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RULES ON CANDIDACY, QUALIFICATIONS, DISQUALIFICATIONS, REMEDIES

The Constitution explicitly forbids an immediate fourth-term reelection directly following three consecutive
terms. However, it does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as it doesn't
immediately follow the conclusion of a third consecutive term. In the context of a recall election occurring
midway through the term following a third consecutive term, it qualifies as a subsequent election but not
an immediate reelection after the third term. Additionally, the Constitution does not restrict someone
barred from seeking immediate reelection from running in any other subsequent election related to the
same term of office. The framers of the Constitution, as evidenced by debates in the Constitutional
Commission, made it clear that the prohibited election pertained to immediate reelection after the third
term and not any other subsequent election.

In Hagedorn's case, his candidacy in the recall election doesn't constitute an immediate reelection
following his third consecutive term. The constitutional prohibition against immediate reelection, as
applicable to Hagedorn, pertains specifically to regular elections, which he did not pursue.

Between June 30, 2001, and the recall election on September 24, 2002, Socrates served as the mayor of
Puerto Princesa, while Hagedorn, during this period, was a private citizen. This time frame signifies a
clear interruption in Hagedorn's mayoral service, not due to his voluntary renunciation but owing to a legal
restriction.

Hagedorn's three consecutive terms concluded on June 30, 2001. His subsequent recall term, spanning
from September 24, 2002, to June 30, 2004, doesn't represent a seamless continuation of his previous
three consecutive terms as mayor. It is incorrect to amalgamate Hagedorn's earlier three terms with his
new recall term to label the recall term as a fourth consecutive term because, factually, it is not. An
involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001, to September 24, 2002, disrupting the continuity or
consecutive nature of Hagedorn's mayoral service.

In Hagedorn's situation, the approximately 15-month period during which he was out of office, though
falling short of a full three-year term, constituted a break in the continuity of his mayoral service. The
Constitution does not necessitate the interruption or hiatus to be a complete three-year term. The explicit
intention is that any interruption, "for any length of time," as long as it is involuntary, is adequate to disrupt
the continuity of service for an elective local official.

To summarize:
1. Hagedorn is not seeking immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor.
2. Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor experienced an involuntary interruption from June 30,
2001, to September 24, 2002, during which time he held the status of a private citizen.
3. Term limits should be interpreted strictly to uphold the electorate's fullest possible right to choose
their leaders.

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