True/False (True=A; False=B)

1. To the extent that ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics raise questions about judgments
relating to value, they are concerned with axiology.

2. The philosophical attempt of ethics to provide a standard for evaluating laws, religions,
customs, and individual preferences is itself based on each philosopher's personal values.

3. In the retributive notion of justice, the purpose of punishment is to change the person's
character so that he or she does not commit such offenses again.

4. As a utilitarian justification for capital punishment, the reform theory recommends the reform
of society at large through the elimination of threatening individuals in the community.

5. Because retribution serves a purpose--namely, giving someone what is due to him or her--it
is generally considered a utilitarian justification for punishment.

6. According to the retributivist, the execution of criminals is a form of respect shown to them
as beings capable of making free choices for which they should take responsibility.

7. According to Socrates and Plato, we should act virtuously for the sake of others, regardless
of whether acting morally improves our ability to discern what is good or to control our
passions.

8. According to Socrates and Plato, we can be truly happy only if we allow our reason or
intellect to guide our emotions and appetites.

9. The point of Plato's story of the ring of Gyges is this: only a fool would act morally if he or
she could get away with acting immorally.

10. In responding to the story of the ring of Gyges, Plato argues that immorality can never be
in someone's ultimate self-interest because immoral people are never truly happy.

11. In Plato's theory of the state, justice is ultimately achieved when the ruling class is able to
do away with social inequalities by driving the military and working classes out of society.

12. For Plato, the moral balance or harmony of the three parts of the soul is a parallel to the
condition of political harmony one must seek in the state.

13. According to Plato, the soul achieves balance or harmony only when reason controls both
the spirited (or courageous) part of the soul and the soul's appetites.

14. According to Plato, moral goodness is achieved by eliminating the activities of the lower
parts of the soul and acting solely on the basis of reason.

15. In Epicurus' version of hedonism, all decisions about how to live should be based on
whether or not one's actions will produce pleasure and avoid pain.

16. For Epicurus, since death is the end of sensation (and therefore the end of all pain), death is
a positive good that we should look forward to.
 17. Hedonism is a form of teleological ethical theory insofar as it recommends that we act so as
to produce happiness (pleasure) as the consequence of our actions.

18. The egoistic hedonist says that, if producing the greatest amount of pleasure for ourselves
means that we have to take into account the pleasure of others, then we are under a moral
obligation to do so.

19. Stoics note that we accumulate power and wealth by restricting our desires to things over
which we have control.

20. According to the Stoics, the only way to fulfill our duty to live in harmony with the universe
is to yield to our passions, desires, and emotions.

21. For the Stoic, the reason one does one's duty is that it is the only way that a person can
achieve true happiness.

22. According to Aristotle, because moral virtues are habits, they cannot be taught but only
learned in living according to them.

23. According to Aristotle, in a good or happy life someone is able to fulfill himself or herself
through behavior that combines moderation, good fortune, and wisdom.

24. According to Aristotle, because happiness is not only the goal of all human beings but also
defined by anyone as he/she sees fit, there is no ultimate standard of ethics.

25. In Aristotle's virtue ethics, moral value is a purely private matter, unconnected to how
people interact with others in the community.

26. Because hedonism is a consequentialist way of thinking, it is more properly identified as a

form of ethical egoism rather than as a form of psychological egoism.

27. Teleological theories of ethics determine the moral value of actions in terms of their
consequences.

28. Though both Epicurus and Bentham agree that we should do that which produces pleasure
or happiness, they differ on whose pleasure or happiness should be taken into account.

29. If psychological egoism is true, then no ethical position (including ethical egoism) is
possible.

30. Because ethical egoism claims that we are incapable of doing anything other than
promoting our self-interests, it violates the moral dictum "ought implies can."

31. For the utilitarian, the whole purpose of ethics and virtuous behavior is the production and
increase of happiness.

32. According to the utilitarian principle of morality, one should always act so as to produce the
greatest overall and long-term amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.

33. Utilitarians claim that actions have value and thus are morally good insofar as they produce
happiness (good consequences) for the greatest number of people.
 34. Since utilitarianism is really a form of social hedonism, it cannot be considered as a
consequentialist theory of morality.

35. Because Bentham's hedonistic calculus does not consider the pleasures or pains that other
people experience as a result of a person's action, it is more egoistic than Mill's version of
utilitarianism.

36. According to Mill, the proof that happiness is good (and thus desirable) is that human
beings desire it.

37. Utilitarians argue that, because all moral values are relative to cultural or individual choice,
no universally valid moral principles hold for all human beings.

38. According to J. S. Mill, the quantity (as opposed to the quality) of pleasures is determined
by how well those pleasures enhance human fulfillment and well-being.

39. A deontological ethical theory is one that makes judgments about the morality of actions
based on the ends, purposes, or consequences of the actions.

40. A person who has a moral obligation to do something is not physically able or free to do
anything else.

41. Kant rejects all forms of hypothetical imperatives because (he claims) no rational agent can
ever be obligated to act morally.

42. Kant's categorical imperative states that we should always act for the sake of doing our duty
except when doing our duty conflicts with deeply held personal or religious values.

43. To act virtuously, Kant argues, means to act for the sake of doing one's duty—even if that
means going against one's religious beliefs.

44. In Kantian ethics (following Hume), "ought implies can" refers to the claim that no one can
be morally obligated to do something unless he or she is able to do it.

45. "Ought implies can" summarizes the moral principle that if someone is physically able to do
an action, he or she is morally obligated to do it.

46. To say that a moral imperative is categorical means (for Kant) that the demand should be
obeyed without exception, regardless of the negative consequences of acting on it.

47. Teleological ethical theories characterize moral obligation in terms of categorical rather
than hypothetical imperatives.

48. From Kant's perspective, utilitarian consequentialism assumes that ethical reasoning is and
should be based on a categorical (rather than a hypothetical) imperative.

49. According to Kant, I can be morally obligated to do an action only if everyone else in the
same type of situation is likewise obligated.

50. A maxim is a subjective principle of action or working rule which, according to Kant, we
are morally bound or obligated to obey.
 51. According to Kant, we should treat people as ends-in-themselves (and never as means
alone) because they produce good consequences through their actions.

52. According to Hume and Moore, ethical theories fall into a naturalistic fallacy when they
derive moral obligations ("should" or "ought") from factual states ("is").

53. Utilitarians commit a "naturalistic fallacy" by thinking that certain behavior is morally
desirable because it has consequences that are desired.

54. According to emotivism (or "positivism") value judgments are simply expressions of
positive or negative feelings about something and thus are neither true nor false.

55. For Sartre, belief in God permits individuals to depend on a standard of morality for which
they are not responsible and for which they are not accountable.

56. According to Sartre, nothing that a human being does, not even acting in "bad faith," allows
that person to transcend human subjectivity.

57. Moral systems—even those that value humility and passivity—are expressions (Nietzsche
maintains) of the will to power, the will to overcome.

58. According to Nietzsche, moral systems are attempts by the masses of weak people to keep
strong individuals from exercising their creativity and passion.

59. Nietzsche rejects utilitarianism because it gives equal value to all individuals, even those
who do not deserve it.

60. Nietzsche rejects moral theories such as Christian, utilitarian, and Kantian ethics because
they fail to treat all human beings as essentially equal.

61. Ethical relativists claim that cultures ultimately share the same basic ethical principles.

62. Ethical relativists claim that even though cultures seem to differ on ethical standards, they
ultimately share the same basic ethical principle--namely, moral goodness is that which
produces happiness.

63 Ethical relativists argue that, because all moral values are relative to cultural or individual
choice, no universally valid moral principles hold for all human beings.

64. For the cultural relativist, if a moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, it is
right (at least within that society).

65. If moral objectivism is true, then homosexuality must be morally wrong.

66. According to Kohlberg, the highest stage of moral development--the postconventional

acceptance of rational, objective principles--is a stage in which people become slaves to rules,
laws, or traditions.

67. According to Carol Gilligan, the ethic of care characteristic of feminist ways of thinking
emphasizes the obligation not to interfere in the lives of others.
 68. Feminine moral development, according to Carol Gilligan, occurs as a person moves from
(1) caring only for herself, through (2) caring for others, to (3) adopting care as a universal
moral principle.

69. Sarah Hoagland argues that male-dominated ethics emphasizes competing interests,
sacrifice and compromise, and duty instead of caring.

Multiple Choice

70. Ethics, political philosophy, and aesthetics are areas of philosophy that address topics that
are likewise addressed in fields like psychology, political science, sociology, and anthropology.
But instead of concentrating on what different people call the good life, moral duties, social
obligations, or beauty, these areas of philosophy search for:
(a) reasons why different people should or should not think about such topics as they do.
(b) the personal or social causes of why different people think about such topics as they do.
(c) ways of getting people to question and ultimately to reject ways they have been raised.
(d) a basic principle or logos by which both philosophy and the social sciences can be reduced
to the physical sciences (especially physics).

71. Ethics and law have sometimes been distinguished in the following way: the law attempts to
resolve conflict in society by regulating behavior, whereas ethics is concerned with determining
the rules for resolving conflict both in belief and in the behavior or action based on those
beliefs. Ethics thus emphasizes:
(a) the reasons that can be given as to why certain beliefs should be adopted and certain actions
done.
(b) the ways in which individuals can be excused from being held responsible for their actions.
(c) how a rational resolution of conflicting beliefs is unattainable due to the different
backgrounds of people.
(d) the difference between an individual's religious training and the requirements of the laws of
his state and nation.

72. From a philosophical perspective, religious teachings or revelations cannot (by themselves)
serve as standards of morality because:
(a) the appeal to the will of God as the reason for one's behavior cannot provide a motive for
acting morally or immorally, even for religious believers.
(b) interpretations of religious revelations often conflict with one another and thus provide no
definite basis for making moral judgments and have no persuasive power for non-believers.
(c) some religious beliefs (even those based on the Scriptures) are not only factually wrong but,
if followed, would result in immoral behavior.
(d) religious teachings are usually interpreted and enforced through civil laws that become the
bases for personal or social morality.

73. According to Plato, no one would choose to act immorally if he/she knew how acting
immorally is really not in his/her self-interest. But it is apparent that evil people appear (at least
on the surface) to benefit from their immorality. So how can acting morally really be in one's
own self-interest? Plato's answer:
(a) Immoral behavior may in fact be in one's own self-interest; but morality is not immediately
concerned with the individual as much as with society.
(b) Harmonious integration or balance of the parts of one's personality is what makes someone
truly happy and constitutes human excellence and moral virtue.
(c) Since there is no objective moral standard (as the ring of Gyges story shows), whatever
someone believes is in his or her self-interest is morally acceptable.
(d) Virtue is the ability to do what one does well, so if someone is able to promote his or her
self interest (even through immorality), then that person is virtuous.

74. According to Plato, we never consciously choose to do that which we know to be immoral,
because to do so would be to act contrary to our own self-interests. Knowing what is in our own
self-interest, however, requires that we recognize which things are truly in our best interests; and
that requires that we recognize:
(a) how those in power determine what is moral or immoral depending on whatever they
choose to believe.
(b) how personal integrity (i.e., getting the parts of our soul into harmony) is linked to knowing
our function in society.
(c) how wisdom is possible only for the ruling class, courage is possible only for the military or
law enforcers, and moderation is possible only for the working class.
(d) how morality is less concerned with doing what is actually right than with doing what
seems to be right according to one's society: that is what the Gyges ring story is about.

75. For most Greeks, the question "why be moral?" is much more important than the question
"what is moral?" Plato's parallel between the parts of the soul and the parts of society collapses
the two questions into one by:
(a) showing why someone should care about having an integrated personality or contributing to
the harmonious operation of society.
(b) understanding how ethics is more concerned with intellectual judgments about actions and
their consequences, and less with moral motivation.
(c) recognizing that personal morality has little or nothing to do with social morality; that is,
one's private moral judgments have no social parallels.
(d) indicating how the judgments of society concerning who is happy and who is not should be
used in telling who is moral and who is not.

76. To say that Plato's question "Why be moral?" is not a moral, but rather a meta-ethical
question means that it is a question about:
(a) what makes certain actions moral or immoral.
(b) how individuals should or should not be held responsible for the ways in which their
consciences have been formed.
(c) why someone should behave in certain ways, even when he agrees that it is the morally
acceptable way to act.
(d) why someone chooses to act in ways that conflict with the recommendations of others.

77. "Why be moral?" is a metaethical question rather than an ethical question insofar as it is
concerned with:
(a) why someone would want to have a balanced personality or be a superior individual.
(b) non-moral reasons for why someone should be moral.
(c) how it is morally wrong for someone to be immoral.
(d) what makes actions moral or immoral, right or wrong.

78. Epicurus proposes that, even though decision-making should be based on the pursuit of
pleasure, not all pleasures ought to be pursued equally, because:
(a) pleasures are the fulfillment of our desires; and insofar as we are determined by nature to
fulfill our desires, we must seek after pleasure.
(b) we ought not to get pleasure out of fulfilling certain desires.
(c) we cannot make decisions based on whether our actions produce pleasure without knowing
beforehand whether we are justified in doing so.
(d) simple pleasures (as opposed to extreme pleasures) are easier to satisfy, less prone to
disappointment, and make us appreciate luxuries all the more.

79. Every time we succeed in any endeavor, we experience pleasure in having accomplished
our goals. But what if our goals involve causing harm to oneself or to others?--Wouldn't that
indicate that the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure is wrong and should not be the basis of a moral
system? To this a hedonist like Epicurus would reply:
(a) hedonism is not a way of life or a way of deciding how to act morally; it is merely a way of
thinking.
(b) if pursuing certain goals causes someone pleasure, that is all that matters; how others are
affected or how they respond to the individual's acts is unimportant.
(c) hedonism recommends that those kinds of endeavors that cause pain or unhappiness be
avoided; it does not say that any successful effort whatsoever is desirable.
(d) no one intentionally pursues or should pursue pleasure for its own sake; we should avoid
worrying about morality as well.

80. Though Epicurean hedonism is similar in certain respects to modern Western capitalism, it
emphasizes a point that Marx says characterizes his position as well, namely, the belief that:
(a) we should not trouble ourselves about things (e.g., economic systems) over which we have
no control.
(b) happiness should not be defined in terms of material things, since in the afterlife they mean
nothing.
(c) only the material world is real and life has meaning only in terms of this world; there is no
afterlife.
(d) work is a necessary evil one has to endure to obtain the means to develop friendships and
gain wisdom.

81. Critics have claimed that Hobbes' egoistic theory of human motivation (including his denial
that anyone can ever act in a purely altruistic way) is not properly a scientific theory because it
fails to fulfill Popper's falsifiability criterion for scientific theories. Specifically, in order for
Hobbes' position to be considered a legitimate theory:
(a) it must be shown to be false.
(b) it would allow for the possibility that it could be false.
(c) it must be able to explain all behavior in terms of self-interest.
(d) it would have to show how believing in the theory is in one's self-interest.

82. Though systems of belief such as fatalism, determinism, and egoism provide their supporters
with ways of explaining experience, these ways of thinking cannot be considered acceptable
theories of human behavior because they violate the falsifiability criterion for legitimate
theorizing. They cannot be proven false because:
(a) such systems of belief are simply true--as the failure of all attempted falsifications of them
shows.
(b) people who believed in them would be determined by fate to act always in their own self-
interest.
(c) there are no explanations of human behavior other than those proposed by these systems of
belief.
(d) any attempt to falsify them would be explained in their terms, supposedly confirming their
truth.

83. According to Ayn Rand's version of ethical egoism, it is not only possible for us to act in
ways that beefit others; it is important that we do so, but only to the extent that:
(a) our own self-interests are promoted through the promotion of the interests of others.
(b) we act compassionately, not always seeking to promote our interests over others.
(c) we act altruistically.
(d) our lives incorporate the goals of asceticism (that is, simplicity and self-denial).

84. If psychological egoism is true, then no ethical system (including ethical egoism) is possible
because:
(a) ethics would then be merely a means by which individuals impose their values on others--
exactly as Nietzsche says happens in Christianity.
(b) if we are determined to act only in our self-interest, then it makes no sense to say we ought
to act either in our self-interest or, for that matter, in any other way either.
(c) psychological egoism is a theory of why people are motivated to act morally, whereas
ethical egoism is a theory of how moral distinctions are determined.
(d) without some means to decide which acts are morally good or bad, there is no way to
explain why people act the way they do.

85. Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius describe the good life in terms of a rational
understanding of the law of nature, because insofar as we understand natural law:
(a) we can change nature to accommodate our interests.
(b) we can get pleasure out of the pure act of knowing.
(c) we can limit our desires to things within our control.
(d) we can remain indifferent about what we choose to do.

86. For the Stoic a meaningful life is one in which she commits herself to do her duty, whatever
it might be. Limiting herself to doing her duty (regardless of what that entails) means:
(a) recognizing how her freedom is limited by what she chooses to desire.
(b) passively resigning herself to accept whatever happens as out of her control and unaffected
by her action.
(c) committing herself with all her power to take responsibility for what she does as her own.
(d) not caring what she does or how she does it, as long as she thinks she won't be disappointed
by taking unnecessary chances.

87. Epictetus' Stoic claim that we should be happy with whatever life offers us differs from
Epicureanism in that:
(a) Epicureanism says that happiness consists in the unrestrained pursuit of pleasure
(hedonism), whereas Stoicism says that we can achieve pleasure only by desiring things that will
not disappoint us.
(b) Epicureanism says that life can be meaningful only if we are happy (regardless of whether
we satisfy our desires), but Stoicism says that we can be happy only if we satisfy our desires.
(c) Epicureanism says that only those things that benefit us can make us happy, whereas
Stoicism says only by doing things that benefit others can we be happy.
(d) Epicureanism says we should desire things that do not disappoint us, whereas Stoicism says
that we cannot be disappointed in life if we do not desire anything.
88. Existentialism differs significantly from Stoicism concerning why we should care about the
specifics of what we choose as values. The Stoic says we should care about doing our duty; but
what that duty might be is something, the Stoic claims, is ultimately due to nature. This is
where the existentialist would object, claiming:
(a) in spite of the fact that nature restricts what we can choose to do, we can still have an effect
on human values by the choices we make.
(b) values established in nature guide our choices and indicate what our duties are, but they do
not force us to act in accord with those values.
(c) freedom requires that we respond with scornful and grudging acceptance of the values
implicit in the structure and laws of nature.
(d) nature itself has meaning for humans only insofar as we choose to consider it as valuable,
so our choices are not determined by nature.

89. Moral virtue, for Aristotle, entails acting in accord with the dictates of reason as determined
by:
(a) an objective, shared standard of right and wrong equally applicable to all people.
(b) a mean or point of moderation between the extremes of morally good and morally evil
behavior.
(c) the mean or point of moderation between the extremes of possible alternative ways of
acting.
(d) the denial of one's own interests in favor of the good of one's community.

90. According to Aristotle, a happy life is a life of virtue, one in which the individual contributes
to the good of his or her community and is respected for such contributions. At the heart of his
description of the morally good life is one's honor in a society, because being an honorable
individual means being someone who:
(a) recognizes how his or her own well-being is intimately linked to the good of the
community.
(b) appreciates how moral values vary from culture to culture and from individual to
individual.
(c) can live a life of moderation without having be sensitive to or involved in social or civic
affairs.
(d) contemplates philosophical principles in order to understand the truths of nature.

91. For Aristotle, "Moral states are the results of activities like the states themselves. It is our
duty, therefore, to keep a certain character in our activities, since our moral states depend on the
differences in our activities." This "certain character" is:
(a) activity in accordance with reason (i.e., sensitive to the social and personal dimensions of
human existence).
(b) the point at which the individual's "golden mean" rule cancels out the society's own
definition of "moderation."
(c) neither excess nor deficiency, but rather the alternation of the two (where one takes over
sometimes, and the other at other times).
(d) the point of moderation in action between virtue and vice, the individual's good as opposed
to the social definition of the good.

92. Bentham's utilitarianism is different from J. S. Mill's version in virtue of Mill's emphasis on:
(a) the happiness of all creatures affected by actions, versus the happiness experienced by
humans.
 (b) how actions done to achieve happiness are in fact desired as opposed to being desirable.
(c) the concern for the qualitative character of happiness versus simply the quantitative.
(d) the number of people affected versus the intensity of pleasure experienced by those
affected.

93. ``Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we
shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and
effects, are fastened to their throne. . . . The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and
assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity
by the hands of reason and law.'' This passage summarizes:
(a) Bentham's utilitarianism. (b) Marx's historical materialism.
(c) Erik Erikson's theory of ego integrity. (d) Mill's objections to utilitarianism.

94. Though J. S. Mill agrees with Bentham that happiness is the goal of ethical behavior, he
points out that "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied." By this remark
he indicates how:
(a) some kinds of happiness are more desirable or valuable than others for social or cultural
reasons.
(b) according to the utilitarian principle, the greatest happiness is determined by the greatest
number.
(b) happiness ought to be desired (and thus is desirable) because people, in fact, desire to be
happy.
(c) uncultivated people are as competent to judge what happiness is as are cultivated people.

95. According to Mill, "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have
experience of both give a decided preference, that is the more desirable pleasure." The decision
about which pleasures are qualitatively desirable should thus be made by those familiar with
different kinds of pleasures based on:
(a) what those persons generally desire.
(b) each expert's opinion considered individually (without having to consult others).
(c) whether that which is, in fact, desired by those persons is what they ought to desire.
(d) the consensus of everyone in the community.

96. In deciding how far we have to calculate the consequences of our actions, Mill says that the
utilitarian recommends that we should realistically consider only:
(a) the rules of desire determined by the person of practical wisdom.
(b) those persons most likely to be affected by our actions.
(c) how our behavior follows necessarily from human nature itself.
(d) the motive of the agent, and not necessarily the consequences of our actions.

97. One objection raised against utilitarianism is that we can never know what we are morally
obliged to do since we can never know all the consequences of our actions. Mill and other
utilitarians reply to this by:
(a) pointing out that no moral theory is ever able to indicate what we should not do.
(b) agreeing that we may not know perfectly what the consequences will be, but we can
determine them well enough to know what to do.
(c) rejecting the claim: we, in fact, can know all of the consequences of our actions if we
investigate the matter well enough.
 (d) redefining "consequences" so that they are limited to what we intend to do and not to what
actually happens.

98. Some theorists argue that the utilitarian claim that we are morally obligated to contribute to
famine relief ignores one central fact about human nature, namely, that we are more inclined to
help members of our own family or culture than others, and therefore should not be expected to
do what we are not inclined to do in the first place. To this the utilitarian responds:
(a) taking care of those near us produces more overall happiness than taking care of others.
(b) the amount of need in some cultures is greater than in others; our own needs are greatest.
(c) while such feelings may be significant psychologically, they are irrelevant morally.
(d) our moral obligations to promote the happiness of our family, friends, and immediate
culture are more important than even obligations to protect the lives of others.

99. One consequentialist argument against famine relief notes that feeding famine victims is not
our moral responsibility, because it causes more harm than good insofar as it wastes our own
resources, makes the starving more dependent on us, and creates conditions for more famine in
the future. Which of the following IS NOT a response utilitarian supporters of famine relief
would typically give in return?
(a) Feeding both the starving and ourselves would require us to become more efficient,
knowledgeable, and industrious (all beneficial effects).
(b) We have a responsibility to other human beings to save them from starvation regardless of
future consequences; after all, we do not know what those consequences may be.
(c) In feeding the starving we can--indeed, we are morally required to--demand that cultures
receiving the food adopt farming and distribution programs to prevent future famine.
(d) Recipients of food can be required to adopt social changes (e.g., birth control programs) in
order to support themselves and not have to rely on others.

100. Some critics of utilitarianism have argued that injustices against minorities would be
permitted under utilitarian principles, since the violation of the rights of a few might produce
more overall happiness than respecting those rights. Utilitarians respond that, on the contrary,
injustices against minorities would not be encouraged under their principles, because:
(a) according to utilitarian principles, minorities have no rights.
(b) if unjust practices became the rule in a society, there would be more unhappiness.
(c) minorities do not experience happiness and unhappiness in the same way as the majority of
society.
(d) calculation of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not
necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.

101. Act utilitarians point out that sometimes violating a moral rule causes more happiness than
following the rule. In such cases, they argue, violating the rule is permitted:
(a) only if no other violations of the rule occur again.
(b) as long as no one affected by the action experiences any unhappiness.
(c) as long as the person's intention or motive is to do his/her duty regardless of the
consequences.
(d) and even morally required by the utilitarian principle itself.

102. Act utilitarians say that we should always do that specific action that produces the greatest
happiness, even if this means violating moral rules. Rule utilitarians challenge this, arguing that
we should follow moral rules even if we think that violating them would yield better results,
because:
 (a) following moral rules generally yields more overall happiness than the unhappiness created
by allowing for the rare exceptions to rules.
(b) we should not become slaves to any moral rules; morality is a matter of personal choices.
(c) acting in general to produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of
people is not always the morally right thing to do.
(d) even if we follow moral rules, we will always cause unhappiness to someone.

103. Critics sometimes claim that, for utilitarianism, motive seems to have nothing to do with
the morality of an action. Mill responds to this by pointing out that:
(a) good consequences cannot follow from an act done by someone with an evil motive.
(b) bad consequences often follow from actions which are done with the best motives in mind.
(c) consequences determine the morality of an action; the person's motive affects only our
judgment of the person doing the act, not the act itself.
(d) the only way to determine what motive I have in acting is to determine the consequences of
my action.

104. In reply to those who object that utilitarianism permits lying if it produces happiness, J. S.
Mill responds in what is now called a rule utilitarian way: "Any, even unintentional deviation
from truth weakens the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is the principal support of all
social well-being, civilization, virtue, and everything on which human happiness on the largest
scale depends." Mill's basic point is that:
(a) insignificant ("white") lies sometimes do cause happiness, so they are morally permissible.
(b) even occasional white lies are immoral because they cause more harm than good in the long
run.
(c) we would be morally obligated to tell the truth even if, as a rule, it did not cause happiness.
(d) lying is immoral because it generally causes unhappiness; but if someone who is qualified
to judge the difference between happiness and unhappiness approves the lie, it is OK.

105. Rule utilitarians have argued that injustices against minorities would be permitted under act
utilitarian principles, since the violation of the rights of a few might produce more overall
happiness in certain situations than respecting those rights. They argue that, by contrast, under
rule utilitarianism injustices against minorities would not be encouraged because:
(a) individuals and minorities have rights only in deontological ethics, not in teleological
ethics.
(b) rule utilitarianism indicates how to act in general, not how to act in specific situations.
(c) if unjust practices became the rule in a society, there would be more unhappiness.
(d) calculation of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people does not
necessarily have to include consideration of all members of a society.

106. The deontological theory of ethics called divine law theory is sometimes confused with
natural law theory because both often refer to God. But unlike in natural law theory, a person is,
in fact, morally obligated to act in a certain way under divine law theory:
(a) if he/she believes that it is what God commands.
(b) if God should require him/her to act in certain ways.
(c) if acting in accord with the person's nature is morally correct.
(d) if God really does command it, regardless of whether it conflicts with human nature.

107. Which of the following IS NOT an objection Kant raises against consequentialism?
(a) If we are inclined to do an act because we naturally seek good consequences (happiness),
then we do not act freely and are not morally responsible.
 (b) The task of ethics is to make judgments about what people intend to do when they act,
regardless of the consequences.
(c) Because people disagree about what happiness is, good consequences cannot provide an
ultimate criterion for making moral judgments.
(d) The consequences of our actions are often out of our control, so we cannot be held
responsible for them or have our actions judged based on them.

108. According to Kant, virtuous actions are those that are done for the sake of doing one's
duty--which means acting for the right reason or with the right motive or intention. Kant limits
the discussion of the moral character of actions to motives or intentions and does not consider
consequences crucial, because:
(a) the consequences are often out of our control and are valued differently by different people.
(b) only those actions based on universalizable motives are moral actions.
(c) moral decisions are conditioned by one's culture and by how one is raised.
(d) every time someone acts, he or she has a motive; but there are not always consequences to
acts.

109. According to Kant, morality presumes that I, as a rational being, am able to do what is
morally right because it is morally right. So, unless doing my duty is my motive in acting, my
action is not morally good, because:
(a) actions that are done solely for the sake of doing my duty do not promote the happiness
caused by the actions as much as actions done because they are morally right.
(b) sometimes doing my duty conflicts with doing the right thing--especially when doing the
right thing involves acting in accord with my religious beliefs.
(c) if my motive in acting is that I am willing to take responsibility for the consequences of my
action, then my action is morally good.
(d) acting with motives other than doing my duty--for example, acting out of instinct, passion,
or interest--is not universalizable and thus cannot be the basis for rational behavior.

110. According to Kant, an action which has a motive or intention that cannot be successfully
universalized:
(a) might be moral or immoral, depending on the consequences of the action.
(b) might be moral or immoral, depending on whether the act is considered acceptable in the
person's society.
(c) is immoral.
(d) might be moral or immoral, depending on whether the action is done freely.

111. Kant claims that I can determine whether all other rational beings are obligated to do what I
am obligated to do by trying to see whether:
(a) certain practices are universally accepted throughout different cultures.
(b) other examples of my action yield good consequences.
(c) the action would be universally good for all individuals.
(d) the motive of my action can be universalized without contradiction or without being
unacceptable to some people.

112. According to Kant, acting morally means acting on an intention that a reasonable person
could will all persons to adopt as the motive for their actions. Critics claim that this makes Kant
a consequentialist, insofar as universalizability considers the consequences of everyone acting
that way. Kant rejects this by pointing out that:
(a) to say that an intention must be universalizable does not mean that everyone's intentions
need to be considered, only the intentions of those who are going to be affected by the action.
(b) the intended consequences of actions are often not the same as their actual consequences.
(c) intentions, not consequences, identify moral actions; if an intention cannot be universalized
for any reason (including unacceptable consequences), it cannot be the basis for a moral act.
(d) if people actually did their moral duty, then the consequences of their doing so would be
better than if they only intended to do their duty.

113. Kant suggests that the maxim upon which an action is based, and not the individual action
itself, is the key for determining whether an action is morally good, because:
(a) a specific action is, by definition, not universalizable.
(b) our actions are always based on some maxim or other.
(c) without maxims we would not know what to do.
(d) our maxims are subjective rules of behavior upon which actions are based.

114. Kant argues that acting in accordance with duty does not make an action morally
worthwhile; rather it is acting for the sake of or because it is one's duty that makes the act
morally worthy. He makes this distinction to indicate how:
(a) the consequences of one's actions might be good or bad depending on how much happiness
is produced.
(b) actions that are done freely are always morally good actions.
(c) the moral value of an action is determined by one's motives, not by the consequences of
one's actions.
(d) acting in a self-interested way differs from acting based on maxims.

115. According to existentialist ethics, there is no absolute foundation upon which moral
judgments are based; we are free to adopt any moral system we choose. As Sartre notes,
however, we are responsible for choosing that set of values. Any system of moral values that is
established by some means other than human choice, then:
(a) contradicts the principle on which the ability to make moral distinctions is based.
(b) ought to be grounded in the will of God or in generally accepted social practices.
(c) in fact never are used by people (even mistakenly) to make moral judgments.
(d) is immoral if the consequences are bad for us.

116. When Sartre says that "there is no human nature," what he means is that:
(a) as self-conscious beings, we can and do determine the kinds of beings that we are.
(b) there can be no basis for deciding between anguish and despair.
(c) human beings do not have genetic characteristics that identify them biologically as
members of a species.
(d) existentialism can accept the existence of God only as the a priori foundation of ethical
judgments.

117. Sartre claims that, for human beings, "existence precedes essence"; in other words:
(a) when human beings are rational, they fulfill their essence of being human.
(b) human beings are essentially determined to exist according to certain God-given directives.
(c) human beings are free to choose even not to act in any way whatsoever.
(d) human beings are condemned to be free and to become anything they choose through their
actions.

118. If, as Sartre's existentialism claims, "man is responsible for his passion," then no matter
what we as human beings do, we do it:
(a) against our wills.
(b) without thought.
(c) freely.
(d) out of scorn for God.

119. Nietzsche argues that the task of true morality is to indicate how human beings, as part of
nature, can move "beyond good and evil" by means of the attempt to:
(a) overcome and gradually do away with our natural inclinations of aggression and struggle.
(b) show our nobility through self-restraint and compassion for the less fortunate.
(c) accept tolerantly our own weaknesses as indications of our place within God's plan.
(d) make moral distinctions the explicit products of the exercise of human will.

120. According to Nietzsche, members of the herd endorse the slave values of sympathy,
kindness, and the "common" good because:
(a) they feel that they should be treated kindly and compassionately since they are not
responsible for their lack of power.
(b) they believe that, if they treat the master-morality overmen kindly, those noble individuals
will not harm them.
(c) they fear that a lack of sympathy or kindness, or failure to consider the common good, will
cause the men of nobility to feel threatened by them.
(d) they prefer following God's will rather than struggling against it (like the overmen are
constantly having to do).

121. Critics of morality (e.g., Callicles or Nietzsche) argue that recommending that people act
morally (that is, with self-restraint, moderation, or concern for others) is itself an attempt by
"common" people to impose their will on their superiors. They conclude, therefore, that doing
something because it is moral makes no sense, since:
(a) even common people admit that no one should act morally unless it produces happiness for
him or her.
(b) only a personality that harmonizes the competing interests of reason, emotion, and appetite
is moral.
(c) the "all too human" values of ordinary people do not provide any guidance for how people
should act.
(d) that would require us to affirm our power to decide values by restricting that power.

122. The "first principle" of Nietzsche's version of humanism is this: "The weak and the failures
shall perish. They ought even to be helped to perish. What is more harmful than vice?--
Practical sympathy and pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity." In Nietzsche's
trans-valuation of humanism, Christianity is:
(a) Nietzsche's attempt to reintroduce values into his theory of the will to power.
(b) an afterlife project that Nietzsche endorses as promoting the overman.
(c) the means by which noble aims filter down from masters to slaves.
(d) that which frustrates the prospects of human advancement.

123. Nietzsche claims that "because life is precisely Will to Power," the attempt to bend all
wills to a common good, avoiding violence and exploitation in order to achieve peace in society,
is:
(a) "the fundamental principle of society" and the necessary means for the development of all
life.
(b) the goal of the noble class.
 (c) "the Will to the denial of life," which itself invites dissolution and decay.
(d) the dark night of barbarism in which "all who are born after us belong to a higher history
than any history hitherto."

124. Nietzsche's critique of "slave morality" includes an attack on the belief in the existence of
God, because as long as God exists:
(a) human beings will continue to experience guilt for their failing to live up to God's call for
them to improve themselves in accord with His law.
(b) there will always be the possibility that God could aid the individuals of the slave or herd
mentality against the noble individual (the overman).
(c) human beings will always have someone to fall back on and blame for their failings, rather
than take responsibility for their destiny.
(d) there is always the possibility that God may bring peace to the world and thus destroy the
need for the overman.

125. Ethical judgments are usually distinguished from judgments of personal preference, taste,
or prejudice by means of showing that ethical judgments:
(a) can be explained in terms of the particular customs or practices of a group or culture.
(b) are intended primarily to rationalize already accepted practices in a society.
(c) serve only as ideals and cannot be the bases upon which people live daily.
(d) need to be supported by reasons that should be universally intelligible or acceptable.

126. Because absolutists argue that the quality or value of something is independent of being
designated or recognized as such, they treat ethical judgments:
(a) as relative to one's own conscience or set of values.
(b) as true or false depending on one's society or on how one is raised.
(c) as inaccessible to the human mind, ultimately unknowable and practically meaningless.
(d) as facts about the world which are true or false regardless of human judgments.

127. Which of the following characterizations is FALSE?

(a) It is possible for a subjectivist to be a relativist.
(b) It is possible for a relativist to be an objectivist.
(c) It is possible for an absolutist to be a subjectivist.
(d) It is possible for an objectivist to be an absolutist.

128. Critics claim that subjective relativism is practically unacceptable and theoretically
contradictory. It is practically unacceptable in that no society could survive unless its members
shared the values needed to maintain the society. Subjective relativism is theoretically
contradictory insofar as it:
(a) assumes that individuals choose their own values and are responsible for their choice of
values.
(b) claims that moral judgments express only how someone feels about an action.
(c) assumes a universal value (viz., freedom to decide one's values) should be respected by
others.
(d) argues that the reasons it gives for acting morally are metaethical, not normative.

129. According to the cultural relativist Ruth Benedict, "The very eyes with which we see a
problem are conditioned by the long traditional habits of our own society." Because of this, she
concludes:
(a) without some perspective upon which to base claims, no observer can justifiably criticize
another culture.
(b) claims about cultural differences are as judgmental as they are descriptive.
(c) all cultural differences can be reduced to basic differences in human nature.
(d) organized behavior within a particular society prevents its own members from seeing when
they have problems.

130. According to the cultural relativist, the attempt to evaluate the moral beliefs of one's own
culture is bound to fail because:
(a) obviously some cultures have better systems of moral beliefs than others.
(b) values are not determined by one's culture as much as they are by the individual's personal
beliefs and prejudices.
(c) even within a particular culture's belief system, no actions are really ever identified as good
or bad.
(d) in order to make such an evaluation, one has to use the very values which are themselves
being judged.

131. Suppose that human well-being is the correct standard for evaluating ethical theories and
judgments. Would this mean that we have to reject the cultural relativist's claim that each
culture has a right to decide its own values?
(a) No: no culture can impose its values on any other culture, even if those values promote
human well-being.
(b) No: all cultures are different in what they value (indeed, that is what makes them different
in the first place); so the destruction of cultural differences would mean the end of cultures.
(c) Yes: but each culture would have to decide whether "promoting well-being" for its
members is really what it wants.
(d) Yes: any culture that would not satisfy basic material and social needs of all of its members
would not be as good as it should be.

132. "We do not any longer make the mistake of deriving the morality of our own locality and
decade directly from the inevitable constitution of human nature. We do not elevate it to the
dignity of a first principle. We recognize that morality differs in every society, and is a
convenient term for socially approved habits.'' This passage summarizes:
(a) the utilitarianism of Bentham. (b) the ethical relativism of Ruth Benedict.
(c) the conservatism of Oakeshott. (d) the atomism of Lucretius.

133. "Even if people have similar needs, sentiments, emotions, and attitudes, there is still the
question of whether these should or should not be satisfied or accepted as legitimate." How is
such a claim intended as a criticism of personal or cultural relativism?
(a) The fact that people agree in their moral beliefs does not make the beliefs justified or
correct.
(b) Since people in different cultures hold different beliefs, they try to satisfy their needs
differently.
(c) Even if people agree on what they believe, it is difficult (if not impossible) to get them to
live according to what they believe.
(d) Only those beliefs which have universal support should be accepted as true.

134. According to the cultural or subjective relativist, the fact that moral values vary from
culture to culture or from individual to individual implies that no absolute or objective moral
standards should be applied to all people in all times or cultures. The problem with this line of
argument is that:
 (a) it ignores the fact that not all cultures and individuals respect and tolerate the rights and
values of others.
(b) it assumes that no set of moral values can be the basis for behavior unless its absolute
principles are fixed and cannot be changed or modified.
(c) it commits the naturalistic fallacy by reasoning from the fact that values differ to the claim
that people are morally justified in acting on their cultural or individual beliefs.
(d) it endorses the logical positivist claim that moral statements are neither analytic (true by
definition) nor synthetic (true by empirical observation).

135. Relativists think that if we recognize how moral values differ from individual to individual
or culture to culture, we will see that there is no neutral, objective, or universal moral standard.
From this they conclude that we should tolerate the value systems of others. But this
conclusion seems to contradict their fundamental belief because it:
(a) suggests that tolerating different viewpoints has value only for relativists, not objectivists.
(b) assumes that all persons universally ought to value toleration, even those who do not
actually do so.
(c) fails to indicate how toleration can be a value only for consequentialists, not deontologists.
(d) treats toleration as a value that no one ought to adopt, even though most individuals and
cultures in fact do.

136. Critics of ethical relativism (e.g., Rachels) often note that cultures seldom differ on certain
basic values: only their belief systems differ. In other words:
(a) each culture determines the basic values necessary for the culture's existence.
(b) no culture can exist very long unless it establishes practices that distinguish it from others.
(c) prejudices within our own society often determine our moral views.
(d) cultures differ in how more or less universal values are implemented in practices.

137. In his critique of ethical relativism, Rachels concludes that we cannot say that merely
because customs differ among societies that values differ as well. Instead, he argues:
(a) because societies differ in their factual beliefs and needs, they differ in how they have to
implement more or less universal values.
(b) because the values of developed, intelligent nations are superior to those of
underdeveloped nations, these higher values should be used as the standards.
(c) the sheer fact that there are no universal moral values explains why societies differ in their
social beliefs, needs, and attitudes.
(d) moral progress is possible only on the assumption that we acknowledge that there are
really no universal values necessary for social existence.

138. ``My thesis about traditional ethics is this: (1) The focus and direction of traditional ethics,
indeed its function, has not been individual integrity and agency (ability to make choices and
act) but rather social organization and control. (2) The values around which traditional ethics
revolves are antagonistic, the values of dominance and subordination. As a result, (3) traditional
ethics undermines rather than promotes individual moral ability and agency. And (4) these
aspects of traditional ethics combine to legitimize oppression by redefining it as social
organization. Appeal to rules and principles is at the heart of this endeavor.'' In this passage:
(a) Sarah Hoagland shows how male-dominated ethics emphasizes competing interests,
sacrifice and compromise, and duty instead of caring.
(b) Mussolini points out how fascist political systems value traditions more highly when those
traditions focus on domination and oppression.
 (c) Kant portrays ethical values as products of the antagonism between those who emphasize
motives and those who emphasize consequences.
(d) Ayn Rand expresses disappointment in ethical systems that value the rights of the
individual over the rights of the State.

139. According to Carol Gilligan, feminine ways of thinking about moral decisions are based on
an "ethics of care" rather than on (male) impersonal, abstract principles. That is, women think
of ethical situations:
(a) as opportunities to deny that there is any right or wrong way to act and to show how the
very act of making ethical distinctions is itself a form of male domination.
(b) not as questions with true or false answers, but as conflicts in need of resolution in order to
maintain stable interpersonal relationships.
(c) as opportunities to replace so-called universal abstract principles of ethical judgment with
more specific abstract principles (e.g., principles that apply only to one's culture).
(d) not as gender (masculine-feminine) conflicts, but as problems that can be solved by
calculating the foreseen consequences for those affected by actions.

140. According to the (feminine) ethics of care, emotional involvement and sensitivity to the
differing needs of other people in different situations are necessary elements in
making objective moral judgments because:
(a) morality is based on nothing more than how each individual feels about things.
(b) sensitivity and caring are subjective expressions of rational, objective, unemotional ways of
thinking.
(c) particular needs and situations seem to differ, but they are similar enough for general moral
judgments.
(d) without sympathetic, emotional involvement, we cannot understand exactly what action
occurs or why it is done.

141. Critics of feminist ethics point out that, while an ethics of care might sound nice, it is less
useful than an ethics of justice for addressing problems generated in modern Western societies.
To this criticism, feminists reply that:
(a) without being able to rely on traditional ethical theories (e.g., utilitarianism, Kantian duty
ethics), we would not know how to make moral decisions.
(b) social practices should focus on cultivating relations with others rather than encouraging
competition and self-interested individualism.
(c) marketplace competition and rational self-interested behavior are matters of economic and
political concern and are thus not issues that are of ethical significance.
(d) being responsible for or caring for others in our society is best accomplished by
encouraging competition and self-interested individualism.

Answers:

1. A 21. A 41. B 61. B 81. B 101. D 121. D

2. B 22. A 42. B 62. B 82. D 102. A 122. D
3. B 23. A 43. A 63. A 83. A 103. C 123. C
4. B 24. B 44. A 64. A 84. B 104. B 124. C
5. B 25. B 45. B 65. B 85. C 105. C 125. D
 126. D
6. A 26. B 46. A 66. B 86. C 106. D
127. C
7. B 27. A 47. B 67. B 87. D 107. B
128. C
8. A 28. A 48. B 68. A 88. A 108. A
129. B
9. A 29. A 49. A 69. A 89. C 109. D
130. D
10. A 30. B 50. B 70. A 90. A 110. C
131. D
11. B 31. A 51. B 71. A 91. A 111. D
132. B
12. A 32. A 52. A 72. B 92. C 112. C
133. A
13. A 33. A 53. A 73. B 93. A 113. A
134. C
14. B 34. B 54. A 74. B 94. A 114. C
135. B
15. A 35. B 55. A 75. A 95. A 115. A
136. D
16. B 36. A 56. A 76. C 96. B 116. A
137. A
17. A 37. B 57. A 77. B 97. B 117. D
138. A
18. A 38. B 58. A 78. D 98. C 118. C
139. D
19. B 39. B 59. A 79. C 99. B 119. D
140. D
20. B 40. B 60. B 80. C 100. B 120. A
141. B