MARRIAGE

1. Falcis vs. Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 217910, September

3, 2019

Facts: On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. His Petition sought to “declare article 1 and 2
of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.”
Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing Magallona v. Executive Secretary, Araullo v. Executive
Secretary, and the separate opinion of now-retired Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice Brion) in
Araullo. Again citing Associate Justice Brion’s separate opinion, he claims that this Court should follow a “‘fresh’
approach to this Court’s judicial power” and find that his Petition pertains to a constitutional case attended by grave
abuse of discretion. He also asserts that the mere passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a prima
facie case of grave abuse of discretion, and that the issues he raised were of such transcendental importance as to
warrant the setting aside of procedural niceties.

Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the right to life and liberty;

Yes. Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn state recognition is better
left to Congress in order that it may thresh out the many issues that may arise:

Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to legal rules.
Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot
be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself must
create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative
obligation on the state to establish this legal framework. (Emphasis supplied)

In truth, the question before this Court is a matter of what marriage seeks to acknowledge. Not all intimate
relationships are the same and, therefore, fit into the rights and duties afforded by our laws to marital relationships.
For this Court to instantly sanction same-sex marriage inevitably confines a class of persons to the rather restrictive
nature of our current marriage laws. The most injurious thing we can do at this point is to constrain the relationships
of those persons who did not even take part or join in this Petition to what our laws may forbiddingly define as the
norm. Ironically, to do so would engender the opposite of loving freely, which petitioner himself consistently raised:
The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that it is
shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each
commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and defined
by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple. It is that
which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by
social expectations but by the care and love each person can bring. (Emphasis supplied)

Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more inclusive and egalitarian
arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Many identities comprise the LGBTQI+ community. Prematurely
adjudicating issues in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It may unwittingly diminish
the LGBTQI+ community’s capacity to create a strong movement that ensures lasting recognition, as well as public
understanding, of SOGIESC.
The evolution of the social concept of family reveals that heteronormativity in marriage is not a static
anthropological fact. The perceived complementarity of the sexes is problematized by the changing roles undertaken
by men and women, especially under the present economic conditions.
To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the complementarity of the sexes is to
perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold.

It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families formed by sterile couples,
families formed by couples who preferred not to have children, among many other family organizations.
Furthermore, it reinforces certain gender stereotypes within the family.

2. Zulueta vs. Martin, G. R. No. 107383, February 20,

1996

Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered
petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent’s clinic without the latter’s knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On

March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the Ipresence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs.

The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which
petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

3. Duncan Association vs. Glaxo, G.R. No. 162994,

September 17, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome
Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had
undergone training and orientation.

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he
agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing
or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of
competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a
possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly
provides these conditions; that otherwise, the management and the employee will explore
the possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or
preparation for employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s
Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area.

Even before they got married, Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager
regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still,
love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.

Tecson’s superior reminded him that he and Bettsy should decide which one of them would
resign from their jobs. Tecson requested for time to comply with the company policy against
entering into a relationship with an employee of a competitor company. He explained that
Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and
Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra.

Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. Thereafter, Tecson applied for a
transfer in Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the
potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of
Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible” policy.

Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson
asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson defied the
transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-
Camarines Norte sales area.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE: Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the
grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration, but Tecson
declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its
employees and persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to
transfer Tecson to another sales territory.

CA sustained; MR denied.

Petitioner’s Contention: that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of

competitor companies violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
creates invalid distinctions among employees on account only of marriage. They claim that
the policy restricts the employees’ right to marry; that Tecson was constructively dismissed

GLAXO argues: that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a
relationship with and/or marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise
of its management prerogatives and does not violate the equal protection clause;
The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company from gaining access to its
secrets, procedures and policies; that Tecson can no longer question the assailed company
policy because when he signed his contract of employment, he was aware that such policy
was stipulated therein.

ISSUE: WON Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor
companies is valid

HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies
and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and
Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor

companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down
the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility
that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy
to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.

Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and
the protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of
the workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.21

EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against

relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are
free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the
company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the
company that may arise out of such relationships.

Moreover, records show that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of
interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy.

4. Star Paper vs. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006
FACTS:
Simbol was employed by the company and met a co-employee and they eventually had a
relationship and got married. Prior to the marriage, the manager advise the couple that
should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company
policy: 1) new applicant will not be allowed to be hired if he/she has a relative, up to 3rd
degree of consanguinity, already employed by the company. 2) if the two employees got
married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated first. Simbol resigned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from working in the same
company, a valid exercise of management prerogative.

RULING:

No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of
employees under the constitution. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code
which provides “it shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated , or to actually dismiss, discharge ,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her
marriage.” The company policy of Star Paper, to be upheld, must clearly establish the
requirement of reasonableness. In the case at bar, there was no reasonable business
necessity. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting
Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be
detrimental to its business operations. The questioned policy may not facially violate
Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the
disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it
is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. Lastly, the
absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction
cannot benefit the petitioners.

5. Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22,

2007
FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of

his first name to “Mely” and sex (gender) in his birth certificate be
changed to female since he underwent sex reassignment surgery.
The OSG alleges that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the live birth certificate by reason of sex reassignment
surgery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person may successfully petition for a change of

name and sex appearing in the live birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery.

RULING:

No. It is the statutes that defines who may file petitions for change
of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. Presently, there is no law allowing the change of entries
in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries,

including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary. A law has to be enacted by the
legislative body laying down the guidelines governing the change
of entries in birth certificate due to sex reassignment in order to
enter the same in civil registry.
 6. Republic vs. Cagandahan, G. R. No. 166676,
September 12, 2008

Facts:
The plaintiff was registered at birth as female, but developed secondary male
characteristics over time. He was diagnosed with congenital adrenal hyperplasia and
displayed both male and female characteristics. At age six the plaintiff was diagnosed
with clitoral hypertrophy and small ovaries; at age thirteen the ovaries had minimised,
he had no breasts and no menstrual cycle. He stated that in his mind, appearance,
emotions and interests he was a male person, and therefore asked that his birth
certificate sex be changed to male, and that his name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
A medical expert testified that the plaintiff was genetically female but that, because the
plaintiff’s body secreted male hormones, his female organs had not developed normally.
He further testified that the plaintiff’s condition was permanent and recommended the
change of gender because the plaintiff had adjusted to his chosen role as male and the
gender change would be advantageous to him.

Issue:
Whether the court should recognise a new name and gender identity to reflect the
chosen gender of an intersex person who was raised as the opposite gender.

Ruling:

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state
of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or
as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

Cagandahan thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him
as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. According to the Court, for intersex persons gender
classification at birth was inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons
like Cagandahan, is fixed.

The Court considered that the plaintiff had allowed “nature to take its course” and had
not interfered with what “he was born with”. By not forcing his body to become female,
he permitted the male characteristics of the body to develop. Thus the Court rejected
the objections of the solicitor general and held that, where no law governed the matter,
The Court held that where the individual was biologically or naturally intersex, it was
reasonable to allow that person to determine his or her own gender.

7. Republic vs. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 15, 2013

FACTS

Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She
later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because
they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations. She said that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship;
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to
the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for
citizenship. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null
and void ab initio.

The RTC ruled in her favor.

In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage
was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In
its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to
explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American
citizenship.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however,
upheld the RTC decision.

Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only
entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange
of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and
void.

RULING:

No, respondent’s marriage is not void.

The court said:

“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In
fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a
real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such
as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.”

“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be
entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.”

8. Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129

A judge who solemnized a bigamous marriage
 Facts
Complainant Mayor Navarro files a complaint against respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law. Nature of the Case: Administrative complaint
against a judge’s misconduct. Charges of Mayor Navarro against Judge
Domagtoy:

1. He solemnized a wedding despite the knowledge that the

groom is merely separated from his first wife.
2. He performed a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction

Explanation of the judge: (1) He merely relied on the Affidavit issued by

the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that the
groom and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years; (2) He did not violate article 7 and 8 of the Family Code.

Issues and Ruling

Did judge Domagtoy validly solemnized the marriage? No.

The groom’s first wife left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon
and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years,
thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is

sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda’s presumptive death, and ample
reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. The Court does
not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides: To contract a
subsequent marriage…, the [remaining] spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)

In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan [groom] did not institute a

summary proceeding for his first wife’s presumptive death. He
therefore remains married to Ida Peñaranda. It was manifest error on the
part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted
by the groom.

Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and

therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, ” The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous
. . . marriages not falling under Article 41.”

Did the respondent judge acted with gross ignorance of Articles

7 and 8 of the Family Code? Yes

Respondent judge misunderstood Article 7 and Article 8 of the Family

Code.
For Article 7, “An incumbent member of the judiciary may only
solemnize marriage within the court’s jurisdiction;” Inasmuch as
respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage
in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.

For Article 8, the written request presented addressed to the

respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario,
and not both contracting parties. Article 8, which is a directory
provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does
not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in
the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
marriage.

9. OCA vs. Justalero, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2424 (Formerly

A.M. No. 15-12-390-RTC). January 18, 2023
Facts: The case involves Judge Justalero, who was designated as
the Assisting Judge in the RTC of Barotac Viejo alongside his duties
as the Presiding Judge of Branch 32, RTC of Iloilo City. A regular
judicial audit revealed irregularities in Judge Justalero's handling of
nullity of marriage cases, such as unusually swift decisions, failure to
follow proper procedures, and various irregularities in the court
process. This led to a discreet investigation and ultimately resulted in
his preventive suspension and a formal administrative complaint
against him.

Judge Justalero defended himself, stating that he aimed to expedite

case resolution and argued that his actions were within the Rules of
Procedure. However, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended his dismissal for gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, gross misconduct, and incompetency, citing his failure to
provide justifiable reasons for the irregularities and the potential
misuse of his court for favorable decisions in nullity cases.

In summary, the case revolves around allegations of misconduct and

irregularities in Judge Justalero's handling of nullity of marriage
cases, leading to a recommendation for his dismissal from the
service.
Issue: whether Judge Globert J. Justalero should be held
liable for guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, gross misconduct, and incompetency.

Ruling: In this case, the Court found Judge Globert J.

Justalero guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
procedure, as well as gross misconduct. The charges
against him stem from several violations, including:

1. Disregarding the rules of procedure when handling

cases of nullity and annulment of marriage.
2. Failing to ascertain the true residence of parties in
these cases, which is essential for determining
jurisdiction.
3. Not complying with the requirement to furnish the
Office of the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor
with copies of the petition for the declaration of nullity of
void marriages.
4. Various procedural lapses and violations in handling
cases.

Due to these serious charges, the Court imposed a

penalty of suspending Judge Justalero from office
 without pay for one year. Additionally, he received a
stern warning that any repetition of similar offenses
would be dealt with more severely.

The violations by Judge Justalero related to his role in

solemnizing marriages and notarizing affidavits of
cohabitation, which he performed without proper
authority and in contravention of established rules, were
a significant part of the charges.

This ruling serves as a reminder of the importance of

judges' adherence to the law and procedural rules,
particularly when dealing with cases involving the
sanctity of marriage.

10. Alcantara vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28,

2007
FACTS:

Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against

respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita,
without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married
on the same day. They went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her
Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has
three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. The CA affirmed the decision.

Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the
Rosita was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just
went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.

He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming
a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita
was a resident of the place.

The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given
weight because the certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on
the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the
marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified
the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are
residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that
does not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is
not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not
detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage
license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands,petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage
celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license.
Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from
his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so
when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle

11. De Castro vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February

13, 2008

Facts:

Annabelle and Reinel applied for a marriage license. However, when they
went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already
expired. Thus, in order to get married as soon as possible, they executed an
Affidavit dated 13 March 1995 to show that they had been living together as
husband and wife for the last five years, hence, exempt from the marriage
license requirement. They got married on the same date before a judge. After
the ceremony, however, they did not live together as husband and wife.

In November 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia.

In 1998, Annabelle filed a petition for support against Reinel, claiming that he
had not given support to her and their child.

In his answer, Reinel denied that he is married to Annabelle, claiming that

their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit. He alleged that they never cohabited with each other five years
before their marriage, hence they were not exempted from the requirement of
a marriage license. He also denied being the father of Tricia.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Annabelle and Reinel is not
valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared Reinel as the natural father of the Tricia, and thus obliged to give her
support. Reinel appealed.

The CA ruled that since the case is an action for support, it was improper for
the trial court to declare the marriage of Annabelle and Reinel as null and void
in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no collusion between
the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity
of a marriage. It also ruled that Tricia, having born during the subsistence of a
marriage, is the legitimate child of Reinel.

Issues:

1. Has the trial court jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between Reinel and Annabelle even though the case before it is for support?
In other words, may the marriage be attacked collaterally?

2. Is the marriage between Reinel and Annabelle valid?

3. Is Reinna Tricia a legitimate child of Reinel?

Held:

1.) Yes. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. In Nial v.
Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such
as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
 nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

2.) No. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity
in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage
license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this
provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons
outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to
protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the
marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not
exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

3.) Reianna Tricia is an illegitimate daughter of Reinel, and therefore entitled

to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists petitioner as the father. In
addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of
respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child. (De Castro vs. Assidao-
De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008)

12. De Loria vs. Felix, G. R. No. L-9005, June 20, 1958

 FACTS: Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Felix lived together as wife and husband
in Pasay City. They acquired properties but had no children. Matea became
seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, Carmen Ordiales and Judith
Vizcarra visited and convinced her to go for confession. They fetched Father
Bautista, Catholic priest of Pasay and the latter upon hearing the confession
of the bed-ridden Matea and knowing that she is living with Felipe without
the benefit of marriage then ratified the union of the two by solemnizing
their marriage in articulo mortis with the consent of Felix. Matea recovered
from her illnes but died subsequently after few months. Arsenio and
Ricarda de Loria, granchildren of Matea’s sister filed a complaint and
complete delivery of the property of the deceased contending that they are
the succeeding heirs of the deceased and that the marriage of the latter is
not valid because of lack of marriage contract signed by the contracting
parties. Felix resisted the action standing his rights as the widower. CFI
ruled in favor of the complainants but was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Matea to Felix in articulo mortis is valid.

HELD:

YES. The marriage is valid. Its celebration in articulo mortis, where all the requisites are
present renders its validity. The failure of the solemnizing priest to make and file an
affidavit as required under Sec 20 and 21 of the Marriage Law does not affect the validity
nor renders the nullity of said marriage. Hence, CA’s devision is affirmed.

13. Pugeda vs. Trias, G.R. No. L-16925, March 31, 1962

FACTS:
On January 5, 1916, plaintiff and the Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of
the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them,
that accordingly to Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two
witnesses one of them was Santiago Salazar and another Amadeo Prudente, and after
the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage
contract and after the witness had signed the some, he delivered one copy to the
contracting parties and another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer
was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. It is also stated that after
the marriage, Pugeda and Ferrer lived together as husband and wife for 18 years.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a phtostatic copy of
the marriages in the municipality of Rosario Cavite in the month of January 1916 which
showed that no records of the alleged marriage existed therein but the Justice of the
Peace explained perhaps the person who kept the register forgot to make an entry of the
marriage in the registry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer exist.

HELD:

Yes, the marriage existed, in view of the proofs presented which are the testimony of the
justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage and the living together of the parties
as husband and wife for 18 years. The failure of the solemnizing officer to send a copy of
the marriage certificate as well when the person who kept the register forgot to make an
entry are not a fatal defects.

14. Mariategui vs. CA, G.R. No. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3
marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he
was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia
Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario,
Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina,
Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina.
Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand,
Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter
named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with
Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and
were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of

extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of
the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration
proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued.
The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of
the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
 ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence
of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s

marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken

place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things
have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.

Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional

rights.

15. People vs. Borromeo, G.R. No. 61873, October 31,

1984

Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told
Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her.
Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and
together, they went to Susana’s hut. There they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying
infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-
appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be liable
for “homicide” and not “parricide”. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract
issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the
victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.

Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are
presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society.
Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of
the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage
does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco,
22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage
does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its
validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one
of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and
the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000

16. Republic vs. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10,

2014

In Fujiki v. Marinay, the Court held that a petition for correction or

cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent\ circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other
related laws. In this case, in allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.

FACTS:
Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics
Office a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend. Upon its
receipt, she discovered she was already married to a certain
Ye Son Sune in 2002. However, she denied havi ng
contracted marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband. Her signature was also allegedly forged.
Thus, she filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the wife portion thereof.

The Office of the Solicitor General argued that in directing the

cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate
of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage void ab
initio. Thus, the petition instituted by Merlinda was actually a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a
Rule 108 proceeding which provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of “ALL THE ENTRIES IN
THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE
CONTRACT” is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio.

RULING:
 No. In Fujiki v. Marinay, the Court held that a petition for
correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A
direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
In this case, with the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the RTC held that Merlinda’s signature in the
marriage certificate was not hers and was forged. Therefore,
it was established that no marriage was celebrated. On the
contrary, aside from the certificate of marriage, no such
evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court
did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was
no marriage to speak of.

17. Van Dorn vs. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8,

1985 (MIXED MARRIAGES)

Facts:

Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard
Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established
their residence in the Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the
petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property.

Issue:

Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

Held:

As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. The
divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.

As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal
assets. He was bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

18. Garcia vs. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 738-739 (2001)

In this case, Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, and Editha

Samson, an Australian citizen, were married in the
Philippines in 1987. They subsequently lived in Australia
and obtained a divorce in 1989 in an Australian family
court. Respondent, also a Filipino, became an
Australian citizen in 1992. In 1994, he married another
Filipina, and they lived together. The first wife filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
 in 1998, alleging bigamy. Respondent argued that he
had already informed the second wife about his previous
marriage's dissolution, and he obtained another divorce
in Australia in 1998. The trial court ruled that the
Australian divorce was valid and recognized in the
Philippines, dissolving the marriage without focusing on
the issue of legal capacity to remarry. This led to a
petition challenging the trial court's decision.

1. whether the divorce between respondent and

Editha Samson was proven, and
2. whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to
take up the rest.
The first issue addressed the recognition of the divorce
between the respondent and Editha Samson. The petitioner
challenged the trial court's recognition of the divorce decree,
arguing that it needed proof of the foreign law allowing
absolute divorce and the actual divorce decree. The court
clarified that the divorce obtained by a foreigner may be
recognized in the Philippines, but it requires proof of the
divorce decree itself and its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. The divorce decree was admitted as evidence in
the case but not properly objected to by the petitioner,
making it admissible. The court also noted that the
registration requirements of the Family Code didn't apply to
the respondent due to his Australian citizenship.
The second issue revolved around the respondent's legal
capacity to remarry. The petitioner contended that the
divorce wasn't enough to establish the respondent's legal
capacity to remarry in 1994. The court highlighted that the
type of divorce obtained was unclear, and the decree
contained a restriction indicating a provisional judgment.
Therefore, it didn't automatically establish the respondent's
capacity to remarry. The court emphasized that the burden
of proving the Australian divorce law and its effects fell on
the respondent, and no evidence was presented to show his
legal capacity to marry the petitioner. The court ordered a
remand of the case for further evidence or a declaration of
nullity based on bigamy if no evidence was provided.

19. Republic vs. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, October 5,

2005

Facts:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva in Ozamis City. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United
States, bringing one of their children with her. A few years later,
Cirpriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen, and sometime in 2000, he learned that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and was remarried to Innocent
Stanley. Because of this, Cipriano filed a petition for authority to
remarry, invoking Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines which states

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law

The Office of the Solicitor General contended that the said

provision cannot be applicable in this case since Article 26 talks
about mixed marriages, i.e., that of a Filipino to a foreigner.
However, this was not the case in Cipriano and Lady Myros’
marriage since both were Filipinos at the time of the marriage

Issue:
1. Does paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply in this
case?

2. Can Cipriano remarry?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court looked at the legal intent of the provision and
found out that the Civil Code Revision Committee’s intent in
including Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation wherein the
Filipino spouse is deemed to remain married to the foreigner when,
after obtaining the divorce, the foreigner is no longer married to the
Filipino. The Court then set the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2, Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse

capacitating him or her to remarry.
The Court made it clear that the reckoning point is not the
citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad. Hence, since Lady Myros was already an
American citizen at the time she obtained the divorce abroad,
Article 26 may be applied to the case.
 2. Yes. As stated earlier, Lady Myros obtained the divorce in the
United States at the time when she was already an American
citizen. This makes her divorce valid and has in fact incapacitated
her to remarry. Cipriano, then, can also remarry as provided in
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

20. Republic vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
(The Court en banc extended the scope of Article
26(2) to even cover instances where the divorce
decree is obtained solely by the Filipino spouse)

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national,
Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after
due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was
granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage
between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed
to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the
Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?

2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid

here in the Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent
should be taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia
Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the
aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having
the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though
the latter is no longer married to the former. According to the
Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained
abroad and does not discriminate as to who should file the divorce,
i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also,
even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted
that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign
spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since doing so
would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this

case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the
nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it
will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes
of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in

violation of the equal protection clause. They said that the
limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary,
and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection
clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino
spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos
who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had
initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike,
and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of
the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and
unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen
the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among
others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. The State cannot do this if the application of
 paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to only
those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two
basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to

lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes
absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven.
Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.

21. Racho vs. Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018
Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for
courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the
divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce
becomes “validly obtained” and capacitates the foreign spouse
to marry. The same status should be given to the Filipino spouse.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse
from initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It
would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited
by her own national laws from something that a foreign law may
allow.
FACTS:
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married on April 20, 2001 in
Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived together for nine
years in Japan and did not have any children. Racho
alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce
and the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce
Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama of the
Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and had it
authenticated by the DFA. She was informed that by reason
of certain administrative changes, she was required to
return to the Philippines to report the documents for
registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial
recognition of divorce.

She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the

Civil Registry of Manila but was refused since there was no
court order recognizing it. When she went to the
Department of Foreign Affairs to renew her passport, she
was likewise told that she needed the proper court order.
She was also informed by the National Statistics Office that
her divorce could only be annotated in the Certificate of
Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her to
remarry.
She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and
Declaration of Capacity to Marry before the RTC but the
latter held that failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained
a divorce. Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied. Racho filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with the SC but the latter deferred action on her Petition
pending her submission of a duly authenticated acceptance
certificate of the notification of divorce. On March 16, 2012,
petitioner submitted her Compliance, attaching a duly
authenticated Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce that she obtained in Japan.
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a
divorce by agreement becomes effective upon notification,
whether oral or written, by both parties and by two or more
witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate stating
“Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued
by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan” is
sufficient to prove that she and her husband have divorced
by agreement and have already effected notification of the
divorce. She avers further that under Japanese law, the
manner of proving a divorce by agreement is by record of
its notification and by the fact of its acceptance, both of
which were stated in the Divorce Certificate. She insists
that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Article
728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial
relationship is terminated by divorce.

ISSUE:
Whether the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce was
validly obtained by Tanaka according to his national law.

RULING:
Yes. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce
between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the
Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to
the foreign spouse’s national law. The second paragraph
provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court
is insufficient. In Garcia v. Recio, the court established the
principle that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized
in this jurisdiction, a separate action must be instituted for
that purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the
divorce decree and the national law of the foreign spouse
must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial
courts.
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the
Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Takayama. This
Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the
Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce, exists. It
is not the divorce decree itself. Upon appeal to this Court,
however, petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance
of the Report of Divorce, certifying that the divorce has
been accepted.
The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce is a question of fact that would not
ordinarily be within this Court’s ambit to resolve. The court
records, however, are already sufficient to fully resolve the
factual issues.
Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor General neither
posed any objection to the admission of the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce nor argued that the
Petition presented questions of fact. In the interest of
judicial economy and efficiency, this Court shall resolve this
case on its merits.
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that
divorce by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in
Article 26 of the Family Code. In this particular instance, it
is the Filipina spouse who bears the burden of this narrow
interpretation, which may be unconstitutional. Article II,
Section 14 of our Constitution provides that State
recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean
that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the foreign
spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce
decree is issued, the divorce becomes “validly obtained”
and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same
status should be given to the Filipino spouse.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino
spouse from initiating or participating in the divorce
proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino
woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from
something that a foreign law may allow. The question in this
case, therefore, is not who among the spouses initiated the
proceedings but rather if the divorce obtained by petitioner
and respondent was valid.
 Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the
matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. The
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not
state any qualifications that would restrict the remarriage of
any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation than
that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is
absolute and completely terminates their marital tie. Even
under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the
marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to
remarry.

22. Moraña v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.

227605, December 5, 2019

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Petitioner and Minoru Takahasi got married in San Juan, Metro Manila but ten
years later, the couple got estranged.The husband refused to give support and
even cohabited with another woman. Because of her persistent demand for
financial support, her husband suggested they secure a divorce so the Japanese
government would give financial assistance to their children. Thus, petitioner
agreed to divorce her husband and they jointly applied for divorce before the
Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City. It was granted and they were issued a
corresponding Divorce Report. Petitioner then filed with the RTC-Manila an
action for recognition of the Divorce Report but the trial court dismissed the
petition for failure to present in evidence the Divorce Decree itself. The motion for
reconsideration was denied and the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The Court ruled that records show that the Divorce Report is what the
Government of Japan issued to the petitioner and her husband when they
applied for divorce. There was no “divorce judgment” to speak of because the
divorce proceeding was not coursed through Japanese courts but through the
office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In any
event, since the Divorce Report was issued by the office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an official body in Japan. By
whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly the equivalent of the
“Divorce Decree” in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the fact of divorce
obtained by petitioner and her former husband.

However, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere printouts of pertinent

portions of the Japanese law on divorce and its English translation. Nevertheless,
the Court gave petitioner a chance to prove the Japanese law by remanding the
case back to the trial court.

FACTS:
On June 24, 2002, petitioner and Minoru Takahashi got married in San Juan,
Metro Manila. Thereafter, they moved to live in Japan where they bore two (2)
children, namely: Haruna Takahashi (born on January 5, 2003) and Nanami
Takahashi (born on May 8, 2006). Ten (10) years later, the couple got estranged.
Petitioner alleged that her husband failed to perform his marital obligations to
her. He refused to give support to their two (2) children, and worse, started
cohabiting with another woman. Because of her persistent demand for financial
support, her husband suggested they secure a divorce so the Japanese
government would give financial assistance to their children and send them to
school. Believing it was for the good of their children, petitioner agreed to divorce
her husband. Consequently, they jointly applied for divorce before the Office of
the Mayor of Fukuyama City, Japan. On May 22, 2012, the Office of the Mayor
of Fukuyama City granted their application for divorce and issued the
corresponding Divorce Report. On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court-Manila an action for recognition of the Divorce Report. The
trial court dismissed the petition for failure to present in evidence the Divorce
Decree itself. The trial court held that the Divorce Report and Certificate of All
Matters cannot take the place of the Divorce Decree itself which is the best
evidence here. Besides, the authenticated Divorce Certificate issued by the
Japanese government was not even included in petitioner’s formal offer of
evidence aside from the fact that it was a mere photocopy and was not properly
identified nay authenticated in open court. Too, on cross, it appeared that
petitioner herself was the one who secured the Divorce Decree which fact is not
allowed under Philippine laws. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays that the
dispositions of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained in Japan may be enforced in the Philippines
even if there was no divorce decree but merely a divorce report – YES
RULING AND DOCTRINE:
Republic v. Manalo emphasized that even if it was the Filipino spouse who
initiated and obtained the divorce decree, the same may be recognized in the
Philippines. Racho v. Tanaka further enunciated that the prohibition on Filipinos
from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
Verily, therefore, even though it was petitioner herself or jointly with her husband
who applied for and obtained the divorce decree in this case, the same may be
recognized in our jurisdiction.

Records show that the Divorce Report is what the Government of Japan issued
to petitioner and her husband when they applied for divorce. There was no
“divorce judgment” to speak of because the divorce proceeding was not coursed
through Japanese courts but through the office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City in
Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In any event, since the Divorce Report was issued
by the office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an
official body in Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly
the equivalent of the “Divorce Decree” in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the
fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and her former husband.

However, here, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere printouts of

pertinent portions of the Japanese law on divorce and its English translation.
There was no proof at all that these printouts reflected the existing law on divorce
in Japan and its correct English translation. Indeed, our rules require more than a
printout from a website to prove a foreign law. At any rate, considering that the
fact of divorce was duly proved in this case, the higher interest of substantial
justice compels that petitioner be afforded the chance to properly prove the
Japanese law on divorce, with the end view that petitioner may be eventually
freed from a marriage in which she is the only remaining party. Thus, the case
was remanded to the trial court.

23. Galapon vs. Republic, G.R. No. 243722, January 22,

2020
FACTS:
Cynthia Galapon, a Filipino citizen, and Noh Shik Park, a South Korean
national, got married in Manila, on February 27, 2012, but divorced by
mutual agreement in South Korea on July 16, 2012, by the Cheongju Local
Court. Cynthia filed before the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, a
Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce, which the case
was ordered to be heard and its notice was published in The Daily Tribune
 once per week for three consecutive weeks. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Notice of Appearance for the Republic of the
Philippines with the assistance of the Provincial Prosecutor of Baloc, Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija.

Abigail Galapon represented her sister Cynthia and claimed that her sister could not
personally testify due to the expiration of her Korean visa. Abigail alleged that Park
intended to marry his former girlfriend, thus he threatened Cynthia’s life and forced her
to agree to the divorce. The RTC granted the Recognition Petition, but the OSG filed a
Petition for Reconsideration arguing that (1) the case should have been filed at the RTC
of Manila City and (2) absolute divorce is not applicable in the case.

The Petition for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC of Santo Domingo, Nueva
Ecija, thus the OSG elevated the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA (1) held
that courts cannot motu propio dismiss an action on the ground of improper venue.
However, (2) it upheld that absolute divorce cannot be granted since it was through a
mutual agreement and not initiated by the foreign spouse as stated in Article 26(2) of
the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of appeals erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree
obtained by Cynthia and her foreign spouse.

HELD:
Yes. Article 26 of the family code states that “All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38 where a marriage
between a Filipino Citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

In the recent case of Manalo the Court extended the scope [of] Article 26 (2) and
removed the distinction between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding
and a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated the proceeding. Therefore,
the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instances, it is extended as
a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos
whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national
law.

The fact that the couple obtained divorce through a mutual agreement does not assail
Article 26(2) of the Family Code which states that a Filipino spouse can remarry
whenever the foreign spouse obtained divorce capacitating him or her to remarry
Pursuant to the majority in the Manalo case, Article 26 (2) applies to mixed marriages
where the divorce decree is:

1. obtained by the foreign spouse

2. obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and
3. obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.

Hence, the divorce decree obtained by Park, with or without Cynthia’s conformity, falls
within the scope of Article 26 (2) and merits recognition in this jurisdiction.

24. Abel vs. Rule, G.R. No. 234457, May 12, 2021
Facts: In this case, the important facts revolve around a marriage
between a Filipino citizen, Mindy P. Rule, and a United States citizen,
Raemark S. Abel, which took place in California in 2005. Subsequently, in
2008, both spouses jointly filed for a summary dissolution of their
marriage in California, which was ultimately granted. After their divorce,
Abel reacquired his Filipino citizenship, while Rule became a U.S. citizen.
In 2017, Abel sought judicial recognition of the foreign divorce in the
Philippines. However, the Office of the Solicitor General opposed the
recognition, arguing that the divorce, which was jointly obtained, did not
meet the requirements of Article 26(2) of the Family Code. The Regional
Trial Court initially dismissed the petition, citing the joint nature of the
divorce as a violation of Article 26(2). Abel appealed the decision,
contending that the divorce should be recognized, regardless of which
spouse initiated the proceedings.

issue: whether a jointly obtained foreign divorce can be recognized in the

Philippines
Held: The court's ruling in this case centers on the recognition of a foreign
divorce obtained jointly by a Filipino citizen and an alien spouse. The
court, based on previous jurisprudence, emphasized that the critical
factor for recognition is the validity of the divorce obtained abroad by the
alien spouse, rather than which spouse initiated the divorce proceedings.
Citing Article 26(2) of the Family Code, the court held that the law does
not make a distinction based on the initiator of the divorce, and it applies
to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is obtained by the foreign
spouse, jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse, or solely by the Filipino
spouse. The decision also highlighted the importance of upholding
fundamental equality between women and men before the law, as
mandated by the Constitution and the Magna Carta of Women.

In conclusion, the court's legal basis for the decision primarily relies on
Article 26(2) of the Family Code and is reinforced by the Constitution's
commitment to ensuring fundamental equality between genders. The
ruling asserts that a foreign divorce, even if jointly obtained, is capable of
being recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse, thereby capacitating both parties to remarry
under Philippine law. This decision aims to eliminate discrimination and
uphold the principle of equal rights in marriage and divorce proceedings.

25. Najera vs. Najera, G.R. No. 164817, July 3, 2009

Facts:
July 3, 2009
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative
Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation
as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains.Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are
residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the United States of America (U.S.A). They
were married on January 31, 1988. They are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of
marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage,
and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.
On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Orderterminating the
pre-trial conference after the parties signed a Formal
Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to
dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains and divide equally
their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina Gates testified
that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological
disorder were nil. Its curability depended on whether the
established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the
malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by
habitual drinking and marijuana, which possibly afflicted
respondent with borderline personality disorder and
uncontrollable impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a
member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified that on
July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that
respondent arrived at their house under the influence of liquor
and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and
that respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in
the police blotter.
Issue:Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was
able to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligations of marriagewarranting
the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the
totality
of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily
prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential
obligations of marriage .The root cause of respondent’s
alleged
psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by
experts or shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

26. Dedel vs. CA, G.R. No. 151867, January 29, 2004
Facts:
January
 29, 2004
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on
left the country, Sharon returned to David bringing along
her two
September 28, 1996
and May 20, 1967
in a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four
children. David instituted a case for the
nullity of their marriage on account
of Sharon’s psychological incapacity to perform basic
marital obligations. He claimed that Sharon had extra-
marital affairs with several men including
a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in
the Presidential Security Command, and
a Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by a clinical
psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship
with the Jordanian, whom she
married and with
whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national
children
by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and
illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon
abandoned David to
even considered the
Jordanian national with her two children. Since then,
Sharon would only
return to the country on
special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified
that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of David and found him to be
 conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who
wants all tasks
and projects completed up
to the final detail and who
exerts his best in
whatever he does.
the
join
On the other
hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was
d
suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibite
by her blatant display of
infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and
had
no capacity for
remorse even bringing with her the two children of the
Jordanian to live
with David. Such
immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage
like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her
family are
indications of
the said disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of
marriage. The trial court declared their
marriage null and void on the
ground of the psychological incapacity of
 Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
While the Court of
Appeals set aside
the trial court’s judgment and ordered the dismissal of
petition. David’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, he appealed
to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
the
Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent
to psychologically
incapacity.
Ruling:
No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically
incapacity. Psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes
a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which as so
expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The law
intended to confine the meaning of“psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
 Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality, which make the respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations
of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the
circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not
for declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal
separation, which need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision
affirmed. Petition is denied.

27. Eng Kiam vs. Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
Facts:
October
23, 2006
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were
married on July 13, 1975 They have three children: Kingston,
Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.
Thereafter, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that
her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct; William would also scold
and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the
buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the
children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December 9,
1995, William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of
the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked
her to leave the house; she then went to her sister’s house in
Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to
their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her
parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.
William for his part denied all the allegations. While he admits that he
and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house at Tondo,
he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills
condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in
their office below.
Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of
legal separation due to the repeated physical abuses felt by both
Lucita and their children. William on the other hand maintains that
the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest
control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal
partnership which were acquired through his sole efforts also,
William reiterated that Lucita cannot file the petition since it Lucita
who abandoned their conjugal dwelling.
Issue:
Whether nor not the defenses of William are valid.
Ruling:
William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal
separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the
conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation
by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings
could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such
reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain
by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at the
expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly
exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita
had to seek redress from the courts. The claim of William that a
decree of legal separation would taint hisreputation and label him as
a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this
Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would
not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts, but
because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides
that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given
ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the
Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
28. Bugayong vs. Ginez, L-10033, December 28, 1956

Facts:
December
CONDONATION/PARDON BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs.
LEONILA GINEZ
28, 1956
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States
Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez.
Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with
 their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After
some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-
in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had
gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.
Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters
from some anonymous writers informing him of alleged
acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then
went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife.
Both husband and wife then proceeded to the house of
Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they
stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and
wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house and
again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On
the third day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the
truth of the information he received that she had
committed adultery but, instead of answering his query,
she merely packed up and left, which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After
that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to
locate her.
Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation
against his wife, who timely filed an answer vehemently
denying the averments of the complaint and stating than
she was condoned by her husband.
Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.
Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation. A detailed
examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband,
clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part
of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife.
Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities
amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant,
a reconciliation was effected between her and the
plaintiff. The act of thelatter in persuading her to come
along with him, and the fact that she went with him and
consented to be brought to the house of his cousin
Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as
husband and wife for one day and one night, and the
further fact that in the second night they again slept
together in their house likewise as husband and wife —
all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of
this court than that a reconciliation between them was
effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by
the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten
months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.It has been held in a long line of
decisions of the various supreme courts of the different
states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual
intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of
the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute
condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the
lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of
the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various
decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that
there is condonation.
29. De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, February 23, 1960
Facts:
February
CONDONATION/PARDON JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA
FLORENCIANO
23, 1960
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot
several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951,
plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying
his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having
found the defendant carrying marital relations with another man
plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture,
where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while
in the said city defendant was going out with several other men,
aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when
defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and
since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff
signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged
with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff a petition for
legal separation. Defendant poses as defense that plaintiff condoned
her adulterous acts with Nelson Orzame since plaintiff never sought
for her after having discovered her adulterous acts.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.
Ruling:
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and
take her home (after the latter had left him in 1952) constituted
condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It
will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with
Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men.
Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her home.
Hers was the obligation to return.
Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar
circumstances, this Court inferred the husband's consent to or
condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful
examination, a vital difference will be found: in both instances, the
husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who "left" her
husband.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition
we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal
separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.
30. Llave vs. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
Facts:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an
RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,
1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil
status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita
has been representing herself to the whole world as
Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri
Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad
 A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of
the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
forthe declaration of nullity of marriage between
Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on
May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage
remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
Issue:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.
Tamano was bigamous.
Ruling:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and
late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated
by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to
Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda
was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and
Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of
which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce
is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior
marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit
 Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the
law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party isa
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide
for a situation where the parties were married both in
civil and Muslim rites.”

31. Ado-an Morimoto vs. Morimoto and the Republic, G.R.

No. 247576, March 15, 2021

Ado-An-Morimoto v.
Morimoto
Facts:
Sometime before December
2007, Rosario was
introduced to Yoshio as one
with whom
she can simulate a marriage
with for her to acquire a
Japanese Visa. On
December 5,
2007, they met at the Manila
City Hall and signed a blank
marriage certificate. They
were assured by the S.O.
that such certificate will
never be registered in the
Civil
Registry.
Eventually, when she was
about to secure a Certificate
of No Marriage, she found
out
that a Certificate of Marriage
was registered that she
married Yoshio on
December 5,
2007, in a ceremony
officiated by a certain
Reverend Roberto Espiritu.
There was also a
marriage license that
appeared on record that was
issued by the Office of the
Civil
Registry of San Juan.
On October 5, 2009, Rosario
filed a Petition for
Declaration of nullity of
Marriage before
the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court. She claimed that
the marriage did not actually
happen and that there was
no application for a marriage
license at all.
As proof she provided as
evidence a certification
issued by the Office of the
Civil
Registrar, NSO, stating that
“said office mistakenly stated
that a marriage was
solemnized between Rosario
and Yoshio.” She also
provided as evidence a
Certificate
issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar, San Juan
City, which states that "no
record of
Marriage License No.
6120159 was issued to the
parties.”
The RTC denied her petition
and the CA also denied her
appeal.
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the
registered marriage between
petitioner Rosario D. Ado-
An-Morimoto
and respondent Yoshio
Morimoto should be declared
null and void
Ruling
The case involves a petition for the declaration of nullity of
a marriage between Rosario D. Ado-an-Morimoto and
Yoshio Morimoto. Rosario claimed that the marriage
was simulated and never actually took place, as it was
used as a front for obtaining a Japanese visa. The court
found that the marriage lacked the essential and formal
requisites required by the Family Code, specifically the
absence of genuine consent and the lack of a marriage
license. The court also considered Rosario's admission
against her own interest as credible evidence. The
decision declared the registered marriage between
Rosario and Yoshio null and void, as it was considered
a fictitious and non-existent marriage.

In essence, the ruling emphasizes that simulated

marriages used for fraudulent purposes, such as
obtaining benefits, are void from the beginning and
should not be recognized by the courts. The decision
underscores the importance of upholding the sanctity of
 marriage while also preventing the abuse of the
institution for illicit gain.

32. Kho vs. Republic and Kho, G.R. No. 187462, June 1,
2016
33. Jumaquio vs. People, G.R. No. 224742, August 7,
2019
34. Camara vs. Rueda, G.R. No. 11263, November 2,
1916
35. Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
36. Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
37. Republic vs. Villacorta, G.R. No. 249953, June 23,
2021
38. Tilar vs. Republic, G.R. No. 214529, July 12, 2017

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
1. Republic vs. Catubag, G.R. No. 210580, April 18, 2018
2. Republic vs. Cantor, G.R. No. 184621, December 10,
2013
3. Republic vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015
4. Republic vs. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
5. Republic vs. Quiñonez, G.R. No. 237412, January 6,
2020
6. Republic vs. Ponce-Pilapil, G.R. No. 219185, November
25, 2020
7. Santos vs. Santos, G. R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014
8. SSS v. Vda. De Bailon, 520 Phil 249 (2006)
9. Tadeo-Matias v. Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April 25,
2018
 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
1. Santos vs. Santos, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
2. Republic vs. Molina, G.R. No. 108763, February 13,
1997
3. Antonio vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
4. Marcos vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
5. Kalaw vs. Fernandez, G.R. 166357, January 14, 2015
6. Tan-Andal vs. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021
7. De Silva vs. De Silva, G.R. No. 247985, October 13,
2021
8. Tani-De La Fuente vs. De La Fuente, 807 Phil. 31
(2017)
9. Garlet vs. Garlet, G. R. No. 193544, August 2, 2017
10. Pugoy-Solidum vs. Republic, G.R. No. 213954, April
20, 2022
11. Datu vs. Datu, G.R. No. 209278, September 15, 2021
12. Mallillin vs. Jamesolamin, G.R. 192718,
13. Marable vs. Marable, G.R. No. 178741
14. Meneses vs. Meneses, G.R. No. 200182, March 13,
2019
15. Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Gina Lao-Tsoi,
G.R. No. 119190, 266 S.C.R.A. 324 (January 16, 1997)
(Phil.)

NOTE:
On 24 January 2023, the Supreme Court enbanc issued a
Resolution approving the (1) amended guidelines to validate
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements in petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, annulment of
voidable marriage, and legal separation, and (2) amendments
to Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and Section 2(c) of
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and the Rule on Legal Separation, respectively.
Amended Guidelines to Validate Compliance with
Jurisdictional Requirements in Petitions for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage, Annulment of Marriage,
and Legal Separation

SEE ALSO:
a. Pulido vs. People, G.R. No. 220149, 27 July 2021
b. Obergefell vs. Hodges, June 26, 2015(discussion on
same sex marriage)