Pakistan Starts Deporting 1.

7 Million Afghans and Other

Undocumented Foreigners
foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/01/pakistan-deports-million-afghans-undocumented-migrants

Michael Kugelman

South Asia Brief

News and analysis from India and its neighboring countries in South
Asia, a region home to one-fourth of the world’s population. Delivered
Wednesday.

Why Is Pakistan Expelling 1.7 Million Afghans?

Islamabad’s policy of deporting all undocumented foreigners will

have widespread repercussions.

Kugelman-
Michael-
foreign-
policy-
columnist13
Michael
Kugelman

By Michael Kugelman, the writer of Foreign Policy’s weekly South

Asia Brief and the director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson
Center.

Afghan refugees arrive on green trucks in a mountainous landscape.

Afghan refugees arrive on trucks from Pakistan at the Afghanistan-Pakistan
Torkham border on Nov. 1. Wakil Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images

November 1, 2023, 8:20 PM

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Pakistan starts to expel 1.7 million Afghans
and other undocumented foreigners, Qatar sentences to death eight
Indian nationals on charges of spying for Israel, and political violence
amps up in Bangladesh ahead of an important election.

Why Is Pakistan Expelling 1.7 Million Afghans?

On Wednesday, Pakistan began the process of expelling all

undocumented foreigners, including 1.7 million Afghans—one of the
country’s largest immigrant communities. Officials say the policy, which
was first announced last month, will be implemented in phases, with
migrants and refugees temporarily placed in holding centers before
deportation.

Afghans in Pakistan have faced forced repatriations in the past but

never on this scale. Islamabad claims the mass expulsion will protect
public welfare and make Pakistan safer. But it’s likely that domestic
politics and worsening relations with Taliban-led Afghanistan drove the
government’s decision.

In recent weeks, Islamabad called on undocumented foreigners to

leave voluntarily by Nov. 1. The government said on Monday that
around 200,000 Afghan nationals had left over the past two months.
Recent days have featured harrowing scenes of Afghan students
hugging their Pakistani classmates goodbye and trucks lining up at the
border piled high with Afghans’ belongings.

The potential repercussions of Pakistan’s draconian decision are

devastating. Taliban-led Afghanistan is not prepared to accommodate
masses of returnees, who will be greeted by a vast humanitarian crisis
—15 million Afghans are acutely food insecure—exacerbated by
drought, floods, and earthquakes. Afghanistan also faces severe global
aid cuts and fewer international relief groups operating in its borders
due to Taliban policies. Most returning girls and women won’t be able
to attend school or work.

For decades, Pakistan has been a top destination for Afghans fleeing
conflict, with several million entering the country since the 1970s,
including at least 600,000 after the Taliban takeover in 2021. Pakistan
prides itself on its ability to house so many Afghan refugees despite its
constraints as a poor country. But human rights groups have
documented Afghans facing years of discrimination at work, school,
and at the hands of landlords and law enforcement. Some Pakistanis,
including government officials, have accused Afghans of stealing jobs,
dealing drugs, and participating in terrorism. Pakistani officials have
previously ordered thousands of them to leave.

Likely for these reasons, many Afghans started to avoid Pakistan

nearly a decade ago and instead fled to Europe via the Mediterranean.
But for hundreds of thousands of Afghans desperate to escape their
country in 2021, nearby Pakistan was the easiest option. They’re all
vulnerable now—especially those who previously worked for the U.S.
military and await approval to enter the United States on special
immigration visas.

Islamabad insists its decision falls within applicable international norms

—likely a reference to the many countries, including in the West, that
deport undocumented immigrants. It emphasizes that the policy targets
all undocumented foreigners, not just Afghans, and that legal
immigrants aren’t affected (though reports emerged this week of some
documented Afghans being deported, too). It is not clear whom,
exactly, the policy will affect, but data in recent years suggests
deportations may also impact migrants and refugees from Iran,
Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.
Indeed, it’s clear that Afghans have become scapegoats as Pakistan
weathers both one of its worst economic crises in years and a major
resurgence of terrorism by the Afghanistan-based Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP). Last month, interim Interior Minister Sarfraz Bugti
accused Afghans of being involved in organized crime and terrorism
and indirectly accused them of hampering Pakistan’s economic
recovery.

Some Pakistanis condemn the move and have staged protests against
it in recent days, though there is no recent data suggesting how many
might oppose it. At any rate, public opinion is unlikely to sway
Islamabad. Pakistan is led by an apolitical caretaker government
preparing the country for elections in January. The military, which
exerts heavy influence over the caretaker regime, is likely driving the
policy. (The army chief publicly endorsed the move and attended the
meeting finalizing the plan.) But it’s letting the caretaker regime—which
need not worry about political blowback—take any public flak.

Additionally, Pakistan’s relations with the Taliban have worsened

because Islamabad thinks the group has not done enough to curb the
presence of TTP fighters and bases in Afghanistan. Islamabad may be
using the expulsion policy in part to compel the Taliban—which have
condemned the move—to help more on counterterrorism. Sadly,
vulnerable Afghans—from young new arrivals to older and established
residents who embrace Pakistan as their only home—are becoming
casualties of broader geopolitical machinations.

What We’re Following

Qatar sentences eight Indians to death. On Oct. 26, an Indian

External Affairs Ministry statement revealed that a court in Qatar had
sentenced to death eight Indian nationals. The men, who were
reportedly jailed last year, were all former members of the Indian Navy
who had gone to Qatar to train its naval personnel. Qatar’s government
has not discussed the case publicly, though a Financial Times report
claims the men were convicted of spying for Israel.

This verdict poses a fresh diplomatic challenge for India. It marks the
second time in just over six weeks—following an ongoing spat with
Canada—that India has experienced a crisis with a top partner. But
unlike New Delhi’s relationship with Ottawa, long hampered by
tensions over the issue of Sikh separatism, its partnership with Doha is
usually stable and largely problem-free.

India relies heavily on Qatar for fuel imports, especially liquefied natural
gas, and the 800,000 Indians based in Qatar are a key source of
remittances. Additionally, Qatar is an important player in the latest
Israel-Hamas war. The country, which is home to top Hamas leaders, is
mediating talks between Israel and Hamas on hostages and aid. India
has taken an uncharacteristically strong pro-Israel stance during the
war—a position that has concerned some of its top Arab partners.

In contrast to its sharp public rhetoric against Canada, India will tread
carefully while navigating the crisis given these geopolitical
sensitivities. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar met with the
convicted men’s families in recent days, and New Delhi has given
repeated public assurances that it is working to assist and even release
them. Otherwise, India has said little publicly.

New Delhi is working with Qatari officials and exploring its options to
provide legal relief for the men. Legal experts say it won’t be easy to
get their sentences commuted given the seriousness of espionage
charges. One diplomatic option could be to turn to a 2015 India-Qatar
prisoner exchange deal, but this would first require Doha to reduce the
sentences to life in prison.
Political violence increases in Bangladesh. On Saturday, Dhaka’s
streets filled with one of Bangladesh’s largest opposition protests in
months. Thousands of members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(BNP) called on Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign and turn power
over to a caretaker administration until elections scheduled for January.
The protests turned violent, with demonstrators throwing stones at
police and law enforcement firing tear gas. Hundreds of BNP members
and supporters, including several top leaders, have since been
arrested.

The ruling Awami League (AL) party and the opposition offer
diametrically opposed accounts: The AL contends the BNP provoked
the violence, while the BNP insists it was actually the police. Some
government critics in private discussions with me in recent days
accused AL goons of staging the violence to give the government a
pretext to crack down harder on the BNP.

There was additional violence on Tuesday, with two people killed and
dozens wounded in clashes between police and the opposition.
Protests are expected to continue. The government and opposition
now appear to be on a collision course: The BNP is doubling down on
its core demand that Hasina make way for a caretaker, and Dhaka has
continuously refused. The more the opposition escalates, the more
defiant the government will likely become. Neither side will want to give
an inch. As political polarization worsens, expect the months before
elections to feature more political instability and rising risks of violence.

Update: The U.S. government has rejected an allegation made in an

Indian media report, referenced in South Asia Brief last week, that it
gave an ultimatum to Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to
resign by Nov. 3.
Jehovah’s Witness prayer session attacked in India. Multiple blasts
hit a Jehovah’s Witness prayer session on Sunday in the southern
Indian state of Kerala, leaving three people dead and more than 50
injured. On Tuesday, authorities arrested a man named Dominic Martin
as a suspect. Martin confessed on Facebook to planning the attack,
claiming he was a former Jehovah’s Witness who is angry with the
group’s teachings, but local officials from the group said he was not a
registered member.

Though Kerala has experienced religious violence in the past,

especially anti-Christian attacks, the state has historically been more
religiously tolerant than many other parts of India.

Reactions to the tragedy show the dangers of disinformation on social

media. Some Indians posted messages on X that appeared to link
Islamist militancy to the attack by pointing out that a large pro-
Palestinian protest had recently taken place in Kerala. The posters may
have been inspired by Indian Deputy IT Minister Rajeev
Chandrashekhar, who accused Kerala’s government—controlled by a
rival party—on social media of appeasing radical groups such as
Hamas, using the hashtags #KochiTerrorAttacks and
#HamasTerrorists.

FP’s Most Read This Week

Saudi Arabia Is Mysteriously Absent in the Israel-Hamas War

by Steven A. Cook
The Best Books for Understanding the Israel-Hamas War by
FP Staff and FP Contributors
Are Chinese Battery Companies the Next Huawei? by Craig
Singleton
Under the Radar

In recent years, Pakistan has seen a resurgence of anti-state terrorism,

most of it perpetrated against police and soldiers by the TTP. However,
recent clashes in the Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province
are a sobering reminder of an additional threat posed by sectarian
militancy. Eight days of fighting began last week after a controversial
video surfaced that reportedly featured “sectarian content.” The
violence, which featured what one Pakistani official called “heavy and
sophisticated weapons,” may have resulted in as many as 40 deaths.

On Tuesday, local officials and elders reportedly brokered a cease-fire,

but the region remains restive. Kurram has a legacy of sectarian
extremism, especially anti-Shiite violence. In May, seven Shiite
schoolteachers were killed in an attack; in July, fighting provoked by
land disputes resulted in at least 11 deaths. An editorial in the Pakistani
newspaper Dawn recently argued that the failure to proactively tackle
these tensions dooms the district to more violence. Reactive
approaches, according to the editorial, keep “the lid on underlying
tensions for a brief period, then disputes explode at the slightest
provocation.”

Regional Voices

A Dhaka Tribune editorial laments Bangladesh’s failure to leverage its

large youth population. The country’s youth is “one of [its] biggest
advantages … an advantage that we continuously fail to grasp,” the
publication writes. “But that prospect becomes even worse when we
realize that, even when armed with a degree, our youth find it harder
and harder to find employment.”
Author Nilakantan RS argues in the Print that debates about whether
India will become the next superpower must be mindful of the country’s
serious human development challenges: With an [infant mortality rate]
that’s about as good or bad as Sub-Saharan Africa when no one thinks
that part of the world is going to be a superpower, what gives India that
confidence?

Activist Shreen Abdul Saroor writes in Daily FT about the plight of the
75,000 to 100,000 Muslims expelled from Sri Lanka’s Northern
Province in 1990 who are unable to return today: “In any forthcoming
elections the northern Muslims have to think seriously and use their
franchise to choose a new leadership that could take forward their
issues genuinely as a right-based issue and demand for accountability
for eviction.”
Michael Kugelman is the writer of Foreign Policy’s weekly South Asia
Brief. He is the director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center
in Washington. Twitter: @michaelkugelman

Read More On Afghanistan | Asia | Migration and Immigration |

Pakistan | South Asia | Terrorism