EOD Training Handbook Rev 1

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
TRAINING HANDBOOK
CHAPTER 1
EXPLOSIVE THEORY
What is an explosive?
1. An Explosive is a chemical composition that is either, a solid, liquid or gaseous

compound, that is in a state of unstable equilibrium. When suitable initiated by heat, shock or
friction, explosives will undergo a very rapid change from the original compound into more
stable substances- usually gases. In the process of changing from an unstable to a stable
chemical compound, energy is released in the form of heat, light, sound and pressure. The
final result is a violent expansion of gaseous matter.
2. Facts about a detonation
Time: varies from about 4000m/s to 8000m/s

Energy: Heat – approximately 3000 - 4000°C
Pressure – approximately 2 – 3 million psi (Blast wave)
Light – the flash will vary depending on type of explosives.
Sound – the bang may also vary with the type of ordnance and explosive.
GENERAL PROCESSES CONCERNING EXPLOSIVES
Combustion Process
3. Many substances when raised to a sufficient temperature (ignition point) will

combine with oxygen in the air and liberate heat. If enough heat is liberated to raise the
temperature of more of the substance to the ignition point, a self supporting chain reaction
sets in, which will continue until all the substance has been oxidise (burned). The combination
of oxygen and heat converts a combustable material or fuel into gases and waste products
(ashes). The combustion or burning process of combustion must be swept away to allow for
more air. If the air supply is cut, the burning ceases.
4. A match is a good example of the combustion process as the substance coating the
match head is the Fuel. Sufficient heat is generated when the match head is stuck against the
striker of the matchbox, which raises the temperature of the fuel to ignition point. And the
oxygen is supplied by the surrounding air in the atmosphere.
Explosion Process
5. An Explosion is a special form of combustion and is characterised by the process of

“Internal Burning”. In this case, however instead of the oxygen being supplied from the
surrounding air (as with combustion), it is supplied in the form of oxidisers or oxidants and is
actually a solid material that is in intimate contact with the fuel.
6. Gunpowder is a typical example of an internal burning substance, for it contains a

combustible component or fuel (charcoal), a binder (sulphur), and an oxygen carrier
(potassium nitrate or saltpetre). Since the oxygen supply is available within the composition
itself, the burning rate is not hindered with trying to get air from the surrounding atmosphere,
and burning proceeds much more rapidly than ordinary burning in air.
EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-1

Detonation Process
7. Detonation is, for all practical purposes, instantaneous decompotiton of molecules,

resulting in a much more violent and rapid burning reaction than that occurring in the
explosion process. The extreme violence of this type of reaction, termed “Detonation”, is
associated with the fact that the combustion process is taking place between atoms of the
same molecule, instead of between separate particles as in the process of explosion.
8. In the Detonation process, a shock wave is generated and passes through the
explosive material at speeds of between 3000 and 9000 metres/sec causing the explosive
molecules to disintegrate. This molecular disintegration releases more energy, which in turn,
helps to continue the detonation process. Explosives with properties like these are:
a. Primary or Initiating Explosives (disintegrating type).

b. Secondary or High Explosives (recombination type).
CLASSIFICATION OF EXPLOSIVES
9. All explosives are classified into 1 of 3 major groups; Low Explosives, Primary High
Explosives and Secondary High Explosives.
a. Low explosives (Explosion Process)

 These are very easily initiated by heat or friction.
 They burn at a controlled rate in a layer to layer fashion on their surface.
 They are used as propellants or pushing explosives.
 Examples are gunpowder, safety fuse, rocket propellant etc.
b. Primary or Initiating High explosives (Detonation Process)

 Very sensitive and unstable, used to start the detonation process.
 Heat, shock or friction will cause detonation.
 Used in detonators, FOI of less than 50.
 Examples are Lead Azide, Lead Styphnate, and Mercury Fulminate.
WARNING
Primary High Explosives will not burn; they will always detonate if exposed to the heat
of a fire.
c. Secondary high explosives, these are divided into two groups:
d. Primers or boosters –
i Relatively sensitive to heat, shock and friction.
ii Easily initiated by a small detonation of primary explosive.
iii It is too sensitive to be used in large quantities and may explode if exposed to
heat. FOI of between 50 and 100.
iv Examples are CE (Composite Exploding), RDX and PETN.
e. Main charges –
i Very insensitive to heat, shock and friction.
ii One can actually fire bullets at them and use them as a combustible source
(not recommended).
iii These explosives require a substantial detonation in order to detonate (i.e.
from a primer or booster). FOI of above 100.
Iv Examples are TNT, Picric Acid, Amatol, Torpex, and Minol.

The Explosive train
10. The different categories of explosives all have different sensitivities. In order for a
main charge to detonate, all other charges preceding the main charge need to be initiated first.
This stepping-up process is much the same as lighting a fire using paper to light straw, straw
to light kindling, kindling to light twigs and finally, twigs to light logs.
Fuze/Striker Detonator Primer/Booster Main Charge
11. Examples of explosive trains are:
a. Low Explosive Train (e.g. Rocket Motor) = Initiator (e.g. electric bridge wire) –
Low Explosive Primer (e.g. Black powder) – Low Explosive Charge (e.g.
Cordite).
b. High Explosive Train (e.g. AC Bomb) = Initiator (e.g. Fuze) – Primary HE (e.g.
Detonator) – Primer/Booster (e.g. RDX) – Main Charge (e.g. TNT).
VELOCITY OF DETONATION (VOD)
12. The Detonating Velocity of Explosives is the actual speed at which the explosive
shock wave travels through the explosive and is measured in Meters Per Second. It is this
speed or velocity, which determines whether an explosive is a Low explosive or a High
explosive. The Velocity of detonation is dependent on several factors and as a result is not
always a true constant but variable due to these factors:
a. Loading density.
b. Diameter of the charge.
c. Strength of confinement.
d. Strength of detonator.
13. The Velocity of Detonation ranges shown below is the maximum allowed or
expected, considering all of the above variables.
a. The Velocity of Detonation for Low Explosives is up to 300m/s.
b. The Velocity of Detonation for Primary High Explosives is 3000 to 4999m/s.
c. The Velocity of Detonation for Secondary High Explosives is 5000 to 9000m/s.

Typical values of VOD are shown below:
Explosive Name Explosive Type VOD

Mercury Fulminate Primary High explosive 4,000m/s
Lead Azide Primary High explosive 4,500m/s
Lead Styphnate Primary High explosive 4,900m/s
TNT- Tri Nitro Toluene Secondary High explosive 6900m/s
CE - Composition Exploding Secondary High explosive 7160m/s
RDX/TNT Mixture Secondary High explosive 7600m/s
PETN – Pentolite Secondary High explosive 8300m/s
RDX Secondary High explosive 8400m/s
EXPLOSIVE SENSITIVITY
Falling Block Test (Drop Test)
14. The sensitivity of an Explosive is usually measured by the Falling Block Test, in
which a weight is dropped from a height onto a quantity of the explosive. The sensitivity is
inversely proportional to the height from which the weight must be dropped to produce
detonation. Some representative figures are:
Explosive Classification Height of Fall
Nitro-glycerine Primary 12 mm
Mercury Fulminate Primary 50 mm
Lead Styphnate/ Azide Primary 75 mm
PETN Primer/Booster 150 mm
RDX/CE Primer/Booster 200 mm
Picric Acid Main Charge 325 mm
TNT Main Charge 375 mm
Figure of Insensitivity (FOI)
15. Sensitivity of an explosive is usually expressed as its Figure of Insensitivity FOI, in

which a standard explosive such as RDX is used for comparison. This gives a Figure of
Insensitivity (F of I) that is related to the RDX standard of 80. Other explosives will then
appear above (More sensitive) or below (Less sensitive)
a. General Ranges of Insensitivity
 Primary High Explosives - 0-50

 Secondary HE, Primers/Boosters - 50-100
 Secondary HE, Main charges - 100 and above

b. Specific Figures of Insensitivity
 Mercury Fulminate - 10
 Lead Azide - 13
 Lead Styphnate - 20
 PETN - 50
 RDX - 80
 CE/Tetryl - 90
 Comp B - 100
 Torpex - 110
 Picric Acid - 120
 TNT - 150
Hot Spot Theory of Sensitivity
16. According to this theory, passage of a shock wave through an explosive causes
movement of crystals. Friction then causes localized “Hot Spots” and the energy produced
initiates the breakdown of the molecules.
17. Other materials may be added to a basic explosive to either increase or decrease its
sensitivity, the latter being the most common in order to improve safety in handling. As an
example of this, if TNT is melted and powdered glass or sand mixed with it, its sensitivity
will be considerably increased, the rough material having increased the number of “Hot
Spots”. Conversly, the addition of lubricants, such as oil, grease or beeswax will greatly
reduce the sensitivity of an explosive.
18. An excellent example of the practical use of this technique is in plastic explosive. The
basic explosive in PE4 is RDX, which has a FOI of 80. This is mixed with 12% “Plasticiser”
which consists of liquid paraffin and lithium stearate. The resulting malleable and easily
handled explosive has a FOI of 120 and is, consequently, much safer than RDX alone. RDX
is often mixed with TNT to make explosives that incorporate the best qualities of each (i.e.
more stable than RDX, but are more powerful and violent than TNT alone.
19. Conversly, the sensitivity of Picric Acid, with its FOI of 120, can be increased by
adding sand to the mix. The FOI for a Picric Acid/ Sand composition is in the range of a
primary explosive (i.e. approximately 43), so it has changed from a Secondary High
Explosive, Main Charge to a Primary High Explosive.
Other Factors Affecting Sensitivity and VOD
20. There are many factors that have a profound influence of the sensitivity and
detonating velocity of an explosive. Among the most important of these factors are:
a. The size of the explosive crystals.

b. The explosive density (i.e., pressed, powdered, blocked or cast fillings).
c. The prescence or extent of coating (i.e. wax or plasticisers).
d. The confinement of the explosive container.
e. The environmental temperature.
f. Moisture absorbed by the explosive (Hygroscopic action).
21. By applying or increasing the presence of the above factors, the velocity of detonation
and explosive sensitivity will be affected as follows:

Affect on VOD Affect on Sensitivity
Increase Crystal size Decrease Increase

Increase Explosive Density Increase Decrease
Apply Lubricants Decrease Increase
Increase Confinement Increase Decrease
Increase Temperature Increase Decrease
Add Moisture Decrease Decrease
EXPLOSIVE POWER
Power of Explosives (Power Index)
22. Explosive power can be measured in one of two ways. This can be done by
calculation or experimentation. One will measure the potential power whereas the other will
measure the actual power. There is a law of thermodynamics that states that: “Whereas all the
work done in a system can be converted to heat, not all the heat can be converted into
work.”Simply put, a calculation of power will express the whole potential whereas
experimental power will include a whole range of contributing factors such as: conditions of
the materials, conditions of the stemming, density of packing etc.
23. The power of explosives is the amount of work an explosive can do, compared with
the standard explosive, Picric Acid, which has the Power Index of 100. Other explosives have
their power indicated by a greater or lesser number than 100. Therefore the Power index is
actually expressed as a percentage compared to the power index assigned to Picric Acid
(100).
Trauzl Lead Block Test
24. One Power Test that has been used since the beginning of the century uses the Trauzl
test, in which 20 gramms of explosive is detonated inside a lead block of standard strength .
the expansion of the cavity after detonation is measured and compared with the expansion
given by the same weight of Picric Acid (i.e. Picric Acid is used as a base value and assigned
a “Power Figure of 100”). Power statistics for certain secondary or high explosives using the
Lead Block (Trauzl Test) are below:
 TNT - 95
 Picric Acid - 100
 CE/Tetryl - 120
 Amatol - 120
 RDX/TNT - 125
 PE4 - 128
 Comp B - 130
 Torpex - 154
 PTN - 165
 RDX (100%) - 170
 Nitro-glycerine - 175

Brisance
25. Knowledge on both “Power” and the “Velocity of Detonation” of an explosive is

useful in assessing its overall performance. The combination of these two properties is a
measure of the “Brissance” of the explosive. Brisance is the shattering effect of an explosive
and is the main effect that the Detonation Pressure has on an explosion. The word Brisance is
derived from the French word briser = to break.
26. It is the property of brisance that enables a high explosive projectile to shatter its
casing and produce high velocity fragmentation. It is also brisance that enables an explosive
to shatter a projectile casing when destroying a projectile during EOD Disposal operations.
On the occasions where an explosive has been used to destroy a thick cased projectile and the
end result was a flattening of the UXO rather than its destruction. This is a direct indication of
the lack of sufficient detonation pressure or Brisance.
27. Brissance is measured by the dent test. Definite weight and shape of an explosive is
detonated on a 6mm steel plate of known tensile strength. The indentation or perforation is
then measured against a standard explosive. Brissance and VOD are very closely related.
TYPES OF DETONATION
Full Detonation (High Order)
28. In this case, sufficient energy (Shock) is provided so that complete detonation of all
the explosive material is accomplished at maximum detonation velocity. Either the ordnance
has functioned as designed, or an attempt to open the case and scatter the explosive (Low
Order) has failed.
Partial Detonation (Low Order) Deflagration)
29. In this case, either a complete detonation at lower than the normal velocity has
occurred or an incomplete detonation has taken place. In the latter case, the initiating shock
wave does not have enough energy to maintain the chain reaction detonation. Therefore, the
detonation wave dies away before the entire explosive has detonated and the remaining
explosive is thrown around. The causes of a partial detonation is usually either:
a. Poor contact in the explosive train.

b. Deterioration of the explosive material.
c. Inadequate shock (i.e. VOD) applied by the initiating charge (Detonator).
Sympathetic Detonation (Detonation by Influence)
30. Sympathetic Detonation is basically, detonation of one explosive charge caused by

the shock wave of another. More specifically, as a detonation wave reaches the end of a
column of explosive, the pressure wave is projected out into the air. In the medium of air, the
pressure wave undergoes a rapid decrease in velocity and pressure until it eventually dies out.
If the shock wave hits another mass of explosive before the pressure and velocity have
decreased too much, sympathetic detonation of the second charge can result.
31. The distance over which a sympathetic detonation will occur varies considerably
because of the varying sensitivities of the different types of explosives. (i.e. Primary
explosives can be detonated sympathetically at a much greater distance than will TNT). Some
weights and distance figures in which sympathetic detonation will occur are as follows:

Explosive Distance
11.34 Kg 0.6 – 3 metres

22.7 Kg 1.4 metres
45.4 Kg 1.3 – 6 metres
90.7 Kg 2 – 7 metres
363 Kg 2.5 – 8 metres
32. As shown by the above figures, the distance over which sympathetic detonation will
occur which increases with the increased size of the initiating charge. Sympathetic detonation
underwater is harder to achieve because the water very rapidly cools the shock wave down.
Therefore direct contact is normally required in order to get a full high order sympathetic
detonation underwater.
Burning to Detonation
33. High Explosive will usually burn quite safely, but if the combustion is fierce enough
and there is a high degree of confinement or lack of ventilation, the rate of heating may be
such that burning changes to detonation. For this reason, whenever explosive is burned out,
adequate ventilation must be provided and mechanical shock during combustion must be
avoid.
ADDITIVES
34. Modern Explosives are rarely used in there pure state. Their explosive characteristics
are usually modified by mixing with other explosives or miscellaneous non explosive
additives. For example, TNT is a very inefficient high explosive because the trinitrotoluene
molecules contain insufficient oxygen atoms to successfully burn all of its carbon atoms. The
result of a TNT detonation is a cloud of black smoke, which indicates wasted energy. This
fact led to the production of Amatol, in which ammonium nitrate (an oxygen agent) is added
to the TNT in order to provide additional oxygen for burning. The result is an increase in
power (i.e. power increase from 95 for TNT to 120-135 for amatol, but a decrease in velocity
of detonation (VOD) and brisance (i.e. VOD decrease from 6950 m/sec for TNT to between
5100 – 5850 m/sec for amatol.
35. Adding powdered Aluminium to an explosive greatly increases its power by

increasing overall heat and gas production. The fact that there are more gases produced during
detonation makes aluminiumized explosives (i.e. Torpex, Minol) much more effective.
METHODS OF LOADING HIGH EXPLOSIVE
36. Cast High explosive is melted with hot water or low pressure steam, poured into a
container and cooled. It is the most economical method of obtaining maximum
density. Most cast- loaded explosives have melting points below 100ºC (the boiling
point) and are relatively insensitive.
37. Pressed Loose or lubricated explosive is poured into a container and

compressed with a ram to the desired density. This method is used for explosives that
have a melting point too high for casting. Remote methods are required in order to
use this method and this fact makes the pressed – filling method expensive.

38. Pouring In this case, granular or flaked explosive is poured into the container.
39. Block Fitted The explosive is cast or pressed into blocks of predetermined size and
shape and then fitted in the container. This method is used by all countries to speed
the loading of explosives into Bombs and projectiles.
SHAPED CHARGE DESIGN
History
40. In 1888 an American named C. E. Munroe discovered that by making a cavity or re-
entrant shape in one end of an explosive charge produces a unique effect. The conical shock
front emerging from the cavity, produces a reflected wave behind it, which then becomes
superimposed on the parent wave and this reinforced narrow front, moves forward at great
speed followed by a jet of gas. This Hollow Charge effect, concentrates most of the energy
from the explosion into one focused point, allowing a localised penetration never achieved
before.
41. This discovery was further improved in time for the 1939-45 war in which hollow
charge weapons and demolition charges were used extensively.
The Improvements included the lining of the cavity with an inert metallic material and the
inclusion of a ‘Stand-off’ facility to allow space for the formation and development of the jet.
This phenomenon is used in many modern military weapons such as HEAT warheads in
Rockets Missiles, Projectiles, Sub-munitions and rifle grenades.
Critical factors in the effectiveness of a Munroe Cone shaped charge.
Stand off The jet needs to travel a certain distance in order to build up the
maximum length of jet to increase the efficiency of penetration.
Usually 3-4 times the diameter of the cone.
Initiator position The position of the initiation is crucial. It must be placed directly
above the apex of the cone, or the jet will not develop correctly.
Filling A shaped charge must have a uniform filling and density. If air
pockets are left the jet will be distorted.
Cone material soft metal such as copper or zinc gives best results, but any metal will
do, even plastic is effective.
Cone angle the optimum angle in the cone is 80°. This gives the best overall
penetration.
Attack angle the shaped charge must be placed directly over the target (at a right
angle / 90°) to prevent ricochet.

Fig 1 – Typical Heat Projectile (Munroe Cone Shaped Charge)
Method of Penetration.
42. Penetration capacity of the jet is due to it great kinetic energy directed at
a small area of impact. The penetration of a thick metal target by the jet is not
due to the melting of the target material or to erosion, but rather to plastic flow
of the material when exposed to a pressure of some 230-300 kbar for about
four microseconds. The liner slug does not physically contribute to the penetration of
the target and is often found lodged in the penetration hole. A copper lined HEAT
warhead against a steel target will typically produce a hole approximately five cone
diameters deep.
Plate Charges (Miznay Shardin)
43. The Misznay-Schardin effect, or platter effect, is a characteristic of the detonation of

a broad sheet of explosive. The explosive blast expands directly away from (perpendicular to)
the surface of an explosive. Unlike the blast from a rounded explosive charge, which expands
in all directions, the blast produced by an explosive sheet expands primarily perpendicular to
its plane, in both directions. If one side is backed by a heavy or fixed object, however, the
majority of the blast (that is, most of the rapidly expanding gas and its kinetic energy) will be
sent in the direction away from it.
44. This effect was studied and experimented with by explosive experts Misznay, a
Hungarian, and Dr. Hubert Schardin, a German, who initially sought to develop a more
effective anti-tank mine for Nazi Germany. World War II ended before their design became
usable, but they and others continued their work. The British AT2 mine and the American
Claymore mine rely on this effect.
45. While most Axial cavities charges are conical in shape for maximum penetration, a
hemispherical cavity can be used if a shallower but wider penetration is required. These plate
charges are less efficient in penetration but surprisingly effective hollow charges. The TMRP
6 A/T Mine utilise plate charges for penetration of steel targets.
Fig 2 – TMRP 6 (Miznay Shardin shaped charge)

Single Plane Shaped Charges
46. In order to achieve the deepest penetration, a cone focuses the detonation wave in two
dimensions. A linear or planar jet can also be used to focus the detonation wave in one
dimension, producing a long cutting, rather than penetrating wave. This is best demonstrated
by the effectiveness of Charge Linear Cutting (CLC), Explosive cutting tape (ECT) and Blade
family of linear shaped charges.
Fig 3- Blade low order technique result on a 1000lb Aircraft Bomb

PROPELLANTS
General Description
47. Conventional propellants consist of mixtures of one or more explosives with various
additives formulated and carefully processed to burn smoothly without detonating. Gun
propellants are sometimes called smokeless powders, a term which originated in the 19th
Century to distinguish the newly developed nitrocellulose propellants from the traditional
gunpowder ones. They are indeed smokeless on firing, certainly when compared with
gunpowder, which gives off more than 50 percent of its weight as solid products. These
smokeless powders are not ‘powders’ in the ordinary sense of the word; they are produced in
characteristic shapes such as flakes, ribbons, spheres, cylinders or tubes.
Spherical
Grain
Cord Propellant
Tube Propellant
Multi-Tubular Propellant
Slotted Tube Propellant
Flake Propellant Tubular Grain

Ribbon Propellant
48. Despite the varying shapes of propellant, the volume of each grain rises in rough
proportion to the size of the gun, due to the lengthening time scale over which they are
required to burn.
Rate of Burning
49. The burning rate of a propellant is governed by the instantaneous pressure at the
burning surfaces. Therefore the more surfaces on the propellant, the faster the rate of burn.
Propellants burn from the outside surface, inwards in a radial manner. In the simplest case of
a spherical grain, the sphere of solid propellant shrinks constantly as the flame front travels
into the propellant. The rate of burning is the velocity at which the flame front travels inwards
at right angles to the burning surface. This can also be defined as the rate of regression of the
burning surface. To prevent the sides of a strand or stick of propellant burning, it is inhibited
by a coating of flame resistant material, leaving only the end or Flame Front exposed.

Flame
Front
A Spherical Propellant Grain A Propellant Strand.

Burns on all surfaces burns only on the flame front
Grain Geometry
50. The precise geometric form of the individual propellant grain in its unburned state is
of great importance to the internal ballistics of the gun. The grain geometry governs the
following factors:
a. Burning surface area.

b. Loading density.
c. Ignition efficiency.
Solid Propellant
51. It is evident that solid propellant grains in the form of spheres, plates or cylinders will
undergo a decrease in surface area during burning, as all surfaces burn. This behaviour is
termed ‘digressive burning’ and results in a steadily decreasing burning pressure.
Single Perforated Forms
52. A tubular grain of propellant burns with the maintenance of a constant surface
burning area, because the surface of the perforation is increasing at approximately the same
rate as the outer surface of the grain is decreasing. This form of grain geometry is said to have
a neutral burning characteristic and results in a constant burning pressure.
Multi-Perforated Grains.
53. The single perforation can be replaced by a larger number of holes, up to ten or more
if the grain size is large enough. As the geometry becomes more complex, some extra
considerations arise. For a small number of relatively large perforations, the combined effects
of the enlarging inner surfaces will exceed the decrease of the outer surface and the burning
will therefore be progressive in the early stages. The degree of progressiveness will vary with
the number and relative diameter of the holes. In all multi-perforated grains, when the burning
reaches the stage at which the perforations meet, the grain disintegrates into a number of
longitudinal slivers. This is known as the ‘sliver-point’, and the type of burning then changes
from progressive to digressive. In general, a large number of perforations entail a smaller
distance between burning surfaces and this causes the sliver-point to be reached earlier. The
overall effect of increasing the number of perforations beyond seven is to flatten the
pressure/time curve of the charge.

3 x Perforations
‘P’
Pressure
1 x Perforation
10 x Perforation
‘T’ – Burn Time
Slotted Tube
54. This is a common form of stick propellant and although it is manufactured as a

tube and then slotted, it burns digressively like a flat ribbon.
The Chemical Nature of Propellants
55. All solid gun propellants contain Nitrocellulose. This material being a nitrated natural
polymer, gives the mechanical strength and resilience necessary to prevent breaking up of the
propellant grain during handling and firing. Any such breakage would result in an altered
ballistic performance of the charge. Other important ingredients of propellants are Nitro-
glycerine and Nitroguanidine (picrite).
There are three basic types of propellant composition, these are:
a. Single base propellants.
b. Double base propellants.
c. Triple base propellants.
Single Base Propellants
56. This is a propellant in which nitrocellulose (NC) is the only explosive ingredient. It is
employed in all kinds of guns from pistols to artillery weapons.
Double Base Propellants

57.
A double base propellant contains Nitrocellulose (NC) and Nitro-glycerine (NG).
Double base propellant is more energetic than single base propellant depending on the
proportion of NG present. The double base propellant is commonly restricted to pistol and
sub-machine gun ammunition.
Triple Base Propellants
58. Triple based propellants contain up to 55% by weight of Nitroguanidine (picrite) as

well as Nitrocellulose and also a limited amount of Nitro-glycerine. The triple base propellant
is used in larger types of gun because of the difficult ignition characteristics of triple base
propellants and also because of their chief virtue, the production of minimal gun-flash.

There is a further class of propellant compositions called ‘Energised propellant’, which
contain a significant proportion of the nitramine explosive, RDX.
Other Ingredients in Propellants
59. In addition to the basic explosive components used to manufacture propellants, there
are other additives that are also used. These include the following:
 Stabilisers – Vaseline, Chalk, Diphenylamine, Carbamite etc.

 Plasticisers – Diethyl Phthalate, Glycerol Triacetate, Carbamite etc
 Surface lubricants – Graphite.
 Flash inhibitors – Potassium Sulphate, Potassium Nitrate etc
 Decoppering agents – Lead or Tin.
 Anti-wear additives – Magnesium Silicate.
 Coolants – Mineral Jelly, Carbamite, Glycerol Triacetates etc.
 Surface moderants – Dinitrotoluene, Methyl Centralite ect
These additives can be added during manufacture, as an addition to the finished grains or as a
separate component within the cartridge itself.

CHAPTER 2
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE (EO) LAND SERVICE AMMUNITION
INTRODUCTION
General
1. The term Land Service Ammunition (LSA) covers all items of ordnance which are propelled,
placed or thrown during land warfare. They may be filled or charged with explosives, smoke,
incendiary or pyrotechnics.
2. Items of ammunition which fail to function correctly after initiation are termed blinds. It is
assessed that between 4% and 10% of LSA fails to function during peacetime usage, with the figure
rising to as much as 30% during times of conflict.
Identification of LSA
3. LSA comprises a wide range of ordnance types. The following will assist in positive
identification (Figure 2-1).
a. Technical manuals, publications, intelligence reports and historical reports.
b. External markings including colour coding, body stencilling, body and fuze stamping.
c. Dimensions.
d. Generic shapes (vital if external markings have disappeared).
e. Fuzing type.
f. Estimation of weight.
g. Operator experience.
Fig 2-1 Aids to Identification

4. LSA can be broken down into 5 main groups:
a. Projectiles (Shells).
b. Mortars.
c. Rockets.
d. Grenades.
e. Landmines (These are detailed in chapter 3)
LSA Fuzing
5. The function of a fuze is twofold:
a. To ensure the projectile remains safe during storage, transportation, handling and
firing.
b. To ensure the munition does not function until intended.
6. Both the position and type of fuze can help identity the munition. Fuzes are classified by:
a. Their assembled position in the weapon (nose or base).
b. The means of initiation (impact, time or proximity). When a combination of methods

is used, the fuze is classified as multi-role.
Impact Fuzes
7. Impact fuzes operate on contact with the target and are either Point Detonating (PD) or Point
Initiating Base Detonating (PIBD). The former are normally used with blast/fragmentation munitions
and bursting carrier shells, and the latter with HEAT or HESH rounds. They can operate on Super
Quick (SQ) or Delay (D) modes, the delay mode allowing the projectile to pass into a target before
exploding.
a. PD Fuzes. Recognition Features:
(1) Always nose mounted.
(2) Normally one piece construction.
(3) An impact nipple at the nose of the fuze.
(4) May have an SQ or D setting (Figure 2-2).

Figure 2-2- Point Detonating Fuze with SQ and Delay Modes
b. Point Initiating Base Detonating Fuze. PIBD fuzes are used with HEAT projectiles
and normally contain piezo-electric crystals. On impact, the piezo-electric crystals are
crushed and create an electric current which fires the detonator at the rear of the shaped
charge (See figure 2-3). Piezo-electric crystals are extremely sensitive and projectiles
with such fuzes should never be moved. PIBD fuzes are.
(1) Always nose mounted.
(2) The fuze housing body is normally made of aluminium.
(3) They are small in size.
(4) Usually visible impact nipple.
Fig 2-3 PIBD
Time Fuzes
8. Time fuzes operate after a pre-selected period of time and are always fitted to the nose of the
munition. They are normally used with carrier munitions but can be used with airburst HE projectiles,
although modern airburst projectiles use proximity fuzes. The 3 main types of time fuze are.
a. Mechanical Time Fuzes (MTF). (Figure 2-4). Recognition points are:
(1) Time scale engraved on the outside.

(2) Normally 2-piece construction.
(3) No blow out holes. Possibly manufactured holes.
(4) A clockwork mechanism which can be seen using field radiography (X Ray)
Figure 2-4 - Mechanical Time Fuze,
b. Electronic Time Fuzes (MTF). (Figure 2-5). Recognition points are:
(1) May have time scale engraved on the outside. But not always
(2) Normally 2-piece construction.
(3) No blow out holes.
(4) 2 different construction materials, i.e. plastic and metal.
(5) Similar in appearance to a proximity fuze.
(6) Electronic components which can be seen using field radiography (X Ray)
Figure 2-5 Electronic Time fuze.
c. Powder Train Time Fuzes (PTTF). (Figure 2-6). Recognition points are:
(1) Time scaled engraved on the setting rings.
(2) Normally three-piece construction.

(3) Gas vents holes for the release of excess gases. In most cases, the vent holes
are sealed with thin metal plugs which, if functioned, will have blown out leaving
scorch marks in the immediate area.
(4) A brass ring is usually visible which houses the compressed powder.
Figure 2-6 - Powder Train Time Fuze’s
Proximity Fuzes (Variable Time)

9. Proximity, or Variable Time (VT), fuzes are designed to employ either an active Radio
Frequency (RF) or passive Infrared (IR) means of target selection. Some fuzes are set to the
calculated time of flight of the projectile to target. If the proximity mode does not function, the fuze
will function in PD mode on impact with the target. Proximity fuzes are normally used with airburst
HE projectiles.
10. Recognition Features:
a. Always nose mounted.
b. Nose cap normally made of plastic, nylon or fibreglass.
c. May have a graduated setting sleeve (Figure 2-7).
d. Main body is made of steel.
11. Safety. A projectile suspected of being fitted with a VT fuze must be approached from the
rear as movement in front of an active RF fuze may cause the fuze to function.

Figure 2-7 - Proximity Fuze with Timing Sleeve
Multi-Role Fuzes
12. Multi-Role Fuzes (MRFs) can operate in both proximity and point detonating modes and are
normally used with HE projectiles (See figure 2-8). They are:
a. Always nose mounted.
b. The nose cap or part of the nose cap is normally made of plastic, nylon or fibreglass.
c. Setter contacts should be present / may have an SQ or D setting.
Figure 2-8 – Multi Role Fuse

Safety Considerations When Dealing With Fuzes
13. The type of fuzing and its condition must be positively identified.
14. The fuze should not be jarred, dropped or otherwise mishandled.
15. No attempt should be made to reset a fuze to an indicated safe position.
16. Particular caution must be observed with piezo-electric fuzes. Shadows should not be cast on
the fuze as the temperature change could cause the crystals to generate a current.
17. Proximity-fuzed and multi-role projectiles should be approached from the rear.
18. The RF status quo must be maintained when dealing with proximity and multi-role fuzed
projectiles.
19. If fuzes and projectiles are found separately, they must be kept so.
20. Extreme caution should be exercised if transporting fuzes as most fuses contain a booster
charge.
PROJECTILES
Definition
21. A projectile, or shell, is defined as an object capable of being propelled by a force, normally a
gun, and continuing in motion by virtue of its kinetic energy. It contains a fuzing mechanism and a
filling (Figure 2-9)
Generic Features
22. Fuze. Projectiles may be nose fuzed or base fuzed. The location and type may help to
identify the projectile.
23. Ogive. The ogive is the curved part of the face of the body of a projectile which assists in
streamlining. It may be part of the body or take the form of a ballistic cap or windshield to assist in
restoring the ballistic shape of some HEAT projectiles.
24. Bourrelet. The bourrelet is the raised, machined cylindrical surface at the forward end of the
body and extending from the ogive towards the driving band. It bears on the rifling and aids in
centring and guiding the projectile in the gun barrel.
25. Body. The main section of the projectile is usually of one piece forged construction. The
diameter of the body is less than the bourrelet and the driving band to prevent it from bearing on the
rifling.
26. Driving Band. Towards its base, a projectile may carry a cylindrical ring made of a relatively
soft material (copper, sintered iron, gilding metal or plastic) which, as the projectile is forced up the
barrel, is engraved by the rifling to impart a stabilizing spin on the projectile. The driving band also
centres the projectile in the barrel and produces a gas-tight seal. Score marks on the driving band are
a positive indication that the projectile has been fired. Some HEAT projectiles are fired from smooth
bore barrels and may be fitted with slipping driving bands (plastic obturating rings), or use fore and
aft bourrelets.

Fig 2-9 Generic Features of a Projectile
Projectile Classification
27. Projectiles are divided into 3 sub-groups:
a. High Explosive (HE).
b. Carrier.
c. Shot.
High Explosive Projectiles

28. HE projectiles are sub-divided into the following 4 roles:
a. Fragmentation or blast or blast/frag
b. High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT).
c. High Explosive Squash Head (HESH).
d. Armour-Piercing (AP) and Semi Armour-Piercing (SAP).
Fragmentation or Blast HE Projectiles

29. Fragmentation or blast HE projectiles (Figure 2-10) are designed to create maximum blast and
fragmentation, with penetration of the target a secondary consideration.
a. Long, pointed ogival nose and streamlined body.
b. Square or tapered base. Boat tailed/streamlined.

c. One-piece body construction.
d. Base plate screwed or welded to the base, occasionally of one piece construction.
e. Copper driving band near the base of the projectile.
f. Body construction normally thin.
g. Low charge to weight ratio.
h. Fuzed with point-initiating and/or base-detonating fuze.
i. If no driving band is present, it may use two bourrelets, or a plastic version of a

driving band, sometimes called a slipping band for firing from smooth Bore Barrels.
Figure 2- 10, HE Projectile
31. Hazards. Blast and fragmentation.
32. Safety Considerations.
a. Has the projectile has been fired or not? If it has been fired, the lands of the rifling
will have cut into the driving band, leaving visible scoring/grooves
b. Which type of fuse is fitted, Time, Impact or Proximity?
c. If a proximity fuse is suspected approach the projectile from the rear. Do not walk in
front of a Proximity fuse.
d. Has the fuze been damaged and/or partially functioned.
33. Disposal. If the projectile has been fired, the charge should be placed as close as possible to
the ogive without touching it. This is where construction is at its thinnest. It will also be adjacent to
the booster, which aids detonation. If the projectile is unfired or unfuzed, the charge may be placed
or taped directly on the projectile (Figure 2-11)

Figure 2- 11 HE Projectile showing charge placement for Dem in situ
34. ERFBBB Demands on increased range for projectiles led to the introduction of a Base Bleed
unit which is fitted to the base of the projectile. ERFBBB (extended-range full-bore base-bleed) have
a long, finely pointed nose to work well at their initial supersonic speeds, and a tapered base filled
with a "base bleed" burning low explosive compound. This unit does not act as a booster but instead
helps reduce drag effect on the projectile thus increasing its range when fired (Fig 2-12)
Fig 2-12 ERFBBB
HEAT Projectiles
35. HEAT projectiles (Figure 2-13) use a shaped charge, or charges, to penetrate armour.
a. Ogival, conical or probe shaped nose designed to provide ballistic stand-off.

b. Two-piece body joined at the ogive or cone/body joint. The nose may be of lighter
construction than main body.
c. Parallel-sided body in the area of the shaped charge.
d. Thin body construction.
e. Low charge to weight ratio.
f. Likely to be fitted with a Point Initiating Base Detonating (PIBD) fuze.
g. May be fitted with a nylon obturating ring.
h. May be fitted with fixed or folding fins hinged to the base.
37. Hazards. Shaped charge, blast and fragmentation.
38. Safety Considerations:
a. Has the projectile has been fired or not?
b. Orientation of the shaped charge (the direction its pointing in)
c. Has the piezo-electric fuze, been damaged or not? (It should NOT be disturbed.)
Figure 2-13 – HEAT Projectile (85mm BK-2M)
39. Disposal. Disposal of HEAT projectiles is with a charge positioned to collapse the cone of
the shaped charge. For blinds, especially those with piezo-electric fuzes, the charge must be placed
above the cone and not pressed onto the body of the projectile. HEAT projectiles should be disposed
of individually or in small quantities (Figure 2-14)

Figure 2- 14 HEAT Projectile showing charge placement for Dem in situ
HESH Projectiles
40. HESH projectiles (Figure 2-15) use the shock wave imparted by detonation momentarily after
impact to spall the inside of the armour plate of a vehicle or the concrete of a bunker or building.
a. Blunt ogival nose.
b. Single piece body construction.
c. Parallel sides.
d. High charge to weight ratio.
e. Thin case construction.
f. Copper driving band.
g. Base fuze protected in a base fuze assembly, normally made of aluminium.
h. Lead and or copper gas check rings pressed around the base plug and fuze to prevent
hot gases entering the projectile through the base plate and igniting the charge.
i. May have cavities in the projectile base containing tracer elements.

Figure 2-15 - HESH Projectile
42. Hazards. Blast.
a. Has the projectile been fired or not?
b. Does it have a fuse? (Practice HESH rounds do not have fuzes).
44. Disposal. A HESH round is disposed using a charge placed just above the driving band but
not touching it. The charge should not be placed against the ogive as this area is likely to contain an
inert filling (Figure 2-16)
Fig 2-16 HESH Projectile showing charge placement for dem in situ.
Armour/Semi Armour Piercing Projectiles
45. AP/SAP projectiles (Figure 2-17) are designed to punch through armour and concrete.
Primarily used by naval forces, they contain small, high explosive charges for after-penetration
effects.
a. Has a blunt ogive nose, usually fitted with clamp flats or threads for attachment to the
projectile body and a ballistic cap over the blunt nose to make the projectile more
aerodynamic.
b. One-piece body construction.

c. Copper driving band.
d. Very low charge-to-weight ratio.
e. Fitted with a base fuze only.
f. May be fitted with a tracer element in the base.
g. May be fitted with an armour piercing cap.
h. Contains a small high explosive bursting charge.
Figure 2-17 - Armour Piercing Tracer Projectile
47. Hazards. Fragmentation.
48. Disposal. Disposal of AP/SAP is by a charge placed in the area of the driving band to
detonate the burster charge and the base fuze (Figure 2-18)
Figure 2-18 AP/SAP projectile showing charge placement for dem in situ

Carrier Projectiles
49. Carrier projectiles are designed to carry their contents to a specific area then cause the
contents to be expelled. They may be used for:
a. Smoke screening, marking, signalling.
b. Illuminating.
c. Incendiary.
d. Propaganda.
e. Decoy-radar echo (chaff).
f. Anti-personnel (shrapnel or flechettes).
g. Anti-Personnel (AP) or Anti-Vehicle (AV) mines.
h. Chemical agents.
50. Carrier projectiles may dispense their payload using one of 4 methods:
a. Base Ejection (BE).
b. Bursting.
c. Nose Ejection (NE).
d. Case Emission (CE).
Base Ejection Carrier Projectiles

51. BE projectiles (Figure 2-19) are designed to eject their contents through the weakened base
section by use of a low explosive charge:
a. Ogival streamlined nose.
b. Nose/Time fuzed.
c. Parallel sides (on older items).
d. Square or tapered base.
e. One or two-piece body construction.
f. Base plate held in place by weakened PVC ring or shear pins.
g. Copper driving band may be fitted.
h. Base plate ejected if the munition has functioned.
i. Contains a small low explosive burster/expulsion charge.

Figure 2-19 – Functioning of a Base Ejection Carrier Projectile
53. Hazards. The contents of the projectile and the low explosive ejection charge.
a. Whether or not the projectile has been fired.
b. Whether the projectile contains sub munitions.
c. The rear of the projectile should be avoided.
55. Disposal. For disposal, a charge should be placed as near to the ogive area as possible,
without touching, to initiate the low explosive ejection charge and cause the projectile to function as
designed. If the projectile is carrying sub munitions, a longitudinal charge should be placed running
from the ogive to the base to ensure the sub munitions are not ejected on detonation (Figure 2-20)
Figure 2-20 – Charge Placement for a projectile carrying sub munitions.
Bursting Carrier Projectiles

56. Bursting carrier projectiles (Figure 2-21and 22) contain an HE charge which bursts the
projectile and dispels its contents. They normally contain smoke (White Phosphorous (WP)) or
chemical agents, and in most cases are ballistically matched to the equivalent HE blast fragmentation
projectile.

a. A long, pointed ogival nose and streamlined body.
b. A point-detonating nose fuze / a fuse well adaptor ring may also be present between
the fuse and projectile body.
c. One piece body construction (including base).
d. A square or tapered base.
e. A copper diving band near the base.
f. Colour codes and marking will distinguish an unexploded bursting carrier projectile
from an equivalent HE blast fragmentation projectile. Radiography can also be utilized.
g. Contains an exploder containing an HE bursting charge.
h. Filler plugs may be present in the base, Fuse adapter rings may indicate the use of
WP.
Propellant Bursting Charge Fill Fuse Adapter Ring
Figure 2-21 - Typical Bursting Carrier Projectile
Figure 2-22– The picture on the left Shows the addition of a fuse adapter
ring on a Carrier Projectile
58. Hazards. The contents (WP or chemical).

b. Is the projectile a bursting carrier or an equivalent HE blast fragmentation projectile
(radiography should be used)?
c. If WP filled, the danger area should be extended downwind to allow the toxic smoke
to disperse. WP also has an active incendiary effect. If WP items are leaking and require
transporting to a disposal area, they should be immersed in water.
d. Heavy concentrations of pyrotechnic incendiary mixtures should not be inhaled.
60. Disposal. A longitudinal charge should be placed running from the ogive to the base to
ensure all exploders and fill are destroyed on detonation. After demolition of a WP filled munition,
the area should be fenced, marked and allowed to weather for 3 months. If doubt exists as to whether
the projectile filling is HE or WP, the danger distances for HE should be used and precautions taken
for WP (Figure 2-23_
Explosive charge placement

Figure 2-23 Carrier Smoke Projectile showing charge placement for dem in situ
Nose Ejection Carrier Projectiles
61. Nose Ejection (NE) carrier projectiles (Figure 2-24) are designed to eject their contents
through the weakened nose of the projectile by use of a low explosive charge. These projectiles are
uncommon but exhibit many of the features found in other modern ordnance types.
a. A pointed ogival nose.
b. A parallel-sided body.
c. A nose/Time fuzed.
d. Two piece construction in the area of the shoulder. By design, this is the weakened
part of the projectile.
e. Square base of one-piece construction.
f. Could be fitted with a copper driving band.
g. Contains a low explosive expulsion charge.

Figure 2-24 – Typical Nose Ejection Projectiles
63. Hazards. The contents and the low explosive ejection charge.
a. Does the projectile contain shrapnel?
b. Has the time fuze functioned?
c. The front of the projectile should be avoided.
ensure that exploders and fill are consumed on detonation. This also ensures detonation of the fuze
and the low explosive ejection charge.
Base Emission Projectiles

66. Base Emission (BE) projectiles are uncommon and are designed to deliver their contents
(smoke or chemical agents) through the base of the projectile. An alloy plug in the base of the
projectile is melted by a small combustion charge and the gases escape through the resulting hole.
a. A flat head (closing disc).
b. A cylindrical body, normally made of steel.
c. Driving band.
d. A threaded steel/alloy plug in the base.
e. Normally one-piece body construction.
68. Hazards. The contents of the projectile, normally smoke but possibly chemical.
b. Fumes should not be inhaled.

c. The base of the projectile should be avoided.
ensure all exploders and fill are consumed on detonation. For chemical filled projectiles, the disposal
techniques described in Chapter 6 should be followed.
Shot Projectiles
71. The term shot defines a solid projectile which is designed to penetrate a target solely by
Kinetic Energy (KE). Shot projectiles do not contain explosive as a main fill, bursting charge or fuze,
but may contain a pyrotechnic tracer element.
a. Has a similar profile to an HE projectile (early designs). Most modern penetrators

resemble long darts.
b. Driving bands (early designs) or obturators (modern designs).
c. Tracer pockets are common.
d. Has ballistic caps and piercing caps (modern designs).
e. Early shot projectiles were made of hard high grade steel. Modern designs use
tungsten carbide or Depleted Uranium (DU) cores or penetrators.
f. Most modern shot projectiles make use of discarding sabots, either of the post or petal
type (see Figure 2-25).
g. Proof shot projectiles have flat heads and are used to test guns.
h. No fuzes will be present.
Fin Stabilised
Body
Tracer Discarding Sabot
Figure 2-25 - Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS)
73. Hazards. DU (Depleted Uranium)

a. DU gives off alpha, beta, gamma radiation emissions, which increase after firing.
Full protective clothing (NBC Suit and Respirator) must be worn whenever DU is
suspected. Radiological dosimeters should be worn and personnel are to be constantly
monitored for excess doses of radiation. Pieces of DU should only be picked up using CV
tools or shovels.
b. DU can stay hot for between 3-4 hours after firing, recognisable by colour changes of
green and blue.
c. Most shot have tracer elements which may present a small hazard if they have not
functioned.
75. Disposal:
a. Unburnt tracer elements can be burnt off using puff powder charges placed against
the tracer pocket.
b. DU must be collected in a metal box with a layer of sand/earth at least 20mm thick in
the bottom and top to act as a protective shield. Full boxes should be carried between
clearance pairs on 2m poles or pickets. Boxes must be placed in a collective area and fenced
off with at least 1m between the boxes and the fencing. Boxes are to be dealt with and
collected by personnel trained in radiological hazards.
c. IMAS TNMA 09.30 /02 contains all relevant information with regards to DU,
therefore this TNMA should be the first document to consult when dealing with suspected
DU hazards.
MORTARS
General
76. A mortar bomb is a fin stabilised munition which is normally nose fuzed and fitted with its
own propelling charge (primary cartridge). Range is increased by adding extra propellant
(augmenting charges). Because of their design mortars cannot be base fused.
Sub-Groups
77. Mortar bombs have similar functions and fuzing to projectiles. They are broken down into
the following sub-groups:
a. HE, which is further subdivided into.
(1) Fragmentation/blast mortars.
(2) Anti-tank mortars (uncommon).
b. Carriers.
Recognition
78. Mortars are generally recognised by their tear-dropped, streamlined shape (see Figure 2-26).
They will have a spigot tube screwed or welded to the rear of the body housing the propellant charge,
with fins fixed to the spigot. The fins are normally the same diameter as the body. This ID feature can
be used to distinguish Mortars from rifle grenades and small hand held rockets. They will always be
nose fuzed with either impact, time or proximity fuzes.Mortars may also be fitted with augmenting
charges which aid and increase firing range.

Figure 2-26 - HE Mortar
79. A fired mortar can be recognised by a crushed fuze cap and the blow out panels missing. The
propellant will be consumed and the gas escape holes on the tail spigot will be blown out.
Fragmentation/Blast Mortars
80. Fragmentation and blast mortars have been designed to create maximum fragmentation and
blast within a target area.
a. Tear-dropped, streamlined shape.
b. Body normally of one piece construction.
c. Low charge to weight ratio.
d. Thick body construction.
e. Normally impact (point detonating) fuzed, although could be fitted with proximity
fuzes.
f. Primary cartridges fitted in the rear of the fin assembly.
g. Obturating grooves or rings found normally at the thickest part of the body.
h. Gas/flash escape holes found in the spigot of the tail or between the fins (Figure 2-
27). A positive indication that a mortar has been fired is when these holes have been
perforated.
Figure 2-27 - Rear View of a Mortar Showing Spigot, Gas Holes and Primary Cartridge

82. Hazards. Blast and fragmentation are the main hazards. Additional hazards are the primary
cartridge and augmenting charges, which may be present with unfired mortars.
a. Is the mortar fitted with a proximity fuze?
b. Has the mortar been fired or not (perforated gas escape holes and fuze damage will
provide an indication)?
84. Disposal. If identified as a blind, a charge must be placed as close as possible to the body of
the mortar adjacent to the fuze. If identified as unfired, a second charge is also to be placed to
demolish the augmenting and primary charges which will also be present.
High Explosive Anti-Tank Mortars

85. Anti-tank mortars (Figure 2-28) are designed to target armour using a shaped charge. These
types of mortars are rare and where not produced in mass numbers.
a. Blunt tear-drop shape.
b. Body may be of two piece construction.
c. Stand-off probe to provide ballistic standoff.
d. Low charge to weight ratio.
e. Fitted with an obturating ring/grooves.
f. Bourrelet may be present.
g. Body may be parallel-sided in the area of the shaped charge.
h. Normally fitted with PIBD (piezo-electric) fuze.
i. Primary cartridges fitted in an assembly complete with flash/gas escape holes.
Figure 2-28 - HEAT Mortar.
87. Hazards. Shaped charge, blast and fragmentation. Additional hazards are the primary
cartridge and augmenting charges, which may be present with unfired mortars.
a. Has the mortar been fired or not?
b. Orientation of the shaped charge.

c. The piezo-electric fuze, which should not be disturbed.
89. Disposal. If identified as a blind, a charge must be places as close as possible to the mortar
body adjacent to the shaped charge to collapse the cone. If required, augmenting charges and primary
cartridges should be demolished using a second charge.
Carrier Mortars
90. Carrier mortars are similar to carrier projectiles and are designed to carry their contents to the
target area and then dispel them. Carrier mortars are broken down into 3 roles as follows:
a. Ejection (nose or base).
b. Bursting.
c. Emission.
Ejection Carrier Mortars

91. Ejection carrier mortars are designed to eject their contents through a weakened body,
normally of two-piece construction (Figure 2-29). A low explosive charge forces the two halves
apart, ejecting the contents within the target area.
a. Nose/Time fuzed.
b. Normally parallel-sided.
c. Body of two-piece construction held together by shear pins.
d. Fitted with an obturating ring.
e. Contains a small low explosive ejection charge.
f. Primary cartridge fitted in fin assembly.
Figure 2-29 - Carrier Ejection Mortar

93. Hazards. Contents, expulsion charge, primary charge and augmenting charges.
94. Safety Considerations. Whether or not the mortar has been fired.
95. Disposal. A longitudinal charge should be placed along the entire length of the mortar to
ensure the contents are contained and do not eject/burst on demolition. If unfired, an additional
charge should be used to demolish the primary and augmenting charges.
Bursting Carrier Mortars

96. In most cases, bursting carrier mortars resemble their HE variants, both ballistically and in
design (Figure 2-30). They contain HE bursting charges which break open the mortar to dispel the
contents, which is normally either WP or chemical agent.
a. Tear-dropped, streamlined shape.
b. One piece body construction.
c. Impact nose fuze.
d. Primary cartridge fitted in rear of tail unit.
e. Obturating grooves/rings.
f. Tail unit with flash/gas escape holes.
g. Contains an exploder containing an HE bursting charge.
h. May have small variations in design to distinguish them from HE variants (e.g.
stepped tails).
i. The presence of a fuse adapter ring.
Figure 2-30 - Bursting Carrier Mortar

98. Hazards. Contents (WP or chemical).
a. Whether or not the mortar has been fired.
b. Whether the mortar is a bursting carrier or an equivalent HE variant.
c. If WP filled, the danger area should be extended downwind to allow the toxic smoke
to disperse. WP also has an active incendiary effect. If WP items are leaking and require
transporting to a disposal area, they should be immersed in water.
d. Heavy concentrations of pyrotechnic incendiary mixtures should not be inhaled.
100. Disposal. A longitudinal charge should be placed along the entire length of the munition to
ensure that all the contents are contained and do not eject/burst on demolition. If unfired, an
additional charge should be used to demolish the primary and augmenting charges. After demolition
of WP items, the area should be fenced, marked, and allowed to weather for 3 months. If doubt exists
as to whether the projectile filling is HE or WP, safety distances for HE should be used and
precautions taken for WP.
Emission Carrier Mortars

101. Emission carrier mortars (Figure 2-31) are designed either with a tail unit that blows off or
with emission holes in the rear to allow smoke to be emitted from the base.
a. No fuze present.
b. Almost parallel-sided with a flat head.
c. One piece body construction.
d. Gas escape holes at the rear.
e. Fitted with an obturating ring.
f. Primary cart fitted in rear of tail unit.
g. Tail unit could be missing, dependant on design.
h. Contains primary discs.

Figure 2-31 - Emission Carrier Mortar
103. Hazards. The contents carried by the mortar and, if present, the primary and augmenting
charges.
a. Whether the mortar has been fired or not (perforated gas escape holes will provide an
indication).
b. Heavy concentrations of the fumes produced by pyrotechnic mixtures should not be

inhaled.
105. Disposal. A longitudinal charge should be placed along the length of the munition to ensure
all the contents are contained and do not eject/burst on demolition. If unfired, an additional charge
should be used to demolish the primary and augmenting charges.
ROCKETS
General
106. A rocket is a self propelled weapon whose trajectory, while in flight, cannot be controlled.
The main components of a rocket are the warhead, propellant section and venture which may have the
addition of stabilising fins although this is not always found on some models of rockets.. Rockets are
broken down into 2 sub-groups.
a. HE, further sub-divided by role into.
(1) Anti-tank rockets.
(2) Blast /Fragmentation rockets.
b. Carriers.
Anti-Tank Rockets
107. Anti-tank rockets target armoured vehicles using a shaped charge warhead. They tend to be
small in size and are normally fired from hand-held launchers (see Figure 2-32).
a. Typical HEAT-shaped warhead of two piece construction.

b. Fuze usually PIBD (piezo-electric) type, with a small visible impact nipple.
d. Small propellant section.
e. Flick-out or fixed fins.
f. A tail venturi (or venturis).
Flip-Out Fins
Ballistic Cone
PIBD Fuze HEAT Warhead Propellant Venturi
Figure 2-32 - HEAT Rocket and Launcher.
109. Hazards. The main hazards associated with rockets are:
a. The rocket motor, which contains a solid low explosive propellant normally cordite.
b. The warhead is likely to be a shaped charge, but older items may have a blast/frag
warhead.
a. Whether or not the rocket has been fired. Indicators will be scorching around the
venturi or damage to the rocket.
b. The PIBD fuze should not be disturbed in any way.
c. Shadows should not be cast over piezo electric crystal fuzes as a temperature change
could cause a current to be generated.
111. Disposal. 3 charges are normally required for disposal of an anti-tank rocket, depending
upon its size. The charges must be initiated concurrently to:
a. Collapse the cone or detonate the blast warhead.
b. Detonate the propellant.
c. Cut the venturi away from the tail of the rocket.

Blast/Fragmentation and Carrier Rockets
112. Fragmentation/blast and carrier rockets tend to be a lot larger than anti-tank rockets and are
normally fired from multi-launched rockets systems (see Figure 2-33). They can be up to 4m long
and have a range of up to 30km.
a. Warhead is of a similar streamlined ogival shape to a typical blast/fragmentation

projectile.
b. Large canted fins fitted to a propellant motor.
c. Rocket motor can be a single or twin stage system.
d. Large venturi or multiple venturis.
e. Nose fuzed, normally of electric time or point detonating types.
f. Warhead could be of two-piece construction.
Figure 2-33 - Carrier Rocket (MLRS)
114. Hazards. The main hazards are:
a. The solid low explosive propellant single/twin stage motor.
b. Blast and fragmentation from the large warhead or sub munitions from the carrier
(e.g. mines, small HEAT Sub munitions).
115. Safety Considerations. Whether or not the rocket has been fired.
116. Disposal:
a. With blast/fragmentation rockets, a minimum of 3 charges should be used. one

placed on the body of the warhead adjacent to the nose fuze; another placed to cut the

venturi(s) off; and at least one on the propellant section, although this may require 2 or 3
charges depending upon the size of the motor.
b. With rockets carrying sub munitions, a longitudinal charge must be placed along the
full length of the warhead to ensure that all the sub munitions are contained and do not eject
on demolition. The venturi and rocket motor should be dealt with as above.
GRENADES
117. A grenade is a short range weapon which may be thrown by hand, fired from the end of a rifle
or projected/propelled from a special purpose grenade launcher.
118. Grenades are broken down into 2 sub-groups:
a. HE grenades, which are further subdivided into roles which are:
(1) Blast and or fragmentation.
(2) Anti-tank (HEAT)
b. Carriers, which are further sub-divided into roles which are:
(1) Emission (usually smoke grenades / CS riot grenades)
(2) Bursting (usually WP or Chemical grenades)
Blast/Fragmentation Grenades
119. Blast or fragmentation grenades can be of the hand delivered, rifle or projected/propelled
type.
a. Older hand grenades have the classic pineapple shape. Modern grenades tend to be
smooth-sided with the fragmentation contained inside (Figure 2-34).
b. The fly-off lever may not be attached and the striker may not have initiated the
primer. The striker may resemble a small mouse trap.
d. Projected grenade - a small driving band might be present with the main body being
of a blunt ogive shape, this enables the use of spin as stabilisation during flight,PIBD fuzing
is normally integral (Fig 2-??)
e. Rifle grenade - a tail tube to fit over the barrel of a rifle and fins.

Figure 2-34 – Blast/Fragmentation Hand Grenades
121. Hazards. Blast and fragmentation.
122. Safety. Blinds should not be disturbed or moved.
123. Disposal. A charge should be placed as close as possible to the grenade body near to the fuse
without touching it.
Anti-Tank (Heat) Grenades

124. HEAT grenades can be of the hand, rifle or projected type (see Figures 2-35 to 2-37). They
generally use a shaped charge and the fuzing may be impact, PIBD, base detonating or piezo-electric
crystal.
Figure 2-35 – HEAT Hand Grenade Figure 2-36 - HEAT Rifle Grenade

Figure 2-37 - Propelled Grenade (Picture on right shows grenade that has been fired, note the
scoring on the driving band)
Recognition Features:
a. HEAT Hand Grenade:
(1) Normally fitted at the front with a stand-off piece.
(2) Fitted with a throwing handle.
(3) Normally two-piece construction.
(4) Thinly constructed body.
(5) Low charge to weight ratio.
(6) Parallel sided in the area of the shaped charge.
(7) Stabilizing drogue could be attached to the handle.
(8) Normally contains an integral base-detonating fuze.
b. HEAT Rifle Grenade:
(1) A typical HEAT-shaped warhead (2 piece construction).
(2) A ballistic cap which gives standoff.
(3) Fuze may be of an impact or PIBD type.
(4) Contains a tail tube to fit over the end of a rifle.
(5) Stabilizing tail fins, maybe made of plastic.
(6) Body made of thin construction.
c. Propelled Grenade:

(1) Blunt ogive-shape nose.
(2) Two piece body joined at the ogive.
(3) Similar in shape to a projectile.
(4) Copper driving band normally present.
(5) Body parallel-sided in the region of the shaped charge.
(6) Integral fuze of a spit back type.
(8) If found as a blind, no cartridge case should be present.
125. Hazards. Shaped charge, blast and fragmentation
126. Safety. Blinds should not be disturbed or moved.
127. Disposal. Disposal of HEAT grenades is with a charge placed to crush the cone of the
shaped charge. For blinds, the charge is to be placed over the cone and not pressed on the body of the
grenade. Shaped charge grenades should be disposed of individually or in small numbers.
Carrier Grenades
128. Carrier grenades (Figure 2-38) are designed to dispense their contents within a target area and
are normally hand thrown, rifle projected or discharged from dedicated grenade discharges.
129. Carrier grenades are subdivided into emission and bursting types. Typical contents are:
a. CS compounds.
b. Incendiary mixtures.
c. WP.
d. Smoke signalling/marking.
e. Smoke screening.
f. Illuminating compounds.

Figure 2-38 - Carrier Grenades
a. Normally parallel-sided, cylindrical sheet metal body.
b. Fuze normally of a percussion type, but some modern grenades have electrical
command fuzes.
c. Emission holes may be visible. If not, it is likely to be of a bursting type.
d. Rifle carrier grenades have a tail and fin assembly.
e. Bursting grenades are fitted with an integral disruption detonator.
f. WP grenades may have specific features such as a tapered base to identify them as
such.
131. Hazards. The contents.
a. Blinds should not be disturbed.
b. Where it is known that the item contains WP, the danger area should be extended
downwind to allow for dissipation of the toxic smoke. WP also has an incendiary effect so
take all necessary fire precautions.
c. Heavy concentrations of pyrotechnic/incendiary mixtures should not be inhaled.
133. Disposal. If the grenade has not been expended, a longitudinal charge should be placed
along the entire length to ensure all the contents are contained and do not eject/burst on demolition.

MAIN GROUP SUB ROLE HAZARDS MOD
GROUP
PROJECTILES HE BLAST/FRAG BLAST/FRAG OGIVE
HESH BLAST DRIVING BAND
AP/SAP FRAG DRIVING BAND
HEAT SHAPED CHARGE COLLAPSE CONE
CARRIER BASE EJECT EXPULSION LENGTH OF MUNITION

NOSE EJECT CHARGE SPECIALIST DISPOSAL
BURSTING NUC / BIO / CHEM LENGTH OF MUNITION
EMISSION / WP
SUB MUNITIONS
SHOT ARMOUR TRACER DET CORD

PENETRATING POCKET/S DISPOSE USING MARKED
DEPLETED BOX-COVER ITEM WITH
URANIUM EARTH-BACKLOAD
WEAR NBC PPE
CHECK SELF WITH PCM
MORTARS HE BLAST/FRAG BLAST/FRAG ON BODY ADJACENT FUZE
HEAT-UNUSUAL SHAPED CHARGE COLLAPSE CONE
PRIMARY BURN USING DI/TORCH
CARTRIDGES
AUGMENTING
CHARGES
CARRIER BASE EJECT EXPULSION LENGTH OF MUNITION

NOSE EJECT CHARGE CHEM PRECAUTIONS
BURSTING CHEM / BIO / WP LENGTH OF MUNITION
EMISSION SUB MUNITIONS
ROCKETS HE BLAST/FRAG BLAST/FRAG WARHEAD

HEAT SHAPED CHARGE MOTOR PROPELLENT
PROPELLENT CUT VENTURI
CARRIER BASE EJECT EXPULSION WARHEAD/CARRIER
NOSE EJECT CHARGE MOTOR PROPELLENT
BURSTING CONTENTS CUT VENTURI
SKIN SHEDDING SUB MUNTIONS
PROPELLENT
GRENADES HE BLAST/FRAG BLAST/FRAG GRENADE BODY
HAND HEAT SHAPED CHARGE COLLAPSE CONE
RIFLE
PROP/PROJ
CARRIER BURSTING SMOKE GRENADE BODY

EMISSION ILLUM CHEM PRECAUTIONS
INCEND
CHEM
MINES HE BLAST/FRAG BLAST/FRAG COUNTER MINE

ANTI VEHICULAR HEAT SHAPED CHARGE TAKING PRECAUTIONS
ANTI TANK DIRECTIONAL UNSEEN TRIP FOR OTHER HAZARDS
ANTI BOUNDING WIRES
PERSONNEL OMNI
DIRECTIONAL

CHAPTER 3
LANDMINES AND BOOBYTRAPS
Introduction
1. A landmine is defined as an explosive or other material, normally encased, designed to
destroy or damage ground vehicles, boats or aircraft, or designed to wound, kill or otherwise
incapacitate personnel. It may be detonated by the action of its victim, by the passage of time, or by
controlled means. Landmines are categorised as either Anti-Vehicle (AV) or Anti-Personnel (AP),
depending upon the intended target.
2. Mines are designed to be left in an armed condition in an area in such a way that they will
deny or delay the passage of an enemy through that area. To achieve this they must remain operable
for the required period of time, often under adverse conditions, and be able to inflict the required level
of damage on their targets.
3. The use of mines in asymmetric warfare or in transition to war or post-conflict situations will
differ from conventional mine warfare. Insurgents, saboteurs or specialist forces are likely to employ
mines in conjunction with booby traps to create nuisance minefields, designed to inflict psychological
as well as physical damage. Such minefields may be planned or opportunist and are unlikely to have
any form of perimeter marking.
How Mines Work

4. To arm, neutralize, or disarm a mine, an understanding of how the mine functions, is required.
5. All mines consist of 4 parts:
a. A firing mechanism to set off the detonator or igniter charge.
b. A detonator or igniter charge which sets off the booster charge.
c. A booster charge which may be attached to the fuze/igniter train or be set into the main
charge of the mine.
d. The main charge in a container, which usually forms the body of the mine.
6. The sequence of events in exploding a mine is as follows: the firing mechanism is actuated by
some form of interference and sets off the detonator or igniter charge. This sets off the booster
charge, which in turn sets off the main charge. The main charge is quite safe to handle if the
detonator or igniter is removed.
7. The aim of all firing mechanisms is twofold; to prevent the mine exploding until it is set off by
interference and to ensure immediate detonation when it is actuated by the type of interference for
which it is designed.
8. Firing mechanisms can be divided into 2 groups.
Simple Firing Mechanisms
9. The simpler types of firing mechanism are actuated in one of the following ways:
a. By pressure (Figure 3-1)

b. Be releasing pressure which has been previously applied (pressure release).
c. By pulling a tripwire (tension) (Figure 3-2).
d. By breaking a taut wire (tension release).
Figure 3-1 Actuation of a simple firing mechanism by pressure
Figure 3-2 Actuation of a simple firing mechanism by tension
10. All mechanisms are fitted with a safety device which prevents accidental release of the
striker, thus preventing premature explosion of the detonator or the mine itself. This usually takes the
form of a pin or clip which must be removed before the striker spring can be released by the firing
mechanism.

11. To arm a mine, the igniter must be put in position, the mechanism must be properly set and
the safety devices must be made inoperative (usually by removing the safety pin, although in
sophisticated devices it may be done electronically).
Complicated Firing mechanisms
12. To make landmines more discriminating, increasingly complicated mechanisms are employed
in modern mine systems. As an IMAS Level 4 EOD operator during the Identification phase of
Reconnaissance should one of the following types of complicated mechanisms be suspected or
encountered then correct Identification must be established so as to ensure the correct Method of
disposal is carried out. Methods of initiation for complicated mechanisms include:
a. Seismic (Fig 3-3)
b. Magnetic influence (Fig 3-4)
c. Radio influence.
d. Audio frequency (Fig 3-5)
e. Timer run-down. (Fig 3-5)
f. Electrical command (Fig 3-6)
Fig 3-3 VP12 Seismic Initiation System

Fig 3-4 Blu 91B Magnetic influence AV Mine
Fig 3-5 ‘Special electronic fuses’ that can be incorporated into Mines to ensure they function in
a variety of ways.

Fig 3-6 Electrical command type of firing mechanism
Landmine Types
13. Landmines can be sub-divided into two types Anti-vehicle (AV) and Anti-Personnel (AP)
Anti-Vehicle Mines
14. AV mines are generally designed to target armoured vehicles but will damage or destroy any
vehicle that passes over them. They may be designed to break a tank track links and parts of the
suspension or final drive, or they may incorporate a shaped charge designed to penetrate the hull of
the tank.
15. A pressure of 100-300kg is generally needed to actuate AV mines, the heel impact pressure of
a running, fully equipped soldier often being sufficient to cause detonation. Many AV mines can be
mechanically altered to reduce the threshold impact pressure for which they were originally designed
to function. AV mines can also be fitted with anti handling firing switches, generally of the pressure-
release or pull variety.
16. AV mines fall into 4 main Categories:
a. Track Attack: These mines are usually laid either on the surface or just below and
rely on the targets passing over them.
b. Full width attack: These mines are usually laid either on the surface or just below and
rely on the targets passing over them.
c. Horizontal action: These mines attack the target from the side and are placed above
ground.
d. Area Defence: These mines have the ability to home in on there target.
Track Attack
17. Example The TM46 – Soviet. (Figure 3-7) has a cylindrical shape and houses 5.3kg of TNT
as the main charge. The mine has a fuze well on the top of the mine and secondary fuze wells on the
side and bottom of the mine. It also has a U shaped carrying handle. The TM-46 is a post-WWII
model that can be laid by mechanical mine layers when employed with the MVM pressure fuze. The
mine may also use the MVSh-46 tilt rod fuze but must then be hand emplaced.
Figure 3-7 - TM-46 (Soviet)
Full Width Attack

18. Example. The Barmine (Fig 3-8) is a large pressure operated minimum metal Full Width
Attack Mine. The rectangular pressure plate which covers most of the top surface, incorporates a tube
filled with a silicon based fluid, this leads into the hydraulic fuse in the centre of one side. Several
add on fuses have been manufactured to give the mine a true Full Width Attack mine capability

Figure 3-8 – UK Barmine
Horizontal Action
19. Example. M24 Horizontal Action AV Mine. (Figure 3-5). The M24 is employed against
vehicle targets as either an individual weapon (such as booby trap or ambush) or as part of an obstacle
system (for example, minefields and tank ditches). It is ideally used along high-speed avenues of
approach and to over-watch potential breached lanes in minefields. It is hand emplaced on the surface
but may be camouflaged to prevent detection. It is ideally positioned at 90o to the expected line of
target travel and has a range of 3-30m. When placing the M24, it is aimed so a vehicle contacting the
discriminator switch is in the line of fire. A vehicle crossing both segments of the discriminator
simultaneously causes the system’s electrical circuit to be completed, activating the mine.

Figure 3-9 - Mine, Anti Vehicular, Horizontal Action - M24
Area Defence
20. Example. The Hornet Wide Area Munition is the U.S. Army's first man-portable, top attack,
smart munition that detects, classifies, tracks, attacks and defeats enemy tracked vehicles that move
within its engagement range of 100 meters. The small, lightweight Hornet can be hand emplaced in
virtually any terrain and safely activated manually using safe separation time settings to allow
personnel time to clear the area. It can also be pre-armed for activation or self-destruct by remote
control or set to self-destruct at a specific time
Fig 3-10 – The Hornet Wide Area – Area Defence

Anti Personnel Mines
17. AP mines are designed to kill or wound personnel and are generally activated by a pressure of
between 1-20kg. AP mines fall into 5 main Roles:
a. Blast (minimum metal).
b. Blast/fragmentation.
c. Directional fragmentation.
d. Bounding.
e. Shaped charge (Heat).
Blast (Minimum Metal) AP Mines

18. Blast AP Mines are generally the smallest of the AP mine group, averaging between 30-250g
of explosive. They are designed to incapacitate rather than kill the victim. The most common form of
initiation mechanism for this type of mine is pressure and they are normally surface-laid or buried at a
depth of between 10mm-40mm.
Example. FMk 1 Argentine AP Mine - Minimum Metal. (Figure 3-6). The FMk 1 has a main charge
of 52g. It also has 2 operating pressures in the AP mode. Normally the operating pressure
is 5kg but with the addition of an anti-personnel stud, this can be increased to 15-25kg.
The FMk 1 has an additional role as the mine fuze for the FMk 3 AV mine, its operating
pressure being increased to 150-250kg by use of an add-on pressure cap.
Figure 3-6 - FMk 1 Argentine Anti Personnel Mine - Minimum Metal
Blast/Fragmentation AP Mines
19. Blast/Fragmentation AP mines generally fall into the group commonly known as ‘stake
mines’. These mines contain charges ranging from 75-200 g and are designed to project
fragmentation splinters out in a radial path. Lethal radii for these mines vary from 15-50m, with a
hazard distance up to 100m, depending upon the type of mine. The majority of blast/fragmentation
AP mines are initiated by use of simple cocked strikers in conjunction with trip wires, the initiating
action on the trip wire being pull or tension release. Some modern blast/fragmentation AP mines are
designed with their own integral striker mechanism with an additional pressure initiation.
Example. POMZ-2/POMZ-2M AP Fragmentation Mine. (Figure 3-7). The POMZ-2 stake mine
resembles a grenade mounted on a stake. The mine contains 6 rows of metal fragments
(the body) propelled by a 75g explosive charge. The mine is not internally threaded to
accept a fuze. The newer version, the POMZ-2M is of post-WWII design; it has 6 rows of
metal fragments and utilises a modified fuze well which is threaded to accept externally
threaded fuzes. The lethal radius of the POMZ-2 and the POMZ-2M is about 25m. The
POMZ-2 is normally employed in groups of at least 4 mines equipped with tripwires
although it can be employed singularly.
Figure 3-7 - POMZ-2M AP Fragmentation Mine
Directional Fragmentation Mines

20. Directional fragmentation mines are normally electrically command detonated. However, the
replacement of the command detonation system with a cocked striker/tripwire mechanism has been
used in many operational theatres to change the mine into a victim-operated device. This group of
mines is either rectangular or circular in shape and will normally have pronged legs or brackets for
attachment to trees etc. The explosive charge within these mines ranging from 0.5-5kg. The high
charge to weight ratio within these mines creates large killing areas.
Example. Claymore (M18A1) AP Mine. (Figure 3-8). Charge. 70g of C4. Fragmentation. 700
spherical steel balls.
Figure 3-8 - Claymore (M18A1) AP Mine
Bounding AP Mines

21. Bounding AP mines are metal-cased mines consisting of a ballistic charge and a main
explosive charge. Upon initiation, the mine body is blown out of its outer container into the air until it
reaches the limit of the anchor wire, the length of which normally ranges from 0.6m-1.5 m. Upon
reaching the full extension of the wire, the main charge is detonated spreading shrapnel out in a radial
path. Lethal radii for these mines vary from 15m-60 m and they have a hazard distance up to 100m.
Because of the ballistic action of the mine, they are placed in the ground with only the initiation
mechanism visible. These mines are generally victim activated by tripwires (pull or tension release)
or by pressure. However, the OZM Soviet range of bounding mines has the capability of electrical
command for the ambush role.
Example. OZM-3 and OZM-4 Bounding Fragmentation AP Mines. The OZM-3 (Figure 3-9) has a
cylindrical metal case. The mine has 2 lead wires protruding from the top, a wing shaped
fin and a fuze well to accept a threaded fuze. The mine contains 7.5g of TNT as the main
charge in addition to a separate propelling charge at the base of the mine. The lethal radius
of the OZM-3 is 25m. The OZM-4 utilises an improved bursting charge and does not have
the electronic leads for command detonation
Figure 3-9 - OZM-3 Bounding Fragmentation AP Mine
Shaped Charge AP Mines

22. There are relatively few shaped charge AP mines and all are activated by direct pressure.
These mines make use of their explosive content and mine body to form a crude shaped charge which
is directed upwards towards the victim.
Example. C3 (Elsie) AP Mine. (Figure 3-10). The C3 (Elsie) has an olive drab phenolic plastic body
and is pointed at one end to facilitate driving into the ground. The other end, the top, is
flared out. The charge weighs 9.45g and is contained in a cylindrical plastic case 38 mm
long x 19 mm diameter and is in the form of an inverted cone.

Figure 3-10 - Mine Anti Personnel C3 (Elsie)
HMA Methods of Mine Detection and Clearance

23. There are 3 main methods, which can be used for mine detection; visual detection, manual
detection and electronic detection. Animals such as dogs are another method that can be used to detect
the presence of mines and UXO.
24. Visual Method. Observation will often disclose the location of a mine when recently laid. A
careful inspection of the area can often reveal some part of the mine or mechanism, or its initiator.
Additionally, patches of dead and disturbed soil, unnatural changes in ground vegetation and loose
soil on the surface may indicate the presence of mines. To achieve effective visual search, the
searcher should adopt and practice a systematic search pattern and allow for visual/mental
degradation. The use of optical aids such as binoculars can be of great assistance when studying
specific areas of time, but may narrow the searcher’s field of vision.
25. Manual Detection. Manual detection is a slow, laborious but effective method of locating all
types of mine buried at standard depths. The searcher must wear personal protective equipment (PPE)
Sleeves are to be rolled down and gloves are not to be worn.. The searcher is to start prodding at least
0.5m to the rear of the perceived danger area using the following technique:
a. Look - visually search immediate area.
b. Feel - search with the tripwire feeler across path of progress. Manually feel for
broken turf, loose sods. Lift leaves to look for AP mines.
c. Prod - use a mine prodder, driving it into the ground at 30o to detect buried mines.
d. Uncover the mine, safety permitting, and check 360 o around and under the mine for
detonating cord links, anti lift pressure release switches, pull operated tripwires and secondary
AP & AV mines.
e. Progress and repeat through area of search.
26. The breach lane should be at least 1.0m wide and is marked on either side of the searcher.
The marking of the safe lane can be any of the following means:
a. Tape
b. Spray paint.
c. Flags.
d. Marking Systems (As derived from in country SOP’s)

26. Electronic Detectors. Electronic metal detectors will indicate the presence of metal objects in
the ground. The use of metal detectors enables ground to be searched far more rapidly than by
prodding, but they will not detect non-metallic mines and their effectiveness against minimum metal
mines is limited. The presence of metallic debris will further complicate the search and the operator
must therefore take stock of the particular environment in which he finds himself. If he is to use the
‘walk in’ method in a high risk area, then every metallic reading must be investigated and eliminated
as a threat.
27. Other Detection Methods. Within the HMA Community there are several other methods of
detection available, although these are usually used as a combination with one of the above.
Mechanical Machinery can be used to help detect the presence of mines and boundaries of minefields
and Animals are also used such as MDD (Mine detection dogs) and UXO dogs to help search large
areas of suspect land quickly. Many organisations are now using a multi-tool approach by combining
several of the methods described to give a Quality assurance when handing back cleared land to its
beneficiaries or customers.
Tripwires
28. Tripwires may be used with almost any type of mine but are most commonly used with anti
personnel mines, particularly those of the bounding or Omni directional fragmentation type. In
wooded areas, tripwires may be used with anti personnel mines fastened to bushes or trees well above
ground level, where they are likely to have greater effect against personnel or vehicles than on the
ground.
29. Detection. Tripwires normally have a matt surface and are dark in colour so they cannot be
readily seen even in bright sunlight. When they cannot be seen, they must be detected by feeling.
This is done using a tripwire feeler - a piece of medium gauge wire or a thin stick (stiff enough not to
bend readily) about 0.5m long. All tripwires must be checked at both ends, adopting the ‘look, feel,
prod’ method. At no time should the EOD operator be physically beneath the trip wire. The search
should be carried out, travelling approximately 0.1–0.2m down one side of the trip wire, searching for
the presence of AP mines along the length of the trip wire. Trip wires tend to be anchored on pickets,
trees, rocks or other heavy articles. Extreme care must be taken whilst investigating slack or loose
trip wires. These are to be searched in the same way as for taught trip wires, except the wire must be
pinned down along its length to prevent movement. All stake mines should be investigated for the
presence of concealed blast fragmentation grenades as these are a very common type of booby trap.
Mine Disposal
30. The primary method of disposal for any mine is destruction in situ (Fig 3-11, 3-12)using a
countermine charge. However, the available resources and situation may not always permit this. The
following alternative means of disposal are available as an IMAS Level 3 EOD operator.
a. Low Order Attack. Low order attack is the most suitable method of attack for certain
mines because of the danger involved in a manual RSP. It may be carried out using a variety
of low order shaped charge techniques (Fig 3-13)
b. Burning. Many thin skinned metal or plastic AV and AP mines can be destroyed
using Pyrotorch (also known as Fire Ant). The Pyrotorch is sited approximately 40mm from
the mine and directed at the explosive fill and not the fuze well. The Pyrotorch is initiated
using electric means and burns for 25–30 seconds (Fig 3-14)
c. Neutralisation By Hand. Neutralisation by hand poses the greatest risk to the

operator and should not be attempted unless other options have been exhausted. (Fig 3-15)

Figure 3-11 – Dem in Situ of a Mine Anti Personnel
Figure 3-12 – Dem in Situ of a Mine Anti Vehicle

Figure 3-13 – Low Order Attack on a Mine Anti Personnel
Figure 3-14 – Pyrotorch set up for a burn on a Mine Anti Personnel

Figure 3-15 – Neutralisation by hand of a Mine Anti Personnel
31. Pulling. Unless being disposed of in situ, mines should always be pulled on the assumption
they are booby trapped
BOOBY TRAPS
Introduction
32. A booby trap is an explosive or non-explosive device or other material deliberately placed to
cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed.
Booby traps are mostly simple, versatile, cheap, reliable and indiscriminate. The vast majority use a
spring operated cocked striker (Figure 3-16) and a simple release mechanism. Several of the designs
currently in service date from WWII, primarily because they remain effective and would not be
enhanced by modification
Figure 3-16 – Examples of Spring Operated Cocked Strikers

Groups
33. Booby traps are classified into 3 main groups:
a. Anti Personnel. Small charges operated by a switch mechanism with net explosive
quantity (NEQ) ranging from 30-500g.
b. Anti Vehicle. Larger charges operated by a switch mechanism with an NEQ ranging
from 5-10kgs.
c. Delayed Action. Sabotage type charges operated by a delay mechanism.
Methods of Operation
34. The main methods of operation are:
a. Pull. Movement of an object connected by a wire or a trip-wire.
b. Pressure. Direct by foot or wheel on a connected mechanism.
c. Release of Pressure. Lifting a harmless object or performing a natural action, such as

opening a door or window.
d. Release of Tension. Release of tension of a taut wire attached to a concealed

mechanism.
e. Delay. Designed to function independent of human action.
Principles of Laying Booby Traps

35. When clearing booby traps, the principles which will have been applied by those who laid
them must always be taken into consideration. These principles are:
a. Concealment. The charges and mechanisms will be concealed or made to resemble a

harmless object. The surroundings will be disturbed as little as possible and all signs of
preparation will have been concealed or removed.
b. Constricted Localities. The more constricted the site in which a trap is laid (e.g. in a
defile or channel), the more chance there is of it being sprung. The detection and clearance of
traps is also much harder in constricted locations.
c. Double Bluff. Obvious traps are likely to conceal something more cunning and
devious.
d. Inconvenience. Areas or routes that have been blocked, or buildings where obstacles
require moving, are prime locations for booby traps.
e. Curiosity. Objects of curiosity or attractive items (books, pictures, weapons,

souvenirs, bodies, etc) are often used to conceal booby traps (Figure 3-17).
f. Every Day Operations. Traps can be designed to function as a result of everyday

actions (e.g. turning on a light switch in a darkened room).
g. Come-On. Traps can be designed as a come on to a delay action or incendiary bomb.
h. Alternative Methods of Firing. When laying traps, a second means of firing may be
incorporated.

i. Variety and Concentration. As an EOD operator you can expect traps to be laid in
large concentrations with plenty of variety. Remember the more traps laid, the greater the
chance of one being sprung!!
Figure 3-17 – Curiosity
36. These principles lead to the following areas being likely sites for booby traps.
a. Buildings that Combatant forces may use for headquarters or logistic installations.
b. Industrial facilities such as water, electricity, docks and airports.
c. Obstacles, particularly those that require moving or repair.
d. Abandoned military equipment.
Construction
37. A booby trap consists of 4 main parts:
a. Firing Mechanism. Most booby traps use factory-produced switches made of either
plastic or metal (Figure 3-18). They can be single or multi-function switches. Booby trap
switches can also be improvised.

Figure 3-18 – Firing Mechanism
b. Explosive Charge. The main charge may be made of any explosives that are
available.
c. Means of Connecting the Mechanism to the Main Charge. Connection is normally

achieved using detonating cord (Figure 3-19).
Figure 3-19 Main Charge Connected with Detonating Cord
d. Means of Concealing and Operating the Trap. The method of concealment will
depend on the locality, the materials at hand and the purpose for which the trap is required.

Booby Trap Clearance
38. Procedures. Booby trap clearance and the variety of scenarios an EOD Operator may
encounter make it impossible to lay down a standard drill which is universally applicable, to all
scenarios. Therefore Procedures must be adapted to meet the circumstances encountered at the time
of the clearance task; however by following the procedures below this will enable the operator to have
a basic methodical approach to Booby trap clearance.
39. Reconnaissance. Where possible, a 360º isolation of the area or building should be
conducted to eliminate the possibility of a command wire ambush. Operators must remain alert and
suspicious, continuing to observe for strange smells, attractive items (weapons, helmets, radios, flags
and television sets etc), During a building search the presence of sawdust, disturbed fittings, nails,
pins, obstructions and broken locks, wedges on doors and windows (which serve as a safety
mechanism for the enemy booby trap layer) will be a key indicator that a building has been booby-
trapped.
40. Entry/Approach A suitable approach route and entry point should be selected. and marked
accordingly in accordance with SOP’s. The method of entry or approach is usually at the discretion of
the EOD operator. This can vary though depending upon the area of operations and SOP’s and will
normally be driven by the perceived threat. The easiest access for the EOD operator especially during
a building clearance task will be the building’s primary entrance but this must be treated as high risk
until proven otherwise.
41. Search. The search techniques used by EOD Operators during either an urban (building) or
rural booby trap task will largely depend on the type of threat either known or perceived. The
following techniques below are to be utilised and are by no means exhaustive when encountering a
building clearance.
a. Floors should be checked; solid floors visually, hollow floors with a weight dropper
and compact floors using a mine detector.
b. Carpets, floor coverings and furniture should be pulled remotely using a Hook and
Line set. Multiple pulls should be used and all remote pulling must cause the item to turn
through 3 planes to negate the effects of tilt- and pull-activated firing switches. Drawers must
be completely pulled clear, spilling the contents onto the floor. Closed doors should be
initially weight- dropped open, and then remotely pulled closed again (Fig 3-20)
c. Some articles or items of furniture can be discounted as a booby trap threat by the use
of x-ray photography. Care should be taken not to disturb the item during this procedure and
a detailed analysis of the photographs must follow prior to the item being physically picked
up. All weapons are to be x-rayed before being handed over to external agencies or before
destruction.
d. A mandatory soak period is to be implemented after each pull or positive action. This
period will be directed by SOP’s.

Fig 3-20 Items of furniture set up for a deliberate pull.
44. Render Safe. The method of render safe techniques used will depend on whether detonation
is acceptable or undesired. The following below are examples of Render safe techniques that are
available:
a. Destruction In Situ. Destruction in situ may be used when it is impossible to attach a

hook and line to the device without disturbing the mechanism. A small explosive charge
(0.1kg) should be placed over or beside the device, without touching it. Once in position, the
charge can then be detonated. The EOD operator must take into account the effects of
detonating the device and may need to consider some form of blast mitigation.
b. Disruption. When damage is undesirable but neutralisation involves too

great a risk to the operator, consideration should be given to the disruption method.
Disruption removes the method of initiation from the booby trap before it has time to
function as designed. This method can be carried out using a disrupter or by the use
of a small shaped charge such as Vulcan. The operator must take into account that a
booby trap may still function as designed and therefore a high order detonation must
be acceptable when using this method. Again, blast mitigation should be considered.
c. Pulling. The aim of pulling is to deliberately activate a device or confirm

there is no device present at a safe distance. This safe distance should be determined
by the operator, taking into account information such as NEQ and protective cover
available from the possible seat of detonation. Great care should be taken not to
disturb the device when connecting the hook & line. The choice of components used
from the hook & line set to connect to the booby trap can only be decided by the
operator at the time.
d. Neutralisation & Disarming (Manual Techniques). Manual neutralisation and

disarming should only be undertaken when damage caused by a device detonating as designed
is deemed unacceptable. The following drills should be used:

(1) Without disturbing the mechanism, the complete system should be examined and
`checked for alternative means of firing.
(2) All trip wires should be traced to both ends to ensure there are no other devices
connected into the booby trap. When tracing tripwires, care should be taken not to
disturb any other devices that may have been laid to protect the trip wire, such as
pressure switches, mines etc.
(3) If accessible, the connection between the switch and the charge of the booby trap
(detonating cord lead) should be cut without disturbing the mechanism. This cut
should be made as close as possible to the detonator fitted into the booby trap
mechanism. This is the quickest and safest way of rendering the booby trap safe. If
the switch should function after the link has been cut, there will only be a small
detonation incorporating the detonator and a small section of the detonating cord link.
If there is no explosive link between the firing mechanism and the main charge (i.e.
the detonator is placed directly into the main charge), then the operator should
consider removing the detonator from the main charge by hand. Under no
circumstances should the detonator leads be cut as there may be a collapsing
circuit within the booby trap firing mechanism.
(4) Once the link has been cut, the safety device of the switch (i.e. safety pin or pins)
should be replaced. If no pins are available, the operator should improvise a method
of gagging the switch to prevent it from operating as designed. The firing mechanism
should then be removed and placed in a safe area for later disposal or intelligence
gathering.
(5) Whenever delay mechanisms are discovered, the operator should consider the
possibility that the device may include anti handling devices.
45. Reporting All tasks conducted will be reported on in various formats depending on National
Guidelines and Organisational SOP’s, the following below are the types of reports an EOD operator
may have to complete:
a. IMSMA forms.
b. Organisational specific formats as directed by SOP’s.
c. Operator driven reports, these are usually written when there is no mechanism in
place for reporting such as above and information from the task needs to be disseminated to
other operators as a matter of Safety. A copy of an example of such a report can be found at
Annex A to this chapter.

A-1
ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 3
LANDMINES AND BOOBY TRAPS
UNKNOWN POSSIBLE MINE/BOOBY TRAP DEVICE

LUAU OPERATIONS BASE – ANGOLA
INTRODUCTION
1. During a recent Spot-UXO task conducted by J Vernon, an unknown possible

Mine/Boobytrap was discovered; therefore this report is being prepared to warn of possible
findings and dangers that could be associated with a find of this kind in the future.
AIM
2. The aim of this report is to share all information, associated findings and possible
actions to take in connection with this device.
SPOT-UXO TASK
3. The task itself took place in Bairro Marco 25, Moxico Province Angola. J Vernon
was tasked with the removal of two possible mines, upon arrival the following sequence of
events took place:
a. Both munitions/devices had been removed from a nearby water well by the
local police detachment, and placed in storage in there local station ( 1 x TMN 46 and
1 x unknown).
b. Upon inspection the TMN46 was still armed, no attempt to either neutralise
or disarm had been made, this was then rectified and the mine made safe. The
unknown mine/boobytrap, which had been placed on the ground outside the police
station, was then inspected, after a initial inspection, it was then decided to try and ID
if possible. However the publications and reference material available did not show
any positive results.
c. A series of questions then followed about the unknown object and the
following info was ascertained:
1. It was found on top of the TMN 46.
2. It had been moved by the local police, and placed into there station
awaiting arrival of outside assistance, this was for a period of approx 24hrs
(this then negated any anti handling, that might be associated with this
device)
3. It was unknown who or what had laid this, and therefore any
previous history of such finds in the area was ruled out.
d. J Vernon then took pictures of the device, (Fig 1,2,3,) and decided to destroy
the said item (the device was moved a short distance and then Countermined) in
question, this was done for the following reasons
A-1
A-2
1. The device was unknown, and as such could not be properly

identified therefore ruling out any recognised neutralisation or disarming
procedure.
2. The items condition did not warrant any form of exploitation due to
its condition, the only access to inside was by removing 4 flathead screws, all of
which were rusty and in a poor condition (Fig 4).
3. Due to the absence of X-Ray equipment no internal picture could be

taken therefore allowing the operator to make an assessment of what if anything
was inside.
Fig 1
Fig 2
A-2
A-3
Fig 3
Fig 4
METHOD OF OPERATION
4. The conclusion on how this Unknown Device operates is by possibly pressure or

pressure release, the following were ruled out Seismic, Accoustic, Anti Handling, and
Magnetic Influence, this was due to the fact that the said item had been removed and exposed
at some time during its removal to all of the above apart from pressure and pressure release.
A-3
A-4
SIMILAR FIND
5. During a period of leave J Vernon travelled to HQ in England, during time spent

there it was noted that in the display case a device of similar origin and attributes was on
display (Fig 5,6,7,8,9,10) J Vernon questioned several people as to its identity including
another operator from another program and the general consensus was that its identity was
unknown.
Fig 5
Fig 6
A-4
A-5
Fig 7
Fig 8
Fig 9
A-5
A-6
Fig 10
METHOD OF OPERATION
6. The similar find in HQ, appeared to have different methods of operation, these
seemed to be the following:
a. Fig 5 shows a possible light sensitive photo cell on the device.
b. Fig 6 and 9 show a possible arming switch and led indicator.
c. Fig 10 shows a possible Magnetic influence method of operation, with the

exposed coil of what appeared brass type wire attached to the device.
FUTURE FINDS
7. J Vernon believes that the resemblance in manufacture of both of these devices, that
somehow they are from the same ‘Family’. There country of origin, true identity and the
recommended ‘Render Safe Procedure’ is still unknown, however all future finds of this
nature should until confirmation of its identity and Render Safe Procedure if any actually
exist, be treated with high suspicion, and dealt with on a case by case basis by EOD
Operators.
SUMMARY
8. Due to the nature of this find, its emplacement and unknown identity, all means of
gaining this information should be exhausted, this includes using other de-mining NGO’s and
there means of identifying unknown devices. HQ England should also assist and if needed
disseminate this information across the board to give it the widest publicity it can receive.
The personal opinion of the author is that this should be a no touch device until its true origins
and identity are known. If this is found to be a known Booby Trap device then its inclusion in
future Courses held and Ops Base Trg need also to be considered
A-6
CHAPTER 4
AIR DELIVERED WEAPONS
INTRODUCTION
Definition
1. With few exceptions, air delivered weapons (ADW) are fin or parachute stabilised and have a
ballistic body, the shape and construction of which is adapted to the function of the weapon, as is its
fusing. Air delivered weapons may contain explosive, inflammable, pyrotechnic or chemical
compounds, or may deliver a non-explosive nature such as propaganda leaflets or graphite. They can
be delivered from fixed wing aircraft, helicopters or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Background
2. The first specifically designed air delivered weapons were of German design. They were first
delivered in anger by the Italians and Spanish in 1911 and 1913 respectively and their development
continued throughout WWI. Bombs were hand-dropped initially but were later carried on release
units under the wings of aircraft.
3. Bomb development moved along apace during WWII and different variants were developed
for specific tasks, with weights ranging from 1kg up to 10,000kg. Since WWII, many new designs
have evolved, with an increasing emphasis on precision guidance to obviate the need for pattern
bombing.
Scope
4. This Chapter describes the generic types of air delivered weapons. It excludes Guided
Weapons and Chemical Weapons which, due to their complex nature and particular hazards, are dealt
with separately.
5. The characteristics and recognition features described in the Chapter were derived during and
immediately following WWII. Not all air delivered weapons fit perfectly into these classifications and
categories and anomalies may occur when the generic guidelines are applied to some modern day
weapons, some of which may fit more than one category. The EOD operator should use the generic
guidelines to focus subsequent investigation and must always refer to the appropriate up-to-date
technical manuals or database’s to ascertain the correct Render-Safe Procedure (RSP).
CLASSIFICATION OF AIR DELIVERED WEAPONS
Types and Categories

6. The EOD operator must possess a good understanding of the types of air delivered weapons
likely to be encountered. Such weapons are classified generically by type and further sub-divided into
categories, as follows:
a. High Explosive (HE) Bombs.
(1) General Purpose (GP).
(2) Medium Capacity (MC).
(3) Deep Penetration (DP).
(4) High Capacity (HC).
(5) Armour Piercing (AP).
(6) Semi-Armour Piercing (SAP).
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

(7) Fragmentation (Frag).
(8) Anti Submarine (AS).
b. Practice Bombs.
(1) Full Size Practice Bomb.
(2) Lightweight Practice Bomb.
c. Incendiaries.
(1) Combustible.
(2) Non Combustible.
d. Pyrotechnics.
(1) Markers.
(2) Signals.
e. Containers/Cluster Bombs.
(1) Amiable Container.
(2) Non Amiable Container.
Design Characteristics
7. The design characteristics which determine EOD action required for air-delivered weapons are
as follows:
a. The type of explosive filling.
b. The type, positions and number of fuses/pistols.
c. The thickness of the bomb case.
d. The charge/weight ratio.
e. The effects to be expected if the weapon detonates. The ratio of blast, fragmentation
and earth shock will be applicable to the ordnance type. For example, a GP HE bomb gives
all 3 effects, whereas an HC HE bomb gives predominantly blast, with minimal or no
fragmentation or earth shock.
HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS
Recognition Features
8. To assist with the recognition of HE bombs, both generically and for final identification, the
key point method should be used. The 7 key points are:
a. Tail.
b. Shape.
c. Suspension.
d. Markings.
e. Dimensions.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

f. Fuse/Pistol Location.
g. Fuse/Pistol Type/Shape.
Tail
9. The tail unit’s main purpose is to stabilise the weapon during its flight. It orientates the
weapon correctly in relation to the target and may also provide some fixtures which form part of the
fuse/pistol arming process (e.g. the arming spindle and fork assembly in British tail units). The tail
unit is usually a non-explosive component (although some tail units contain explosive fills or
explosively activated components) and is attached to the body of the bomb by a variety of methods.
On some weapons, the tail unit is welded to the bomb.
10. When the bomb impacts, the tail unit usually become detached from the bomb case and are
often the first indication of a UXO. Since WWII, the development of faster aircraft has resulted in the
use of ballistic tail units (see Figure 4-1); these are longer and more streamlined than those previously
used and normally take the form of enclosed cones with open fins. When a ballistic tail unit is fitted, it
is an indication that the bomb was delivered from medium to high level. For low-level bombing,
retarded tail units are used. These are generally much more robust in construction and have either a
parachute or flip-out fins for retardation (see Figures 4-2 and 4-3).
Figure4-1 – Ballistic Tail Unit
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure 4-2 – Parachute-Retarded Tail Unit.
Figure 4-3 – Fin-Retarded Tail Unit
11. Country of Origin. Different countries have adopted particular shapes and styles of tail units
and this can aid greatly in determining country of origin.
a. British. Early British tail units tended to be a cone and drum shape, with clip on or
screw attachments, as shown in Figure 4-4.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure 4-4 – British Multi-Fin Cone and Drum Tail Unit
In 1939, an arming vane/arming fork assembly was added and this is still used on British tail
units today.
b. American. Early American tail units were of an open, square boxed shape, of
relatively thin construction and secured by a large nut, as illustrated in Figure 4-5.
Figure 4-5 – American Bomb with Box Tail Unit
Due to this thin construction, American tail units corrode easily, and the operator may only be
left with a large nut in the rear of the bomb as a recognition feature.
c. German. German tail units consist of cruciform parallel fins on a cone type tail
(Figure 4-6). The leading edge of the fins is ‘cut off’ at a 45-degree angle. It can be bolted on
or be part of the bomb construction. It may also have a cross brace to improve rigidity.
Figure4-6 – Cruciform Tail Unit
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

d. Former Soviet Union. FSU tail units may resemble British, American or German tail
units in shape. Additionally, FSU bombs may sometimes be fitted with multiple fins and
cones on drum style tails (see Figure 4-7). FSU tail units can be the bolt-on type or, as is quite
commonly used, welded as part of the bomb body construction with pockets or wells to accept
fuses and boosters. When this is the case, the tail is filled with the main explosive filling.
Figure 4-7 – FSU Multi-Fin Cone and Drum Tail Unit
Shape
12. The shape of an HE bomb is a quick way to identify it by its generic category. Each country
tends to have its own characteristic shape. Basic shapes are described in the section on Bomb
Characteristics.
Suspension Lug
13. The purpose of a suspension lug is to enable the bomb to be fitted to the suspension or release
unit fitted in the aircraft wing or bomb bay. Some suspension lugs also double-up as lifting points for
use during storage, preparation and ground handling. Suspension lugs usually screw into location
wells in the bomb body although some are welded to the bomb casing during manufacture (Fig 4-8)
14. Most NATO ordnance is designed to be interchangeable and hence the weapon may have
many receptacle points in the bomb skin, or the facility to fit adapter saddles, to enable the weapon to
be fitted to aircraft from different NATO countries. Typically, the distance between the suspension
lugs is 35-75cm (14 and 30 inches) for NATO bombs and 25cm (10 inches) for FSU bombs.
Figure 4-8 Russian Bomb Lugs (2 on one side 1 on the other).
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Markings
15. Markings are usually in one or more of the following formats.
a. Colour Codes. Bombs may be painted in an overall role colour, with bands and
markings to indicate the weapon’s hazards. For example, a British MC 1000lb HE (post
1964) is coloured deep bronze green to denote operational use, with yellow bands and
markings to denote HE filling (Figure 4-9). Different countries use different marking and
colour coding systems. The authoritative document for the NATO colour coding system,
which was standardised in 1964, is STANAG 2321 and the colours are described in DEF-
STAN 08-10. Prior to 1964 colour codes were not standardised and are therefore not a
reliable key to identification.
b. Stencilling or Stamping. In addition to painting, markings can be stencilled, stamped

or embossed on the bomb body (Figure 4-9). These markings give technical information such
as type and mark of the bomb, explosive fill type, manufacture and fill date, plus any
modifications to the weapon. In the case of British HE bombs, a brass ‘kidney’ plate is
attached to the rear of the bomb body between the fuse well and the tail unit attachment ring.
Markings such as this can be a great aid to identification, especially if the ordnance has
suffered impact damage and the normal painted markings have been abrasively removed or
obliterated.
Figure 4-9 – Markings
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Dimensions
16. Accurate measurements of relevant features of the UXO are key when referring to appropriate
publications or identification databases. However, extreme care must be taken not to disturb the item
of ordnance, the undergrowth or other obstructions when taking measurements. As a minimum, the
dimensions shown in Figure 4-10 should be taken, although they may not all be available as tail unit
and suspension units may have been ripped off during impact.
Figure 4-10 Key Dimensions
Fuse/Pistol Location
17. The fuse/pistol may be positioned in the nose, tail or transverse, as illustrated in Figure 4-11.
The fuse/pistol position will further aid weapon identification; for example, an AP Bomb would not
have the facility to fit a nose fuse. Blanking plugs are normally fitted if there is no fuse/pistol fitted to
a particular fuse pocket.
Figure 4-11 Fuse/Pistol Location
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Fuse/Pistol Shape/Type
18. The shape of a particular fuse or pistol will give the EOD operator a good indication of the
type of fuse/pistol fitted, and therefore the probable role of the bomb (i.e. pre-impact, impact, short
delay or long delay).
CHARACTERISTICS BY CATEGORY
General Purpose Bombs

19. Shape - pointed nose, tapers from shoulder to base plate (teardrop) (Figure 4-12). Early
British and foreign bombs can be teardrop shaped, or of a parallel-sided design similar to British
Medium Capacity (MC).
a. Case - moderately thick (09mm - 12.5mm (3/16 in - 1/2 in)).
b. Charge/weight ratio - 33 – 60%.
c. Weight range - 9-2500 Kg. (20lb - 5500lb)
d. Effects - blast, fragmentation and earth shock.
e. Fusing - nose and/or tail, transverse sometimes in foreign GP bomb types, pre-impact,
impact, delay (long or short), anti handling.
f. Use - general bombardment.
Figure 4-12 GP Bomb
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Medium Capacity Bombs
20. MC bombs were designed by the British to replace the GP bomb in order to give a standard
explosive filling. MC is British terminology and looks similar in appearance to foreign GP Bombs.
a. Shape - pointed nose, parallel sides (Figure 4-13).

b. Case - moderately thick.
c. Charge/weight ratio – 50%.
d. Effects - blast, fragmentation and earth shock.
e. Fusing - Nose, tail, pre-impact, instantaneous, long or short delay and anti-handling.
Use - general targets.
Figure 4-13 MC Bomb
Deep Penetration Bombs

21. Deep Penetration (DP) bombs appear similar to MC Bombs in basic shape, but are extremely
large with a solid nose and special ballistic qualities.
a. Shape - streamlined, tapering from shoulders to base plate (Figure 4-14).

b. Case - solid nose, thick case.
d. Weight range - 5450 Kg - 10,000 Kg (12,000 - 22,000 lb).
e. Effects - earthquake.
f. Fusing - multiple short delay, tail only.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

g. Use - penetration (reinforced concrete targets).
Figure 4-14 DP Bomb
High Capacity Bombs

22. High Capacity (HC) bombs are designed to cause maximum blast damage.
a. Shape - may be conventional bomb shape, prefabricated or made up of sections, but

usually drum or boiler shaped (Figure 4-15).
b. Case - very thin.
c. Charge/weight ratio - 75-80%.
d. Weight range - 1000-7000 Kg (2200 – 15,500lb)
e. Effects - blast.
f. Fusing - nose and/or tail (usually multiple fuse wells) pre-impact or impact
instantaneous.
g. Use - where maximum blast effect is required.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure 4-15 – HC Bomb
Armour Piercing Bombs

a. Shape - pencil shaped or streamlined (Figure 4-16).
b. Case - thick with a solid nose.
d. Weight range - 500-1000 Kg (1,100 - 2,200lb).
e. Effects - penetration and fragmentation.
f. Fusing - tail, short delay.
g. Use - penetration of heavily armoured targets (reinforced concrete bunkers etc).
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure 4-16 AP Bomb
Semi-Armour Piercing (Older generation)

a. Shape - teardrop, moderately streamlined, similar to GP (Figure 4-17).
b. Case - reasonably thick.
d. Weight range - 100-500 Kg (220 - 1,100lb)
e. Effects - penetration and fragmentation.
f. Fusing - tail, short delay.
g. Use - light armour (tanks, ships, lightly reinforced facilities).
Figure 4-17 SAP Bomb
Fragmentation Bombs
23. Fragmentation bombs are constructed of cast steel with often visible pre-formed ‘scoring’ to
optimise the fragmentation effect.
a. Shape – various, dependent upon weapon size (See examples at Figure 4-18).
b. Case - thick. (maybe with visible fragmentation scoring evident).
d. Weight range - 1-250 Kg (2 - 500lb)
e. Effects - maximum fragmentation.
f. Fusing - nose and/or tail, pre-impact, impact.
g. Use - dropped either singly or from containers (clusters) against soft skinned targets.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure4-18 Fragmentation Bomb
Anti-Submarine Bombs
24. Early Anti-Submarine (AS) bombs had pointed noses with truncated cone adapters; later
bombs were made with flat noses. These bombs have now been replaced by depth charges.
a. Shape - flat nose, tapering from shoulders (Figure 4-19).

b. Case - thin walled.
d. Weight range - 45 - 270 Kg (100 - 600 lb).
e. Effects - blast with minor fragmentation.
f. Fusing – predominantly tail (possibly hydrostatic) or short delay.
g. Use - underwater targets.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure 4-19 AS Bomb
PRACTICE BOMBS
25. Practice bombs are designed to have the same ballistic properties as the bombs they represent.
They are instantly recognisable by their light blue colour. Practice bombs should not be regarded as
inert as some mark their point of impact and consequently contain pyrotechnics or explosives (up to
23kg). The main hazards with practice bombs are smoke, flash and fragmentation effects.
26. Practice bombs currently in use fall into 2 main categories.
a. Full size practice versions of real HE bombs. These consist of a real bomb casing
complete with normal fusing facilities. They are filled, or partly filled, with sand or aerated
concrete.
b. A lightweight, economic range of bombs designed primarily for aircrew weapon

training. These are small bombs, weighing only a few kilograms each but, because of their
aerodynamic shape, have a performance comparable with the types of HE bomb they represent
(Figure 4-20).
Figure 4-20 Practice Bomb
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

INCENDIARY BOMBS
27. Incendiary bombs cause significant fire damage and historically have proved to be highly
effective when used against built up areas. There are 2 types of incendiary bomb, combustible and
non-combustible.
Combustible
28. The body of a combustible incendiary bomb is usually made of a magnesium alloy, which
burns fiercely and is difficult to extinguish. Bomb initiation is by thermite, which burns with a heat
sufficient to melt steel. Combustible incendiaries are usually small (about 2"/50mm in diameter and
8-12"/200-300mm long) and weigh between 1-2kg. The fuses are of a simple impact type and may be
fitted in the nose or the tail. They are usually delivered from containers, which may hold several
hundred bombs. This type of incendiary is often fitted with an explosive device to discourage fire-
fighting efforts. This anti personnel device may take the form of an explosive charge in either the
nose or the tail which is initiated simply by the heat of combustion or it may have a more complicated
device incorporating a delay of about 5 minutes. An example of a combustible incendiary is shown in
Figure 4-21.
Figure 4-21 Combustible Incendiary Bomb
Non Combustible
29. Non-combustible incendiary bombs differ from the combustible type in that only the contents
are designed to burn. They are normally a conventional bomb shape with a steel body (or converted
aircraft fuel tanks) filled with a flammable mixture. Impact fuses are usually fitted and a burster
charge incorporated to break open the casing and ignite the contents. An example is shown at Figure
4-22. The filling may be:
c. An inflammable liquid such as crude oil or petrol, usually mixed with benzene or
phosphorous.
d. A number of small combustible incendiaries. Some bombs with this type of filling
also incorporate a HE charge arranged so as to detonate several seconds after the contents
have been ejected.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

e. A solid combustible fill with thermite cartridges.
Figure 4-22 Non-Combustible Incendiary Bomb
PYROTECHNICS
General
30. Pyrotechnics are used for many different purposes including illumination, navigation and
signalling. They are filled with a variety of fillings and come in various shapes and colours.
Colour
31. Pyrotechnics are categorised by the way they function into markers (Figure 4-23) which
function on the surface, and signals, which function in the air. The colour of a pyrotechnic generally
gives an indication of its use or role. However, colour markings for pyrotechnics and explosive stores
have changed many times over the years and the colour coding should never be relied upon as a means
of identifying a munition, merely as a guide.
Figure 4-23 Pyrotechnic Markings
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Markings
32. As with other types of ordnance, markings are applied to a pyrotechnic. They can often be
covered with a number of different markings, the purpose of which is to.
f. Provide all necessary manufacturing and filling details to assist inspection.
g. Enable pyrotechnics to be clearly and easily identified by the user under all conditions
of service, and provide the user with the maximum information possible concerning the
nature, type, function and hazard of the pyrotechnic supplied. These are known as 'Hazard
Markings'.
h. Ensure the pyrotechnics are correctly stored, handled and transported, according to the
nature of the hazard.
Pyrotechnic Disposal
33. Pyrotechnics may seem quite harmless but are inherently dangerous. The specific hazard and
disposal procedures associated with particular pyrotechnics are detailed in the relevant publications, to
which reference should always be made.
Safety Considerations
34. The following safety rules should be followed when dealing with pyrotechnics.
i. Photoflash and flare bombs are particularly hazardous. Typically the 8-inch
photoflash should be treated with the same caution as a 120 kg HE Bomb.
j. Some pyrotechnics have little or no explosive but the nature of the filling can be such
that with moisture, dangerous flammable gases are given off which can be toxic. Personnel
should approach from up wind and avoid inhaling the fumes. If the pyrotechnic is in an
enclosed area, it should be ventilated to clear the fumes.
k. The chemicals normally used - calcium phosphide, red phosphorous, white

phosphorous and magnesium - will burn the skin. Personnel should therefore wear gloves and
keep arms and face covered.
l. Some devices are initiated by percussion, which may fail due to imperfections in the
striker mechanism. Personnel should therefore avoid dropping or jarring the object, which
may free a hung-up striker.
m. Some devices fire a signal flare 300-500 ft into the air. The munition should therefore
be picked up in the same attitude as found and always kept pointing away from any personnel.
n. A partially burned pyrotechnic may re-ignite. Personnel should therefore avoid

looking into the end.
o. Pyrotechnics should never be put in water (fresh or salt) as this cause some
pyrotechnics to function
p. Liquid splashes on personnel or vehicles may re-ignite when they dry out.
q. If in doubt, further information should be obtained before handling any pyrotechnics.
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CONTAINER/CLUSTER BOMBS
Definition
35. Containers are a means by which multiple items can be delivered to a target. The payload of a
container may be of a non-explosive nature, but the payload of a cluster bomb will always be of an
explosive nature.
36. There are 2 types of container/cluster; aimable and non-aimable.
Aimiable
37. An aimable container is a bomb shaped weapon which functions after it has left the aircraft.
Aimiable containers (Figure 4-24) are usually fitted with pre-impact (airburst) fusing and on operation
of the fuse; the weapon opens and disperses the contents. The external appearance of the container
gives an indication of how this dispersion is achieved, either by weakened portions on the weapon
surface, detachable skins, ejection holes or ejectable tails. These weapons are often relatively soft
skinned and there is usually a reinforced area or saddle where the suspension units are attached.
Figure 4-24 Aimiable Container
Non-Aimiable
38. A non-aimable container (Figure 4-25) is retained in the aircraft and operated by a crew
member, scattering its contents over a large area as the aircraft flies over the target. Modern versions
are known as dispensers and usually have the smaller weapons projected from tubes within the
container in either a rearward, sideways or downward direction (e.g. JP 233). This type of container
may have the facility to be jettisoned after it has dispensed its payload. Non-aimable containers have a
far greater capacity than aimable containers and the contents tend to be complex in their fusing.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure 4-25 – JP 233 No2 Mk1 Non-Aimiable Container
Fuses and Pistols
Purpose
39. The purpose of a bomb pistol or fuse is that it is a device designed to initiate the detonation,
ejection or dispersion of a bomb filling at a previously selected time or position. They incorporate
devices intended to ensure reliable and effective operation of the bomb, hence they are considered to
be the most hazardous components of a UXB. Therefore, they must be approached, handled and
rendered safe following acceptable EOD practices.
Definition
40. Pistol. A pistol (Fig 4-26) contains no explosives and is used in conjunction with a separate
detonator. When a pistol is removed from a weapon then the means of initiation is removed but the
explosive train remains in place in the weapon. A pistol is not a hazard once it is removed.
Detonators are not normally removed from a weapon if it cannot be confirmed that they have been
fitted for less than 14 days.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

PISTO
L
DETONATOR
Fig 4-26 - Pistol
41. Fuse. Bomb fuses contain explosives such as a detonator and magazine (Fig 4-27). If
removed from a weapon then the explosive train is broken. The primary high explosive will be
located in the Fuse. Fuses that have been removed are still a hazard and require care in handling,
transportation and storage.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

TAIL FUZE
FELT WASHER
FUZE MAGAZINE
EXPLODER EXPLODER
Fig 4-27 - Fuse
Classification
42. Before any Render Safe Procedure (RSP) is attempted on a pistol or fuse, the following facts
must be determined:
a. Condition. Is the pistol/fuse safe, armed or partially functioned?
b. Number. Is there more than one fuse fitted to the bomb? When more than one fuse is
fitted, it may be possible to deal with both fuses at the same time. Otherwise, then the most
hazardous should be dealt with first.
c. Type. Is the pistol/fuse impact-operated, airburst, influence, long-delay or anti-

disturbance?
d. Plan of Attack. Should the pistol/fuse be immunized, removed or attacked?
43. To aid the recognition of pistols/fuses, 3 criteria are used:
a. Position in store.
b. Method of arming.
c. Functioning action.
Position in Store
44. Pistols/fuses are classified by the position in which they are fitted into the bomb as follows
(Fig 4-28):
a. Nose.
b. Tail.
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c. Transverse.
d. Multi position – fits into more than one of the other positions.
MULTI-POSITION
NOSE TAIL
TRANSVERSE
Fig 4-28 Position in store
Method of Arming
45. Arming commences when the bomb is released from the aircraft, usually incorporating some
form of delay to ensure safe separation of the bomb from the aircraft. Arming is normally
accomplished by one of 4 methods:
a. Mechanical. The most common form of mechanical arming is the rotation of an

arming vane or spindle. The action can be direct to the pistol/fuse or delayed by the use of
gearings. Another method used is the ejection or withdrawal of an arming pin or removal of a
safety cap.
b. Electrical. In electrical arming, an electrical charge, supplied by either the parent

aircraft or a self-contained battery, is passed through a resistor capacitor circuit to charge a
firing capacitor. The delay to arming can be achieved by varying the amount of resistance
through which the charge must flow to charge the firing capacitor. Another example would be
that of electrical energy being used to move inline shutters that have been keeping the
explosive train misaligned.
c. Electro-Mechanical. (Figure 4-29). Electro-mechanical arming is the use of electric

or explosive motors that perform a mechanical function to arm the pistol/fuse. The electrical
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

input is normally passed from the parent aircraft to the motor, which may operate an actuator
(electrical) or gas piston (explosively), to shear a shear wire within the fuse. Sometimes these
are ‘bolt on’ additions to older pistols/fuses where increased safety distances for arming are
required when flown on newer/faster aircraft.
Electro-Mechanical Component As Fitted to a Fuse
Figure-4-29 - Electro-Mechanical Arming
d. Combination. (Figure 4-30). Combination arming incorporates more than one arming
action to increase the safety of the pistol/fuse. The figure illustrates a fuse that requires a
mechanical arming action through the ‘T’-bar and an electrical arming action delivered via the
electrical connector. Therefore one action alone will not arm the pistol/fuse.
Figure-4-30 – Combination arming
Functioning Action
46. The functioning action, also called the final action, can be divided into 8 groups of operation
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

a. Impact/short delay.
b. Airburst.
c. Influence.
d. Hydrostatic.
e. Long Delay.
f. Anti-Disturbance/Anti-Handling.
g. Protective/Anti-Withdrawal.
h. Modular/smart.
47. These main groups can also be split down into various sub-groups, according to the
requirements of a specific bomb and pistol/fuse combination.
Impact Fuses and Pistols
48. There are 3 basic types of impact fuses/pistols:
a. Direct action - nose mounted pistols/fuses.
b. Indirect action - tail mounted pistols/fuses.
c. Combination/All-Ways Acting - nose, tail or transverse mounted pistols/fuses.
Direct Action
49. Direct action fuses operate by the impact of the bomb either driving the striker rearward into
the detonator or primer (mechanical action) or creating an electrical current by closing a switch in an
electrical circuit (electrical action). This can be achieved in a number of ways, of which the following
are the main examples:
a. Shear Wire. The striker is retained in position, clear of the detonator, by shear wire.
On impact, the wire is sheared and the striker is forced rearwards into the detonator (Figure 4-
31).
Figure-4-31 – Shear wire
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b. Compression Spring. The striker is held away from the detonator by a spring. On
impact, the striker is forced rearwards overcoming the spring pressure, which compresses to
allow the striker to strike the detonator (Figure 4-32).
Figure -4-32 - Compression Spring
c. Diaphragm/Membrane. The striker is attached to a convex thin metal membrane, in

front of which is an open air chamber. On impact, the air is compressed in front of the
membrane, reversing it and pushing the striker into the detonator (Figure 4-33).
Figure -4-33 - Diaphragm/Membrane
d. Heat of Compression. A heat sensitive material is placed adjacent to an air cylinder.

On impact, the air in the cylinder is compressed either by a plunger action or by the crushing
of the cylinder. The air is rapidly heated by the compression and ignites the heat sensitive
material (Figure 4-34).
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure -4-34 - Heat of Compression
e. Electrical. There are a number of ways of using the impact force to create an
electrical current or circuit. One method is to use a piezo-electrical crystal which, when
crushed, produces an electrical charge to fire an electric detonator. A second method is to use
a protruding plunger which, on impact, drives a magnet through a coil to produce an electric
current, which in turn fires an electric detonator (Figure 4-35).
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure 4-35 – Electrical
Indirect Action
50. Indirect impact fuses use the inertia force of the bomb impacting to drive the striker. Main
examples of this type of pistol/fuse are as follows:
a. Compression Spring. A heavy striker is held away from the detonator by a

compression spring. On impact, the inertia force drives the striker forward, overcoming the
spring pressure and striking the detonator (Figure 4-36).
Figure -4-36 - Compression Spring
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

b. Plate. A heavy striker is retained in position by a thin metal plate or soft metal
cruciform. On impact, the inertia force bows the plate/cruciform, allowing the striker to move
forward to strike the detonator (Figure 4-37).
Figure -4-37 – Plate
c. Cocked Striker. Steel balls within firing pin housing hold a spring-loaded firing pin
back. The housing itself is kept in position by a compression spring. On impact, the housing
overcomes the spring and moves forward allowing the steel balls to fall into a recess, freeing
the striker, which is then driven forward by its pre-stressed spring (Figure 4-38).
Figure -4-38 - Cocked Striker
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

d. Heat of Compression. Heat sensitive material is placed adjacent to a sealed air
cylinder. On impact, a plunger overcomes a compression spring to move forwards to
compress the air cylinder. Compression of the cylinder heats the air, thus igniting the heat
sensitive material (Figure 4-39).
Figure-4-39 – Heat of compression
Combination/All-Ways Acting
51. Combination/All-Ways Acting fuses are used mainly for low-level bombing and for transverse
fusing where the pistol/fuse needs to function regardless of the angle of impact.
52. The interior of the fuse body has a cammed surface, inside of which is housed the combination
(all-ways acting) mechanism comprising of detonator and striker carrier. When the pistol/fuse is
armed, both the detonator and striker carriers are free-floating within the body, held apart by a
compression spring. On impact, the cammed surfaces of the fuse body acting on the cammed surfaces
of the detonator and striker carriers drives the 2 assemblies together, overcoming the compression
spring and driving the striker into the detonator.
53. A pistol/fuse operating at any angle of impact is called universal (Figure 4-40) and a
fuse/pistol which operates at all angles except one it is called Multi-Way Acting (Figure 4-41).
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure -4-40 - Universal
Figure -4-41 – Multi Ways
Short Delay
54. A large number of impact fuses have an option of utilizing a short delay before actioning the
weapon, e.g. weapon target penetration. They are grouped with the impact functioning action fuses
and not as a separate type.
Airburst Pistols and Fuses
55. Airburst pistols and fuses are designed to detonate the store at some pre-selected time before
impact with the ground. There are 6 main airburst groups1.
1
Proximity fuses do have an airburst function but are generally referred to as influence fuses.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

a. Mechanical time (clockwork).
b. Mechanical.
c. Electrical.
d. Pyrotechnic time.
e. Barometric.
f. Blast pressure.
Mechanical Time
56. Mechanical time fuses (Figure 4-42) use a clockwork mechanism that releases a cocked striker
at a preset time. The majority of mechanical time fuses are constructed with the detonator held 'out of
line' with the explosive train until the fuse becomes fully armed. The hazard with this type of widely
used fusing system is that the mechanism may jam during operation and subsequently restart by
movement or jarring of the bomb.
57. A recognition feature for this type of fusing is the presence of a graduated scale engraved
around the pistol/fuse body, on a movable ring, or inside an inspection window. No attempt should
be made to reset the graduated scale as a means of rendering safe the pistol/fuse. Calibrated scale
measurements differ between countries and the fuse must therefore be positively identified before the
time of functioning can be established.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Fig-4-42 - Mechanical Time Airburst Fuse
Mechanical
58. Mechanical fuses (Figure 4-43) normally function by using either the pull of a lanyard or by
vane rotation to release a cocked striker, the delay of operation being determined by the length of the
lanyard or the number of vane revolutions.
Figure-4-43 - Mechanical Airburst Fuse
Electrical
59. An example of an electrical airburst fuse is the German WWII No 9 fuse (Figure 4-44), which
consists of a capacitor-resistor circuit containing a glow tube acting as a firing switch. The fuse
functions by placing a charge on an arming capacitor. In time, the charge passes through the arming
resistor to energise the firing capacitor. When charged to the correct voltage, the gas in the glow tube
ionises and allows the charge to flow through to fire the igniter bridge.
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60. A method of varying the time of operation is to pre-charge the firing capacitor to a voltage
less than the actual firing voltage, thus shortening the time taken to ionise the glow tube switch.
Modern electrical airburst fusing incorporates electronic delaying chips to achieve a delay prior to
firing, the electrical current being produced by a turbo-generator.
Figure Error! No text of specified style in document.-4-44 – Electrical Airburst Fuse
Pyrotechnic Time
61. Pyrotechnic airburst fuses (Figure 4-45) incorporate a pyrotechnic delay which may be
initiated mechanically (e.g. with a cocked striker) or electrically by means of an igniter bridge.
Variable time settings are achieved by means of a graduated setting ring containing a moveable
powder train, or by actuating one or more igniter bridges if electrical initiation is used. The hazard
with this type of pistol/fuse is that it is possible, due to the effects of temperature and/or humidity, for
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

the powder train or delay element to smoulder at a slower or faster rate than set, thereby initiating the
bomb outside the preset time range.
62. Both mechanical time (clockwork) pistols/fuses and pyrotechnic pistols/fuses have calibrated
scales as a recognition point. The key difference between the two is that the pyrotechnic pistols/fuses
have vent holes to release exhaust gases from the pyrotechnic train and which, if fired, exhibit a sooty
deposit around the vent holes.
Figure-4-45 - Pyrotechnic Airburst Fuse
Barometric
63. Barometric pistols/fuses (Figure 4-46) are designed to function through the increase of
barometric air pressure as a bomb falls. The increase in pressure acts on a bellows assembly which
gradually collapses, releasing a cocked striker at a preset height. It is usual for these pistols/fuses to be
armed by mechanical means, such as vane rotation, to allow safe separation from the aircraft.
64. A recognition feature for this type of fusing is the presence of air inlet holes around the
pistol/fuse body.
Blast Pressure
65. Blast pressure fuses (Figure 4-47) employ a diaphragm/membrane striker assembly which is
operated by the blast or pressure wave created by the detonation of another store ahead of it. If the
pressure wave is insufficient to reverse the diaphragm, it operates as a standard impact pistol.
66. During clearance operations, it must be remembered this type of fusing is sensitive to nearby
demolitions.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure 4-46 – Barometric Airburst Fuse Figure -4-47 - Blast Pressure Airburst Fuse
Influence fusing
67. Influence fuses are designed to detonate a bomb at some optimum point from the target to
maximise the effect of the weapon. They can be operated using any of the following stimuli.
Stimuli Method of Operation

Radio. Active (electro The most commonly used form of stimuli. It functions by using
magnetic wave) (Figure -) the Doppler effect between a transmitted and reflected radio
pulse. When the outgoing and incoming pulses reach certain
amplitude, the firing circuit is energised to fire the fuse.
Radio. Passive Sensitive to energy radiated from the target.
Light Initiated by the detonation of a photoflash bomb in close

proximity to this fuse. Not a common method in modern fusing.
Heat Dropped over an incendiary fire, the resultant blast from the bomb
is used to spread the incendiary fires.
Acoustic (Seismic) Uses the acoustic signature from the target to initiate the fuse.
Magnetism Uses the magnetic signature from the target to initiate the fuse.
IR/Laser Modern variations of the radio wave fusing, using the same
principles but with IR or laser beams.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Proximity Sensing Elements
68. It is possible to install a proximity-sensing element in the nose of a bomb. This is essentially a
radio wave fuse but contains no explosive train. The sensing element houses a thermal battery to
power the system and to transmit a firing pulse through cabling to a tail-mounted fuse. The tail-
mounted fuse is usually impact functioning, capable of operating independently of the proximity-
sensing element (see Figure 4-48).
TAIL IMPACT FUZE
CHARGING WELL
TAIL FUZE WELL
CONDUIT FOR
PROXIMITY SENSING
ELECTRICAL CABLE
ELEMENT
Figure -8 - Proximity Sensing Element
Recognition of Influence Fuses

69. Influence fuses are complex in design. Some common recognition features are.
a. Usually larger than other types of fusing.
b. Normally contain aerial or sensor arrays, the appearance of which depends on stimuli
type (Fig 4-49)
c. May have a plastic/ceramic radome, indicates the possibility of radio wave fusing (the
aerials being hidden underneath the radome).
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Fig 4-49 Influence Fuse
Approach
70. If an influence system of the radio wave type is suspected, the approach to the fuse should be
from the rear of the weapon along its centre line.
Long delay Fuses and Pistols
71. Long delay pistols and fuses are used primarily for their nuisance value and to demoralize
enemy forces and the civilian population.
72. The 4 main types of long delay fusing are:
a. Chemical.
b. Material Creep.
c. Clockwork.
d. Electrical.
Chemical Long Delay

73. Chemical long delay fuses (Figure 4-50) are the most common type. They usually take the
form of a cocked striker held by a soluble delay component. During the arming sequence, a container
holding a dissolving agent (usually acetone) is pierced or broken and this dissolving agent reacts with
the delay element, dissolving it over a set period of time until the cocked striker is released to fire the
pistol/fuse.
74. The length of delay is normally set at manufacture and is governed by either the strength of
the dissolving agent or the thickness of the delay element. However, the ambient temperature at the
time of use can affect both these components, low temperatures retarding and high temperatures
accelerating initiation.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Recognition
75. The majority of long delay pistols and fuses are enclosed within the bomb body to protect
them; time of delay markings may not be visible. Possible recognition features are.
a. A weakened portion of the pistol/fuse is designed to break off, leaving little of it

protruding thus hindering attempts to remove it.
b. A stub of arming fork visible, but sheared off after having been screwed in to break
the capsule.
c. The smell of acetone (nail varnish remover) due to leakage along the screw threads.
d. Chemical corrosion from acetone at the head of the pistol/fuse (dependent on material
used in the manufacture of the fuse).
Fig 4-50 - Chemical Long Delay Fusing
Material Creep
76. Material creep pistol/fuses (Figure 4-51) use a cocked striker held by a delay component made
from plastic or an alloy of lead and tin. Arming of the pistol/fuse subjects the delay component to
continuous stress, usually in the form of spring pressure. After the delay has elapsed, the delay
component yields to the pressure and releases the cocked striker.
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77. Time delay is set at manufacture and is dependent on the strength of delay component and
strength of spring. Both are influenced by ambient temperature.
Figure -9 - Material Creep Fusing
Clockwork
78. Clockwork pistol/fuses (Figure 4-52) incorporate a clockwork mechanism which releases a
cocked striker or completes an electrical firing circuit. The delay can be preset at manufacture or prior
to pistol/fuse installation. The advantage of clockwork pistol/fuses over other types of long delay is
that the delay time can be set very accurately and will not be affected by ambient temperature.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Figure 4-52- Clockwork Long Delay Fusing
Electrical
79. Electrical pistols and fuses (Figure 4-53) incorporate a firing circuit energized by a storage
capacitor through a high resistance timing network after the pistol/fuse has armed. Impact arming is a
common feature of this type of fuse and can be used to align the explosive train, remove any safety
switches and complete the firing circuit. The delay is achieved by the value of the resistance through
which the storage capacitor leaks its charge to the firing capacitor. When the firing capacitor has
accumulated a sufficient charge, a gas tube or some similar electronic switch conducts the firing
charge to the electrical detonator.
80. A hazard with this type of pistol/fuse is that if the switching device malfunctions, it is possible
an electric charge may be held by the firing capacitor for up to several months.
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Fig-4-53 Electrical Delay Fusing
Anti-Withdrawal Devices
81. Due to the functioning design of long delay pistols/fuses, it is usual for some form of anti-
withdrawal device to be fitted to prevent EOD operators from removing the fuse (Fig 4-54). These
mechanisms could be separate, in which case they are classed as protective fusing, or an integral part
of the pistol/fuse mechanism. Anti-withdrawal can be achieved by the following methods.
a. Clawed Foot. Once a fuse is fully armed, a clawed foot is rotated outwards. On
attempted removal of the fuse, the clawed foot binds and digs into the wall of the fuse well.
b. Offset Groove and Ball. As the fuse is screwed into the fuse well, the ball runs to the
deepest part of the groove. If an attempt is made to remove the fuse, the ball runs to the
shallowest part of the groove and jams up against the fuse well wall, thus preventing fuse
removal.
c. Knife Edges. As the fuse is inserted, spring-loaded knife-edges deploy. Should fuse
removal be attempted, the knife-edges dig into the fuse well wall.
d. Anti-Removal Sleeve. Mainly used on pistols. The retaining sleeve is locked into the
detonator head by a rubber washer. Any attempt to remove the pistol results in the retaining
sleeve being unscrewed, thereby releasing the striker into the detonator.
e. Electrical Contact. An electrical contact switch is kept open while the fuse is in the
fuse well. Any attempt to remove the fuse results in the contact switch being closed, thereby
short-circuiting the current to the electric detonator.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Fig-4-54 Anti Withdrawl Fusing
Anti-Disturbance Fuses
82. Anti-disturbance fuses are designed to function on slight movement or disturbance of the
store. They represent a major hazard to EOD operators as some types are so sensitive that the
vibration from personnel approaching the store can be sufficient to function the fuse.
83. Anti-disturbance fuses can be used singly or in conjunction with another fuse, normally long
delay. They can be installed to be hidden from view or even disguised to resemble other types of fuses
or bomb plugs. Functioning can be achieved by:
a. Electrical (Figure 4-55). These contain switches which complete an electric circuit to
the detonator. The switches of various types (e.g. trembler, mercury tilt) are often arranged in
a number of different planes and angles and wired in parallel to the firing circuit.
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Fig-4-55 - Electrical Anti-Disturbance Fusing
b. Mechanical. These usually consist of a cocked striker, held away from the detonator
by some form of sensitively balanced retaining device. They are not normally found in
modern fuses.
Protective Fuses
84. Protective fuses (Figure 4-56) are essentially an anti-withdrawal booby trap mechanism
designed to prevent removal of a long delay pistol or fuse. The hazard with this type of fuse is that it
sits beneath the fuse it is protecting and is not visible.
Fig4-56- Protective Fusing
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

Modular or Smart Fuses
85. Modern fuses are becoming increasingly more complex and sophisticated (‘smart’) than their
predecessors. They have the facility to be computer coded on the ground and, as aircraft technology
advances, in an air during the aircraft sortie.
86. The coding enables a single fuse to carry out a range of different functioning actions (impact,
influence, long delay and anti-disturbance), negating the need for several different fuses to carry out
specific functions. In the event of one functioning action failing, they have the ability for other actions to
take over e.g. if the weapon fails to operate through influence, (when set) it operates on impact. They
may incorporate anti-disturbance and anti-withdrawal mechanisms as an integral part of the fuse and as
such they represent a major hazard to EOD operators. An example is shown in Figure 4-57.
Fig- 4-57 - Modular /”Smart” Fuse
EOD TRG HANDBOOK

CHAPTER 5
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS
INTRODUCTION
1. The IMAS Level 4 EOD operator is not trained in the disposal of any Chemical EO or chemical
substance.
2. As an IMAS Level 4 EOD operator you have been trained in the recognition of Chemical EO and
recognition features to enable you to call for specialist trained personnel, with the specific equipment
needed to deal with an EOD Chemical task.
COUNTRIES USING OR RESEARCHING THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

World map
Chemical EO LSA
3. Chemical LSA can look very similar to conventional EO with the addition of a filler plug or bung,
(see fig 10.2) extreme caution should be taken is a piece of EO is suspected of containing a chemical
substance and the task should be halted Immediately and the operator should withdraw and establish a
new ICP upwind of the suspected munition and seek advice from higher authority.

Generic Chemical projectile
4. Possible NATO Non-Permanent markings.
 Abbreviated item designation IE. MOR (Mortar) HOW (Howitzer) etc

 Number and/or mark or model number
 Symbol for agent fill (GB)
 Filling lot number
 Initials or monogram of filler
 Date of filling (Month and year)
 Descriptive, instructional or warning legends IE. GAS SMOKE etc.
5. Method of filling (fig 10.2)

6. Generic appearance of non-permanent stenciling of LSA Projectile
Role Markings
7. Chemical EO has very distinctive markings to enable to establish their contents.
 Background colour code for all toxic chemical agents, incapacitating fillers and RCA’s is
GREY
 Role markings are applied as a 12mm wide colour band around body of weapon
 Chemical weapon colour codes are standard in NATO and follow US MIL STD marking
system 709
8. US Standard military marking system (see Annex A to Chapter 5)
 709 – PRE 1960

 709 A – 1960 1976
 709 C – 1976 ONWARD
 Note- the US stockpile of chemical weapons has never been repainted
 Note- the US has not manufactured any new Chemical munitions since 1972, the majority of the
arsenal is marked as 709A.
9. Chemical ADW and containers
Chemical Air delivered Weapons again, can look very similar to conventional EO in respect to size
and id features but will have the same chemical munition markings of that within LSA.

10. Generic US Chemical ADW
11. Generic US ADW Container
12. Generic FSU colour markings on ADW

Annex A to Chapter 5
Chemical Weapons
CHAPTER 5
GUIDED WEAPONS
INTRODUCTION
1. A Guided Weapon (GW), or missile, is a system which accurately delivers a warhead to a target.
GWs are guided to increase the probability of a warhead hitting a target, enabling the use of longer-range,
stand-off weapons thus reducing the possibility of collateral damage.
2. This Chapter describes the classification of GWs and their component parts. It also outlines the
procedures required for carrying out GW reconnaissance.
CLASSIFICATION
3. GWs with similar characteristics present similar EOD hazards. The ability to place an unidentified
GW in its correct role and category allows the relevant safety precautions to be observed when approaching
the weapon to obtain positive identification. It also aids the use of publications and databases to confirm
identification.
4. For EOD purposes, GWs are classified as follows:
a. Air-to-Air Missile (AAM):
(1) Short Range, often referred to as Within Visual Range (WVR).
(2) Long Range, often referred to as Beyond Visual Range (BVR).
b. Air-to-Surface Missile (ASM):
(1) Tactical - not capable of delivering NBC warheads.
(2) Strategic - capable of delivering NBC warheads.
c. Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM).
(1) Hand held, often referred to as Man Portable Air Defence (MANPAD).
(2) Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD).
(3) Long Range.
d. Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM). There are 3 categories of SSM:
(1) Anti-Armour.
(2) Tactical (non NBC-capable).
(3) Strategic (NBC-capable).
5. Helicopter-launched GWs have the same generic characteristics as surface-launched weapons and
are classified as such.
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COMPONENT PARTS
6. The characteristics of a GW’s components reflect its role and category. The 4 main components of a
GW are (see fig 5-1)
a. Guidance section.
b. Control section.
c. Warhead section.
d. Propulsion section.
7. These are examined in more detail in the sections below.
Fig 5-1
GUIDANCE SECTION
8. The guidance section tells the control section where to steer. The 3 types of guidance are:
a. Homing.
b. Command.
c. Pre-set.
Homing Guidance
9. Homing guidance operates by means of a sensor at the front of the weapon. This allows it to home
into a signal from target. The 3 types of homing guidance commonly used with GW are:
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a. Radar Homing. (Fig 5-2). Radar guidance tracks a reflected radio signal. The weapon has a
movable antenna (dish) mounted at the front and covered by a plastic, glass-fibre or ceramic fairing.
This is ogival in shape and is known as a radome. On some weapons, fixed aerials replace movable
antenna and radome. Radar is the most common form of weapon guidance and is suitable for most
weapons, although it is too complex and large to be used in hand held SAMs and is not commonly
used in short range SAM. Radar homing is often employed on GWs that engage targets beyond
visual range.
Fig 5-2 – Radar Homing - Radome and Seeker
b. Infra-Red (IR) Homing. (Fig 5-3). IR guidance tracks heat sources and has a clear or
opaque (smoked) glass dome covering a sensor at the front of the weapon. The sensor will be some
form of gimballed ‘eye’ with a silvered mirror behind it. Other forms of guidance (electro-optical
and laser homing) also utilise a glass dome but only IR weapons have opaque domes. Although used
against a range of targets, aircraft exhausts are the primary heat source. IR weapons have limited
range and are most commonly used in short range AAM and hand held and short range SAM.
Fig 5-3 - IR Homing Guidance (smoked glass dome)

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c. Laser Homing. (Fig 5-4). Laser guidance tracks reflected energy from a laser beam fired at
a target. It consists of a glass dome at the front of a weapon covering a gimballed ‘eye’. Unlike IR
guidance, it has clear glass and a gold coloured mirror. Laser guidance is normally found on tactical
air to surface weapons and laser guided bombs (LGBs).
Fig 5-4 - Laser Homing Guidance
Command Guidance
10. Command guidance operates via a link at the rear of the weapon through which it receives steering
instructions after launch. For EOD purposes, there are 4 types of command guidance commonly used with
GW:
a. Wire Command. (Fig 5-5). Wire guidance uses thin electrical wire to send steering
information from the firing point to the weapon. A spool or spools of wire fitted to the rear of the
weapon remain connected to the firing position and payout after launch. An advantage of wire
guidance is its immunity to countermeasures. Limitations are the practical maximum length of wire
(typically 5km) and the speed of wire payout (subsonic). This means wire guidance is suitable only
for SSM anti-armour.
Fig 5-5 - Wire Command Guidance

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b. Radio Command. Radio guidance uses radio waves to send steering information from a
command position to the weapon, the steering information being received by rearward facing aerials
on the weapon. Radio aerials can be plastic or metal and are insulated from the main body of the
weapon. They may appear as conventional looking aerials (Fig 5-6) or square/rectangular cross
sectional metal tubes (Fig 5-7). Many GW will have a single rear facing aerial acting as a data link.
The key identification feature of radio guidance is two or more rear-facing aerials. Multiple aerials
ensure the airframe of a manoeuvring weapon does not screen the radio guidance from its steering
information. The need for a constant, secure link means that radio guidance is not suitable for AAM
and SSM and thus a radio command GW will always be ASM or SAM.
Fig 5-6 - Radio Command Guidance Aerials (Roland)
Fig 5-7 – Box-Type Radio Command Guidance Aerials
c. Beam-Riding. Beam-riding guidance uses a beam of energy pointing at a target, the weapon
being programmed to position itself in the centre of the beam. Provided the beam remains trained on
the target, the weapon will hit it. Modern beam-riding weapons use laser technology and have a
rear-facing glass window or windows. The fact that line of sight is required means that beam-riding
weapons will be SAM hand held or SSM anti-armour.
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d. Electro-Optical. Electro-optical (TV) guidance uses a camera in the front of the weapon to
identify and track its target (Fig 5-8). Depending on attack profiles, this can be a conventional TV
camera, a Low Light Television (LLTV) camera, or an Imaging Infra-Red (IIR) camera. The camera
will be housed behind a large, clear glass dome. The need for target recognition, before or after
launch, means that electro-optical guidance is suitable only for ASM.
Fig 5-8 – Electro-Optical Command Guidance
Pre-Set Guidance
11. For pre-set guidance, a weapon follows a route programmed in before launch. Used on its own, it is
not suitable for use against mobile targets although it can be used to position a weapon in the general target
area (mid-course guidance) before another type of guidance (terminal guidance) takes over. Most forms of
pre-set guidance are internal and may be difficult to identify. Examples include.
a. Inertial. Inertial guidance uses a system of accelerometers and gyroscopes to sense any
deviation from a programmed flight plan. It is completely self-contained but is the least suitable
form of guidance for precision accuracy. It is often used as mid-course guidance and in strategic
weapons where pinpoint accuracy is not a requirement.
b. Celestial. Celestial guidance uses distinctive fixed star formations as reference points.
Celestial guidance is only used in Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Intermediate
Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). These are classified as SSM Strategic.
c. GPS. GPS guidance uses satellites to provide navigational reference from fixed points.
This can be very accurate but relies on satellite access and can be jammed. GPS guidance is used in
cruise missiles (ASM and SSM Tactical and Strategic) and guided high explosive bombs.
d. Terrain Comparison (TERCOM). TERCOM guidance uses a stored radar map of the
programmed flight path to compare the actual flight. This can be very accurate and only brief radar
transmissions are necessary at waypoints. TERCOM guidance is used in cruse missiles (ASM and
SSM Strategic).
Guidance Section Hazards

12. Potential hazards associated with the guidance section are Radio Frequency (RF) emissions, high
voltages, high-pressure coolants, toxins, and carcinogens.
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CONTROL SECTION
13. The control section of a GW performs 2 functions; it steers the weapon, acting on instructions from
the guidance section, and it controls the power and cooling required for the other sections.
Weapon Steering
14. GWs can be steered by movable control surfaces or by altering the angle of the propulsion exhaust.
Movable control surfaces (Fig 5-9) require considerable power in a high-speed weapon but they provide
good manoeuvrability. Altering the angle of the propulsion exhaust (Fig 5-10) also provides
manoeuvrability and requires less power, although steering is lost if the propulsion system runs down. Both
types are common.
Fig 5-9 - Movable Control Surface
Fig 5-10 - Altering Angle of Propulsion Exhaust
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Rollerons
15. Many GWs are highly manoeuvrable and hence unstable. They require gyroscopic stabilisation to
allow them to fly without losing control. This places power and weight demands on the weapon. Many
short range AAMs use a simple method of gyroscopic stabilisation known as rollerons (Fig 5-11). These are
located on the wing trailing edges and are driven by air passing over them. They differ in design but all
work in a similar way. If present, they normally confirm the weapon’s classification as AAM Short Range.
Fig 5-11 – Rolleron’s
Steering Power
16. GWs need a power source to move control surfaces or to alter the propulsion exhaust. Examples of
power sources include pneumatics (high pressure air bottles), hydraulic accumulators (high pressure liquids);
diverting some of the propulsion exhaust gases to provide pressure and low explosive charges that are ignited
to provide pressure and electrical energy. Steering power demands vary according to the weapon’s role and
category. Short-range, low speed weapons launched in the direction of their intended target (SSM anti-
armour) make minimal demands whereas high-speed, manoeuvring weapons (AAM and SAM) have
substantial power demands.
Electrical Power
17. Whatever the power source for steering, all GWs need an electrical power source for the guidance
and warhead sections. Electrical power can be provided by thermal batteries, wet or dry cell batteries, or a
turbo-generator driven by low explosives, liquid fuels, air pressure or the propulsion exhaust. A key
consideration in GW disposal is the length of time after firing the electrical power source is capable of
providing sufficient power to initiate the weapon.
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WARHEAD SECTION
Warhead Components
18. GWs are designed as a system and the component parts of the warhead section are located in the
optimum effective position within the weapon. The component parts of a warhead section are the fuze(s),
the Safety and Arming Device (SAD), and the warhead itself (the payload). These may be grouped together
or located around the weapon. As GW are relatively complex systems, initiation is almost always by
electrical means.
Fuze Options
19. The fuze is the sensor that tells the warhead when to detonate. It differs in classification from the
fuzing on air-dropped weapons in that it contains no explosives; it performs the ‘functioning’ action only.
There are 3 possible fuzing types fitted to GW.
a. Contact Fuzing. All GWs are fitted with a contact fuze, either as the primary option or as a
back-up. They are classified as ‘contact’ rather than ‘impact’ because possible initiation options
include break-wires, piezo-electric crystals, and crush switches that require minimal pressure to
operate. As with air-dropped weapons classification, contact can include the incorporation of a short
delay to allow target penetration. Multiple contact fuze systems are very common.
b. Proximity Fuzing. Because of the difficulties of achieving a direct hit on a fast moving
target, almost all GWs designed for use against aircraft (AAM and SAM) will have side-looking
proximity fuzes fitted (Fig 5-12 and 5-13). It is potentially hazardous to approach an unidentified
unexploded GW from the side. Many ASM and SSM will also have proximity fuzing fitted to the
front or underside of the weapon to enhance the warhead effects, and there are safety implications in
approaching such weapons from the front. Common sensors used in both sideways and forwards
looking proximity fuzing are Radio Frequency (RF), Laser, and Active IR.
Fig 5-12 - Sideways-Looking Laser Proximity Fuze
Fig 5 - Sideways-Looking Radio Proximity Fuze

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c. Self-Destruct Fuzing. GWs used over friendly positions are likely to have self-destruct
fuzes fitted. All AAM and SAM fall into this classification. ASM and SSM are used over enemy
positions and are not normally fitted with self-destruct fuzing. Common methods of achieving self-
destruct are loss of command signal on command guided weapons, time delay, or power run-down.
The disconnection of electrical connections on weapons with power run-down self-destruct fuzing
could initiate the warhead.
Safety and Arming Device

20. The SAD performs 3 main functions:
a. Provides safety breaks before weapon launch.
b. Arms the weapon after launch.
c. Links the fuze or fuzes to the warhead.
21. In air-dropped weapon terms, SAD performs the arming actions and initiates the explosive train. It
contains the primary high explosive and is likely to contain a booster or boosters.
22. Because SADs are an integral part of a weapon system, they cannot be identified generically, unlike
air-dropped weapon pistols/fuzes. However, SADs need to receive an electrical input from their fuze(s) and
will be in intimate contact with the warhead to initiate the explosive train. An important point is that SADs
are a common location for self-destruct fuzing, if fitted.
Warhead
23. The warhead will be optimised to defeat targets for which the GW has been designed. The main
types of warhead are:
a. Armour Defeating. GWs designed for use against armour use a shaped charge warhead.
Some weapons are fitted with 2 shaped charges (tandem shaped charge) to overcome the effects of
Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA), which is designed to disrupt the plasma jet of the shaped charge.
Other weapons attack the thinner, top armour using downward facing shaped charges.
b. Anti-Aircraft. Weapons designed for use against aircraft are designed to function as they fly
by the target. This means the warhead is designed to produce most effects in a sideways, or annular,
direction. The most common warhead used against aircraft is an Annular Blast Fragmentation
(ABF) type designed for maximum effect at both high and low level. A variation on this is the
Expanding Rod warhead, where rods of steel are welded together at each end and protected from the
explosives by packing. Detonation throws the rods out in a spinning ring that ‘saws’ through the
target until the ring reaches its maximum extent and breaks up (Fig 5-14). This type of warhead
needs to be over a certain size to be effective and is not suitable for smaller weapons. Other types of
warhead designed for use against aircraft are blast, which are used in small, light weapons against
low level targets (SAM Hand Held), and multiple shaped charge, where numerous small shaped
charges are incorporated into the annular surface of the warhead (used in some French short-range
SAMs) (Fig 5-15).
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Fig 5-14 - Continuous Rod Warhead (CROW)
Fig 5-15 - Multiple Shaped Charge Warhead
c. Missiles and Strategic Warheads. Strategic weapons are capable of carrying NBC
warheads, which means the weapon must be over a certain size. Although difficult to generalise, a
guide to weapon sizes is included in Annex A.
d. Other Warhead Types. Anti-ship weapons may use a Misznay-Schardin plate, with larger
weapons incorporating a forward-looking proximity fuze to allow the slug to form effectively. A
variation is a semi armour-piercing warhead incorporating a short delay to allow target penetration
(Fig 5-16). Other types of warhead in service include sub-munitions, blast, fragmentation,
penetration, and thermo-baric (fuel/air). Some weapons use non-explosive warheads such as shot
(kinetic energy), copper wire or graphite powder (for use against electricity grids).
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Fig 5-16 – Semi Armour-Piercing Warhead
PROPULSION SECTION
24. There are 2 methods of propulsion used by GW; air-breathing engines and rocket motors. Although
most GWs have a propulsion section, this is not always the case; e.g. guided bombs delivered from aircraft
and guided projectiles fired from heavy artillery.
Air-Breathing Engines
25. Air-breathing engines are only used in weapons that need to travel a significant distance to their
target. They can be either:
a. Ramjet. Although an air-breathing engine gives a weapon longer range, ramjets must travel
at supersonic speed to compress the air before it is mixed with the fuel and burnt. A ‘shock cone’ in
the intake compresses the air, but the weapon must be at supersonic speed before the ramjet works.
The extra drag created by travelling supersonically also degrades overall range potential. Ramjets
are most suitable for use against high-speed targets and are used in a number of in-service SAM
Long Range. They have also been specified for use in next generation AAM Long Range.
b. Turbo-Jet. Turbo-jets are optimised for long-range performance but will not propel a
weapon at supersonic speed. This means they are not suitable for use against aircraft. Turbo-jets
used in GW are miniature aircraft engines and, as they are very expensive, are generally only used
against high-value targets. Turbo-jets will have a simple intake, lacking the ramjet’s shock cone.
They may also have a low explosive charge to deploy or to clear the air intake.
Rocket Motors
26. Rocket motors can be either solid fuel or liquid fuel:
a. Solid Fuel. Solid fuel rocket motors are used in the majority of GW propulsion sections as
they are powerful and do not present any significant storage and handling problems. Low explosives
provide the propulsive impetus. The main disadvantage is that once burning, the rate of thrust
cannot be varied. The cross-section of solid fuel rocket motor propellant is often shaped to influence
the rate of burn and this is a key identification feature of solid fuel rocket motors (Fig 5-17).
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b. Liquid Fuel Rocket Motors. Liquid fuel rocket motors tend to be used in older weapons and
the weapon needs to be over a certain size to accommodate its complex propulsion system. Many of
these older weapons are still in service and liquid fuel is also used as a means to provide power in
many GW control sections.
Fig 5-17 - Solid Fuel Rocket Motor Propellant Grain
Propulsion Section Hazards

27. Hazards associated with air-breathing engines are flammable liquids, such as kerosene or paraffin,
and possibly also low explosive charges. The primary hazard associated with solid fuel rocket motors is low
explosives. Hazards associated with liquid fuel rocket motors are the presence of highly volatile, toxic, and
possibly corrosive liquids.
Propulsion Section Make-Up

28. Many GWs have 2 parts to their propulsion section; a booster section and a sustainer section. If
fitted, the booster section will always use a solid fuel rocket motor or motors.
In-Line Boosters
29. In-line boosters, although separate from the sustainer, are incorporated within the main airframe of
the weapon. This ensures the weapon is more streamlined. The booster is not jettisoned at burnout. The
presence of 2 rocket motors might not be immediately apparent but is particularly significant for charge
placement if a demolition procedure is being carried out.
External Boosters
30. Tandem boosters attach to the back of the main weapon. Wrap-round boosters are multiple boosters
fitted around the main weapon, and strap-on boosters attach underneath the main weapon. All external
boosters create high drag and are jettisoned immediately on booster burnout. Because of the high drag
factor, external boosters are only fitted to surface-launched weapons.
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GW RECONNAISSANCE AND DISPOSAL
Characteristics of Impacted GWs

31. GWs are of relatively fragile construction and can be expected to break up on impact, possibly into
their component sections (see Fig 5-19 and 5-20). Parts may be scattered over a large area and are likely to
display the following characteristics:
a. The warhead is likely to have detached and travelled furthest from the point of impact. It
may be buried.
b. The thin metal cases of burnt-out solid fuel rocket motors will have distorted on impact. If
liquid fuelled, it is likely that residual fuel will remain in fuel tanks and lines.
c. Pressurised containers are likely to have survived impact but may be fractured and in a
dangerous condition. Piping may still be pressurised.
d. Although GW are generally designed to provide high levels of power for a short period of
time, capacitors and batteries can hold a charge for a considerable period. Electrically initiated
warheads and motors can function as a result of exposure to RF hazards.
Fig 5-19 - Missile and Pylon from Crashed Aircraft
Fig 5-20 - Impacted Missile (TOW 2)
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Arrival Procedures
32. Thorough questioning of witnesses and use of information sources may lead to a positive
identification and a reason for weapon failure. The RF environment that the weapon is in is important, as
any change to this environment could induce power to damaged or dormant circuits and components, with
possibly catastrophic results. The RF status quo should therefore be maintained at all times.
Remote Reconnaissance
33. The potentially large impact area means a remote reconnaissance should be conducted whenever
practical. Any high ground providing an overview of the area should be used to locate all parts and identify
likely hazardous components. Particular attention should be paid to the possible presence of liquid fuels (i.e.
vapour type and drift). The weapon may be identifiable by size, shape, colour coding and markings. If the
target is known, the likely warhead and fuzing can be deduced. Remote reconnaissance should also be used
for checking for secondary hazards, such as selecting an approach route, establishing a suitable demolition
firing point, and selecting a decontamination area if required.
Close-in Reconnaissance
34. The aim of any close-in reconnaissance is to positively identify the item. This allows all relevant
safety precautions to be taken and an appropriate RSP to be selected.
35. To minimise possible hazards, an unidentified GW must, whenever possible, be approached at an

angle of between 10 and 30º from the rear, (see Fig 5-21). This reduces the hazard from any homing sensors,
proximity fuzing, and propulsion exhaust. Due to the possible hazard of static electricity, the potential
difference between the EOD operator and the UXO must be equalised. This can be achieved by carrying out
earthing procedures whilst operating within the immediate vicinity of the weapon.
36. Key identification features will be the weapon diameter and wingspan, and any markings. It may be
difficult to calculate the length of an impacted weapon, but all relevant measurements and features should be
noted.
Fig 5-21 - Safe Approach Routes
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Annex A to Chapter 6
Guided weapons
GUIDED WEAPONS CATEGORISATION TABLE
AAM ASM SAM SSM

Short Range Long Range Tactical Strategic Hand Held Short Range Long Range Anti-Armour Tactical Strategic
Dimensions L. 2m-3.5m L. 3m-7m L. 2m+ L. 5m+ L. 1m-1.5m L. 1.25m-3m L. 3m+ L. 0.8m-1.8m L. 2m+ L. 5m+
D. 120-150mm D. 150-400mm D. 200mm+ D. 500mm+ D. 70-120mm D. 120-250mm D. 300mm+ D. 100-250mm D. 200mm+ D. 450mm+
Guidance IR homing Radar homing IR, laser or Homing and/or IR homing, IR homing or Radar homing Wire Homing and/or Homing and/or
radar homing, pre-set beam rider or radio or radio command, pre-set pre-set
radio or TV radio command command possibly other
command command command or
homing
Control Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust Exhaust
gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases, gases,
movable movable movable movable movable movable movable movable movable movable
control control control control control control control control control control
surfaces, may surfaces surfaces surfaces (may surfaces surfaces. surfaces (may surfaces surfaces (may surfaces (may
have rollerons have liquid have liquid have liquid have liquid
fuel) fuel) fuel) fuel)
Warhead Annular blast/ Annular blast/ Blast/frag, Nuclear, Annular blast/ Annular blast/ Annular blast/ Shaped charge Blast/frag, Nuclear,
frag or frag or SAP, shaped chemical or frag or blast frag, frag or or tandem SAP, shaped chemical or
expanding rod expanding rod charge, large HE blast expanding rod expanding rod shaped charge charge, large HE blast
tandem or multiple penetration,
shaped charge shaped charge sub-munitions
Fuzing Side-looking Side-looking Forward- Forward- Side-looking Side-looking Side-looking Contact Forward- Forward-
proximity, proximity, looking looking proximity, proximity, proximity, looking looking
contact and contact and proximity and proximity and contact and contact and contact and proximity and proximity and
self-destruct self-destruct contact contact self-destruct self-destruct self-destruct contact contact
Propulsion Solid fuel Solid fuel (may Solid fuel (may Air-breathing Solid fuel, in- Solid fuel, in- Air-breathing Solid fuel with Solid fuel, in- Air-breathing
have in-line have in-line engine or liquid line booster line or engine, solid or in-line booster line or engine or
booster) booster) fuel (may have jettisonable liquid fuel jettisonable rocket motor,
solid fuel in- external rocket motor, external in-line or
line booster) booster in-line or booster jettisonable
jettisonable external
external booster
booster
CHAPTER 7
EOD TASK MANAGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Objectives of an EOD Task
1. The objectives of an EOD task are;
a. To remove ordnance that is a hazard to life, or property.
b. To return the situation to normal so that effected people or communities can go about their
daily lives as before without the threat of UXO contamination.
2. Elimination of the UXO hazard may involve use of Render Safe Procedures (RSP’s),
destruction of the item in place, or its removal from the area where it poses a hazard. The preferred
and safest method of eliminating an EOD hazard is to blow the item in situ.
3. Where explosive ordnance remains after elimination of the hazardous situation, its final
disposal may be accomplished in a number of ways. Disposal may be specified by the tasking
authority where further service or intelligence use is desired. When requirements for recovery are not
specified, the preferred method is to remove the hazardous components to a demolition area and
destroy them by detonation.
Phases of an EOD Operation
4. An EOD operation can be split into 10 generic phases. The phases, which may vary in
sequence and may not all be applicable to every EOD task, are as follows:
1. Tasking, Preparation and Deployment.

2. Arrival Procedures & Question Technique.
3. Location.
4. Access.
5. Reconnaissance.
6. Identification and Diagnosis.
7. Damage Limitation.
8. Render Safe Procedure (RSP).
9. Site Remediation.
10. Reporting.
Key Activities
5. In addition to the distinct phases of the operation, a number of key activities will occur throughout
the task. These are:
a. Evaluation and continual threat assessment.

b. Planning.
c. Command and Control.
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TASKING, PREPERATION & DEPLOYMENT
6. The tasking of EOD tasks or operations are normally the responsibility of the National Mine
Action Authority or a designated authority such as the UNMAC. This procedure will vary from
country to country, but in all cases information will have been gathered or reported about the UXO or
suspected UXO threat. This may be in the format of an IMSMA report or by radio message from a
tasking authority, in any case the EOD operator should be given authority via the tasking request to
deal with the EOD task.
7. Before planning to deploy to the EOD task the EOD operator or team leader should gain as
much information as possible to aid in preparing. The description and location of the item may have
been reported, this will help decide if extra resources, specific equipment or man power is needed to
deal with the task.
8. Once all sources of information have been exhausted and any necessary equipment has been
prepared the EOD operator or team should deploy to the task, the selected route should take into
account any information that may be a factor in which direction to approach the task location, for
example upwind of a crashed missile that may contain toxic liquid propellant, or a leaking white
Phosphorous munition. The route should always where possible be a known safe route, i.e hard
metalled road.
ARRIVAL PROCEDURES & QUESTIONING TECHNIQUE
Arrival Procedures
9. The operator or team should attempt to stop a minimum of 100m prior to the reported
location, again in a safe area or on a road if possible. This is an initial safe distance until more
information can be gained about the threat or UXO, and then can be adjusted accordingly,
10. The team should always remain on hard ground or a known safe area upon reaching this initial
100m safe distance. Use of buildings or other features that will afford some level of protection should
be utalised if available.
11. A check of the immediate area should be conducted to ascertain if there are other UXO in the
vicinity, the distance of this 360 degree check is dependant on the ground and the situation the
operator finds himself in on the ground.
12. Once all the above precautions have been met then the operator should encourage any witness
or contact persons to remain in this safe location, so that further information can be gained by
questioning. A local person that may have reported the UXO may have a different perception of
danger, and may want to lead the operator directly to the UXO, this should be avoided.
Questioning Technique
13. An EOD operator must develop a sound questioning technique for dealing with witnesses or
points of contacts when he has arrived at the task location.
62. When questioning relevant personnel for information, the following points should always be borne
in mind:
a. Questions do not always produce the answers required. The EOD operator must
therefore ask himself ‘What do I need to know?’ and then ask questions to gain this
knowledge. ‘Yes/No’ answer questions should be avoided.
b. Each answer must be fully exploited. A useful technique is to ask of the answer
received ‘So what happened then?’ or ask your self ‘What does that mean to me in terms of my
aim?’
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c. When questioning personnel, it is advisable to allow them free rein to tell their story
rather than asking a range of pointed questions which may cause the person to withhold
information because the appropriate question was not asked. Only after the story has been
told should the person be questioned to fill in the gaps.
d. The operator should listen to what is being said and always keep an open mind.
Tunnel vision must be avoided.
e. Personnel should be interviewed separately as people in stress situations tend to be

confused and accounts of events can become contaminated by the accounts of others.
f. The EOD operator should be firm and friendly and show no hostility towards
personnel. Whilst a degree of scepticism is healthy, this should not be revealed during
questioning and the operator should always remain impartial.
63. The WWAT ECHO - provide a good guide to ascertaining the information needed. These are
covered in more detail in the aide memoire for questioning technique at Annex A.
LOCATION
64. It might not always be immediately obvious where the ordnance or how many items of
ordnance is present. Systematic search techniques should be used to detect and locate the exact
position of the target, or to confirm there is no EO present. The full EOD team should be used if
necessary. The search can be carried out either visually or by using instrument search.
ACCESS
65. To gain access to the target, physical barriers or obstacles may have to be overcome. These
can include demolished structures, water, or atmosphere that does not support life. Deliberate access
denial devices may also be present such as booby traps or Anti-Personnel (AP) mines.
66. For physical or natural barriers, specialist teams, training and equipment are required. Options
include:
a. Avoiding the obstacle, (go around it).
b. Remove the obstacle, (use of hand/power tools or heavy machinery may be needed).
c. Ensure the obstacle is sufficiently supported or made safe, and got through it if
possible, (shoring).
67. For water or atmosphere that does not support life specialist teams, training and equipment are
required. Options include:
a. Divers.
b. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA).
c. Protective suits.
68. For many access denial devices, the task is carried out by the EOD team before approaching
the main target. Options for dealing with access denial devices include:
a. Demolition in situ.
b. Deflagration.
c. Disruption.
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d. Semi-remote removal.
e. Weight Dropper
f. Water cannon.
g. Manual.
RECONNAISSANCE
General
69. The aim of the reconnaissance is to ascertain whether an item is UXO and, if so, to obtain all
the information required to undertake the EOD task. Reconnaissance may be carried out as a phase of
the task itself or as a separate activity.
70. This section describes the procedures which should be followed when conducting a
reconnaissance.
Remote (Long Range) Reconnaissance

71. A great deal of information can be obtained without approaching the danger area of a
suspected item of UXO. This can be achieved either by the use of optical viewing devices (e.g.
binoculars) from a suitable observation point, or by the use of remotely operated equipment.
72. A long-range reconnaissance should always be conducted when a crashed Guided Weapon
(GW) is suspected due to the hazards involved. If chemical weapons are suspected, the operator
should always keep upwind of the incident to avoid vapour hazard.
73. Information on the following points may be obtained from a long-range reconnaissance:
a. Identification:
(1) Size, shape, colour and markings.
(2) Whether a live or practice munition.
(3) Type of warhead/fill - by deduction.
(4) Type of fuzing - by deduction.
b. Location of Parts:
(1) HE Bomb – tail fin, main body.
(2) GW – warhead, booster motors, fuel tanks, guidance and control sections.
(3) Container – sub munitions, cluster components.
c. Type of Fuel (GW):
(1) Solid or liquid.
(2) Type of smoke or fumes, i.e.:
d. Reason for Failure:
(1) HE Bomb – position of arming vane.
(2) GW - absence or presence of boosters, condition of venturi.
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(3) Condition of cluster/container.
(4) LSA - presence of fuze cap.
e. Other Observations:
(1) Best approach route.
(2) Suitable demolition firing point.
(3) Nearest water supply.
(4) Evacuation areas.
(5) Decontamination area.
(6) Vapour drift.
Close-In Reconnaissance
74. Having obtained as much information as possible from a long-range reconnaissance, a close-in
reconnaissance should be carried out. The close-in reconnaissance allows the operator to obtain all the
detailed information needed to identify the ordnance and plan the Render Safe Procedure (RSP).
75. When carrying out a close-in reconnaissance, the following points must be borne in mind:
a. If a GW is suspected, if it is beyond the qualification & experience of the Operator,

then specialist advice must be sought.
b. If a chemical weapon is suspected, Specialist BCMD trained and Qualified Operators

should be called.
76. The following detailed information should be obtained from the close-in reconnaissance:
a. Dimensions of the EO and fuze.
b. Body colour.
c. Hazard bands.
d. Stencilling.
e. Body stamping.
f. Spread of EO.
g. Associated hazards.
h. Secondary hazards.
Conducting a Reconnaissance
77. When conducting the reconnaissance, the operator should:
a. Always be prepared to transition from a long-range to a close-in reconnaissance.
b. Be alert to the possibility that the UXO may be influence-fuzed and take appropriate
precautions.
c. Treat the weapon and the fuze as 2 separate items.
d. Not assume that a particular weapon type will always have the same fuze.
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e. Get a complete 360º observation of the fuze.
f. Have a team member watching from a safe distance to relay information back to the
team and act as safety man if necessary.
IDENTIFICATION AND DIAGNOSIS

30. During the reconnaissance the operator may have been able to make a positive I.D of the
UXO, if he cannot then he will have gathered enough information as described in paragraph 16 to be
able to use publications or a database to aid in the identification of the item.
31. Once the operator has ensured he has positively identified the item, he should take into to
account the following factors, to aid him in planning the most appropriate render safe procedure.
a. The condition of the item, i.e. has it been fired, thrown or dropped, is the fuze in an
armed or unarmed state.
b. Has the item been subjected to any external trauma such as excessive heat or shock?
c. The type and quantity of the net explosive content of the item, and any donor charge
that may be used.
d. The effects of the item, blast/frag, incendiary, smoke.
32. The operator having taken the above factors about the UXO into consideration should also
consider the following factors about the situation and environs.
a. Locality of any local population or communities.
b. Any buildings or facilities in close proximity to the item, will they be damaged.
c. Is protective works needed to either surround the item or protect property or vital
installations that cannot be moved?
d. Any radio frequency hazards in the area, i.e. proximity to Airports, Antenna or
transmitting aerials.
e. The type of immediate and surrounding ground, i.e. rocky ground will produce
secondary fragmentation if demolition in situ RSP is used. Also the ground can dictate the
travel of the blast or shock wave which can cause damage hundreds of meters away from the
item.
f. The weather as low cloud base will cause the shockwave to travel a greater distance
along the ground. Also electrical storms will create an RF hazard.
g. Will an effective cordon or evacuation be able to be enforced; i.e. thick wooded area’s
or densely populated urban areas will need a lot of resources to enforce an effective cordon or
evacuation.
33. Once the operator has taken into consideration all the factors he should be able to make a plan
to Render safe the UXO, this plan may involve a simple pick up and carry away for disposal at
a designated Demolition site, if safe to do so. Or it may involve extensive resources to effect
an evacuation and cordon, or extra machinery to create protective works or protect property or
vital installations.
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34. An RSP flow chart is at annex B, although the flow chart does not take into account the
factors that have been discussed in the above paragraphs. It can help to aid the operator in
planning the best and safest course of action to take.
DAMAGE LIMITATION
Evacuation
35. Unless there is convincing proof that no explosion will occur, evacuation must be enforced
immediately the presence of a UXO is suspected if necessary.
Principles
36. Some degree of evacuation may be in force when the EOD operator arrives to carry out the
reconnaissance, if the national authority has an effective reporting and initial response procedures. The
extent of this evacuation will have to be assessed by the operator on arrival or re-assessed after the
reconnaissance has been conducted.
37. If the EOD operator assesses that explosive munitions are not present, the evacuation can be
cancelled. If the presence of EO is confirmed and evacuation is considered necessary, the operator
should assess whether the measures already taken are either excessive or inadequate, so their plan may
be changed accordingly. If the EO is assessed as not dangerous the EOD team and/or civil authority
(i.e. Police) should be informed that evacuation is unnecessary, but protective measures may be
required to prevent interference.
38. Evacuation around an EOD task may not have to be continuously maintained until the EO is
removed, but must be maintained until the maximum delay period of any time fuze likely to be fitted
has expired, or until any anti-disturbance fuze sensitive to vibration has become inoperative.
39. The EOD operator should wait for the maximum safety period if any soak period is observed.
For example, arming vanes may be recovered indicating a fuze with a precise delay time. When
excavating to, or disposing of, UXO, it may be necessary to extend or impose a further period of
evacuation.
40. The EOD operator must consider and plan for variations in evacuation requirements so the
civil authority and through them the evacuees, are given ample warning of future requirements.
Wherever possible, EOD work needing evacuation is to be timed to cause the least disruption to
industry and local populace.
Evacuation Plan
41. The plan for evacuation depends primarily on whether the EO is likely to exert its maximum
effect above or below ground if it detonates. A bomb for example from which most of the forces
produced would be felt above ground, such as blast and primary fragments, is referred to as surface
UXO, whereas one which damages by the effects of earth shock is termed buried. The dividing line
between the two is not always clear-cut but, for planning purposes, a bomb is defined as buried when
its upper surface, exclusive of the tail unit, is at least 2 to 2½ times the length of the bomb body below
the surface.
Types of Evacuation
42. There are 2 degrees of evacuation: complete and partial. Complete evacuation is self-
explanatory. For partial evacuation, all vehicles and fragile stores not adequately screened must be
removed. Rooms on the remote side of houses may be occupied but access must be by way of
shielded approaches adequately screened from the bomb.
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43. Flying glass can cause a large percentage of injuries to people as well as minor damage to
vehicles and equipment. Windows in the affected area are to be opened so that the pressure inside and
outside the rooms becomes equalised, minimising the chance of breakage. It is important to remember
that during the suction phase pressure changes are felt all round the house, so windows on all sides are
to be open.
44. As a general guide an initial evacuation should be 100m, this is the distance the EOD team
should set up its initial control point (ICP).
45. Small High Explosive Missiles. Evacuation distances for missiles lighter than 50kg are not
stated. However, a small buried missile is unlikely to be dangerous at over 50m in the open (although
splinters from an unburied missile may travel some hundreds of metres). Every incident must be
treated on its merits, taking into account the fuzing, surroundings, and operational situation.
46. Prevention of Vibration. Some fuzes, particularly in unburied bombs, are extremely sensitive
to vibration. It may be necessary to prohibit the driving of stakes into the ground to form barriers etc.
It may also be necessary to stop the passage of road and rail traffic, even if safety screened, and to stop
static machinery from causing vibrations.
47. Railways. There are no hard and fast rules for UXO near railway lines. An EOD operator
must make the reconnaissance as early as possible but must not take action to affect the running of
trains without consultation with the railway authority. The EOD operator's role is to identify the bomb
type, size and probable fuzing and to advise the authorities as to a probable effect if it was to explode.
Advice on the likely effects on UXO of vibration from trains distant from the railways will also be
required, as will the degree of protection offered to the tracks by existing screens.
Example Evacuation Plan

48. Figure 7-1 illustrates the evacuation plan for an unburied, unexploded GP bomb weighing
between 250kg and 1500kg in a normal residential area. There are 2 possible variations:
a. If Buildings A were tall, steel framed office blocks or similar, Buildings B might be
occupied fully or in rooms at the rear of the buildings.
b. If Buildings A and B were flimsy, partial or complete evacuation of Buildings C

would be necessary.
49. Partial evacuation of Buildings D will be necessary since, although outside the 300m radius
they will be influenced by the funnelling effect of the street leading to them. Equally, the church will
need complete evacuation as it is exposed and because of the inherent danger of flying glass. It is to
be noted that church windows are very difficult to protect.
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Figure 7-1 - Evacuation Plan for a 500kg UXO on the Surface in an urban area.
PROTECTIVE WORKS
General
50. Protective works are used to prevent damage to structures or services should UXO
inadvertently explode or be demolished in situ. They may also be used in order to reduce the area of
evacuation.
Preliminary Assessment
51. Before considering the design of protective works, the Operator must have an understanding
of the distances at which explosions will cause damage to people, structures or public utilities. These
distances are difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy owing to a number of factors which
must be taken into account but the following points must be considered:
a. The type and size of the bomb.
b. The charge/weight ratio.
c. The kind of explosive.
d. Whether the UXO/bomb is buried or unburied.
e. If buried:
(1) The soil composition.
(2) The water content.
(3) If soil movement is restricted in any direction by structures such as heavy

foundations.
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f. If unburied:
(1) Screening or funnelling influences.
(2) The relevant position of the object to be protected to the axis of the bomb.
52. The tables for making these assessments (7-3 to 7-9) have been derived from data gained
during WWII. The figures quoted should be used as a rough guide only, as variations will occur as a
result of variations in the design and manufacturing process of modern Munitions and UXO compaired
to WWII munitions.
ESTIMATION OF EXPLOSIVE DANGER AREAS

General
53. The hazard to the general public from the demolition of UXO and multi-item demolitions
arises from three main causes, the shock front, the blast wave and the projection of high velocity
fragments, (either primary or secondary).
54. The shock front hazard can be discounted for the purposes of danger area estimation as it
decays at a much higher rate than the blast wave (usually within 2 charge diameters), which then takes
over from it. If an individual is close enough to an explosion to be affected by the shock front, then the
individual is too close anyway. The calculations used to estimate danger areas are based on the blast
and fragmentation hazards, which extend much further out from the explosion source than the shock
front hazard.
55. The EOD operator should use the calculations stated in “Technical Note for Mine Action
(TNMA) 10.20/01, Estimation of explosive danger areas” to calculate the explosive danger area when
he has ascertained the All Up Weight (AUW) for the munition. These calculations give figures for
public access, Controlled access and fragmentation hazard zone. A pre calculated table for these
distances is at annex C.
Public access
56. It must be assumed that the local public will have access to most places outside sealed military
camps. This means that the mine action management has a responsibility to ensure that the safety
distances required to isolate the danger areas are strictly observed, and the rules for setting up
demolitions contained in IMAS 10.30 are strictly adhered to, especially in the matters of warning the
local villagers and of posting sentries to ensure no involuntary incursions my locals or their animals
during demolitions. Where the ground makes observation by sentries difficult, the explosive weights
of individual demolitions may have to be reduced to reflect the practical capabilities of the village
authorities and sentries to keep locals, especially children, out of hazard range.
Controlled Access
57. Controlled access can only be assumed if the mine action manager is convinced that there are
no local people or animals in the area. If there is any doubt, the "public access" formula should be used
as a default solution.
No Fragmentation Hazard Zone
58. The No fragmentation zone safety distance should be calculated to reduce the risk of harm
from fragmentation thrown out from the explosion to those working on the worksite and to the local
population. Where necessary, protective works, such as demolitions pits, earth bunds, sandbag walling
or water suppression, should be used to reduce the extent of fragmentation hazard zones.
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Explosive Damage
59. The below tables give distances for various expected damage results for explosions it is
stressed that these have been included in this publication as a guide only. The tables are issued to
British Army Bomb Disposal Engineers, and therefore the information cannot be confirmed as
accurate.
NOTE: The IMATC or MAT cannot be held responsible for operational use of these distances, they
are intended as a guide only, specialist information from local structural engineers should be sought
for operational use.
Damage to Brick Built Housing

60. The assessed damage to brick buildings from surface and buried UXO is shown in Tables 7-1
and 7-2 respectively. 250mm brick walls are assumed and the distances indicate the maximum at
which the degree of damage specified is likely to be maintained.
TABLE 7-1 DAMAGE DISTANCES FOR BRICK BUILDINGS (SURFACE UXO)
Damage Distance (m)

Total
Type of Ordnance Weight Slight
Complete Uninhabitable/
(kg) Damage/
Demolition Repairable
Inhabitable
50 6 13 61
Penetration 250 19 37 183
and 500 29 58 290
GP Bombs 1000 43 86 427
2000 89 177 884
Blast Bombs and Anti 500 43 86 427
Ship Mines 1000 77 153 762
TABLE 7-2 DAMAGE DISTANCES FOR BRICK BUILDINGS (BURIED BOMBS)
Total Damage Distance (m)

Weight Complete Damaged Beyond Uninhabitable/
(kg) Demolition Repair Repairable
50 4 7 16
250 7 14 22
500 11 22 31
1000 19 37 61
2000 37 61 122
4000 61 92 168
6000 77 122 213
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Damage to Underground Services and Foundations
61. The distances given in Table 7-3 and 7-4 are the normal maximum at which damage to
underground services and foundations is likely to occur. They are applicable to clay soil and the
multiplication factors for other soils are:
a. Made up ground: 1.3
b. Chalk: 0.9
c. Sand and Gravel: 0.8
TABLE 7-3 DAMAGE TO UNDERGROUND SERVICES AND FOUNDATIONS

(SURFACE UXO)
Damage Radii (m)

Total
Weight Cast Iron/ Earthenware Electric
Brick
(kg) Foundations Concrete or Brick Cables or
Walls
Pipes Sewers Steel Pipes
2 5 1 1 1 1
10 20 5 3 5 3
50 60 10 6 10 5
250 185 22 10 15 7
500 290 35 12 18 8
1000 430 50 15 30 12
3000 500 75 50 75 20
5000 1000 150 100 100 35
TABLE 7-4 DAMAGE TO UNDERGROUND SERVICES AND FOUNDATIONS (BURIED

UXO)
Damage Radii (m)

Total
Weight Cast Iron/ Earthenware Electric
Brick
(kg) Foundations Concrete or Brick Cables or
Walls
Pipes Sewers Steel Pipes
2 1 1 1 1 1
10 5 5 4 6 3
50 15 15 8 12 6
250 20 30 12 20 10
500 30 60 15 25 12
1000 75 75 18 35 15
3000 150 120 50 100 30
5000 250 200 100 175 50
62. Damage may occur at greater distances if a pipe enters a rigid structure such as a manhole,
which prevents its yielding to the earth's movement, and also if the ground is waterlogged.
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Crater Diameter
63. The probable crater diameter, resulting from the delayed explosion of a buried bomb are
shown in Table 7-5.
TABLE 7-5 PROBABLE DIAMETERS OF CRATERS RESULTING FROM THE

DELAYED EXPLOSION OF BURIED BOMBS
Diameter of Crater (m)

Charge/Weight Radio (%)
Total Weight (kg)
Chalk, Sand or
Made-up-Ground Clay Soil
Gravel
50% 80% 50% 80% 50% 80%
50 5.8 8.2 4.6 6.4 3.7 4.9
250 9.1 13.1 7.3 10.4 5.5 7.9
500 11.9 16.5 9.5 13.1 7.3 10.1
1000 16.5 22.9 13.1 18.3 10.1 13.7
2000 21 29.6 16.8 23.5 12.8 17.7
Note: These diameters may increase as a result of collapse of the edges.
DAMAGE LIMITATION
Design of Protective Works

64. Having decided that the structure to be protected lies within the radius of probable danger, but
outside the probable crater area, the design of an adequate protective work can be considered.
Protective works other than mounds will have no mitigating effect if sited within the crater likely to be
formed by the delayed explosion of a buried bomb.
Protective Walls
65. Protective walls are used to deflect and absorb the blast and to arrest primary splinters and
debris. They may be used inside buildings as well as outside. The length of the wall is adjusted to suit
the object to be protected. It is to be sited a few feet outside the probable crater area (see Figures 7-2
and 7-3).
Figure 7-2 - Siting a Protective Wall
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Figure 7-3 - Siting a Protective Wall
66. Protective walls are usually constructed of sandbag fresco bastions. For general use the base
must be at least 1.25m wide and 3m high. The surface of the wall furthest from the bomb should slope
at 6:1. In exceptional cases, where speed is vital and when vibration is unlikely to affect the fuzes,
earth-moving plant can be used and banks of loose earth built up (for example, in the case of a
suspected delay action fuze which cannot be reached before explosion is due). Being less compact
and with the soil lying at its natural resting slope, such a wall would need to be considerably larger
than a sandbag wall to be effective. Properly sited, the borrow-pit could provide some protection
against earth shock.
67. In some circumstances, it may be possible to improvise. Loaded rail trucks (with relatively
inert material such as coal) placed on the track nearest the bomb will frequently provide adequate
protection for trains using the other track. In factories, bales or crates of merchandise may be used to
protect vital machinery.
Protective Trenching
68. Trenches are used to protect underground services and basements outside the probable crater
area from damage by earth shock. The bottom of the trench should be at least 0.7m below the line
joining the bomb to the bottom part of the object to be protected. The trenching may be as narrow as
convenient for construction but there must be no cross bracing, since this would provide a bridge for
the shock wave. (Figure 7-4)
0.7 m
TRENCH
Figure 7-4 - Trench Protecting an Underground Pipe
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Sandbag Abutments
69. Where the bomb is too deep or too close to permit trenching, sandbag abutments may be used
to protect walls of cellars and basements against earth shock. The abutment should be as large as
possible and extend for at least 3m into the room, but must not touch any other load bearing walls or
the ceiling as this would transmit the shock through the building (Figure 7-5).
Figure 7-5 - Protective Sandbag Abutment
Protective Vents
70. It is possible to minimise the intensity of the earth shock from a buried bomb if the earth
coverage above the bomb is reduced sufficiently to permit easy escape of the gases arising from the
explosion. If the resultant increased blast effect can be accepted, vents may be dug from the surface.
Such a course might be advisable when bridge abutments, dams, underground railways or deep
underground services or structures are threatened. Excavations sunk to recover UXO can also serve as
vents.
71. Example. A deep-buried UXO containing a time fuse with a maximum delay of 24 hours
threatens an important underground service and must be classed as Category A unless some reduction
of the effects of earth shock can be effected. It is not possible to recover the bomb in 24 hours but it
would be sufficient to sink a shaft rapidly to within 2 lengths of the bomb, evacuate the site until the
end of a maximum delay period, and then return to recover the bomb. The use of remotely-operated
earth-moving plant should be considered for digging vents.
Protective Mounds
72. Protective mounds have the opposite effect of protective vents, since they minimise blast and
splinter damage but increase the effect of earth shock. The method is applicable only to comparatively
small bombs and consists of piling soil or filled sandbags in a cone over the bomb position, thus
forming an artificial camouflet.
73. Blocks of wood, masonry or brick must not be used since the shock wave may throw them a
considerable distance. Since mounds will hinder the recovery and disposal of the UXO, the method is
normally only used when UXOs are to be temporarily or permanently abandoned. The specifications
for protective mounds are shown in Table 7-6.
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TABLE 7-6 REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTIVE MOUNDS
Weight Dimensions of Cone

Total Position Type of of Soil No of
Weight (kg) of Bomb Soil Required Sandbags Diameter Height
(Tonne) (m) (m)
50 Buried Clay 40 1,600 6.1 1.8
50 Buried Sand 60 2,400 7.3 1.8
50 Unburied Any 40 1,600 6.1 1.8
250 Buried Clay 125 5,000 12 1.8
250 Buried Sand 180 7,200 12 2.7
250 Unburied Any 90 3,600 12 1.8
Not
500 Buried Clay 270 14 2.7
Practicable
Not
500 Buried Sand 400 15 3
Practicable
Protective Surrounds
74. Protective surrounds are used to provide protection against blast and splinters from anti-
personnel bombs weighing up to 2.5kg. They are used as a precaution against inadvertent explosion
when sensitive fuzes are fitted, or when demolishing bombs in situ. A square surround consisting of
80 sandbags gives almost complete protection. The bags must be carefully laid and tightly packed
with no gaps left through which splinters could pass (Figure 7-6). The bags may be thrown as much as
3m from this surround and splinters will be thrown into the air unless boards are laid over the top
covered with a layer of sandbags. The bags may then be scattered up to 5m.
Figure 7-6 - Protective Surrounds
75. When a number of bombs have to be dealt with in a small area, it may be advisable to provide
every bomb with an inner wall of 32 bags in the first instance and then return to complete the walls as
time and labour permit. The 32-bag surround gives reasonable protection against splinters but is not
as efficient in absorbing blast. The bags are likely to be shattered by the explosion and may be thrown
up to 4m from the bomb. To provide further protection to specific structures from blast effects and to
reduce the chance of damage due to displaced sandbags, a gap should be left in the surround on the
side facing away from the structure.
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Summary of Protective Works Requirements
76. Walls. The minimum dimensions for protective walls to deflect blast from property are:
a. Base width - minimum 1.25m.
b. Height - minimum 3m.
c. Outer wall slope - minimum 80º (6 in 1).
77. Trench. For protection against earth shock, the requirements for trenches are:
a. 0.7m deeper than the line connecting the bomb to the property to be protected.
b. No cross bracing.
c. Outside the anticipated crater area and as close as possible to the property being
protected.
78. Abutment. The requirements for abutments to protect foundations and walls against earth
shock where the bomb is too close or too deep for trenching are:
a. Base width - minimum 3.0m.
b. No contact with other walls or ceiling.
79. Surround. The requirements for surrounds to provide protection against up to 2.5kg of
surface UXO are:
a. 32 bag - splinters only.
b. 80 bag - blast and splinters.
c. LSA on the surface - 20 sandbags per 0.5kg, inclusive of the disposal charge weight,
10 sandbags per 0.5kg in an undercut trench.
RENDER SAFE PROCEDURES

80. Render safe techniques in general fall into 4 categories: component isolation/removal; power
interruption/removal; mechanical incapacitation and explosive neutralisation.
Tools
81. Tools for carrying out RSPs include:
a. Rocket wrench.
b. De-armer.
c. Disrupter.
Explosive Techniques
82. Explosive techniques may be used to render the fuze inoperative or to break the explosive
train. Examples include:
a. Cracker Barrel.
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b. Charge Linear Cutting (CLC)/Charge Demolition Liner Cutting (CDLC) (Blade).
c. Baldrick.
d. Vulcan.
e. Pyrotorch.
Hand Removal
83. For many items of UXO, hand-removal of the fuze is the only recognised method of
neutralisation. However, hand removal poses the greatest risk to the operator and should only be
undertaken when:
a. The category of the task merits the risk.
b. Other techniques are unacceptable or unsuited to the task.
RECOVERY AND FINAL DISPOSAL

Recovery
84. The selection of a suitable recovery method will need to take into account the size of the
UXO, whether plant or manpower is required, where the UXO is going, how it is going to get there,
and the distances involved. The implications of each recovery option must be carefully thought
through.
Final Disposal
85. The final disposal actions need to be considered early in the task because the EOD technique
may affect the final result and there may be logistic problems. The first consideration will be whether
a high order event is acceptable; if so, this is normally the best procedure.
86. Before carrying out any positive action, the following issues need to be reconsidered:
a. Incident Control Point location, Cordon, NOTAM.
b. Secondary hazards.
c. Vital installations.
d. Protective works plan.
e. Method of initiation.
SITE REMEDIATION
87. Restoration of the site is required to enable its safe use by others. If actual restoration is
beyond the scope of the EOD team, then advice is to be passed to the National Authority or tasking
agency. It is the EOD operators’ responsibility to ensure that the site is handed over in a safe state.
88. If there are any doubts then the area must be marked to warn of hazards. More resources may
be required to complete a thorough and systematic search. Potential tasks include marking-off
dangerous areas or contaminated ground; removing protective works and shafts; filling in craters; and
repairing damage.
EOD Trg Handbook

Page 7-18
REPORTING
89. Reporting is the final phase, The EOD operator must complete the relevant report and forms
ASAP and submit them to the relevant organisation or agency. This will usually be in the IMSMA
format or any other as dictated by the national mine action authority.
Other reports that may be required, and should be recorded by the EOD operator as a matter of course
are.
a. Demolition report; This should detail, the charge size and placement, location and
time of the demolition, any protective measures used, result of demolition.
b. Low Order Techniques (LOT) Performa; This should record the equipment and
technical information of the effectiveness of the procedure and equipment used in the
technique(s). This information can then be used to provide data from which new RSPs can be
devised by.
92. It is vital that EOD reports are given the widest possible circulation. This ensures that
appropriate action is taken with regard to lessons identified and that training, equipment and
procedures are developed to meet the threat.
Annexes:
A. Aide Memoire for Questioning Technique (EOD Task).

B. Render Safe Procedure (RSP) Flow chart.
C. IMAS safety distance table.
EOD Trg Handbook

Page 7-19
ANNEX A: QUESTION TECHNIQUE FOR EOD TASK
What: IS IT?
 Happened?
 Did you do?
 Did you see?
 Why did the attack occur here?
 Is the target?
 Did you hear?
Where: IS IT?
 Were you when the attack occurred?
 Did the attack come from?
 Did you see it land/laid/thrown?
 Did you see the UXO? Where did you stand?
 Did you walk? How close did you get?
Am I Safe:
 How close?
 ICP Location?
 ICP Free from secondary items?
 Did you find the weapon/item?
 Is everyone in area safe?
 Did you report it?
Time Log:
 Arrival on site?
 Key moments?
 Depart site?
Evacuation:
 There are any casualties to evacuate. (e.g. fragmentation injury, chemical burns).
 Civilian population urban/rural
 Livestock?
 Is still in the area? Do they need to be there? Can they be moved?
 Any thing has happened since? (e.g. detonations heard, smoke seen, other sounds).
Cordon:
 Access routes
 Over watch
 Air/Sea
 Secondary Hazards Fuel, Gas, Nuclear, Chemicals
Hazards:
 There are any secondary hazards (e.g. gas pipes, electricity lines, fuel storage)
 There are any vital installations that need protecting.
 Anything that could enhance the task in hand.
Other Agencies:
 Any IMAS agencies
 Emergency services
 Specialist services Fuel, Gas, Nuclear, Water
7-22
ANNEX B: RENDER SAFE PROCEDURE (RSP) FLOW CHART
START
POSS ID ITEM
CAN ITEM BE
YE BIS
BIS
N
END
WILL PROTECTIVE
MEASURES/LOW ORDER
PERMIT BIS ?
N YE
CAN ITEM BE PROTECT/LOW ORDER

PUCA AND BIS
YE N END
PUCA RENDER
SAFE
COMPONENT POWER REMOVAL/ MECHANICAL

ISOLATION/REMOVAL INTERRUPTION INCAPACITATION
DISPOSAL
SAVALAGE ALL OR DESTROY ALL OR IN

IN PART PART
SUBMIT
REPORTS
END
7-22
ANNEX C: IMAS SAFETY DISTANCE TABLE
7-22
CHAPTER 8
USE OF EXPLOSIVES
INTRODUCTION
1. The EOD operator is to read all relevant information applicable to the ordnance to be destroyed
before proceeding with an explosive procedure. If in any doubt about the destruction, then advice
should be sought from the EOD tasking authority.
2. As an EOD operator Initiation of a charge can be achieved by several methods, each of which
is described in detail in this Chapter. The methods available for disposal options will need to take into
account local regulations, conditions and the equipment available. The final choice of disposal
method rests with the EOD Operator in line with NMAA and authorised SOP’s.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Electro Explosive Devices

3. Firing circuits associated with Electro Explosive Devices (EED), or other electrical
conductors such as wires, tools and fingers in contact with the EED or firing circuit, when placed in a
RF field will act as antennae and will pick up some electrical energy from the field.
4. When the wires of an EED are separated they may form an effective dipole antenna and
provide an optimum impedance to match the EED, giving maximum transfer of power to the EED
from the radiation source.
5. Unless appropriate precautions are taken, the power/energy levels induced into a firing circuit
from a RF field may be sufficient to inadvertently initiate an EED.
Static Electricity
6. Static electricity is generated when materials move across a surface. If sufficient charge is
created and is then in contact with an EED, this may be sufficient to initiate the EED.
7. Individuals have differing inherent ability to generate and dissipate static electricity.
Virtually all outdoor military style clothing is capable of creating static and certain climates or
weather conditions, such as hot, dry desert environments, will increase the likelihood of static. It is
therefore important to take static precautions when EEDs are being used.
8. The precautions taken will depend on the environment and circumstances in which the EOD
operator is working. They will include:
a. Ensuring that clothing is as anti-static as possible and creating as little movement as

possible.
b. Touching the conductors for as short a time as possible.
c. Ensuring, by earthing, that the conductors are at the same potential before connecting.
Electrical charge will flow to the point of lowest potential and if the land surface is providing
a good conducting medium, this will be the most convenient earth. An earth spike assists this
process and damp soil is better than dry.

Clearance of Destruction Sites
9. After destruction of UXO by detonation, the residue is to be thoroughly examined by the
EOD operator to ensure all explosive substances have been destroyed. This examination is a critical
safety point and any unconsumed explosives found should be destroyed. Except where otherwise
stated, resulting debris of a non-explosive nature is to be disposed of as scrap.
10. Explosive residue left on scrap EO items, following disposal action, may contain toxic by-
products. The use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) should always be considered,
especially where direct contact with this type of debris is required.
11. Where possible, destruction sites are to be thoroughly cleared of any remnants and all
equipment is to be recovered. If pits or trenches have been dug, they are to be filled in and the area
examined to ensure no weapon components (transit rings, blanking caps etc.) remain. At permanent
sites, pits and trenches may be left open for future use at the discretion of the officer in charge.
12. All areas used for destruction by burning, whether on the surface or in trenches, are not to be
used again for at least 24 hrs to allow the ground to cool sufficiently to allow safe operations to
commence.
INITIATION METHODS
ELECTRICAL INITIATION METHOD
13. This Method employs electrical initiation using an electrical Demolition Exploder and an
Electric Detonator in conjunction with a high explosive charge.
Advantages
14. The electrical method of initiation has advantages over the safety fuze method and should be
used whenever possible. The main advantages are:
a. Control is maintained until the precise moment of firing.
b. The risk of premature initiation is reduced, provided all the relevant safety
precautions are carried out.
c. Should a misfire occur, the waiting period is 10 minutes compared with a minimum
30 minutes when the safety fuze method is used.
Explosives Required
15. Explosives required are:
a. Explosive Charge
b. Detonator, Electric
c. Detonating cord if required
Equipment
16. The equipment required is as follows:
a. Electric firing Cable
b. Demolition exploder
c. Insulating tape
d. Detonator crimping tool.

e. Shovel/Entrenching tool.
f. Wooden stake.
g. Knife and wooden cutting board.
h. Earthing Rod, if available and suitable for the environment.
17. Before proceeding onto demolition area, all equipment is to be checked for serviceability.
Electric Demolition Exploder/Initiator Procedures

18. The procedures for the use of the preferred Demolition Exploder/Initiator should be as per the
operators and user manual associated with that specific type of equipment.
19. Except when being used to fire a demolition circuit, the above mentioned equipment must be
kept in the possession of the EOD Operator under lock and key.
Electrical Firing Cable

20. The length of cable required will depend on the danger area of the ordnance to be destroyed.
Should it be found necessary to use more than one length of cable to obtain the required length, the
cable should be joined in accordance with Figure 8-1 and the complete length tested.
21. At the destruction site, the EOD Operator is to supervise the laying out of the cable and is to
ensure that the cable at no time passes within 15m of operating radios or mobile phones. Where
possible, the cable is to be firmly attached to a wooden stake at a distance of approximately 2m from
the ordnance to be destroyed, leaving the cable slack between the stake and destruction charge.
Figure 8-1 - Joining Firing Cable

Destruction Charge
22. The destruction charge is to be positioned in accordance with the relevant RSP or generic
principles for the EO involved. Where necessary and if safe to do so, the charge can be secured using
adhesive tape. The charge can be rectified (i.e. a hole made in it) using the Detonator Crimping tool
to allow fitting of detonator without undue friction. Alternatively, a double thumb knot or a series of
figure of eight knots can be used to initiate the charge (Figure 8-2).
Figure 8-2 – Destruction Charge
Arming and Firing Procedure

23. Before final arming, all personnel other than the EOD operator are to retire outside the danger
area (as specified in IMAS and Applicable SOP’s) taking with them all surplus explosives, tools and
equipment. The EOD operator is to ensure that the DEMOLITION EXPLODER/INITIATOR
is kept under control during the final arming phase to prevent accidental initiation of the
charge.
24. EED may pick up sufficient energy from discharged static electricity to cause a premature
initiation. Before handling unpackaged EED, personnel are to observe anti-static precautions.
25. The EOD operator is to:
a. Ensure he is earthed before handling the EED.
b. Remove the detonator from its packaging.
c. Carefully unwind the leads, twist the ends together and place the detonator in a safe
location (preferably under a filled sandbag)
d. Earth the firing cable.
e. Connect the detonator leads to the firing cable and bind the bare connections with
insulating tape (ensure detonator is still under sandbag during connection to firing cable)
f. Insert the detonator into the rectified destruction charge or attach it to a prepared, pre-
laid detonating cord.
g. Retire outside the danger area to the firing point, taking care to collect and remove all
remaining items of equipment.
h. Ensure that the danger area is clear, that all personnel have taken cover, and no
aircraft are over or about to cross the danger area.

i. (At the firing point), connect the Firing cable to the Exploder/Initiator and test for
continuity.
j. Make a final visual check of the area (check with sentries that area is clear), prime the
Exploder/Initiator, issue a verbal warning, then fire.
k. Ensure personnel remain under cover to allow any fragments to fall. Apply any
additional soak times required.
l. Ensure the procedure was successful, initially by remote visual or optical observation.
26. Once satisfied that it is safe to do so, the EOD operator should approach the demolition site,
alone, to physically confirm that successful disposal of the item has taken place.
Misfire Procedure for Electrical Initiation Method

27. Should a misfire occur, the following procedures are to be followed:
a. At the firing point, the connection of wires should be checked and the circuit re-
tested. If there is continuity, the Operator should attempt to fire the Exploder/Initiator again.
b. If this procedure fails, a misfire time of 10 minutes should be applied. Under no

circumstances is the EOD operator, or any other person, to approach the UXO before
this time has expired.
c. Where possible, the operator should determine the cause of the misfire from a
distance.
d. After the misfire time and soak time have elapsed, the EOD operator is to proceed
alone, with any necessary equipment, to assess the reason for failure.
e. To re-lay the charge, the operator is to cut the cable on the side of the stake nearest to
the firing point, test the cable and repair, or replace, as required.
f. Without disturbing the original charge, a new charge is to be placed in close

proximity to the original and the full firing procedure repeated.
NON-ELECTRICAL INITIATION METHOD
28. The Non Electrical method employs a non-electrical initiating system using safety fuze and a
non-electric detonator, in conjunction with the explosive charge.
29. Safety fuze should be used for initiation when:
a. The electrical method of initiation is impracticable.
b. Radiation hazards cannot be removed.
c. Dealing with large sub munition fields.
Explosives Required
30. The explosives required are as follows:
a. Explosive Charge
b. Detonator, non-electric
c. Safety Fuze
d. Matches Fuzee
e. Detonating Cord
f. Detonating Cord Boosters
Equipment
31. The equipment required is as follows:
a. Detonator Crimping Tool.
b. Knife and wooden cutting board
c. Measure (marked in inches/mm).
d. Shovel.
e. Stop Watch.
Safety Fuze Procedure

32. Safety Fuze is hydroscopic (absorbs water easily) so every precaution should be taken to
ensure that it remains dry during preparation. Whenever safety fuze is cut, the bare ends are to be
sealed with the sealing sleeves provided in each container.
33. The rate of burning of the safety fuze is first to be tested as follows:
a. Cut off the first 300mm (due to the possibility of hydroscopic action), burn and
discard.
b. Cut off a further 300mm, ignite it and note the burning time. The burning time for
300mm should be within manufactures limits. If the time of burning is outside these limits,
the remainder of the roll is to be destroyed. The time should be noted on the packaging for
future use.
c. The last 300mm of a coil is to be burned and discarded.
34. The operator must calculate the safety distance for the UXO to be destroyed and the time
taken to walk, at normal walking speed, the distance from a safe firing point to the destruction point,
taking into account the terrain. From the burning time of the safety fuze to be used, the length of
safety fuze required can then be calculated by dividing the burning rate by the time taken.
Alternatively, the manufactures burning time Table can be used if supplied. A safety margin of a
further 300mm should be added to the length calculated.
Detonator Procedures
35. The Non Electric Detonator is sensitive to shock and must always be handled with care. A
probe is not to be used in the open end of the detonator.
36. The end of the safety fuze for insertion into the detonator must be cut square and gently
pushed into the detonator. A screwing motion is not to be used.
37. The detonator is secured by a single crimp positioned at approximately 5-10mm from the
open end of the detonator. For operations on or around water, a sealing sleeve should be used. Care
must be taken not to over crimp the detonator as this will damage the safety fuze. Over crimping
should not occur provided the correctly issued crimping tool is used. This preparation must be carried
out a safe distance away from the explosive charge (Fig 8-3)

Figure 8-3 Crimping a Non Electric detonator approx 5-10mm from open end.
Destruction Charge
38. The charge is to be positioned in accordance with relevant specific RSP or generic principles.
If necessary and it is safe to do so, it may be secured with adhesive tape. The charge can be rectified
using the crimping tool to allow the fitting of a detonator without undue friction. Alternatively, a
detonating cord link with a cradle, a double thumb knot or a series of figure of eight knots can be used
to initiate the charge (Fig 8-2).
Arming and Firing Procedure

39. All personnel other than the EOD operator are to retire outside the danger area, (as specified
in IMAS and Applicable SOP’s) taking with them all surplus explosives, tools and equipment.
40. The operator should then insert the safety fuze into the detonator and crimp, as described in
Paragraph 37. The detonator should then be inserted into the destruction charge or taped onto the
detonating cord cradle.
41. If using match fuzee, ensure the end of the safety fuze is scarfed and 2 matches with Striker is
made ready (Fig 8-4)
Figure 8-4 Safety Fuse Scarfed ready for lighting with Match Fuzee.

42. Excessive weight should not be placed on the safety fuze as this may cause it to flash.
43. The EOD operator is to satisfy himself that the danger area is clear, and that no aircraft are
over or about to cross the danger area. He will then ignite the safety fuze, start the stopwatch and
retire immediately, at normal walking pace, to the firing point.
Misfire Procedure Non Electric Initiation Method

44. In the event of an initiation failure, a waiting period of 30 minutes from the time the charge
should have operated is to be observed. Once the 30 minutes has elapsed, the EOD operator alone is
to approach the site. Having ensured, by careful observation, the safety fuze is extinguished and
without disturbing the original destruction charge, a new charge is to be positioned on the items to be
destroyed (Fig 8-5 and 8-6)
Figure 8-5 1st Explosive Charge misfires
Figure 8-6 2nd Explosive donor charge placement

INITIATION BY STORES OWN FUZE POCKET METHOD
45. The stores own method (Fig 8-7) is only used for the destruction of explosive items that
contain their own exploder system (e.g. HE bombs, which have a detonator or fuzing cavity capable
of housing a demolition charge).
46. This method should only be attempted if access can be gained to the detonator or
booster cavity. It must not be attempted on fired munitions or stored munitions which have
gone through energetic action.
Stores Required
47. The stores required are as for destruction Methods Electrical or Non Electrical, depending
upon the method of initiation adopted by the EOD operator.
Procedure
48. The UXO should be positioned in such a manner that the nose and/or tail plugs are readily
accessible. The exploder system is then to be exposed. PE is to be packed into the detonator or fuze
cavity. Initiation will be in accordance with the appropriate procedures for the method being used.
49. Due to the small size of most detonator or fuze cavities, Detonating Cord Boosters (DCB) is
well suited to this task. The detonator or detonating cord booster is inserted into the rectified
explosive charge in the fuze pocket.
Misfire Procedure Stores Own Fuze Pocket Method

50. In the event of an initiation failure, the misfire drill appropriate to the method used is to be
carried out. When re-preparing the store for destruction, it is essential that only the procedure detailed
in either Electric or Non Electric is used.
51. Under no circumstances is the detonator to be withdrawn from the charge. Every
precaution is to be taken to ensure that the original explosives, and any cable or safety fuze
attached to it, is not disturbed.
52. If possible, an alternative fuze pocket should be utilised to complete the destruction.
Fig 8-7 Stores Own Method on a unfuzed mortar.

Precautions When Using Detonating Cord.
53. When using detonating cord, care is to be taken to ensure that all lines proceed to their
respective destruction charges without abrupt changes in direction or crossing over itself. This avoids
the possibility of the detonation wave stopping or cutting the detonating cord.
Initiation
54. Whenever possible, initiation is to be by electrical means as detailed for Electrical Initiation
Method. An electric detonator is to be connected to the electric cable in the prescribed manner and
the detonator is then taped to one end of the main length of detonating cord onto a detonating cord
cradle. The destruction is then to be completed as detailed in Electrical Initiation Method.
55. If it is not possible to complete the destruction by Electrical Initiation Method, then Non
Electrical or Combination Method is to be adopted, using the relevant procedure.
Laying Out of Detonating Cord and Charges

56. There are 2 possible methods for initiating simultaneous demolitions: main line (Figure 8-9)
and ring main (Figure 8-10). Both allow charges to be connected by detonating cord via the use of
joints or junctions.
Figure 8-9 – Main Line

Figure 8-10 – Ring Main
57. There are various methods for the joining of det cord, In all cases, spare ends of either 100mm
with rubber sealing sleeve, or 300mm without sealing sleeve, must be left on all joints.
a. Lap Joint. A lap joint (Figure 8-11)is used for main line simultaneous demolitions.
Detonating cord leads are tightly bound together using tape or wire, ensuring that a minimum
of 100mm of contact are achieved in the joint. It is essential that the branch leads are
positioned correctly in relation to the detonation wave. Up to 4 lap joints can be bound
together to form a detonating cord junction box.
LAP JOINT
100mm
100/300mm
Fig 8-11 Lap Joint

b. Y-Junction. A Y-Junction (Figure 8-12) is a combination of 3 lap joints. They
function regardless of the direction of travel of the detonation wave and for this reason they
are ideal for ring main simultaneous demolitions.
‘Y’ JOINT
TARGET
Fig 8-12 Y Joint
c. Clove Hitch. A clove hitch junction (Figure 8-13) should only be used in an
emergency only when junction clips are not available or time precludes the use of Y-
junctions.
Fig 8-13 Clove Hitch

Misfire Procedure Simultaneous Method
58. In the event of an initiation failure, the initiating system is to be checked and the appropriate
misfire drill is to be carried out as detailed for the method chosen.
59. When either Electrical Initiation Method or Non Electrical Initiation Method misfire
procedure is carried out, a new detonator is to be used. Whatever method is adopted, it is essential
that the new detonator is secured to the main length of detonating cord without disturbing the original
detonator.
SAFETY IN THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES
Responsibility
60. At every EOD practice, the appropriately qualified/ authorised person is responsible for the
safe use of all explosives and accessories used.
61. The EOD Operator is to enforce strict observance of the necessary regulations and must
clearly specify who will give the order to fire.
62. The EOD Operator is to take charge of all explosive material on the range or task and ensure
that the following regulations are observed before any demolition work commences:
a. Unauthorised personnel do not approach the stores.
b. The stores are only issued as and when they are required.
c. The balance of stores not issued is put in a place of safety before any charge is fitted
or fired.
d. Explosives are not stored where they are exposed to sunlight.
e. Rough handling and friction are avoided.
Handling and Stowage of Explosives (General Considerations)

63. Regulations for the handling and stowage of explosives are contained in IMAS 10.50,
Transportation and Handling of Explosives and must be observed at all times.
64. Modern Explosives (Commercial and military grade) are necessarily and intentionally made
stable so that they are safe to handle and, except where chemical deterioration has taken place, they
will not detonate unless deliberately initiated. Therefore, if handled and stowed correctly, there is
minimal risk to personnel.
65. Detonators are extremely sensitive and must be handled with great care. Except when
actually required for service use, the following safety regulations must be observed:
a. Detonators must be kept in the containers in which they are supplied complete with
the correct packing materials. Each container must contain only one type of detonator.
b. The detonator containers must be stowed well away from other explosives.
c. Detonators are always to be transported in their containers, packed in some form of

soft packing.

d. Stowed detonators, or those being transported, must be kept separate from other
explosives.
Danger Areas and Sentries

66. On ranges, a danger area is to be established if one is not laid down in local orders as follows:
a. The danger area is to be closed, cleared and demarcated by red flags.
b. The area is to be of adequate size to contain possible fragmentation from the amount
of explosive being used and the perimeter is to be patrolled by sentries.
c. The sentries must be instructed in their duties and provided with red flags and some
means of communicating with the control point.
d. The sentries must be sufficient in number to prevent the entry of persons and
livestock into the danger area.
e. Sentries must be posted at barriers on any roads which pass through the area to warn
traffic that the area is closed.
f. The EODO is to ensure that the sentries understand their duties and that they can hear
or see the signals from the control point. He/she is also to ensure that the area is clear before
the charges are fitted.
Place of Safety
67. A Splinter proof shelter (SPS) should be used to provide complete protection against
fragmentation. Whenever possible, the shelter should be upwind of the charge. The amount of time
to walk between the charge position and the place of safety should be measured before charges are
placed
LOW ORDER TECHNIQUES

DEFLAGRATION
Introduction
68. In the past, the principal means for disposal of ordnance has been through countermining,
immunising or removing a fuze followed by case entry and removal of filling. Extensive research into
a range of alternative techniques designed to produce deflagration in the explosive filling of the
ordnance under attack has been undertaken. These techniques have been applied successfully to a
range of ordnance from sub munitions to 2000lb bombs.
69. Although nearly all chemical explosives function by means of a combustion process, the
speed at which the reaction proceeds varies greatly from one explosive to another. It is also
influenced by the conditions under which the reaction takes place, specifically the degree of
confinement and the means of initiation. Most explosives can be easily ignited in the open air
(commercial water-based slurries are an exception) and many of them burn relatively slowly in that
condition.
Deflagration and Detonation

70. Deflagration is defined as a chemical reaction proceeding at subsonic velocity along the
surface of an explosive, producing hot gases at high pressures. A deflagration under confinement
increases the pressure, the rate of reaction and the temperature, which may cause transition into a
detonation.
71. Deflagration is generally a non-steady reaction. The rate of reaction can vary from a few
millimetres to several hundred metres a second. Some explosives are naturally inclined to burn
rapidly; others are disinclined to burn at all. That inclination to deflagrate in a specific way is as
much a property of the explosive as its colour or its other physical properties. Importantly for EOD,
the explosiveness of an explosive filled system depends primarily on the degree of confinement
afforded to the part of the charge where the reaction is taking place.
72. The combustion process can also occur at a far higher rate of reaction and by a different
physical mechanism, known as detonation. Detonation occurs when a supersonic shock wave passes
through the body of the explosive with the chemical decomposition of the explosive and their
recombination as gases taking place within and behind the wave front. Detonation waves in solid or
liquid explosives travel at 1800-9000m/sec and because of the much greater and more rapid build-up
of pressure and the directional nature of the shock wave, detonations generally cause more damage to
material and disturbance of the atmosphere than deflagrations.
73. The detonation of an explosive can be brought about in one of 2 ways:
a. Burning to detonation, otherwise known as Deflagration to Detonation Transition

(DDT).
b. Shock to detonation.
THE APPLICATION OF DEFLAGRATION TO EOD TECHNIQUES
Concept
74. A low order technique uses an explosive reaction in which the shock generated by the donor
charge is insufficient to cause detonation of the high explosive main filling directly, but possesses
sufficient energy to achieve one of the following:
a. Deflagration. Deflagration is the rapid burning of HE where the pressure at the

reaction front never catches the shock wave. It is achieved by thermal ignition, thermal
mechanical shock or degraded shock. Deflagration is a means of gaining entry into confined
munitions such as a shell without causing unacceptable detonation. Much of the explosive is
either consumed or spread over a large area (Figure 8-14).
Fig 8-14 Deflagration
b. Mechanical Break-Up. A situation where the case is opened explosively exposing

the filling with no reaction (Figure 8-15)

Fig 8-15 Mechanical Break up
c. Burning. Burning is achieved by using a high temperature incendiary charge. This

can be used to dispose of pyrotechnic natures and for the destruction of light cased HE
natures (Figure 8-15).
Fig 8-15 Burning
d. Cutting and Burning. The case is explosively cut open and the filling is ignited in a
single operation (Figure 8-16). Any explosive burning may burn to detonation.

Fig 8-16 Cut and Burn (Rocket motor)
Acceptability of Damage
75. Should damage to the surrounding area be deemed acceptable, then a LOT should be
considered as it carries low risk to the operator and, if successful, will cause minimal damage.
However, there is no guarantee of success and therefore:
a. LOT should not be attempted if a detonation is unacceptable.
b. Safety distances must always assume the worst case (i.e. a high order
detonation).
Factors
76. The factors affecting the performance of low order techniques on high explosive main fillings
are as follows:
a. The composition of the high explosive main filling (TS4B, RDX/TNT etc).
b. Whether boosters or exploders are fitted to the ordnance.
c. Whether the ordnance is fuzed.
d. The case thickness and shape of the ordnance.
e. The type and quantity of explosives used as the donor charge.
f. The stand-off distance of the donor charge.
g. The position of the donor charge on the ordnance.
Operating Window
77. Numerous trials have shown the operating window for the techniques described in this
Chapter are wide enough to cater for variations in case thickness, filling quality and other components
that are likely to be encountered in mass-produced ordnance. It is important to note, however, that
even small design changes in the equipment used to induce these reactions can dramatically change
the level of response.
Burning Rate
78. The continuation of the burning reaction and its rate are determined by the innate
explosiveness of the composition in its given form. As a rule of thumb, the more brittle and frangible
the explosive material, the more violently it will deflagrate. Hence explosives such as TNT or
RDX/TNT exhibit moderately high levels of explosiveness, whereas the more plastic PBXs (PBX fill
burns without flame or smoke) exhibit low levels of explosiveness.
79. The following factors will change the reaction rate:
a. Confinement. Without confinement, most explosives burn from the free air surface
only. The gases, which are the products of combustion, vent to the atmosphere and hence
have little or no effect on the reaction rate. If confinement remains intact, then the gaseous
products of reaction cannot escape and pressure at the reaction front increases. The
immediate effect of this is to increase the rate of reaction. The reaction rate increase also
increases the rate of release of gas and the whole cycle continues to accelerate until one of
two things usually happens; either the internal pressure exceeds the yield point of the
munition casing, causing it to rupture, or the pressure exceeds the shock initiation pressure of
the unreacted explosive and there is DDT. When the casing ruptures, the pressure acting on
the explosive decreases rapidly. The effect on the burning reaction is dramatic; it
immediately stops its rapid acceleration and often quenches completely.
b. Cracked Filling: The degree, to which the explosive filling has been cracked, either
through its impact with the ground or by the interaction of projectiles with the case and the
explosive filling, will impact on the reaction rate.
c. Temperature of the Filling. Temperature of the explosive is a key factor, particularly

if it is subjected to something like a fuel fire. Explosives that start to deflagrate at elevated
temperatures nearly always act in a more violent manner than they would at ambient
temperature.
Disposal of Remains after Deflagration

80. Disrupted ordnance may still contain explosive, possibly around the initiating device. All
such munitions should be treated with extreme caution. The rapidity of the deflagrative event induced
by most successful projectile attack techniques can generally beat the initiating device functioning
time. However, an ejected initiating device is by no means safe and it should be countermined
without displacing it.
81. The ejected explosive and the remaining explosive left in the opened munition bodes can be
burnt. Initiating device components and large booster pellets must be kept away from this fire.
Methods of Attack
82. A variety of LOT that can be applied are derived from military techniques using military
explosives, however the commercial market has a vast array of LOT that are available on the
commercial market for sale, and as such are commonly used within the HMA/EOD environment.
Some examples of commonly used LOT are as follows:
a. Baldrick.
b. Round Tom
c. Donor Disk.
d. Cut and Burn. (CLC -Charge Linear Cutting)
e. CDLC (BLADE) /
f. Crackerbarrel.
g. Vulcan
Recommended Low Order Techniques

83. The recommended LOTs are as follows:
Store Method
Mortars up to 68mm Crackerbarrel, Baldrick, Vulcan
Shells up to 250mm Crackerbarrel, Baldrick, Vulcan
Small Bombs (up to 50kg) Crackerbarrel, Baldrick, Vulcan, CDLC
Large Bombs (50 kg to 1000kg) Crackerbarrel, Baldrick, Vulcan, CDLC, Round Tom
Blast Warheads Charge Linear Cutting, Vulcan, Baldrick
Continuous Rod Warheads Charge Linear Cutting, CDLC, Baldrick, Vulcan
Mine Cases Charge Linear Cutting, CDLC, Vulcan
Rocket Motors Charge Linear Cutting

Examples of LOT
Baldrick
84. Baldrick (Figure 8-17) consists of an aluminium tube 130mm long and 50mm in diameter. Fitted
at one end is a copper disc crimped into position. BALDRICK is filled with PE4 to the required
charge weight and a plastic detonator holder is inserted to close the tube. The charge weights which
can be used range from 2oz to 8oz and recommended fills are as follows:
a. Items up to 155mm – 2oz.
b. Thin skinned munitions eg. Mk 82, Mk 83 Mk 84 – 2oz.
c. 1000lb bombs – 6oz.
Figure 8-17 - BALDRICK
85. BALDRICK disposes of the munition by energy transfer induced deflagration. On initiation,
the copper disk reverses producing a self-forming slug which penetrates the case.
Method of Use
86. BALDRICK should be filled with the required amount of Explosive prior to use, adding small
amounts of Explosive at a time and ensuring no air gaps remain within the filling. The plastic
detonator holder should be placed at the rear of the filling to locate the detonator accurately. The
filled BALDRICK is then placed at the centre of the mass, at 90o to the axis and adjacent to the
munition where the wall is thinnest. A stand off distance of 200mm is required. BALDRICK should
be aimed to avoid exploders/boosters or areas of casing that are strengthened (Figure 8-18)
Anticipated Result
87. The firing of BALDRICK should produce a hole approximately 20mm in diameter in the
outer case and deflagrate the filling (a mechanical break up may also occur). It is possible it may
cause the munition to detonate, so a suitable safety distance must be observed for all personnel.
Should the outer case be holed but the filling not ignite, a second attempt may be carried out (Figure
8-19)

Figure 8-18-OFAB 100 -120 HE Frag Aircraft Bomb set up (one Ballistic disc “Baldrick”)
aimed at centre of bomb with 150mm standoff
Deflagration ofFigure
OFAB 100Results
8-19 –120 HEof aFragmentation
Baldrick attack Aircraft Bomb
(one Ballistic Disc aimed at center of bomb 150mm standoff)
a. The base plate is likely to travel a significant distance, but it must be located as it will
be complete with the fuze pocket, which will still contain a quantity of live explosive.
Donor Disk
88. The donor disk method relies on the explosive effect of a stack of SX2 discs scabbing the inside
of the bomb case to cause a reaction in the filling. PE4 can be used, but results are unpredictable due
to the lack of uniformity of the PE4. Vaseline should be spread between each disc to prevent air gaps.
Depending on the size of the item, one or two stacks may be used.
Construction of Charge for a 155mm Shell:

89. The construction of the charge for an 155mm shell is shown at Figure 8-22
90. The charge is to be made using three discs of SX2, each with a diameter of 75 mm, positioned
on the shell. Place a plastic detonator holder or DCB on the centre of the discs and secure the charge
and detonator holder with self-adhesive tape. Care should be taken to ensure the detonator is at 90o to
the charge.

Construction of a Charge for a 1000lb bomb.
91. The construction of the charge for a 1000lb bomb is shown at Figure 8-23.
92. The charge is to be made using 2 stacks of discs of SX2, each with a diameter of 75mm.
Each stack should contain between 5-8 discs. Care should be taken not to position the stacks over the
explosive train of the bomb or over strong points, such as the lifting lugs. The first stack should be
positioned 275mm in from the rear of the bomb and the second stack a distance of 300mm from the
first.
Figure 8-22 – Donor Disc on a 155mm Projectile
Figure 8-23 – Donor Disks on a 1000lb Bomb
Cut and Burn
93. The cut and burn technique (Figure 8-24) can be used on any item containing propellant (ie.
missile motors or rockets, or large warheads) where it is necessary to cut open and burn the item or to
cut open only.
94. CLC should be used, although thin strips of SX2 may be utilised if CLC is not available.
Charges should be placed to remove the venturi and the motor closure plate (opposite end of venturi).
A charge is also placed to cut out a ‘chimney’ in the centre of the motor to allow the hot gasses to
vent to atmosphere.
95. To prevent the item becoming airborne during this technique, it is essential that all 3 charges
are initiated simultaneously.

Figure 8-24 Cut and Burn of a Rocket Motor
CDLC (BLADE)
96. CDLC is used to cut through the casing of a munition, exposing the fill which can then be burnt
using a DI.
97. Various sizes of CDLC can be used, depending on the size of the item to be attacked. 450g can be
used successfully against a 1000lb bomb.
98. Placing the CDLC around the circumference of the munition is the most successful method.
However, if this is not feasible, placing it along the length also works. Detonators or DCB can be
fitted to either the exposed end or by cutting through the plastic sheath and fitting a plastic detonator
holder to the exposed fill (Figure 8-25 & 26)
Figure 8-25 CDLC

Figure 8-26 CDLC Results
CRACKERBARREL
General
99. CRACKERBARREL has been developed to remove remotely the fuze from nose-fuzed
munitions. It works on the principle of a flat steel plate being explosively projected at the nose of a
target munition (Figure 8-27). Its force causes the fuze threads to shear or the shell and fuze bodies to
deform, separating the fuze from the target munition whilst imparting little energy to the target body.
100. When using CRACKERBARREL, neither the fuze nor target munition should detonate
although safety precautions for such an event must be taken. A CRACKERBARREL in free flight
may fly for some considerable distance.
Figure 8-27 - Emplacement of CRACKERBARREL

Technical Description
101. CRACKERBARREL is assembled as shown in Figure 8-28. It consists of the following
components:
a. Steel Plate. A 10mm thick square plate of mild steel measuring 80 x 80mm. The
plate may be made up locally using Steel Bar, Carbon, Hot Rolled, and Flat.
b. Backing. A 6mm thick piece of flat expended polyethylene measuring 80 x 80mm is

fitted immediately behind the steel plate to prevent spalling. Expanded polyethylene is
commonly used as a packing fitment in ammunition containers.
c. Explosive SX2. SX2 is cut to the size of the steel plate and polyethylene backing
(i.e. 80 x 80mm). 3 sheets of SX2 should be used for ground supported firings and two sheets
of SX2 for stand supported firings.
d. Detonator Holder. A plastic (top hat) detonator holder is clamped in the centre of the
SX2.
e. Clamping. Adhesive tape or strong elastic bands are used to clamp and hold the
components together.
f. Stand. Two stands have been developed and approved for use with
CRACKERBARREL.
Figure 8-28 – CRACKERBARREL Components
Initiation
102. An electrical means of initiation is recommended, using a Detonator L2A1or DCB inserted in
the detonator holder. However, safety fuze and a Flash Detonator may be used where electrical
means are not practical.
Method Of Use
103. The target munition is to be prepared by clearing all soil and debris from around the area of
the fuze leaving it totally unsupported. This should only be done if it is possible to do so without
disturbing the munition in any way. The bulk of the munition may remain buried providing correct
identification is possible.

104. Using a stand-off distance of 50mm, the CRACKERBARREL should be aligned to fire across
the longitudinal axis of the shell (Figure 8-29) with the first point of contact being the shell/adaptor or
shell fuze joint.
Figure 8-29- Optimum CRACKERBARREL Placement
105. When a stand is available, CRACKERBARREL is to be angled vertically downward to

minimize the risk of free flight after a ricochet. Alternatively, the CRACKERBARREL may be fired
horizontally provided a 500mm high stop butt is constructed around the far three sides of the shell
(Figure 8-30).
Figure 8-30 – CRACKERBARREL Fired Horizontally

LARGE SCALE MUNITIONS DEMOLITION OR MIXED BULK DISPOSAL OF UXO
Introduction
110. In certain circumstances the EOD Operator may be called upon to dispose of bulk munitions
which have been deemed safe to move from an Area and have therefore to be taken to a specified bulk
disposal area. In all instances the EOD operator is to ensure he/she is fully familiarised with IMAS,
NTSG’s and Organisational SOP’s for Disposal Operations of this nature. Specific IMAS relating to
this subject are:
a. International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 11.20, edition 2, 2003-01-01, Principles

and procedures for open burning and open detonation operations.
b. International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 10.10, first edition, 2001-10-01, Safety
& occupational health General requirements.
c. International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 10.20, First edition, 2001-10-01, Safety
and occupational health- demining worksite safety.
PROCEDURES
111. Loading & Transportation. After being deemed safe to move to a disposal area the EOD
Operator should ensure that suitable transport is available to move the munitions. The EOD Operator
should consider a number of factors prior to moving the munitions. These are as follows:
a. Type of transport required.
b. Do the munitions require packaging, if so is the original packaging available or does

new packaging need to be sourced?
c. Consider how the vehicle is to be loaded, where possible keep fuzing systems
separate from the main munitions and load heavier items on the bottom and light items on the
top of the vehicle.
d. Securing of munition once in the vehicle.
e. Route to be taken to demolition area; where possible avoiding populated & built up
areas.
f. Notification to relevant authorities of movement of bulk munitions.
g. Is Security & Escorts required?
112. Selection of Disposal Site. As with any demolition area certain factors should be considered.
Some of these factors are listed below; (IMAS 11.20 shows a standard Demolition Range Layout)
a. No Habitable or historical buildings within the danger area of the range.
b. No other hazards within range limitations, (fuel stores, power sub stations/overhead
cables, Gas/Oil pipelines, Underground drainage or sewers, etc).
c. Good vehicle access but not main heavy trafficked roads.
d. Area should be free from Flammable vegetation.
e. Area should be Soft sandy/clay type soil, rocky or stony ground should be avoided.
f. Ideal sited in an uninhabited Valley surrounded by hills/forest, or on an isolated
hilltop site.
113. Preparation of Disposal Area. Once an area has been identified it should be prepared in
readiness for the Bulk Disposal taking into account the types of munitions to be disposed. The
disposal of munitions with a large fragmentation effect should be carried out sub surface where
possible. If the ground is undulating demolitions should be prepared and initiated in low lying areas.
If the area is flat and open and plant is available disposal pits or trenches should be excavated to
accommodate the munitions. The size and depth of the trench or pit will be determined by the amount
and type of munitions to be disposed of and will also be limited by the max NEQ of the demolitions
site. This maximum NEQ will be determined by the in theatre SOPs and also by the Higher
Command’s authorisation for the individual operators. If in doubt the EOD Operator should always
consult with his Senior Commander and liaise with the Local Area Commander.
114. If plant is unavailable an excavation can be formed explosively using bulk explosive (e.g.
blast mines) to create a crater into which the remaining munitions can be placed for disposal.
Safety. Ensure enough time has elapsed to allow any harmful gasses to disperse prior
to entering the crater to set up the demolition and also ensure that the crater is stable
and will not collapse onto those personnel setting up the demolition.
115. Preparation of the Demolition. If the munitions to be disposed of are of the same type; the
laying out within the disposal trench will be quite simple i.e. stacking the munitions on top of each
other safely and securely until the maximum NEQ is achieved. Care should be taken to ensure the
explosive effect of the munitions is utilised and therefore achieves the best effect for the bulk
disposal. This will also reduce the fragmentation effect of the demolition (Figure 8-31)
Fig 8-31 Demolition using Stores Own Charges
116. Initiation. Initiation of the demolition should be by multi point; where possible using the
stores-own method (fig 8-32). If stores-own is not viable then the charges should be placed on top of
the munitions ensuring the best explosive effect (fig 6- 7). Initiation charges should be placed on the
top and sides of the demolition ensuring that the detonation wave is transferred inwards and
downwards. The ring main method is the most suitable method of transferring the initiation wave.
Care should be taken to ensure that all det cord leads are as near as possible the same length to ensure
simultaneous detonation and therefore reduce throw-out (fig 8-33).

Fig 8-32 Demolition using Donor Charges
Fig 8-33 Ring Main Method
117. Mixed Bulk Demolitions. When different types and varying natures of munitions are to be
disposed of, the demolition can still be carried out within one pit; however, it is difficult to stipulate
an exact method. As a guide the following procedure should be applied where possible:
The ammunition should be stacked in the following manner:
a. Bottom Layer – Containing munitions such as smoke compositions, pyrotechnics

(low explosives) and small quantities of high explosive (AP mines).
b. 2nd Layer – Containing heavy cased munitions e.g. projectiles, mortars etc.
c. 3rd Layer – Light cased munitions with a high NEQ e.g. AV blast mines.
d. Top Layer – Bulk explosives.
N.B. In mixed item demolitions it is essential that multi point initiation is used to ensure all
munitions are disposed of. If necessary initiation points can be placed between the respective layers,
as well as on the top and sides of the demolition (Figure 8-34).

Fig 8-34 Mixed Bulk demolitions
118. White Phosphorus Munitions (WP). Any munitions containing WP should be disposed of
separately from others. Areas selected should be free from dense undergrowth and foliage to reduce
the risk of large uncontrollable fires. When preparing the demolition consideration should be given to
ensuring that the explosive force of the detonation, breaks open the munitions and throw the WP
upwards. This will have the effect of exposing nearly all the WP fill to the atmosphere which will in
turn allow it to burn. Once the demolition has been carried out and the phosphorus has burned off, the
area should be marked out as a contaminated and access restricted. Under no circumstances should
the area then be utilised for normal demolitions due to the chance of buried WP from previous
demolitions being uncovered and starting to burn. Consideration should also be given to the
downwind hazard created by burning WP when selecting the disposal site.
119. Clear Area. On completion of the demolition the immediate area of the demolition (including
the demolition pit) and surrounding area should be searched to ensure that no munitions have been
thrown clear of the pit during the demolition.

CHAPTER 9
IEDD PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
1. The EOD operator is not trained in the disposal of any Improvised Explosive device (IED)
2. As an 4 EOD operator you have been trained in the recognition of IEDD component parts and
recognition features to enable you to call for specialist trained personnel, with the specific equipment
needed to deal with an IED.
DEFINITIONS
Improvised Explosive Devices
3. An IED is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal,
noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It
may incorporate military stores but is normally derived from non-military stores.
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE MAKE
4. COMPONENTS OF AN IED
• Power source
• Switch(es)
• Initiator
• Main charge
• Container
5. BASIC IED CIRCUIT
FIRING
SWITCH POWER
SOURCE
INITIATOR
6. Power Source
 Electrical – batteries, output, life size and weight
 Chemical – Burning fuze
 Mains Electrical Supply
7. Switches
 Timers
 Clothes pegs & Mouse traps
 Toggle switches
 Tilt switches
 Microswitches
 Sensors
 Relays
8. Initiator
 Military Explosive MILEX

 Commercial Explosive CEX
 Improvised
9. Main Charge
 High Explosive (Military (MILEX) - Commercial (CEX) )

 Low Explosive (Military – Commercial - Home made )
 Improvised explosive (HME)
10. Container
 Can be of any construction, size, shape, material

 Will fit the size of explosive
 Will include all of the above
11. IED CIRCUIT
Lamp safe to Arming

arm indicator switch
Firing switch
Power source
Initiator
Main charge

METHODS OF CLASSIFICATION
12. TARGET & EFFECT
13. Anti- Property
Blast
Incendiary
Blast Incendiary
14. Anti- Personnel
Blast
Fragmentation
METHODS OF OPERATION
Time
Victim
Command
15. Time
 Burning fuse
 Clockwork
 Electronic
 Collapsing circuit (Battery decay)
 Chemical
 Material fatigue
 Pneumatic delay
 Thermal delay
Casio F91w timer
16. Victim

 Simple mechanical action
 Smoke & gas
 Magnetic
 Acoustic
 Light sensitive
 Active infra red
 Passive infra red
 Barometric
 x-ray sensitive
 Collapsing circuit
POWER WIRE
CLOSED PIN TRIPWIRE
Victim operated pull switch
17. Command
 Command pull
 Command wire
 Radio controlled
 Light sensitive
 Mobile phone & pagers
 Active infra red
 PCIED
Radio Controlled command IED

CHAPTER 10
Battle Area Clearance (BAC) TASK PROCEDURES
INTRODUCTION
1. This Chapter details the procedures which are specific to the conduct of BAC tasks. It should
be read in conjunction with:
a. IMAS 09.11, Battle Area Clearance, Draft First Edition, September 2007.
2. The target of humanitarian demining is the identification and removal or destruction of all
mine and UXO hazards from a specified area to a specified depth. In a war or conflict many areas may
be fought over but not mined and these former battle areas may contain hazards from ERW. The ERW
may then pose a humanitarian threat and constrain development. Clearance of former battle areas
differs from mine clearance but should still be conducted in a planned and systematic way to ensure
safe access and land use.
4. As for all munition clearance, the beneficiaries of land released through BAC must be
confident that the cleared land is safe for their use. This requires management systems and clearance
procedures which are appropriate, effective, efficient and safe. Planning for BAC should consider
national and local provincial priorities. In addition, the local community should also receive regular
briefings and explanations during the clearance operation as this acts as a very effective confidence
building measure. A community liaison function should be a routine activity incorporated with
operations.
General
5. BAC operations involve the location and disposal of ERW, including UXO and Abandoned
Explosive Ordnance (AXO or AO), over specific areas, which may include battlefields, defensive
positions and sites where air delivered or artillery munitions have been fired or dropped.
6. Depending on the humanitarian priorities and required land use, BAC may involve surface and
sub-surface clearance. The requirement for BAC can be in both urban and rural environments.
7. BAC operations do not normally include the disposal of large stockpiles of AXO unless these
have been dispersed over a large area, possibly as a result of an explosion, nor do BAC operations
cover the disposal of stockpiled munitions in national storage facilities.
8. BAC should not be conducted in areas where a landmine hazard is expected. Conversely,
landmine clearance procedures should not be used, where BAC could be more appropriate, and more
efficient.
9. In some circumstances it may be acceptable for BAC techniques to be applied in areas where
it is known that only certain type of anti-vehicle mines may exist but definitely there are no
antipersonnel mines. However, this decision shall be taken based on a complete threat analysis of the
specific area.
BAC REQUIREMENTS
Initial Assessment
10. The initial assessment should be made in conjunction with the land-owner, and all other
relevant stakeholders if possible. The local police may also be invited as their knowledge of the local
area and its present use and history is often invaluable. During the Initial assessment, the location of
EOD Trg Handbook 10-1

police, hospitals and security facilities should be ascertained. The EOD operator must also determine
if there are any particular times when, or reasons why, clearance cannot be undertaken.
11. The following factors need to be considered during the Initial assessment:
a. Use for Which the Land is Required. The description of use must always include the
depth to which the land will be excavated, ploughed, probed or otherwise disturbed. This
should also include if possible whether the ground disturbance should be in pre-planned areas
(i.e. for a foundation or fence) or if it can be indiscriminate.
b. The defined perimeter of the Area. The area of which any development and/or
ground intrusive work is to be carried out. The area of contamination may be larger than the
area of intended land use, this may not be able to be determined until a Technical Survey is
conducted.
c. Specified clearance depths. Specifying clearance depths will depend on the

intended land use, the likely UXO hazard in the area to be cleared and other environmental
factors. For example:
(1). UXO may be on the surface of the ground. In this case, the specification may
call for the removal and or destruction only of surface UXO hazards.
(2). Clearance in urban areas may require the removal of many meters of rubble as
part of the clearance process.
(3). In situations where large bombs and missiles or heavy calibre projectiles have
been used, the depth of clearance may be several meters.
(4). Shifting sands in desert areas or coastal areas may require clearance to a depth
of 1.0m or 2.0m to locate and destroy UXO which were originally on or close to the
surface.
d. The required clearance depth can be adjusted as clearance work progresses. Any
change shall be agreed between with the NMAA and the clearance organisation, and shall be
formally recorded.
e. The clearance process should be repeated if there is a subsequent change to the land
use which requires a greater depth of clearance. Detailed records and mechanisms for
monitoring potential changes should be established.
Technical Survey
12. Once the initial assessment with all the relevant stakeholders has been conducted a technical
survey should be instigated to further determine the requirements for clearance. The technical survey
report should include the following;
a. Density of UXO. It is not possible to accurately determine the degree of contamination in

a possible search area but wherever possible a spot check should be carried out. Density is
then to be recorded below is an example of a density scale:
(1) Very light - 1-2 UXO per Ha.
(2) Light - 3-5 UXO per Ha.
(3) Normal - 6-20 UXO per Ha.
(4) Heavy - 21-50 UXO per Ha.

(5) Very heavy - Over 50 UXO per Ha.
b. A site plan showing the boundaries and any public access of the area to be cleared.
c. Site security including fencing, Service/civilian guard force, patrols etc.
d. Site hazards including contamination, UXO, radiological, tidal, quicksand, marsh,

pits, power sources, unsafe structures and any other risks to human health.
e. The use of metal detectors to confirm presence and extent of ordnance contamination
in line with the projected end use of the component parts of the site.
f. The environmental impact of clearance operations.
g. The need for a more detailed survey using geophysical or similar technology.
h. Site accommodation and support for personnel and equipment.
i. Local communication and medical facilities.
j. The need for specialized machinery and equipment.
k. A contact list for site stakeholders, (This could include any development agency with
planned works in the area).
l. A comprehensive site Risk Assessment and Health & Safety Plan.
m. Storage for demolition explosives and recoveries.
n. A realistic time frame for the clearance operation using the tables at Annex A.
o. The nature of clearance recommendation as to whether the search should be visual,

shallow or deep instrument.
p. Landowners’ consents/refusals where appropriate.
Technical Survey Report
2. At the conclusion of the Technical Survey, the EOD operator or technical advisor / Team
Leader should submit a technical survey report to the tasking authority detailing his findings and
recommendations. This report should be added to the IMSMA database.
CONDUCTING BAC OPERATIONS

Tasking Letter
3. When the clearance task has been endorsed by the tasking authority, a formal tasking Dossier
is to be issued detailing clearance constraints/responsibilities, reporting frequency, date of the first task
review meeting, risk acceptance, and any technical constraints.
Site Setting out
4. At this juncture, the task has been confirmed and site set-up can commence. The clearance
task site supervisor is to be a qualified EOD operator who is to produce a set of site specific orders
which are to be authorized by the appropriate national authority.
5. The site orders are to reflect the authorised SOPs of the respective organizations for the BAC
of sites and are to contain a site risk assessment and Health & Safety Plan. A site visitor’s book is to
be maintained where each visitor is to sign as having had a site Health & Safety briefing.
6. Throughout the task, weekly work sheets detailing areas cleared and the site supervisor’s QA
checks are to be submitted to the appropriate authority.
7. The following definitions should be applied when setting out an area for a BAC task:
a. Datum Point: A pre-determined point on the ground accurately surveyed from GPS
and/or fixed landmarks and semi-permanently marked throughout the operation by a picket or
other means.
b. Datum Line: A line on a pre-determined bearing in mils through the datum point. It
will normally be along the longest axis of the area, but may alternatively be aligned with
access routes. It may also be an existing natural or man-made line.
c. Start Points: Points on the datum line for intermediate lines.
d. Start Lines: Lines at right angles to the datum line through the start points. In small
irregular shaped areas these lines may be the area boundary.
e. Intermediate Lines: Lines at right angles to the start lines, which enclose the area to
be swept. They may also be the boundary of the area being cleared.
f. Boxes: Areas bounded by 2 adjacent start lines and 2 intermediate lines. They are
normally sub divided into 50m x 50m boxes.
g. Lanes: Areas within boxes of not more than 1m in width, searched at 0.5m spacing
and normally 50m long that are numbered and lettered consecutively within the box starting at
the start point.
h. Lane Number: The number of the lane from the datum point line or intermediate line.
i. Master Map: A 1:10,000 map (when available) marked with the areas to be cleared.
j. Master Trace. A 1:10,000 trace of the Master Map or to larger scale with the area(s)
to be cleared marked in outline on which clearance progress is recorded, with the datum line
and boxes recorded.
k. Shuttle Trace. A trace of the Master Trace upon which teams in the field can record
daily progress.
Setting Out Procedure

8. Whatever type of search is being carried out (visual, shallow instrument or deep instrument),
the following procedure should be followed:
a. From the specified landmarks survey, the datum point should be located and marked
as per national standards or authorised SOP’s. A sighting picket may temporarily be tied to
this marking picket.
b. A bearing should be taken onto the datum point to determine the datum line. The
compass must not be placed on or near the metal picket. The datum line should be marked
with 2 pickets as far apart as possible, consistent with inter-visibility.
c. Pickets should be inserted at 50m (or less depending on intervisibility) intervals along
the datum line to establish the start points for boxes.
d. Intermediate pickets should be placed at 50m intervals at right angles to each picket
on the datum line. This will establish box areas.
e. Start points should be located along the datum line and intermediate lines.
f. Start lines should be set out with tape/cordage at right angles to the datum and
intermediate lines as required.
TYPES OF SEARCH
Conduct of Visual Search

9. The following procedures should be adopted when conducting visual search:
a. Searching sections should consist of 1 x Supervisor/Team Leader controlling up to 15

men. Any number of EOD sections may be employed on an area providing a minimum safety
as dictated by SOP’s (Usually 100m) is maintained between teams at all times.
b. Areas should be divided into sectors and one sector allotted to each working section.
The minimum safety distance governs the division of areas. Sectors should be divided into
lanes of 6m maximum (depending on the lay of the land), marked with brightly painted stakes
and recorded using Global Positioning System (GPS).
c. Personnel should not search for more than recommended work time before taking a
break of at least 10 minutes.
d. Searching should be carried out in silence except for instructions by the EOD
supervisor/Team Leader, and the order to halt by any searcher on finding UXO.
e. As with instrument search, the ground must be accurately marked and a record kept of
the area searched.
Conduct of Instrument Search

10. The following procedures should be adopted when conducting instrument search:
a. The operator should sweep his 1m lane keeping the search head as close as possible
above the ground and parallel to it. He should advance one search-head distance at each
sweep, ensuring that all holes, gullies and patches of vegetation are checked.
b. The operator should walk along the cord in one direction and down the other in the
opposite direction, keeping the probe as near to the ground as possible.
c. When an object is located, the operator should estimate its depth and indicate it
without touching the ground with the locator. The excavation man should investigate the
indication; care must be taken to avoid striking the object with hand tools, but it must be
uncovered to the extent that it is possible to decide whether or not the object is EO, non-EO,
or part of a main body.
d. If the object is confirmed as EO, the EOD site supervisor or T.A should be informed
and will assess whether it is live or expended. If the ordnance is deemed to be live, he should
oversee further excavation in order that a positive identification can be made. Based on his
findings, he will conduct a risk assessment and recommend subsequent disposal action.
e. The hole should be re-checked by the locator operator once the metal object has been
removed to ensure that no further munitions remain. If manual digging is unduly time-
consuming due to the depth or soil conditions, plant support should be requested. On recovery
of the item, the ground should be restored to its original condition.
f. The EODO should make spot QA checks of the lanes during each working day. He
should select his lanes at random and vary his time of check.

g. In areas where modern weapons have been fired and there is a possibility of UXO on
the surface, the EODO should ensure strict control over access and movement over uncleared
ground. The following safety precautions should be applied:
(1) All setting out parties are preceded by a visual and locator search.
(2) All movement across uncleared ground should be restricted to that which is
cleared by the setting out parties.
(3) Cleared areas are to be clearly marked with white tape or poles.
(4) All teams should be briefed on the access routes to their allocated box and
procedures for movement, breaks etc.
(5) The activities of any working parties detailed for work other than those
searching must be properly recorded.
Depth of Search
11. When clearance is required to a greater depth than the current in service locator can provide,
plant machinery which removes the cleared spoil and allows a further sweep to take place) may be
used for excavation purposes until the required depth is achieved. If this is the case, extra precautions,
including the use of a banksman, will be required. If heavy machinery is used, this may necessitate the
installation of shafting and shoring equipment.
Clearance Sequence
12. There is no limit to the number of men who may be deployed to one task, provided the
following safety regulations are adhered to:
a. The distance between working detectors should be as per manufacture’s

recommendations.
b. The distance between working searchers or sections should be as dictated by NMAS

or NTSG’s, this is usually a min of 50m.
13. Blocks should be cleared starting in Lane 1 and cleared consecutively through to the boundary
or until fade-out has been achieved. Fade-out is when no UXO has been found for a specified distance
beyond the boundary. This distance should be specified by NTSG’s or Authorised SOP’s.
14. A lane will be cleared by sweeping from 1m before the start line to 1m after the end line.
Both tapes will be overlapped by the detector/locator. At the end of each lane, all personnel should
wait until the EODO has recorded the lane numbers as cleared.
15. Should the task be suspended, the last lane cleared will be marked by iron pickets as for the
datum point. When a task recommences, the new EODO must be briefed on:
a. The location of datum point.
b. The datum line bearing.
c. The block number last worked.
d. The lane number last cleared.
16. The last lane cleared should be rechecked to ensure no discontinuity.

Clearance Methods
17. There are various methods of conducting clearance tasks. The most common used method is
the box method, this is described in Annex B.
Safety - Medical
18. Prior to conducting clearance, the EODO should ascertain the location and telephone numbers
of the nearest and alternative contact details of doctors and hospitals. He should also ensure that the
local police, doctor and hospital are informed that there is an EOC team working in the area that may
require assistance in the event of an incident.
19. The EODO must ensure that a qualified medic is nominated and that a stretcher and first aid
kit/trauma pack, plus fresh water is available on site. A designated safety vehicle must remain on site
at all times during clearance operations. Each first aid kit should contain items that conform to
national standards or authorised SOP’s, and in particular be able to cope with phosphorous burns.
20. Should an incident occur, the relevant Ops Base and Mine Action Centre should be informed
immediately.
21. Site risks assessments should be completed as soon as practically possible of a task
commencing
Safety - Explosives
22. The standards for the movement, storage and transportation of explosives and accessories are
contained in IMAS 10.50.
23. In outline, the following guidelines must be adhered to at all times:
a. All explosives must be stored in licensed explosives and ammunition stores/bunkers

only. Under no circumstances are storage arrangements with local authorities to be made
without first notifying the national authority.
b. Explosives must be carried in a correctly marked containers. This must be a locked

container that can be locked in or into the vehicle. Detonators must always be carried
separately in the proper issued container.
c. Explosives must never be left unattended.
d. The following safety precautions must be taken whenever explosives are to be used.
(1) No demolition must take place within the recommended safety distances of
any building, as outlined in the relevant publications, unless it is considered unwise to
move the UXO. In such instances, every precaution must be taken to ensure the
minimum amount of damage.
(2) Sentries must be posted at the relevant safety distance from the demolition
and on all likely access routes. Prior to firing, the EODO must obtain the all clear
from all sentries.
(3) The EODO will ensure that, if using safety fuse for ignition, he can walk
safely out of the danger area.
(4) The local authorities shall be informed prior to any demolition being
conducted.
(5) The EODO should ensure that NOTAM is completed.

(6) The EODO should check the demolition pit and surrounding area for any
explosive debris and/or discarded accessories.
(7) All demolition accessories and stores are to be accounted for before departing
site.
Live UXO
24. Each and every item found must be treated as live until proved otherwise. When finding an
object, every precaution will be taken to safeguard the public, worksite personnel and property. No
potential item of UXO should be left unless it has been adequately protected and safety notices
erected.
Disposal of UXO
25. The following principles must be applied when undertaking the disposal of UXO:
a. Any UXO found must be made safe by destruction as soon as possible.
b. The EOD Operator should, under no circumstances, leave a site where EO suspected
of being dangerous has been found but left undemolished. If fading light or inclement weather
prevents the EOD Operator from confirming the identify or condition of a suspected item of
UXO, all reasonable steps must be taken be taken to safeguard the security of the item and all
relevant authorities be informed immediately of the situation. The item should then be
destroyed or moved as soon as the situation allows.
c. In any case of doubt as to the nature of the EO, advice should be sought from a more
qualified and/or experienced person.
d. The EOD Operator must use his judgement when determining the method of
demolition and disposal to be adopted in respect of each individual item found. Should at any
time a method of demolition or disposal appear to be too dangerous, he must immediately seek
advice.
e. All personnel conducting live demolitions must be authorised by the national authority
and have attended the appropriate qualifying course.
f. Only standard methods of demolition are to be used in the disposal of EO as stated in

national standards or authorised SOP’s.
26. On occasions it will be necessary to carry out EOC operations in locations where it is not
possible to authorise an on-site demolition facility or provide authorised explosive storage within a
practical distance of the site.
27. On exposing an item of ordnance the EODO, without disturbing the item, is to decide whether
or not it is safe to move. If it is not safe to move it is to be destroyed in situ.
Disposal of Non Explosive Items

28. Domestic Scrap. Usually all domestic scrap and debris found during an area clearance task is
the legal property of the landowner, or in certain circumstances the tenant. Any metallic items found
which are not EO, are to be stockpiled on cleared land for disposal by the landowner. If the landowner
wishes the organisation to remove such scrap, then the landowner should signs an agreement
authorising the removal of such scrap.
29. EO Scrap. All items of EO origin, but which have been individually checked and identified
by the EOD Operator as FFE (e.g. shot, expended carrier munitions, tail fins), are to be stockpiled on
cleared ground on site for back loading. The NMAA should give instructions for the disposal of EO
scrap.

POST-TASK ACTIVITY
Reporting
30. On completion of the task, the EOD operator or Technical Advisor shall submit the relevant
IMSMA forms and mark the site as per the completion marking as stated in NMAS or SOP’s.
Quality Control
31. The NMAA or its designated authority shall conduct a quality control check of the site, before
issuing a Land Re-lease Certificate (LRC). A formal handover ceremony should be conducted at the
site to give confidence to the local community that the area has been cleared to the required standard.
Annexes:
A. Method of Determining Manpower Requirements for BAC Tasks.

B. Box Method.

ANNEX A: METHOD OF DETERMINING MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR EOC
TASKS
The below tables and factors are for example purpose and are only to be used for planning practice
during the MAT/IMATC IMAS Level 4 EOD course.
Information and data should be collected by mine action projects to accurately determine factors and
constants that apply to the techniques used and conditions found in that country.
FACTORS
Preparation Factor
1. The criteria which should be applied when assessing the number of man-days required to
prepare an area, based upon the nature of the terrain, are shown in Table 9-1 below:
TABLE 9-1 PREPARATION FACTORS
Nature of Terrain Man-Days per Hectare

Short grass/hard floor 0
Long grass/light undergrowth 10
Gorse/dense undergrowth 40
Spares trees requiring lopping but not felling 15
Dense trees requiring felling 60
Search Factor
2. The basic search factors, based on a 1m wide lanes, are as follows:
a. Visual 2.6 man-days per hectare.
b. Shallow instrument search 6 man-days per hectare.
c. Deep instrument search 4.5 man-days per hectare.
3. On marshy ground or wet sand, progress will be slower. To allow for this, a multiplying
factor of 1.5 should to be applied to the figures quoted above.
Recovery Factor
4. The recovery factor incorporates many diverse elements and will require careful consideration
of the following:
a. UXO Type. It may be possible to profile the recovery factor if the UXO type can be
ascertained (i.e. mortar bomb range). These items are usually found at a shallow depth.
Artillery shells, rockets, and large aircraft bombs will be deeper due to the weapon mass and
terminal velocity.
b. Access. Shallow UXO can usually be more safely and effectively removed by hand
digging. Access to deeper buried ordnance is more efficiently achieved using appropriate
plant machinery with final excavation by hand. At depths below 1m specialist shoring
equipment should be used to ensure the earth does not collapse into the excavation.
Approximate access timings are shown in Table 9-2 below:
TABLE 9-2 ACCESS FACTORS
Time to Access by
Vol Removed to Access Item Time to Excavate Time to Access
Open Cast/ Hand
= d x l x b (cu m) by Hand by Plant/Hand
(a) (b) (c) (d)
0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5 = 0.125 cu m 15 mins N/A N/A
1 x 0.5 x 0.5 = 0.25 cu m 40 mins 10 mins N/A
1 x 1 x 1 = 1 cu m 2 hrs 12 mins N/A
2 x 1.5 x 1.5 = 4.5 cu m 12 hrs 1 hr 15 mins 45 mins
3 x 2 x 2 = 12 cu m 30 hrs 3 hr 15 mins 60 mins
Note: Shaded area = specialist shoring equipment should be used.
c. Soil Type. Different soil types will facilitate or hinder recovery. Tidal ranges are
problematical in that UXO will move considerable distances and inter-tidal areas invariably
include soft/quick sand areas. Access timings should be multiplied by the following factors,
dependent upon soil type:
(1) Sand and shingle: x1
(2) Top soil: x 0.85
(3) Mud: x 0.75-0.85
(4) Clay and chalk: x 0.75
METHOD OF CALCULATION
5. An EOD clearance task is initially broken down into areas according to the nature of the
terrain and the expected number of recoveries per hectare within each area. Each area is then
measured in hectares. The man-days required to clear each area will be the sum of the man-days
needed to prepare the ground and to search, recover and dispose of recoveries in that area.
6. To calculate each element of this sum, the number of hectares is multiplied by the factor of the
area being considered. It may be that more than one type of topography exists within an area, in which
case the appropriate factors are proportioned to give an overall topography factor. The man-days
required for the whole task are found by adding the totals for each area. The task length is then
calculated by dividing the total man-days by the number of searchers available for the task.
WORKED EXAMPLE
7. A worked example for a suspect hazardous area of 36 hectares is shown below. The area is
broken down into 3 distinct types of terrain.
Preparation Factors:
Man-Days
Terrain Type Area in Ha Preparation Factor ((b) x (c))
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Hard standing 2 0 0
Long Grass 30 10 300
Dense Gorse 4 40 160
TOTAL 36 460
Search Factors:
Equipment To Be Man-Days
Used Area in Ha Search Factor ((b) x (c))
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Visual 2 2.6 5.2
Shallow Instr 34 6 204
TOTAL 36 209.2
Recovery Factors:
8. The reconnaissance resulted in an assessed UXO density as follows:
a. Hard standings 2ha– nil.
b. The remaining area has been assessed as being normal UXO density so 6-20 UXO’s
per hectare, say worse case for planning purpose 20 UXO per hectare for the remaining 34 ha.
However only 2-3 items of UXO are actually subsurface, so say 3 UXO per hectare that will
require excavating.
Assessed Recovery Man-hours:
Assessed 0.5m 1.0m 1.5m 2.0m Total

Area Ha Recoveries/ Totals Recovery Recovery Recovery Recovery Man-
Ha Man-Hrs Man-Hrs Man-Hrs Man-Hrs mins
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Pond 34 3 102 15 0 0 0 1530
TOTAL 1530
Assessed Time to Recover Targets: 102 x 15 = 1530 mins. Divide by 60 =25.5 Man Hours
Convert Man-Hours to Man-Days: 25.5/6 = 4.25Man-Days.
Preparation Factor + Search Factor + Recovery Factor: 460 + 209.2 + 4.25 = 673.45 Man-Days.
Final assessed Man-Days for the task: 673.45 SAY 674Man-Days.
One man would take 674 days to complete the task, however we have a section of 12
deminers/searchers in the team so 674/12 = 56.16 say 57days.
A 12 man BAC team would take 57days to complete the task.
Total Time Required

9. Thus a 12-man BAC team working a standard working week (6 Days) would take
approximately 2 months and 2 weeks to complete the task. A further period should be added to take
account of any non working days expected, perhaps due to rainy season, also other activities during
the task such as demolition of finds, and recovery and disposal of residues from demolition/burning.
An assessment of 3 months for a 12-man BAC team to complete the task would therefore be realistic.
ANNEX B: BOX METHOD
Layout
1. For the Box Method, the task should be conducted as illustrated below:
Start Points (Note 3)

Datum Point (Note 1) Datum Line (Note 2)
50m
50m Intermediate
Lines
(Note 5)
Direction of
search, lanes 1 x 2 or 3 man team
1m apart in each box
Direction of
clearance
Start Lines (Note 4)

Notes:
1. Points on the ground accurately surveyed using GPS.
2. The datum line will be usually the longest axis of the area running through the datum point, or
an existing natural or man made line, which must be recorded in degrees.
3. Points usually running at 50m spacing along the Datum Line.
4. Lines running from the start point at right angles to the Datum Line.
5. Lines running parallel to the Datum Line usually at 50m spacing (to form a box).
6. 50m x 50m boxes should be the maximum size, they can be smaller than as the ground
conditions dictate.
Procedures
2. The following principles should be applied when carrying out the Box Method:
a. Searches are to be carried out by teams supervised by a Team leader. Teams should
not work within 100m of each other where practical, or as NMAS or SOP’s dictate.
b. The area to be searched should be set out in boxes. One team should be allocated to
each box. Each box should be sub-divided into lanes, which are searched and cleared
consecutively.
c. The strength of the team will depend on the density of contamination and the type of
soil. Under normal conditions, a team should be 1 x Instrument man and 1 x shovel man, but
in areas that are badly contaminated or where ground conditions make it difficult to dig (i.e.
chalk, clay), the team may be increased to 2 x shovel men. In conditions where
contamination is very light, a team could also be 2 x locator men and 1 x shovel man. Teams
should be deployed to each 50m adjacent box and the following safety factors applied:
(1) No more than one team to work in each box where practical.
(2) One team leader should only control a number of adjacent boxes that are
within his visible control.
3. Lanes are to be cleared starting at Lane 1 of each 50m box and consecutively thereafter until
they reach the intermediate line of boundary of the allocated box.
4. A lane should be cleared by sweeping 1m before the start line to 1m after the end line. On
completion of an allocated box, the EODO should record the lane number as cleared and allocate
another box.
Battle Area Clearance Box Layout

GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Access Procedure
Actions taken to locate precisely, and gain access to the Unexploded Explosive Ordnance
(UXO)/Improvised Explosive Device (IED).
Active Mine
A mine actuated by the reflection from a target of a signal emitted by the mine.
Actuate
To operate a firing mechanism by an influence or a series of influences.
Airburst
An explosion of a bomb or projectile above the surface as distinguished from an explosion on contact
with the surface or after penetration. See also type of burst.
Ammunition
See munition.
Anti-Countermining Device
A device fitted in an influence mine designed to prevent its actuation by shock.
Anti-Disturbance Device
An internal or external device on a mine arranged to actuate the mine in case of outside disturbance.
Anti-Handling Device
A device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the
mine and which actuates the mine when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally
disturb the mine.
Anti-Helicopter Mine
A mine designed to produce a destructive effect on low-flying helicopters.
Anti-Lift Device
A device designed to actuate a mine if the mine is moved.
Anti-Personnel Mine
A mine designed to wound, kill or otherwise incapacitate personnel. It may be detonated by the action
of its victim. See also mine.
Anti-Tank Mine
A mine designed to immobilize or destroy a tank.
Area Clearance
In countermine operations, the removal of the immediate threat from mines, unexploded explosive
ordnance, improvised explosive devices and booby traps from a defined area.
Armed Mine
A mine from which all safety devices have been withdrawn and, after laying, all automatic safety fea-
tures and/or arming delay devices have operated. Such a mine is ready to be actuated after receipt of
a target signal, influence or contact.
Arming
As applied to explosives, weapons or weapon systems, the changing from a safe to an armed state of
readiness.
EOD Trg Handbook Page 1

Arming Delay Device
A device fitted in a mine to prevent it being actuated for a preset time after laying.
Arming Pin
A safety device inserted in a munition which, until its removal, prevents the unintentional action of
the arming cycle. Also called ‘safety pin ’.
Base-Ejection Shell
A type of shell which ejects its load from its base.
Base Fuze
Fuze located in the base of a projectile or bomb.
Battle Area Clearance

The clearance of land over which battles have been fought. Also called battlefield area clearance.
Blast
The brief and rapid movement of air, vapour or fluid away from a centre of outward pressure, as in an
explosion or, in the combustion of rocket fuel, the pressure accompanying this movement. This term
is commonly used for ‘explosion’ but the two terms are distinguishable.
Blast Wave
The wave created by the rapid expansion of hot gases in the atmosphere which results from an explo-
sion. The blast wave is initially a shock wave which subsequently decays into a sound wave.
Blind
Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fuzed, armed, initiated or otherwise prepared for action,
and which has been dropped, fired, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to constitute a
hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material and remains unexploded either by malfunc-
tion or design, or for any other cause.
Blow In Situ
See destroy in situ.
Booby Trap
An explosive or non-explosive device or other material, deliberately placed to cause casualties when
an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed.
Booster
A high-explosive element sufficiently sensitive so as to be actuated by small explosive elements in a
fuze or primer and powerful enough to cause detonation of the main explosive filling.
Brisance
The shattering effect shown by a detonating explosive to an adjacent non-explosive material.
Bulk Explosives
Within the Land Service, service charges of explosives which are generally removed from their con-
tainers before use, such as Charges Demolition, PE and Charges Demolition, Slab, CE/TNT.
Burning
The propagation of an exothermic reaction through an explosive/pyrotechnic material by conduc-
tion/convection/radiation.
Cartridge
A cased quantity of explosives (excluding rocket motors) complete with its own means of ignition.

Charge
The amount of propellant required for a fixed, semi-fixed, or separate loading projectile, round or
shell. It may also refer to the quantity of explosive filling contained in a bomb, mine or the like.
In combat engineering, a quantity of explosive, prepared for demolition purposes.
Cleared Area
An area that has been physically and systematically processed by a demining organization to ensure
the removal and/or destruction of all mine and unexploded explosive ordnance hazards to a specified
depth. The quality assurance system is specified in IMAS 09.10.
Cleared Lane
Any lane, other than a boundary lane, cleared by a survey or clearance team to the international stand-
ard for cleared land. This may include access lanes outside the hazardous area or cross/verification
lanes inside a hazardous area. Also called safety lane.
Cluster
A group of bombs released together. A cluster usually consists of fragmentation or incendiary bombs.
Cluster Bomb Unit

An expendable aircraft store composed of a dispenser and sub-munitions. See also dispenser.
Combination Firing Circuit

An assembly comprising two independent firing systems, one non-electric and one electric, so that the
firing of either system will detonate all charges.
Combination Influence Mine

A mine designed to actuate only when two or more different influences are received either simultane-
ously or in a pre-determined order. Also called ‘combined influence mine ’.
Complete Round
Ammunition which contains all the components necessary for it to function.
Control Point
A point used to control the movement of personnel at a task site.
Controllable Mine
A mine which after laying can be controlled by the user, to the extent of making the mine safe or live,
or to fire the mine.
Conventional Munition Disposal

The location, detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal
of unexploded EO, which includes booby traps but not IEDs. It may also include EO which has be-
come hazardous by damage or deterioration, when the disposal of such explosive is beyond the capa-
bilities of personnel normally assigned the responsibility for routine disposal.
Countermine
To explode the main charge in a mine by the shock of a nearby explosion of another mine or inde-
pendent explosive charge. The explosion of the main charge may be caused either by sympathetic
detonation or through the explosive train and/or firing mechanism of the mine.
Cutting Charge
A charge which produces a cutting effect in line with its plane of symmetry.
Deflagration
A chemical reaction proceeding at subsonic velocity along the surface of, and/or through, an explo-
sive, producing hot gases at high pressures. A deflagration under confinement increases the pressure,
the rate of reaction and the temperature, which may cause transition into a detonation.

Demining
See Humanitarian Demining.
Demining Organisation
Any organization (government, non-government organization, military or commercial entity) respon-
sible for implementing demining projects or tasks. This organization may be a prime contractor, sub-
contractor, consultant or agent.
Demolition
The destruction of structures, facilities or materiel by use of fire, water, explosives, mechanical, or
other means.
Destruction In Situ
The destruction of any item of ordnance by explosives without moving the item from where it was
found, normally by placing an explosive charge alongside. Also called blowing in situ.
Detection
The discovery by any means of the presence of mines or unexploded ordnance.
Detonation.
An exothermic reaction at molecular level induced by the action of a disruptive wave through an ex-
plosive material causing a sudden violent increase in volume due to the evolution of gaseous products.
Detonating Cord
A waterproof flexible fabric tube containing a high explosive designed to transmit the detonation
wave.
Detonator
A device containing a sensitive explosive intended to produce a detonation wave.
Diagnostic Procedures
Those actions taken to identify and evaluate EO.
Disarmed Mine
A previously armed mine which has been returned to a safe state.
Disposal Site
An area authorised for the destruction of ammunition and explosives by detonation and burning.
Dud
An explosive munition which has not been armed as intended or which has failed to explode after be-
ing armed.
Electro-Explosive Device
An explosive or pyrotechnic component that initiates an explosive, burning, electrical, or mechanical
train and is activated by the application of electrical energy.
Exploder
A device designed to generate an electric current in a firing circuit after deliberate action by the user
in order to initiate an explosive charge or charges.
Explosives
A substance or mixture of substances which, under external influences, is capable of rapidly releasing
energy in the form of gases and heat.
Explosive Materials

Components or ancillary items which contain some explosives, or behave in an explosive manner,
such as detonators, fuzes and primers.
Explosive Ordnance
All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials and biological and chemical
agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and
small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispens-
ers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and improvised
explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.
Explosive Ordnance Clearance

Action taken to reduce or eliminate the EO hazards from a defined area.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unex-
ploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance which has become hazardous by
damage or deterioration.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operator

A member of an EOD Team qualified and authorised to conduct EOD operations within the re-mitts
of their IMAS EOD Qualification held:
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures
Those particular courses or modes of action taken by EOD personnel for access to, diagnosis, render-
ing safe, recovery and final disposal of explosive ordnance or any hazardous material associated with
an explosive ordnance disposal incident.
 Access Procedures: Those actions taken to locate exactly and to gain access to unexploded explo-
sive ordnance.
 Diagnostic Procedures: Those actions taken to identify and evaluate unexploded explosive ord-
nance.
 Render-Safe Procedures: The portion of the explosive ordnance disposal procedures involving the
application of special explosive ordnance disposal methods and tools to provide for the interrup-
tion of functions or separation of essential components of unexploded explosive ordnance to pre-
vent an unacceptable detonation.
 Recovery Procedures: Those actions taken to recover unexploded explosive ordnance.
 Final Disposal Procedures: The final disposal of explosive ordnance which may include demoli-
tion or burning in place, removal to a disposal area or other appropriate means.
Explosive Train
A succession of initiating and igniting elements arranged to cause a charge to function.
Filling
The explosive content of a cartridge. charge. shell. bomb, complete round. component or separate part
of a round. The contents of a round or component when not strictly explosive in kind, such as smoke
or chemical, are normally referred to as ‘chargings’.
Final Disposal Procedures

See Explosive Ordnance Disposal Procedures.
Firing
Actuation of the firing system.

Firing Circuit
In land operations, an electrical circuit and/or pyrotechnic loop designed to detonate connected charg-
es from a firing point.
Firing mechanism
See firing circuit.
Firing Point
That point in the firing circuit where the device employed to initiate the detonation of the charges is
located.
Fixed Ammunition
Ammunition in which the cartridge case is permanently attached to the projectile.
Fuze
A device which initiates an explosive train.
Handover
The process by which the beneficiary (usually the national mine action authority) accepts responsibil-
ity for a cleared area. The term 'alienation' is sometimes used to describe a change of ownership of
the land which accompanies the handover of a cleared area.
Handover Certificate
Documentation used to record the handover of cleared land.
Hazard
Potential source of harm.
Hazard Area
An area which is not in productive use due to the presumed or actual presence of mines, unexploded
explosive ordnance or other explosive devices. Also called hazardous area or contaminated area.
Hazard Marker
An object, other than mine signs, used to identify the limits of a mine and unexploded explosive ord-
nance hazard area. This marker should conform to the specification established by the national mine
action authority.
Hazard Marking System

A combination of measures designed to provide the public with warning and protection from mine
and unexploded explosive ordnance hazards. The system may include the use of signs or markers, or
the erection of physical barriers.
Hollow Charge
A shaped charge producing a deep cylindrical hole of relatively small diameter in the direction of its
axis of rotation.
Horizontal Action Mine

In land mine warfare, a mine designed to produce a destructive effect in a plane approximately paral-
lel to the ground.
Humanitarian Demining
Activities which lead to the removal of mine and unexploded explosive ordnance hazards, including
technical survey, mapping, clearance, marking, post-clearance documentation and the handover of
cleared land. Also known as Humanitarian Mine Action. It may be carried out by different types of
organizations such as non-governmental organizations, commercial companies, national mine action
teams or military units. See also Mine Action

Impact Fuze
A fuze that is set in action by the striking of a projectile or bomb against an object. e.g. percussion
fuze, contact fuze. Also called Direct Action Fuze.
Incendiary
An IED which contains low explosive and is primarily designed to cause burning.
Incident Control Point

A safe area, within a cordon, from which a Task is controlled.
Information Management System for Mine Action

The information system for the management of data in UN-supported mine action programmes.
Igniter
A device designed to produce a flame or a flash which is used to initiate an explosive train.
Improvised Explosive Device

A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, py-
rotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It may in-
corporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components.
Improvised Explosive Device Disposal

Those actions taken to disrupt or neutralise an improvised explosive device.
Inert Filling
A prepared non-explosive filling of the same weight as the explosive filling.
Influence Mine
A mine actuated by the effect of a target on some physical condition in the vicinity of the mine or on
radiations emanating from the mine.
Initiation
The action of a device used as the first element of an explosive train which, upon receipt of the proper
impulse, causes the detonation or burning of an explosive item.
Intermediate Marker
A marker, natural, artificial or specially installed, which is used as a point of reference between the
landmark and the minefield. See also marker.
Intermittent Arming Device

A device included in a mine so that it will be armed only at set times.
International Mine Action Standards
Documents developed by the UN on behalf of the international community, which aim to improve
safety and efficiency by providing guidance, by establishing principles and, in some cases, by defin-
ing international requirements and specifications.
Liquid Explosive
Explosive which is fluid at normal temperatures.
Logistic Disposal
In the context of humanitarian demining, the removal of ammunition and explosives from a stockpile
utilising a variety of methods that may not necessarily involve destruction. Logistic disposal may or
may not require the use of render-safe procedures.
Magazine
Any building, structure or container approved for the storage of explosive materials.

Magnetic Mine
A mine which responds to the magnetic field of a target. Also called ‘magnetic circuit ’ See also mine.
Main Detonating Line

In demolition, a line of detonating cord used to transmit the detonation wave to two or more branches.
Man Portable
Capable of being carried by one man.
Marking
Implementation of a measure or combination of measures to identify the position of a hazard or the
boundary of a hazardous area. This may include the use of signs, paint marks, or the erection of phys-
ical barriers.
Marking System
An agreed convention for the marking of hazards or hazardous areas.
Mine
An explosive or material, normally encased, designed to destroy or damage ground vehicles, boats or
aircrafts, or designed to wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate personnel. It may be detonated by the
action of its victim, by the passage of time, or by controlled means.
Mine Action
Activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of landmines and un-
exploded explosive ordnance. Mine action comprises 5 complementary groups of activities:
 Mine and UXO awareness and risk reduction education;
 Humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and UXO survey, mapping, marking and (if necessary) clear-
ance;
 Victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;
 Stockpile destruction; and
 Advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines.
Mine Action Centre

An organisation that carries out mine awareness training, conducts reconnaissance of mined areas,
collection and centralisation of mine data and coordinates local mine action plans with the activities of
external agencies, non-governmental organizations and local deminers.
Mine Awareness
A communication strategy aimed at preventing the occurrence and reducing the number of casualties
caused by mines and unexploded explosive ordnance through appropriate, coordinated and well tar-
geted programmes of training and education.
Mine Ban Treaty

See Ottawa Convention
Mine Clearance
The clearance of mines from a specified area to a predefined standard.
Mine Detection
Activities to discover the presence of and to locate individual mines. This may include the identifica-
tion of their type and status.
Mine Disposal

The process of either rendering safe, neutralizing, recovering, removing or destroying mines. See also
Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
Mine Sign
A sign which, when placed as part of a marking system, is designed to provide warning to the public
of the presence of mines.
Mine and UXO Threat

An indication of the potential harm from the number, nature, disposition and detectability of mines
and unexploded explosive ordnance in a given area. Also called mine threat.
Mine Warfare
The strategic and tactical use of mines and their counter-measures. Also called land mine warfare.
Mined Area
An area declared dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.
Minefield
An area of ground containing mines laid with or without a pattern.
Munition
A complete device charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, initiating composition, or nu-
clear, biological, or chemical material for use in military operations, including demolitions. Certain
suitably modified munitions can be used for training, ceremonial, or non-operational purposes. In
common usage, ‘munitions’ (plural) can be military weapons, ammunition and equipment. Also
called ammunition.
National Mine Action Authority

The government department(s), organization(s) or institution(s) in each mine-affected country charged
with the regulation, management and coordination of mine action. In most cases, the national mine
action centre or its equivalent will act as, or on behalf of, the national mine action authority.
Neutralisation
Interruption of the make-up of the EO or IED in such a way that it can no longer function.
Ottawa Convention (Mine Ban Treaty)

Provides for a complete ban on the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines
and on their destruction. Article 5 of the Treaty lays down the requirements for the destruction of an-
ti-personnel mines in mined areas. Article 6 details transparency measures required under the Treaty
including on the location of mined or suspected mined areas and measures taken to warn the local
population.
Overpressure
The pressure resulting from the blast wave of an explosion. It is referred to as positive when
it exceeds atmospheric pressure and negative during the passage of the wave when resulting pressures
are less than atmospheric pressure.
Passive Mine
A mine which does not emit a signal to detect the presence of a target.
Payload
The warhead, its container, and activating devices in a military missile.
Plastic Explosive
Explosive which is malleable at normal temperatures.
Primed charge

A charge ready in all aspects for ignition.
Priming charge
An initial charge which transmits the detonation wave to the whole of the charge.
Primary Soak
A mandatory length of time to be applied by the EOD Operator during which he is NOT to make a
manual approach to an IED, CMD Demolition or Burn.
Projectile
An object capable of being propelled by a force normally from a gun, and continuing in motion
by virtue of its kinetic energy.
Proving
See Route or Area Proving.
Proximity Fuze
A fuze wherein primary initiation occurs by remotely sensing the presence, distance, and/or direction
of a target or its associated environment by means of a signal generated by the fuze or emitted by the
target, or by detecting a disturbance of a natural field surrounding the target.
Pyrotechnics
A mixture of chemicals which when ignited is capable of reacting exothermically to produce light,
heat, smoke, sound or gas, and may also be used to introduce a delay into an explosive train because
of its known burning time. The term excludes propellants and explosives.
Remotely Delivered Mine

A mine delivered to the target area by air assets, or by indirect fire from a distance of more than
500m. See also Scatterable Mine.
Render Safe Procedure

The application of EOD principles, techniques and or methods applied to neutralize or remove the
possibility of an unacceptable explosion. Complete EOD may involve a number of RSP stages.
Rendered Safe
The condition of an EO or IED when the essential components have been separated or neutralized so
that the EOD Operator may approach for detailed examination.
Risk
Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm.
Risk Reduction
Actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences or both, associated with a particular
risk.
Rounds
A complete assembly of a projectile (with or without fuze), the propelling charge in a cartridge case
and the means of igniting the propelling charge. The word is also used in the expression ‘supply by
complete rounds’ meaning that all the components necessary for the ammunition to be fired are issued
together. For instance, with BL ammunition the complete round consists of a shell, charge, fuze and
primer.
Route or Area Clearance

The removal of the immediate threat from mines, unexploded explosive ordnance, improvised explo-
sive devices and booby traps along a route or area.
Safe
The absence of risk. In the context of EOD operations, the term ‘acceptable risk’ is usually more ap-
propriate and accurate.
Safety
The reduction of risk to a tolerable level.
Safety and Arming Mechanism

A dual function device which prevents the unintended actuation of a main charge or propulsion unit
prior to arming but allows activation thereafter upon receipt of the appropriate stimuli.
Safety Fuze
Pyrotechnics contained in a flexible and weatherproof sheath burning at a constant rate, used to
transmit a flame to the detonator, with a predetermined delay.
Safety Pin
See Arming Pin
Scatterable Mine
A mine laid without regard to classical pattern and which is designed to be delivered by aircraft,
artillery, missile, ground dispenser or by hand. Once laid, it normally has a limited life.
Secondary Soak
A length of time applied at the discretion of the EOD Operator or dictated by SOP’s when, in a CMD
situation he/she awaits the effect of the explosion or burn to dissipate.
Segregation
Storing apart or in separate accommodation. Ammunition in a doubtful or dangerous condition or
ammunition requiring special storage conditions is normally stored segregated.
Self-Neutralization
Action generated by means of a device integral to a mine, which renders the mine
inoperative, but not necessarily safe to handle. In land mines, this process may be reversible.
Sensor
Equipment which detects, and may indicate, and/or record objects and activities by means of energy
or particles emitted, reflected, or modified by objects.
Shaped charge
A charge shaped so as to concentrate its explosive force in a particular direction.
Sheet Explosive
Plastic explosive provided in a sheet form.
Shock Wave
The continuously propagated pressure pulse formed by the blast from an explosion in air, underwater
or underground. See also blast wave.
Stockpile
In the context of mine action, a large accumulated stock of explosive ordnance.
Stray Ammunition
Any item of ammunition found in such places as parks, farmland, disused training grounds and built
up areas, which is reported by military or civilian authorities.

Submunition
Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition.
Sympathetic Detonation
Detonation of a charge by exploding another charge adjacent to it.
Tamping
The covering of the EO and charge with sandbags filled with sand or earth (free of stones) in order to
reduce the damaging effects of explosive blast and fragmentation to the surrounding environment.
Technical Survey
The detailed topographical and technical investigation of known or suspected mined areas identified
during the planning phase. Such areas may have been identified during a general survey or have been
otherwise reported.
Time Fuze
A fuze which contains a graduated time element to regulate the time interval after which the fuze will
function.
Unexploded Ordnance
Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for action, and which
has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to
operations, installations, personnel or material and remains unexploded either by malfunction or de-
sign or for any other cause.
United Nations Mine Action Service

The office within the United Nations Secretariat responsible to the international community for the
development and maintenance of International Mine Action Standards. It is the focal point within the
United Nations for all mine-related matters.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACE Abrasive Cutting Equipment
ADW Air Dropped Weapon
AMT Advanced Manual Techniques
AOR Area Of Responsibility
AS Advanced Search
BCMD Biological and Chemical Munitions Disposal

BD Bomb Disposal
BDA Bomb Damage Assessment
BS Basic Search
CDLC Charge Demolition Linear Cutting

CLC Charge Linear Cutting
CMD Conventional Munitions Disposal
CW Chemical Weapon
CWA Chemical Weapons Act
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
CWG Capability Working Group
CWIED Command Wire Improvised Explosive Device

DCB Detonating Cord Booster
DI Destructor Incendiary
DRFD Demolition Remote Firing Device
DSO Demolitions Safety Officer
DTG Date Time Group
ECM Electronic Countermeasures
EDD Explosive Detection Dog
EED Electro-Explosive Device
EO Explosive Ordnance
EOC Explosive Ordnance Clearance
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FFE Free From Explosives
GPS Global Positioning System

GW’s Guided Weapons
H&S Health & Safety

HE High Explosive
HHMD Hand-Held Mine Detector
HMA Humanitarian Mine Action
HME Home Made Explosive
ICP Incident Control Point

IED Improvised Explosive Device
IEDD Improvised Explosive Device Disposal
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action
IR Infra-Red
ISFE Igniter Safety Fuze Electric
LED Light-Emitting Diode

LOT Low Order Technique
LSA Land Service Ammunition
MCM Mine Counter Measures
MILEX Military Explosive
MPV Mine Protected Vehicle
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBC Nuclear Biological and Chemical
NEQ Net Explosive Quantity
NGO Non Governmental Organization
NOTAM Notice to Airmen
OP Over Pressure
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PAT Projectile Attack Technique

PCIED Projectile Command Improvised Explosive Device
PE Plastic Explosive
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
RCA Riot Control Agents

RCIED Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
RDX Research Department Explosive

RF Radio Frequency
RPM Revolutions Per Minute
RPS Radiation Protection Supervisor
RSP Render Safe Procedure
SAD Safety and Arming Device

SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SF Security Forces
SME Subject Matter Expert
SOP Standing Operating Procedure
SSSI Sites of Specific Scientific Interest
STANAG Standardization Agreement
TI Thermal Imaging
TNT Tri-Nitro Toluene
UNMACC United Nations Mine Action and Coordination Centre

UXB Unexploded Bomb
UXO Unexploded Explosive Ordnance
UXOIS Unexploded Ordnance Identification System
VBIED Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

VOIED Victim Operated Improvised Explosive Device
WG Working Group

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EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

1. An Explosive is a chemical composition that is either, a solid, liquid or gaseous

2. Facts about a detonation

Time: varies from about 4000m/s to 8000m/s

GENERAL PROCESSES CONCERNING EXPLOSIVES

3. Many substances when raised to a sufficient temperature (ignition point) will

5. An Explosion is a special form of combustion and is characterised by the process of

6. Gunpowder is a typical example of an internal burning substance, for it contains a

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-1

7. Detonation is, for all practical purposes, instantaneous decompotiton of molecules,

a. Primary or Initiating Explosives (disintegrating type).

a. Low explosives (Explosion Process)

b. Primary or Initiating High explosives (Detonation Process)

c. Secondary high explosives, these are divided into two groups:

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-2

Fuze/Striker Detonator Primer/Booster Main Charge

11. Examples of explosive trains are:

VELOCITY OF DETONATION (VOD)

a. The Velocity of Detonation for Low Explosives is up to 300m/s.

b. The Velocity of Detonation for Primary High Explosives is 3000 to 4999m/s.

c. The Velocity of Detonation for Secondary High Explosives is 5000 to 9000m/s.

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-3

Explosive Name Explosive Type VOD

Falling Block Test (Drop Test)

Explosive Classification Height of Fall

Mercury Fulminate Primary 50 mm

Lead Styphnate/ Azide Primary 75 mm

PETN Primer/Booster 150 mm

RDX/CE Primer/Booster 200 mm

Picric Acid Main Charge 325 mm

TNT Main Charge 375 mm

Figure of Insensitivity (FOI)

15. Sensitivity of an explosive is usually expressed as its Figure of Insensitivity FOI, in

a. General Ranges of Insensitivity

 Primary High Explosives - 0-50

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-4

Hot Spot Theory of Sensitivity

Other Factors Affecting Sensitivity and VOD

a. The size of the explosive crystals.

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-5

Increase Crystal size Decrease Increase

Power of Explosives (Power Index)

Trauzl Lead Block Test

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-6

25. Knowledge on both “Power” and the “Velocity of Detonation” of an explosive is

Full Detonation (High Order)

Partial Detonation (Low Order) Deflagration)

a. Poor contact in the explosive train.

Sympathetic Detonation (Detonation by Influence)

30. Sympathetic Detonation is basically, detonation of one explosive charge caused by

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-7

11.34 Kg 0.6 – 3 metres

35. Adding powdered Aluminium to an explosive greatly increases its power by

METHODS OF LOADING HIGH EXPLOSIVE

37. Pressed Loose or lubricated explosive is poured into a container and

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-8

SHAPED CHARGE DESIGN

Critical factors in the effectiveness of a Munroe Cone shaped charge.

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-9

Plate Charges (Miznay Shardin)

43. The Misznay-Schardin effect, or platter effect, is a characteristic of the detonation of

Fig 2 – TMRP 6 (Miznay Shardin shaped charge)

EOD Trg Handbook Page 1-10

Fig 3- Blade low order technique result on a 1000lb Aircraft Bomb