 was estimated
to be 14,571 and 16,009m3/day, respectively (Section 5.3.3.2). The contributions from the
different sources (MMRP, public and private wells) are not known. Similarly, the water
demands for the city of Az-Zintaan for the years 2018 and 2023 were estimated to be 6,918
and 7,475 m3/day, respectively.

5.3.9.2 Future Water Supply Sources and Infrastructures

As stated in Section 5.3.4.2, the Phase II supply line from Gharyan to ArRuhaybaat feeds the
city of Az-Zintaan through a special turnout with a supply rate of 23,000 m3/day. This supply
is clearly sufficient for the 2023 demands of the city.

The MMRP water is already available to users at the filling points. The supply rate is below
the design capacity, however, as the major infrastructures needed to fully utilize this water;
namely, a balancing reservoir, a pumping station and a transmission line have not been
executed yet.

Upon completion, the MMRP will become the main source of water supply with other public
and private wells becoming supplemental and emergency sources. These sources should
be maintained regularly and kept in a good condition. Moreover, rainwater harvesting
should be encouraged as it represents a viable source for drinking water because of its
superior quality to other sources.

5.3.9.3 Water Supply Masterplans and Infrastructures Projects

The National Development Program 2008-2012 included several projects that were intended
to provide, improve or rehabilitate infrastructures supplying water to be implemented in
the MoZ. These projects were initiated in 2009-2010, but were halted completely in 2011
due to armed conflict. Some of these projects were in the design stage, while others were
under execution in 2011. The most important projects are described briefly below.

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Abu Zayyaan Ar-Ruhaybaat Transmission Line -Central Track/ Phase II of the MMRP
This project involves construction of a 10-km 500 mm long ductile iron pipeline to convey
water from Az-Zintaan turnout on the MMRP main line to a ground storage tank with a
capacity of 12,000 m3to be constructed near the Southern Az-Zintaan elevated storage tank.
The project also includes the construction of a pumping station connected to the ground
storage tank. This pumping station will pump water into elevated tanks distributed in the
city; these tanks were at the design stage in 2011 as was the pumping station. No progress
was reported to date on this project.

Design of Elevated Storage Tanks and Supply Lines

This project consisted of: 1) The design of 6 new elevated tanks of a capacity of 200 m3 in
addition of maintenance of 3 existing elevated storage tanks and a 50 m3 ground storage
tank and 2) The design of water transmission lines from the main pumping station at the
12,000 m3 ground tank to the existing and new (proposed) elevated tanks; the pipelines
material was high density polyethylene (HDPE); their diameters were 74 - 258 mm and their
total length was 26,674 meters

Supply of the City of Az-Zintaan from the Wellfields of the Sauf AjJeen and Saru Zeinuba

This project was intended to design a water supply system to feed the city of Az-Zintaan
from Sauf AjJeen and Saru Zeinuba Wellfields. The Project components included well
pumps, collection lines from wells, chlorination unit and collection tanks, which serve as
an equalization tanks, new pumping station, new transmission pipe line to the storage tank
in downtown Az-Zintaan. The design also included a control and communication system
in addition to service facilities for workers and operators, power transmission network and
supply of electricity from the transfer station. The design works have been completed but
the execution of the project has not been contracted yet.

Other design and execution projects may be underway, but no data was provided on
them. It was clear from discussions with water supply staff that project activities were not
coordinated in an integrated manner and with proper consideration to other infrastructures
and future growth and expansion. Activities take place almost in response to crisis rather
than as part of strategic planning. Such practices dampen greatly the effectiveness of
the large efforts made by water authorities and limit their benefits and impacts to short
durations. In light of the limited planning, design, execution, operation and maintenance
capacities of the GCWW Service Offices and MoZ, it is best to contract a technical consultant
to follow up and manage all issues related to water supply in the municipality in coordination
and association with water supply officials. Such technical assistance is needed in light
of the interactions between the water supply systems and other infrastructures such
as roads system, sewerage systems, storm water drainage, electrical and gas network,
telecommunications.

5.3.10 IDPS AND RETURNEES OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN

THE MOZ
In 2011, over half of the city of Az-Zintaan population was displaced; in the meantime, the
city received IDPs from the municipality of Yefrin and other neighboring “conflict impacted”
municipalities.

As conflict erupted in Tripoli and its surroundings in 2014, many long-time Tripoli residents
originally from the MoZ were displaced; almost all of them resettled in the MoZ. With the
passage of time and improvement of the security situation, these IDPs returned gradually
to their homes in Tripoli.

In 2011, over half of Az-Zintaan’s population left it temporarily for a safe haven anywhere
(19). Most returned soon after. In 2016, the city of Az-Zintaan hosted 3,800 displaced families

129
in collective center (20).The latest IMO statistics on IDPs in Az-Zintaan (Round 22 Oct.-Nov.
2018) are summarized in Table 12 (21). It can be seen that a total of 2250 IDPs are residing
presently in the municipality, mainly in AlQaryah East and Az-Zintan Center. All IDPs reside
in private houses; none are residing in public buildings, squatting or in camps. These IDPs
come mainly from Tripoli.
Table 12. Basic Data on IDPs in the MoZ

Type of Housing

IDPs Host County (Mahallat) No. of IDPs Municipality of Origin

Rented Hosted

Al Qaryaat Al–Sharkiyah (East) 1000 Tripoli 1000

Az-Zintaan Al Markaz (Center) 1250 Tripoli 750 500

Total 2250 Total 1750 500

These IDPs are distributed in two counties and live within urban areas. They obtain water
from the same sources as the rest of the residents; namely, the public WDN, trucking, open
wells, harvested rainwater and bottled water. As such, they do not pose a considerable
overload on the host counties water supply systems. Like their hosts, the IDPs face two
major water supply problems; namely, water is expensive and it is not suitable for drinking
and sometimes for cooking.

5.3.11KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
AZ-ZINTAAN
This report presented an assessment of the state of water supply in the MoZ with a focus
on the city of Az-Zintaan because it is the capital of the municipality and its administrative,
commercial and cultural center. The report included an identification of gaps, and
subsequently, a quantitative definition of the urgent investment needs and the preparation
of short-term and medium-term development plans for rehabilitation or restoration of
water supply services. The key findings, priorities and recommendations of this assessment
are listed below. The following section specifies the urgent, short, and medium range
interventions (Investment/ development plans).

5.3.11.1Key Findings
1. The MoZ is home to about 73,000 persons living in 10 counties; the number will
increase to about 80,000 in 2023. The municipality is also a host to about 2500 IDPs,
most of them live in the city of Az-Zintaan;
2. Data on actual water demand and supply situation within the MoZ are unavailable due
to the lack of monitoring, metering and documentation. Based on a per consumption
of 200 lpcd, the estimated water demands for the MoZ for the years 2018 and2023
are 14,571 and 16,009 m3/day, respectively;
3. There is no assessment of the state of water supply infrastructures in the MoZ
(Including the city of Az-Zintaan). Lack of knowledge about this state represents a
major challenge to planning as well as executing institutions and service providers
including municipalities;
4. The MoZ obtains water for domestic uses from two water sources (Wellfields and
the MMRP); these sources provide sufficient quantities for the major parts of the

130
 municipality. Other parts rely solely on groundwater which is not always available in
sufficient quantities thus constituting a serious supply problem;
5. Water quantities supplied by the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield meet adequately the needs of
the city of Az-Zintaan up to 2020 (23), but such quantities are not available to the city
presently for the reasons stated above;
6. The amount of MMRP water allocated to the city of Az-Zintaan satisfies the city’s
water demand for many years to come;
7. The quality of waters from the MMRP, private wells and harvested rainwater is
acceptable; it is inconformity with the Libyan Drinking Water Standards;
8. The quality of the public Wellfields (Sauf AjJeen and Saru Zeinuba) is poor and
unacceptable for most domestic uses;
9. Chlorination facilities are not available at the Wellfields, storage tanks or at filling
points; the MoZ residents are thus exposed to potential public health risks;
10. Twelve of the 14-18 wells comprising the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield are out of service
thus limiting severely access to potable water to the majority of the residents of the
city of Az-Zintaan and forcing them to purchase water at high prices;
11. The pumping station at the Sauf AjJeen Wellfield is inefficient because of inherent
and permanent design problems; moreover, its performance is reduced significantly
due to the failed state of its standby pumps and the obsoleteness of the standby
diesel generator;
12. As such, the reliability of the water supply from the field is compromised markedly;
13. The Wellfield of Saru Zeinuba will not be available for some time to come because
of lack of pumping and transmission facilities which will require time and funds to
execute;
14. The state of water storage facilities is mostly fair, poor to bad; all of these facilities
require some maintenance varying from minor to major maintenance while one
elevated tank requires replacement;
15. The WDN is generally in poor condition; moreover, its coverage is very limited. Water
losses due to leakage are high while operational pressure is low;
16. Replacement, renovation, rehabilitation and expansion into new areas are in order;
17. Designs of major water supply infrastructures are completed or near completion so
these works are ready to execute promptly;
18. Planning, designing, implementation, operation and maintenance, monitoring, and
following up of water supply within the MoZ are conducted by different institutions
with practically no inter communication, coordination, integration, or sharing of data,
experience and expertise. As a result, water supply infrastructures are improperly
planned, designed, executed and operated;
19. Water supply and demand management are undertaken on a reactive, improvised,
crisis case-by-case basis not on a preplanned, coordinated, integrated long term
planned scenario based basis. The outcomes of both practices are temporary, short
lived and costly solutions;
20. Operation and maintenance (O & M) of water supply works within the MoZ is the
responsibility of the GCWW; the human, financial and material capacities available
for these services are very modest and can hardly meet the rising demands of the
residents and the sustenance of the deteriorating infrastructures;
21. The MoZ has a utilities office which overlooks the water supply issues; the role of this
office is not integrated well with that of the GCWW. It is at the same time understaffed
and overwhelmed with growing challenges and activities;
22. The technical and financial capabilities of the Az-Zintaan Service Center/ GCWW and
the Water Administration of the MoZ are limited; staff numbers are excessive but most are
under qualified;
23. Workforce in the water supply fields is available; large numbers of technical institutes
and universities graduates are seeking employment in the municipality. Some basic training
is necessary, however, to maximize their performance and efficiency;
24. Coordination between the GCWW Service Center and the Water Administration of the
MoZ is limited;
25. The MoZ is a host to a total of 2250 IDPs; 1250 IDPs live in Az-Zintaan city and the rest

131
live in AlQaryaah East. All of them live in rented houses or are hosted by relatives so their
water supply needs are identical to those of their host cities, i.e., they don’t need special
interventions; their impacts on the water supply systems of the guest cities are negligible;
26. The local government represented by the staff of the MoZ understands the water supply
problems and challenges and is strongly committed to solving them;
27. There is a common understanding of the water supply challenges and commitment
to cooperate to overcome them among the water supply institutions (The GCWW and the
Water Administration/ the MoZ);
28. Many donor organizations and UN organizations are providing help especially in the
service sectors and humanitarian fields, water supply being of these fields; their help can
be counted especially when required services are well defined as is the case for the MoZ;

5.3.11.2 Major Challenges

In view of the above, it can be seen that the GCWW/ MoZ water supply service provision
faces many serious threats and challenges which have reduced significantly the GCWW/
MoZ capacity to effectively provide high level water supply services to the municipality’s
population; the major ones are:

1. Armed conflict and lack of security with adverse impacts on implementation

of projects as well as severe damages and destruction to the water supply
infrastructures;
2. The financial, technical and human capacities available are limited restricting
the GCWW and the MoZ from adequately installing, operating and maintaining
water supply systems; consequently, services are limited in scope and at
substandard levels;
3. The state of the water supply infrastructures ranges from fair to poor; the
WDN, covering only about 60% of the city of Az-Zintaan, is in poor condition
as is the case in Sauf AjJeen Wellfield pump station and some of the water
tanks.
4. Large financial resources are needed to rehabilitate or renovate these
infrastructures;
5. Frequent power cuts and fuel shortages causing prolonged water shortages
with adverse impacts on water supply service levels and on electromechanical
equipment as well as socioeconomic impacts;
6. Water users are reluctant to pay their service fees because of the unsatisfactory
level of service provided causing a considerable loss of badly needed revenues;
7. Random, unplanned urban growth of the city of Az-Zintaan complicates
further the water supply system planning, execution and operation; roads
are narrow, ungraded, with no allowance for water, sewerage and rainwater
infrastructures.
8. Communication and coordination among urban planners, GCWW, the MoZ
and other water supply stakeholders are limited;
9. Water supply services responsibilities and functions are shared between the
GCWW and the MoZ (Ministry of Local Governance); they are not clearly
defined and overlap at times with adverse effects on the water supply
management and service levels.

5.3.11.3 Recommendations for Improving the Water

Supply Provision Levels in the MoZ
In view of the above, it is clear that water quantity is not a problem in the city of Az-Zintaan,
the municipality’s water demand center. It may be however in other parts of the municipality,
but data are lacking. It is therefore very important to take the following short-term and
long-term measures in order to address the water supply problems in the municipality
sustainably:

132
3. Short to medium term actions

• Protection of the current water infrastructures from terrorists, vandalism, sabotage,

illegal connections as well as anthropogenic pollution;
• Preparation of an integrated masterplan for water and other utilities for the MoZ;
• Conducting a baseline survey of the state of water supply and its capacities (Technical
(infrastructures) human and financial) within the municipality to identify gaps and
urgent short term, and long term needs of the cities within the municipality including
water storage facilities and redevelopment, rehabilitation and renovation of water
supply infrastructures (as needed);
• Provision of means of transporting water to households and vital facilities in cases
of extended water shortages or emergencies;
• Providing access to safe drinking water in areas of the MoZ which lack this basic
service “Right”;
• Completing works for receiving and delivering the MMRP waters while making and
implementing plans for maintaining and protecting the current resources so that
they remain viable alternatives in cases of emergency;
• Completion of halted water supply projects which address directly supplying water
to areas of severe shortages;
• Installation of water meters and pressure gauges in critical locations to allow
understanding of network or water supply hydraulics, and consequently, to improve
operation, service quality and minimize leakage losses and associated damages;
• Improving the reliability of electric power supply services connected to water supply
systems to ensure continuity of services and provision of standby power generators
to overcome electric power cutoffs;
• Improving mechanisms for collection of revenues making use of internationally
demonstrated technologies and practices;
• Raising awareness on water conservation and water demand management;
• Establishment of an information management unit with staff, equipment, software,
etc. along with application of electronic archiving system;
• Establishing a water supply and quality monitoring program and provide all human,
material and financial means needed to ensure its continuity including water quality
analysis laboratories;
• Installation of water treatment systems to improve the quality of groundwater
sources; demonstrated treatment technologies are readily available for such waters;
• Supply of chlorination systems for all MoZ waters to protect public health;
• The significance of water quality and its impact on public health and infrastructures
durability make it an essential element in these management practices. To this end,
assigning personnel, providing special administrative units, provision of analytical
laboratories with materials and training are a priority for the MoZ. Data generated
from this water quality management subsystem should be incorporated into
the water supply system information and archiving system for easy referencing,
documentation, analysis and reporting;
• Provision of security for all employees, infrastructures and other assets to ensure
safety and service provision;
• Institutionalizing water supply services within the MoZ through upgrading and
streamlining of mandates of the Water Administration of the MoZ and the GCWW
Service Offices and clear identification of mandates;
• Completion of preparation of urban and infrastructures masterplans;
• Establishment of a capacity building program for water supply employees within the
MoZ.

4. Long-term actions
• Execution of water pumping and transmission facilities for the Saru Zeinuba Wellfield
in order to be used as a viable source of water supply for the city of Az-Zintaan;
• Updating of the water supply sector organizational structure to eliminate
overlapping and minimize numbers and duplication of roles and facilities;

133
 •Provision of a large scale balancing and emergency storage for the city of
Az-Zintaan to overcome extended water cutoffs due to power failures and
terrorist acts.
The above key priorities and recommendations have been translated into an investment/
development action plan to be implemented in three phases, urgent, short term and
medium term sub-plans. These urgent needs and plans are elaborated below.

5.3.12URGENT NEEDS ANDINVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR

WATER SUPPLY IN THE MOZ
Armed conflict, economic and political instabilities had impacted the water supply systems
in the different counties forming the MoZ. Based on field visits and technical assessment,
it was concluded that the state of water supply infrastructures and services in Az-Zintaan
city was generally poor. Although no accurate and sufficient data are available, the state
of water supply in other counties is also likely to be poor affecting directly the service
provision levels.

To upgrade the level of water supply services and provide all residents of the municipality’s
capital with access to adequate “Improved” water supplies, urgent investment
interventions, short-term and medium-term action plans have been proposed. The activities
and implementation schedules of these plans are presented in Annexes A.1, A.2and A.3,
respectively.

The urgent interventions have been identified based on: 1) Meetings with senior GCWW
and the MoZ staff, 2) Review of water supply reports, programs, and 3)Field visits to the
municipality including the water infrastructures. Prices for the items and services needed
have been estimated from previous contracts and offers, implemented projects and from
suppliers directly, in addition to the consultant’s experience. Because most of the items
are not available locally and, therefore, need to be imported, the original prices – in US
dollars – were adopted. This approach was supported by the unstable rate of exchange of
the Libyan dinar against foreign currencies.

The BOQ and prices for the urgent interventions investment plan which is to be implemented
within 6-12 months are presented in Annex A. It can be seen from this section that the
total cost of rehabilitation is about 3.6 million US dollars. This amount represents mostly
supplies of water supply infrastructures (Pumps, pipelines, ancillaries), rehabilitation or
repair, and trucks for water supply to households and vital facilities in case of extended
water shortages or emergencies. Although the interventions are urgent, their causes are
not all directly related to the armed conflict and insecurity.

It is also clear that the amount of funds required is not large and can be managed readily within
the municipalities’ budget, emergency allocations by the state and donor organization. In
the event such funds are not available, a phased implementation plan should be prepared
with criteria based priorities.

5.3.13 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
AlKasaba Consultants wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of senior staff of
the Municipality of Az-Zintaan and the GCWW Tripoli and GCWW Service Offices/ MoZ
in granting access and providing data and information on water supply infrastructures.
Special thanks are extended to them.

5.3.14 REFERENCES
1. Urban Planning Department, 3rd Generation Masterplan, under preparation;
2. Secretariat of Planning, The National Development Program 2008-2012, prepared on
2007;

134
 3. General Information Authority, General Results Census-2006, 2007;
4. Secretariat of Planning, National Program for Water and Sanitation, 2005;
5. General Water Authority, Unpublished Report, 2009;
6. Data on Sauf AjJeen and Saru ZeinubaWellfields
7. Elgzeli, Y. M., “Future Groundwater Development in the Jefara Plain, Libya, and
Possible Environmental Impacts: Regional Approach”, PhD Thesis, Charles University
Prague, Chekia, 2010;
8. General Company for Water and Wastewater, Annual Water Supply Report, 2017;
9. General Water Authority, Unpublished Report, 2007;
10. National Center for Standards and Metrology, Libyan Drinking Water Standard
82/2015;
11. General Water Authority, Unpublished Report, 2005;
12. AlKasaba Consulting Engineers, Municipalities Water Quality Analysis Report, June
2018;
13. Manmade River Project Execution and Management Authority, Phase II, Water
Quality Report 2015;
14. Manmade River Project Execution and Management Authority, Phase II, Water
Quality Report 2014;
15. Manmade River Project Execution and Management Authority, Phase II, Water
Quality Report 2017;
16. Al-Alwani, N. H., “Estimation of some Chemical Characteristics of Water Sources in
the city of Az-Zintan”, Tekrit Pure Sciences Magazine, 18 (4) 2013;
17. Municipality of Az-Zintaan, Water Administration, Personal Communication, Mar.
2018;
18. General Company for Water and Wastewater, Unpublished Report, 2017;
19. United Nations Inter-Agency Security and Humanitarian Access Mission to the Nefusa
Mountain of Libya, Wazin – Nalut – Jadu – Az-Zintaan,30 June and 1 July 2011;
20. Libya Humanitarian Situation Report Mid-Year 2016, UNICEF;
21. DTM Libya – R22 IPD Returnee Report Final, IMO, 2018;
22. AlKasaba Consulting Engineers, Design of Water Supply Works for 5 Cities of the
Western Mountain, Technical Report, 2018.

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN RELATION TO REPORT PREPARATION

No. Name Title Mobile, email

Mustafa Mohammad AlBa- 00218913439591 mustfa172@

1 Mayor, Municipality of Az-Zintaan
rouni yahoo.com

2 Musa Mohammad Basbaas Municipality Deputy, Diwan 00218913836653

Member, Services, Az-Zintaan

3 Sadeg Ahmad Azhari 00218925051837
Council

4 Mabrouk Zraireeg Head, Social Affairs Office 00218914218433

5 Mustafa Arammah Head, Projects Office 00218914231804

135
 00218913408578arrmah64@
6 Abdullah Arammah Saad Water Supply File Supervisor, MoZ
gmail.com

7 Mohammad Attir Emergency Office Head 00218914516137

8 Ahmad Athumun GCWW Az-Zintaan Office Head 00218925179948

ANNEXES
Activities and Implementation Schedules for the Investment/ Development Plans for the
Water Supply Systems in
the City of Az-Zintaan
Annex 1.Bill of Quantities for Urgent Investment/ Development Plan for Water Supply in the City of Az-Zintaan

Unit Price Subtotal

No. Description Unit Quantity
($) Price ($)

Supply of trucks equipped with 12 m3 steel water tanks

fully equipped for transporting water from allocated Well-
1 No. 12 130,000 1,560,000
fields or sources to households and vital public utilities in
cases of extended water shortages or emergencies

Prepare a scope of work for RFP for the preparation of an

integrated infrastructures masterplan for the counties of
2 the municipality (Roads, water supply system, sewage and LS 1 25,000 25,000
rainwater drainage, communication, electrical and gas
networks)

Prepare a scope of work for RFP for the design of the infra-
3 structure (Roads, water, sewage and rainwater drainage, LS 1 250,000 250,000
communication, electrical and gas networks)

Supply and installation of a 50 Hz, 380 v submersible

pump of stainless steel L316; capacity = 30 m3/hour and a
pumping head Hp = 355 m including electrical cables and
4 No 8 25,000 200,000
switch control panel with all protection required. Most of
the Wells diameters are 25 cm-30 cm. The item includes
spares for one year

Supply and installation of rising main (304L stainless steel

(AISA 304L); a 125 mm diameter; pressure rating of 80
5 bar with threaded fittings (ZSM connection). The length of m 2400 100 240,000
the pipe segment shall not exceed 6 meters as per techni-
cal specifications

136
 Annex 1. Bill of Quantities for Urgent Investment/ Development Plan for Water Supply in the City of Az-Zintaan
“Continued”

Unit Subtotal
No. Description Unit Quantity
Price ($) Price, ($)

Supply and installation of standby diesel power

generator; capacity 1MKVA including all accessories
6 No 1 250,000 250,000
and a 3 m3 fuel storage steel tank, automatic flip
switch, electrical cables and spares for one year.

Supply and installation of the wellhead system

including all valves: air, non– return, gate valves,
pressure and flow meters, all connections, elbows
7 and valve for water sample withdrawal and drainage LS 14 15,000 210,000
pipes to clean the well, complete with all accessories
required to connect the well water to the collection
stainless steel piping.

Supply and installation of a multi-stage 50 Hz

horizontal surface pump; capacity = 160 m3/hour,
a pumping head H = 170 m; rotation speed rate
8 of 1450 rpm. The item includes switch panel and No. 4 20,000 80,000
spares for one year. Both pumps and switch panel
should be IP68 and Insulation class Y – desert condi-
tions.
Supply and installation of suction and discharging
pipes inside the pumping station with all required
9 accessories of stainless steel L304 type. The item L. S. 1 20,000 20,000
includes gate, non- return valves and all connection
fittings.
Supply and installation of standby diesel power
generator; capacity 1MKVA including all accessories
10 No 1 250,000 250,000
and a 3 m3 fuel storage steel tank, automatic flip
switch, electrical cables, and spares for one year.

Annex 1. Bill of Quantities for Urgent Investment/ Development Plan for Water Supply in the City of Az-Zintaan
“Continued”

Unit Subtotal
No. Description Unit Quantity
Price ($) Price, ($)

Supply and installation of water quality analysis lab

including equipment, chemicals for one year, build-
11 LS 1 250,000 250,000
ing, furniture and training of 8 personal laboratory
operators.

Supply and installation of water chlorination sys-

tem for use in Sauf AjJleen Wellfield. The injection
capacity of 2.5 kg Cl2/hour of chlorine gas, includ-
ing injectors, sensors, flow meters, safety system,
12 LS 1 75,000 75,000
prevention and air ventilation. The system should
be equipped with water sprayers and chlorine gas
detector. The work includes the supply and installa-
tion of 3 cylinders of 1 ton chlorine gas.

Design and construction of a chlorination room of

13 46 m2. The design should be in coordination with LS 1 15,000 15,000
chlorination system supplier

137
 Prepare training needs assessment and develop a
training plan for workers in the water sector, includ-
14 LS 1 30,000 30,000
ing planning, designing, operation, maintenance,
management and development

Establishment of a central workshop for the main-

tenance of water supply systems and the supply of
workshop equipment, especially those related to
15 excavation work, leakage detection, maintenance LS 1 150,000 150,000
and repair of distribution networks, dismantling
and piping of pipes, maintenance of valves and
operation and control panels

Total (Three million six hundred and five thousand) US dollars 3,605,000

Annex 2. Activities and Implementation Schedule for Short-term Development Plan (1-3 years) for Water Supply in the
City of Az-Zintaan

Implementation Time

Item Description Year 1 Year 2 Year 3

No

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10

Preparation of a comprehensive plan for

urban planning for the city of Az-Zintaan
and the preparation of infrastructure plans
for basic services including the following
schemes:
• Urban plan includes classification of
residential, service, commercial and
industrial land of the city.
• Planning and designing of the city’s
road and transport network.
• Designing the water supply system
that takes into consideration the
1 integration of the available water re-
sources, processing, transportation
and distribution within the city.
• Planning and designing of drainage
systems for wastewater, rainwater
and wastewater treatment plant.
• Planning and designing of electricity
grid and lighting
• Planning and designing of gas distri-
bution network
• Planning and designing of telecom-
munication networks

138
Annex 2. Activities and Implementation Schedule for Short-term Development Plan (1-3 years) for Water Supply in the
City of Az-Zintaan “Continued”

Implementation Time
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
No Item Description
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9

Implementation of training programs in

several of water supply fields (Planning,
2
designing, operation, maintenance, man�
.)agement and development
Initiation of the contracting procedures for
the implementation of the water supply
project from the Wellfields of Sauf AjJeen
3
and Saru Zeinuba and from Man- made
River System- Abu Zayyan Ar-Ruhaybaat
.Transmission Line

Annex 3.Activities and Implementation Schedule for Medium-Longer Term (3-5 years) Development Plan for Water Sup-
ply in the City of Az-Zintaan

Implementation Time

Year 1 / Year 2 / Year 3 / Year 4 / Year 5 /

No Activity
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

Construction of infrastructure projects

including road network, water supply
system, distribution network, reservoirs,
1 pumping stations, sewage system, elec-
tricity and lighting network, gas distribu-
tion network, communications and solid
waste transfer stations

Review the training plan for the reha-

bilitation of workers in the water sector,
including the implementation of ad-
vanced courses and development of the
2 water services company in the region to
provide services at excepted international
standards in the fields of (Strategic plan-
ning, designing, operation, maintenance,
management and development).

139
ASSESSEMNT OF THE STATE OF
WATER SUPPLY AND URGENT
INVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT
PLANS IN FOCAL/ IDP IMPACTED
MUNICIPALITIES

THE MUNICIPALITY OF TAWERGHA

140

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BOQ Bill of Quantities

GCWW `General Company for Water and Wastewater
GWA General Water Authority
IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
LYD Libyan Dinar
LS Lump Sum
lpcd liter per capita per day
MMRP `Man-made River Project
NPWS `National Program for Water and Sanitation
H `Head
O & M Operation and Maintenance
RO Reverse Osmosis
TORs Terms of Reference
TDS Total dissolved solids
UN United Nations
UNICEF `United Nations Fund for Children
WDN Water Distribution Network

141
CONTENTS 2 Disclaimer
3 Abbreviations and Acronyms
4 CONTENTS
7 FIGURES
8 TABLES
9 5.3.1 INTRODUCTION
9 5.3.1.1 Objectives of the Report
5.3.1.2 Scope of Work, Data and Meth-
10
odology
11 5.3.1.3 Report Contents
11 5.3.2 BACKGROUND
5.3.2.1 Location, Boundaries and Plan-
11
ning
5.3.3 WATER DEMAND OF THE MU-
12
NICIPALITY OF AZ-ZINTAAN
5.3.3.1 Population Growth in the MoZ:
12
2018- 2023
5.3.3.2 Water Demand in the MoZ:
12
2018-2023
5.3.4 SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY
FOR THE MUNICIPALITY OF
13 AZ-ZINTAAN
13 5.3.4.1 Wellfields
16 5.3.4.2 The MMRP
17 5.3.4.3 Trucked Public Water
5.3.4.4 Trucked Water from Private
17
Wells
18 5.3.4.5 Harvested Rainwater
5.3.5 COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO
18
WATER SUPPLY
5.3.6WATER QUALITY CHARACTERIS-
19
TICS
5.3.6.1 Water Quality Characteristics of
19
Public and Private Wells
21 5.3.6.2 Quality of the MMRP Water
22 5.3.6.3 Harvested Rainwater Quality
5.3.7 WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUC-
22
TURES AND THEIR CONDITIONS
22 5.3.7.1 Wellfields
5.3.7.2 Reservoirs, Tanks and Storage
23
Capacity
5.3.7.3 Pumping Station, Transmission
Lines and Water Distribution
24 Network
5.3.7.4Armed Conflict Caused Damag-
es to Water Supply Infrastructures
25 in the MoZ
5.3.8 MANAGEMENT OF WATER SUP-
PLY IN THE CITY OF
26 AZ-ZINTAAN
5.3.9 FUTURE WATER SUPPLY SOURC-
28
ES

142
 5.3.9.1 Water Demand and Supply
28
Balance
5.3.9.2 Future Water Supply Sources
29
and Infrastructures
5.3.9.3 Water Supply Masterplans and
30
Infrastructures Projects
5.3.10 IDPS AND RETURNEES OF THE
ARMED CONFLICT IN
31 THE MOZ
5.3.11 KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY IN
32
THE MUNICIPALITY OF AZ-ZINTAAN
32 5.3.11.1Key Findings
35 5.3.11.2 Major Challenges
5.3.11.3 Recommendations for Improv-
ing the Water Supply Provision
35 Levels in the MoZ
5.3.12 URGENT NEEDS ANDINVEST-
MENT/ DEVELOPMENT PLANS
37 FOR WATER SUPPLY IN THE MOZ
38 5.3.13 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
38 5.3.14 REFERENCES
LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED IN
RELATION TO REPORT
40 PREPARATION
ANNEXES
Activities and Implementation Sched-
ules for the Investment/
Development Plans for the Water Sup-
ply Systems in the City of
41 Az-Zintaan
Annex 1. Bill of Quantities for Urgent
Investment/ Development Plan for
42 Water Supply in the City of Az-Zintaan
Annex 2. Activities and Implementa-
tion Schedule for Short-term
Development Plan (1-3 years) for Wa-
ter Supply in the City of
45 Az-Zintaan
Annex 3. Activities and Implementa-
tion Schedule for Medium-Term
(3-5 years) Development Plan for Wa-
ter Supply in the City
47 of Az-Zintaan

Figure 1. Growth of Water Demand in

FIGURES
the Municipality and City of
13 Az-Zintaan
Figure 2. Location of Sauf AjJeen and
14
Saru Zeinuba Wellfields

143
 Figure 3. New Well Drilled by UNICEF
15
(Well head buried for protection)
Figure 4. Turnout Feeding Az-Zintaan
16
City
16 Figure 5. MMRP Filling Point Platform
Figure 6. Water Truck Tanker being
17
Filled from a Private Well
Figure 7. North Elevated Tank in a Poor
24
Structural Condition
25 Figure 8. Sauf AjJeen Pumping Station
25 Figure 9. Diesel generator, Sauf AjJeen
Figure 10. Private Trucks Leaving Fill-
ing Point Platform on the
26 Way to Sell Water to Users
Figure 11. Deteriorated Metal Pipes
27
and WDN of the City of Az-Zintaan
Figure 12. Destroyed Power Supply
27
Line Feeding Wellfield in Az-Zintaan

TABLES 12 Table 1. Population Growth of the

Municipality and City of Az-Zintaan
15 Table 2. Characteristics of Sauf AjJ-
een Wellfield
16 Table 3. Characteristics of Saru Ze-
inubaWellfields
Table 4. Water Quality Characteristics
of Sauf AjJeen and Saru Zeinuba
19 Wellfields
20 Table 5. Water Quality Characteristics
of Sauf AjJeen Wellfield
20 Table 6. Water Quality Characteristics
of Saru Zeinuba Wellfield
Table 7. Water Quality Characteristics
from Different Locations in
20 Az-Zintaan City
Table 8. Water Quality Characteristics
of the MMRP Distributed in the
21 MoZ
22 Table 9. Harvested Rainwater Quality
from Houses in Az-Zintaan City
24 Table 10. Capacities and Status of
Water Tanks in Az-Zintaan City
Table 11. Numbers and Classification
of Az-Zintaan Services Center
28 Employees
32 Table 12. Basic Data on IDPs in the
MoZ

144
5.4.1 INTRODUCTION
Tawergha, a coastal town in Libya, was home to about 24,000 residents until August 11, 2011
when the city became a ghost town, as a result of armed conflict, with all of its residents
being forced to become Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) throughout Libya’s different
regions. The population of the city is estimated to be about 31,000.

Historically, the city relied on artesian wells for water supply; the productivities of these
wells were sufficient to meet the city’s present and long term domestic water demands.
The water was treated to decrease temperature and oxidize high hydrogen sulfide which
was present in high concentrations. Domestic water was provided by the General Company
for Water and Wastewater (GCWW). The water supply infrastructures along with the city’s
superstructures suffered serious damages and destruction during the armed conflict in
2011 and as a result of looting, vandalism and theft afterwards which escalated in the
absence of the city’s residents.

Despite the numerous reconciliation efforts and agreements taking place since 2011,
most of Tawerghans continue to live in substandard shelters in many make-shift camps
mostly within the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi; these camps lack adequate water supply
and sanitation services. Regrettably, these IDPs will face similar challenges once they are
allowed to return to their long-deserted homes.

5.4.1.1 Objectives of the Report

This report was prepared as an output of the second/ Final Phase of a UNICEF sponsored
project for the Assessment of Water Supply Institutions in Libya which included the state
of water supply in four IDPs impacted focal municipalities including the city of Tawergha.

The ultimate objective of this report was to describe the state of water supply system in
the city of Tawergha with the intention of drawing plans for rehabilitation of this system so
that it can provide water services effectively. Specifically, the objectives of the report were
as follows:

6. Collect data on the state of water supply in the city of Tawergha, with special focus
on the impacts of armed conflict and its aftermath on the this system’s functionality
and ability to supply the city’s population upon return in the near future;
7. Assess the state of water supply through analysis of data collected;
8. Assess the capacities of the water supply institutions within the city;
9. Propose urgent, short-term and medium-term investment/ development plans for
rehabilitation of the water supply system in the city;
10. Provide a database and a baseline for water supply in the city of Tawergha for future
reference and utilization.

5.4.1.2 Scope of Work, Data and Methodology

The scope of work of this report focused primarily on the state of water supply in the city
of Tawergha and the assessment of the institutional capacities of the GCWW with regard to
provision of water supply services in this city with special consideration to the impacts of
armed conflict and displacement of the city’s residents. Accordingly, the scope is limited to
the geographical boundaries of the city and the water supply infrastructures within these
boundaries.

145
Information and data used to achieve the report’s objectives listed above were compiled
from many sources; the major sources are listed below:

21. Literature surveys and reviews of studies, articles, reports, plans and programs
prepared by water institutions, consultants, national and international organizations
on water supply issues of relevance to the city of Tawergha;
22. Review of national and regional population and master planning data;
23. Review of design standards, water quality standards and guidelines;
24. Meetings and communications with senior members of the City Council of Tawergha;
25. Meetings and communications with GCWW and Housing and Infrastructures Board
(HIB) specialists in charge of the city of Tawergha water supply;
26. Meetings with the special committee formed by the GCWW to identify the immediate
and urgent water supply needs of the city of Tawergha;
27. Meetings with HE, the Minister of IDPs, the Chairman of Tawergha Local Council,
members of the Tawergha Dialogue Committee on the Return of the IDPs and
Chairman of the Misrata/Tawergha File Committee;
28. A total of 3 field visits to Tawergha’s water supply infrastructures during the period
June-November, 2018 which included meetings with technical staff, City Council
Members and the Emergency Committee for Tawergha;
29. Collection and water quality analysis of samples from several wells located within
the city’s water supply system;
30. Media coverage and official websites of institutions and organizations working in
Tawergha.
Cost data utilized for preparation of Bills of Quantities (BOQs) for the urgent intervention
and investment/development plans for the city of Tawergha were solicited from several
sources including the following:

11. Manufacturers and suppliers;

Contractors and previous contracts;
12. Offers;
13. Local markets;
14. Experts.

The data compiled were synthesized and analyzed for validation, completeness and gap
identification. Subsequently, key issues and priorities were identified, indicators were
defined, recommendations and urgent, short, and medium term intervention plans were
drawn.

5.4.1.3 Report Contents

To achieve its objectives and comply with the Project TORs, the report contents are presented
as follows:

6. Introduction and Background (Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2);

7. Water demand, sources, quality, coverage and infrastructures, (Sections 5.4.3 to
5.4.7)
8. Armed Conflict impacts on water supply and future water supply sources(Section
5.4.8 and 5.4.9)
9. Key findings, challenges and recommendations (Section 5.4.10)
10. Urgent, short and medium term investment/development plans (Section 5.4.11)

5.4.2 BACKGROUND
5.4.2.1 Location, Topography and Climate
The city of Tawergha is located on the Mediterranean coast of Libya, about 30 kilometers
southeast of Misrata and 65 kilometers northwest of AlHeisha AlJadidah (Figure 1).

146
Tawergha is situated on a flat area at a height of 5 to 10 meters above sea level, with
many local depressions called Sabkhats which are 1 to 5 meters deep. The total area of​​
the Sabkha is estimated to be 2,000 km2. Groundwater is very close to the surface in these
Sabkhas areas composing small saline ponds in the depressions. Due to evaporation of
these ponds in the summer season, a layer of a salty soil is prevailing.
The topography of the city of Tawergha is flat, ranging from 2 m to 50 m above sea level
and averaging 5 to 20 m.

Figure 1. Location of the City of Tawergha

The city’s climate is Mediterranean with a mild winter and humid summer; average annual
temperature varies from 15 °C to 30° C. The hottest months are July and June of (30-40 °C)
and the coolest months are December and January (15 - 20 °C). Rainfall rates are 100 - 150
mm/year. Southern winds prevail in the summer and north-western winds predominate
during the autumn (1).

5.4.2.2Urbanization and Development

The old city of Tawergha has developed randomly over the years with a dense urban spread
around the city; only 35% of the overall “planned” area has been developed. Urbanization
and population are moving south and west away from the sea due to the presence of
Sabkhat low-lying area.

Economic activities are limited to irrigated agriculture, palm trees, cattle and cattle breeding,
some minor handicrafts and some food industry based on milk production and dates.

Several infrastructures projects were planned within the National Development Program
2008-2012 (2); execution of some projects was started in 2009-2010, but those projects were
soon interrupted indefinitely in 2011as foreign contractors fled the country for security
reasons.

5.4.3 WATER DEMAND OF THE CITY OF TAWERGHA

5.4.3.1 Population Growth in Tawergha: 2018-2023
The city of Tawergha was home to 24,223 and 26,282, residents in the years 2006 (3) and
2011, respectively. On 11/8/2011, it became a ghost town, however, with all of its residents
being forced to become Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) throughout Libya’s different
regions as a result of armed conflict. The majority of displaced Tawerghans have been
residing in camps in the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi.

The population of the city was estimated to be 31,047 and 34,430 persons in 2018 and 2023,
respectively, based on growth rates adopted by the Census Department (3). The population
growth of the city of Tawergha is shown in Table 1.

147
 Table 1. Population Growth of the City of Tawergha: 2006– 2023

Year 2006 2011 2018 2023

Population of the City of Tawergha 24,223 26,282 31,047 34,430

5.4.3.2 Water Demand in the City of Tawergha: 2018-2023

There are no data on actual consumption rates in the city of Tawergha. Water demand can,
however, be estimated based on rates set by the National Program for Water and Sanitation
(NPWS) (4). For the city of Tawergha, the rate is 200 lpcd; accordingly, the estimated water
requirements of the city of Tawergha for the years 2018 and 2023 are 6,200 and 6,880 m3/
day, respectively.

5.4.4 SOURCES OF WATER SUPPLY FOR THE CITY OF TAWERGHA

The area and city of Tawergha are amongst Libya’s richest regions in ground and surface
water resources. Groundwater is found in three main aquifers: 1) Surface aquifer. 2) Mezda-
Nalut aquifer, and 3) The Kikkla aquifer (1). The general characteristics of these waters are
summarized in Table 2. A total of 11 artesian wells and 3 non-artesian wells have been
drilled in these aquifers; these wells supply water for both domestic and agricultural uses.
Table 2. Characteristics of Aquifers in the Tawergha Area

Concentration of
Depth of Static Estimated Well Productivity
Groundwater Reservoir Depth, m TDS, mg/L
Water Level, m (m3 / hour)

Surface 120- 150 20-50 5 - 15 3500-5000

Mezda -Nalut 400 - 700 0 - 20 20 - 40 1800 - 3500

Kikkla 1400 +40 to +60 100 - 150 1800 - 2200

Another water source is the Ain Tawergha “Spring” (Figure 2) with a flow of 7200 m3/hour
and a TDS concentration of 2500 and 3000 mg/ liter (1). Most of the Ain Tawergha water has
been used for the Tawergha Agricultural Project since 1976 while a small fraction is used
for domestic purposes.

Figure 2.Ain Tawergha “Spring”

148
The chemical analysis of waters from wells drilled in the area indicates the presence of high
levels of sulfate. The upper layer has a high percentage of calcium sulfate that dissolves
easily. The corrosive nature of both water and soil in Tawergha has affected adversely
.metal based and cement based pipes used in the water supply infrastructures

5.4.4.1 Artesian Public Wells

The TWTP is fed by eight artesian wells distributed around the plant at distances varying
from 1.5 km to 6.5 km. Depths of the wells are 1435-1500 meters, their diameters are 400
mm, and their productivities range from 180 m3/ hour to 430 m3/hour (Table 3). The water
levels at the wellhead range from 7 meters to 60 meters. Well productivities range from 150
m3/hour to 430 m3/hour with an average of337 m3/hour. The total productivity is 2,700 m3/
hour (64,800 m3/day).

5.4.4.2 Non-Artesian Public Wells

A total of 8 non-artesian wells have been utilized to supply water to the city of Tawergha.
These wells were drilled by the People’s Committee of the city and by the General People’s
Committee for Utilities and Housing. Basic characteristics of these wells are shown in Table
3.It can be seen that the depths of wells were 200 - 600 meters while well productivities
ranged from 20 to 100 m3/hour; the average was63 m3/hour. The total productivity is 441
m3/hour (10,584 m3/day).

Table 3. Basic Characteristics of Tawergha Well

Water
Well Total Well
Tem-
Well Loca- Produc- Depth casing Sulfates,
No .Well No pera- Connected To
tion tivity Diameter, mg/L
)m( ture,
)(m3/hr mm o
C

Alfateh Pumping
1 Alam **5/1/5/1 45 400 250 High 40
Station

Mloog Pumping
2 Mloog 5/1/5/2 100 500 300 High 35
Station

3 Alltham 5/1/5/3 80 1500 400 High 50 Direct to WDN

4 ALheeta 5/1/5/4 20 200 150 High 30 Direct to WDN

5 Alrwazig 5/1/5/5 50 600 300 High 45 Direct to WDN

6 Almharza 5/1/5/6 50 500 300 High 45 Not connected

Somoud W 5/1/5/15 97 600 300 )1620( 30 Not connected

7
Atsdi 47/0/84/2B/T

149
 5/1/5/7
8 TWTP1 430 1486 400 )1900( 50 TWTP
36/0/84/2A/T

5/1/5/8
9 TWTP2 360 1460 400 )1800( 50 TWTP
37/0/84/2A/T

5/1/5/9
10 TWTP3 288 1457 400 )1530( 50 TWTP
38/0/84/2A/T

11 5/1/5/10
TWTP4 180 1457 400 )1605( 50 TWTP
39/0/84/2A/T

12 TWTP 5 5/1/5/11 288 1435 400 )1970( 50 TWTP

40/0/84/2A/T

13 TWTP 6 5/1/5/12 360 1445 400 )1780( 50 TWTP

41/0/84/2A/T

14 TWTP 7 5/1/5/13 360 1453 400 )1757( 50 TWTP

42/0/84/2A/T

15 TWTP 8 5/1/5/14 430 1465 400 )1344( 50 TWTP

43/0/84/2A/T

5.4.4.3 Private Wells

Private wells are also used; the water level at these wells is only 20-30 m below ground
surface. The TDS concentration in these wells is very high reaching 6000 mg/L (3).

5.4.4.4 The Man-made River Project (MMRP)

The city of Tawergha has been also allocated 12,832 m3/d of urban supply water from the
MMRP system. This amount will be supplied from a turnout on the eastern route of Jabal Al-
Hasawneha, Al-Jafara system; it supplies the cities of Tawergha, Al-Kararim and Tummina.

It can be seen from the data above that sufficient groundwater quantities are available to
satisfy the city’s water demand for a long time to come from two reliable sources; namely,
local groundwater wells and the MMRP.

5.4.4.5 Management of Water Supply System in Tawergha

Prior to 2011, Tawergha had been provided with domestic water by the General Company
for Water and Wastewater (GCWW). The water supply works were operated by the Tawergha
Service Center (of the Central Region Office of the GCWW); the center employed 30 persons
including 25 technical, 4 administrative, and one financial staff.

150
Armed conflict and lack of security impacted the water supply infrastructures significantly;
the artesian and non-artesian wells and the TWTP were damaged severely or destroyed
completely as it was a large part of the Water Distribution Network (WDN). Collection
and transmission pipelines suffered serious corrosion. It is, therefore, not possible to
supply Tawergha’s returnee population with water via the existing system without major
rehabilitation, replacement and renovation works.

5.4.5WATER QUALITY CHARACTERISTICS

5.4.5.1 Water Quality Characteristics of Public Wells
The chemical and physical characteristics of some artesian wells in Tawergha are shown in
Table 4. Artesian groundwater has high sulfate concentrations (1,344 to 1970 mg/L), high
hardness, high TDS and a high temperature (50 o C).

The water quality of the non-artesian wells is also marginal with high sulfates, TDS,
hardness, sodium and potassium. Accordingly, Tawergha’s ground water quality does not
comply with the Libyan Drinking Water Standard No. 82/2015 (5). To meet this standard,
the Tawergha Water Treatment Plant was built during the late 1980s and early 1990s; it was
located about 2 kilometers east of city. The design capacity of the plant is 60,000 m3/day
(10,000 m3/day to Tawergha and 40000 m3/day to Misrata). The city of Tawergha received
about 3500 m3/day in 2011.

Water quality characteristics of the water produced by the TWTP are not available. The
treatment units employed included temperature reduction, oxidation of hydrogen sulfide
and disinfection. It can be safely assumed that the product waters were high in TDS, sulfates,
chlorides, calcium, magnesium and potassium.
Table 4. Water Quality Characteristics of Some Artesian Wells in Tawergha*

Well Designation/ Parameter Value

Parameter
/T2 /T2/2
*pH 7.2 7.4 7.5 7.2 7.0
TDS 1,780 1,757 1,620 1,530 1,620
EC 2,800 2,800 2,400 2,300 2,400
Total Hardness 760 750 690 180 770
0 0 0 0 0
92 152 164 146 305
315 294 340 350 309
800 790 470 520 586
120 196 164 180 180
110 65 67 70 78
260 260 210 180 204
52 52 62 42 41
* Adopted from Ref. 1.
**All units in mg/L except pH (no unit) and electric conductivity (uS/cm); hardness and bicarbonate are
expressed as CaCO3

Based on these characteristics, it can be concluded that the well waters and treated artesian
wells waters were not in conformity with the Libyan Drinking Water Standard No. 82/2015.
Microbiological characteristics were not reported despite their significance. Treatment of
these waters is, therefore, necessary prior to domestic uses.

151
5.4.5.2 Quality of the MMRP Water
Water quality analysis of the MMRP at the turnout or filling platform is not available.
However, the quality of the MMRP Phase II waters is monitored regularly. A typical analysis
results is shown in Table 5 (6, 7). It can be seen from this table that the MMRP waters
comply with the Libyan Drinking Water Standard No. 82 of 2015 with the analysis taken in
2017 showing a critical nitrate concentration level. Available data from the MMRP/Phase II
over many years give nitrate concentration below the allowable limit (8), this result being
an objective of their water quality management policies and practices. The more recent
analysis shown in table 5 is in full compliance with the standards.

If nitrate concentration rises above the allowable level in the future, nitrate removal must be
considered and treatment units should be added to the existing water supply infrastructures
to make the water suitable for human consumption. If bottled water is used for drinking
and culinary purposes, then water treatment is not needed.

Table 5.Quality Characteristics of the MMRP Waters to be Supplied to the City of Tawergha*

Value**
Libyan Drinking Wa-
Indicator
ter Standard Limits
Ref. 6 Ref. 7

pH 7.6 to 7.8 7.23 6.5 - 8.5

TDS 1026 - 1050 995.70 1000

Total Hardness*** 160-170 420 500

Potassium - 11.7 40

Sodium - 170 200

Calcium - 132.25

Magnesium 21.87

Sulfates 28-35 272.65 250

Chlorides - 129 250

Manganese - 0.05

Nitrate 45- 48 16.3 45

Free chlorine residual 0.2 - 0.3 0.08 0.5

*Adopted from references 6 and 7.
**Expressed as mg/L except pH ***Expressed as CaCO3

152
The MMRP water is generally in compliance with the Libyan Drinking Water Standards
except for nitrates and residual chlorine which is the responsibility of the service provider,
the GCWW. Nitrate levels are usually managed through operation by selection of the
production wells combinations based on nitrate concentrations so that nitrate concentration
remains within the acceptable levels.

5.4.6 COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO WATER SUPPLY

Data on the geographic extent of the distribution networks within the city of Tawergha
are not available. Moreover, the quantities of water supplied to the city of Tawergha are
not known as no flow measurements were made and no records were available of such
quantities. Based on the records of the TWTP, the city received about 3500 m3 of treated
water daily. More water was supplied from the artesian and non-artesian wells, however,
but no records are available on the volumes supplied.

Similarly, water consumption rates and variations were not monitored. Accordingly, actual
per capita consumption rates cannot be determined. It can be deduced, however, from field
visits to the city of Tawergha that water is abundant and that the city’s residents prior to
the exodus had access to water - in sufficient quantities although of questionable quality
– through public WDN or through private wells. Coverage rates have dwindled to a few
households who have returned to the city recently due to the complete destruction of most
of the water supply infrastructures within the city.

5.4.7 WATER SUPPLY INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONDITIONS

The water supply infrastructures of the city of Tawergha consisted of artesian and non-
artesian ground water wells, TWTP, storage reservoirs, pumping station, collection or
transmission lines, elevated tanks and a WDN. A description of these components and their
operational and physical conditions is presented below.

5.4.7.1 Groundwater Wells

Artesian wells formed the major source of water supply to Tawergha until 2011. All artesian
wells and their appurtenances have been out of service ever since because of corrosion-
caused damages but mainly due to man-made damages during and after the 2011-conflict
(Figure 3). As a result, huge volumes of water are being lost. Overflowing water created
cavities and flows back into the soil causing settlements and potential pollution to
groundwater (Figure 4). Access to these flooded wells is not possible making it very difficult
to inspect and repair them. Two wells were reinstated recently. The remaining wells need
to be reinstated by installation of well heads, collection pipes and control equipment.

Figure 3.Damaged and Corroded Artesian Wells Flooding Surroundings

153
Non-artesian wells are also out of service because of deterioration of well casing due to
corrosions; pumps were damaged with no spares to maintain them, or pumps and pump
control and protection systems, parts and cables were stolen and looted (Figure 5). One
of these wells (Somoud) has been reinstated lately and it is currently in use by the few
numbers of returnees. Water is hauled by tanker trucks to places of residence. Another
reason was the lack of electric power due to destruction of power transmission lines.

Figure 4. Ground Settlements Caused by Groundwater Overflows

Figure 5. Non-artesian wells of Tawergha (Somoud and Mallough)

5.4.7.2 Tawergha Water Treatment Plant

The TWTP was destroyed completely during and after the conflict and all of its mechanical
and electrical components were stolen and looted (Figure 6). Currently, the TWTP and the
water transportation lines are out of service.

154
 Figure 6.Fire-Destroyed and Looted Components of the TWTP

5.4.7.3 Water Pumping, Ground and Elevated Water Tanks

As explained previously, water is pumped from the TWTP to three ground storage tanks
and from a non-artesian well at Mallough to a ground storage tank. The volume of each
tank is 800 m3; all of the tanks need cleaning and maintenance.

A pumping station at each of these four tanks lifts water employing two surface pumps to
an elevated tank. Water flows from these tanks to the WDN. Water is also fed to the WDN
at different locations along the main feeders from the TWTP to the ground storage tanks.
Thus, four pumping stations are utilized within the city. All of these stations are out of
service because of theft, looting and destruction of their components during and after 2011.
Procurement of complete pump systems is in order along with installation and provision
of spares and consumables. Power supply is also not available presently and installation
of new system components is needed urgently. The buildings are also in different states
of damage. Assessment of their condition is needed prior to rehabilitation and restoration
operations.

There are five elevated tanks in Tawergha; namely, Mallough, Hay (suburb) Alam, Hay
AlWataniya, the Ring Road and Hay Khaled Ben AlWaleed. The five tanks are cylindrical
with a capacity of less than 200 m3 each. All tanks have been subject to damages; two
elevated tanks have been destroyed completely (Figure 7) while the other three tanks are
in a fair to poor conditions requiring maintenance. A tank was hit by a shell (Figure 8). A
fifth tank did not enter into service because of technical problems during its execution;
subsequently, it was not handed over to the GCWW.
A 10,000 m3 concrete ground tank is under construction; it will receive water from the
MMRP. This tank is 30% complete, but appears to be in a bad condition (Figure 9) as a
result of the armed conflict inflicted damages and tampering with the reinforcing steel and
water stops. The condition of most elevated and ground water tanks is poor to irreparably
damaged necessitating demolition and replacement.

5.4.7.4 Water Transmission Lines and Distribution Network

Transmission lines convey water from wells to the TWTP and from the plant (or wells) to
ground water reservoirs from which water is pumped to elevated reservoirs. Water flows
by gravity to the WDN. A large part of the transmission lines was unearthed (Figure 10) and
looted while the remaining part is damaged visibly and of little use in the future.

The state of transmission lines and WDN pipe works and ancillaries is generally poor as
these metal-based pipes suffered corrosion problems due to extended exposure to highly
corrosive water and soil conditions. As a result, leakage is continuous while corrosion is
accelerating.

155
 Figure 7. Destroyed Elevated Tank Figure 8. Shelled Elevated Tank

Figure 9. A Damaged 10,000 m3 Water Storage Tank (Under Construction)

Figure 10. A Transmission Line Un-earthed Completely

The WDN was executed randomly; its extent is limited to parts of the city only. It is a
collection of sub-networks, some of them have been executed by residents with little
engineering or supervision. These networks were supplied directly from elevated tanks.
Data on pipe sizes, directions, age, condition, layout and valve types and locations are
missing. Some of these sub-networks are functional but not in use. The actual level of
functionally of these sub-networks can only be determined upon operation of the water
supply system, however.

156
Moreover, water works have been subject to tampering, theft and looting, damages, and
destruction. Based on the three field visits, it was observed that most of the water supply
works of Tawergha have been damaged severely. As a result, there are no water supply
services currently in the city.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the infrastructural components of the water
supply system in the city of Tawergha are generally in seriously damaged to completely
destroyed condition. As such, the system is not functional and its reliability of the water
supply system is practically non-existent. Urgent interventions are required with financial
implications.

5.4.8 ARMED CONFLICT CAUSED DAMAGES TO WATER SUPPLY

INFRASTRUCTURES IN THE CITY OF TAWERGHA
5.4.8.1 Internal Displacement of Tawergha Population
The city of Tawergha was a battle ground during Libya’s armed conflict in 2011; the intensity
of the conflict and destruction forced the city’s population to evict it en masse, on August 11,
2011, to become a ghost town (Figure 11). The city’s residents turned suddenly to Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) dispersed in Libya’s different regions (Table 6); the largest numbers
of IDPs have been hosted by the cities of Benghazi and Tripoli. These IDPs live in make-shift
camps which lack basic water supply, sanitation and hygiene requirements (Figure 12).
Despite their strong desire to return, only a few IDPs have ventured to return to a destroyed
city that lacks security, jobs and basic services. The large majority wait impatiently until
reconciliation agreements are implemented forcefully while living miserably in camps that
lack all basic human amenities.

Figure 11. Heavily Damaged Apartment Buildings in Tawergha

Table 6.Estimated Numbers of Tawergha IDPs in Libya’s Regions

Estimated Number of IDPs Fam- Estimated

Region
ilies Number of IDPs

Western 4,173 20,865

Eastern 2,178 10,890

157
 Southern 649 3,245

Total 7,000 35,000

*From Ref 9

*From Ref 9.
Figure 12.TawerghaIDPs Camps: AlHalis, Benghazi (Left) and Airport Road, Tripoli (Right) (10, 11)

5.4.8.2 Armed Conflict Caused Damages to the Tawergha Water Supply

Infrastructures

The water supply infrastructures in the city of Tawergha also suffered major damages and
destruction. The main source of water supply, artesian well fields, water treatment plant,
pumping stations, transmission and distribution pipe works, and storage reservoirs or
tanks were destroyed or damaged severely as was described above. The exact nature and
extent of these damages must be surveyed to assess the needs for rehabilitation, repair
and replacement of the water supply system of the city, and, subsequently, to prepare an
investment and development plan for the city. Minimal repairs have been made recently to
ensure provision of water to the small number of returnees (9). Water supply has been cut
completely since 2011.

Examples of the damages caused by armed conflict and lack of security – and accelerated
by the displacement of the city’s residents - are listed below:

• The artesian wells heads and valves are completely destroyed along with
delivery pipes causing flooding of areas and cavities around these wells
resulting in loss of large quantities of water and damages to the wells,
pipework, soil and nearby structures. A potential also exists for groundwater
contamination as a result;
• The Tawergha Water Treatment Plant (WTP) is currently out of service; all of
its mechanical and electrical equipment has been looted or damaged; parts of
its structural works have also be destroyed or damaged;
• The randomly implemented water distribution network (WDN) pipes were
uncovered, tampered and stolen or destroyed;
• All five elevated water tanks were damaged severely and some irreversibly;
• All four pumping stations were vandalized with complete removal of all
electromechanical equipment, cabling and control systems;
• The 10,000 m3 balancing MMRP water tank was 30% constructed; it was poorly
executed and appears to be irreversibly damaged;

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5.4.9FUTURE WATER SUPPLY SOURCES
5.4.9.1 Water Demand and Supply Balance
The total estimated water demand for the city of Tawergha for the years 2018 and 2023 was
estimated to be 6,200 and 6,880m3/day, respectively (Section 5.4.3). The contributions from
the different sources (Artesian wells, non-artesian wells, the MMRP) are shown in Table 7.
They are of a total 88,246 m3/day. It can be seen that the amount of water available from
these sources far exceeds the demands of the city of Tawergha in 2023 and beyond. In
fact, the quantity allocated by the MMRP alone exceeds the city’s demands beyond 2023. It
should be pointed out that the water quality of the MMRP is the best while that of artesian
and non-artesian wells is marginal requiring treatment. Consequently, priority should be
made to using the MMRP waters especially knowing that such waters are available at the
special Tawergha turn out.
Table 7. Water Sources in Tawergha and Quantities Available

Water Source Quantity Available, m3/day

Artesian Wells 64,800

Non-Artesian Wells 10,584

MMRP 12,862

Total 88,246

5.4.9.2 Water Supply Projects for Tawergha

Several water supply projects were being executed in 2011 as part of the National
Development Programme2008-2012. The major projects are described briefly below.
Supply Line from the MMRP Turnout

This project is intended to supply the cities of Tawergha, Al-Kararim and Tummina from
the MMRP Phase II Eastern Route through a transmission line extending from turnout No.
E 520 + 003 to the coastal road. The line is 13.54 km long and its diameter is 500 mm; it is
made of ductile iron. This line is divided into three sectors. First sector, intended to supply
Tawergha, is made of ductile iron; it is 3.47 km long and 400 mm in diameter of 400 mm.
The line is about 90% complete, but the air valves and washing rooms have not been
completed yet.

Execution of a 10,000 m 3 Reinforced Concrete Ground Water Storage Reservoir

Execution of this tank is about 22%. This project also includes the construction of a main
pumping station for pumping water to an existing elevated tank. This tank was completely
destroyed during the armed conflicts in 2011, however.
Weathering and tampering along with abandonment led to damages to the concrete,
enforcement steel and the water stops (Figure 9). The state of the reservoir needs to
be assessed with consideration to alternatives such as iron tanks which require shorter
installation or construction time (4-5 months) to cater for returnees who may come any
time. Completion of the MMRP supply line presents a preferred alternative as it requires a
shorter time also compared to rehabilitation of the wells and transmission lines.

159
Design of the Tawergha WDN

The existing Tawergha WDN was designed in 2008 on the basis of direct pumping from the
10,000 m3 ground reservoir through main lines with diameters ranging from 160 mm to
300 mm and sub-lines with diameters of 90 mm to 110 mm. The proposed network pipes
lengths totaled about 73 kilometers. Detailed design drawings are not available; drawings
of the current status of the water supply and another drawing showing the final design
of the system were available, however. Both drawings did not show much of the existing
components or design targets.

5.4.10 KEY FINDINGS, PRIORITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY FOR THE RETURNEES TO THE CITY OF
TAWERGHA
This report presented an assessment of the state of water supply in the city of Tawergha
whose residents were subjected to mass displacement while its water supply infrastructures
underwent extensive damages and destruction. The report included a description of the
existing state of water supply and demand, the state of the water supply infrastructures,
future water supply sources and projects, the impact of armed conflict on the water
supply system, key findings, challenges and recommendations. The report ended with an
identification of gaps, and subsequently, a quantitative definition of the urgent investment
activities and services which, upon execution, will ensure restoration of basic water
supply services for the returning residents of the city. Finally, short-term and medium-
term development plans for rehabilitation and restoration of water supply services were
presented. The key findings, challenges and recommendations of this assessment are
listed below followed by the urgent, short and medium range interventions investment/
development plans.

5.4.10.1 Key Findings

1. Tawergha, a coastal town in Libya, was home to about 30,000 residents until 11/8/2011
when the city became a ghost town, as a result of armed conflict, with all of its
residents being forced to become Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) throughout
Libya’s different regions as a result of the armed conflict. The majority of displaced
Tawerghans have been residing in the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi;
2. In 2011,the population of the city was about 24,000 persons with an estimated water
demand of 8,600 m3/day; its 2018 and 2023 populations and water demands are
31,047 and 34,430 persons and 6,200 and 6,880 m3/day, respectively;
3. Historically, the city relied on 8 artesian (Averaging 300 m3/hour) and 7 non-artesian
(Averaging. 50 m3/hour) groundwater wells for water supply. Moreover, 12,800 m3/
day are allocated to the city from the MMRP from the Tawergha turnout;
4. Sufficient groundwater quantities are therefore available for the city’s residents for a
long time to come from two reliable sources; namely the local wells and the MMRP;
5. Artesian and non-artesian groundwater has high sulfate concentrations and hydrogen
sulfides, high hardness and a high temperature; these waters require treatment prior
to domestic use while the MMRP waters are of suitable quality and require only
disinfection;
6. Uncontrolled flows from artesian wells have caused flooding and inundation of
surrounding areas resulting in settlements of land and buildings, backflow into the
wells with potential pollution and loss of large volumes of water over a period of 8
years;
7. Data and information on the Tawergha water supply infrastructures are non-existent;
it is, therefore, very difficult to assess the exact state of these infrastructures or
propose and implement any activities related to rehabilitation and repair of these
works correctly;
8. Most of the water supply infrastructures in Tawergha have sustained severe or

160
 complete destruction, damages and deteriorations as a result of the armed conflict
and vandalism, looting and theft. Additionally, the WDN is comprised of plastic and
metallic based pipe works; the latter are corroded excessively. Based on field visits,
it can be safely concluded that the most of the water supply works of Tawergha are
damaged beyond repair so their restoration will be a fruitless endeavor that is more
costly and time consuming than renovation and reconstruction;
9. Insecurity continues to keep most Tawergha’s residents away from their homes. The
solution to this human tragedy is urgent. The nature of this “Reconciliation drawn”
solution will determine the nature of Tawergha water supply restoration project. Three
scenarios are foreseen: 1) Immediate mass return, 2) Slow return, and 3) Gradual
return followed by a “Faster return” depending on security and service provision
levels. Clearly, the water supply system rehabilitation and renovation requirements
will differ greatly form one scenario to the other, especially the financing and
implementation tools;
10. The first scenario is the easiest to manage; smaller returnee numbers can be supplied
using water hauling trucks. Other scenarios require intensive planning, designing
and construction (Excavation machinery, equipment, materials, chemicals as well as
contractors and workforce and ample time for design and execution);
11. Security is a prerequisite to the return of the city’s population and to implementation
of all rehabilitation activities including those of restoration of water supply to the
city;
12. The need for water supply provision is urgent and will increase rapidly in response
to the rate of return of IDPs. Meeting such needs through traditional means is not
possible; non-traditional means must be developed to meet such urgent needs
while planning and implementing traditional water supply schemes based on timely
executed and financed plans;
13. The rehabilitation of the water supply works requires coordination with other
infrastructural works; namely, wastewater, stormwater, electricity, gas, communication
and roads. Integrated planning and synchronization of activities by all stakeholders
must be given special attention;
14. The Tawergha IDPs scattered throughout Libya’s regions live in unacceptably bad
conditions as was concluded from assessments of water supply conditions in the
municipalities of Abu Saleem and Benghazi. The plight of these IDPs continues
indefinitely. Restoration of water supply services to Tawergha’s water supply will
undoubtedly encourage their return and put a happy end to their unjustifiable
sufferings;
15. The city’s residents have a strong desire to return as was demonstrated frequently
by organized efforts by hundreds of residents which were met with counter efforts
preventing such returns. This strong desire to return is coupled with enthusiasm to
rebuild the city and restart a new active and prosperous life as was demonstrated by
the volunteer works of the returnees;
16. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of the city’s structures and infrastructures will
provide work opportunities to large numbers of the city’s returnees and to others
from neighboring townships;
17. The towns of AlKarrarim and Tummina located near the city of Tawergha were
affected by the armed conflict although the damages were at a very small scale
compared to Tawergha;
18. Many donor organizations and UN agencies are providing help especially in the
service sectors and humanitarian fields, water supply being of these fields.

5.4.10.2 Major Challenges

Provision of water supply services to Tawergha city residents faces extraordinary challenges
given the devastated state of the city’s infrastructures and superstructures and its having
been abandoned completely by its displaced residents for nine years. These challenges
vary from life threatening ones to capacity challenges caused by non-traditional technical,
financial, human and administrative constraints that may exceed the capacities of the city.

161
In view of the results of this assessment report and its key findings, the following challenges
were identified:
1. Lack of security to the city’s potential returnees and to those individuals, institutions
and companies who will be engaged in rehabilitation and restoration of the city’s
water supply system as well as other infrastructures. To date, no official or non-
official body could provide any guarantees for security, safety and peace keeping in
the city and enforce the rule of law;
2. The city’s water supply infrastructures are in poor to bad “completely damaged”
conditions with practically no capacities to meet the demands of the thousands of
returnees. Unfortunately, there is no previous assessment of the state of water supply
infrastructures in the city of Tawergha. Lack of knowledge about this state represents
a major challenge to planning as well as executing institutions and service providers
including municipalities;
3. The financial, technical and human capacities needed for rehabilitation and
restoration of the water supply infrastructures are not available at the city presently.
Recruitment of national workforce may prove to be a challenge but can be overcome
partly by recruitment of local workforce;
4. The population is dispersed over large low density communities within the city’s
boundary making it difficult to plan and implement water supply infrastructures;
5. Restoration of water supply services is only possible in the presence of electric
power; so restoration of power supply must precede or take place concurrently with
restoration of water supply infrastructures implying doubling of efforts and costs.

5.4.10.3 Recommendations
1. A basic element of security is reconciliation and good neighborly relationships.
Special efforts should be made locally and nationally to expedite and perpetuate the
on-going reconciliation efforts leading to permanent peace and respect for law;
2. These efforts must be concentrated and continued at a rapid pace to ensure the
return of Tawerghas’ IDPs and their safety and security within their “long-deserted”
city. This step is also the key prerequisite to overcoming most of challenges facing
Tawerghans;
3. The Tawergha Service Center of the Central Region Office of the GCWW should have
a leading role in the planning and management of the rehabilitation of the water
supply activities and projects. The Center needs to be restructured and rehabilitated
immediately as a priority step towards the restoration of water supply services to the
city of Tawergha;
4. The Center should be provided with mobile treatment units, water tankers, drilling
machinery, O & M workshop, spares, materials and chemicals especially disinfectants.
5. The Center should strive to establish a water supply database to be accessible to all
stakeholders who will be engaged in planning, execution, O & M and management
of water supply in the city of Tawergha.
6. Implementation of the “Urgent” Investment and Development Plan for
Tawergha(Annex 1) which was prepared based on the first “Returnees” scenario,
i.e., slow rate of return of IDPs to Tawergha;
7. Implementation of the “Short and Medium Term” Investment and Development
Plans for Tawergha(Annexes 2-5) which were prepared to address the short and
medium term water supply needs of the city of Tawergha sustainably;
8. Conduct a detailed assessment of the water supply infrastructures in Tawergha to
diagnose their actual conditions and level of damages sustained. Results of this
assessment should form the base for a comprehensive project for the restoration
of Tawergha water supply system and for estimation of the size of funding and
time required for such a project. This assessment addresses the second and third
scenarios (short and medium term Investment and Development Plans);
9. Good planning, joint efforts and sufficient human, financial and technical capacities
must be provided along with strong national commitments for undertaking the
rehabilitation of the city and, simultaneously, managing the successful return of its

162
 residents. To this end, generous financial, administrative and technical support must
be provided urgently;
10. This national task must include an emergency preparedness plan that is fully
supported by specialized international organizations particularly those in the fields
of water supply and sanitation because these services are presently unavailable and
will be most needed and most in demand upon return of the residents;
11. In the meantime, it is advisable to establish a capacity building program for
water supply employees within the city of Tawergha to set a base for sustainable
management of water works in the city;
12. Use must be made of any existing data on planning (Urban and infrastructures
masterplans, design works, etc.) in the process of restoring water supply works and
interrupted water supply and other infrastructure schemes;
13. The enthusiasm of the returnees should be utilized in expediting certain citizen and
volunteer oriented activities especially in the water supply areas;
14. Development of the towns of AlKararim and Tummina, located near Tawergha, should
be planned and executed simultaneously with rehabilitation of Tawergha projects to
ensure integration, inter-dependence and complimentarily between them;
15. The help of national and international donor organizations should be solicited
especially in the areas of direct project funding and capacity building. The
rehabilitation and capacity building needs should be translated into projects that will
be made available to donors to select from based on the donors’ field activity and
funding capabilities.

5.4.11 URGENT, SHORT AND MEDIUM TERMINVESTMENT/ DEVELOPMENT

PLANS FOR WATER SUPPLY IN THE CITY OF TAWERGHA
The above recommendations have been translated into an investment/development action
plan to be implemented in three phases: urgent, short-term, and medium-term sub-plans.
These urgent needs and plans to satisfy them are elaborated below.

5.4.11.1 Introduction
Armed conflict has impacted heavily the water supply systems in the city of Tawergha.
Based on the field visits and technical assessment, it was concluded that the water supply
infrastructures have suffered major damages limiting severely their capacity to provide
water services to the city of Tawergha’s residents.

To rehabilitate the water supply infrastructures so that they can provide all potential
returnees to the city with access to adequate “improved” water supplies, urgent, short-
term and medium-term investment/ development plans have been proposed. The activities,
Bills of Quantities (BOQs) and implementation schedules of these plans are presented in
Annexes 1, 2 and 3, respectively.

Needs to rehabilitate the water supply system of the city of Tawergha were assessed through
background data, baseline surveys, field visits, meetings and interviews. Criteria were
developed to classify these needs as urgent, short-term, and medium-term. The primary
criterion was the need for the activity, action or service to avoid and prevent adverse health
impacts upon end-users or to guarantee the continuity of water supply, which is a basic
human need and right. Provision of funds is another criterion as less costly items and
activities are more likely to be funded, procured or implemented in a short time. Finally, the
nature of the activity and, hence, the amount of time needed to implement it; some works
and activities require a short execution time while others require long times.

Activities which can be implemented within 6-12 months were considered urgent while
those requiring 1-2 years and 3-5 years were considered short-term and medium longer
term plans, respectively. The prices are quoted in US dollars as the items required are not

163
available locally and must be imported. This approach was supported by the unstable rate
of exchange of the Libyan Dinar against foreign currencies.

It is to be stressed that the costs and implementation times are estimates at best for lack of
recent quotations for some items. Conversely, some costs are very accurate as they were
taken from quotations from bids or from signed contracts which are at different stages
of development. Execution times were also subject to changes depending on the timely
availability of skilled staff, equipment, spares, materials as well as security at the worksites.
When implementation must be done with the help of expatriate experts, availability becomes
critical as most countries forbid their citizens from traveling to Libya for security reasons.

5.4.11.2 Urgent Development/ Investment Plan (6-12 months)

The urgent interventions have been identified based on: 1) Meetings with senior GCWW
and the Council of Tawergha Members, 2) Review of water supply reports, programs and 3)
Field visits to the city including the water infrastructures. Prices for the items and services
needed have been estimated from previous contracts and offers, implemented projects,
directly from suppliers, in addition to the consultant’s experience.

The Bill of Quantities (BOQs) and prices for the urgent interventions/ investment plan -
which is to be implemented within 6-12 months - are presented in Annex 1. It can be seen
that the total cost of rehabilitation is about 5 million US dollars. This amount represents
mostly supplies of water transport trucks, a desalination plant, and equipment to ensure
drawing water from its sources and conveying it directly to consumers at delivery points
and to vital facilities until the WDN is rehabilitated and reconstructed in due time. These
interventions are urgent and must be made immediately so that returnees can have access
to potable water.

It is also clear that the amount of funds required is small and can be managed readily
within the national budget, emergency allocations by the state and donor organization. In
the event such funds are not available, a phased implementation plan should be prepared
with criteria based priorities.

5.4.11.3 Short-term Development Plan

Short-term development plans are comprised of activities which require 1-3 years to be
completed. Such activities, works and services may start as early as urgent ones but will
be completed in 1-3 years and may depend on corresponding urgent phase works. The
activities for this plan, implementation schedule and Bill of Quantities (BOQs) are specified
in Annexes 2 and 3, respectively. The total cost for implementing this plan is 11 million
US dollars. This amount is to be spent mainly on preparation of masterplans and design
of integrated infrastructures or utilities and the execution of two large steel water storage
tanks.

5.4.11.4 Medium-term Development Plan

The medium-term plan lists those activities which require 3-5 years to be completed.
Such works fall generally within the GDC’s strategic plans. The activities for this plan,
implementation schedule and Bill of Quantities (BOQs) are specified in Annexes 4 and
5, respectively. The estimated cost of implementing this plan is 70 million US dollars.
This entire amount is to be used for execution of integrated infrastructures and utilities
(wastewater, stormwater, water, roads, power and communications networks) within the
city of Tawergha.

164
5.4.12 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
AlKasaba Consultants wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of HE, the Minister
of IDPs, the Chairman of Tawergha Local Council, Chairman and Members of the Tawergha
Dialogue Committee on the Return of the IDPs, the Chairman of the Misrata/Tawergha File
Committee, and the GCWW staff in charge of Tawergha water supply in providing data and
information and access to the water supply infrastructures. Special thanks are extended to
them.

5.4.13 REFERENCES
1. General Water Authority, Geologic and Hydrologic Reports on Drilling of 8 Artesian
Wells in Tawergha, 1987;
2. State of Libya, Secretariat of Planning, Development Program 2008-2012, prepared
in 2007;
3. State of Libya, General Authority for Information, Results of the National Census
2006, 2007;
4. State of Libya, Secretariat of Planning, National Program for Water and Sanitation
(NPWS), 2005;
5. National Center for Metrology and Standardization, Libyan Drinking Water Standard
82/2015;
6. Authority for the Execution of the MMRP, Phase II Water Quality Analysis Report,
Unpublished, 2015;
7. Authority for the Execution of the MMRP, Phase II Water Quality Analysis Report,
Unpublished, 2017;
8. Authority for the Execution of the MMRP, Phase II Water Quality Analysis Report,
Unpublished, 2018;
9. AbuAraba, Abdunabi, Head of the Committee for Follow-up of the Tawergha-Misrata
Agreement, a Report submitted to the Consultant, Feb. 2019.
https://www.google.com/search?q=TAWERGHA+BENGHAZI&safe=strict&-1.1
source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiooNeS0YbhAhWS2KQKHU-
:AeAcEQ_AUIDigB&biw=1021&bih=644#imgrc=6_zytd8vVkKRJM
https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libyas-sidelined-idps2.2

165
 To be finalized upon approval of the Report as more information may be sought from different experts,
officials or staff.
.No Name Title Institution
1 A. Abujallala HE, Minister of IDPs Ministry of IDPS
AbduNabi Mohammad Head, Follow-up Committee of Tawergha- Mis-
2
AbuAraba rata Agreement on Tawergha
Ashour Makhlouf Head, Tawergha Service Office and Member, GCWW
3
Crisis Committee on Tawergha
4 Abdullah Addwaieh Member, Crisis Committee on Tawergha GCWW
5 Ramadan AlKaloush Head, O & M Office, Central Region GCWW

ANNEXES
Activities and Implementation Schedules for the Investment/ Development Plans for the
Water Supply Systems in the City of Tawergha
Annex 1. Bill of Quantities (BOQs) for Urgent Investment/Development Plan for Water Supply in the City of Tawergha

Subtotal
.No Description Unit Quantity )$( Unit Price
)$( ,Price
Supplying trucks provided with 12 m3 steel water
tanks equipped with full equipment for transporting
1 and discharging water to the ground or plastic tanks No. 15 130,000 1,950,000
in the city. The truck shall have the capacity to work
in paved and unpaved roads.
Supplying and installing a 50 Hz submersible pump
of stainless steel L316 type with a capacity of 40 m3/
2 hour, and Pumping Head of 100 m. including elec- No. 6 5,000 30,000
trical cables and control and protection box
Supply and installation of rising pipes of pump wells
, the pipes should be stainless steel 304L type (AISA
304L) with a diameter of 125 mm and a pressure
3 tolerance of 16 bar, it should be equipped with flang- l.m. 660 100 66,000
es that allow the installation of electrical cables. The
length of the pipe shall not exceed 6 meters accord-
.ing to technical specifications
Supply and installation of the wellhead system in-
cluding all valves “Ventilation valves, non-return
4 valves and gate valves”, pressure and flow meters, L.S 6 10,000 60,000
connections, elbows and sampling valves and all re-
.lated drainage and clean pipes
Works required stopping the flow of water from arte-
sian wells in order to prevent pollution of groundwa-
ter in the region. The works also required to supply
well head and to install valves on the heads of wells;
the work should go along in coordination with the
General Authority for Water on a study of stopping
5 the flow of water through cracks and gaps in the L.S 8 60,000 480,000
.ground

166
 Annex 1. Bill of Quantities (BOQs) for Urgent Investment/Development Plan for Water Supply in the City of Tawergha

Subtotal
.No Description Unit Quantity )$( Unit Price
)$( ,Price
Supply all necessary equipment and exca-
vation, dismantling and pipe laying routine
maintenance and repair of distribution net-
6 works and pressure testing, leakage detec- L.S 1 400,000 450,000
.tion

Design, supply and installation of 1000 m3/

day Reverse Osmosis Brackish Water De-
salination Unit (RO) including disinfection
7 units for the purpose of providing high qual- L.S 1 450,000 450,000
ity water for drinking, cooking and working
purposes, and a backup generator with the
.capacity required to operate the plant
Supply stainless steel tanks mounted on
trucks for distribution of desalinated water
8 .No 3 150,000 450,000
to the residential area with a capacity of 12
.m 3
Supply and installation of horizontal sur-
face pumps for the Maloog pump station
9 with the a capacity of 60 m3 /hour, pump- .No 4 12,000 48,000
.ing head (TDH) of 50 m

Reconstruction, repair and maintenance of

elevated water tank and well at the Mloog
Pumping Station. The work shall include
10 supplying and installation of the tank fill- L.S 1 50,000 50,000
ing pipes, discharge pipes, over flow, gate
.valves and all the necessary ancillaries
Supply and installation of suction and dis-
charge pipes for the Mloog Pump Station.
The work also includes all the accessories
11 L.S 1 20,000 20,000
of stainless steel pipes type L304 and flang-
es, reducers, gate and non-return valves
.PN10

Annex 1. Bill of Quantities (BOQs) for Urgent Investment/ Development Plan for Water Supply in the City of Tawergha
“continued”

,Subtotal Price
.No Activity Unit Quantity )$( Unit Price
)$(
Supply and installation of a platform to fill the truck
tanks. The work includes filling pipes and gate valves.
12 The platform should accommodate two trucks at a .No 4 5,000 20,000
.time and be equipped to fill the trucks in a short time

Supply and installation of water disinfectant powder

13 of calcium hypochlorite Ca(OCl)2 for disinfection of L.S 1 20,000 20,000
.water prior to filling of tanks mounted on trucks
Supply and installation of standby electrical genera-
tors for the operation of wells and pumping station
14 (60 KVA), including automatic switch,3 cables, electri- .No 6 8,000 48,000
cal connections and steel tank of 5 m for fuel storage
.as per appropriate technical specifications

167
 Prepare a scope of work for the preparation of an ur-
ban plan and then to carry out the design works of
15 the Tawergha city infrastructure including: roads, wa- L.S 1 20,000 20,000
ter distribution, sewerage and rainwater, electricity,
.communications and gas networks
Conduct a training needs assessment and develop
16 .training plan for Tawergha Service Center of GCWW LS 1 50,000 50,000
Constructing and equipping a central workshop for
the maintenance of water supply, sewage and rain-
water work. The workshop should include all tools,
17 equipment, and machinery needed for works related LS 1 850,000 850,000
to excavation work, laying of pipes, maintenance and
repair of distribution networks, dismantling and pip-
…ing of pipes, etc
Total (Five million and sixty two thousand) US dollars 5,062,000

Annex 2. Activities and Implementation Schedule for Short-term (1-3 years) Investment/Development Plan
for Water Supply in the City of Tawergha

)Implementation Time (in quarters of the year

No Activity
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
1 Preparation of a comprehensive mas-
ter urban plan for the city of Tawergha
and preparation of infrastructural plans
for basic services including the following
:schemes

Urban plan includes classification of res�-

,idential

service, commercial and industrial land of

.the city

Planning and designing of the city’s road-

.and transport network

Planning and designing of water supply-

system including water resources, storage,
.treatment, transportation and distribution

Planning and designing of drainage sys�-

tems for wastewater, rainwater and waste-
.water treatment plant

Planning and designing of electricity and-

lighting network

Planning and designing of gas distribution-

network

Planning and designing of telecommuni�-

cation networks

Planning and designing of road network -

2 Implementation of training programs in
various fields of water supply engineering
(Planning, designing, operation, mainte-
.)nance, management and development

168
3 Evaluation of structural state of the
10,000m3 ground reservoir under construc-
tion

Annex 2. Activities and Implementation Schedule for Short-term (1-3 years) Investment/Development Plan
for Water Supply in the City of Tawergha “Continued”

Activity )Implementation Time (in quarters of the year

Q1
No
Q2 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
Q3
4 Supply and installation of two glass fused
stegel tanks. The capacity of each tank is
5000 m3. The work includes the covers of the
tanks, entry and ventilation openings, stairs
and railings, the supply and installation of all
the feed, discharge, drainage, overflow pipes
washing, valves and fittings as well as the
materials, mechanical, and hydraulic testing
of the two tanks, the chlorination and clean-
ing works, and all complimentary works as
.per accepted international standards

Annex 3. Bill of Quantities (BOQs) for Short-term (1-3 years) Investment/Development Plan for Water Supply
in the City of Tawergha
,Subtotal Price
.No Activity Unit Quantity )$( Unit Price
)$(
Preparation of a comprehensive master urban plan for the
city of Tawergha and preparation of infrastructure plans for
basic services including the following schemes:

• Urban plan includes classification of residen�

tial,
• service, commercial and industrial land
of the city.
• Planning and designing of the city’s road and
transport network.
• Designing water supply system that takes into
consideration the integration of the available
water resources, processing, transportation
1 LS 1 7,000,000 7,000,000
and distribution within the city.
• Planning and designing of drainage systems
for wastewater, rainwater and wastewater
treatment plant.
• Planning and designing of electricity and light�
ing network
• Planning and designing of gas distribution
network
• Planning and designing of telecommunication
networks
• Planning and design of road network

Implementation of training programs in various water supply

engineering fields (Planning, designing, operation, mainte�
2 .)nance, management and development LS 1 60,000 60,000

169