Zeng Zhang 2021 From Asia Pacific To Indo Pacific The Adjustment of American Asia Pacific Strategy From The Perspective

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East Asian Affairs

Vol. 1, No. 2 (2021) 2150009 (41 pages)
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From “Asia Pacific” to “Indo Pacific”:

The Adjustment of American Asia Pacific
Strategy from the Perspective of Critical
Geopolitics*
East Asian Affairs 2021.01. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com
Zeng Xianghong
Institute for Central Asian Studies
School of Politics and International Relations
Lanzhou University
No. 222 South Tianshui Road, Lanzhou 730000
Gansu Province, P. R. China
Zhang Shaowen
School of Politics and International Relations
Lanzhou University
No. 222 South Tianshui Road, Lanzhou 730000
Gansu Province, P. R. China
Published 10 December 2021
Abstract
After taking office, the Trump administration has shifted the U.S. strategy in
the Asia Pacific region from “Asia Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific”. This paper
attempts to start with critical geopolitics, compare the “Asia Pacific” strategy
of the United States with the “Indo-Pacific” strategy, and investigate the
changes and dynamics of the geopolitical imagination of the United States in
the Asia-Pacific region. Through the investigation, it can be found that the
strategic transformation from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” reflects the
transformation of the U.S. strategy towards China from “L-shaped defense” to
“half-mouth encirclement”, as well as the Trump government’s attempt to
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for non-commercial purposes.
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East Asian Affairs Vol. 1, No. 2
rebuild the U.S. hegemony in various fields through all-round competition,

reshape its identity and confidence as a great power by changing its self-
identity and consolidating and expanding the alliance of Western style liberal
democratic countries by looking for strategic fulcrum to reconstruct the
strategic demands of the key geopolitical space. After Biden’s administration

took office, it has inherited and strengthened the Trump administration’s
“Indo-Pacific” strategy, which means that the strategic game between the
United States and China in the “Indo-Pacific” region and even the global stage
will continue for a long time. In order to safeguard China’s national interests
and effectively respond to the “Indo-Pacific” strategy, China should enhance
its influence and maintain the mentality as a great power, adopt social creation
strategies to seek identity and recognition, and make plans based on the “Belt
and Road Initiative”, “Polar Silk Road”, “Belt and Road Initiative” and other
initiatives; if pushed forward smoothly, it will effectively crack down on the

U.S.’s attempt to contain China through the “Indo-Pacific” strategy.
Keywords
Asia-Pacific strategy of America; “Indo-Pacific” strategy; critical geopolitics;
L-shaped defense; half-mouth encirclement.
1. Introduction
Throughout history, the United States has repeatedly adjusted its Asia Pacific
strategy, which has been changed particularly frequently since the 21st century.
The Obama administration has adjusted its strategic statement for the Asia Pacific
region three times and successively put forward the strategies of “returning to
Asia”, “turning to Asia” and “Asia Pacific rebalance”. Since Trump was sworn in
as the President, he has comprehensively adjusted the internal and external policies
of his predecessor’s and rearranged the strategic focus of national interests, with
hopes to “make America great again” under his leadership. As far as the Asia
Pacific strategy is concerned, the Trump administration has created a broader “Indo
Pacific” strategy to cover and abandon Obama’s Asia Pacific strategy. In December
2017, the first national security strategy report of the Trump administration put
forward the “Indo Pacific” strategy officially for the first time. Once the strategy
was put forward, senior government officials such as the then U.S. Vice President,
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense frequently mentioned “Indo Pacific” in
diplomatic conferences and speeches on Asia Pacific Affairs, with further expla-
nation and expansion of it. At the same time, in the official discourse system of the
United States, the traditional concept of “Asia Pacific” was replaced by “Indo
Pacific”. Since then, the U.S. government has taken a series of diplomatic and
defense measures to continuously strengthen the international community’s
acceptance and understanding of its concept of “Indo Pacific” strategy.
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The Adjustment of American Asia Pacific Strategy from the Perspective of Critical Geopolitics
At present, some scholars use the perspective of critical geopolitics in their

research results. For example, in his article The Construction of Indo Pacific
Strategy and the Tension of Asian Geopolitics, Lin Minwang, with focuses on the
concept of “Indo Pacific” and regional construction, as well as its strategic and
security implications, puts forward that China should take the initiative in partic-
ipating in and shaping the pattern of “Indo Pacific”. In his article Island Chain,
Space Control and Hegemony — the United States’ Geopolitical Imagination of
the Western Pacific Region, Ge Hanwen, through in-depth analysis of the origin,
development and current performance of the United States’ geopolitical imagina-
tion of the Western Pacific region since the end of World War II, summarizes the
relationship between space control and hegemony, namely, according to its spatial
imagination of the Western Pacific region; United States consolidates its hege-
monic position in the Western Pacific region, based on the control of sea areas and
island chains (Lin, 2018; Ge, 2020; Pan, 2014). This paper has drawn important
inspiration from the above two existing documents though they failed in com-
prehensively sorting out the geopolitical imagination and strategic demands of the
Trump administration’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy.
This paper will discuss from the following four aspects. First, it introduces the
theoretical connotation and core concepts of critical geopolitics and examines its
applicability in interpreting the changes of American Asia-Pacific strategy. Second, it
examines the geopolitical imagination behind the “Asia Pacific” and ‘Indo-Pacific”
strategies of the United States, so as to reveal the deep motivation behind the ad-
justment of its diplomatic strategy. Based on this, this paper proposes that the change
of the concept from “Asia Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” reflects the efforts of America in
the transformation of the “L-shaped defense” to “half-mouth encirclement” towards
China. Third, it elaborates the demands of the “Indo Pacific” strategy from three
aspects: transforming the international order and consolidating American hegemony,
repositioning the role of the United States in international and regional affairs, and re-
planning important geopolitical space for the priority of American interests. Finally, it
puts forward possible countermeasures on how to resolve the constraints posed by the
American “Indo-Pacific” strategy on China’s development.
2. Critical Geopolitics to Interpret the Applicability of American Asia

Pacific Strategic Adjustment
The critical geopolitics emerged and developed at the call of a specific era and
theoretical needs. Since the 1980s, great changes have taken place in the global
geopolitical reality. The rapid development of globalization, informatization and
science and technology is changing or has changed the traditional research scope
and content of geopolitics, fundamentally reshaped the political, economic and
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social boundaries, and gave birth to various actors and complex ideas about the
world. At the same time, it has changed the communication mode and nature of
various actors. It is increasingly recognized that the traditional geopolitical theory
has failed to guide people close to the real national strategy and the essence of the
interaction between great powers. In this case, a new perspective urgently needs to be
opened in geopolitics, with new thinking integrated, to deal with the ever going or
ever changed world politics for the explanation of new phenomena and problems.
2.1. Core concepts of critical geopolitics

Critical geopolitics generally has the following three aspects (Tuathail and
Dalby, 1998a; Xu, 2006; Ge, 2010). First, critical geopolitics explores how human
beings understand and imagine the geographical environment so as to shape the
concept of geopolitics and carry out political practice. Critical theorists emphasize
that geopolitical research should not only explore the promotion or restriction of
geographical factors such as resource endowment and geographical location on
national behavior but also pay attention to the important influence of people’s
subjective factors (such as national composition, value orientation, ethical judg-
ment, cultural differences, and political identity) in geopolitical thought and
practice (Tuathail and Dalby, 1998b). Furthermore, critical geopolitical scholars
believe that geographical knowledge is usually entangled with the power controlled
by political and intellectual elites and finally develops into a “power-knowledge
complex”. Therefore, the conclusions of the research of the traditional geopolitics
are not based on completely objective, scientific, and real geographical factors.
Richard K. Ashley once pointed out that geopolitics was an ideological process of
building spatial, political and cultural boundaries to separate self-regions from
other regions of threats (Ashley, 1987). By studying its research purport, it criti-
cizes geopoliticians’ attempt to deconstruct the policy practice of diplomatic elites,
so as to investigate how they “spatialize” international politics on the basis of
describing, measuring and evaluating specific geographical environment, and strive
to reveal the value orientation and ideological motivation behind this process.
Second, critical geopolitics pays special attention to the conceptual boundaries
of geographical regions and group generic identity. Different from traditional
geopolitics, critical geopolitics shows little interest in traditional issues such as
spatial confrontation, hegemonic support and zero-sum game of sovereign states
but focuses on the concept formation process of dividing geographical boundaries
and constructing group generic identity. First, critical geopolitics is fairly interested
in the process of the formation of the concept of dividing “here or there” and
“internal or external” boundaries (Walker, 1993).1 The “boundary” here does not
1 Quoted from G. O. Tuathail and S. Dalby, Rethinking Geopolitics, p. 4.
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refer to the real geographical boundary, but the conceptual boundary generated by
various practices or imagination, such as the “Greater Eurasia” of Russia, the
“Greater Middle East” of the United States, and the regional boundaries referred to
as “Asia Pacific” and “Indo Pacific”. Second, critical geopolitics is interested in
shaping group generic identities such as “self or others” and “friends or enemies”.
The group generic identity here does not refer to the conclusive group identity but a
“hypothetical product” with great subjective initiative and constructiveness, such
as the Western Camp and the Eastern Camp during the Cold War, contemporary
Western liberal democratic countries and revisionist countries. Strictly speaking,
the above regional boundaries and group generic identities generated through
imagination or practical activities are not only conceptual and imaginary but also
material and practical. Their determinations and changes can be attributed to the
evolution of social consciousness and its practice. So, regional boundaries and
group generic identities are not stable entities assumed by traditional geopolitics
but are temporary and changing.
Third, critical geopolitics does not exclude diverse geopolitical views but
advocates understanding geopolitics as a broad social and cultural phenomenon
(Tuathail and Dalby, 1998b). Critical geopolitics holds that to understand the role
of ideas and values in national diplomatic practice; it is necessary to investigate the
social and cultural backgrounds of the emergence and development of geopolitical
concepts, reveal the implied value propositions and ideological tendencies behind
them, and restore the original complex situation of history. It is worth noting that
critical geopolitical scholars face up to the differences, opposites and their sig-
nificance in ideas, systems and ideologies among countries or regions and regard
them the same as the strategic significance of economic, scientific, technological
and military competition. In addition, critical geopolitics attaches particular im-
portance to irrational factors. Since the end of World War II, sovereign states in the
international community are generally not in danger of collapse but are often
driven by emotional factors such as anxiety, unsettledness and even anger in their
pursuit of international status, recognition as great powers and economic and
security interests. Critical geopolitics tries to capture these phenomena and
explores and excavates in the fields of ontological security, fear, trust and so on. To
sum up, compared with traditional geopolitics, critical geopolitics is more com-
prehensive and three dimensional in observing problems.
To solve the conflicts between national identities, world power structure and
geopolitical constraints, critical geopolitics researchers put forward the concepts
of geopolitical imagination and geopolitical codes (Dijkink, 1996).2 According to
2 For the discussion on the concept of geopolitical codes, refer to Gertjan Dijkink, National Identity and Geo-
political Vision: Maps of Price and Pain, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 12.
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John Agnew, geopolitical imagination generally means that a specific political unit
understands its own, regional and global cognitive picture and plans world space,
constructs geostrategy and carries out geostrategic practice accordingly
(Agnew, 2003). Furthermore, geopolitical imagination is a series of “strategic
assumptions” made by the government to other countries (or important geopolitical

space) when formulating foreign policy. It refers to a set of social representations
based on national political identity, including a country’s overall views on its
natural allies and enemies, the nature of external threats, major international pro-
blems and the methods to solve these problems (Starr, 1992).3 In this sense, as a
discourse with practical political utility in constructing and demonstrating diplo-
matic strategy, geopolitical imagination is “a way for specific countries to locate
themselves” and a special way for specific countries in their descriptions and
reflections of the world.
2.2. The applicability of critical geopolitics in analyzing the Changes

of American Asia Pacific strategy
The “Indo Pacific” strategy is a strategic statement put forward by the Trump
government under the new domestic and international background, which contains
the Trump government’s new geopolitical imagination of the vast region of Indian
and Pacific Oceans. The Trump administration claims that the United States counts
on the Asia Pacific region for its future stability, security and prosperity. Today, the
Asia Pacific region faces multiple security challenges and impacts. As can be seen
from several government documents during Trump’s term of office, China is
considered to be a geopolitical opponent that poses the most severe challenges to
the strategic interests of the United States. Trump’s first National Security Strategy
Report during his term of office pointed out that China is a “revisionist country” in
the international system and a “subverter” of the current international political and
economic order. The report even asserted that the era of great power competition
has come and the United States must take China as a “strategic competitor”.4 Since
then, the Trump administration has made it clear that the “Indo Pacific” region has
replaced the “Asia Pacific” as the primary concern of the U.S. security strategy, and
its importance even exceeds that of Europe and the Middle East. In June 2019, the
Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Net-
worked Region (hereinafter referred to as the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report) pub-
lished by the U.S. Department of Defense pointed out that United States is losing
its relative military advantage, and the imbalance of regional power will encourage
3 Quoted from Aylin Güney and Fulya Gökcan, “The ‘Greater Middle East’ as a ‘Modern’ Geopolitical Imagi-
nation in American Foreign Policy”, Geopolitics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2010, pp. 23–24.
4 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, U.S., December 2017, http://
nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017.pdf, pp. 25–46.
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competitors to challenge or subvert the prosperity and stability of the “Indo Pa-
cific” order. Therefore, The United States must increase cooperation with allies and
partner countries to rebuild its military advantage by optimizing military deploy-
ment and developing new operational concepts.5 As a document connecting the
past and the future, the report put forward guiding and programmatic opinions on
the military layout and strategic planning of the United States in the Asia-Pacific
region, marking the outline of the “Indo-Pacific” strategy planned for three years.
Once formally put forward by the Trump administration, the concept and its
derived strategic framework and security connotation of “Indo-Pacific” have
attracted the attention and research of China’s strategic and academic circles at
home and abroad. The foreign scholars tend to believe that the United States
launched the strategy of “Indo-Pacific” to relieve the enormous pressure brought
by China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the expansions towards southwest
Pacific and Indian Oceans or to take it as a diplomatic strategy to defend the
leading position and economic security and interests of the United States
(Tan, 2020; Jung, Lee and Lee, 2021). The interpretations of the “Indo Pacific”
strategy by the domestic scholars mostly focus on the political motivation, internal
logic, possible consequences and potential impact of the “Indo Pacific” strategy
issued by the United States with China’s countermeasures and put forward
(Qiu, 2019; Ding, 2019; Yang and Liu, 2019). The interpretations of the “Indo-
Pacific” strategy from the traditional geopolitical perspective also contain corre-
sponding geopolitical imagination. The prominent feature of this understanding
and interpretation is that the strategy regards China as the main strategic goal, takes
maritime security cooperation as the strategic focus, takes building the “Indo-
Pacific” maritime alliance as the strategic means, and gradually transforms to a
network in the framework structure. The above views still regard the “Indo-Pacific”
strategy as one of the means for the strategic game between the United States and
China, but with less complete and systematical investigation, the geopolitical
imagination contained in the adjustment of the U.S. Asia Pacific strategy.
From the perspective of critical geopolitics, the “Indo-Pacific” strategy of the
United States was carried out upon a deeper geopolitical strategic consideration.
Against the backdrop of the gradual eastward shift of the world power center, how
to prevent the further decline of American hegemony and reconstruct the inter-
national order “with the U.S. as the dominator”, how to reshape the identity of the
United States in international and regional affairs, and how to give priority to its
own interests in the process of re-planning the important geopolitical space in the
5 Indo-PacificStrategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, U.S. Department
of Defense, June 1, 2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/Department-of-Defense-
Indo-Pacific-Strategy-Report-2019.pdf, pp. 1–54.
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world turned out to be the deep motivation for the “Indo Pacific” strategy of the
United States. In view of the extraordinary strategic significance of the Asia Pacific
region for China to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, great
importance must be attached to the “Indo-Pacific” strategy in our own interpre-
tation and opinions on the regional planning and connotation of the “Indo-Pacific”
strategy so as to grasp the essence and development trend of the U.S. Asia Pacific
strategy as much as possible from multiple angles. In fact, to form a diversified
understanding of the strategic significance and security connotation of “Indo
Pacific”, we may also start from the complex power knowledge interaction
mechanism contained in “Indo Pacific” as a concept or discourse, which is the
advantage of the research perspective of critical geopolitics. In view of this, this
paper will preliminarily investigate the geopolitical imagination, strategic practice
and the driving force of the transformation of America’s Asia Pacific strategy.
3. From “L-shaped Defense” to “Half-mouth Encirclement”: The Change

of America’s Geopolitical Imagination about the Asia Pacific Region
In terms of geographical concept, “Asia-Pacific” is not a region to be easily
defined. In fact, Asia-Pacific is not only a geographical concept but also a unique
political system with history and culture and diverse civilizations. In view of the
vigorous development trend of Asia-Pacific countries in recent years, many
scholars predict that “the 21st century will be the century of Asia”.6 Regardless of
whether this statement is correct or not, it is certain that Asia-Pacific countries are
undergoing historic changes under the global gaze. In response to the changes in
the international power pattern and the rise of emerging countries, the United
States has adjusted its strategy for the Asia-Pacific region. To make the “Asia-
Pacific” strategy and “Indo-Pacific” strategy more vivid and intuitive, based on the
geopolitical imagination of the United States on the Asia-Pacific region in
different periods, this paper defines them as “L-shaped defense” and “half-mouth
encirclement” against China, respectively.
3.1. Geopolitical imagination of American “Asia-Pacific” strategy

and its practice: L-shaped defense
The geopolitical imagination of the Asia-Pacific region of the Obama adminis-
tration is reflected in the following three aspects. First, world power is more diverse
and decentralized. The Obama administration believes that “the distribution of
6 John Naisbitt, an American scholar, and Pierre grosser, a professor of the history of international relations at Paris
Institute of Political Studies, put forward the view that “the 21st century is the Asian century” on different
occasions.
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power is changing, a multi-node (multipolar) world is gradually taking shape, and

some global and regional powers are showing nationalist tendencies, trying to use
conflicts to test the leadership of the United States and the tolerance of our partners
to deal with difficulties”,7 among which, the uprising of China is the most no-
ticeable. American cognition of China’s rise has experienced a process from

welcome to worry. At first, the United States regarded China as a partner in dealing
with global issues such as terrorism, maintaining economic stability, climate
change and nuclear non-proliferation and expressed hope to establish a positive,
constructive and comprehensive relationship with China. As China’s total economy
continues to rise in proportion to the global economy and its military capabilities
continue to grow, the United States is increasingly worried about China’s strategic
intentions and actions. In the second National Security Strategy Report during his
term of office, the Obama administration directly upgraded the security threat
warning, warned China for its “trying to solve the territorial problem by force”, and
asked China to “abide by international rules”8 in safeguarding maritime rights and
interests and human rights protection. In 2015, the United States successively
issued two reports, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower and the
Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, with focusing on China’s policies in the
maritime field, accusing China’s sea and air behavior of being “an important factor
leading to regional tension and instability”.9
Second, the existing international and regional mechanisms cannot protect the
interests of the United States. During his tenure, Obama insisted that taking the
controls is the key for the United States to maintain its leadership in the Asia-
Pacific and the world, as well as an important embodiment of the United States
using “smart power” to employ new diplomatic ideas (Wu, 2013). With the rise of
China and the fruitful cooperation in East Asia, the order in the Asia-Pacific region
and even the world has undergone changes to varying degrees. However, the
Obama administration found that the changed international norms, systems and
rules not only failed to promote the national interests of the United States but also
weakened the structural power of the United States. Specifically, in the Asia-
Pacific region, the United States realized that the changes in the pattern of East
Asia are promoting the transformation of the order in the Asia-Pacific region from
external force to endogenous force, and the United States was no longer the only
7 The National Military Strategy of the United Strategy of America 2011: Redefining America’s Military Lead-
ership, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington DC, February 8, 2011, p. 2.
8 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, U.S., February 2015, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015 national security strategy.pdf, pp. 10–28.

9 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, March
2015, pp. 3–4; The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a
Changing Environment, U.S. Department of Defense, August 2015, pp. 5–17.
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power source and leader of the order in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States
deeply feels that it is more difficult to deal with threats and uncertainties in advance
with normative and institutional power and to achieve strategic goals. Therefore, it
is urgent for the United States to shape and participate in its own favorable Asia-
Pacific mechanism so as to maintain and enhance its leadership in the international

order.
Finally, the United States lacks participation and leadership in Asia-Pacific
Affairs. Because the Asia-Pacific region is located at the overlap of “heart zone”
(Mackinder, 2010) and “edge zone” (Spykman, 2016), with a huge population and
rich resource reserves, the United States emphasizes the importance of the strategic
position of the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of land power and sea
power. However, in recent years, a series of new political, economic and security
ecosystems have emerged in the Asia-Pacific region, and the influence of emerging
countries is rising in the Asia Pacific region, such as China and India improving
their overall strength, especially their material power, Japan pursuing the status of a
political power, and South Korea gradually expanding its influence to Asia and
even the world as a medium power, and multilateral mechanisms such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continue to promote integration,
which the United States believes poses a challenge to its world hegemony and
regional power.
In addition to showing its concern about the pattern of international power and
the eastward movement of the political and economic center, its dissatisfaction
with the international system and international order, and its concern about the
impact of emerging powers in the Asia-Pacific region and East Asian cooperation
on the regional dominance of the United States, the Obama administration’s Asia-
Pacific strategy also constructs a unique imagination in the form of discourse to
understand the Asia-Pacific political space. This imagination was reflected in the
important report issued during the Obama administration. In other words, the
strategic document formulated or issued by the U.S. government makes the Asia-
Pacific region so “spatialized” as a region connects the East China Sea, the South
China Sea, Eastern Asia, the southwest Pacific and Oceania. It generally starts
from Aleutian Islands and ends at New Zealand. The countries/regions and sea
areas covered include Russia, China, the East China Sea, countries in Northeast
Asia, the South China Sea, countries in Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific,
Oceania and the United States.10 In this way, a pattern similar to the English letter
“L” appears in front of us, which has become a spatial imagination representing the
Obama administration’s construction of the Asia Pacific region and its mode for the
10 Readerswho are interested in understanding the specific Asia-Pacific strategic deployment of the United States
can contact the author to obtain it.
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connection. The Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific strategy is in line with not

only the “L-shaped defense” in space imagination but also its military bases in the
Asia-Pacific region which generally show an “L-shaped pattern”, which is an
island chain defense map.
Based on the above geopolitical imagination, the Obama administration transfer

its strategic forces to the Asia Pacific region upon the opportunity of dealing with
terrorism to hoping to achieve its strategic goals of shaping an international
mechanism and regional order in line with its interests, balancing the rise of
China’s power and influence, and revitalizing the U.S. leadership in the world. The
Obama administration starts from the following four aspects: First, deepen the
alliance relationship and expand the network of partner countries. While consoli-
dating its original alliance, the United States has increased contacts and commu-
nications with other countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania and expanded
security cooperation and military exchanges with them.11 The Obama adminis-
tration encourages its alliances and partners to form small multilateral organiza-
tions to strengthen cooperation in the fields of information and defense and to
establish regional structures and promote multilateral cooperation in response to
emerging countries (Pan, 2013). Second, promote a “fair and lasting” international
order and reshape the institutions and norms of the Asia-Pacific region. During
Obama’s administration, the United States strongly supported the “modernization”
of relevant international institutions and cooperation frameworks to enhance their
authority and legitimacy, especially requiring countries to abide by and practice
international rules. On this basis, the Obama administration manipulated the cor-
responding international institutions or regional systems, encouraged and affirmed
the responsible actions of the United States, and took punitive measures ranging
from sanctions to isolation against countries that it believed refused to bear re-
sponsibility. Third, take cooperative and competitive measures against China. On
the one hand, the United States maintains relations and seeks cooperation with
China, for example, it carries out practical cooperation with China on issues such
as the global economy, climate, environment and terrorist threat. On the other
hand, the United States joins hands with other nations to fight for the balances
against China, such as discrediting and distorting China’s image on the Diaoyu
Islands and the South China Sea upon its advantages of discourse and provoking
neighboring countries to be on guard and fear against China. In addition, Obama
administration took an indirect opposition and a tactful refusal against Asian In-
frastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Belt and Road Initiative. Fourth, weaken
the cohesion among Southeast Asian countries and restrict the process of ASEAN
11 National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America’s Military Leadership, U.S.
Department of Defense, 2011, p. 2.
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integration. In addition to developing bilateral relations with Southeast Asian

countries, the United States has also actively established institutional contacts with
ASEAN and other multilateral forums and organizations to shape the direction of
regional affairs and influence the regional agenda.
On the whole, the confrontational nature of “L-shaped defense” is not very

prominent. In terms of strategic objectives, the Obama administration will give
priority to promoting the economic and security interests of the United States,
establishing rules and order in the Asia Pacific region, and consolidating and
expanding the existing multilateral ties of the United States in Asia. At this time,
the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy covers many aspects such as economy, diplomacy
and military but with its focus in the economic field. In terms of strategic means,
the Obama administration relies on regional structures such as Asia Pacific Eco-
nomic Cooperation (APEC) and the trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP),
making it the focus of Asia Pacific strategy. The Obama administration is com-
mitted to making the TPP the most important regional economic policy tool and
promoting it to its allies and partners so as to leverage economic cooperation across
the Pacific. As far as the attitude towards China is concerned, the Obama
administration’s Asia Pacific strategy attempts to deal with China’s rise by
establishing a strong regional order structure including China. Kurt Campbell, then
assistant Secretary of State of the United States, concluded that the Obama
administration’s strategy of “returning to Asia” means to strengthen ties with Asia
rather than to rein China. He “refuses to take China as priority in Asian diplomacy”
but prefers to “embed China into a broader and more inclusive regional frame-
work” (Campbell, 2016). In the early days of Obama’s administration, the strategic
cooperation and coordination with China accounted for a large proportion; in the
later period of governance, the confrontational factors in China–U.S. relations
increased due to the gradual enhancement of China’s military presence in the
Southwest Pacific and the gradual rise of the voice of regional security. Overall,
the Obama administration’s China strategy can be summarized as contact and
prevention.
3.2. Geopolitical imagination of American “Asia Pacific” strategy

and its practice: Half-mouth encirclement
Compared with that of the Obama administration, the Trump administration’s
geopolitical imagination of the Asia-Pacific region has undergone significant
changes and adjustments. First, the Trump administration believes that the United
States is in an extremely severe international security environment full of com-
petition and threats. The manifestations are as follows: (i) the rule-based interna-
tional order is declining. The “revisionist countries” represented by China and
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Russia and the “rogue regimes” represented by Iran and North Korea “openly
challenge and destroy” international conventions, norms and rules.12 (ii) The
strategic competition between countries is becoming increasingly intense.
The Department of Defense of the U.S. believes that competition among big
powers has replaced counter terrorism as the focus of national security strategy.
(iii) The absolute superiority of the United States in the military field has been
challenged. The Trump administration believes that the United States faces fierce
competition in the sea, land, air, space and cyberspace. In addition, the conven-
tional forces that have long occupied an absolute dominant position in the United
States are facing a huge impact from the transformation and development of
emerging technologies (big data analysis, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and
new technologies from the business sectors). (iv) The national interests of the
United States are threatened in many ways. The Trump administration believes that
unequal economic and trade relations with other countries and unfair military
spending sharing with allies have increasingly weakened the economic develop-
ment of the United States. Terrorists and transnational criminal organizations re-
gard the American people as targets of attack. Many development trends of this
kind have weakened the American people’s trust in the government, their faith in
the future and their confidence in their own values.
Second, the U.S. is becoming increasingly negative in the cognition and posi-
tioning of China. The Trump administration’s first national security strategy report
pointed out that in the final analysis, the “Indo-Pacific” competition is the com-
petition of two order forms, namely freedom and oppression, which directly
positions China as a “strategic competitor”. The report believes that for the United
States, China is trying to erode the economic prosperity and national security of the
United States by weakening economic freedom and fairness, improving military
modernization, controlling the free flow of information and data, and competing
for governance in space and cyberspace. The report also said that China is de-
veloping advanced weapons, which may threaten the integrity and security of the
U.S. global command and control system and key infrastructure in the future.13
Based on the above cognition, the U.S. government holds mostly a negative view
on China’s foreign policy and behavior. The Trump administration’s general po-
sition towards China can be seen through the attitude towards Belt and Road
Initiative and Made in China 2025 of American conservative think tanks14 in terms
of their policy influence. Such as the ideas that after all, the Belt and Road
12 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American
Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, pp. 1–14.
13 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, U.S., 2017, p. 8.
14 Made in China 2025 Issued by the State Council, Chinese government website, May 19, 2015, http://www.gov.
cn/xinwen/2015-05/19/content 2864538.htm.
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Initiative is but a “disguised” economic initiative, which is, in the final analysis, an
important tool to “for China to realize its geopolitical ambitions”, according to a
report released by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS),15 and China
aimed at “rebuilding the regional economic and political order in India and the
Eurasian continent upon investments in new infrastructure and communications”

through its expansionary Belt and Road Initiative, said the conservative think tank,
Heritage Foundation,16 whose researcher, James Jay Carafano even claimed that
“China’s 5G and Belt and Road Initiative will bring tremendous risks to the na-
tional interests and national security of the United States”.17 Such views reflect that
the Trump administration holds more negative perception of China and more
pessimistic strategic judgment on China compared with Obama administration.
Finally, the Trump administration believes that the regions around the Indian
Ocean and the Pacific are increasingly becoming an organic whole that is closely
linked and has a great impact on changes in the international pattern. The Trump
administration believes that to maintain its status as a superpower, the United
States must give major strategic concern to the Indian Ocean region. Geographi-
cally, the main maritime economic and trade channels, including the Suez Canal,
the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca, are closely connected with the
Indian Ocean. In terms of economic and trade interests, about half of the world’s
trade volume crosses the Indian Ocean Pacific sea route, and the openness of the
sea route in the “Indo-Pacific” region is becoming increasingly important to
countries in the region and the world (Wong, 2018). In terms of primary energy, the
total consumption of countries in the region is equivalent to about 45% of the
global total,18 and most of them are transported by sea, from which it can be seen
that the “Indo-Pacific” region has a huge consumer market and strong marine
transportation capacity. From a strategic point of view, controlling the Indian
Ocean is convenient for the United States to implement its global strategy.
Strengthening the military frontier presence and power projection capability in the
“Indo-Pacific” region is the key to the success of the U.S. strategy (Auslin, 2010).
Upon recognizing China as the biggest competitor facing the United States, in
order to effectively expand its influence in the “Indo-Pacific” region, win over
India and increase its military presence in the Indian Ocean has become a logical
strategic choice for the United States.
15 Grading China’s Belt and Road, Center for a New American Security, April l8, 2019, https://www.cnas.org/
publications/reports/beltandroad.
16 China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Implications and International Opposition, The Heritage Founda-
tion, August 9, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/BG3331 2.pdf.

17 James Jay Carafano, America Must Counter China’s Great Power Threat with Military Strength, https://www.
heritage.org/asia/commentary/america-mustcounter-chinas-great-power-threat-military-strength.
18 According to relevant data of BP, see Statistical Review of World Energy 2020, BP, P. 8
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In addition to geopolitical imagination based on concerns about the develop-

ment of the international situation, anxiety over China’s growing influence and
attention to the Indian Ocean region, the “Indo-Pacific” strategy also constructs a
unique imagination of the Trump government’s perception of the “Indo-Pacific”
region in the form of discourse. This imagination has been clearly reflected in the
Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. According to the report, the “Indo-Pacific” strategy
runs through the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, Asia, Oceania and North
America, covering countries/regions and sea areas, including Russia, China, the
East China Sea, Northeast Asia, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, the Indian
Ocean, South Asia, Oceania and the United States. The United States has con-
nected the Pacific and Indian Oceans by establishing cooperative relations with
Southeast Asian countries and India. In this way, a kind of spatial imagination
featuring the “half-mouth” pattern has basically taken shape, which has become the
basic way to express the Trump government’s conception and planning of the
strategic space of the so-called “Indo-Pacific” region.
The “Indo-Pacific” strategy is not only in line with the “half-mouth encir-
clement” in space imagination but also in tone with the Trump administration’s
strategic outlook, security outlook and values. The encirclement is roughly com-
posed of Japan islands, Aleutian Islands, Alaska Peninsula, Hawaiian Islands,
American Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand, Maluku Islands (Indonesia),
Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory) and India. Compared with the
“L-shaped defense”, the “half-mouth encirclement” firmly encircles the “trouble
makers” in China, North Korea, Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Ob-
viously, the “Indo-Pacific” strategic vision can pay close attention to the situation
in the Middle East and reduce China’s space at sea by expanding the scope of U.S.
activities in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific and enhancing U.S. strategic
autonomy.
Based upon the above geopolitical imagination, the Trump government has tried
its best to pour diplomatic resources into the “Indo-Pacific” region, hoping to
maintain the global influence of the United States through getting the upper hand
in the competition among major powers. The Trump administration mainly starts
from the following four aspects. First, build security alliances and partnership
networks. So far, the United States has established a relatively solid contact
mechanism with the major coastal island countries in the “Indo-Pacific” region,
with particular emphasis on deepening cooperation with India. For example, the
United States provides India with military technology related to advanced fighters
and aircraft carriers; the two sides actively promote counter terrorism cooperation
in central and South Asia, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, and constantly
explore cooperation in maritime security, regional order and defense security. It is
particularly noteworthy that the Trump administration has begun to attach
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importance to and enhance the status of the security cooperation mechanism be-
tween the United States, Japan, India and Australia as an important tool to deal
with China’s maritime activities. In this way, the United States attempts to build a
maritime encirclement around China in order to exert maritime and air pressure on
any channel from China to the sea.

Second, increase military deployment and operations. Compared with the pre-
vious administration, the Trump administration is unwilling to support the uni-
lateral actions and some risky attempts of partner countries but prefers to carry out
independent military actions. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019 signed by the U.S. government, based on the guiding principle of long-
term strategic competition with China, refreshes the record of the U.S. national
defense budget and provides the necessary strength for the U.S. Department of
defense to effectively implement the national defense strategy and develop high
and new technology, including improving the military infrastructure in the “Indo-
Pacific” region and targeted pre-deployment, with funds provided for more military
exercises (McCain, 2018). In addition to adjusting the deployment of military
forces, the U.S. Department of Defense has also significantly increased the scale
and intensity of military activities so as to highlight its special status in the “Indo-
Pacific” region. In 2020, even though COVID-19 wreaked havoc worldwide in
2020, the U.S. military continued to carry out intensive military activities in the
South China Sea. For example, large formations of the U.S. Navy frequently went
in and out of the South China Sea, focusing on the operational concept of
“dynamic force deployment”, with obvious deterrence intention; the U.S. sent
reconnaissance aircraft from multiple bases to the South China Sea for close
reconnaissance; in the name of “freedom of navigation and overflight”, the U.S.
continued to exert extreme pressure on China through “breaking into islands and
reefs” and sailing across the Taiwan Strait.19 Affected by the COVID-19, the scale
and frequency of exercises of the United States and its allies and partners have been
greatly reduced but with significantly enhanced intensity, and the atmosphere of
battlefield construction and preparations for the battlement is very strong.
Third, full competition with China. Since taking office, Trump has carried out
an “all-round competition”, with the adoption of the whole-of-government strategy
and implementation of more intensive, intense and comprehensive sanctions
against China (Gong, 2020). The Trump administration attaches particular im-
portance to playing the cards of “economy” and “science and technology” with
China, for example, the imposition of tariffs on some Chinese goods, the
19 An Incomplete Report on US Military Activities in the South China Sea in 2020, website of South China Sea
Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI), March 12, 2021, http://www.scspi.org/sites/default/files/reports/
2020nian mei jun nan hai jun shi huo dong bu wan quan bao gga pdf, pp. 1–20.
2150009-16
prohibition of the export of high-tech products such as chips to China, and the
advocacy of the decoupling of China–U.S. capital markets. The United States even
made formal legislation on export control and upgraded relevant regulations.20
Such moves reflect the intention of the United States to restrict technology exports
to China to delay China’s technological development. In addition, the new trend of

the U.S. competition in China also includes the comprehensive use of law en-
forcement and intelligence measures to start the “China Project”, with a view to
strengthening sanctions against Chinese governmental departments and senior
officials on the basis of two levels of sanctions, human rights and COVID-19. The
year 2020 should have been for China and the United States to shelve disputes and
work together in the prevention and control COVID-19, if not for that the U.S. side
was constrained by political bias and focused on power manipulation. At the
instigation of the government, the U.S. media took the opportunity to transfer
responsibility and spread all kinds of inappropriate remarks in order to slander
China’s international image and vigorously suppress China.
Generally speaking, the “half mouth encirclement” shows quite obvious an-
tagonistic nature. From a strategic perspective, unlike the Obama administration,
which supports multilateralism and attaches importance to regional allies, Trump
believes in power politics and unilateral action, relies on military strength, and
emphasizes active attack and actively shaping the agenda, with the hopes to
maintain absolute superiority in all fields to ensure the absolute security of the
United States. This can be seen from the U.S. military’s continued high-intensity
military activities in the South China Sea, the intensive conduct of various re-
connaissance operations, and the Trump government’s continuous withdrawal from
international organizations and treaties. In terms of geographical scope, the “Indo-
Pacific” strategy has gone beyond the level of defense around the island chain in
East Asia and has become a grand strategic design similar to the cold war and far
beyond the regional scale.21 The United States tried to build a targeted and ex-
clusive military system in the Asia Pacific region, with “Asia-Pacific” officially
replaced with “Indo-Pacific” as the regional security framework of the United
States. It can be reasonable to consider that the Trump administration’s approach in
the Indo-Pacific region is a strategy of containment, abandoning the idea of pre-
vious U.S. governments trying to integrate China into the Western led liberal order.
20 The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 has officially become a law, which expands the scope and types of
export control projects in the United States, especially the export control of “emerging and basic technologies” in
the United States. See “H.R. 5040-Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 115th Congress (2017–2018)”, U.S.
Congress, August 13, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5040/text.
21 Ge Hanwen: Island Chain, Space Control and Hegemony — America’s Geopolitical Imagination of the Western
Pacific Region, p. 76.
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The Trump administration’s strategy towards China can be summarized as encir-

clement and containment.
3.3. The dynamic of the transformation of U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy

Compared with the “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy of the Obama administra-

tion, the Trump administration’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy maintains continuity (such
as the recognition of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region) and graduality
(such as the position on the QUAD); it also highlights adjustment (such as the shift
from multilateral to bilateral and unilateral) and balances (such as tougher attitude
towards China and Russia). The transformation from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-
Pacific” reflects that the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy has gradually changed from
emphasizing the soft influence of values during the Obama administration to the
strength determining position during the Trump administration. This transforma-
tion showcases the continuous adjustment of its national security strategy under the
effects of a series of factors, such as the change of power structure, the fierce
competition of major powers and the increasing importance of strategic relations in
the “Indo-Pacific” region. From the perspective of strategic evolution, the
“Indo-Pacific” strategy is the continuation, adjustment and strengthening of
the “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy during the Obama administration. From the
perspective of strategic objectives, the United States hopes to maintain its control,
influence and economic security interests in the new geographical strategic center
of the world, “Indo-Pacific” region, balance China’s growing strength and influ-
ence, and reshape its leading position as a big power. From the perspective of
strategic content, the U.S. “India-Pacific” strategy can be summarized into the
following four levels: politically consolidating and expanding the alliance and
partnership network, economically renegotiating trade agreements and expanding
financial and investment cooperation with other countries at the name of “pro-
moting trade fairness and reciprocity”, militarily building armed forces in the
“Indo-Pacific” region, and institutionally building a new regional and global order
structure. In terms of strategic means, the Trump administration brandishes a “big
stick” and frequently displays military strength to deter opponents or enemies on
the one hand and waves the “carrot” on the other hand to maintain and mobilize the
alliance by providing strategic guarantee.
It seems that the Trump administration’s proposal of the “Indo-Pacific” strategy
is related to its tendency to “oppose every measure of Obama” and his nature as a
businessman, but in fact, it is based on deep strategic considerations. During the
Trump administration, the United States ran into a more complex and challenging
international environment than that for the Obama administration. Both the White
House and the Department of Defense believe that the strategic competition among
2150009-18
major powers is the main security challenge and primary strategic risk in current
international politics. China has replaced Russia as the largest strategic competitor
of the United States in the “Indo-Pacific” region and even in the world
(Chen, 2018). The U.S. cognition of China has been changing dynamically. The
enhancement of China’s strength and influence and the rise of China’s willingness
to use this strength and influence are the cognitive basis of the U.S. Asia-Pacific
strategic adjustment. In addition, in recent years, the imbalance between China and
the United States has worsened, and the United States has become increasingly
negative about China, on the belief that China will threaten its own status. On this
premise, Trump has strengthened the prevention and balances against China, trying
to put India, Japan, Australia and other regional powers and medium-sized powers
into its “Indo-Pacific” network, so as to achieve the strategic goal of reining
China’s rise and consolidating its own strength advantage.
4. Three Demands of the United States in Promoting the “Indo-Pacific”

Strategy
At the beginning of 2021, the White House website released the document of the
U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific prepared in 2018 and originally
scheduled to be disclosed as early as 2043. The document makes programmatic
arrangements for the strategic picture of the United States in the “Indo-Pacific”
region, including “safeguarding” China’s Taiwan region, helping India rise to
balance China, and maintaining the strategic leading position of the United States
in the “Indo-Pacific” region.22 Although the concept of “Indo-Pacific” means to
serve the goal of the United States to expand power and exclude China, it reflects a
more strategic thinking, a geographical imagination and order vision. At present,
the so-called “Indo-Pacific” strategy is actually something between “strategy” and
“imagination” (Zhang, 2018). Compared with the grand strategies issued by the
United States after World War II, the “Indo-Pacific” strategy lacks detailed plan-
ning in terms of strategic connotation, diplomatic action and resource allocation,
and the specific details still need to be further disclosed. As a product upon the
reflection on traditional geopolitics and realism theory, critical geopolitics
emphasizes that non-power factors (culture, identity, value, etc.) have the same
effects on the United States in its understanding of the Asia-Pacific geopolitical
environment, constructing the political concept of “India Pacific” and imple-
menting geopolitical strategy. The three demands embodied in the U.S. “India
Pacific” strategy will be discussed as follows.
22 U.S.Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, The White House, February 2018/January 2021, https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-national-security-advisor-robert-c-obrien-011221/.
pp. 1–10.
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4.1. Rebuilding American “all-round” hegemony

The changes in the strength and development between China and the United States
in various fields have exacerbated the concerns of American society about the
decline of its hegemony. It is undeniable that most of the social panic and anxiety
over hegemony in the United States come from China. After the end of the cold
war, the United States is still committed to maintaining its alliance system and
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, that is, the effects of China’s devel-
opment are accumulating and its power is growing (Friedberg, 2005). At present,
the strategic circles in the United States universally agree that its own national
security is under the threat of China’s ever-growing comprehensive strength, es-
pecially its military strength. Therefore, the goal of rebuilding an “all-round”
hegemony is embedded in the “Indo-Pacific” strategy. The Trump administration
frequently competes with China in aspects like military, economy, human rights,
social system, culture and others, with its fundamental appeal to establish un-
shakable hegemony in various fields. Seemingly to be a regional strategy, the
“Indo-Pacific” strategy actually cooperates with the comprehensive competitive
strategy of the United States against China and has become the main starting point
for the United States to rein China’s development and maintain its own influence.
From the perspective of diplomatic practice, the Trump administration has con-
tinuously invested material and institutional resources into the competition among
major powers, trying to bring more countries and mechanisms into the strategic
track of reining China and rebuilding the “all-round” hegemony of the United
States.
Competitions over military and maritime space mark the key areas of the “Indo-
Pacific” strategy. Alfred Mahan, a sea power theorist, once said that the geo-
graphical hub of the empire was not in the heart of Eurasia but in the Indian Ocean
and the Pacific Ocean. Whoever controls these two oceans can have its power
broadcasted along the edge of Eurasia. Entering the 21st century, people have
realized that the control of sea is very important to obtain and consolidate hege-
mony. Therefore, the focus of the strategic competition of great powers has shifted
from the Asian continent to the sea area, and the game of the international com-
munity on marine power is more prominent. In 2015, the Chinese government
issued the White Paper: China’s Military Strategy, which clearly proposed for the
first time that its navy should promote the strategic transformation from offshore
defense to the combination of offshore defense and high-sea protection.23 After
that, following this strategic requirement, China broke through the traditional
mindset of emphasizing land over sea, attached great importance to the economy
23 White Paper: China’s Military Strategy, Website of the Information Office of the State Council, May 6, 2015,
http://www.scio.gov.n/zfbps/ndhf/2015/Document/1435161/1435161.htm.
2150009-20
and strategy of the sea, committed to building a maritime combat force system,
carried out practical military training, and promoted the normalization of the navy
in the open sea. Naturally, the United States will not remain indifferent to this. In
order to consolidate and expand the strategic space of the United States in the
Indian Ocean and ensure the geographical balance of the “Indo-Pacific” region, the
Trump government regards the Pacific and the Indian Ocean as a strategic system
and puts forward the “Indo-Pacific” strategy and is committed to building a
maritime security alliance system to encircle its strategic competitors. The so-
called maritime security alliance system refers to the “group of Indo-Pacific
democratic states” led by the United States and composed of maritime states in the
Indo-Pacific region, which is gradually built to deal with common maritime se-
curity threats through cooperation in a diversified and flexible manner (Li, 2020).
The so-called containment of strategic competitors means to build an encirclement

against China with its allies. The Trump administration has placed special em-
phasis on controlling the “Indo-Pacific” sea area, important channels and strategic
hubs, increasing the deployment of military forces, developing and strengthening
new weapons, upgrading anti-missile and network systems, integrating the joint
cooperative combat capability of sea, land and air, and improving the frequency of
military exercises so as to strive to lock China’s forces in the “half-mouth encir-
clement”.
Another important part of the “Indo-Pacific” strategy concerns the economy. As
the designing of the “Indo-Pacific” strategy in the economic field, “Indo-Pacific
Economic Vision” incisively and vividly expresses the strategic intention of the
United States to seek economic hegemony (Pompeo, 2018; Zhang, 2020). The
Trump administration put forward the “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” in 2018
based on the following considerations, that is, economic security is an important
part of national security to serve the overall security strategy and the goal of
sustained prosperity of the United States (Singh, 2018). To achieve its goal of
governing economy and making rules, the Trump administration adopted a three-
step parallel approach. First, ease the U.S. trade deficit and promote fair and
equitable rules. After withdrawing from the TPP, the Trump administration hopes
to change the situation of the unbalanced trade with other countries, negotiate with
South Korea and Japan, and revise and reach a new bilateral trade agreement (Qiu;
2020).24 Seeing China strengthens the construction of infrastructure in Asia and
Africa under the Belt and Road Initiative, the United States also eagerly competes
with China in this field. In 2018, the Trump administration signed the Better
24 TheUnited States amended the US South Korea Free Trade Agreement with South Korea and reached the US
Japan Trade Agreement and the US Japan Digital Trade Agreement with Japan.
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Utilization of Investment Leading to Development Act (BUILD25 and established

the international Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) upon the integration
of the original companies to see investment and financing growth and support
global infrastructure projects. Second, expand and deepen economic contacts and
cooperation with allies and partner countries in the “Indo-Pacific” region. The
United States plans to provide us $11.3 billion for broader and in-depth cooper-
ation with its allies and partner countries in the fields of energy, finance, infra-
structure, digital economy and cyber security (Pompeo, 2018). Third, launch a
trade war and a science and technology war against China. In 2018, the Trump
administration accused China of many unfair conducts in foreign trade, such as
government support, dumping and subsidizing exports, pirating intellectual prop-
erty rights, imposing non-tariff barriers and compulsory technology transfer, and
then launched several rounds of trade offensives against China.26 From the eco-
nomic perspective, Trump’s trade war aims to open up the Chinese market and
enhance economic interests. In fact, it gives more strategic meaning to the trade
war; in addition to taking the “Indo-Pacific Economic Vision” to strengthen eco-
nomic existence and influence, Trump also relies on shaping rules and economic
cooperation to attract partners to crowd out and confront China.
The “Indo-Pacific” strategy also contains a strong confrontation between values,
ideology and political system. Joseph Nye, a former assistant Secretary of State of
the United States, predicted in his book many years ago that the key problem
facing the United States in the future is not whether it has the richest resources and
minerals but to what extent it controls the political environment and makes it serve
the will of the United States (Nye, 1992). At present, the U.S. government is
increasingly aware that international mechanisms, norms and rules cannot defend
U.S. interests (Wang, 2019). All sectors of American society attribute the main
reason to competition from China. Based on this, the Trump administration
describes the Sino–U.S. competition as a struggle between “freedom” and “op-
pression”, believing that the Sino–U.S. competition is not limited to security or
economic fields, but also a competition between two world views and two de-
velopment models (Wei, 2018). In National Security Strategy of the United States
of America, Trump pointed out that over the past decades, China has not only
expanded its power by undermining the sovereignty of other countries but also
promoted authoritarian system and socialist ideology. In the face of such acts, the
United States should take decisive measures to respond, instead of doing nothing,
25 The BUILD Act of 2018, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, May 8, 2018, https://www.uschamber.com/letter/hr-5105-
the-better-utilization-of-investments-leading-development-build-act-of-2018.
26 President Donald J. Trump Is Confronting China’s Unfair Trade Policies, May 29, 2018, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-confronting-chinas-unfair-trade-policies/.
2150009-22
to protect American values.27 The Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific dis-
closed in early 2021 expressed the same idea. To this end, the United States needs
to actively participate in “Indo-Pacific” regional affairs, promote western demo-
cratic values, and carry out more cooperation with “regional democratic partners”
such as Japan, South Korea and Mongolia.28 In addition, the Trump administration
also tried to separate the Chinese people from the Chinese government and the
Communist Party of China in its China-related remarks, with the spearhead pointed
at the latter two.29 In the geopolitical imagination of the “Indo-Pacific” strategy of
the United States, China is recognized as increasingly showing the attribute of
expansion and even trying to establish a “domineering” cultural circle in the sur-
rounding areas and even the world. The Trump administration pointed out that
China’s Belt and Road Initiative serves an important carrier of Chinese civilization.
It not only brings China’s productivity advantages, advanced technology and

massive investment to Southeast Asia and South Asia but also China’s values,
social culture, system and ideology to the Southwest Pacific and India Ocean
regions, which will seriously impact and frustrate the United States in “Indo-
Pacific” region in it playing a leading role in regional order. In addition to slan-
dering China by words, the United States has also intervened in Hong Kong,
Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet with unprecedented strength. It can be seen from the
remarks and practices of the Trump administration that the United States is trying
its best to push China–U.S. relations to the track of ideological confrontation and
political system competition.
The “Indo-Pacific” strategy includes not only promoting military security but
also topics and logic such as economic governance and rule makings. When
expounded, the “Indo-Pacific” strategy should not be only regarded as an eco-
nomic or security confrontation among countries but as an all-round confrontation
covering society and culture. While integrating military forces, launching tariff
wars and implementing economic retaliation measures, the United States is also
actively promoting the reform of the current international order and promoting
western values about freedom. To some extent, the above practices reflect the
Trump government’s strategic determination to maintain its absolute global dom-
inance in military security, economic and trade structure, scientific and techno-
logical innovation, ideology and other fields. In view of the strategic demand of
reconstructing “all-round” hegemony, on the one hand, the Trump government
envisages strengthening military deployment within the “half-mouth encirclement”
outlined in the “Indo-Pacific” strategy, adopting the “small multilateral” alliance
27 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, U.S., 2017, pp. 25–28.
28 U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, The White House, 2018/2021, p. 7.
29 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, 2019, p.7.
2150009-23
(Wang, 2021) to build maritime rules, promote economic and trade cooperation
and infrastructure projects, and spread the idea of freedom and openness in the
Western way. On the other hand, the Trump administration hopes to “turn” the
Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean into “cages” and use the “half-mouth en-
circlement” to limit and compress China’s space so as to achieve the strategic goal
of reining China’s rise and maintaining the U.S. hegemony.
4.2. Reshaping the identity and confidence of the United States as a great power
This paper holds that the dual imagination mode of “self” and “others” and too
much emphasis on ontology security are important emotional mechanisms for
Trump’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy. The breeding of the above two emotions leads to
the loss of confidence in the national prospects of the American elites and even the
whole society, resulting in “identity anxiety”. The “identity anxiety” here is not the
product of real or potential crises and dilemmas in the usual sense but the identity
stability created by the American elites through a series of discourse strategies and
practices. From the perspective of social psychology, the main reason for anxiety is
that the existence value and standard identified by the individual cultural partici-
pants are threatened. It can be found that identity anxiety is not necessarily pro-
portional to physical threat, and the anxiety of each society is closely related to its
historical and cultural development model. At present, the causes of identity
anxiety in the United States also have special reasons. As a result, the Trump
government has an obvious characteristic of binary distinction between “self” and
“others” with the emphasis on ontological insecurity when reconstructing
American identity.
The dualistic imagination model of “self” and “others” has always been deeply
rooted in American history and culture. It is a subconscious of the United States in
distinguishing and defining groups of self and external groups. As a result, the
maintenance or demonstration of American self-identity and characteristics often
needs to be found and shaped upon the differences from “others”. In this regard,
the imagination of “others” serves an essential part of the formation of American
self-identity. As some scholars have said, without the opposition against “others”, a
country cannot have an obvious sense of regional identity or boundary (Beeson and
Wilson, 2018). In the view of the United States, the criterion of the United States
should be the yardstick of the whole world, and the Western liberal democratic
system is above all else. America is the center, and others are just the periphery,
which must revolve around the center without interference. Once other countries
have the strength to challenge the United States, the United States will show strong
tension and anxiety, on the belief that “the strength of the “others” will inevitably
mean the relative weakening of the strength of the “self”, and the rise of the
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“others” will inevitably lead to the relative decline of the “self” (Kong, 2015).” It
can be seen that the strength rather than the intention of the “others” is an important
basis for the strategic framework of the United States. This actually means that the
United States always portrays its competitors or enemies as the “evil others”. When
the “evil others” become strong, the “self” will face a threat and American anxiety
will arise.
Since the 21st century, the “others” or “aliens” imagination has once again burst
out a powerful force to stimulate and induce all sectors of American society to
show deep symptoms such as identity anxiety and lack of confidence due to
China’s rise. The “identity anxiety” of the United States is mainly reflected in two
aspects: first, the United States always emphasizes that its strategic environment is
full of conflicts and increasingly severe. Especially, in the face of the of China’s
ever-growing material strength and the increasing rise of its foreign influence, the
United States is worried that its central position in world politics will be chal-
lenged. Second, the United States believes that it has fallen into a serious crisis of
identity political competition (Zhang, 2020). The Trump administration is worried
that the identity uniqueness of the United States in terms of value orientation, mode
of thinking and behavioral habits will gradually lose. When he projected the
imagination of “others” into the “Indo-Pacific” region, he found that China, Russia
and the DPRK are powerful challengers to the current U.S. world hegemony and
the international order and are “evil others” that must be encircled strategically.
Among them, China, as the “head of evils”, naturally became the bull’s eye of the
“Indo-Pacific” strategy. Driven by “identity anxiety”, Trump, on the one hand,
emphasized the hegemonic identity of the United States, took the “America first”
approach and committed many acts detrimental to the interests and reputation of
the United States. On the other hand, he actively launched narrative wars against
China (Wang, 2021), unilaterally regarded China as its “number one enemy” in
concept and practice, and spared no effort in distorting the image of China in an
all-round way and constructing the image of the so-called “evil others”.
Too much emphasis and amplification of ontological insecurity is also an im-
portant reason for the loss of self-confidence and identity anxiety in American
society. “Ontology security” is an important concept proposed by Anthony
Giddens, who constructed a new framework to explain modernity and its rela-
tionship with self, with focus on the complex relationship between identity and
security. The relationship between ontological insecurity and existential anxiety is
the core of its theory. According to Giddens, ontological security refers to the sense
of continuity and order in daily life, which provides certainty for self-identity and
can be determined through the performance of habits and daily practices
(Giddens, 2016). Specifically, ontological security is the basic sense of security for
individuals, which has the control over social life on the belief that life can go
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according to their expectations; even if they encounter setbacks and bad conditions,
they will still be courageous to face the reality (Kinnvall, 2004). From this point of
view, once the habit or daily routine is interrupted, resulting in the loss of personal
control over life, there will be ontological insecurity, resulting in identity instability
and undermining the previously determined cognition.

The “China Threat Theory”, “revisionist state” and “Thucydides’s trap” widely
spread in American society are the direct reflection of the increased insecurity of
American elites and average people. First, the United States believes that China’s
strong material strength and unique identity culture have brought great impact,
which may break the continuity of the identity of the United States as the leader in
the international system and make the United States fail to maintain its control over
international affairs. Second, both American political and academic circles agree
that China will pose a practical challenge to its regional and world hegemony upon
its ambition to replace the status of the United States. At the same time, American
mass media try their best to portray China as negative in public discourses. Third,
the Trump administration believes that the dominant position of the United States
in many fields is being challenged, such as the erosion of economic and trade
interests and the further destruction of self-integrity. Finally, the whole American
society feels threatened, worried and even their self-confidence damaged.
The above two emotional mechanisms lead to the United States’ urgent com-
prehensive containment of China. When actors fall into identity uncertainty, they
generally adopt the following two measures: first, reduce the threat of potential
stressors through self-adjustment and adaptation to the environment; second,
change the identity of the original group, resort to black or white ideological
confrontation, and resist the change of the environment. The Trump administration
has taken the second path. The United States believes that in the geopolitical
imagination of the “Indo-Pacific” strategy, putting a number of Western liberal
democracies in the “Indo-Pacific” chess is an effective way to balance and hedge
against the “evil others”. Therefore, the consolidation and expansion of the “self”
camp (the Western alliance of liberal democracies established by allies and partner
countries) has been promoted to an important strategic position. Neither China nor
the United States is a nation state in the general sense, and both hold greater
identity than countries.30 By a broad definition, some “Indo-Pacific” regional
powers share Western values and Western liberal democratic system with the
United States, so they hold a certain degree of group identity. Among them, Japan,
South Korea and Australia are regarded as the firmest strategic fulcrum countries in
the “Indo-Pacific” region. To expand the maritime encirclement of containment of
the “evil others”, the United States tried to coerce Southeast Asian countries to
30 Wang Jisi, “Identity Politics” in China US relations, China Newsweek, p. 25.
2150009-26
confront China and even manipulate the Taiwan issue out of its eagerness. At the
same time, the United States regards India as a natural balancer against the “others”
and brings it into a broader vague “self” camp. This directly expands the scope of
the scale of the “half-mouth encirclement”.
Through the above analysis, it can be found that the strategic demands of the
United States in the “Indo-Pacific” region involve not only material factors closely
related to power but also non-material political factors of identity. Identity politics
plays an important role in the geopolitical imagination of American “Indo-Pacific”
strategy. In the view of the United States, once China rises, it will become more
proactive and aggressive. The reason why the Trump administration imagines
China as an “evil and threatening other” between a “rogue state” and a global
strategic opponent like the Soviet Union during the cold war is precisely because
China is a “non-Western democracy”. The United States believes that China’s

political and social system is unique, which will not be weakened by China’s
integration into the international community.31 On the contrary, in the imagination
of the United States, India is a (Western style) democratic country committed to
freedom and open order. “The United States and India, with the aim at the
framework of common security, safeguarding the rule of law, freedom of navi-
gation and freedom of trade, must act as lighthouses in the East and West of the
Indo-Pacific, respectively” (Tillerson, 2017). The United States and India should
be the two “Bookends” of the regional order of the “Indo-Pacific”, standing sep-
arately either side, with the United States in the East and India in the West
(Scott, 2018). In fact, in its geopolitical imagination of “Indo-Pacific”, on the one
hand, the United States recognizes India’s western democratic status and regards it
as a friend with similar interests. On the other hand, it tries to use India’s power to
resist the “evil others” (Rajagopalan, 2020). It can be seen that the U.S. view of
China is not so much an objective judgment based on real threats as an emergency
emotional response to the destruction of self-identity and ontological security.
4.3. Rebuilding the international important geo-strategic space

and regional structure
In the perspective of critical geopolitics, regions in world politics have important
constructiveness. As some scholars pointed out, “‘regions’ do not depend entirely
on geographical space but are often closely related to political shaping, with large
countries often being the main participants in the political shaping of the ‘regions”’
(Ling, 2019). The concept of region originated from Europe’s conquest of the
31 Zhang Yifei: The Declining Influence of the “Hobbs-Keohane” Range and the Rise of Identity Politics in
International Relations, pp. 71–73.
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world in the 17th to 19th century, and the regional boundary division has been
evolving since then. Planning and constructing geographical space according to
their own strategic needs is one of the common means of politicians. In this
process, the strategic demands of large countries turn out to be the decisive factor,
while regional geographical location and resource endowment become secondary

factors. In other words, regional boundaries in world politics are not entirely
“natural”, which often have social constructiveness involved in and reflect specific
political realities. The process of regional reconstruction means that large countries
change the original interactive relationship in the region and advocate and establish
a new regional framework. Global and regional relations are dynamic, open and
dialectical. For this reason, only by examining the region on a global scale can
people more accurately understand the geo-strategic significance of a specific
region in different periods. Thus, examining the changing relationship between the
whole and various regions in the global system can help us clarify the concept,
interests, available resources, activity areas and strategic capabilities of regional
powers (Hurrell, 2010). In this regard, in the process of studying regional de-
marcation and reconstruction, the changes of global factors, especially the changes
of international system structure and the cognition of major powers on the world
situation, should not be ignored.
In fact, the definition and elaboration of regions itself is a part of power. For
example, hegemonic countries often name regions according to their own strategic
needs, and the repeated renaming of the Asia Pacific region is the result of
American politics. During the Obama administration, the “Asia-Pacific” strategy
mainly involved Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim. Subse-
quently, based on a series of changes in social, geographical, political and eco-
nomic factors in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has an increasingly
strong demand for changing and adjusting the boundaries of the Asia-Pacific
region; thus, the “Indo-Pacific” region and strategy were born. Observed on the
map, the scope of the “Indo-Pacific” is actually the southwest expansion of
the “Asia-Pacific” region. As an expanded version of the Asia-Pacific concept, the
geospatial relations and interaction among major powers of “Indo-Pacific” are
more complex. As far as the specific geographical boundary is concerned, there is a
huge dispute over the concept of “Indo-Pacific”. In the National Security Strategy
of the United States of America of 2017, “Indo-Pacific” originally refers to the sea
and land range from the west coast of India to the west coast of the United States32
but later it extends to South Asia and Central Asia.33 Mark Beeson believes that the
“Indo-Pacific” strategic concept may try to include the whole of South Asia, the
32 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, U.S., 2017, pp. 45–46.
33 Ibid., p. 50.
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Middle East and East Africa to form a new regional framework.34 So far, the “Indo-
Pacific” region still remains ambiguous. However, there is no doubt that the areas
of greatest concern to the United States are the so-called “Indo-Pacific” core areas,
including the South China Sea, Southeast Asia and the Bay of Bengal (Medcalf,
2012). In addition, the “Indo-Pacific” region is not only conceptually contradictory

but also inconsistent with reality. The fuzzy boundary of the region itself makes it
possible for concept creators and demanders to obtain and maintain power.35
Although the specific geographical boundary of the “Indo-Pacific” region remains
controversial, it does not prevent the United States from appropriately narrowing or
expanding according to its own strategic interests and preferences, which gives the
“Indo-Pacific” strategy a certain flexibility and toughness, and leaves a certain
space for the United States to construct the “Indo-Pacific” strategy through
discourse.
In the geopolitical imagination of “half-mouth encirclement”, in addition to
taking balancing China as the key consideration for the introduction of the “Indo-
Pacific” strategy, the Trump government also takes the division and control of
important geopolitical regions themselves as the main factors. Since the Monroe
Declaration, the United States has regarded the Asia-Pacific as a region closely
related to its own strategic interests and prosperity (Green, 2017). With the growing
prominence of the strategic position of the Asia-Pacific region, the Trump gov-
ernment has continuously adjusted its attention and cognition and directly shaped it
into a strategic region of priority concern. The Trump administration believes that it
is in line with its strategic demands to merge and control the Indian Ocean and the
Pacific into a strategic unit and move Japan and Australia, the two traditional allies,
from the edge of the geopolitical map of the Asia-Pacific to the center.
Of course, the “Indo-Pacific” region is not a “hypothetical creation” that can be
forcibly shaped only by imagination and international hegemony system. Behind
it, there is a realistic basis to support the development of the whole region. On the
one hand, the Trump administration supports strategic fulcrum countries in the
Indian Ocean to Pacific region. Based on multiple factors, the United States chose
Japan, Australia and India as the strategic fulcrum in the three directions of the
“Indo-Pacific” chessboard to hold the two ends and arc vertices of the “half mouth
encirclement”, respectively. Upon this arrangement, the layout from the three
directions can more effectively control this key area. The United States spared no
effort in improving the internal relations and developing the dialogue mechanism
among the four countries and regarded it as the core framework of the
“Indo-Pacific” regional framework, which is also based on the consideration of
34 Mark Beeson and Jeffrey Wilson, The Indo-Pacific: Reconceptualizing the Asian Regional Space, pp. 79–80.
35 Lin minwang: The Construction of “Indo-Pacific” and the Tension of Asian Geopolitics, p. 18.
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better controlling the “Indo-Pacific”, an important international geopolitical space.

On the other hand, the United States of America carries out strategic cooperation
and mechanism construction with India (Liu, 2020). Because it does not have the
absolute maritime advantage in the Indian Ocean as it does in the Pacific, objec-
tively, the United States has to seek security cooperation with India to maintain its
influence and deterrence in the Indian Ocean (Zhu, 2018). India is willing to
strengthen defense and security cooperation with the United States because of the
competition between India and China in terms of sea and land geopolitical power
and India’s great doubts about the Belt and Road Initiative, especially the con-
struction of China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Against this background, the
“Indo-Pacific” regional economic power discourse and strategic practice may
eventually be constructed as a political reality.
The above briefly expounds the demands contained in the “Indo-Pacific”

strategy. It should be acknowledged that the interpretation of the “Indo-Pacific”
strategy cannot bypass the shadow of power politics. However, in addition to
power politics, the “Indo-Pacific” strategy of the United States has other con-
notations. Its introduction and practice are closely related to the demands of the
United States to maintain its hegemonic status, reshape its national identity and
reconstruct the geopolitical space of the Asia-Pacific and its adjacent regions.
Although the Trump administration spared no efforts in promoting the practice of
the “Indo-Pacific” strategy during its term of office and initially created a “half-
mouth encirclement” against China, the implementation of the “Indo-Pacific”
strategy still faces many problems due to the short time of its practice, the minds of
relevant countries and the limited investment of the United States. First of all,
because the scope of the “Indo-Pacific” super region is too broad with each region
of different development degree, it is difficult to become a coherent strategic unit,
which restricts the construction of the real “Indo-Pacific” mechanism to a great
extent. At the same time, not all “Indo-Pacific” countries have equal influence
upon regional affairs and protect the interests of countries in each region equally.
The interaction of major powers will often create regional tensions (Liang, 2020).
Second, the strategic objectives of the United States and its allies and partners
conflict with each other, making it difficult for them to take concerted diplomatic
action. Most importantly, it is difficult for the United States, Japan, India and
Australia to reach consensus on the concept of “Indo-Pacific” and the path for its
construction. There is inevitable uncertainty about how far the core framework of
the “Indo-Pacific” Region, namely, security cooperation mechanism for the four
nations, can go. In this regard, although a lot of progress has been made in the
implementation of the American “Indo-Pacific” strategy, which has also been
inherited and strengthened by the Biden government, there are still many weak
links in its practice, and its final operation may not be as smooth as that envisaged
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by American policymakers (Bo, 2019; Xia and Zhong, 2018; Wuthnow, 2019;
Tow, 2019).36
4.4. China’s response to the “Indo-Pacific” strategy of the United States

from the perspective of critical geopolitics

The practice of American “Indo-Pacific” strategy reflects a geopolitical imagina-
tion of “half-mouth encirclement” mainly targeted at China. After the Biden ad-
ministration took office, it has inherited and strengthened the Trump
administration’s “Indo-Pacific” strategy, which means that the strategic game be-
tween the United States and China in the “Indo-Pacific” region and even the global
stage will continue for a long time. As far as the promotion of the U.S. “Indo-
Pacific” strategy is concerned so far, it does pose a certain pressure and challenge
for China in adhering to the path of peaceful development and breaking through
the encirclement. How to deal with the “Indo-Pacific” strategy of the United States
presents a huge and complex topic, which is unable and not intended to be dis-
cussed comprehensively in this paper. With its focus on the changes in geopolitical
imagination brought about by the U.S. adjustment in its Asia-Pacific strategy from
the perspective of critical geopolitics, this paper concentrates on the demands of
the United States for the introduction of the “Indo-Pacific” strategy, especially on
preliminary analysis on China’s response on how to crack the “half-mouth encir-
clement” by the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.
4.5. Conquer the “toughness” of American force with the “gentleness”

of Chinese civilization
In response to the demand of “rebuilding American hegemony” in the “Indo-
Pacific” strategy, China should not only accumulate strength but also enhance the
influence of Chinese civilization and cultivate a relaxed big country mentality.
Through the efforts of several generations, China’s economic and military strength
has reached a certain height, depth and breadth and will continue to develop at a
steady pace. Based on this, during the two sessions of NPC and CPPCC in 2021,
Secretary Xi Jinping said firmly and confidently that China can see the world in a
straight way.37 What does it mean to see the world in a straight way? That is to
look at the development and changes of the world from a more confident, open and
36 Due to the limitation of the space, it is not intended to focus on the limitations and challenges faced by the
United States in implementing the “Indo Pacific” strategy. In fact, there have been many research achievements on
this issue in academic circles at home and abroad.
37 We Should Make Good Use of the “Extended Ideological and Political Lectures” (General Secretary Xi Jinping
in the delegations during the two sessions, scene on the spot of the two sessions), People’s Daily, March 7, 2021,
the front page.
2150009-31
equal perspective. In the context of the increasing competition between China and
the United States, what image should China take in the world? This paper holds
that the real and complete rise of a country is the rise of civilization and the
maturity of mentality (Zhang, 2015). In response to the United States’ recon-
struction of hegemony based on military absolute superiority in the “Indo-Pacific”

region, China should not return to the old way of the arms race like the former
Soviet Union, neither should it take the United States’ style of building a country
with a big stick. While maintaining stable economic development and improving
its military strength, China needs to strive to shape the charm of Chinese civili-
zation and show the image of a peaceful and confident civilized country.
To break through the “half-mouth encirclement”, we should use the “gentleness”
of Chinese civilization to overcome the “toughness” of American force. Compared
with the influence of Western civilization, the revival of Chinese civilization may
have a long way to go before it is respected and recognized by the international
community. The Chinese government and people should make efforts in the fol-
lowing aspects: first, enhance the influence of civilization. We will strengthen the
construction of political systems with Chinese characteristics, build a new political
discourse system, expand the attraction and influence of Chinese ideas, Chinese
values and Chinese propositions, improve ourselves while absorbing other coun-
tries’ excellent civilizations, and make more original contributions to the develop-
ment of the world and the civilizations of other countries. Second, look at all
countries in the international system equally. Although China’s current economic
strength ranks second in the world, the current national mentality is not consistent
with the status of a big country, in that the “victim mentality” (Zhao and
Meng, 2018) and “weak state mentality” are often found in people’s words and
deeds. Today, with great changes in the domestic and international environment,
China should be clearer about its role at home and abroad and treat its friends and
competitors in the world equally. In the face of the imputation, stigmatization and
rumors of other countries, although we do not have to swallow it, we should also pay
attention to the principle of being reasonable, forceful and restrained in response.
Third, cultivate cultural self-confidence and cultivate the mentality of a big country,
stressing rationality rather than act on impulse, stressing principles rather than
profit. We should conduct exchanges with all countries on an equal footing, neither
clinging to the strong nor bullying the weak. We should be confident and open-
minded, neither complacent nor tolerant of provocation (Li, 2017).
5. Adopt Social Creativity Strategies to Seek Identity and Recognition

In response to the strategic appeal of “reshaping American identity” through the
“Indo-Pacific” strategy, China can adopt social creativity strategy to obtain greater
2150009-32
international recognition and higher international status. In the 1970s, social

psychologist Henri Tajfel and his colleagues put forward a widely influential
theory, namely Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978), which discusses how social
groups maintain their unique identity and positive social identity, and holds that
when groups do not obtain satisfactory social identity, they will adopt single or
mixed identity management strategies (Social Mobility Strategy, Social Competi-
tion Strategy and Social Creativity Strategy) to seek status and distinguish from
others. Some scholars further pointed out that since the founding of the People’s
Republic of China, it has been flexible in switching among the three strategies.
After the end of the cold war, China is more inclined to adopt the Social Creativity
Strategy as a means of seeking status and identity, and this behavior of maintaining
the international order and participating in global governance has indeed won the
appreciation of major countries (Larson and Shevchenko, 2010).

Obviously, superior military capability alone does not necessarily bring superior
status, respect and recognition. According to the theory of social identity, China
can adopt Social Creativity Strategy in the “Indo-Pacific” region as response to the
actions of the United States and win the favor and respect of other countries,
through conducts like resolutely maintaining the uniqueness of its own identity and
reconstructing the negative attributes of its identity into positive attributes, pro-
viding public goods and services for the “Indo-Pacific” region and even the world,
such as taking the initiative leading the development of the BRIC cooperation
mechanism and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, building it into an im-
portant multilateral mechanism for maintaining world peace and stability, and
promoting the project for connectivity of Belt and Road Initiative to enhance the
prosperity and stability of the countries and regions along the routes of Belt and
Road Initiative. It is worth mentioning that, not like the U.S. who takes the
opportunity of the pandemic to stigmatize, press and attack China, U.S. ignores the
life of its people and international responsibility; the CPC and China’s government
made an active contribution in fighting against the epidemic through putting the
pandemic under control in a relatively short time and sharing the experience and
achievements in fighting the pandemic with other countries, which won universal
praise from the international community.
5.1. Belt and Road Initiative as a powerful tool to break the

“half-mouth encirclement”
To get out of the “half-mouth” encirclement of the U.S. “Indo-Pacific” strategy, a
further step for the Belt and Road Initiative with the international community can
be used as a powerful tool. First, strengthen China Russia maritime security co-
operation and promote the construction of the Polar Silk Road to resist the upper
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jaw of “half-mouth encirclement” from the north. According to what mentioned

earlier in this paper, the “half-mouth encirclement” formed under the “Indo-Pa-
cific” strategy has been tightened in the southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean. If the
United States controls the Arctic Ocean in the future, “half-mouth encirclement”
will become a closed “mouth encirclement”. At that time, it will be even more
difficult for China to break through the “Indo-Pacific” strategy. The development
of the Polar Silk Road, especially the Arctic waterway, not only has value con-
cerning energy but also promotes the further diversification of China’s marine
transportation routes so as to reduce China’s dependence on Indian Ocean routes
and disperse the safety risks of marine transportation (Xia and Ma, 2018). More
importantly, the construction of the Polar Silk Road can reduce the pressure
brought by the U.S. military deployment in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific to a
certain extent (Yi, 2019). To this end, China can promote the construction of the
Polar Silk Road from the following aspects. First, particular attention should be
paid to strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination with
Russia in the new era and further broadening the areas of cooperation. Therefore,
China should do a good job in communication, coordination and guidance with the
Russian government, highlight the key construction points, especially give full
play to the radiation role of the Polar Silk Road, drive the construction of other
transportation lines for the connection with it, and give a stronger endogenous
driving force to the strategic cooperation between China and Russia (Yi, 2019,
p. 69). Second, starting from the bilateral cooperation between China and Russia,
actively welcome other friendly countries along the route to join and build the
Polar Silk Road as a template for multilateral cooperation, such as attracting in-
terested Northeast Asian countries like Japan and South Korea and Nordic coun-
tries, so as to reduce other countries’ suspicion of China and create a better
atmosphere of international public opinion. If the Polar Silk Road is effectively
unblocked, it will be difficult for the United States to completely encircle China.
Second, implement and consolidate the project construction of the Silk Road
Economic Belt in Eurasian region. The reality is that the construction of the Silk
Road Economic Belt has achieved fruitful results, with cooperation projects
blooming everywhere, and the concept of cooperation deeply rooted in the hearts
of the people. Along with the unceasing expansion of Belt and Road construction,
attention must be paid to the problems and the limitations, such as some Economic
Corridor has not seen any development since being initiated, the other countries are
still full of doubts towards Belt and Road construction, the driving capacity of
some city terminals are insufficient and the practical functions of CR express still
remain limited. Relevant scholars said that the Silk Road Economic Belt should
have its focus on supporting and participating in domestic development projects of
countries along the routes, consolidate the docking achievements with the Eurasian
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Economic Union (EAEU), Kazakhstan’s “bright road” new economic policy and
Russia’s energy development strategy, and continue to look for the practical pos-
sibility of docking with other countries’ development strategies.38 In addition, to
promote the construction of China–Central Asia–West Asia economic corridor, we
should give full play to the role of Central Asian countries as “channels” and
“bridges” in the Belt construction, especially to take advantage of the unique
geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages of “dual identity” countries (Yang and
Wang, 2018). Besides, China should not ignore the doubts about the Belt and Road
Initiative from external important actors, especially the need to reduce or eliminate
the doubts of the neighboring countries. Therefore, it is necessary for the Chinese
government and scholars to make efforts in constructing and promoting the cor-
responding discourse and explaining the relevant concepts (Yang, 2017).
Third, cross the Southwest and Southeast seas to build the 21st Century Mar-
itime Silk Road with African and Latin American countries, respectively, tearing
the connection between the upper and lower jaw of the “half-mouth encirclement”.
Africa and Latin America have always been the key points of the Belt and Road
Initiative. At present, the contacts between China and Africa, as well as the
communication between China and Latin America, are indeed at a low level.
Looking forward to the future, the prospects for China–Africa and China–Latin
America cooperation are very promising. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
will be an important link for China–Africa and China–Latin America cooperation.
Since 2017, countries from Latin America have been taking active part in the Belt
and Road construction through signing memorandum of understanding on coop-
eration. China has signed bilateral agreement with 19 Latin American and Ca-
ribbean countries by the end of 2019.39 Unfortunately, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia,
Argentina and other major countries in Latin America have not yet joined. Some
problems still exist in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative between
China and Africa, including disorderly operation, insufficient trade power and trade
friction. Considering the similar conditions in Africa and Latin America, China can
learn from some common strategies when promoting the implementation of the
21st Century Maritime Silk Road. First, build a strategic fulcrum country (Fangye,
2015; Pengqin and Xiao, 2020). China should consider various factors and select
countries that can play an overall or key role so as to realize the radiation effect of
one for ten. Second, regulate the behavior of foreign trade enterprises under the
38 Interview with Li Yongquan, Director of the Research Center of Belt and Road Initiative, CASS, and Yang Shu,
Professor of the Institute of Central Asian Studies, Lanzhou University (ICAS): The Cognitive Transformation of
the International Community will Accelerate the Cooperation upon Belt and Road Initiative, people.com, April
24, 2019, http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0424/c1002-31047190.html.
39 Belt and Road as the path for cooperation and mutual benefits of China and Africa, Belt and Road Portal,
February 10, 2020. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/hwxw/117000.htm.
2150009-35
framework of mutual benefit and constantly innovate trade strategies with dis-
tinctive characteristics. If the branches of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
reaching Africa to the southwest and Latin America to the southeast can be suc-
cessfully completed, for China, they will serve as “two knives” directly cutting a
huge gap in the “half-mouth encirclement” of the United States.

Fourth, formulate principled and flexible policies for Southeast Asian countries,
India, Australia and other countries, divide and disrupt the network of allies and
partners of the United States, and finally knock out the teeth on the “half-mouth
encirclement”. In terms of the policy towards India, we should strictly take serious
precautions for India’s provocation and even illegal cross-border occupation and
control of China’s territory on the Western border of China and strengthen coop-
eration with Pakistan, Bangladesh and other South Asian countries. In terms of
policy towards Japan, we should develop non-governmental exchanges and eco-

nomic and trade cooperation with Japan. In terms of relations with Australia we
will resolutely struggle against Australia’s words and deeds that discredit and
slander China, and carry out tit for tat and deterrent countermeasures against
Australia’s provocations without harming our own interests. We should focus on
Southeast Asian countries, properly handle South China Sea disputes with some
countries, actively develop bilateral and multilateral economic and trade cooper-
ation, and fully respect the central role of ASEAN in Asia Pacific Affairs. Obvi-
ously, when the teeth in the “half-mouth encirclement” are pulled out or controlled,
the U.S. “Indo-Pacific” strategy will not cause substantive harm to China.
6. Conclusion and Discussion

Needless to say, China is the most important target of the Trump administration’s
“Indo-Pacific” strategy. Several official documents released by Trump during his
term of office made it clear that China has surpassed Russia as the primary strategic
competitor that the United States must fully deal with. Moreover, the U.S. gov-
ernment said frankly that this opponent has gone beyond the Asia-Pacific region
and economic and trade fields as a global and all-round opponent. Therefore, the
“Indo-Pacific” strategy of the United States includes strengthening not only the
armed forces but also economic sanctions and ideological confrontation. Although
Trump has stepped down, the “Indo-Pacific” strategy will not die out. In early
March 2021, the Biden administration issued the Interim National Security Stra-
tegic Guide, which proposed that China is the only country with economic and
military strength to challenge the current international system, and the goal of the
United States is to provide a convincible deterrent to China.40 Judging from the
40 Interim
National Security Strategic Guidance, The White House, March 3, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf. pp. 19–22.
2150009-36
current situation, President Biden is bound to inherit and develop the concept and
strategy of “Indo-Pacific”, and the friction between China and the United States
will be intense in a long term.
This paper examines the connotation of geopolitical imagination contained in
the “Indo-Pacific” strategy from the perspective of critical geopolitics. Geopolitical

imagination is not only a power politics model but also a cognitive way to un-
derstand the world. From the perspective of critical geopolitics, the geopolitical
imagination behind the “Indo-Pacific” strategy is different from people’s traditional
interpretation to a certain extent. Although the “Indo-Pacific” strategy does have
the consideration of consolidating American hegemony in the traditional geopo-
litical sense, its geopolitical imagination is beyond the scope of the traditional
geopolitical imagination. According to the Trump administration’s imagination of
the Indian Ocean and Pacific region, the geographical distribution and connectivity
of allies, partner countries and military bases are very similar to the strategic
schema of “half-mouth encirclement”. Through investigation, it can be found that
the “Indo-Pacific” strategy reflects the demands of the United States to rebuild its
hegemony in various fields through all-round competition, to reshape its identity
by strengthening self-identity and consolidating and expanding the alliance of
Western style liberal democratic countries, and to reconstruct international key
geopolitical space by looking for strategic fulcrum.
The U.S. government has expanded the scope of strategic competition among
major powers to the whole “Indo-Pacific” region. For China, pressure and tension
exist at the same time, and opportunities and challenges exist at the same time as
well. The implementation of the U.S. “Indo-Pacific” strategy has indeed brought
great pressure to China’s current development, but the strategy and its “half-mouth
encirclement” are not impeccable. With proper planning, China can not only ef-
fectively break the containment carried out by the United States through this
strategy but also expand its space through flexible and forward-looking counter-
measures. Specifically, in response to the three demands of the U.S. “India-Pacific”
strategy, China can take the following responses: first, while accumulating
strength, enhance the influence of Chinese civilization and cultivate a relaxed
mentality of a great power. Second, adopt Social Creativity Strategy to seek
identity and recognition in the “Indo-Pacific” region and even the world. Third,
take the Belt and Road Initiative as a tool to carry out strategic layout against “half-
mouth encirclement” and to break through it in many directions, such as the
construction of the Polar Silk Road in the north with Russia, and to hold the upper
jaw of “half-mouth encirclement”, the implementation and the consolidation of the
Silk Road Economic Belt in Europe and Asia in the west; establishment of the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road with Africa and Latin America through the southwest
and Southeast waters to tear the connection between the upper and lower jaw of the
2150009-37
“half-mouth encirclement”; formulation of principled and flexible policies for

Southeast Asian countries, India, Australia and other countries to disintegrate the
network of allies and partners of the United States; and finally knock out the teeth
on the “half-mouth encirclement”. Of course, these coping strategies still have
obvious reactive elements. However, from another point of view, this can be a
possible measure for China to shape the international environment and strengthen
its ability to transform the international geo-environment.
It should be noted that there are still many defects in this paper for the studies on
the changes of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy from the perspective of critical
geopolitics. Due to limited capacity of the author, this paper only expounds the
transformation of geopolitical imagination behind the changes of the U.S. Asia
Pacific strategy, with some broad suggestions put forward on China’s response, but
without a comprehensive analysis on the specific content, actual results and de-
velopment trend of “Indo-Pacific” strategy, nor even no centralized and in-depth
analysis on the similarities and differences between the “Indo-Pacific” strategy of
the United States and the “Indo-Pacific” in the foreign policy discourse of India,
Japan, Australia and other countries (Ming et al., 2021; Yi, 2020; Dexing and
Zhao, 2019). If possible, we will write a separate article to study the above pro-
blems. In addition, in terms of theory, this paper only uses the relevant viewpoints
and concepts of critical geopolitics to investigate the “Indo Pacific” strategy of the
United States and does not make important amendments to the theory itself, let
alone theoretical innovation. However, the theoretical value of this paper may be
that it analyzes the obvious changes in the U.S. Asia Pacific strategy in recent years
from the perspective of critical geopolitics, especially the different imagination of
the United States on the Asia Pacific region in different periods behind this stra-
tegic change and the resulting changes in cognition or strategic practice. This may
help to overcome the blind spots in the research based on the traditional geopo-
litical perspective and help people observe the American “Indo Pacific” strategy
from more perspectives. In terms of practical significance, through the research of
this paper, it can be found that the geopolitical imagination contained in the
American “Indo Pacific” strategy not only has obvious defects but also has
the problems of “half mouth encirclement” and uneven “teeth”, which may be the
focus of China’s response to the “Indo Pacific” strategy.
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Zeng Zhang 2021 From Asia Pacific To Indo Pacific The Adjustment of American Asia Pacific Strategy From The Perspective

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East Asian Affairs

From “Asia Pacific” to “Indo Pacific”:

Published 10 December 2021

rebuild the U.S. hegemony in various fields through all-round competition,

strategic demands of the key geopolitical space. After Biden’s administration

initiatives; if pushed forward smoothly, it will effectively crack down on the

At present, some scholars use the perspective of critical geopolitics in their

2. Critical Geopolitics to Interpret the Applicability of American Asia

2.1. Core concepts of critical geopolitics

1 Quoted from G. O. Tuathail and S. Dalby, Rethinking Geopolitics, p. 4.

assumptions” made by the government to other countries (or important geopolitical

reflections of the world.

2.2. The applicability of critical geopolitics in analyzing the Changes

nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017.pdf, pp. 25–46.

3. From “L-shaped Defense” to “Half-mouth Encirclement”: The Change

3.1. Geopolitical imagination of American “Asia-Pacific” strategy

power is changing, a multi-node (multipolar) world is gradually taking shape, and

ticeable. American cognition of China’s rise has experienced a process from

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015 national security strategy.pdf, pp. 10–28.

Pacific mechanism so as to maintain and enhance its leadership in the international

connection. The Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific strategy is in line with not

Based on the above geopolitical imagination, the Obama administration transfer

Department of Defense, 2011, p. 2.

integration. In addition to developing bilateral relations with Southeast Asian

On the whole, the confrontational nature of “L-shaped defense” is not very

3.2. Geopolitical imagination of American “Asia Pacific” strategy

Eurasian continent upon investments in new infrastructure and communications”

tion, August 9, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/BG3331 2.pdf.

In addition to geopolitical imagination based on concerns about the develop-

any channel from China to the sea.

to China to delay China’s technological development. In addition, the new trend of

Pacific Region, p. 76.

The Trump administration’s strategy towards China can be summarized as encir-

3.3. The dynamic of the transformation of U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy

Compared with the “Asia-Pacific rebalancing” strategy of the Obama administra-

China’s rise and consolidating its own strength advantage.

4. Three Demands of the United States in Promoting the “Indo-Pacific”

4.1. Rebuilding American “all-round” hegemony

The so-called containment of strategic competitors means to build an encirclement

Utilization of Investment Leading to Development Act (BUILD25 and established

It not only brings China’s productivity advantages, advanced technology and

ment of Defense, 2019, p.7.

and undermining the previously determined cognition.

30 Wang Jisi, “Identity Politics” in China US relations, China Newsweek, p. 25.

China is a “non-Western democracy”. The United States believes that China’s

4.3. Rebuilding the international important geo-strategic space

International Relations, pp. 71–73.

while regional geographical location and resource endowment become secondary

2012). In addition, the “Indo-Pacific” region is not only conceptually contradictory

better controlling the “Indo-Pacific”, an important international geopolitical space.

The above briefly expounds the demands contained in the “Indo-Pacific”

4.4. China’s response to the “Indo-Pacific” strategy of the United States

from the perspective of critical geopolitics

4.5. Conquer the “toughness” of American force with the “gentleness”

struction of hegemony based on military absolute superiority in the “Indo-Pacific”

5. Adopt Social Creativity Strategies to Seek Identity and Recognition

international recognition and higher international status. In the 1970s, social

appreciation of major countries (Larson and Shevchenko, 2010).

5.1. Belt and Road Initiative as a powerful tool to break the

jaw of “half-mouth encirclement” from the north. According to what mentioned

February 10, 2020. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/xwzx/hwxw/117000.htm.

huge gap in the “half-mouth encirclement” of the United States.