Third World Quarterly

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Population Pressures and the North–South Divide

between the first century and 2100

Marcin Wojciech Solarz & Małgorzata Wojtaszczyk

To cite this article: Marcin Wojciech Solarz & Małgorzata Wojtaszczyk (2015) Population
Pressures and the North–South Divide between the first century and 2100, Third World Quarterly,
36:4, 802-816, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2015.1024452

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1024452

Published online: 18 May 2015.

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Third World Quarterly, 2015
Vol. 36, No. 4, 802–816, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1024452

VIEWPOINT
Population Pressures and the
North–South Divide between the first
century and 2100
Marcin Wojciech Solarz* and Małgorzata Wojtaszczyk
Department of Political Geography and Regional Studies, Faculty of Regional and Global Studies, University
of Warsaw, Poland

This article examines the relationship between the populations of the

more and less developed societies between the first century and 2100.
Such an analysis reveals a changing dependency between the level of
development (and GDP) achieved and population numbers between the
first century and 1998. In relation to the past the article suggests a
dynamic model for dividing the world into more and less developed
areas. In relation to the present and the future it bases the population
analysis on the developmental division of the world as published by
one of the co-authors of this article. The article largely uses population
estimates (with those referring to the past taken from Angus Maddison
and those referring to the future from the most recent projections by the
United Nations). Taking the 2013 UN projection as a model, it dis-
cusses three variants for demographic development in the North and
South up to 2100. It argues that the more restrictive population growth
variants of the UN projection predict a greater relative ‘Third
Worldisation’ of the world than does the most dynamic projection.
Keywords: North; South; population; past; future

The milestones in the progress of the world’s demographic development may be

conventional, but they are also precise. The global population had grown to one
billion by the 19th century, the same year Napoleon Bonaparte appointed him-
self emperor of the French. The two billion mark was reached in 1927, the year
of Charles Lindbergh’s solo non-stop flight over the Atlantic Ocean, while three
billion was reached in 1960, which was proclaimed the year of Africa. The pop-
ulation reached four billion in 1974, when Richard Nixon left politics, and five
billion in 1987 when, during his speech at the Brandenburg Gate, Ronald Rea-
gan called for Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall. It reached six
billion in 1999, when the first countries of the former eastern bloc were admit-
ted to NATO, and seven billion in the year when the ‘Arab Spring’ spread
across the region, Osama bin Laden was killed and Prince William married Kate

*Corresponding author. Email: mwsolarz@uw.edu.pl

© 2015 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com

 Third World Quarterly 803

Middleton (2011). Almost all the aforementioned milestones have been reached
either recently or very recently. Even from the perspective of our individual
lives, most of these dates are not from some long-forgotten past, in which only
history teachers are interested. Six of the seven milestones discussed were
achieved during the lives of people who are still with us (as of the time of
writing), people like Queen Elizabeth II, Alan Greenspan and Fidel Castro.
Currently human population numbers are not only high, they are continuing
to grow. From an individual’s perspective this is not surprising, because none of
the people living today has ever known a world in which the population was
under one billion (the authors of this article have never known a world with a
population below four and five billion, respectively). Well over 92% of the cur-
rent global population was born after the two billion milestone and 42.3% were
born after the five billion milestone.1 Nevertheless, for us as a species the fact
of a very large global population is a new and unique phenomenon. If we were
to reduce the unthinkably long history of human evolution to 12 hours, the
modern human being would only have appeared 20 minutes ago, while the sud-
den global demographic explosion would not have been in effect for more than
1.5 seconds.2 De facto the number of humans was always low because the
demographic explosion occurred more or less in the last moments of our 12
hours, developing into the most important current global problem and providing
other global problems with sense and meaning.
Roughly speaking the ecumene covers some 90 million km2 (if we exclude
i.a. deserts and frozen areas), which means that the population density 10 thou-
sand years ago (that is, about a minute ago) was 0.05 per 1 km2. It had grown
to 7,8 people per 1 km2 by the start of the industrial era (no more than two
seconds ago). In 2014, it was close to 80,5 people per 1 km2.3 Therefore, when
we look at the numbers of our neighbours within our world, it seems that we
have moved from Svalbard to Macedonia in about a minute of our 12-hour
timescale. Thus the population problem is one of the most serious in the history
of our species. ‘Humans keep growing in numbers…while the land is not
expanding, at least not during the current geological era. Who knows if there
will ever be a time when mankind is short on room, if not for graves, then
for...cradles.’4 ‘If we were to compare Earth to a big skyscraper, its different
countries and states would be seen as numerous flats. The societies and states
are tenants of Earth…Earth is becoming more and more crowded and
uncomfortable.’5 This situation entails consequences at every level – biological,
psychological, political, economic and cultural – and presents our species with
great challenges, which we must face immediately, despite the fact that we are
probably not yet morally or materially prepared.

The rich North and the poor South between the first century and 2012
Ralf Dahrendorf once said: ‘Where there is society, there is also inequality’.6
This observation also pertains to the international community. Human societies
and the territorial authorities created by them have ‘forever’ been diverse when
it comes to the level of development achieved.7 This is one of the most impor-
tant social facts, attracting in our times probably more attention from people and
the institutions built by them than at any other point in history. Compared to
804 M.W. Solarz and M. Wojtaszczyk

other problems, past and current, inequality is definitely one of the greatest
challenges we face, and entails the contemporary anger, terrorism and war.
The success or failure of state development strategy is significantly deter-
mined by the size of the population. Depending on the conditions, a large or
small population may either accelerate or block development. However, this arti-
cle is only concerned with the relationship between the population numbers of
the more and less developed societies between the first century and 2100.
Analysis of this issue will not only reveal the variables regarding dependency
between the level of development achieved and population size, but will also
provide grounds for contemplating the current priorities of poverty-reduction
policy on a global scale and the operating strategies adopted in the face of the
population problem.
The objective specified above sets the authors numerous challenges, one of
which is that the research time-span adopted covers the distant past and the
always uncertain future. For this reason, with the exception of contemporary
times (the start of the twenty-first century), the article will be based mainly on
population estimates (with those referring to the past taken from Angus
Maddison,8 and those referring to the future from the most recent projections by
the United Nations9).
Reflecting upon development is accompanied by just as much uncertainty.
There are numerous questions without a clear answer – how should we under-
stand development, how do we define its levels, and what criteria and indicators
do we use to define it? The answers to each of the examples allow for consider-
able subjectivity and should be considered multiple times and separately in
reference to the different historical periods.
The division of countries into those more or less developed is highly
dynamic. The nature of development and the borders of particular segments into
which the international community is divided have changed with time. High or
low development are de facto not constant features but, rather, processes.
Because of this, the United Nations elaborates on the future population numbers
of the more developed and less developed countries in its World Population
Prospects: The 2012 Revision,10 but its adopted division of the world commu-
nity, which is subsequently projected into the future, opposes the very philoso-
phy of development. It is rigid – static in fact – and based on either
geographical or political and legal premises rather than de facto developmental
ones. In the former case the more developed regions include all the regions of
Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, while the less devel-
oped ones include all the regions of Africa, Asia except Japan, Latin America,
the Caribbean, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia.11 In the latter case the least
developed countries are those confirmed as such by the General Assembly of
the United Nations in its resolutions.12 The credibility of the UN’s population
analysis regarding developed, developing and least developed countries discred-
its the very reservation made in the quoted text. According to this, the designa-
tions ‘more developed’ and ‘less developed’ do not reflect an assessment of
development level achieved by particular states or areas, so what do the afore-
mentioned designations express, and why were they used, since the explanation
that they are referred to for statistical purposes is weak and inconsiderate?.13
Nevertheless, a rough ‘geographical’ glance at the UN definitions reveals that,
 Third World Quarterly 805

for example, Albania, Moldova and Ukraine are advanced, while Israel, South
Korea and Singapore are backward.
For this reason, in relations to the past the current article suggests a dynamic
model for dividing the world into more and less developed areas. This model con-
siders the changeability of the material and geographical frames of the division. In
relation to the present and future, the article bases its population analysis on the
developmental division of the world as published by one of the co-authors.14 Of
course, the latter division is open to criticism and negation (as with any other
similar one), but at least it is cohesive and based on developmental criteria. The
division model referring to the past is likewise not free from flaws and reserva-
tions, for example because of its strongly schematic and simplifying nature.
This creates the potential for producing the following model of the global
North and global South between the first century and 2000 (Figure 1), which
will subsequently be applied to the population analysis. From the start of the
first century until the turn of the 18th century the role of the global North has
been played by Asia, and is evidenced by its high GDP, which was, until about
1850, higher than the rest of the world’s GDP combined. The Industrial Revolu-
tion introduced new criteria for dividing the global population into more and
less developed regions – participation in the process of industrialisation. Those
involved in industrialisation – initially Western Europe and its overseas settle-
ment colonies (known as neo-Europes) – were part of the new global North,
while the rest of the world community found themselves in a backward world,
regardless of their GDP. With time industrialisation significantly increased the
wealth of the new, more developed countries and, starting in the mid-19th cen-
tury, the European world as broadly defined was at the same time the epicentre
of modernity and the pole of wealth. More countries and regions joined the pio-
neers of industrialisation at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries – Eastern
Europe, Russia and Japan. In the 20th century the Russian Revolution, the
industrialisation processes in Third World countries and the high quality of life
achieved by Western societies made industrialisation an obsolete criterion for

Figure 1. The North–South divide from a theoretical perspective, AD 0–1998.

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
806 M.W. Solarz and M. Wojtaszczyk

division, and GDP a less fitting one. In the second half of the 20th century it
was quality of life that determined affiliation with either the wealthy North or
the poor South. Soon the end of the Cold War would reveal that Russia was part
of the global South and that quality of life could not be examined separately
from political rights and civil liberties.
The division of the world into the rich North and poor South of the early
twenty-first century, adopted for the purposes of population analyses up to 2100,
relates to the very specific philosophy of division, criteria and indicators. The
starting point is John Locke’s perspective on development – it should aim to
limit the uncertainty in human life (which is different from the approach of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the idea of human
development). The amount of uncertainty in human lives shrinks with improving
material conditions, health care, quality of the living environment, education,
and with the expansion and enforcement of political rights and civil liberties.
When the future becomes more certain and predictable, and when people
become wealthier, healthier, better educated and more empowered, they are
likely to become, en masse, happier. Therefore a sense of happiness seems to be
strongly correlated with a sense of existential security.
In order to measure quality of life on the basis of the aforementioned criteria,
this article applies the Human Development Index and Overall Life Satisfaction
indicators published by the UNDP, as well as the Freedom in the World indica-
tor produced by Freedom House. The institutions publishing the Human
Development Index and Freedom in the World indicators use them to create
their own classifications of states (for ‘Overall Life Satisfaction’ we assume the
dichotomous division of happy/unhappy, determined by the middle of all poten-
tial points). Each category receives a specific point weight and states can score

Figure 2. The North–South divide in 2012.

 Third World Quarterly 807

between 0 and 3 points. As a result, those states that scored 3 points are deemed
the most developed, while those with 0 points are considered the least devel-
oped. The states that obtained 2.1–3 points are deemed part of the global North,
while those with 0–2 points are deemed part of the global South. The 2012
North–South division is presented in Figure 2, while groups of the most and
least developed countries are presented in Figure 10.15

North–South: GDP and population between the first century and the end of
the 20th century
From the start of the first century until the second half of the 19th century the
GDPs of the more and less developed regions were very similar. The turn of the
18th century was a special time because the Industrial Revolution created new
epicentres of development (the new global North) which, however, initially had
a lower total GDP than the countries of the previous global North (part of the
new global South).16 From the second half of the 19th century the more devel-
oped regions had a greater GDP once again. Over the next century the contrast
between the GDP of the North and that of the South reached an unprecedented
level (Figure 3).
The population of the global North was greater than that of the global South
until the Industrial Revolution, but both segments were similar in numbers. This
changed in the 18th century, when the population of the global South overtook
the population of the global North. The 20th century presented a demographic
explosion in the South, whereas the population of the North, which reached its
peak in the second half of that century, started to shrink (Figure 4).

Figure 3. The North–South divide in terms of GDP, AD 0–1998 (million international

dollars, 1990).
Source: Maddison, The World Economy.
808 M.W. Solarz and M. Wojtaszczyk

Until the Industrial Revolution the value of GDP was mainly determined by
the volume of population, ie by human labour resources. That is why Figures 5
and 4 show the GDP chart line as fairly faithful to the population chart line.
Before the Industrial Revolution the line representing changes to the population
level runs above the GDP line for both the global North and the global South of
that time, because the latter was ‘riding on the coat-tails’ of the former. In the
societies of the pre-industrial era the productivity of working people was closely
tied to the efficiency of their organisms and to environmental conditions. There-
fore the productivity of the non-mechanical world was relatively low. The obsta-
cle to general prosperity was the fact that objectively there were always too few
goods for distribution among the population. This produced the low total value
of GDP and of GDP per capita. Nevertheless, the global North had a higher
population than the global South, which provided it with the status of the
wealthier hemisphere in a world that was rather poor collectively. More human
labour meant a higher GDP.
In relation to the global North the Industrial Revolution broke the previous
relationship between GDP volume and size of population. The charts were not
the only things that changed and from that point on the GDP chart line found
itself above the demographic chart line. Furthermore, the GDP of the new global
North kept growing faster, while its population remained stable. In general the
level of GDP ceased to depend on the number of working people. At the same
time the volume of goods for distribution grew fast, as did the share of the
population. Society was becoming more effective and wealthier.
Meanwhile, in the global South, the situation until the mid-20th century was
similar to the pre-industrial situation – the population chart line was above the
GDP chart line. GDP may have clearly grown along with the start of the

Figure 4. Population of the global North and global South, AD 0–1998 (000s).
Source: Maddison, The World Economy.
 Third World Quarterly 809

Figure 5. The global North: population and GDP, AD 0–1998 (000/million interna-
tional dollars, 1990).
Source: Maddison, The World Economy.

industrial era, which is evidence of developmental influences from the North,

but the population also grew at a firm pace. This, in turn, seems to have resulted
from hygenic, medical, pharmaceutical and chemical progress in the North and
its influence on the South.17 However, compared to the pre-industrial age,
the dynamics of GDP growth were clearly below the population growth. Para-
doxically the collective influence of two positive factors caused a deterioration
in the situation, which is illustrated in Figure 6 by a clear separation between
the GDP and population chart lines from the mid-18th century onwards. Not
only were there still more hands to share in the goods than the actual number of
goods for distribution, but also the population was relatively even more numer-
ous than before. It was not until the mid-20th century that a new situation
evolved in the global South, paralleling the situation in the global North, and
resulting from the global expansion of industrialisation started after World
War II.18
The South recorded a sudden growth in GDP and its dynamics were greater
than those of the population. As a result, the chart lines switched places and
finally there were more goods for distribution than there were beneficiaries.
However, the positive change had a limited impact on the global South and on
the relationship between North and South. The start for the Third World was
about 100 years after that of the North and began from a relatively low level. In
addition, the numbers of potential beneficiaries of the developmental accelera-
tion were not only much higher than in the North, but also continued to grow
strongly (Figure 7). The South also had the problem of uneven goods distribu-
tion. Thus the breaking of developmental stagnation in the global South did not
entail a reconstruction of the North–South relationship. The world as a whole
810 M.W. Solarz and M. Wojtaszczyk

Figure 6. The global South: population and GDP, AD 0–1998 (000/million

international dollars, 1990).
Source: Maddison, The World Economy.

Figure 7. The North–South divide: population and GDP, AD 0–1998 (000/million

international dollars, 1990).
Source: Maddison, The World Economy.
 Third World Quarterly 811

may have been getting wealthier, just as were the North and South as individual
groups of territories, but the North was still wealthier. Furthermore, the North
saw its quickly growing wealth still being divided among a similar number of
people, while the South saw the dynamic and parallel growth of both variables.
Nevertheless, the GDP dynamics in the South were greater than the population
dynamics. This meant that, even if the global South could never catch up with
the global North (because of the latter’s initial advantage, dynamic development
and lower population), it still had a chance to become a world of the wealthy,
statistically speaking – though not as wealthy as its neighbours in the North.

North–South to 2100: population relations

Shortly after the global population surpassed seven billion, the United Nations
published a global demographic projection for the period up to 2100 (Figure 8).
The projection included three variants. The maximum variant assumed that
the global population would grow quickly until the end of the twenty-first cen-
tury, reaching over 16.6 billion by its end. The intermediate variant also
assumed a stable global population growth which, though slower, would reach
almost 11 billion. The low variant projected that the global population would
reach its peak around the middle of the century (at over 8.3 billion) and would
then start to drop gradually to a level of slightly over 6.75 billion. Given that
the population during most of human history has been low and has grown very
slowly, if at all,19 the sudden growth of the planet’s population recorded within
the past 300 years can be perceived as a dramatic disturbance of the previous
balance between humanity and the environment.20 This leads to expectations of

Figure 8. Projected world population, 2010–2100 (000s).

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World
Population Prospects.
812 M.W. Solarz and M. Wojtaszczyk

a new balance, with a much greater global population, which is suggested in the
average and low variants of the UN projection .
The North–South division projected for the years up to 2100, as shown in
Figure 2, allows for an assessment of population evolution based on the UN
projections within both the international community segments (Figure 9). In
2010 the approximate population of the global North was 1.6 billion (23% of
the planet’s population); that of the global South was almost 5.2 billion (77%).
As stated in the UN evaluation prepared according to its geographical classifica-
tion of developed and developing countries, the 2013 population of developed
countries was 1.25 billion (17.5% of the global population; or, according to our
classification 1.6 billion (22.85%)); that of developing countries was 5.9 billion
(82.5%; or, according to our classification, 5.4 billion (77.14%)).21
Much like the case of the estimated population of the entire Earth, there are
three demographic development projection variants for North and South up to
2100. The high variant for both segments sees the population still growing,
including a clear and rapid growth in the South. By 2100 the population of the
global South will have surpassed 13 billion (13.3 billion), while that of the glo-
bal North will be close to three billion (2.9 billion). This means that the percent-
age of inhabitants in the North will have dropped to 17.8% of the global total in
less than 100 years, while the percentage of inhabitants in the South will have
grown to 82.2% in the same period. Using the intermediate variant, the number
of inhabitants in the global South will keep growing, although more slowly than
in the high variant, while over the second half of the century the population of
the global North will have slowly started to drop. According to this projection,
the population of the global South will have reached 8.7 billion by 2100, while
that of the global North will have reached 1.86 billion. The inhabitants of the

Figure 9. North–South divide: projected population, 2010–2100 (000s).

Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World
Population Prospects.
 Third World Quarterly 813

Figure 10. The most and least developed worlds in 2012.

South will compose 82.5% of the planet’s population, with 17.5% of it left in
the North. Finally, the low variant sees the population of the North reach its
peak in the 2030s and that of the South in the 2050s, to be followed by a pop-
ulation drop in both cases, but a more dynamic one in the global South. Using
this variant, the 2100 population of the poor South would be 5.44 billion
(82.7% of the global population), while that of the rich North would be 1.14
billion (17.3%).
The first thing that becomes obvious from the adopted freeze of the North–
South division on a global scale up to 2100 is the fact that each demographic
variant sees a very similar percentage of rich and poor. The image of the world
at the end of the twenty-first century will undoubtedly be more Third World
than it is now. Paradoxically, however, the most favourable relationship between
the populations of the North and South is offered by the high variant. In conclu-
sion, our results should also be compared with the UN assessment based on
geographical division that is presented in reference to the intermediate variant.
According to the UN, by 2100 the population of the global North will have
grown by only 0.3 billion to 1.28 billion (11.8% of the global population), while
that of the global South will have grown by 3.7 billion to 9.6 billion (88.2% of
the global population).22 As such the UN assessments are more pessimistic in
comparison to nearly all the variants presented in this article.
The criteria and indicators adopted above can also serve to distinguish
groups of the most and least developed countries, which were composed,
respectively, of 33 and 16 states in 2012 (Figure 10). In 2010 the population of
the most developed countries was clearly the higher of the two (almost 1.1
billion). The population of the least developed countries was only 334 million
814 M.W. Solarz and M. Wojtaszczyk

(Figure 11). Under the high variant both groups of states present rapid
demographic growth, although it is stronger in the case of the least developed
countries. In this way the 2100 population of the most developed parts of the
world (1.8 billion) will not be much greater than the population of the opposite
pole of development (1.7 billion). The intermediate variant presents slight pop-
ulation growth in the most developed countries (up to 1.22 billion), while the
growth of the least developed countries will be considerable and their population
at the end of the twenty-first century will be 1.17 billion. Under the low variant
the population of the most developed countries quite clearly drops (to 775 mil-
lion), while the population of the least developed countries in principle doubles
(also to 775 million), thus basically catching up with the population of the for-
mer. It should be noted that each of the variants discussed is unfavourable if the
spatial model adopted for the division of global development continues.
While the 2010 relationship of the richest to the poorest was 3:1, this would
even out to more-or-less 1:1 under every demographic variant by 2100 and only
the highest (1.07:1) and intermediate (1.04:1) variant would see a higher popula-
tion in the most developed countries than in the least developed ones (0.99:1
under the low variant). Furthermore, considering relative values, the high variant
paradoxically turns out to be the most favourable in this case as well. In turn,
looking at the UN assessments based on political and legal criteria (concerning
only the least developed countries), under the intermediate variant the popula-
tion of this group of states will grow from 898 million in 2013 to 2.9 billion in
2100.23 The UN assessments are therefore drastically more pessimistic than ours
for every variant.

Figure 11. The most and least developed worlds: projected population, 2010–2100
(000s).
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World
Population Prospects.
 Third World Quarterly 815

Conclusions
Paradoxically the more restrictive population growth variants (low and inter-
mediate) of the UN projection lead to a considerably greater relative Third
Worldisation of the world than does the most dynamic one (high variant). At
least the latter seems to guarantee the most favourable relationship between the
populations of the more and most developed countries and the respectively less
and least developed ones. There is also no reason to think that the relationship
between development and population levels in the global North was completely
broken by the Industrial Revolution. Certainly the societies of the global South
(and particularly those within the borders of weak, failing or failed states)
should see rapid population growth as one of the true great challenges to
development (if such can even be considered under such institutional conditions;
it is at least doubtful). But the hazards to the prosperity, stability, security and
even the identity of the societies of the global North seem also increasingly to
be the result of their demographic stagnation and breakdown.

Notes on contributors
Marcin Wojciech Solarz is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies at the
University of Warsaw. He is the author of The Language of Global Development: A Misleading Geography
(2014); “The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Polish Political Geography.” Geopolitics 19, no. 3 (2014); “‘Third
World’: The 60th Anniversary of a Concept that Changed History.” Third World Quarterly 33 no. 9 (2012);
and “North–South, Commemorating the First Brandt Report: Searching for the Contemporary Spatial Picture of
the Global Rift.” Third World Quarterly 33, no. 3 (2012).

Małgorzata Wojtaszczyk is a PhD student in the Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies at the University
of Warsaw.

Notes
1. Worldometers, “Population.”
2. Konarzewski, Na początku był głód, 9–10; and Solarz, The Language of Global Development, 7.
3. Worldometers, “Population.”
4. Pawłowski, “O renesansie geografii politycznej,” 171–172 (authors’ translation).
5. Pawłowski, “Na zamknięcie Międzynarodowego Kongresu,” 199–200 (authors’ translation).
6. Dahrendorf, “Granice nierówności,” 5 (authors’ translation ).
7. Solarz, The Language of Global Development, 3–28.
8. Maddison, The World Economy.
9. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects.
10. Ibid., Vol. 1, xvi.
11. Ibid., viii.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Solarz, The Language of Global Development, 21–28.
15. Ibid., 26–27.
16. Ibid., 12.
17. Hobsbawm, Wiek skrajności, 318.
18. Thurow, “Naszą rzeczywistością,” 110–111.
19. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects, Vol. 1, 3.
20. Maddison, The World Economy, 241.
21. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects, Vol. 1, xvi.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
816 M.W. Solarz and M. Wojtaszczyk

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