Epistemology

Lecture 3

CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM

Nihel Jhou
周先捷
 Cartesian Skepticism - opening questions
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 How do you know that you are not dreaming right at this
moment. How would you prove to yourself that this is not
true?
 How do you know that the world you perceive and
understand is not just an illusion?

Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)

 Cartesian Skepticism
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 Distinguish:
 How do you know the way the world really is? (Epistemology)

 What is the way the world really is? (Ontology)

 Given that the world is in fact the way we believe it to be, how can
we justify our beliefs about the way the world really is? (We are not
questioning the truth of (our beliefs about) the world, but our
justification of our beliefs.)

Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)

 The Matrix 1999 trim 1
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Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)

 Now think:
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 Is Neo or Morpheus justified in believing that (an object in)

the matrix is not real?
 Is Neo or Morpheus justified in believing that “the reality” is
real?
 Does it matter to you whether or not your experiences are
real, and if so, why?
 Is there a sense in which Cipher does know that steak is
delicious?
Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)
 Descartes, “the 1st & 2nd Meditations”
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 Knowledge is built upon certain

foundations.
 Knowledge requires completely
certain and indubitable belief /
justification.
 We don’t have knowledge about
the external world. (Cartesian
skepticism)
 But I know I exist as long as I René Descartes (1596 – 1650)

think.

Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)

 Methodological Skepticism:
seeking indubitable foundations of knowledge
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 Many beliefs we took to be true turn

out to be false, and hence beliefs built
upon them are doubtful.
 We should withhold our assent no less
carefully from opinions that are not
completely certain and indubitable
than we would from those that are
patently false.

Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)

 The inaccuracy argument
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 Many beliefs we considered most true

are received either from the senses or
through the senses.
There are students in front of me.
 However, senses are sometimes
deceptive.
Limitation (size & distance), illusion, &
hallucination.
 Is there still something right?
I am wearing jeans.

A peripheral drift illusion by Paul Nasca

Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)
 The dream argument
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 There are no definitive signs by which I can distinguish being

awake from being asleep.
There are students in front of me.
 Perhaps I am dreaming, and hence what I believe is false.
I am opening my eyes, moving my head, extending my hands, or even have
a body.
 Therefore I am not justified in believing that I am now in a
classroom, even if this belief is luckily true.

Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)

 A response
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 Is there still something right?

Concrete things have size and color, 2+3=5, a square does not have
more than 4 sides.

Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)

 The evil genius argument
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 Perhaps, there was an evil genius,

supremely powerful and clever, who
had directed his entire effort at
deceiving me -- there would have
been no earth at all, no heavens, no
extended thing, no shape, no size, no
place, 2+3 != 5, a square has more
2+3=5
than 4 sides, etc.
 My beliefs / experience stay the same
2+3=5
with or without a evil genius -- there
2+3=5
2+3=5
is no way to rule out the possibility.
 Therefore I am not justified in
believing that 2+3=5, even if this
belief is accidentally true.
Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)
 A brain in a vat: more questions
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Olivia Walch
Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)
 What cannot be deceived
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 Is it then the case that I too do not exist?

 An evil genius deceiving me? Then there is no doubt that
I exist, if he is deceiving me.

 This pronouncement “I am, I exist” is necessarily true

every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind.

Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)

 The nature of “I”
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 What about thinking?

 Thought exists; it alone cannot be separated from me.
 I am; I exist – for as long as I am thinking.
 I am therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing; that
is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason. (It’s
not a brain.)
“Am I dreaming?”
“Is there Evil Genius?”
“Do I exist?” Note: my thoughts
may be wrong, but it’s
a fact that I am having
these thoughts
Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)
 The world
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 In the 1st and 2nd meditations: we don’t yet have

knowledge about the external world. (Cartesian
skepticism)
 In the 3rd and 4th meditations: there is a way of justifying
our knowledge about the external world. (It may not be
as successful as Descartes thought.)
 Still, the world is less known than the mind.

Epipstemology - Lecture 3 (Nihel Jhou)