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A social imaginary: Drug personalities in the Philippine drug war

A. Schlegel

Under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has seen radicalisation, of leadership style, and a
nation, who have accepted their leader’s narrative that drug pushers and addicts must be killed. In
his campaign for presidency, Duterte popularised an interest in drug personalities. He presented a
narrative that the “social ills” and “malaise” of the country was due to these people and to criminals.
By killing them extra-judicially, the country, he contended, would more prosperous (e.g. Ramirez
2016). His rhetoric was accepted immediately. An interest in drug personalities went viral and has
remained so, throughout this first year of his term (e.g. Arugay 2016:287; and Reuters 2017).
During his first month in office alone, 465 victims were killed; almost exclusively slum-dwellers1
(McKirdy 2016). Duterte kicked up a huge following (Thompson 2016:58). Despite some division,
the majority condoned the killings, at all levels of society and government (e.g. Arugay 2016:287).
In trying to understand this phenomenon of how people’s “moral compass” (Bautista 2017:7-8)
changed so swiftly and radically, some commentators and scholars have focused on particular stages
of that process of change. However, aside from Senator Leila de Lima (2016:60-62), this has been
without looking at the actual mechanisms of persuasion.

There are three main contributions to this puzzle. One, the drug personality is an enemy that the
state has constructed (Breuil and Rozema 2016:410). Targets are killed as a public performance and
spectacle (Reyes 2017:111,113,121). The effect is for the state to take away the power it imagines
its enemy to have, gaining it for itself (Aretxaga 2003:403). It is an exercise in gaining state
legitimacy (Barker 2001:21,29). Two, it is a product of Philippine history (Cherian 2016:4; and de
Lima 2016:62). Four-hundred years of colonial rule under the Spanish, forty under the Americans,
and three under the Japanese, has made strongman leadership cultural, and its discipline desired
(Thompson 2016:51). Only for thirty years between the ousting of former dictator Ferdinand
Marcos in 1986, and the election of Duterte was there no strongman (Cherian 2016:4). Furthermore,
vigilantism is not new. After independence in 1945, the weakness of the Philippines state left a
niche for vigilantism, filling in the inadequacies of law enforcement. Vigilantism had its hey-day in
the years following Marcos’s ousting (Kreuzer 2016:6).The current situation is not new (Kreuzer
2016:5-6). Killings are just at an unprecedented scale. Third, Senator Leila de Lima, the fiercest
1Most of the confirmed 6,225 drug related deaths up until September 16, 2017, have been slum-
dwellers (Cabico 2017).
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critic of Duterte – whom he had incarcerated – links this transformation of the Filipino outlook to a
few factors: desire for national prosperity; socioeconomic othering; fear; and the power of
persuasion commanded by a new leader.

De Lima (2016:60-62), through her work on the front line, in her battle against Duterte and the
social imaginary that she sees to be the illusion of so many in the Philippines; draws a connection
between extrajudicial-killings (EJK), its acceptance, and social cleansing as a wider phenomenon
featured in history. In so doing, she goes a long way in presenting the mechanisms of propaganda
that are at play. She says:
“A state system of “social cleansing.” We are witnessing the mass serialized murder of those
who have been painted as the dregs of society and enemies of the state… There is now a
normalized economy of murder… The president and his officials do not see drug addicts as part
of humanity... Duterte’s victory was made possible because of the support of the upper- and
middle-class segments of society… What is important is the eradication of blue-collar
crimes so their private enclaves and subdivisions remain safe… Duterte’s consolidation of
power, this narrative of crime and drugs as the main problem, and extrajudicial killings as the
solution, became the dominant narrative, even beyond the rich and the middle class. Any new
administration is capable of making its narrative of the national experience dominant. It can
mobilize the whole government in order to propagate the worldview of the president. And
Duterte’s is a dangerous worldview. He espouses the surrender of rights to a strongman, who
will decide what is good for the majority—even if this includes the killing of the poor and
marginalized for the rich and middle class to live in so-called peace… A lot have family
members who have lived and worked in more advanced societies. They are envious and want
the Philippines to be like these countries. But they have no idea what it takes… Hence, the
popularity of the strongman option, where rights are surrendered in exchange for transforming
the Philippines overnight” (de Lima 2016:60-62).
Through this frame of reference, de Lima makes a breakthrough in objectifying the scene of this
drug war in the framework of war propaganda that is particular to the carrying out of genocides. In
so doing, she gives us the analytical tools to delve into the mechanisms of the persuasion at play at a
whole new level.

The insights of de Lima have provided the framework through which common Filipinos’ moral
compasses changed so swiftly and radically. However, it is necessary to substantiate her claims,

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with strong evidence, and also to use them as leads to further investigate the social phenomena she
has described. This research seeks the primary principle of the Filipino condition that made them
malleable. It is this vital principle which combined with the various factors to produce the
endorsement of the killing of other Filipinos.

Methodology

To find the primary principle, YouTube videos, online comments, news articles, a government letter
(Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2006), and a student paper (Herrera and Aguirre
2016:np) are analysed. This is complemented with the experience and insight of eleven months
spent in Philippines between 2010 and 2016. Two Filipino contacts also served as key informants.
News articles from 2009 to 2017 were searched on google to find trends in the interest in drugs and
for the emergence of the present drug narrative (Beltran 2016; Carcamo 2015; Clapano 2011; Diaz
2012; Cabico 2017; Galupo 2014; GMA News Online 2009; Manlupig 2015; McKirdy 2016;
Ramirez 2009; Ramirez 2016; and Woody 2016). One YouTube video was treated as an
ethnographic interview (Asian Boss 2017). Eight informants of both sexes were asked questions
such as, “What do you think of the war on drugs, EJK, and Duterte?” Two informants were a pair.
The others were alone. I read through about 500 comments under YouTube videos (AFP news
agency 2017; AJ Plus 2016; Asian Boss 2017; D3u Technology 2016; and UpFront 2017) related to
the Philippine drug war. I analysed them through abductive reasoning: feeling around and allowing
patters to emerge which are detailed in the findings section. Through inductive reasoning –
bouncing the findings, and factors given above, off theories – this case was found to fit neatly into a
genocidal discourse particularly that of Nazi Germany (see Hinton 1998:9-14).

As a foreigner, I must add weight to my interpretations, by briefly mentioning the time in

Philippines that I draw heavily from in my analysis. I interacted with people across the
socioeconomic spectrum, from the beggar to the peso-billionaire, and political elites. In the eleven
months in Philippines, nine-and-a-half months was spent in Manila, and the other seven weeks in
Occidental Mindoro, Quezon Province, Palawan, and Mindanao. As I wanted to know what poverty
is like, I lived on the street in Manila for nine-and-a-half weeks, and in slums for three months, and
at the same economic level as those I lived with. I engaged with all kinds of people that congregated
on the streets, without discrimination. Twice weekly I met with middle and upper class Filipinos as

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a member of a group. For two weeks I stayed with a rich woman. Three other months in Manila
were spent in a standard house, a week in a nice hotel, and week in an apartment. Twice I was at
dinner with super-wealthy families. Once I was a guest for half an hour in the opulent family
residence of a particularly famous former president. These experiences gave me a well grounded
familiarity of Filipino society and class relations.

Findings

Finding 1. Filipinos viewed the drug problem in their country as more serious than it actually was.

Filipino commenters expressed relief that Duterte saved the country from becoming a “narc-
economy”, or an “Asian Mexico” (e.g. Mehmet Yılmaz1 2017; and WulfGalactus777 2017). Olario
(1999:172), a scholar within the Philippines National Police, says that most of the “shabu”
(methamphetamine hydrochloride), the Filipino drug of choice, is imported from China through
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Some foreign scholars say it is imported whilst others say it is
manufactured in the Philippines (see O’Connor 2014:7; and Kulsudjarit 2004:448). Just 2.35% of
the population are addicts, which is slightly higher than the USA at 2.2%, but still “below the world
average” (Medina; 2016:162; and Yee 2017:68). Duterte overstates the total number of addicts as 3
or 3.7 million (Ranada 2017). The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency finds it to be about 1.8
million (Kulsudjarit 2004:450; and Medina 2016:162). The UN Transnational Crime Report puts
the number of methamphetamine addicts at a mere 960,000 (O’Connor 2014:7). A drug situation
imagined to be more serious than it is contributes to the popular endorsement of the killings.

Finding 2. Undue fear fuels the endorsement of killings.

Filipinos view their social environments as more dangerous than they actually are. Preoccupation
with safety is a justification for EJK. Cases of rape or murder by addicts, often fuelled by an altered
state of consciousness, are not infrequent, however (e.g. Galupo 2014). The danger exists, but is at a
lower risk-level than what is attributed. When asked about EJK, beauty pageant, Miss Dimaluna,
replied, “I believe that life is a gift. If killing is to save a million lives, then it is better to sacrifice
one life than to lose everybody’s safety and endanger humanity forever” (Pinoy Trending 2017).
Whilst pageants try to please, and the integrity of answers are questionable, she thought of safety

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rather than other conceivable justification. Following a long spate of EJK, Filipinos now feel safer
to walk down the street (e.g. law student, Asian Boss 2016). Foreign critics are portrayed as
ignorant (e.g. Marco Gorospe Bildan 2017). Filipinos suggest that they come and walk through the
street. Apparently they will be robbed and then discover that Filipinos are right (e.g. jan lady 2017).
When I asked why I was not robbed in the slums and streets, Banana is Life (2017) replied, “It is
different if you were born and raised in the Philippines. If you are a visitor, they will leave you be,
or maybe admire you.” Her statement shows an illusion checked by reality.

This illusion is demonstrated by my experiences. My host in a slum, prohibited me from going out
alone, lest I be murdered or robbed (Pasay City, 30/03/2014). When alone, however, I went
anywhere, particularly to dangerous places. A Filipina was terrified listening to stories of adventures
I had in Sydney (Santa Cruz, 15/04/2014). A Filipino cautioned us into a taxi in North Harbour,
Tondo, Manila, rather than walk and be robbed (24/02/2011). When colleagues of the University of
Philippines heard I had gone to the Tondo slum area, alone, they were horrified, and considered that
perhaps I wanted to die (Katipunan, 18/02/2011). I walked through Tondo several times. Finally,
when I announced that I was going to Mindanao, twelve Filipinos, including a professor of
Mindanao studies, protested (Batangas, 02/05/2014). They said I would be taken hostage for ransom
by guerillas, or killed. “You will be killed in Zamboanga City,” the Professor said. “If not, your
ferry will be hijacked when you pass the Zulu Islands” (Batangas, 02/05/2014). These claims were
unfounded. Conflicts had abated, and Smart Traveller had deemed Zamboanga City to have now
been safe (04/2014). I travelled through Mindanao without problems. Generally speaking, Filipinos
are fearing people. The targets of the drug war pay the price for it.

Finding 3: Endorsement of EJK by Filipinos is associated with nationalism.

Commenters, and YouTube informants defend EJK within a nationalist discourse. They have picked
up Duterte’s rhetoric and express the same anti-imperialist sentiments to other countries that
condemn the killings (e.g. security officer, Asian Boss). They have developed a heightened
awareness of the “imperialist” dimensions of economic relations that first world countries have with
the Philippines. Economically, they justify EJK for nation building, to become a country like
Singapore (e.g. One Man Animator 2017). Supporters see Duterte as a good man, many as a
saviour.

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A few instances serve to illustrate. “God will protect the President,” wrote the dissonant Hope Glory
(2017). “[The] president is anointed by God. No weapon forms against him shall prosper and
everyone that speak against him shall be condemn by God. People must know it. Let all evildoers
be cut off in Jesus name.” Many speak favourably of Hitler. “People in our country see this [EJK] as
a good thing but actually it's not,” a critic wrote. “If you see this [as] bad, you could be targeted as
“stupid" or "full of crap". Wait for Duterte fans to bad-mouth you. Duterte fans see Hitler [as] a
good person too without knowing what he did or why he killed Jews. Sometimes I cry while
watching other people mourn because of this but Duterte fans just laugh it off” (Hello World 2016).
“Our country is currently suffering from a massacre lead by your so called "saviour",” a student
wrote (Dream Puas 2017). “There are two kinds of Filipino, pro-country, and people who see
Duterte as a God like Mocha Uson” (Hello World 2017). Key informant “Cat” confirmed this
(16/10/17). She added that those within the country cannot see objectively and are blinded.

Finding 4: Filipinos defending EJK use words and imagery that come straight from Duterte's
speeches.

Words and imagery with direct links to Duterte’s speeches include “narco state” and “Asian
Mexico” in reference to the Philippines, and (e.g. Mehmet Yılmaz1 2017; and WulfGalactus777
2017). In January 2016, Philippine Star (Ramirez 2016) published an article saying, “Duterte said
he would not allow drug cartels to operate in the country and gave assurance the Philippines will
not become ‘Asia’s Mexico’ which he said has become a ‘narco-state’” Searching through past
news articles through google, reveals that it is from Duterte that the Filipino narrative of the “narco
state” and “Asian Mexico” emerged. After this popularisation, the number of news items, videos,
and comments on drug topics increased exponentially. Duterte’s dehumanising antics have bolstered
representations of targets as scum (Bautista 2017:3-4). Muzik note (2017), said for instance, “The
drug pushers are the scum sh-t and p-ss on them,” and another (Banana for Life 2017), ““Filipinos
are respect[ful] first unlike other countries except for Scums!” In February 2017, Duterte said, “To
be Frank, are they even human?” (Bautista 2017:3-4). “Duterte is a key peddler of misinformation
in Philippines” (Yee 2017:71). Key informant “Grace” said, that the Filipino worldview towards
EJK and drugs came from Duterte (15/10/2017).

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Discussion

War propaganda, according to Holslag (2015:97) does not create a totally new idea, but makes use
of ideas already in place, to stir up sentiments of mass murder. It takes advantage of a social
imaginaire, “a complex network of ideas, symbols, imagery and values” (Holslag 2015:97). In other
words, in the Philippines, the marginalisation of drug pushers and addicts is not new (see also
Arugay 2016:287).
“Residents identified illegal drugs as a serious problem even before Duterte launched his
campaign… before the campaign period, the resident’s narratives were represented in low
mimetic discourses… Although the drug problem was seen as problematic, the primary
approaches seen to solve it was in line with rational and logical measures. During the campaign,
however, the discourses elevated to an apocalyptic genre, most probably affected by Duterte’s
stories” (Barrera 2017:14).
This development parallels the transitioning of anti-Semitic sentiments in Germany prior to WWII
into the mass killing of Jews with the Nazi rise to power.

The drug war has an undercurrent of class relations. The drug personality has become fused to the
image of poverty. Rather than target manufacturing sites, or high-ranking distributors, the drug war
is prejudiced in targeting the petty addicts and users in the slums (see Breuil and Rozema 2009:408-
410,418). The relatively few elites who have been implicated have had a chance to defend
themselves in court, or pay a bribe (Breuil and Rozema 2009:408-410,418). A few have been killed
by vigilantes, usually as holders of secret information about corrupt officials (Medina 2016:165).
But Socioeconomic othering of the lower class is a structural violence2 that has been a feature of the
class relations in Philippines for a long time (Makati, 21/4/2014; Breuil and Rozema 2009:410-
411,418-419; and Thompson 2016:58). Another feature of class relations are the efforts for upward
mobility and the scathing visible reality of class difference, that both sides of inequality – the rich
and poor – face every day. Overseas foreign work is a particularly strong pathway for upward
mobility (Informant “Grace”, 21/10/2017). On the world stage, the Philippines faces humiliation
perpetually by the insinuating prejudice that the wealthy have for the disadvantaged (Project 8,
28/6/2012). A climate of class discord, and social norm of not crossing class boundaries (Breuil and
Rozema 2009:418), combined with fear, creates a disjunction between the poor and the rich. The
2 Structural violence: Social injustice in which structures of society cause the differential treatment
of certain segments of society (Galtung 1969:171). Some are privileged, whilst others deprived of
the necessities of life (Galtung 1969:171).
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poor of the slums and streets have an image for dirtiness, poverty, and everything that the middle
and upper class does not want to be (Breuil and Rozema 2009:418,419). War propaganda, the
carrying out of incited murder, and the moulding of a nation’s perspectives around the normalisation
of this violence, is part of identity formation, a vigorous effort of forming a new Filipino national
identity (see Breuil and Rozema 2009:419).

Reforming of identity, as a desperate move by a nation, and manipulated and magnified by the state,
occurs during a “political and social crisis” (Holslag 2015:97). Holslag (2015:97) contends that the
self-reflection that results, compels the formation of a new notion of self, by “inventing another.” In
the process, he says, a dichotomy is created, in which the Other has no connection to dominant
society, and can be cut-off. Filipinos have widely been disappointed at the prevalence of a political
and economic culture that continues to fail to help the disadvantaged, whilst bolstering the rich, and
turning a blind eye to social problems, particularly corruption (Arugay 2016:28). Filipinos widely
perceived the former president Ninoy Acquino’s term in office, as final evidence of the failure of
liberal governance as a system (Arugay 2016:28). More largely it reflects a recognition of the
inability of neoliberalism to iron out socioeconomic inequality, and empower the disadvantaged. On
a mass scale, Filipinos sought a new political order, and new policies (Bautista 2017:3-4). Duterte
fitted the bill as someone who was an outsider to the elite club of senators in congress. He promised
to crush corruption, and through extermination, rid the “social ills” of society: criminals, but
particularly drug pushers and users. The nation would prosper and Filipinos would no longer not
need to work abroad (Informant “Cat”, October 2017). It was the token the masses were looking for.
Duterte's campaign fuelled nationalism. It validated a deep seated narrative that the Philippines does
not have to be poor, and created a vision of a rapid rise of of poverty. Formation of the new identity
began at an accelerated pace.

New identity formation transforms the dominant society into “predators” (Holslag 2015:96).
According to Holslag (2015:96) those who fit into the category of the Other are a threat to this
identity. He says, a sentiment emerges to eradicate the Other through social cleansing, as a move to
purify national identity. The Other is a construct according to a social imaginary (Holslag 2015:96).
He adds, it is a “dialectical process” of mirroring. By defining the Other with negative qualities, an
imaginary Self is created of the opposite positive qualities (Holslag 2015:96). A narrative is then
created of the Other as bad, and the Self as good (Holslag 2015:98; see also Hinton 1998:11). In this
process, the Other is dehumanised (Holslag 2015:96). As a threat to the Self, the Other must be

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killed (Holslag 2015:96). This social imaginary, operating within the framework of identity, is
where thought becomes action, and mass killings ensure (Holslag 2015:97). State sanctioned mass
killings are a physical war, but also a “symbolic and mythological one that sets to destroy” the
identity of the Other in order to preserve the new identity of Self (Holslag 2015:97). Ultimately it is
a project of creating a new Self on the national level (Holslag 2015:97). In the Philippines, the
Other is the drug pusher and addict, belonging to the poorest socioeconomic environment. These
poor people are constructed in Filipino minds as the quintessential image of what they are not. This
social minority as embodiments of the Third World condition, are a threat to the new Filipino
identity; an identity of a nation that is something like Singapore, but which is in a process of
becoming (see also Breuil and Rozema 2009:419). The drug pusher and user is the enemy of that
identity, and becomes targeted for social cleansing.

Conclusion

Drug pushers and addicts are the quintessential image of the “third world” under the new Filipino
nationalism stirred up by Duterte. As such the extermination of this counter-image of the new
prosperous and more equal society – in Filipino imagination – is fuelled by the combined primary
principles of inequality and nationalism. Inequality is connected to the humiliation of not being a
high social status country. It is connected to socioeconomic othering and fear, in which Filipinos
seek to distance themselves from poverty and the poor, and all its symptoms and consequences. The
drug pusher and addict is a social imaginary that embodies all that is poor, dirty, uncivilised, and
low status. Whilst inequality does not factor alone, its double in this case is nationalism. It is
nationalism that gives Filipinos the sense that they are better than what is narrowly suggested on the
world stage. Nationalism is the essential spark that when united to inequality, and desire for upward
mobility, seeks to obliterate the signs and symptoms of an ill economy and state “over night” – as
de Lima puts it – without the slow and prolonged pathway of good economic and institutional
policies.

In this formation of new identity, not only is there extermination, but there is the reigning in of the
country from the “imperialist” hands of prosperous countries that foster the Philippine state of
poverty. Bad neoliberal relations, internationally, give the Philippines a bad deal economically, and
foster its subservience to hegemonic powers. This is dis-empowering for the majority of a nation.
The drug war came at a time of crisis, when like the Germans, Filipinos just wanted direction, to

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build the economy, and to have good governance that gave them hope. Duterte mobilised a
depressed nation with propaganda that was particularly powerful at engineering the reality that
Filipinos now follow. Inequality and nationalism would not have created social cleansing just
anywhere, but required the right historical, political, and cultural factors for fuel. These findings
ultimately point to the role of neoliberalism, globally, in creating violence.

Word count: 3,842

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