9828vers Angl

Doc 9828, AN-Conf/11
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION
ELEVENTH AIR
NAVIGATION CONFERENCE
Montréal, 22 September – 3 October 2003
REPORT
Approved by the Conference and

published by authority of the Secretary General
MONTRÉAL 2003
Supplement No. 1 Doc 9828, AN-Conf/11
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
ELEVENTH AIR NAVIGATION CONFERENCE (2003)
Montreal, 22 September to 3 October 2003
SUPPLEMENT NO. 1
1. The Council, at the eleventh meeting of its 171st Session on 10 March 2004, and the Air
Navigation Commission at the first and second meetings of its 165th Session on 13 and 15 January 2004,
under authority delegated by the Council, took action as indicated hereunder on the recommendations of the
Eleventh Air Navigation Conference (2003).
2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF

STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES
AND PROCEDURES (RSPP)
2.1 The Air Navigation Commission made a preliminary review of Recommendation 6/10, and
agreed that it should be transmitted to Contracting States and interested international organizations for
comments, together with the Commission’s comments and proposals thereon. Following receipt of these
comments, a further review will be conducted by the Commission, which will then present its final proposals
to the Council for approval of the amendments to Annex 10, Volume I.
3. RECOMMENDATIONS OTHER THAN FOR

STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES
3.1 The Council noted that the following will be the allocation of follow-up responsibility for
non-RSPP recommendations made under Agenda Items 1 to 7:
Report Reference Action by Council (C) Recommendation Title

or Air Navigation and
Rec. No. Page No. Commission (ANC) Action Taken
1/1 1-3 C Endorsement of the global ATM operational concept
Approved the recommendation and requested the

Secretary General to take appropriate action.
1/2 1-4 ANC Coordination with military authorities

Secretary General to bring it to the attention of States.
-2-
Doc 9828, AN-Conf/11 Supplement No. 1

1/3 1-6 ANC Development of ATM requirements
Approved the recommendation and requested the Air

Traffic Management Operational Concept Panel
(ATMCP) to develop relevant proposals before the end
of 2005.
1/4 1-7 ANC Development of Standards and Recommended

Practices (SARPs) from the global ATM operational
concept

Secretary General to bring it to the attention of relevant
panels, noting its relationship to Recommendation 1/3.
1/5 1-8 ANC Interoperability and seamlessness

ATMCP to develop relevant proposals before the end of
2005.
1/6 1-9 ANC Endorsement of the automatic dependent

surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) concept of use and
recommendations for further work
Approved parts a) c) and d) of the recommendation and

requested the Secretary General to take appropriate
action; and
Noted the intent of part b) of the recommendation and

requested Operational Data Link Panel (OPLINKP) to
consider it in its further work to the extent possible.
1/7 1-10 ANC Ground and airborne automatic dependent

surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) applications for
global interoperability

Secretary General to bring it to the attention of States
and relevant international organizations.
-3-

1/8 1-13 ANC Global aeronautical information management and
data exchange model
Approved part a) of the recommendation and requested

the ATMCP to develop relevant proposals by the end of
2005;
Approved the intent of part b) of the recommendation

and requested the Secretary General to take appropriate
action; and
Approved part c) of the recommendation and requested

the Secretary General to progress the work.
1/9 1-14 C Raising the status of the Global Air Navigation Plan
for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750)
Noted the intent of the recommendation and requested

the Air Navigation Commission to develop relevant
proposals.
1/10 1-15 ANC Status of the Global Air Navigation Plan for
CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750)

the Secretary General to bring it to the attention of States
and ICAO Regional Offices.
1/11 1-15 ANC Publication of the Global ATM Operational Concept

the Secretary General to develop relevant proposals for
an appropriate approval and publication process.
1/12 1-15 ANC Amendment of Chapter 4 of the Global Air

Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750)

Secretary General to take it into account when
developing the next amendment to Doc 9750.
-4-

1/13 1-16 ANC Harmonization of air navigation systems
Noted the recommendation and requested the Secretary

General to take appropriate action, noting that work was
already in progress.
1/14 1-17 ANC Development of an ICAO air navigation plan

database and associated Web-based information and
charting service

Secretary General take appropriate action, noting that
work was already in progress.
1/15 1-18 ANC Implementation of airborne collision avoidance

system (ACAS) provisions
Noted the recommendation, expressed its safety concern,

and requested the Secretary General to bring it to the
attention of States.
1/16 1-20 ANC Provisions related to airborne collision avoidance

systems (ACAS)
Noted parts a) b) c) and e) of the recommendation and

that work is already in progress; and
Approved part d) of the recommendation and requested

that Surveillance and Conflict Resolution Systems Panel
(SCRSP) develop relevant proposals for review by the
ANC.
2/1 2-3 ANC A framework for system safety

-5-

2/2 2-5 ANC Implementation of ATS safety management
programmes and establishment of acceptable levels of
safety

General to bring it to the attention of States.
2/3 2-6 ANC Sharing of ATM accident and incident data
Approved part a) of the recommendation and requested

the Secretary General to develop the relevant guidance
material; and
Approved part b) of the recommendation and requested

the Secretary General to bring it to the attention of
States.
2/4 2-8 C The protection of sources of safety information

2/5 2-8 ANC Monitoring of safety during normal operations

Secretary General to develop the relevant guidance
material.
2/6 2-11 ANC Safety certification of ATM systems

2/7 2-12 ANC Safety oversight capabilities and procedures

-6-

2/8 2-14 C Harmonization of aviation safety and aviation
security
Noted part a) of the recommendation and requested the

Secretary General to take action as necessary; and

States.
2/9 2-15 ANC In-flight emergency response procedures for air

traffic controllers

3/1 3-2 ANC Required communication performance (RCP)
Noted part a) of the recommendation; and

OPLINKP to progress the work accordingly.
3/2 3-3 C Standardization of minimum reporting requirements

3/3 3-7 ANC Performance framework
Approved part a) and b) of the recommendation and

requested the ATMCP to develop relevant proposals for
review by the ANC; and

the Secretary General to take appropriate action.
-7-

4/1 4-2 ANC Harmonization of air navigation systems between
regions
Approved parts a) and b) of the recommendation, noting

its relationship to Recommendation 1/13, and requested
the Secretary General to take appropriate action; and

States.
4/2 4-4 ANC Investigation of performance-driven planning and

implementation methods

Secretary General bring it to the attention of States.
4/3 4-4 ANC Collaborative decision-making and global

demand/capacity balancing

4/4 4-5 ANC Investigation and analysis of the “Single European

Sky” approach to global harmonization

Secretary General to take action as necessary.
4/5 4-7 ANC Runway safety programmes

4/6 4-8 ANC Capacity-enhancing procedures

-8-

4/7 4-8 ANC Global runway incursion risk management
Noted part a) of the recommendation and that the work

was already being progressed and under active
consideration by the Commission; and

the Secretary General to take appropriate action, noting
that work was already being progressed.
4/8 4-9 ANC Rectification of air navigation deficiencies

Secretary General to take action as appropriate, noting
that work was already being progressed.
4/9 4-10 ANC Harmonization of flight level assignment

methodology across flight information region
boundaries

Secretary General to urge relevant States to apply a
common cruising levels structure in accordance with the
tables of cruising levels expressed in metres or feet, as
outlined in Annex 2 — Rules of the Air, Appendix 3.
4/10 4-10 ANC Tables of cruising levels
Noted the recommendation and its relation to

Recommendation 4/9, and agreed that no action was
required.
5/1 5-3 ANC Preparation for WRC-2007

-9-

5/2 5-6 ANC ICAO activities on interference
Noted the recommendation and requested:
a) the Secretary General to take appropriate action; and
b) the Aeronautical Communications Panel (ACP) in

coordination with the Navigation Systems Panel
(NSP) as required, to develop the necessary
guidance material.
6/1 6-8 ANC Transition to satellite-based air navigation
Approved the recommendation and:
a) agreed that the relevant panels continue the

development of SARPs, procedures and guidance
material in line with part a) of the recommendation;
and
b) requested the Secretary General to bring parts b) and

c) of the recommendation to the attention of States
and appropriate international organizations.
6/2 6-10 ANC Guidelines on mitigation of GNSS vulnerabilities

General to:
a) bring the recommendation to the attention of States

and appropriate international organizations; and
b) incorporate the guidelines referred to in part a) of the

recommendation in the first edition of the Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Manual.
6/3 6-11 ANC Assessment of atmospheric effects on SBAS

performance in equatorial regions
Noted the recommendation and requested the Navigation

Systems Panel (NSP) to give priority to the development
of suitable guidance material.
- 10 -

6/4 6-11 ANC Automated means for reporting and assessing the
effects of outages on GNSS operations

Systems Panel (NSP) to consider the development of the
relevant provisions.
6/5 6-12 ANC Early resolution of issues arising from

implementation of RNAV and RNP

Secretary General to progress the necessary work as a
matter of urgency with the assistance of the Required
Navigation Performance and Special Operational
Requirements Study Group (RNPSORSG).
6/6 6-13 ANC Advanced GNSS RNAV procedure design

Navigation Systems Panel (NSP) and Obstacle Clearance
Panel (OCP) to develop relevant proposals for
consideration by the ANC.
6/7 6-13 ANC Curved GNSS RNAV procedures

Navigation Systems Panel (NSP) and Obstacle Clearance
Panel (OCP) to develop relevant proposals for
consideration by the ANC.
6/8 6-13 ANC GNSS/INS integration

Navigation Systems Panel (NSP) to develop relevant
proposals for consideration by the ANC.
- 11 -

6/9 6-15 C Support of and participation in SBAS
pre-operational implementation activities

6/11 6-19 C Amendment to the Global Plan — Navigation

6/12 6-20 ANC Development of guidance material on applications of

new GNSS elements and their combinations

Systems Panel (NSP) to develop the required guidance
material.
6/13 6-20 C Potential constraints on using multiple GNSS signals

General to bring it to the attention of States and
appropriate international organizations.
6/14 6-21 ANC GNSS services in the 960 — 1 215 MHz band
Approved the recommendation and:
a) requested the Secretary General to bring part a) of

the recommendation to the attention of States and
appropriate international organizations;
b) requested the Navigation Systems Panel (NSP) to

develop proposals for consideration by the ANC.
6/15 6-22 ANC Updating of SARPs for radio navigation aids in

Annex 10, Volume I

Navigation Systems Panel (NSP) to develop relevant
proposals for consideration by the ANC.
- 12 -

6/16 6-23 ANC Completion of guidance material on application of
data quality SARPs in Annex 15

General to expedite publication of the Quality
Management System Manual for AIS/MAP Services.
7/1 7-11 ANC Strategy for the near-term introduction of ADS-B

7/2 7-11 ANC Support of longer term ADS-B requirements
Approved the recommendation, and
a) requested the Secretary General to bring part a) of

the recommendation to the attention of States and
appropriate international organizations;
b) requested the ACP and the SCRSP, in coordination

with other appropriate panels, to continue the
development of provisions for ADS-B technologies
as required.
7/3 7-16 ANC Evolutionary approach for global interoperability of

air-ground communications

7/4 7-17 ANC Investigation of future technology alternatives for

air-ground communications
Approved the recommendation and requested the ACP to

carry out the relevant activities.
- 13 -

7/5 7-18 ANC Standardization of aeronautical communication
systems
Approved the recommendation and requested all ICAO

bodies involved in the standardization of aeronautical
communication systems to apply it in their work.
— END —
REPORT OF THE
ELEVENTH AIR NAVIGATION CONFERENCE
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
To: President, Air Navigation Commission
From: Chairman, Eleventh Air Navigation Conference
I have the honour to submit the report of the Eleventh Air

Navigation Conference which was held in Montreal from
22 September to 3 October 2003.
Albert Lam
Chairman
Montreal, 3 October 2003

ii - Table of Contents ii-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii-1
HISTORY OF THE CONFERENCE
1. Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-1
2. Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-1
3. Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-1
4. Secretariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-1
5. Adoption of the agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-2
6. Working arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-2
7. Opening remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-2
7.1 President of the Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-2
7.2 President of the Air Navigation Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-5
8. Status reports on GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO and MTSAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-9
9. Joint meeting of Committees A and B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv-14
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v-1
AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi-1
GLOSSARY OF TERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii-1
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE
Agenda Item 1: Introduction and assessment of a global air traffic management

(ATM) operational concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1
Agenda Item 2: Safety and security in air traffic management (ATM) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1
Agenda Item 3: Air traffic management (ATM) performance targets for safety,
efficiency and regularity and the role of required total system
performance (RTSP) in this respect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
Agenda Item 4: Capacity-enhancement measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1
Agenda Item 5: Review of the outcome of the ITU World Radio Conference (2003)
(WRC-2003) and its impact on aeronautical electromagnetic
spectrum utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1
Agenda Item 6: Aeronautical navigation issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
Agenda Item 7: Aeronautical air-ground and air-to-air communications . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

iii-1 iii - List of Recommendations
LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS*
Page
1/1 Endorsement of the global ATM operational concept . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

1/2 Coordination with military authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
1/3 Development of ATM requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6
1/4 Development of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
from the global ATM operational concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7
1/5 Interoperability and seamlessness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8
1/6 Endorsement of the automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast
(ADS-B) concept of use and recommendations for further work . . . 1-9
1/7 Ground and airborne automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast
(ADS-B) applications for global interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-10
1/8 Global aeronautical information management and data exchange
model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-13
1/9 Raising the status of the Global Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM
Systems (Doc 9750) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
1/10 Status of the Global Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems
(Doc 9750) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15
1/11 Publication of the Global ATM Operational Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15
1/12 Amendment of Chapter 4 of the Global Air Navigation Plan . . . . . .
for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-15
1/13 Harmonization of air navigation systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-16
1/14 Development of an ICAO air navigation plan database and
associated Web-based information and charting service . . . . . . . . . . 1-17
1/15 Implementation of airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS)
provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-18
1/16 Provisions related to airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) 1-20
2/1 A framework for system safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

2/2 Implementation of ATS safety management programmes and
establishment of acceptable levels of safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5
2/3 Sharing of ATM accident and incident data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6
2/4 The protection of sources of safety information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
2/5 Monitoring of safety during normal operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8
2/6 Safety certification of ATM systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11
2/7 Safety oversight capabilities and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12
2/8 Harmonization of aviation safety and aviation security . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
2/9 In-flight emergency response procedures for air traffic controllers . . 2-15
3/1 Required communication performance (RCP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

3/2 Standardization of minimum reporting requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3
3/3 Performance framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7
*
Recommendations annotated “RSPP” relate to proposals for amendment of Standards, Recommended Practices, Procedures for
Air Navigation Services or guidance material in an Annex.
iii - List of Recommendations iii-2
Page
4/1 Harmonization of air navigation systems between regions . . . . . . . . 4-2

4/2 Investigation of performance-driven planning and implementation
methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
4/3 Collaborative decision-making and global demand/capacity
balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4
4/4 Investigation and analysis of the “Single European Sky” approach
to global harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
4/5 Runway safety programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7
4/6 Capacity-enhancing procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
4/7 Global runway incursion risk management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8
4/8 Rectification of air navigation deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9
4/9 Harmonization of flight level assignment methodology across flight
information region boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
4/10 Tables of cruising levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10
5/1 Preparation for WRC-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

5/2 ICAO activities on interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6
6/1 Transition to satellite-based air navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9

6/2 Guidelines on mitigation of GNSS vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10
6/3 Assessment of atmospheric effects on SBAS performance in
equatorial regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11
6/4 Automated means for reporting and assessing the effects of outages
on GNSS operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
6/5 Early resolution of issues arising from implementation of RNAV
and RNP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
6/6 Advanced GNSS/RNAV procedure design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
6/7 Curved GNSS/RNAV procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13
6/8 GNSS/INS integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14
6/9 Support of and participation in SBAS pre-operational
implementation activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15
RSPP 6/10 Amendment to Annex 10, Volume I, Attachment B — Updating the
strategy for introduction and application of non-visual aids to
approach and landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-17
6/11 Amendment to the Global Plan — Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19
6/12 Development of guidance material on applications of new GNSS
elements and their combinations 6-20
6/13 Potential constraints on using multiple GNSS signals . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-20
6/14 GNSS services in the 960 - 1 215 MHz band . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-21
6/15 Updating of SARPs for radio navigation aids in Annex 10,
Volume I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-22
6/16 Completion of guidance material on application of data quality
SARPs in Annex 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23
7/1 Strategy for the near-term introduction of ADS-B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-11

7/2 Support of longer term ADS-B requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12
7/3 Evolutionary approach for global interoperability of air-ground
communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-17
iii-3 iii - List of Recommendations
Page
7/4 Investigation of future technology alternatives for air-ground

communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-18
7/5 Standardization of aeronautical communication systems . . . . . . . . . 7-18
——————————
iv - History of the Conference iv-1
REPORT OF THE ELEVENTH AIR NAVIGATION CONFERENCE
Montreal, 22 September to 3 October 2003
HISTORY OF THE CONFERENCE
1. DURATION
1.1 The Eleventh Air Navigation Conference (AN-Conf/11) was opened by the President of the
Council, Dr. A. Kotaite, at 1515 hours on 22 September 2003 in the Assembly Hall of the Headquarters of
the Organization in Montreal. The President of the Air Navigation Commission, Mr. D. Galibert, attended
and addressed the conference. The closing Plenary was held on 3 October 2003.
2. REPRESENTATION
2.1 The Eleventh Air Navigation Conference was attended by 686 participants from
122 Contracting States and 24 observer delegations. A list of participants may be found on pages v-1 to v-19.
3. OFFICERS
3.1 The following officers were elected at the first Plenary meeting:
Chairman: Mr. A. Lam (Hong Kong, China)

First Vice-Chairman: Mr. V. Kuranov (Russian Federation)
Second Vice-Chairman: Ms. J. Taylor (Canada)
4. SECRETARIAT
4.1 The Secretary of the conference was Mr. J. Howell, Director, Air Navigation Bureau who
was assisted by Mr. M. C. F. Heijl, Deputy Director, Air Navigation Bureau. He was also assisted by officers
of the Air Navigation Bureau of ICAO as indicated in paragraph 6 below and by officers of other bureaux
and offices of the Organization as necessary.
4.2 General administrative arrangements for the conference were made under the direction of
Mr. A.P. Singh, Director, Bureau of Administration and Services. Language services were provided under
the direction of Mr. Y.N. Beliaev, Chief, Language and Publications Branch, assisted by Mrs. R.J. Ezrati,
Chief, Interpretation Section, Mr. S.M. Mostafa (Arabic Section), Mr. Li Keli (Chinese Section),
Mr. D. Wilson (English and Publications Section), Mr. P. Butler (French Section), Mr. V. Gapakov (Russian
Section) and Mr. H. Scarone (Spanish Section).
4.3 The physical arrangements for the conference were made by Mr. M. Blanch, Chief,
Conference and Office Services Section, Ms. A. Craig, Document Control Officer and Mr. J.D. Daoust, Chief,
iv-2 iv - History of the Conference
Printing Section. Other specialist officers of the ICAO Secretariat provided advice to the conference as
required.
5. ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA
5.1 The agenda transmitted to the conference by the Air Navigation Commission was adopted
at the first Plenary meeting.
6. WORKING ARRANGEMENTS
6.1 The organization plan submitted to States in advance of the conference was approved without
change at the opening Plenary. The plan called for the establishment of two committees. The two committees
were constituted as shown below:
Committee A (to consider Agenda Items 1, 2, 3 and 4)
Chairman Mr. K. Theil (Denmark)

Vice-Chairman Mr. K. Chamieh (Lebanon)
Secretary Mr. V. Galotti, assisted by Messrs. C. Dalton, B. Day, G. De León,
G. Emausson and N. Karppinen
Committee B (to consider Agenda Items 5, 6 and 7)
Chairman Mr. P.C. Marais (South Africa)

Vice-Chairman Mr. N. Araújo de Medeiros (Brazil)
Secretary Mr. J. Chagas, assisted by Messrs. A. Capretti , V. Iatsouk, M. Paydar,
A. Rizvi and R. Witzen
7. OPENING REMARKS
7.1 President of the Council, Dr. Assad Kotaite
On behalf of the Council and Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), I would like to welcome all of you to the Eleventh ICAO Air Navigation Conference.
And on this occasion, it also gives me great pleasure to introduce to you Dr. Taïeb Chérif, our
newly-appointed Secretary General. Dr. Chérif has served on the Council of ICAO since 1998 and brings to
his new position a great deal of knowledge and experience from the world of international civil aviation.
Over the next 12 days, you will define and agree on the next steps towards fulfilling our
vision of an interoperable, seamless and global air traffic management system for international civil aviation
in the 21st century.
Those of you who attended the Tenth Air Navigation Conference in 1991, or are familiar with
its outcome, will remember it as a pivotal event in the evolutionary process toward an improved air navigation
system. We decided then to move from a ground-based to a largely satellite-based air navigation system that
also relied on digital communications technologies. At that same time, we endorsed a new concept to meet
the future needs of international air transport. Originally known as the Future Air Navigation System or
FANS, it is now known as communications, navigation and surveillance and air traffic management
(CNS/ATM) systems.
Since then, we have all together made considerable progress in many aspects of
implementation of CNS/ATM systems, diligently addressing various technical, operational and institutional
issues.
— ICAO has developed and adopted the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
required for enabling the communications, navigation and surveillance technologies to
be implemented.
— ICAO has also enhanced the effectiveness of mechanisms for the ICAO Planning and
Implementation Regional Groups to foster the introduction of CNS/ATM systems in an
orderly and cost-beneficial manner. These regional planning groups have brought
uniformity and consistency to the exercise.
— ICAO has developed a Global Plan to align and harmonize the systems planning and
implementation process to provide high-level guidance to States, regions, service
providers, users and manufacturers on how to realize benefits from the new technologies.
— And all of us as aviation community partners have been making progress in many other
areas, often incrementally, and I take this opportunity to express my most sincere
appreciation for your excellent contribution.
Now, the time has come to fine-tune our strategy and to embark upon the next phase in
establishing the air navigation infrastructure of the future. New technologies necessary for the modernization
of the air navigation infrastructure are available, and ICAO has developed the relevant global Standards and
Recommended Practices that will help States to implement those new technologies in an orderly and
cost-effective manner. During this conference, we will turn our attention to specific elements of a rejuvenated
approach to the air traffic management component of the equation and also address the CNS technologies.
This conference will review a proposed global air traffic management operational concept.
This global concept is visionary in its description of the services that will be required to operate the global
air traffic management system up to and beyond 2025, while outlining a range of changes that can be
expected throughout the planning horizon. An important premise of the operational concept is the idea that
timely, accurate and quality-assured information will be available and shared on a system-wide basis. The
extensive sharing of information encourages collaborative decision-making, thereby allowing air traffic
management to optimize efficiency in the conduct of its operations.
A critical feature of the air traffic management operational concept is its performance
orientation. This responds to the need for ensuring that we meet the expectations of various stakeholders for
the best possible outcome in terms of safety, efficiency and economics.
Central to the issue of meeting expectations is the type of technologies and systems that will
allow us to meet the various performance requirements of the new air traffic management operational concept.
We must define what facilities, services and systems are needed to move a set number of aircraft through
specific airspaces and airports, in the safest and most efficient manner possible, and based on performance
requirements.
These issues will be discussed within the context of the relationship between technological
developments and operational requirements. In the past, technological developments were driving operations.
We must now shift our approach towards operational needs driving technological developments. Eventually,
we must aim for a more symbiotic relationship between the two streams — technology and operations — so
that we make optimum use of human and financial resources in developing an operationally sound and
productive air navigation system for the 21st century.
Harmonization is another vital factor in providing transparent air traffic services. The
ultimate goal of integration and harmonization is to provide transparent services so that users can operate
seamlessly across different systems, with a consistent level of safety and with minimum requirements for
equipment carriage. We will look at ways to reconcile the differences both within regions and between
neighbouring regions by adopting an approach based on cooperation and consensus building.
As you know, the foundation of the global communications, navigation and surveillance
infrastructure is the availability of the required radio frequency spectrum that enables the safe operation of
all aviation radio systems, be they ground- or satellite-based. In this connection, we will assess the results of
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Radio Conference, held earlier this year. The
conference was very successful for civil aviation and secured continued availability to aviation of the
spectrum. But we cannot rest on our laurels; the next ITU conference will be held in 2007 and we will be
starting our preparation here, at our conference.
We will discuss varied and wide-ranging issues related to aeronautical navigation including
those surrounding the global navigation satellite system (GNSS). In a few moments, the GNSS service
providers will inform the conference of the status of the system’s developments and its evolution. This
information will aid discussions on a number of concerns over the role of satellite-based navigation in the
provision of aeronautical navigation services, today and in the future. Of particular importance are the issues
of GNSS’ vulnerability to interference and its capabilities to support low minima operations. Subsequently,
ICAO’s policy for transition to satellite-based navigation will be updated in light of these discussions and
conference recommendations which are expected to guide the development of aeronautical navigation
services for years to come.
At this conference, we will also review the developments on aeronautical mobile

communications since the Tenth Air Navigation Conference and, in particular, consider the planned evolution
of existing communication systems and the potential development of future ones in the framework of the
global air traffic management operational concept.
As always, safety remains key to all of these considerations. A highly integrated air traffic
management system must be built upon the highest of safety standards. To accomplish this, we need to review
the ways that we address safety. The ICAO Council has adopted Standards that require States to implement
systematic and appropriate air traffic services safety management programmes to ensure that safety is
maintained in the provision of air traffic services. I am pleased that you will be presented at this conference
with the new ICAO Manual on Safety Management for Air Traffic Services and that you will address all
aspects of safety, including the work of the Air Navigation Commission on its Global Aviation Safety Plan,
the expansion of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme to air traffic management and the
idea of a systems approach to safety. We need to gain a total understanding of the safety implications of the
new systems and to identify the measures we must take to maintain and improve upon the excellent safety
record of civil aviation.
In light of the events of 11 September 2001, we must also address security. We need to
understand the vulnerabilities of air traffic management and of communications, navigation and surveillance
infrastructure and to identify practical measures to eradicate or lessen their impact. Indeed, while we forge
ahead in the design of our global air navigation system of the future, the fundamentals of both safety and
security must be our central focus.
Throughout your deliberations, I am sure you will remain conscious of the vulnerable state
of the air transport industry. For the past two years, global air transport has experienced more adversity than
in any other period in its history. In 2001, world passenger traffic fell by 3 per cent as a result of a slowing
world economy and the events of 11 September. These effects continued into 2002 and were intensified by
the build up to war in Iraq. Traffic fell in the first part of 2003 because of the war and particularly the impact
of concerns regarding Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). In many parts of the world, airlines are
now in crisis, characterized by bankruptcies, unprecedented losses, massive layoffs and radically shifting
schedules. As a consequence, many airports have suffered sharp declines in revenues. States have also
experienced financial difficulties regardless of whether they are developed or developing countries.
But, recovery is now under way and traffic for 2003 is expected to be about the same as in
2002 on year-on-year basis. We then expect traffic to rebound, with over 4 per cent growth in 2004 and over
6 per cent in 2005. Our forecasts assume gradual restoration of passenger confidence in international travel,
improved application and facilitation of aviation security measures, an improving world economy and a stable
operating environment. In the longer term, global scheduled passenger traffic growth can be expected to
proceed at an average annual rate of around 4 per cent.
This should motivate us in our drive to develop a work plan that will ensure greater efficiency
of the global air navigation infrastructure. ICAO itself was born in a period of great chaos near the end of the
Second World War, and it has blossomed into one of the most enduring institutions of the 20th century, and
now the 21st century. We must press on with our vision, because the progressive realization of a sound,
flexible and performance-based air navigation system will ultimately be of immense benefit to all sectors of
the industry.
It is now an honour for me to declare open the Eleventh ICAO Air Navigation Conference
and to invite the President of the Air Navigation Commission, Mr. Daniel Galibert, to address the conference
and elaborate on its agenda.
I wish you very successful deliberations.
7.2 President of the Air Navigation Commission,

Mr. D. Galibert
Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, I am sure you will agree that it is difficult to find
something intelligent to say when one intervenes after such a brilliant speaker. So, in order to make sure that
I will get your attention, at least for a moment, I will start by telling you something in confidence — when
the President of the Council, in late 2000, launched the idea of a worldwide air navigation meeting, this did
not initially trigger very much enthusiasm within the Air Navigation Commission. The Rio Conference on
CNS/ATM systems was still fairly recent, amendments to Annex 10 on the CNS side, and to Annex 11 and
the PANS-ATM on the ATM side, were well on their way in order to accommodate, on the one hand, the
rapid technological evolutions and, on the other hand, the necessary improvements to aviation safety. There
were even experiments and implementation projects going on at the regional level. So why hold a
Conference? When I see the numerous attendance of today and the amount of working papers which are to
be presented and the enthusiasm which has been so evident, I realize that Doctor Kotaite has shown, once
more, his visionary perception and wisdom in foreseeing a need for this gathering to address the key subjects
of CNS and ATM. We have indeed many reasons to discuss the subjects at hand and, if I may name a few,
I would like to consider the following:
— the economic situation of the airlines, of our customers, which is a very difficult one and
imposes upon us an overwhelming call for efficiency, quality of service and
productivity.
— the need to remove capacity constraints wherever possible in order to improve the
efficiency of air traffic services and to prepare for the air traffic growth which will,
hopefully, soon come back.
— the technological advances that are so evident. Without quoting all the acronyms that can
be found in the documentation, I would like to recall that we see new satellite
constellations coming, new augmentation systems, new data links in both fields of
communication and surveillance and all this will certainly give us the means to achieve
the safe, cost-effective and environmentally friendly system we are dreaming of. But at
the same time, I cannot help but think that, probably for the first time in aviation’s
history, we might have at our disposal more solutions than we have problems and, in
some cases, more possibilities than our users can realistically afford to investigate.
I am sure that you will have these considerations in mind when going through your agenda
and that you will provide us with sound advice and sensible recommendations to consider.
Speaking of your agenda, I note that two committees will be established to work in parallel
on operational and technical aspects of the conference.
Committee A will address operational issues and the core of this work will take place under
Agenda Item 1 where you will review an ATM operational concept and several concepts of use and enabling
technologies. You will discuss the need to develop ATM requirements, as well as review other planning
activities. The ATM operational concept that you will review describes what is envisaged in the future ATM
system and was developed on the basis of services to be delivered. You will identify the benefits that can be
obtained and to what extent they meet the expectations of the aviation community.
Under Agenda Item 2, the conference will address safety. Since the ATM system is evolving,
the conference will need to re-examine the methods that are used to ensure that safety is achieved and
maintained. It is no longer acceptable to examine systems, people and procedures and all of the elements of
the future ATM system as separate entities, but rather as integrated elements of a much larger system.
Addressing safety in this way requires a systems approach. New separation minima and sharing of
responsibility between pilots and controllers for some ATM services will also require careful safety studies
and new methods for assessing and ensuring that acceptable and agreed to safety levels can be met. The
conference will also review several related safety activities under way in ICAO, including the expansion of
the universal safety oversight audit programme to ATM, the Organization’s Global Aviation Safety Plan,
certification and regulation issues, and you will be presented with ICAO’s new Manual on Safety
Management for Air Traffic Services. This work will lead to a clear safety framework to go along with our
operational concept work under Agenda Item 1. Security issues will also be addressed under this item and
I hope that the conference will reach agreement on practical measures to eradicate or to lessen the impact of
vulnerabilities.
As I said, the operational concept has been developed on the basis of users’ expectations and
has, therefore, a strong performance orientation. Performance must ultimately be measured — this is the new
business reality. The future ATM system must be equitable and accessible; targets for safety and efficiency
must be met and it is necessary to measure all of the various technical and operational aspects of the system.
Under Agenda Item 3, you will review the latest work of ICAO on performance, which includes the new
concept of required total system performance. There is a great deal of work that remains with respect to
measuring performance and the methods that are used to do this, but this work must begin now and our
discussions at this conference will help set the agenda for accomplishing that work.
Finally, Committee A will address capacity enhancement under Agenda Item 4. This is both
an economic and a safety issue. As demand increases in the global ATM system, it is necessary to find the
proper solutions to accommodate it and also to ensure that safety margins will not be eroded. This will require
a review of ICAO provisions and how they interrelate with each other. You will also be presented with
advanced concepts such as collaborative decison-making (CDM) in air traffic flow management or, should
I say, in capacity management. Advanced surface movement guidance and control systems will be another
subject and ICAO will disclose on this occasion its freshly-produced Manual on A-SMGCS. Not to forget the
closely-related subject of runway safety. This area is of concern right now, especially at busy airports, and
you will be presented with work being done to implement runway safety programmes, including ICAO’s
work in this regard. Lastly, I would like to mention another first: ICAO, under that agenda item, will release
an advance copy of its Manual on Simultaneous Operations on Parallel or Near-parallel Instrument
Runways.
Ladies and Gentlemen, let me turn now to the technical issues contained in the agenda of this
conference which will be addressed by the Committee B.
Under Agenda Item 5, the conference will consider the results of the ITU World
Radiocommunication Conference 2003, which were very favourable for aviation. The continued availability
of adequate spectrum to communications, navigation and surveillance systems, and the protection of those
systems from harmful interference are vital to the provision of safe and efficient air navigation services. In
that regard, efforts are under way in ICAO to identify spectrum requirements for new or emerging systems
and to prevent incursion in our spectrum from non-aeronautical systems. This will form part of the
preparation for the next WRC which is currently expected to be held in 2007. I also wish to advise that the
Commission has been concerned with the increasing number of reported cases of interference to radio
aeronautical systems and would welcome discussion on this subject that could lead to practical ways to
eliminate or minimize such occurrences.
Since 1995 when the SP COM/OPS/95 meeting promoted global navigation satellite system
(GNSS) as an ICAO standard navigation aid for all phases of flight, ICAO has developed a body of Standards
and Recommended Practices (SARPs), Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) and related guidance
to support introduction of satellite-based navigation. One clear indication of the amount of work undertaken
in this context is the fact that Annex 10 has been amended every year since 1995 and will again be amended
at the end of this year and, in 2004, many of those amendments are pertaining to GNSS.
It is widely recognized by now that transition to satellite-based navigation is a long-term

commitment, and working papers developed at the request of the Air Navigation Commission for
Agenda Item 6 address basic issues associated with further introduction of satellite-based navigation for all
phases of flight and development of the GNSS new elements. These papers also suggest updates to the Global
Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750). When reviewing those papers, it must be kept in
mind that we have to ensure a progressive integration of GNSS elements with the existing ground-based
navigation infrastructure supporting area navigation (RNAV) and required navigation performance (RNP)
operations. This vision was embraced by the Commission when it agreed recently to re-organize the GNSS
Panel in order to accommodate the work on both satellite-based and conventional navaids and renamed the
panel as the Navigation Systems Panel (NSP). The Commission is also aware of difficulties observed in the
introduction of differing RNP types; it recently agreed to establish the RNP Study Group which is expected
to address related issues and to develop proposals for harmonization of work in this area.
Lastly, as regards guidance material, you will recall that the SP COM/OPS/95 meeting had
called for some assistance from ICAO for the introduction of GNSS and this role had been devoted to Circular
267 published in 1996 but, this time, you will be presented under this agenda item with the just-printed and
most-awaited draft ICAO Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Manual.
Under Agenda Item 7, we expect that the conference will recognize the need to overcome
the saturation of the VHF band, at least in the busiest parts of the airspace, and will recommend solutions for
the evolution of the communications infrastructure within the framework of the global ATM operational
concept and on the basis of available and emerging technologies. In so doing, the conference will be able to
build on the preliminary work conducted within ICAO on the development of communication scenarios as
a common basis for discussion and assessment of the most likely evolution paths. You will note that those
scenarios include potential development of a next generation of terrestrial and satellite systems. Our
discussion on the matter has resulted in a set of guidelines which will be brought to the attention of the
conference; in a nutshell, we acknowledged the fact that, as I said before, Annex 10 was getting thicker every
year and we felt that this Organization should not invest its scarce resources in standardizing any new system
without sufficient guarantee that it is technically proven and will provide operational or financial benefits.
Having heard that long description, you will not be surprised to learn that, after the first
moment of surprise and hesitation, the Air Navigation Commission strongly supported the convening of this
conference and became heavily involved in its preparation. Your deliberations will now take place and they
are expected to result in the formulation of a number of recommendations for guiding the future work of the
Organization in the field of air navigation. ICAO will do its best to follow up on those recommendations in
the most timely manner. However, the overall slowing down of the economy that was mentioned by
Dr. Kotaite in his opening remarks might also affect the Organization and, in particular, its budget for the next
triennium. I would, therefore, recommend that you adopt a prudent and realistic approach when devising your
recommendations and bear in mind that it might become difficult to produce always more within a limited
budget.
I wish you all, on behalf of the Air Navigation Commission, every success in your
deliberations.
8. STATUS REPORTS ON GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO AND

MTSAT
8.1 Status report on GPS

Ms. M. Blakey, United States
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration, I want to thank
you for this opportunity to speak at the Air Navigation Conference. Also, I would like to welcome Secretary
General Chérif to his first major ICAO global conference as Secretary General. It is also mine, and it’s a real
pleasure to join you on this occasion.
I would also like to note that the United States is pleased to be the thirtieth Contracting State
to ratify the Montreal Convention of 1999 that will modernize the seventy-five year old Warsaw Convention
which provides compensation in cases of international air accidents. This is an important effort, and I am
proud the United States is supporting this initiative.
It’s a privilege to take part in a meeting that means so much for the future of our global air
navigation system. This conference will address a wide range of technologies and procedures many of which
hold tremendous potential for improving safety and taking us closer to a truly seamless global aviation
system. Of the topics on the ANC agenda, there is none more important than how we, as a global community,
decide to proceed with the implementation of the global navigation satellite system, or GNSS.
As a major stakeholder in this system, the FAA is grateful for the opportunity to comment
on the potential for satellite-based navigation.
The development of satellite-based air navigation has come a long way since the last Air
Navigation Conference in 1991. That’s when the United States, as the provider of GPS, and the Russians, as
the provider of GLONASS, offered free satellite navigation services to civil aviation for the foreseeable
future.
Since our initial offering, GPS has become a major component of global air navigation
operations. We have taken many satellite navigation technologies and procedures from the conceptual phase,
through a rigorous testing phase, and to the operational phase. There is no question that GPS works — and
it works well.
In May 2000, the United States further improved the GPS accuracy available to the global
civil aviation community by removing Selective Availability, which intentionally degraded the GPS signal.
Selective Availability, under current U.S. policy, has not and will not be re-instituted.
As you know, GPS has been under joint civil-military management since 1996. Both our
executive and legislative branches of government have a consistent dual use policy in place.
GPS reached an important milestone this past July when we commissioned the wide area
augmentation system — known as WAAS — for operational use in U.S. airspace. WAAS is the first
satellite-based augmentation system that has been certified for public use, and it is an important step in
supporting ICAO’s vision of a seamless global navigation satellite system.
WAAS provides such a high level of accuracy, integrity, and availability that it permits
properly equipped aircraft to conduct near-precision approach and landing operations over most of the
contiguous United States. WAAS will also enable the development of required navigation performance, or
RNP, operations. We believe that RNP will facilitate more efficient airspace and procedure design. Simply
put, it will allow us to fly more planes, closer together, and more safely than ever before.
On a global basis, we will continue to work with other service providers to ensure all future
satellite systems are capable of providing interoperable service to all users.
The transition to satellite navigation will advance further with the planned implementation
of GALILEO. We are pleased with our working relationship with our European counterparts and we look
forward to developing bilaterally standards for this new system. We hope that our cooperative efforts will
result in a robust GNSS that will provide increased safety and efficiency for users and service providers.
The United States will continue to modernize GPS and provide increased service capabilities
for all civil users worldwide. We will also continue to provide these enhancements free of direct user fees.
The ability of aircraft to utilize GALILEO, along with a modernized GPS and Russian GLONASS, will
provide increased GNSS capabilities and overall system availability. We will continue our current efforts,
both bilateral and multilateral, to ensure global interoperability of all satellite navigation constellations and
related augmentations.
GNSS provides the most effective — and economic means — to implement a modern
navigation system suitable for aviation commerce in the 21st century. The future of GNSS looks even more
promising, not only in aviation, but also in other modes of transportation.
As we look to the future, GNSS providers should consider the needs and limitations of
smaller, less developed States that have the need for modern air navigation systems. Current GNSS
constellations, including satellite-based augmentation systems, provide service without direct user fees. To
assure the maximum benefit to the entire civil aviation community, we strongly believe that all future
evolutions of GNSS, including augmentations and safety of life navigation signals, must remain free of direct
user charges. GNSS is not a business proposition — it’s a safety proposition.
Through your participation in the Air Navigation Conference, we can chart our global action
plan for the future. What we accomplish here in Montreal during the next two weeks will affect the direction
of ATC modernization for many years to come. When the 12th Air Navigation Conference looks back at
recommendations made by this conference, I hope they will see that we have set the right course for the future
of our global air navigation system.
I ask that you all join me in making a commitment to work through ICAO in developing a
truly seamless and interoperable global system. As ICAO members, we are obligated to look beyond our own
borders, and our own airspace, for ways to improve our global system. Always remember that we share one
world. . .we share one sky. . . and we share one critical mission — SAFETY! Thank you.
8.2 Status report on GLONASS

Mr. A. Neradko, Russian Federation
Mr. Chairman, Conference participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to thank you for the
opportunity to inform the conference about the state of affairs in Russia with regard to implementation of the
CNS/ATM concept. The Russian Federation is still in the position of implementing and making widespread
use of CNS/ATM in civil aviation. In recent years, Russia has taken specific steps in this area. One of the
major contributions by Russia to the transition to the use of the CNS/ATM concept by the world aviation
community is the possibility for aviation users to use the GLONASS satellite navigation system.
The GLONASS global navigation satellite system was developed in the Russian Federation
and it was offered in 1996 for use by aviation civil users without any restrictions for 15 years on a cost-free
basis. The Council of ICAO accepted this offer.
The orbital segment of the GLONASS system is incomplete at the present time.
In August 2001 the Government of the Russian Federation adopted a long-term federal
special programme “Global Navigation System” which is designed for ten years.
The main objectives of the programme are:
— to restore the orbital segment of the GLONASS system to 24 satellites by 2007 to 2008;
— to modernize the navigation satellites, starting with second-generation GLONASS-M

satellites which have improved performance and a lifetime increased to seven years, and
after 2007 to gradually replace satellites with third-generation GLONASS-K satellites
which, together with improved performance and a lifetime of up to 10 to 12 years, will
have the possibility to radiate the navigation signal on the L3 frequency in the
aeronautical radio navigation band.
The budget of the Russian Federation has made provision for allocating resources to restore
the orbital segment and to create a new generation of satellites. It is intended for a second-generation
GLONASS-M satellite to be launched into orbit at the end of 2003 together with two older-generation
GLONASS satellites by the Proton launch vehicle from Baikonur Cosmodrome.
Besides better performance than that of satellites of previous generations and the introduction
of the third frequency in the aeronautical radio navigation band, the third-generation GLONASS-K satellite
will have significantly better size and mass parameters. Its mass will not exceed 700 kg. This will make it
possible to launch these satellites using the Proton launch vehicle with six satellites in one launch, which will
make it possible to restore the orbital segment in a short period of time, and the Soyuz launch vehicle with
two satellites in one launch, which will make it possible to effectively maintain the orbital segment in the
future. These capabilities will make it possible to reduce by several times the costs of deploying and
maintaining the orbital segment of the GLONASS system.
The programme also provides for undertaking scientific research and experimental design
work for the development of the new generation of satellites, for modernizing the ground GLONASS system
control complex and for deploying the production of user equipment, augmentations and an orbital segment
status monitoring system.
In accordance with existing international agreements on ensuring the electromagnetic

compatibility of the GLONASS system with radioastronomy facilities and mobile satellite services, the
Russian Federation will implement the decisions of the International Telecommunication Union on the
transition of the satellite radiation to the lower part of the occupied frequency sub-bands L1 and L2.
Using the GLONASS system with other navigation satellite systems will make it possible
to increase GNSS performance considerably: the accuracy, accessibility, integrity and continuity of
navigation services to aviation users.
Thank you for your attention.

8.3 Status report on GALILEO

Mr. M. Ayral, European Community
Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to speak here at the Eleventh ICAO Air
Navigation Conference about the European initiatives on satellite navigation.
Europe follows a two-step approach in its endeavour to enter into satellite navigation. The
first step is a space-based augmentation system called EGNOS augmenting GPS and GLONASS and will go
into operation in 2004. After a validation and certification phase, EGNOS will provide APV-I and APV-II
capabilities, compliant with the ICAO regulations, over ECAC landmasses.
The second step in our venture is GALILEO, a civil, independent but complementary
European satellite navigation system.
At a later stage, EGNOS will be integrated into GALILEO.
2003 was an important year for GALILEO
The European Member States decided to go ahead with GALILEO and initiated the
development phase. The GALILEO joint undertaking, which will manage this phase, is operational since
1 September.
The frequencies for GALILEO have been secured at the World Radio Conference in Geneva.
The contracts for the first two GALILEO satellites have been signed in July to occupy those
frequencies.
GALILEO is on the right track and we are confident that it will become reality in 2008.
What will GALILEO offer to the User Community?
GALILEO will be a global system for multi modal users. To meet all the different
requirements GALILEO will provide five services:
a) the free to air Open Access Service;
b) the Commercial Service;
c) the Safety of Life Service;
d) the Search and Rescue Service; and
e) the Public Regulated service.
The Safety of Life Service will especially meet the requirements of the aviation community.
This service is designed to meet APV-II requirements worldwide and will provide integrity information along
with service guarantees.
GALILEO as distinct to the currently available systems will provide integrity information
worldwide and service guarantees. GALILEO is a civil system and will be developed and operated in a
transparent way allowing for full service certification. This feature is important for all safety of life
applications but especially for aviation with its strict safety regulations. The need for service guarantees for
safety of life applications has been taken into account already in the design of the system. Legal implications
of service level commitments are driving the GALILEO system implementation. The aviation community
will especially profit from this thorough and clear process as it supports the strict safety and performance
regulations of ICAO and allows establishing clear responsibilities and liabilities for service provision later
on.
GALILEO will be operated by a private concessionaire in a public private partnership to

guarantee long-term viability. The process to select this concessionaire has already started.
It will support the implementation of the Single European Sky that will benefit from a
significant technological change and an investment in the modernization and consolidation of the air traffic
management infrastructure and related services.
This global satellite navigation infrastructure will provide services to all modes of transport
as well as to the widest range of applications; additionally GALILEO will indeed represent a fundamental
tool for the aviation and in particular for the implementation of the Single European Sky.
The way forward sees the provision of EGNOS next year and the implementation of
GALILEO services by 2008.
With GALILEO, along with the other satellite systems, the transition to a global satellite
navigation infrastructure for aviation becomes feasible. Therefore, we ask ICAO to standardise GALILEO
and to consider the European Satellite Navigation Systems in its future strategy.
8.4 Status report on MTSAT

Mr. T. Iwasaki, Japan
Dr. Assad Kotaite, the President of the Council of ICAO, Dr. Taieb Chérif, the Secretary
General of ICAO Secretariat, distinguished Delegates from States, representatives of international
organizations, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of the Government of Japan, it is my honour and privilege
to report to you on the current status of the MTSAT programme in Japan and also to present how MTSAT
has been designed in order to implement global air navigation services, which will be the main focus of this
conference.
As you recall, the Tenth Air Navigation Conference (AN-Conf/10) endorsed the Future Air
Navigation Systems or FANS Concept. The fundamental idea behind the FANS concept was to adopt new
CNS/ATM systems by utilizing satellite-based technologies to overcome the limitation of the current
ground-based systems. Taking this concept into full consideration, Japan has decided to develop and
implement Multi-functional Transport Satellite or MTSAT.
The MTSAT is designed to accommodate a continuous increase of air traffic as well as

improve aviation safety. It will not only provide aeronautical mobile satellite services (AMSS) but also
provide augmentation of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). The first MTSAT is scheduled to launch
in 2004 and will be stationed on a geostationary orbit of 140 degrees east longitude covering areas throughout
the Asia/Pacific Region. The second MTSAT will follow in 2005. In designing the MTSAT, two aspects were
considered as the utmost importance, that is, high redundancy and full interoperability.
In order to ensure the high redundancy, Japan has established a system composing of two
MTSAT and two dedicated aeronautical satellite centres on the ground. This system architecture will ensure
that AMSS and GNSS services will be maintained continuously, even in failure of some components or in
the event of natural disasters. This is the essential feature for the reduction of the longitudinal aircraft
separation that is less than half of the current separation minimum to increase the air traffic capacity over the
North Pacific.
The second aspect is the full interoperability among the systems, one of the issues to be
discussed at this conference. While MTSAT is covering areas throughout the Asia/Pacific Region, we clearly
understand that the satellite would not be used unless it offers global and seamless services. Therefore, we
have made various efforts to establish and assure full interoperability with other systems.
As to AMSS, MTSAT is fully in compliance with the ICAO SARPs. In order to achieve this,
Japan has made an agreement with Inmarsat to ensure the interoperability with their AMSS network. In
addition, Japan has selected a data link service provider for delivering messages internationally with the use
of their ground network. These measures will ensure that anyone utilizing MTSAT will enjoy global and
seamless AMSS all over the world.
As to the augmentation of GNSS, MTSAT is again fully in compliance with the ICAO
SARPs. Japan has tried to assure the full interoperability among the SBAS service providers, that is, the U.S.
WAAS, European EGNOS and our MSAS through coordination at the Interoperability Working Group
(IWG). Several new States, which have recently announced to develop SBAS, have also joined the IWG to
ensure the full interoperability with each other.
In conclusion, the Government of Japan would like to ensure that the MTSAT will provide
a global and seamless AMSS as well as GNSS network maintaining interoperability with other systems. Japan
strongly believes that MTSAT will play a significant role in the capacity and safety enhancement in the
Asia/Pacific Region. Japan hopes that MTSAT will be utilized as a common aeronautical infrastructure in
the region. Japan is fully committed to make continuous efforts to contribute to the development of
international air transport and aviation safety. Thank you very much for your attention.
9. JOINT MEETING OF COMMITTEES A AND B
On 2 October 2003, at a joint meeting of Committees A and B, highlights of the results of

the committees were presented and the following topics of common interest were discussed: security of
aviation infrastructure; data quality (including integrity); status of the Global Air Navigation Plan for
CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750); performance objectives; and aviation frequency spectrum.
——————————
v - List of Participants v-1
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
CD — Chief Delegate ADV — Adviser

ACD — Alternate Chief Delegate COBS — Chief Observer
D — Delegate OBS — Observer
ALT — Alternate
State/Territory/International Name Designation

Organization
Afghanistan Mir, Y. CD
Algeria Yousfi, Y. CD
Arroudj, S. D
Hamed Abdelouahab, F. D
Larfaoui, H. D
Argentina Alvarez, J. CD
Fraga, C. ACD
Trisano, H. ACD
Cimbaro, R. D
Cocchi, G. D
Gouarnalusse, O. D
Rodino, E. D
Sánchez Ara, E. D
Armenia Zadoyan, K. CD
Musoyan, E. ACD
Australia Clegg, S. CD
Kuchel, C. ACD
Mallett, I. ACD
Graff, R. D
Peake, R. D
Shirley, J. D
Woods, J. D
Dollman, W. ADV
Austria Fürst, M. CD
Bahrain Juman, M. CD
Mubarak, S. D
Hassan, A. ALT
Bangladesh Khan, M. CD
Barbados Archer, E. CD
Beckles, M. D
v-2 v - List of Participants

Organization
Belarus Mazaï, N. CD
Belgium Cottyn, J. CD
Callebaut, H. D
Benin Akobi, A. CD
Gasseto, J. ACD
Adjakpa, B. D
Soumaila, A. D
Bolivia Melean Eterovic, E. CD

Quiroga, C. ACD
Fortun Landivar, J. D
Villar Rojas, J. D
Borda, M. ADV
Botswana Mosupukwa, K. CD
Maroba, O. ACD
Brazil De Oliveira Lencastre, F. CD

Araújo de Medeiros, N. ACD
Borges Cardoso, R. ACD
Dos Santos Pohlmann, A. ACD
Basílo Dias, J. D
Hoyer, F. D
Mahler, M. D
Ramos Júnior, C. D
Ribeiro Da Silva, L. D
Rodrigues Filho, R. D
Rodrigues Patrício, E. D
Rolim, H. D
Siewerdt, E. D
Zamprogno, E.R. D
Brunei Darussalam Latip, K. CD

Salleh, M. ACD
Burundi Hajayandi, J. D
Cameroon Ndeh, J. CD
Manga Fouda, F. ACD
Ndeh, C. D
Sama Juma, I. D
Tekou, T. D
Zoa Etundi, E. D

Organization
Canada Preuss, M. CD
Mein, D. ACD
Taylor, J. ACD
Bourgeois, G. D
Chambers, S. D
Fudakowski, T. D
Hohm, M. D
MacDonald, J. D
Taylor, J. D
Bellingham, S. ADV
Bowie, R. ADV
Chad Traoguingue, S. CD
Chile Meirelles, M. CD
Romero, P. ACD
Abatte, H. D
Fernández, A. D
Retamal, D. D
Dueñas, D. ADV
Rossi Jofré, L. ADV
China Liu, S. CD
Lam, A. ACD
Zhang, Y. ACD
Liu, Y. D
Liu, E. D
Zhang, J. D
Leung, W. D
Gao, Y. D
Li, R. D
Li, X. D
Lo, S.M.N. D
So, K. D
Wen, L. D
Wong, D.F. D
Yeung, H. D
Zhang, J. D
Zhang, L. D
Tam, A. D
Colombia Ramírez Mejia, J.C. CD

Muñoz, A. ACD
Ortiz Cuenca, J. ACD
Delgado, G. D
Riveros-Gutiérrez, J. D

Organization
Costa Rica Ramos, M. CD

Fernandez, J. D
Ramirez, L. D
Côte d’Ivoire Elefteriou, G. D
Cuba Ojeda Vives, A. CD

Ara Cruz, F. D
Ayón Alfonso, J. D
Cid Jiménez, G. D
Fabelo Corzo, O. D
Ibáñez Cruz, L.I. D
Morales Lorenzo, P. D
Madrigal Muñoz, R. ALT
Sandoval Morera, J. ADV
Czech Republic Mika, L. CD

Gorgol, O. ACD
Hubert, I. D
Materna, P. D
Democratic People’s Republic Kim H. CD

of Korea Chol, R. D
Kang Ki, K. D
Ri, H. D
Ri, K. D
So Won Ho, S. D
Democratic Republic of the Tabora Afata, G. CD

Congo Marie Omanga, O. ACD
Milinganyo, M. D
Denmark Theil, K. CD
Jensen, L. ACD
Andresen, S. D
Halskov-Jensen, S. D
Dominican Republic Reyes Rodriguez, R. CD
Djibouti Farah, I. D
Ecuador Arellano, I. CD
Bonilla, R. D
Salas, I. ADV

Organization
Egypt El Bagoury, M. CD
El Azab, S. ACD
El Shanabary, M. ACD
Ragheb, M. D
Sadek, H. D
Ryad, M. ALT
El Kady, M. ADV
El Salvador Zaghini, R. CD
Rodas, M. D
Ethiopia Belayneh, M. D
Hunde, G. D
Mekonnen, T. D
Fiji Yee, N. ACD

Baba, O. D
Vave, J. ALT
Finland Talvitie, M. CD
Jaakkola, H. ACD
Nyberg, M. D
Salonen, K. D
Lampi, M. D
Solatie, T. D
Tupamaki, M. D
France Guyard, M. CD
Dobelle, J.-F ACD
Morisseau, F. ACD
Andriamonje, M. D
Bousquet, C. D
Calvet, M. D
Chevallier, J. D
Colin de Verdiere, D. D
Coulardot, F. D
Delhaye, J. D
Lacaze, E. D
Rosso, R. D
Anton, R. ADV
Aqallal, A. ADV
Dabin, M. ADV
Dedryvere, A. ADV
Dumas, C. ADV
Fischer, S. ADV
Lagarrigue, G. ADV
Wonneberger, L. ADV

Organization
Gabon Obiang Zue Beyeme, J. ACD
Ndoutoumou, C. D
Mfoubou-Moudhouma, D. ALT
Gambia Cham, M. CD
Saine, P. ADV
Germany Froböse, H. CD
Mürl, H. CD
Mickler, T. ACD
Nitschke, D. ACD
Radusch, M. ACD
Hoebel, A. ADV
Ghana Boachie, J.A. CD

Addo, E. D
Boateng, P. D
Greece Konstantinidis, S. CD
Kyriakakis, K. ACD
Koukoulas, P. D
Malikoutis, E. D
Neonakis, E. D
Passas, T. D
Guinea Keita, E. CD
Bah, E. D
Diallo, T. D
Kaba, M. D
Haiti St. Juste, F. CD

Legagneur, M. D
Hungary Kiss, L. CD
Szekely, Z. ACD
Kiss, A. D
Kovács, A. D
Mudra, I. D
Sipos, Z. D
Bakos, J. A
Iceland Pálsson, T. CD
Hauksson, H. ACD
Pálsson, A. ACD
Gudmundsson, B. D

Organization
India Roy Paul, K. CD
Zaidi, N. ACD
Gohain, K. D
Kaul, S. D
Khurana, R. D
Ramalingam, K. D
Indonesia Suprojo, C. CD
Syachrudin, E. ACD
Sjioen, J. ACD
Ichwanul, I. D
Abubakar, R. D
Darsosuwignyo, M. D
Dima, W. D
Idrus, I. D
Loftus, A. D
Mala, A. D
Pangastuti, N. D
Setiawan, A. D
Silooy, E. D
Sitompul, Y. D
Taruf, N. D
Iran, Islamic Republic of Mahdavi, G. CD
Iraq Polis, B. CD
Mohammed, F. ACD
Ireland Doyle, K. CD
Brennan, E. D
McGinley, A. D
Ryan, P. D
Israel Attali, M. CD
Italy Sciacchitano, S. CD
Cecchi, R. ACD
D’Aloia, P. ACD
Pilotto, A. ACD
Ciancaglioni, P. D
Del Duca, G. D
Falessi, L. D
Ferraro, E. D
Ferri, P. D
Kalpakjian, K. D
Podiani, F. D
Scazzola, G. D
Sparpaglia, F. D
Adami, S. ADV

Organization
Jamaica Baker, J. CD
Stern, P. ACD
Japan Iwasaki, T. CD
Takeda, H. ACD
Kono, H. ACD
Kosaka, S. ACD
Kudo, M. ACD
Udaka, K. ACD
Suzuki, Y. ACD
Kawakami, M. D
Yamaguchi, S. D
Yamaguchi, S. D
Morishima, T. D
Imamura, J. D
Oshimo, H. ADV
Shirakawa, M. ADV
Kenya Kuto, C. CD
Amukowa, B. D
Nyikuli, S. D
Otiende, P. D
Yagomba, W. D
Kuwait Alfozan, F. CD
Al-Adwani, A. D
Al-Jenaee, Y. D
Latvia Khankhaldov, S. A
Lebanon Chamieh, K. CD
Yehia, H. ACD
Shaaban, F. D
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Abughres, M. CD
Lithuania Danilevicius, V. CD
Chadasevicius, J. D
Jakas, K. D
Matulaitis, G. D
Madagascar Robinson, A. CD
Malawi Matiya, A. ACD

Matemba, J. D
Malaysia Zolfakar, A. CD
Ismail, K. D
Lim, Y. D
Nathan, V. D

Organization
Mali Tradore, C. ACD
Mauritius Gungah, A. CD
Mexico Kobeth Gonzalez, R. CD

Arellano Rodríguez, C. D
Hernandez Sandoval, V. D
Labastida Ponce, A. D
Mendez Mayora, D. D
Pelaez Lira, M. D
Silva, M. ADV
Mongolia Gombosuren, D. CD
Mendbayar, C. D
Morocco Yaalaoui, A. CD
Bousfiha, A. ACD
Moumni, H. D
Alaoui, A. ADV
Fahim, S. ADV
Namibia Günzel, T. CD
Nepal Dhital, U. CD
Adhikari, M. D
Sakya, L. D
Netherlands, Kingdom of the Kneepkens, J. CD

Zandstra, M.J. ACD
De Jong, M. D
Kraan, B. ADV
New Zealand Taylor, C. CD

McConway, J. ALT
Jamieson, A. ADV
Niger Halidou, M. CD
Mayaki, R. ACD
Adamou, A. ACD
Nigeria Oyelade, T. CD
Oyudo, C. ACD
Eniojukan, D. D
Gowon, M. D
Inyamkume, B. D
Modu, A. D
Onasanya, E. D
Oteghile, K. D
Oti, I. D

Organization
Norway Skaar, K. CD
Hernaes, H. ACD
Mo, F. ALT
Oman Al-Adawy, A. CD
Alharithy, A. ADV
Bouëdo, P. ADV
Pakistan Nawaz, A. CD
Awan, M. D
Khan, J. ADV
Panama Chavarria Castillo, H. CD

Barahona, A. D
Dutary, C. D
Garcia de Paderes, R. ADV
Paraguay Farias Servin, C. CD
Peru Hurtado, R. CD
Muñoz, J. CD
Nunez, F. ACD
Avila, P. D
Gamara Malca, M. D
Munete Lozano, J. ALT
Philippines Germino, C. D
Santos, R. ADV
Poland Mikrut, C. CD
Nawroki, B. ACD
Jesionowski, R. D
Lisowski, J. D
Zanienski, A. D
Portugal Monteiro, C. D
Oliviera, A. D
Paraiba, A. D
Ventura, A. D
Republic of Korea Kim, C. CD

Park, M. ACD
Chang, M. D
Kim, G. D
Nam, G. D
Han, D. ADV
Republic of Moldova Buinitki, V. CD

Vartik, V. D

Organization
Romania Ionescu, M. CD
Leu, V. D
Kramer, R. ADV
Nita, S. ADV
Russian Federation Neradko, A. CD

Romanenko, Y. ACD
Meleshko, Y. ACD
Ampilogov, V. D
Falkov, E. D
Korovkin, V. D
Kozlov, V. D
Laletin, S. D
Levshunova, N. D
Lobachev, E. D
Lysenko, I. D
Mikhaylov, B. D
Rudakov, V. D
Saleyev, V. D
Shavlyugin, V. D
Shcherbakov, L. D
Talalai, M. D
Burykin, I. ADV
Chesnokov, V. ADV
Klimov, V. ADV
Kuranov, V. ADV
Lebedev, B. ADV
Mednikov, A. ADV
Nartov, V. ADV
Oleynik, V. ADV
Shilov, A. ADV
Saint Lucia Wilson, H. CD
Saudi Arabia Al-Salmi, M. CD

Al-Alawi, M. ACD
Al-Ghamdi, A. D
Abu-Dawood, H. D
Jahdli, S. D
Al-Aufi, H. D
Al-Jabri, I. D
Mannan, A. D
Fairaq, T. D
Al-Motirey, S. D
Al-Ghorabi, H. ADV
Senegal Gueye, B. CD
Bessane, M. D
Sall, A. ALT

Organization
Serbia and Montenegro Radosavljevic, Z. CD
Singapore Wong, W. CD
Bong, K. ACD
Cheng, H. D
Fernando, M. D
Tan, V. D
Tay, T. D
Yap, P. D
Hong, L. ADV
Lim, S. ADV
Oh, A. ADV
Slovakia Mihalus, M. CD
Slovenia Jansa, S. CD
South Africa Peege, T. CD

Bradshaw, A. ACD
Machobane, S. ACD
Marais, P. ACD
Mabaso, L. D
Mamabolo-Chueu, M. D
Mothusi, T. D
Spain Perez Blanco, J. CD

Arias Serrano, A. D
Calvo Fresno, J. D
Galan, C. D
Gonzalez Diez, E. D
Quereda Rubio, F. D
Rivero Hidalgo, C. D
Rodriguez Gil, L. D
Seco Dominguez, J. D
Adrover, L. ADV
Hernandez Fernandez, M. ADV
Herrero, J. ADV
Morales Lopez, J. ADV
Negrete, L. ADV
Sri Lanka Rajapakse, H. CD

Silva, R. ADV
Wimalshanthi, W. ADV
Sudan Abd El Karim, A. CD

Abdella, I. ACD
Mohamed, H. D
Martin, D. ADV
Swaziland Dube, S. D

Organization
Sweden Hietala, A. CD
Danielsson, J. ACD
Standar, M. D
Redeborn, B. ADV
Switzerland Stucki, P. D
Vonlanthen, L. ALT
Bertz, G. ADV
Schubert, F. ADV
Syrian Arab Republic Alkhatib, N. ACD

Dib, A. D
Thailand Hetrakul, P. CD
Kalayanajati, R. D
Rongthong, S. D
Sang-Ngurn, N. D
Wongsongsarn, S. D
The former Yugoslav Republic Hamidi, F. CD

of Macedonia
Togo Amelete, B. CD
Latta, D. CD
Dobou, K. D
Tonga Faletau, A. CD
Maake, V. D
Tunisia Berrajah, A. CD
Chettaoui, N. ACD
Benkhelifa, H. D
Cherif, M. D
Dridi, R. D
Hedfi, A. D
Becheikh, M. ADV
Turkey Calisar, S. CD
Enc, F. D
Cendek, U. D
Birdal, O. D
Kilic, M. D
Ergin, A. D
Sarigul, G. D
Aygun, C. D
Zeren, A. D

Organization
Uganda Akandonda, A. CD
Kagoro, J. D
Musoke, A. D
Ukraine Petriv, L. CD
Afanasiev, V. ACD
Avramenko, O. D
Babeychuk, D. D
Bezmal, V. D
Cherednichenko, Y. D
Melnyk, O. D
Nastasiyenko, V. D
Prystaiko, V. D
United Arab Emirates Al Amoudi, A. D

Roberts, P. D
United Kingdom Elder, R. ACD

Evans, D. ACD
Coombs, B. D
Daly, H. D
Jackson, J. D
Knill, A. D
Lawson, J. D
Roberts, P. D
Sayce, A. D
Ashton, K. ADV
United Republic of Tanzania Alloo, M. CD

Nundu, O. ACD
Makoroma, G. D
Mpinga Mgana, C. D
Paul, L. D
Sajan, I. D
United States Blakey, M. CD

Keegan, C. ACD
Salvano, D. ACD
Aguilera, F. D
Carmody, J. D
Chew, R. D
Cirillo, M. D
Coulson, R. D
Eck, J. D
Fagan, C. D
Howell, T. D

Organization
Jennison, M. D
Lavin, D. D
Levine, G. D
MacKenzie, W. D
Mandel, D. D
McGraw, J. D
Phillips, B. D
Price, F. D
Scardina, J. D
Serwer, C. D
Stimpson, E. D
Storm, A. D
Voss, W. D
Westover, M. D
Williams, J. D
Schanne, J. ALT
Brown, J. ADV
United States (continued) Decleenes, B. ADV
Fee, J. ADV
Herishen-Smith, S. ADV
Orlando, J. ADV
Pozesky, M. ADV
Valentine, B. ADV
Uruguay Olmedo, D. CD
Tardaguila, A. D
Tissoni, A. D
Venezuela Paz Fleitas, F. CD

Blanco, R. D
Guerra Pinto, F. D
Velasquez Leon, L. D
Viet Nam Bui Van, V. CD

Le Quoc, K. D
Nguyen, H. D
Yemen Abdulkader, M. CD
Bafaqih, A. ACD
Jawlah, A. D

Organization
Zambia Kabalika, C. CD
Chishala, H. D
Kapwepwe, C. D
Mambwe, E. D
Sinjwala, P. D
Mwanza, P. ALT
OBSERVERS
Palestine Abu Halib, S. OBS

Abu-Halim, S. OBS
Salman, M. OBS
Aeronautical Radio, Inc. Glennon, R. COBS

(ARINC) Belcher, J. OBS
Hutchinson, K. OBS
Jeffers, B. OBS
Montgomery, E. OBS
Nagowski, V. OBS
Oischi, R. OBS
African Civil Aviation Heshmat, M. OBS

Commission (AFCAC)
Agency for Air Navigation Fokoua, T. OBS

Safety in Africa and Guitteye, A. OBS
Madagascar (ASECNA) Jaquard, P. OBS
Ndiaye, M. OBS
Airports Council International Gamper, D. OBS

(ACI) Heitmeyer, R. OBS
Arab Civil Aviation Daoudi, A. COBS

Commission (ACAC) Lahboubi, A. OBS
Central American Corporation Oyuela Martine, J. COBS

for Air Navigation Services Mendoza, G. OBS
(COCESNA) Urbizo Fley, U. OBS
Civil Air Navigation Services Ter Kuile, T.A. OBS

Organization (CANSO)
Common Market for Eastern Van Der Westhuizen, V. OBS

and Southern Africa
(COMESA)

Organization
European Civil Aviation Benjamin, R. COBS

Conference (ECAC) Mariadassou, J. OBS
Stastny, P. OBS
European Community (EC) Ayral, M. COBS

Bernabei, C. OBS
Chatre, E. OBS
Ureher, J. OBS
Van Houtte OBS
European Organisation for the Aguado, V. COBS

Safety of Air Navigation Bauchet, J. OBS
(Eurocontrol) Bozsa, I. OBS
Cerasi, E. OBS
Hendriks, A. OBS
Miaillier, B. OBS
Philipp, W. OBS
Rees, M. OBS
Sauvage, J. OBS
Stastny, P. OBS
Van Dam, R. OBS
International Air Transport Matschnigg, G. COBS

Association (IATA) Comber, M. OBS
Davies, J. OBS
Dumsa, A. OBS
Heighes, R. OBS
Kneeland, A. OBS
Kritter, E. OBS
Lay, P. OBS
Rochat, P. OBS
Shand, A. OBS
Thompson, R. OBS
Van den Boogaard, K. OBS
Wilson, G. OBS
International Association of Carel, O. OBS

Institutes of Navigation (IAIN)
International Business Aviation Spruston, D. COBS

Council (IBAC) Ingleton, P. OBS
Longmuir, S. OBS
Paine, T. OBS
Stine, B. OBS

Organization
International Coordinating Camus, P. OBS
Council of Aerospace Industries Murphy, T. OBS
Associations (ICCAIA) Potocki, P. OBS
International Council of Aircraft Sheehan, J. COBS

Owner and Pilot Associations Hofmann, F. OBS
(IAOPA)
International Federation of Air Ruitenberg, B. COBS

Traffic Controllers’ Baumgartener, M. OBS
Associations (IFATCA) Beadle, A. OBS
Churchill, D. OBS
Iavorskaia, T. OBS
International Federation of Air McCarthy, P. COBS

Line Pilots’ Associations Denke, C. OBS
(IFALPA) Frühwirth, H. OBS
Marin, M. OBS
Meyer, H. OBS
Newman, L. OBS
Torn, R. OBS
International Federation of Air Dillman, A. OBS

Traffic Safety Electric Ouellette, Y. OBS
Association (IFATSEA) Efford, C. ADV
International Mobile Satellite Norrish, L. OBS

Organization (IMSO)
International Transport Workers Enright, S. COBS

Federation (ITF) Magee, J. OBS
Marlin, R. OBS
Myles, G. OBS
Weiland, R. OBS
Inter-State Aviation Committee Ermolov, O. OBS

(IAC) Filatov, A. OBS
Rukhlinskiy, V. OBS
Société internationale de Clinch, P. COBS

télécommunications Charlton, A. OBS
aéronautiques (SITA) Mattos, A. OBS
Sharma, A. OBS
——————————
vi - Agenda of the Conference vi-1
AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE
Agenda Item 1: Introduction and assessment of a global air traffic management (ATM) operational
concept
1.1: The global ATM operational concept
1.2: Enabling concepts in support of the global ATM operational concept
1.3: The need for a global air navigation plan
1.4: The role of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) technologies
Agenda Item 2: Safety and security in air traffic management (ATM)

2.1: Safety management systems and programmes
2.2: Safety certification of ATM systems
2.3: Safety regulation
2.4: Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP)
2.5: Safety and security of the ATM infrastructure
Agenda Item 3: Air traffic management (ATM) performance targets for safety, efficiency and
regularity and the role of required total system performance (RTSP) in this respect
3.1: Performance targets for ATM
3.2: The concept of RTSP
Agenda Item 4: Capacity-enhancement measures

4.1: Global measures
4.2: Regional measures
Agenda Item 5: Review of the outcome of the ITU World Radio Conference (2003) (WRC-2003) and
its impact on aeronautical electromagnetic spectrum utilization
Agenda Item 6: Aeronautical navigation issues

6.1: Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) development status based on reports from
States, service providers and industry organizations
6.2: Navigation policy issues in the light of present and envisaged GNSS services and
architectures, integration and back-up options
6.3: Amendments on aeronautical navigation subjects in relevant ICAO documents
including the Global Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750),
Annex 10 — Aeronautical Telecommunications and other documents as necessary
6.4: Directions for future development of aeronautical navigation services
Agenda Item 7: Aeronautical air-ground and air-to-air communications
——————————
vii - Glossary of Terms vii-1
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
AAC aeronautical administrative communication

AAI Airports Authority of India
AAIM aircraft autonomous integrity monitoring
ABAS aircraft-based augmentation system
ACARS aircraft communications addressing and reporting system
ACAS airborne collision avoidance system
ACP Aeronautical Communications Panel
ADP aeronautical data package

ADREP Accident/Incident Data Reporting
ADS automatic dependent surveillance
ADS-B automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast

ADS-C ADS contract
ADSP Automatic Dependent Surveillance Panel

AEEC Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee
AES aircraft earth station
AGAS Action Group on ATM Safety

AICM Aeronautical Information Conceptual Model
AIXM Aeronautical Information Exchange Model
AIM aeronautical information management
AIP aeronautical information publication
AIS aeronautical information services
AMSS aeronautical mobile-satellite service
AOA ACARS over aviation
AOC aeronautical operational control
APANPIRG ASIA/PAC Air Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group
APC aeronautical public communications
APT Asia Pacific Telecommunity
vii-2 vii - Glossary of Terms
ARINC Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
ARTCC air route traffic control centre

ASAS airborne separation assistance system
Agence pour la Sécurité de la Navigation Aérienne en Afrique et à
ASECNA
Madagascar (ASECNA)
ASMG Arab Spectrum Management Group
ATC air traffic control
ATM air traffic management
ATMCP Air Traffic Management Operational Concept Panel
ATN aeronautical telecommunication network
ATS air traffic services
ATU African Telecommunication Union
AW aerial work
C/A code coarse acquisition code
CAIS computerized aeronautical information services

CAR/SAM Caribbean/South American
CC compliance checklist
CENPAC Central Pacific
CEPT European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CITEL Commisión Interamericana de Telecommunicaciones
CNS/ATM communications, navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management
CNS communications, navigation, and surveillance
COTS commercial off-the-shelf

CPDLC controller-pilot data link communications
CS commercial service
CSA channel of standard accuracy (GLONASS)
D-ATIS data link-automatic terminal information service
D-VOLMET VOLMET data link service
DFIS data link flight information services

DME distance measuring equipment
DOP dilution of precision
EAD European AIS database
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference
ECIP European Convergence and Implementation Plan

EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
ENRI Electronic Navigation Research Institute
ESA European Space Agency
ETG European Tripartite Group
EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
Eurocontrol European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation

FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FANS future air navigation systems
FASID Facilities and Services Implementation Document
FIR flight information region
FIS-B flight information services — broadcast
FL flight level
FOC final operating capability
GA general aviation
GAGAN GEO augmented navigation
GASP Global Aviation Safety Plan
GBAS ground-based augmentation system
GEO geostationary earth orbit
GIS geographic information system
GLONASS GLObal NAvigation Satellite System
GNSS global navigation satellite system
GNSSP Global Navigation Satellite System Panel
GPS Global Positioning System (GPS)
GRAS ground-based regional augmentation system

GREPECAS CAR/SAM Regional Planning and Implementation Group
HF high frequency
IAOPA International Council of Aircraft Owner and Pilot Associations
IATA International Air Transport Association

IBAC International Business Aviation Council
ICCAIA International Co-ordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
IFALPA International Federation of Airline Pilots’ Associations
IFATCA International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations
ILS instrument landing system

IMO International Maritime Organization
INS inertial navigation system
IRS inertial reference system
ISRO Indian Space Research Organisation

ITU International Telecommunication Union
IWG Interoperability Working Group

JAA Joint aviation authorities
JCAB Japan Civil Aviation Bureau

JTSO JAA technical standing order
LEO low earth orbit(ing satellite)
LNAV lateral navigation

LOSA line operations safety audit
MASPS minimum aviation system performance standards
MCS master control station

MDR multimode digital radio
MEL minimum equipment list
MEO medium earth orbit
MET meteorology
MLS microwave landing system
MMR multi-mode receiver

MNPS minimum navigation performance specification
MRS monitor and ranging station

MSAS MTSAT satellite-based augmentation system
MTSAT multi-functional transport satellite
NAS national airspace system

NEXCOM next generation air/ground communications
NOPAC North Pacific
NOSS normal operations safety survey
NSE navigation system error
OCP Obstacle Clearance Panel
OPLINKP Operational Data Link Panel

OS open service
P-code (GPS/GLONASS) precision code
PA precision approach
PANS-OPS Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Aircraft Operations (Doc 8168)
PANS Procedures for Air Navigation Services
Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Air Traffic Management
PANS-ATM
(Doc 4444)
PDC pre-departure clearance
PIRG planning and implementation regional group

PPS precise positioning service (GPS)
PZ-90 parameters of the Earth 1990 co-ordinate system
R&D research and development

RAIM receiver autonomous integrity monitoring
RASP required ATM system performance

RCC rescue coordination centre
RCP required communication performance
RF radio frequency
RMP required monitoring performance

RMS root mean square
RMS remote monitoring station
RNAV area navigation
RNP required navigation performance
RNSS radionavigation satellite service
ROIs Roadmap of Operational Improvements

RPP required planning performance
RSP required surveillance performance
RTSP required total system performance
RVSM reduced vertical separation minimum
SA selective availability (GPS)
SAAQ State Aviation Activity Questionnaire

SAR search and rescue
SARPs Standards and Recommended Practices
SATCOM satellite communication
SBAS satellite-based augmentation system

SCAT-I Special Category I (approach system)
SCRSP Surveillance and Conflict Resolution Systems Panel

SDU satellite data unit
SID standard instrument departure
SITA Airline Telecommunications and Information Services
SoL safety of life

SPS standard positioning service (GPS)
SSR secondary surveillance radar
STAR standard instrument arrival
STDMA self-organizing time-division multiple access
SV space vehicle
TACAN tactical air navigation
TDMA time division multiple access
TEM threat and error management

TIS-B traffic information service — broadcast
TLAT Technical Link Assessment Team
TSE total system error
TSO (FAA) technical standard order
UACC upper area control center
UAT universal access transceiver
UHF ultra-high frequency
USOAP universal safety oversight audit programme

UTC Co-ordinated Universal Time
VDL VHF digital link

VHF very high frequency
VNAV vertical navigation
VOR VHF omnidirectional range radio
WAAS wide area augmentation system

WGS-84 world geodetic system-1984
WRC-2003 World Radiocommunication Conference (2003)
XML extensible mark-up language
————————
Report on Agenda Item 1 1-1
Agenda Item 1: Introduction and assessment of a global air traffic management (ATM)
operational concept
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.1.1 Under this agenda item, the conference reviewed and assessed a global air traffic
management (ATM) operational concept and several enabling concepts. Other issues related to the future
ATM system such as the need to develop ATM requirements, the role and function of the Global Air
Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Global Plan, Doc 9750), the role of airborne collision avoidance
systems (ACAS) and the planning mechanisms necessary to progress toward implementation of a future ATM
system based on the ATM operational concept were discussed.
1.2 THE GLOBAL ATM OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
1.2.1 The conference reviewed the global ATM operational concept (operational concept) as
developed by the Air Traffic Management Operational Concept Panel (ATMCP) under the guidance of the
Air Navigation Commission. The conference recalled that, in follow-up to the Tenth Air Navigation
Conference (Montreal, 5 to 20 September 1991), States, international organizations and ICAO, at the global
level and regional level through planning and implementation regional groups (PIRGs), had embarked on
communications, navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management (CNS/ATM) systems planning and
implementation programmes intended to improve aviation operations by making use of CNS/ATM
technologies. Although good progress had been made, it was later recognized that a comprehensive concept
of an integrated and global ATM system, based on clearly-established requirements, would facilitate the
implementation programmes. This concept, in turn, would form the basis for the coordinated implementation
of CNS/ATM technologies and progression to a more global and interoperable ATM system.
1.2.1.1 The conference was informed that the operational concept presented to the conference had
been initially reviewed by the Air Navigation Commission in follow-up of the first full panel meeting of the
ATMCP (18 to 28 March 2002). After the Commission’s review, the operational concept had been circulated
to States and international organizations for assessment and to make recommendations for improvement. The
comments received had been reviewed by the ATMCP in accordance with the instructions of the Air
Navigation Commission which led to several changes. The Air Navigation Commission then had reviewed
the revised operational concept and had agreed that it should be presented to the conference for assessment.
The Commission had agreed to take further action on the operational concept on the basis of the
recommendations of the conference.
1.2.1.2 The conference was informed that the issue of sovereignty was an important cornerstone of
the operational concept, recognizing that the operational concept should neither infringe upon nor impose
restrictions on States’ sovereignty, authority or responsibility for the control of air navigation.
1.2.1.3 The conference noted that the planning horizon used for the development of the operational
concept was up to and beyond the year 2025 and that the operational concept outlined a range of conceptual
changes that would evolve through the planning horizon. Key to the philosophy adopted within the
operational concept was the notion of global information utilization, management and interchange. This was
seen as the enabler of significant change in the roles of all participants within the ATM system, which would
facilitate enhancements in safety, economy and efficiency across the ATM system. The goal, therefore, was
an evolution to a holistic, cooperative and collaborative decision-making environment, where the expectations
of the members of the ATM community would be balanced to achieve the best outcome based on equity and
1-2 Report on Agenda Item 1
access. It was noted that this was in contrast to the present day principle of “first-come, first-served” and
would better achieve an incentive-based approach to investments for the improvement of ATM.
1.2.1.4 The benefits which could be expected from implementation of an ATM system based on the
operational concept were recognized by the conference. From an airspace user perspective, greater equity in
airspace access, greater access to timely and meaningful information for decision support and more autonomy
in decision-making including conflict management, would result in optimum system outcomes with minimum
deviation from user-requested flight trajectories. From a service provider perspective, including that of airport
operators, the ability to operate within an information-rich environment, with real-time data, as well as system
trend and predictive data, fused with a range of automated decision-support or decision-making tools, would
enable optimization of services to airspace users. From a regulator perspective, safety systems were envisaged
to be robust and open, allowing safety not only to be more easily measured and monitored, but also compared
and integrated on a global basis.
1.2.1.5 The conference agreed that the operational concept provided a vision that would allow States
and regions to align their planning processes, allow system solution engineering to be directed toward a
harmonized and interoperable outcome, allow airspace users and service providers to share data and
information to best mutual outcome, and enhance levels of safety, economy and efficiency, for the good of
all members of the ATM community. The need for social dialogue as the future ATM system was designed
and implemented was stressed, as was the need for ATS personnel to be involved in all stages of the
development process.
1.2.1.6 The conference recognized that the section of the operational concept dealing with conflict
management would lead to the most significant changes in the future ATM system and that much more work
had to be accomplished and consensus reached in order to safely implement the techniques envisaged. Also,
evolution to the concept component of conflict management should occur in a careful, considered and
evolutionary fashion, with full participation of the ATM community. Among several issues raised was the
need to ensure that the ATM system needed to respect the different nature of the three layers of conflict
management identified in the operational concept (i.e. strategic conflict management, tactical conflict
management and collision avoidance) and that they must be incorporated appropriately into the ATM system
design. It was agreed that clearly-established principles of operation had to be developed that did not lead to
system users having to respond to conflicting and contrary demands.
1.2.1.7 The conference agreed that the conflict management process, as described in the operational
concept, would enable the ATM users to collaboratively interact to achieve the best overall outcome for ATM
as a whole, and that this attribute of collaboration would bring with it a responsibility on each user that should
be characterized by cooperation and trust. It was agreed that the above issues, and others raised, should be
forwarded to the bodies that would be involved in the continuing work on conflict management.
1.2.1.8 The conference was presented with the activities of several States, regions and sub-regions
toward improving ATM systems and procedures, which included collaborative efforts across regions. This
included a report on the significant efforts under way in Europe to implement a fully harmonized, highly
interoperable and seamless European ATM system and, in particular, toward establishment of the European
Upper Flight Information Region as part of the implementation of the single European sky, which, it was
noted, was aimed at eliminating the fragmentation of airspace in Europe. The conference was also presented
with a significant effort under way in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to ensure the
realization of the main benefits of the operational concept through regional and sub-regional harmonization
of air navigation systems and eventual integration into the global ATM system.
1.2.1.9 During the discussions, the conference was made aware that such regional solutions could
cause difficulties to neighbouring regions if coordination with, and participation of, all affected States and
regions was not thorough. The need for adequate inter-regional planning and coordination was therefore
stressed.
1.2.1.10 In addition to the above, the conference agreed that the global ATM system must meet the
differing requirements of the various regions and States. Scalability and adaptability would have to be taken
into account in future work on scenarios, transition strategies and planning for implementation. In the same
context, it was recognized that States with less developed aviation or ATM systems would also play an
important role in the development of an integrated global ATM system and that such States could benefit
significantly from full integration into a global ATM system. Therefore, these States should be afforded full
participation in development of regional and global ATM systems. Due importance must therefore be attached
to the development of ATM systems in such States through the provision of technical support and financial
and funding mechanisms to address imbalances in economic development.
1.2.1.11 The conference agreed that it would be essential that transition strategies based on a roadmap
detailing the migratory path necessary for all members of the ATM community to manage their activities in
parallel would be useful. In this context, the conference was informed that the ATMCP already had this item
in its work programme and that the panel would likely resume its work in April of 2004 in follow-up to the
conference. A roadmap offered by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the roadmap of
the European ATM Strategy 2000+ would therefore be forwarded to the ATMCP for use in its further work.
1.2.1.12 Based on the discussions on the operational concept, the conference expressed its full support
for the operational concept and agreed that there was a need for all CNS/ATM partners to rally around one
global ATM operational concept. In consideration of the above, the conference endorsed the global ATM
operational concept and agreed on the following recommendation.
Recommendation 1/1 — Endorsement of the global ATM operational

concept
That:
a) ICAO, States and planning and implementation regional groups

(PIRGs), consider the global ATM operational concept as the common
global framework to guide planning for implementation of ATM
systems and to focus all ATM development work;
b) the global ATM operational concept be used as guidance for

development of ICAO CNS/ATM related provisions;
c) States with the support of the other members of the ATM community
undertake work to validate the seven components in the global ATM
operational concept;
d) ICAO, States and PIRGs develop transition strategies for

implementation of ATM systems based on the global ATM operational
concept; and
e) ICAO align its technical work programme to facilitate future work

related to the global ATM operational concept.
1.2.1.13 The conference considered the effect of military activity on the ATM system and expressed
its view that processes of close coordination should be put in place in order to satisfy the needs of all airspace
users and to assure overall safety. The conference agreed that the issue of discretionary military activity and
its effect on civil aviation would be best addressed at the national and regional levels through the normal
planning and coordination processes. However, it would be in the best interest of international civil aviation
if military authorities were fully briefed on activities related to planning and implementation of the
operational concept and were involved and integrated into long-term planning and implementation efforts.
The conference therefore agreed on the following recommendation.
Recommendation 1/2 — Coordination with military authorities
That States take appropriate action to coordinate the global ATM operational
concept with their military authorities with a view to achieving maximum
cooperation and integration in an effort to implement a flexible and
cooperative approach to airspace organization and management.
1.2.1.14 The conference was reminded that CNS/ATM systems were intended to accommodate the
needs of all airspace users, including general aviation (GA) and aerial work (AW) operations and that often,
airspace design, aircraft equipment requirements and operational procedures did not address the needs of
GA/AW operators. The conference agreed that while CNS/ATM systems must be designed to provide
services to commercial air transport, user provisions must also be made to accommodate the needs of GA/AW
operators as well. It was noted that this could be accomplished by instituting procedures and employing
technology that would permit access to valuable airspace segments without either unnecessarily excluding
GA/AW operations or requiring on-board equipment effectively excluding them. In this context, the vision
statement in the operational concept was recalled which made reference to all users, as well as the operational
concept expectation of “access and equity” which also addressed this issue. However, it was agreed by the
conference that, as work toward planning for implementation of an ATM system based on the operational
concept, or any future work emanating from the concept or the conference, progressed, the needs of the
GA/AW community should be fully considered.
1.2.1.15 Several additional issues were discussed and the conference agreed that although there was
strong support for the operational concept, it was understood that these issues, which were not addressed in
great depth in the operational concept, would have to be more fully dealt with in the ensuing work emanating
from the conference. These included legal, financial, environmental, human factors and security issues.
Additionally, the conference agreed that there was a need to stress the criticality of frequency spectrum to the
successful implementation of the future ATM system and that this requirement should be raised in appropriate
fora.
1.2.1.16 In concluding its discussions on this item, the conference agreed that the operational concept
should be considered as a “living” document that would have to be revisited from time to time to take into
account the changing nature of technology, the results of validation, as well as other factors; however, it was
also necessary to consider the operational concept as a completed body of work at this point, in order to have
a common basis to continue work toward a global ATM system.
ATM requirements
1.2.1.17 The conference was presented with a framework in which a future ATM system based on the
operational concept could develop, which included the interrelationships and dependencies of the various
activities involved. The conference noted that the framework used by the ATMCP for the development and
evolution of the global ATM system stipulated the development dependencies as follows:
a) ATM community expectations. The needs and expectations of the ATM community
would guide operational concept development.
b) ATM operational concept. The operational concept would provide the vision to direct
the development of the global ATM system.
c) ATM requirements. The ATM requirements would specify the scope, characteristics
and attributes forming the ATM system. The ATM requirements collectively would
provide for the development of a functional architecture and system specifications.
d) Global ATM system design. The global ATM system design would be driven by ATM
requirements, taking into account external factors identified in the Global Plan. The
design would include the functional architecture needed to achieve the required system
performance (performance is addressed under Agenda Item 3). The system design would
provide the basis for a scalable response to achieve explicit expectation outcomes
(expectations were contained in the operational concept). The review and development
of necessary Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) and Procedures for Air
Navigation Services (PANS) would complete the design process. It was important that
SARPs and PANS were traceable to the ATM requirements which originated from the
operational concept.
e) Balancing requirements. The operational concept would envisage the balancing of the
concept components which were integrated to achieve different expectation outcomes.
From the guidance and planning criteria, specific technological solutions could be
selected for implementation.
f) Implementation. The implementation of facilities and services would be based on

guidance and transition strategies that identified all requirements. The regional air
navigation plans would then provide the transition blueprint for implementation of
system changes that must occur on a region-wide basis.
g) ATM community operations. The implementation of facilities and services would

allow for operations that met the expectations of the ATM community.
1.2.1.18 The conference was made aware that the dependencies identified above would allow a
coordinated framework for the work that must be done. Furthermore, a structured framework would provide
the means to ensure that the development of ATM requirements, SARPs and procedures, would proceed in
a thorough and well-documented manner.
1.2.1.19 The conference noted that the process of developing ATM requirements would be
accomplished through the derivation of the functions that the operational concept envisioned that the ATM
system would provide, followed by specification of the ATM requirements for those functions. It was noted
that a concept component function was a characteristic action or activity that must be performed in order to
achieve a desired ATM community expectation or objective. The identification of the concept component
functions was an iterative process and would continue until all functions and sub-functions necessary to
describe the expected performance of the concept component had been derived.
1.2.1.20 It was further noted that the operational concept component functional requirements did not
describe the full set of ATM requirements. Operating requirements must also be derived to describe the ATM
system operating elements and the performance it must meet to achieve the functional interactions described
in the scenarios. It was stressed that aeronautical information services (AIS) and meteorological services
(MET) were subsets of the ATM information requirements and therefore, would need to be fully addressed
when developing ATM requirements.
1.2.1.21 The conference recognized that a balance was required between the need for global safety
and interoperability requirements and that safety should be considered as paramount when developing ATM
requirements. Additionally, it was considered that interoperability requirements should not be exclusively
considered only as an issue of requirements between facilities, States or regions, but should also be
considered on a smaller scale, for example, between air traffic control units in a single State.
1.2.1.22 The conference considered that in order to progress toward implementation of a global ATM
system as envisaged in the operational concept, several follow-up activities must take place. These included
specification, design and planning of the ATM system as well as development of SARPs, procedures and
guidance material necessary for implementation. The next step in the development process should therefore
be the development of a clear set of ATM requirements. Based on this, the conference endorsed the following
recommendation.
Recommendation 1/3 — Development of ATM requirements
That ICAO as a high priority develop a set of ATM functional and operating
requirements for a global ATM system on the basis of the global ATM
Development of SARPs from the operational concept
1.2.1.23 In follow-up to the above discussion on ATM requirements and the review of the ATM
development process, the conference was presented with a framework for the review and development of
SARPs in relation to the operational concept. It was noted that the framework was developed by the ATMCP
to facilitate the complete development process of a global ATM system. The conference agreed that SARPs
development would be a critical element when considering progression to implementation of a global ATM
system. It was agreed that as part of the planning activities necessary to implement facilities and services that
would meet ATM requirements, the need for relevant SARPs must be identified and the nature and objective
of the SARPs described and that, ultimately, CNS/ATM related SARPs should be traceable to ATM
requirements. The conference recognized that such a process would be progressively implemented on an
evolutionary basis. In order to ensure a thorough and traceable ATM development process, the conference
agreed on the following recommendation.
Recommendation 1/4 — Development of Standards and Recommended

Practices (SARPs) from the global ATM
operational concept
That ICAO, when developing CNS/ATM-related SARPs, ensure that such

SARPs are traceable to ATM requirements.
Interoperability and seamlessness
1.2.1.24 The conference was presented with a paper which identified the need to come to a clear
understanding of the terms “interoperable” and “seamless”, noting that the two terms were often used when
referring to the future ATM system and, in particular, when attempting to convey the expectations of that
system. It was agreed that because interoperability was such an important factor when considering the future
ATM system, and due to the need to ensure interoperability and seamlessness in that system, common
understandings of these notions were necessary. Therefore, there was a need to develop these notions within
the context of an ATM system, which included operators, pilots, air traffic controllers and procedures, as well
as systems and other agents.
1.2.1.25 The conference was made aware of the explanation of the terms intended to assist in the
development of the operational concept as follows:
a) Interoperability within the ATM system might be described as the ability to transfer
information, or effect functionality, across any discontinuity, in order to enable
operations; and
b) Seamless within the ATM system might be described as the property that would allow
a transition across any discontinuity which, from the perspective of the transiting agent,
did not require a considered action to facilitate the transition. It should be noted that, in
this context, seamless did not imply ATM systems convergence into singleness.
1.2.1.26 It was recognized that interoperability was primarily associated with the need for systems,
people and procedures, among other things, to operate effectively across disparate systems, whereas seamless
was primarily associated with the needs of the users or operators of a system. An important objective of a
seamless ATM system was therefore to ensure that, as aircraft operated across different regions where various
levels of service existed, those services would be delivered in a manner that allowed the aircraft to operate
seamlessly, with a consistent level of safety being provided.
1.2.1.27 On the basis of the above, the conference agreed that when developing ATM requirements,
it would also be essential that corresponding requirements for interoperability and seamlessness be defined.
1.2.1.28 It was cautioned however, that there must be an effort to avoid prescribing excessively
prescriptive requirements with respect to interoperability and seamlessness and that the goal should be toward
achieving a transparency of functions, procedures and operations. Thus a balance was needed which would
also ensure accommodation of existing systems while allowing emerging systems and new technological
solutions to be integrated in the air navigation infrastructure. The conference stressed that the goal should not
be to develop a single system, but to develop a global ATM system that accommodated and seamlessly
integrated many interoperable systems.
1.2.1.29 On the basis of the discussions and considering the importance of interoperability and
seamlessness with respect to the future ATM system based on the ATM operational concept, the conference
agreed on the following recommendation:
Recommendation 1/5 — Interoperability and seamlessness
That ICAO, when developing ATM requirements, define a corresponding

minimum set of requirements for interoperability and seamlessness.
1.2.2 Enabling concepts in support of the global ATM operational

concept
Automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast (ADS-B) concept

of use
1.2.2.1 The most recent work of the Operational Data Link Panel (OPLINKP) concerning
development of a concept of use for automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast (ADS-B) was presented.
In this context, the conference was informed that the fifth meeting of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Panel (ADSP/5, October 1999) had reported to the Air Navigation Commission on the progress of States and
had provided information on the potential for ADS-B to satisfy identified requirements, as well as a detailed
breakdown of the outstanding issues before such an application could be implemented. The Commission had
amended the panel’s work programme to include the development of operational requirements for the use of
a system to increase traffic situational awareness, the development of a concept of use and operational
requirements for the application of ADS-B, and a monitoring role in the development of the use of systems
providing airborne separation assistance in order to develop a concept of use. The first step in this work
programme therefore involved the development of an ADS-B concept of use.
1.2.2.2 The conference noted that an ADS-B concept of use, defined as a detailed description of how
a particular functionality or technology could be used, was completed during the first quarter of 2003 by the
OPLINKP. ADS-B was seen by OPLINKP as a potential key data link application in a future ATM
environment, providing new surveillance capabilities to both aircrew and air traffic services. It was noted that
several entities within the aviation community were investigating this technology with a view to providing
a cost-effective replacement of current systems and technology.
1.2.2.3 It was further noted that ADS-B was seen in many quarters as a potential application to
address the need for increased airborne traffic situational awareness and to provide for airborne separation
assistance. However, it had also been recognized that, within the wider context of its potential, including a
new sharing of tasks between the flight crew and controller, the application of ADS-B-related procedures was
indeed complex.
1.2.2.4 The conference recognized that the material presented in the ADS-B concept of use was not
a final product, but rather, a compendium of matters that were being considered and reflected upon to a large
extent within the aviation community. In addition, it was noted that as the ATM operational concept matured
and a set of ATM requirements were developed, the role of ADS-B as an important data link application and
concept element in the future system would become clearer.
1.2.2.5 It was agreed that ADS-B would serve as an important enabler of several of the ATM
operational concept components including traffic synchronization and conflict management, and that work
on the ADS-B concept of use should be continued. It was also stressed that any existing concepts of use as
well as any new ones, needed to be aligned with the ATM operational concept and meet the ATM
requirements emanating therefrom. Therefore, the conference agreed to endorse the ADS-B concept of use
and formulated the following recommendation aimed at encouraging and guiding further work.
Recommendation 1/6 — Endorsement of the automatic dependent

surveillance — broadcast (ADS-B) concept of
use and recommendations for further work
That ICAO:
a) follow research and development work in the area of ADS-B

applications, and update/maintain the ADS-B concept of use as
necessary;
b) work cooperatively with other international bodies to ensure that the

ADS-B concept of use is properly aligned with existing operational and
technical documents;
c) utilize the ADS-B concept of use, in its current form and as it matures,
as a basis for development of SARPs and guidance material for air-to-air
and air-to-ground surveillance applications; and
d) ensure that all future work on the ADS-B concept of use is aligned with
the ATM operational concept and meets the emerging ATM
requirements that emanate therefrom.
1.2.2.6 The conference was presented with work being accomplished by several States to take
advantage of the opportunities afforded by ADS-B. It was agreed that this rapidly developing technology
would be critical to the success in implementing a more advanced and global ATM system and that States
which did not have comprehensive radar surveillance coverage should recognize the potential for early
benefits from using ADS-B as an alternative to radar to support en route and approach traffic control, using
existing avionics packages. Early adoption of this technology would particularly assist in improving air traffic
services in areas where a cost/benefit analysis could not justify an expensive radar infrastructure.
Furthermore, it was agreed that ADS-B could provide significant safety benefits when used for air-to-ground
surveillance, compared to procedural air traffic control without radar surveillance and that ADS-B data could
support automated safety tools such as short-term conflict alert, level and route adherence warnings, and
danger area infringement warnings, which would improve safety and security.
1.2.2.7 The conference was presented with a plan for implementing an initial package of ADS-B
services in the United States which consisted of two phases. It was noted that the first phase concentrated on
developing ADS-B applications and establishing pockets of implementation to enable initial operational use
of ADS-B and stimulate user equipage, while the second phase would focus on the development and
deployment of ADS-B ground infrastructure nationwide.
1.2.2.8 The Roadmap of Operational Improvements (ROIs) to be implemented as part of the overall
European ATM system enhancement up to the year 2020 which described the contribution of the envisaged
ADS-B related applications was introduced. The conference noted that the European approach would consist
of applications which had been organized into three packages and that each package consisted of a number
of ground and airborne ADS-B applications. The conference was informed that for each subsequent package
the airborne ADS-B applications would permit an increased level of transfer of aircraft separation
responsibility to the cockpit.
1.2.2.9 In the context of the above, the conference was informed that the United States and Europe
were collaborating on a joint European/United States development and implementation package. Further
discussions to achieve maximum cooperation and alignment were ongoing.
1.2.2.10 The conference was informed that Australia was in the process of conducting an operational
trial using ADS-B for ATC surveillance whereby a single ADS-B ground station had been installed, a number
of aircraft had been equipped with ADS-B avionics, and Australia’s operational ATM system had been
upgraded to process and display ADS-B tracks. A safety case supporting the use of a radar-like 5 NM
minimum separation had been prepared. It was noted that the performance being achieved by the ADS-B
system in the Australian environment had exceeded expectations, that coverage was excellent and exceeded
the performance that would be expected from a secondary radar installed at the same site. Manoeuvre
performance was better than from radar, the update rate was higher, and identity data were reliably received.
1.2.2.11 Encouraged by the performance of the trial system, Australia planned to install a network
of approximately twenty ADS-B ground stations across its non-radar areas to provide nationwide coverage
at and above flight level 300.
1.2.2.12 The conference was informed of ongoing work in ICAO’s Asia/Pacific Air Navigation
Planning and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG) which had established an ADS-B
Implementation Task Force to plan the implementation of ADS-B in the Asia/Pacific Regions. In this regard,
it was noted that the ADS-B concept of use recommended that any decision to implement ADS-B by a State
should be based on consultation with the wider ATM community. Moreover, the implementation should also
be coordinated between States and Regions, in order to achieve maximum benefits for airspace users and
service providers.
1.2.2.13 Mongolia, the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States all reported
on the significant activities under way in their States or regions with respect to trials and implementation of
ADS-B to improve their ATS systems.
1.2.2.14 Based on this progress, the conference agreed that maximum use should be made of global
developments and, therefore, endorsed the following recommendation.
Recommendation 1/7 — Ground and airborne automatic dependent

surveillance — broadcast (ADS-B)
applications for global interoperability
That ICAO and States:
a) recognize ADS-B as an enabler of the global ATM operational concept

bringing substantial safety and capacity benefits;
b) support the cost-effective early implementation of packages of ground

and airborne ADS-B applications, noting the early achievable benefits
from new ATM applications; and
c) ensure that implementation of ADS-B is harmonized, compatible and

interoperable with respect to operational procedures, supporting data
link and ATM applications.
Airborne separation assistance system (ASAS)
1.2.2.15 An update of progress achieved by the Surveillance and Conflict Resolution Systems Panel
(SCRSP) with development of an airborne separation assistance system (ASAS) was presented. It was noted
that ASAS had been defined by SCRSP as an aircraft system based on airborne surveillance that provided
assistance to the flight crew supporting the separation of their aircraft from other aircraft. It was further noted
that ASAS might support a part of the conflict management and traffic synchronization functions of the
1.2.2.16 It was noted that a range of ASAS applications had been envisaged which encompassed
increasing flight crews’ situational awareness relating to traffic, and assisting the flight crews in maintaining
separation from other aircraft. The conference was made aware that ASAS applications would require a
surveillance capability based largely on ADS-B and traffic information service — broadcast (TIS-B).
1.2.2.17 Four categories of candidate ASAS applications had been identified by the SCRSP as traffic
situational awareness applications; airborne spacing applications; airborne separation applications; and
airborne self-separation applications.
1.2.2.18 In concluding its discussions on this item, the conference was reminded that significant work
was under way within several ICAO panels of the Air Navigation Commission to enable implementation of
ADS-B and ASAS applications. This work consisted, inter alia, of development of operational requirements
and separation minima for ADS-B. Additionally, the conference recalled the work that would be undertaken
in follow-up to the recommendations of the conference with respect to the ATM requirements which would
further support and guide implementation of ADS-B, including airborne separation applications. Therefore,
it was agreed that the papers presented under this item, as well as the report and recommendations of the
conference with respect to this agenda item, should be forwarded to the relevant ICAO panels to guide their
further work. This structured and step-wise approach was a necessary part of consensus-building.
Aeronautical information management
1.2.2.19 The conference was presented with an envisioned computerized aeronautical information
services (CAIS) system concept that was developed with the aim of supporting the global ATM system by
establishing conditions for the provision, in real-time, of high quality aeronautical information (in a common
exchange format) to any airspace user, any time, anywhere. The conference noted that the system concept
envisioned a system consisting of: a database, servers and clients; a publisher-subscriber type system; the
capability to maintain aeronautical information publication (AIP) information of all States in an electronic
format, referred to as an aeronautical data package (ADP); and the promulgation of changes to the ADP to
States and other subscribers in an electronic format.
1.2.2.20 The conference was informed that several fundamental principles had been taken into account
when developing the CAIS system concept, e.g. existing Annex 15 — Aeronautical Information Services
provisions concerning the autonomy and responsibility of States for the provision of quality aeronautical
information. The concept was based on data exchange while ensuring that network traffic was minimal, and
the system was expandable and modular. By focussing on the exchange process, Annex 15 and the
Aeronautical Information Services Manual (Doc 8126) would be used to develop an extensible mark-up
language (XML) -based exchange format. The conference noted that a prototype had demonstrated that
currently available technology could be used to exchange electronically aeronautical information.
1.2.2.21 The conference was also presented with the developments and activities within Eurocontrol
in the area of aeronautical information which demonstrated that there was a clear need to migrate to a digital
environment and which called for the adoption of a platform-independent common data exchange model to
enable interoperability at the system level. It was noted that, to be effective, aeronautical information
management (AIM) must incorporate, at a high level, the structure, delivery and critical nature of all
information relevant to ATM, such as aeronautical and meteorological information, flight planning, planned
and real-time status of ATM and CNS systems and airspace configurations. Specifically, the decisions taken
by controllers, pilots, dispatchers, flight planners, weather forecasters, etc. represented information that were
used by others as inputs to their own planning and decision-making processes. Therefore, the full benefit of
information management would only accrue if pertinent information were made available to all appropriate
participants when and where needed.
1.2.2.22 Furthermore, it was noted that the quality of aeronautical information such as availability,
relevancy, accuracy, integrity, timeliness, security and confidentiality was important, and might well be flight
critical. Consequently, the processing of aeronautical information from origination, through publication to
incorporation into an end-user system must be managed throughout the whole process under strict quality
management procedures. Eurocontrol studies had shown that integrity requirements specified in Annex 15
could significantly be improved by automating end-to-end processing of aeronautical information.
1.2.2.23 The conference also noted that the development of an electronic AIP (eAIP), a fully digital
version of the paper document, was well under way by Eurocontrol and that the European AIS database
(EAD) had became operational in June 2003, which were both essential milestones in the realization of the
digital environment. The EAD had been developed using the Aeronautical Information Conceptual Model
(AICM) and Aeronautical Information Exchange Model (AIXM). It was noted that the AIXM was the only
exchange model currently in operational use.
1.2.2.24 The conference recognized that in the global ATM system environment envisioned by the
operational concept, aeronautical information service (AIS) would become one of the most valuable and
important enabling services. As the global ATM system foreseen in the operational concept was based on a
collaborative decision-making (CDM) environment, the timely availability from authorized sources of high
quality electronic aeronautical, meteorological, airspace and flow management information would be
necessary.
1.2.2.25 To achieve the future ATM objective of making informed collaborative decisions for the
most efficient operations and business practices, aeronautical information must be managed efficiently and
shared on a system-wide basis by making it available for access by any participant in the ATM environment
when and where required. It was therefore agreed that quality-assured aeronautical information should
ultimately be available in real-time, through the seamless interchange of relevant aeronautical information
between parties in an interoperable, flexible, adaptable and scalable manner. To ensure the cohesion and
linkages between different components of the operational concept and to accomplish the role of AIS,
consideration must also be given by AIS to the interchange and management of aeronautical information to
be used by different services and users, while taking into account interoperability of existing and future
systems. It was stated by IATA that the provision of basic AIS services in accordance with Annex 15, both
present and into the future, regardless of the format and distribution process, should be in accordance with
ICAO policy on charges for air navigation services.
1.2.2.26 The conference recognized that there were issues that had to be considered as the aviation
community moved to a digital environment. Among these was the need to ensure that as more and more data
became available through electronic means, obtaining such data should remain affordable. Additionally, it
was recalled that a large portion of the aviation community continued to use paper products and that not all
would immediately embrace the digital age. Therefore, it was necessary to ensure that this portion of the
aviation community continued to have access to necessary data and that their needs were considered. Finally,
it was pointed out that developing States had particular needs as they would not always be in a position to
move quickly to a digital environment and this had to be considered from a global perspective.
Recommendation 1/8 — Global aeronautical information management

and data exchange model
That ICAO:
a) when developing ATM requirements, define corresponding

requirements for safe and efficient global aeronautical information
management that would support a digital, real-time, accredited and
secure aeronautical information environment;
b) urgently adopt a common aeronautical information exchange model,

taking into account operational systems or concepts of data interchange,
including specifically, the Aeronautical Information Conceptual
Model/Aeronautical Information Exchange Model (AICM/AIXM), and
their mutual interoperabilities; and
c) develop, as a matter of urgency, new specifications for Annex 4 —

Aeronautical Charts and Annex 15 — Aeronautical Information
Services that would govern provision, electronic storage, on-line access
to, and maintenance of, aeronautical information and charts.
1.2.3 The role and function of the Global Air Navigation Plan for
CNS/ATM Systems
1.2.3.1 Under this agenda item, the conference discussed the role and function of the Global Plan
in the overall planning process. In this context, it was recalled that in order to progress implementation of
CNS/ATM systems, a plan of action was needed. The first such effort towards developing a plan was the
Global Coordinated Plan for Transition to ICAO CNS/ATM Systems (Global Coordinated Plan) which was
included as an appendix in the Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Special Committee for the Monitoring and
Coordination of Development and Transition Planning for the Future Air Navigation System (FANS Phase
II) (Doc 9623). The objective of the Global Coordinated Plan was to provide a progressive and coordinated
worldwide implementation of the elements of the future air navigation system in a timely and beneficial
manner.
1.2.3.2 The conference was informed that in 1996, the ICAO Council determined that a more
concrete plan which would include all developments, while placing the focus on regional implementation,
was required. The Council directed the ICAO Secretariat to revise the Global Coordinated Plan as a “living”
document comprising technical, operational, economic, financial, legal, human resource development needs
and institutional elements, offering practical advice and guidance to PIRGs and States on implementation and
funding strategies, which should include technical cooperation aspects.
1.2.3.3 On 13 March 1998, the Council reviewed and accepted the revised Global Coordinated Plan,
which was re-titled the Global Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Global Plan, Doc 9750). The
Council also agreed at the time, that future updates of the Global Plan should be carried out by the ICAO
Secretariat based on ongoing work of ICAO at both the global and regional levels.
1.2.3.4 Since the acceptance of the first edition of the newly-revised Global Plan by the Council in
1998, the Secretariat, the Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP), several panels of the
Air Navigation Commission, and the PIRGs had recognized the increasing utility of the Global Plan in
relation to their work, and its relevance in the overall ICAO CNS/ATM documentation structure. The need
to update the document was subsequently recognized. Based on the above, the Secretariat conducted a review
of the Global Plan and a comprehensive proposal for amendment to several parts of the document was
developed. In June 2001, the Council accepted the first amendment to the Global Plan and, subsequently, the
second edition was published in 2002.
1.2.3.5 The conference focussed on the future role of the Global Plan and discussed the relationship
between the Global Plan and the operational concept and, in particular, their respective roles in planning for
implementation of a future ATM system. In this respect, it was agreed that planning for implementation of
ATM systems based on the operational concept would be facilitated through the Global Plan, regional plans
and State implementation plans, which would describe the progressive intermediate steps toward the end
result. The conference agreed, therefore, that the plans of all States and regions needed to be aligned to
ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that solutions were internationally harmonized and integrated.
1.2.3.6 In the context of the above, a proposal was made to elevate the status of the Global Plan to
a level that would require review and agreement by States. This was based on the premise that the Global Plan
was a significant component in the development of regional and national plans and that together with the
operational concept, the Global Plan could provide an effective architecture or roadmap for the future ATM
system and that ICAO provisions were more effective when there was a formal review process. The
conference was informed, however, that raising the status of the Global Plan would not be an easy process
as it was neither a procedural document, nor did it contain requirements for facilities and services.
Furthermore, even if agreed to within the ICAO process, the Global Plan contained many subject areas
covering a broad spectrum of aviation issues and the circulation and amendment process could be
cumbersome and difficult to manage. Also, it was noted that this could go against the philosophy of
maintaining the Global Plan as a living and dynamic document. In any case, the conference agreed that the
issue should be given further consideration and therefore agreed to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 1/9 — Raising the status of the Global Air Navigation

Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750)
That ICAO develop a formal review and agreement process for the Global Air
Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750).
1.2.3.7 The conference recognized that, as technologies proliferated and more options became
available, it might serve the planning purposes of the international civil aviation community if the Global Plan
was used as the basis for considering options within a global safety and interoperability framework. In this
way, States and PIRGs would consult the Global Plan and use the ATM operational concept as the basic
planning premise. ATM requirements established in the further development of the ATM operational concept
will guide the choice of technologies, models or systems. Implementation decisions of States and PIRGs will
ultimately be based on business cases corresponding to their regional needs as foreseen by the scalable
response found in the ATM operational concept. At the same time, ATM requirements would also have to
provide for an ATM system design that takes into account external constraints (e.g. security features,
environmental issues, training needs, legal, financial and organizational aspects).
1.2.3.8 The regional air navigation plans (ANPs) would then additionally be used as transition plans
for implementation of system changes that must occur on a region-wide basis as well as contain a listing of
the facilities, services, procedures, and technologies, including human factors considerations, based on the
guidance provided in the Global Plan. On this basis the conference agreed that the Global Plan could play an
important role as a catalyst for change by its mere existence and would not be seen as a tool to discipline,
manage or control the evolutionary process. The regional plans would continue to maintain the independence
necessary to meet the specific and unique needs of the various regions. Based on the above, the conference
agreed to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 1/10 — Status of the Global Air Navigation Plan for

CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750)
That States and planning and implementation regional groups (PIRGs)

consider the Global Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750) as
a catalyst for change, providing a global safety and interoperability
framework while allowing regional or local adaptation to efficiently meet
regional and local needs.
1.2.3.9 A proposal was made to include the core portion of the operational concept in Chapter 4 of
the Global Plan and replace the material that was currently contained therein. However, the conference felt
that as the material contained in the operational concept document was created as a single and complete
package, it was important that the material contained in the operational concept document should be
maintained as a single entity and not be divided and placed in separate documents. Therefore, it was agreed
that the format of an ICAO manual would serve as the most suitable location for the operational concept
within the ICAO documentation structure. On this basis, the conference agreed on the following
recommendation:
Recommendation 1/11 — Publication of the Global ATM Operational

Concept
That ICAO publish the global ATM operational concept as a new ICAO
manual.
1.2.3.10 The conference then considered that Chapter 4 of the Global Plan was in need of an update
and that it was necessary to establish the linkage between the Global Plan and the operational concept. In this
context, the conference agreed to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 1/12 — Amendment of Chapter 4 of the Global Air

Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems
(Doc 9750)
That ICAO take action to amend Chapter 4 of the Global Air Navigation Plan
for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750), clearly establishing the linkage to the
Global ATM Operational Concept.
A regional framework for the implementation of a global ATM system
1.2.3.11 The conference recalled previous discussions related to the need to address several activities,
primarily at the global level, in follow-up to endorsement of the operational concept, in order to progress to
a global ATM system in a progressive, cost-effective and cooperative manner. However, it was also observed
that new regional initiatives, if pursued, could augment the considerable efforts already made by the regional
planning groups and ICAO Contracting States toward implementation of CNS/ATM systems. In this context,
the conference was informed that a number of States were coming together to forge joint ventures on a
subregional basis, to implement air navigation systems.
1.2.3.12 The conference was unanimous that harmonized implementation of air navigation systems
would enhance airspace capacity while producing additional benefits in the way of more efficient flight
profiles and increased levels of safety. Therefore, it was agreed that States should implement the regional air
navigation plans, recognizing the longer-term vision of the operational concept and the Global Plan to secure
convergence towards a uniform gate-to-gate ATM system and that any implementation plans should fully
consider the needs of the airspace users.
1.2.3.13 In addition to the above, the conference considered that in light of the new impetus which
would likely be gained from the recommendations of the conference and the endorsement of the operational
concept, it would become necessary to reconcile the differences both within regions and between
neighbouring regions. It was agreed that greater efforts should therefore be made toward cooperation and
consensus-building, as well toward utilizing harmonization tools and techniques.
1.2.3.14 Based on the above, the conference agreed on the need to explore putting into place a
mechanism which would consist of the process and tools for harmonization and integration of air navigation
systems resulting in a global continuum of airspace that would allow implementation of the operational
concept and the fulfilment of the benefits expected therefrom. Such a mechanism, if pursued, should consist
of an implementation strategy guided by the operational concept and the expectations of the ATM
community; an implementation process which would be based on groupings of States and service providers
based on homogeneous ATM areas and major traffic flows, and an implementation mechanism to support the
ICAO planning processes. Based on the above, and in order to ensure that an effective planning mechanism
was established to facilitate implementation of the operational concept, the conference agreed on the
following recommendation.
Recommendation 1/13 — Harmonization of air navigation systems
That ICAO and the ATM community explore the possibility of developing a
mechanism for implementing the interregional interface applications with a
view to facilitating the harmonized implementation of air navigation systems
giving rise to a global ATM system in an evolutionary fashion.
ICAO air navigation plan database
1.2.3.15 In the context of planning for implementation of the future ATM system based on the
operational concept, the conference noted that there was already a well-established interrelationship between
the regional ANPs and the Global Plan. However, there was a pressing requirement to make up-to-date air
navigation planning information more available and functional for all those involved in the planning process.
It was noted that ICAO had already developed air navigation planning databases and related publication and
charting systems that supported CD-ROM and hard copy ANP publication formats, and which were
extensible to take advantage of recent Internet database and mapping technologies. Furthermore, recent
technology advances allowed not only for the timely dissemination of ANP information through a central
Web server, but also for efficiencies in maintaining an up-to-date ANP database that could be extended to
include interregional and global planning information. The functionality of this information could be
significantly increased through an associated Web-based charting/geographic information system (GIS)

system.
1.2.3.16 The conference agreed that electronic access to the ANP material and related planning and
implementation data of the CNS/ATM partners would constitute an invaluable analytical planning tool.
Therefore, steps should be taken so that electronic versions of the tabular material from all ANPs were
accessible to States in order to allow for updates to be made in real time.
1.2.3.17 The conference therefore agreed that an air navigation plan database and associated
Web-based information and charting service would provide several benefits including improved access by
States, PIRGs, participating CNS/ATM partners, regional offices and Headquarters to ANPs and the data
upon which they are based. The development of the Global Plan and ATM system planning through enhanced
information availability and charting, with particular regard to interregional homogeneous ATM areas and
major traffic flows and the charting of data and forecasts, would also be facilitated.
1.2.3.18 In order to provide an ICAO air navigation plan database and associated Web-based
information and charting service, it was considered that a central Web server should be developed under
ICAO auspices and thus have proximity to current ANP databases, production resources, and information
technology support.
1.2.3.19 The conference was informed that, for ANP material, the currency of the Web site would be
maintained by authorized ICAO regional office and Headquarters staff who would input most amendments
through standardized tables and text formats which would include database filters to limit erroneous entries.
A technical review of submitted ANP material and verification of formal approval would take place at ICAO
Headquarters before the material was posted as an ANP amendment. This would essentially follow the same
paper/e-mail based process that now occurs when amendments were submitted for inclusion in the hard copy
ANP publication. For other material that may be entered in the database, such as ANP-related implementation
information and traffic flow forecasts, it was agreed that this material could be evaluated by authorized
regional office staff for their direct entry.
1.2.3.20 The conference proposed that ICAO develop a suitable name for the ICAO air navigation
plan database which conveyed its true purpose and objectives which were to facilitate planning at the global
and regional levels and that took into account the fact that it would be comprised of a conglomeration of
regional plans. Finally, it was agreed that the Web-based information and charting service would directly
support the regional, interregional and global planning elements in support of the operational concept and
therefore the conference agreed upon the following recommendation.
Recommendation 1/14 — Development of an ICAO air navigation plan

database and associated Web-based
information and charting service
That ICAO develop and maintain a database containing all tabular material
from all the regional air navigation plans, both Basic Operational
Requirements and Planning Criteria (BORPC) and the Facilities and Services
Implementation Document (FASID), together with the major traffic flows and
other regional data from Part II of the Global Air Navigation Plan for
CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750), and make this database and associated charts
available through the Web.
1.2.4 The role of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS)

technologies
1.2.4.1 Under this agenda item the conference reviewed ICAO provisions relating to the operation
of airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) and discussed the role of ACAS in the future ATM system.
1.2.4.2 The conference was informed that, following the publication of an accident investigation
report dated 12 July 2002 concerning a near mid-air collision over Japan on 31 January 2001, the Air
Navigation Commission reviewed ICAO provisions relating to the operation of ACAS. This accident
involved two wide-bodied aircraft equipped with ACAS and resulted in injuries to passengers and crew. It
was also noted that there was an ongoing accident investigation of a mid-air collision over Germany on 1 July
2002 which involved two aircraft equipped with ACAS. Factors common to both accidents were identified.
1.2.4.3 The conference noted that in follow-up to the Air Navigation Commission’s review,
amendment proposals to ICAO provisions had been developed, which were widely supported by States. The
amendments to the ICAO documentation had been adopted by the Council in March 2003 and were to
become applicable on 27 November 2003. The conference was presented with an outline of the steps taken
by ICAO to strengthen and clarify provisions in ICAO documentation concerning the operation of ACAS II,
particularly provisions on pilot responses to resolution advisories, in light of the safety recommendations of
the investigation report of the near mid-air collision over Japan on 31 January 2001.
1.2.4.4 The conference was unanimous that ACAS played an important role in the resolution of
encounters between aircraft where there was a risk of collision and agreed that safety studies and operational
experience had confirmed the significant safety benefit provided by ACAS. However, it was also recognized
that the safety benefits were seriously degraded by an incorrect response to resolution advisories or when
there was confusion by the flight crew as to what action to take. Considering the importance of the new ICAO
provisions in this respect, the conference agreed on the following recommendation.
Recommendation 1/15 — Implementation of airborne collision

avoidance system (ACAS) provisions
That States take immediate action to implement, in appropriate national

documentation, the ACAS provisions contained in Amendment 28 to ICAO
Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, Part I — International Commercial Air
Transport — Aeroplanes, and in Amendment 12 to the Procedures for Air
Navigation Services — Operations (PANS-OPS, Doc 8168), Volume I.
1.2.4.5 During the discussions, the conference was reminded of the roles of ACAS and ADS-B and
the differences between them, noting that ACAS provided a collision avoidance function that must remain
independently available in case separation assurance was lost. It was further agreed that:
a) ACAS should be kept as a last resort, collision avoidance safety-net;
b) the availability of ADS-B data on cockpit displays would increase the pilot situational
awareness, thus improving the surveillance function in a way that is expected to reduce
the probability that collision avoidance systems will be activated; and
c) ICAO provisions should ensure that ACAS retains independence so as not to

compromise the safety-net function of the collision avoidance system;
1.2.4.6 In the context of the above, the conference agreed that it was important that collision
avoidance remain independent from separation provision and that in the selection of surveillance
technologies, the consequences of the selection of collision avoidance systems should be taken into account
through appropriate safety assessments.
1.2.4.7 The conference discussed the possibility of making available to the air traffic controller, a
display of the “aircraft resolution advisory status” as it was considered that this might enhance the awareness
of ground personnel that aircraft under their control may deviate from a cleared flight profile in response to
an ACAS command. Several technical considerations were noted in this respect. During the discussions it
was noted that there may be significant human factors considerations involved with implementation of such
technology and these should be thoroughly investigated and taken into account prior to a decision as to
whether or not to implement.
1.2.4.8 In view of the need to reduce the delay between the occurrence of a resolution advisory and
its ensuing notification to a ground station, it was agreed that if such technology were to be used, an increase
of the report rate to a technically feasible value in the order of not less than one report per second should be
considered.
1.2.4.9 In addressing the problem of receiving conflicting instructions from ACAS and ATC, the
conference also recognized that with respect to certain ATC techniques, such as approaches to closely-spaced
parallel instrument runways where a precision runway monitor was used, training of both air traffic
controllers and pilots would be necessary. In the same way, it was stressed that account should also be taken
of the possibility of spurious actuation of ACAS under which the flight crew would also react.
1.2.4.10 In view of the above, and considering that new technologies such as ADS-B would improve
situational awareness and could have an effect on collision avoidance, the conference agreed that studies
should address the place and role of each safety and situational awareness system, as well as the principles
for their integrated interoperability. It was agreed that training of air traffic controllers with respect to ACAS
and the development of suitable training material were important aspects of the successful utilization of
ACAS. The conference was informed that ICAO was currently addressing several issues aimed at enhancing
ACAS. In particular, it was noted that SCRSP was addressing the following:
a) the feasibility of downlinking resolution advisories to air traffic control, using such
technologies as secondary surveillance radar (SSR) Mode S and ADS-B; and
b) the feasibility of an automatic indication to air traffic control that an aircraft has received
a resolution advisory, using conventional radar (SSR Mode A).
1.2.4.11 While it was recognized that the Technical Work Programme (TWP) of the Organization in
the Air Navigation Field was sufficiently broad to cover matters discussed, the conference requested that
ICAO pay specific attention to the following items:
a) the relevant legal issues associated with the operational and technical procedures for
collision avoidance systems;
b) current ACAS II performance and, in particular, nuisance alerts and resolution advisory
sense reversal logic, and take action as necessary;
c) ongoing work to improve the performance of the ACAS II collision avoidance system
logic;
d) areas where resolution advisories regularly occur (i.e. “hot spots”) and associated
airspace organization and procedures; and
e) the possibility of establishing regional focal points to collect and analyse data obtained
concerning resolution advisories.
1.2.4.12 The view was also expressed that the establishment of regional units might be beneficial to
monitor the performance of ACAS II in the ATC environment, to ensure that trends in ACAS encounters
could be identified and appropriate action taken, as necessary.
1.2.4.13 Finalizing the discussions on this issue, the conference agreed on the following
recommendation:
Recommendation 1/16 — Provisions related to airborne collision

avoidance systems (ACAS)
That ICAO review current provisions and investigate the need to develop new
provisions to enhance the effectiveness of ACAS as follows:
a) provisions in Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, Part II — International

General Aviation — Aeroplanes, concerning training of general aviation
pilots in the operation of ACAS;
b) provisions in Annex 10 — Aeronautical Telecommunications,

Volume IV — Surveillance Radar and Collision Avoidance Systems,
concerning performance of the ACAS II collision avoidance logic;
c) provisions concerning the training of air traffic control personnel;
d) the registering by the parametric flight recorder of resolution advisory

commands; and
e) air traffic control provisions in ICAO Annex 2 — Rules of the Air and
Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services and the PANS-ATM (Doc 4444),
Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Air Traffic Management.
1.2.4.14 The conference was presented with a paper which was prepared as additional supporting
material to assist in the discussions on the role of collision avoidance in the future ATM system. It was
recalled that the role of collision avoidance as defined in the operational concept was described under the
concept component of conflict management, wherein three layers of conflict management were defined. These
were: strategic conflict management, separation provision and collision avoidance and were stated in the
operational concept as follows:
“Collision avoidance is the third layer of conflict management, and must activate when the
separation mode has been compromised. Collision avoidance is not part of separation
provision, and collision avoidance systems are not included in determining the calculated
level of safety required for separation provision. Collision avoidance systems will, however,
be considered part of the ATM safety management. The collision avoidance functions and
the applicable separation mode, although independent, must be compatible.”
1.2.4.15 The conference was made aware that in the context of the above, collision avoidance was
seen as the last layer of conflict management and was activated in order to avoid disaster. It was stressed that
separation provision and collision avoidance were not the same, that there was a functional difference and
that the operational concept definition of a third layer was deliberate.
1.2.4.16 Most importantly, the conference agreed with the notion that collision avoidance systems
should be considered part of overall ATM safety management. However, it was further recognized that in line
with today’s understanding, collision avoidance systems should not be mixed with separation provision, nor
be included in determining the calculated level of safety required for separation provision.
1.2.4.17 The conference recognized that the subject of how the ATM system was ultimately designed
to meet all of the requirements of the conflict management functions would take a great deal of work.
However, work on the ATM requirements could begin to address the functional and operating requirements
of such a system.
————————
Agenda Item 2: Safety and security in air traffic management (ATM)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.1.1 Under this agenda item, the conference addressed the issues identified in the air traffic
management (ATM) operational concept relating to safety management, the existing ICAO provisions for
safety management in air traffic services (ATS), certification of ATS service providers, safety regulation, the
ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and safety and security of the ATS infrastructure.
2.2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND

PROGRAMMES
A global framework for safety
2.2.1 The ATM operational concept presented under Agenda Item 1 established a strong link
between the key concepts of performance and safety, and identified safety performance as the most important
performance indicator for the ATM system. The operational concept also identified the need for a system
safety approach, i.e. an integrated, system-wide approach to safety.
2.2.2 Noting that there was already a significant degree of interdependence between ground-based
and airborne components in current air traffic management systems, and that it was expected that this
interdependence would become even more significant in future systems, the conference agreed that the
adoption of a uniform approach to safety management, as proposed in the operational concept, would be
beneficial, and should be studied further.
2.2.3 The conference recalled that safety management provisions for aerodromes had already been
introduced in Annex 14 — Aerodromes, and was advised that harmonization of the guidance material on
safety management for air traffic services and aerodromes was envisaged.
2.2.4 The adoption of a system safety approach would require that each element of the system be
the subject of a safety analysis as an individual element, and as a component which interacts with others as
part of a larger system. The conference noted that the operational concept provided the following definition:
System safety approach. A systematic and explicit approach defining all activities and
resources (people, organizations, policies, procedures, time spans, milestones, etc.) devoted
to the management of safety. This approach starts before the fact, is documented, planned
and explicitly supported by documented organizational policies and procedures endorsed by
the highest executive levels. The system safety approach uses systems theory, systems
engineering and management tools to manage risk formally, in an integrated manner across
all organizational levels, across all disciplines and all system life cycle phases.
2.2.5 The conference was advised that ICAO had established GASP as a means of coordinating
the many safety initiatives under way worldwide, and that this was not a separate activity in its own right;
rather, it was a mechanism which allowed consolidated reporting on safety-related activities, and presented
an overview of all safety-related activities in one document. Further information on GASP would be provided
under Agenda Item 2.4.
2.2.6 The conference noted that, while existing mechanisms within ICAO provided for
consolidated reporting of safety-related activities, there were, as yet, no provisions requiring a uniform
approach to the management of safety. In order to achieve a uniform approach, the operational concept had
proposed the establishment of a global framework for the assessment and management of safety. The
conference noted that this was in accordance with the objectives of Assembly Resolution A33-16: ICAO
Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and supported the need for such a framework.
2.2.7 The operational concept indicated that the global framework for safety management should
address issues such as:
a) harmonization of safety indicators to be used across the aviation system, with particular
emphasis on the development of predictive or “leading” indicators in addition to those
which express the achieved level of safety;
b) the setting of safety targets for the system as a whole;
c) guidelines for determining the acceptable level of safety for system components and
appropriate metrics for expressing this;
d) guidelines concerning the way in which accountability for safety should be addressed
within an organization and the need for documentation of safety-related decisions;
e) suitable mechanisms for monitoring of safety indicators and ensuring that there are
formal feedback learning/control loops, such as the universal safety oversight audit
programme (USOAP), to ensure that mitigation measures are implemented in areas
where safety concerns are identified; and
f) the importance of all organizations developing a positive safety culture, recognizing that
accidents result not just from the mere coincidental occurrence of multiple undefended
failures, but also from the migration of organizations toward unsafe behaviour.
2.2.8 The conference recalled that the operational concept had proposed the adoption of a holistic
approach (i.e. an approach which considered the “whole made of interacting parts”) which, it stated, was
considered by many safety authorities to be the most effective and efficient approach to the management of
safety. The conference agreed that the adoption by ICAO of a uniform safety framework, as proposed in the
system safety approach, would significantly enhance the effectiveness of the safety management process.
2.2.9 It was noted that a “system”, under this concept, was composed of people, procedures,
technologies and information interacting to perform a task. The elements of the total system extended beyond
the scope of any one Annex. Factors related to, inter alia, meteorology, aeronautical charts, aircraft
operations, airworthiness, aeronautical information and the transport of dangerous goods could have an
impact on total system safety. It was recognized that it may therefore be necessary to broaden the current
ICAO requirement for safety management to additional Annexes.
2.2.10 The conference expressed strong support for the system safety approach, and the need to
ensure a harmonized approach to safety management across the whole aviation system. It also emphasized
the importance of ensuring that the safety management principles and practices embodied in this approach
were actually adopted, and became an integral part of the ongoing operations of the organizations concerned,
since a safety management system which existed only on paper would do nothing to enhance safety.
2.2.11 After consideration of the foregoing, the conference agreed to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 2/1 — A framework for system safety
That ICAO investigate appropriate mechanisms for the development and

implementation of a framework for a uniform and system-wide approach to
safety, and the application of this framework to:
a) the harmonization of provisions relating to safety assessment and safety

management in relevant Annexes and Procedures for Air Navigation
Services (PANS); and
b) the harmonization of the approaches to safety assessment in the

development of safety-related Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs).
Requirements for ATS safety management
2.2.12 The conference recalled that provisions for ATS safety management had already been
introduced in amendments to Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services and the Procedures for Air Navigation
Services — ATM (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444), both of which had become applicable on 1 November 2001, and
that these provisions required States to implement systematic and appropriate safety management programmes
to ensure that their ATS systems achieved an acceptable level of safety, and to establish such levels of safety
and safety objectives for their air traffic services by 27 November 2003.
2.2.13 The conference noted that the PANS-ATM expressed the objectives of safety management
as being to ensure that the established level of safety applicable to the provision of ATS within an airspace
or at an aerodrome was met, and that safety-related enhancements were implemented wherever necessary.
The provisions of the PANS-ATM required that an ATS safety management programme should include, inter
alia:
a) monitoring of overall safety levels and detection of any adverse trend;
b) safety reviews of ATS units;
c) safety assessments in respect of planned implementation of airspace re-organizations,

the introduction of new equipment, systems or facilities, and new or changed ATS
procedures; and
d) a mechanism for identifying the need for safety enhancing measures.
2.2.14 The conference was advised that, as it had been recognized that many States would require
further assistance in the implementation of safety management, ICAO had developed further guidance
material, to be published as the Manual on Safety Management for Air Traffic Services. The manual addressed
the basic principles of safety management including, inter alia:
a) factors affecting system safety, with a particular emphasis on human error;
b) the importance of organizational issues, including responsibility and accountability for

safety performance, and the need for a positive safety culture;
c) the responsibilities of the State regulatory authority, and the need for separation of the
safety responsibilities associated with the regulatory function, and the ATS service
provision function;
d) safety assessment procedures; and
e) assuring the ongoing safety of the system through audits and monitoring.
2.2.15 While the document had yet to undergo final editing, the latest draft version was presented
to the conference. It was agreed that States should be encouraged to make use of this as preliminary guidance,
pending publication of the document. The conference expressed its satisfaction with the new manual, and
urged ICAO to facilitate its translation in as short a time as possible.
2.2.16 The conference was presented with an overview of the principles of safety management. The
conference noted that implementation of a safety management system would not eliminate all risk. However,
it would enable risk to be controlled and reduced to a level as low as reasonably practicable. The purpose of
a safety management system was stated to be: to provide an ATM service-provider with a management tool
which would ensure a systematic and proactive approach to safety throughout the whole ATM organization.
2.2.17 A view was expressed that over-reliance on mitigating arguments, particularly those
involving air traffic controllers, could have a detrimental effect on the risk management process. The
conference was advised that the procedures for the conduct of safety assessment described in the manual
should ensure that this would not happen, since they required that, when mitigation measures were proposed,
a further hazard analysis of the system be conducted, to assess both the effectiveness of the mitigation
measures, and to ensure that any new hazards associated with the mitigation measures were identified, and
the mitigation methods modified if necessary.
2.2.18 Noting the lack of knowledge on the part of many States concerning safety assessments and
the setting of acceptable levels of safety, it was suggested that there would be a need to support training to
enable States to introduce effective safety management systems.
2.2.19 The conference was advised that ICAO was planning to conduct two seminars, which would
address ATS safety management, in December 2003. These were to be held in Singapore and Cairo. While
the main topic was to be runway safety, it had been considered this would be a good opportunity to introduce
some information on general safety management issues as well. It was emphasized that these would not,
however, be comprehensive seminars on safety management principles and techniques.
2.2.20 The conference supported the need for the introduction of effective safety management
programmes by all States, and agreed to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 2/2 — Implementation of ATS safety management

programmes and establishment of acceptable
levels of safety
That States which have not already done so, take action in accordance with
Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services, 2.26 to:
a) implement systematic and appropriate ATS safety management

programmes to ensure that safety is maintained in the provision of ATS
within airspaces and at aerodromes; and
b) establish the acceptable levels of safety and safety objectives applicable

to the provision of ATS within airspaces and at aerodromes.
2.2.21 The conference was then presented with an overview of the European strategy for
implementation of safety management by air navigation service providers. It was noted that a method for the
elaboration of safety cases had already been applied to a number of projects in Europe, including the
introduction of the reduced vertical separation minimum above FL 290 (RVSM), and 8.33 kHz channel
spacing. The presentation stressed the importance of the sharing of safety-related data and, in particular,
information concerning the lessons learned from the analysis and investigation of safety occurrences among
all relevant organizations. This would include regulators, air navigation service providers, and where
appropriate, aircraft operators and aerodrome operators. The conference agreed that the sharing of safety data
should be encouraged at both the regional and global levels.
2.2.22 The conference was also presented with information on the work of the European high-level
Action Group on ATM safety (AGAS), and the action plan which they had developed, entitled One safe sky
for Europe — A strategic action plan for enhanced ATM safety in a single pan-European sky. AGAS had
concluded that, if forecasts were correct and European traffic doubled by 2020, a sustainable delivery of
capacity would be reliant on a sustainable investment in safety. The action plan which they developed had
presented a detailed assessment of what needed to be done to improve European ATM safety in the short to
medium term, and set out indicative timescales for successful completion of each action.
2.2.23 One of the issues identified by AGAS was the need for provisions and guidance for the
sharing of ATM incident and accident data between States. The conference agreed that this was a necessary
activity, in order to ensure that lessons learned from the investigation of safety occurrences were made
available as widely as possible. The conference was advised that the enhanced ICAO accident and incident
reporting data base (ADREP 2000) could provide one mechanism for the sharing of safety-related data; it
incorporated an enhanced taxonomy for the classification of incidents, with more categories relevant to
ATS-related occurrences than had been contained in the original ADREP taxonomy. The conference noted
that, in Europe, a directive had already been implemented to share the data on accidents and incidents.
Recommendation 2/3 — Sharing of ATM accident and incident data
That ICAO:
a) develop guidance material on the use of the ADREP 2000 data base; and
b) encourage States to share information on ATM accidents and incidents.
2.2.24 The proposals from AGAS also included a suggestion that there was a need to consider the
applicability of the minimum equipment lists (MEL) concept for ATM systems and CNS infrastructure. The
conference noted that the MEL concept was applied in the determination of the airworthiness of aircraft to
manage aircraft operation under technical outages and system degradation. It was proposed that the principles
used in determining aircraft MELs could also be applied to managing technical outages and system
degradation in ATM ground systems.
2.2.25 The conference was advised that the draft Manual on Safety Management for Air Traffic
Services had addressed certain aspects of this issue. The safety assessment process described in the manual
included provisions requiring that the assessment consider the effects of failures and degradations, in addition
to normal operations, in order to ensure that an adequate level of safety could be maintained during periods
of non-normal operations. The conference supported the need to address these issues, and to ensure that an
adequate level of safety was maintained at all times.
2.2.26 The conference noted that the work done by AGAS could have relevance to States outside
Europe, and agreed it could be a useful source of information for the development of the global framework
for safety. Therefore the conference suggested that the European States should ensure the distribution of the
results of the work of AGAS to relevant ICAO bodies and other States.
2.2.27 The need to take into account future safety requirements and the impact of increases in traffic
density in the initial assessment of safety requirements for new ATM systems was stressed, in order to ensure
that the systems would continue to meet appropriate levels of safety. The conference noted the comment, and
the fact that the system safety approach proposed in the ATM operational concept included the need to
consider safety over the whole life cycle of a system.
Human factors issues in safety management
2.2.28 The conference discussed a number of issues concerning the role of organizational culture
in achieving safety in ATM, and the concept of a safety culture. The conference agreed that development of
a safety culture was an important element in safety management, and noted that the role of the human had
been identified in the ATM operational concept, and had also been addressed in the draft Manual on Safety
Management for Air Traffic Services presented to the conference.
2.2.29 The conference noted that the outstanding safety record of international civil aviation was
primarily due to three key factors:
a) the dedication to safety by aviation organizations and their people;
b) a continuous learning process, based on free flow of safety information; and
c) the ability to turn errors into preventive actions.

2.2.30 The conference recognized that information from safety monitoring and data collection
systems had allowed international civil aviation to develop an understanding of errors, and was being
increasingly used to develop and implement corrective actions, and proactive long-term strategies. The
conference noted that monitoring based on submission of reports of safety occurrences was an important
element of such systems, and that for these to be effective, the culture of the organization must encourage
staff to submit reports.
2.2.31 It was recognized that the majority of operational errors in aviation were inadvertent, and that
the way in which such inadvertent operational errors were handled had an impact on the willingness of staff
to submit reports of safety occurrences. In the rare situations where operational errors were the result of wilful
acts, substance abuse, sabotage, violations or similar acts, disciplinary or enforcement action was appropriate
and necessary. However, it was also recognized that there was a need for an enlightened understanding of
inadvertent operational errors, which moved beyond a “blame culture” that singled out individuals and
criminalized errors.
2.2.32 It was noted that organizational culture in many sections of the aviation industry had moved
towards the concept of a “just culture” with respect to the treatment of unintentional errors. Attention had
shifted from determining who made the error, to identifying the circumstances under which the error was
made. The purpose was twofold: first, by understanding the circumstances, it might become possible to
introduce changes that could make it less likely that similar errors would be made again (error prevention);
and second, understanding the circumstances might make it possible to develop strategies to minimize the
negative effect of the error (error recovery). It was further noted that safety occurrence reporting programmes
were a cornerstone for identifying these circumstances.
2.2.33 The conference noted that there had been cases in international civil aviation where
information from accident and incident records, and safety monitoring and data acquisition systems, had been
admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings. In some cases, this had resulted in criminal charges being
brought against individuals involved in occurrences. It was noted that this could hinder the free flow of
information, and thus adversely affect aviation safety.
2.2.34 The conference recalled that issues related to the protection of sources of safety information
had already been addressed within ICAO in a number of different places. These included Assembly
Resolution A33-17, Non-disclosure of certain accident and incident records, Assembly Resolution A33-16,
ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP), Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation,
paragraphs 5.12 and 8.3, and Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, paragraph 3.2.4. It was noted, however, that
giving effect to these provisions required that each State enact appropriate legislation.
2.2.35 The conference supported the need for these issues to be addressed in the implementation
of safety management systems, and agreed the following factors should be taken into account in determining
an organization’s policy on disciplinary action.
a) No group or workforce should be above the law.
b) There is a need to strike a balance between the protection of sources of safety

information, with a view to enhancing the safety of civil aviation, and the public interest
in the availability of evidence in judicial proceedings.
c) Judicial proceedings related to actions by operational personnel should primarily be

based on evidence other than that obtained from sources of safety information.
d) Protection of sources of safety information is not intended to provide operational

personnel with undue protection from prosecution, but to preserve the sources.
2.2.36 The conference supported the need for further action on this issue, and agreed to the
following recommendation:
Recommendation 2/4 — The protection of sources of safety

information
That ICAO develop guidelines which will provide support to States in

adopting adequate measures of national law, for the purpose of protecting the
sources and free flow of safety information, while taking into account the
public interest in the proper administration of justice.
2.2.37 The conference was advised that a further source of safety information could be found in
programmes for observation of normal operations by appropriately trained observers. Programmes of this
type, known as line operations safety audit (LOSA) had been implemented by a number of airlines.
2.2.38 The conference noted that LOSA was based on the threat and error management (TEM)
model, which proposed that threats and errors were an integral part of daily flight operations, and that they
must be managed by the flight crews to ensure the safe outcome of flights. The TEM model provided a
quantifiable framework to collect and categorize safety data. In LOSA, trained observers recorded and coded
potential threats to safety, and how the threats were addressed during the flight. They also recorded and coded
the errors such threats generated, and how flight crews managed these errors.
2.2.39 The conference was informed that the Air Navigation Commission had requested that the
Secretariat explore the extension of LOSA to ATS, under the activities of the Flight Safety and Human
Factors Programme. However, as with other safety initiatives that originated in the airline environment, an
adaptation of LOSA would be required.
2.2.40 To distinguish the ATS tool, ATS organizations involved in the development of the concept
tentatively adopted the name “normal operations safety survey (NOSS)”. It was expected that NOSS would
share most of the operating characteristics of LOSA, with modifications where necessary.
2.2.41 The conference agreed that ATS organizations needed to explore all available sources of
safety data when establishing their safety management programmes, and that in this regard, ATS
organizations could benefit from the experience of airlines, and agreed to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 2/5 — Monitoring of safety during normal

operations
That ICAO
2.2.42 The conference also discussed a broad range of issues related to other aspects of human
factors and their importance in the achievement of safety, and agreed that human factors was an important
issue in the establishment of effective ATM safety management systems.
2.2.43 The discussions identified a range of human factors considerations, in addition to the issues
of organizational culture addressed earlier, which could affect the safety of an ATM system. These included,
inter alia, the interaction of human operators with automated systems, interface design, workplace issues such
as lighting, temperature and noise levels, and the provision of adequate rest facilities. The conference noted
that ICAO guidance was available in Human Factors Guidelines for Air Traffic Management (ATM) Systems
(Doc 9758), and that considerable emphasis had also been placed on human factors considerations in the draft
Manual on Safety Management for Air Traffic Services.
2.2.44 The conference noted that in the development of some of the options proposed in the ATM
operational concept, there would be a need to clearly identify the proper allocation of tasks between air traffic
controllers, pilots and automated systems.
2.2.45 The conference recognized that there would be a need to address issues of responsibility and
liability, for example, in situations where a controller would not be able to intervene if pilots or automated
systems were not able to maintain separation.
2.2.46 The conference was presented with information concerning the potential impact on safety
of differing understandings of terms, definitions and phraseologies. It was noted that many languages were
spoken by more than one State, and that regional differences in the meanings associated with particular words
could exist between native speakers of a language who came from different countries. The conference further
noted that the ATM Committee of the CAR/SAM Planning and Implementation Regional Group
(GREPECAS) had established a Phraseology Task Force which was developing a methodology, which
involved participation by aeronautical operational personnel at the end-user level, for addressing this problem.
The intent was to apply the methodology to a review of the Spanish phraseology in the PANS-ATM.
2.2.47 The conference agreed that it was essential to have a common understanding of terms,
definitions and phraseologies, and expressed its support for the initiatives being taken by GREPECAS. It also
supported the application of this methodology, once fully developed, to reviewing other language versions
of the PANS-ATM to identify any similar problems.
Expansion of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme

(USOAP)
2.2.48 The conference was presented with information on the expansion of the ICAO Universal
Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) to Annex 11, Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident
Investigation and Annex 14 as of 2004. The presentation briefly explained the historical background to the
expansion of the USOAP, the status of the preparatory work and the procedures for conducting the audits.
It also emphasized the need for cooperation from all Contracting States to ensure the achievement of the
objectives of ICAO in respect to conducting safety oversight audits.
2.2.49 The conference was informed that the audits would, in general terms, follow the process
which had been utilized during the previous audits relating to Annex 1 — Personnel Licensing, Annex 6 —
Operation of Aircraft and Annex 8 — Airworthiness of Aircraft and that the Safety Oversight Manual, Part A,
The Establishment and Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System (Doc 9734) was being amended to
cover all audit areas. Additional guidance material, the Safety Oversight Manual, Part B — The Development
and Management of Regional Safety Oversight Systems, was also being developed to provide guidance to
Contracting States which wished to establish a common safety oversight management system. Both manuals
were expected to be available by late 2003.
2.2.50 The conference was further advised that all safety oversight-related documents would be
available in electronic format and that States would be provided with the ability to access, complete and
submit the State Aviation Activity Questionnaire (SAAQ) and the compliance checklist (CC) electronically.
It was emphasized that the full cooperation of States for the timely completion and submission of all required
documentation pertaining to the preparation, conduct and reporting of the audits will be essential for the
effectiveness of the programme and the fulfilment of the mandate given to the Organization by the Assembly.
2.2.51 The conference was informed that the long-term objective was to transform the audit
programme from audits on an Annex-to-Annex basis into a systemic and comprehensive audit programme
which would address the overall safety oversight management system established in States and determine its
ability to ensure the effective implementation of SARPs and the critical elements of a safety oversight system.
2.3 SAFETY CERTIFICATION OF ATM SYSTEMS
2.3.1 The conference discussed a number of issues concerning the need for certification of ATM
service providers and systems, and the need for coordination and cooperation between safety regulatory
authorities with regard to certification standards and procedures. The conference recalled that certification
requirements existed for aircraft and aircraft equipment. Provisions requiring certification of aerodromes had
become applicable on 1 November 2001. However, there were no existing ICAO requirements for
certification of ATM systems, or ATM service providers.
2.3.2 The conference noted that a significant number of States were moving to a situation where
air traffic services were provided by an organization separate from the State body responsible for the
regulatory function. However, irrespective of whether or not the service provision is the responsibility of the
State or a separate body, it was the State which was responsible for ensuring compliance with the provisions
of ICAO Annexes. Certification had been seen, by some States, as an important element of the regulatory and
oversight functions, and it was noted that a number of States had already implemented requirements for
certification of ATM service providers.
2.3.3 The conference expressed strong support for the concept of certification. It was recognized
that there was more than one way in which this could be approached. Certification requirements could be
introduced for ATM equipment, or for ATM service providers, or for both.
2.3.4 The conference noted that safety of ATM system operations depended on a great number of
criteria including, inter alia, the competency of personnel, the quality and reliability of the aeronautical data,
operational procedures, navigation communications and surveillance equipment, and the interactions between
these elements. It was further noted that in modern ATM systems, it was possible that ATS providers could
be relying on facilities or services, such as satellite navigation and communications, which were outside the
jurisdiction of the State concerned. All these factors would need to be taken into account in the development
of certification criteria.
2.3.5 While recognizing that States could introduce, and in some cases had introduced, certification
requirements for ATM service providers in spite of the absence of ICAO SARPs, the conference considered
that it would be preferable, in order to achieve harmonization of certification criteria, to have these specified
as ICAO provisions. The conference agreed to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 2/6 — Safety certification of ATM systems
That ICAO investigate the need for the development of provisions for safety
certification of ATM systems and service providers.
2.3.6 One organization raised the need to consider air traffic electronics personnel in the overall
debate on safety and certification, and to introduce licensing provisions for such personnel in Annex 1. The
conference recognized the importance of such personnel to the safety of operations, and agreed that were
certification of ATS service providers to be introduced, having competent electronics staff would be one of
the criteria to be considered in the certification process. However, it was pointed out that there were specific
requirements to be satisfied in order to justify the inclusion of provisions requiring licensing in Annex 1, and
that competency could be assured without licensing. The conference was of the view that the need related
more to training than to licensing, and did not support the inclusion of licensing requirements. However, it
did express the view that the needs related to training, qualification and competency of air traffic safety
electronics personnel required further investigation.
2.4 SAFETY REGULATION
2.4.1 The conference recognized that both the State and ATS service providers had responsibilities
for the safe, regular and efficient provision of ATS. It was recalled that the responsibility of a Contracting
State was implicit in its acceptance of the SARPs for the safety of air navigation to which Article 37 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation refers.
2.4.2 The ATS service provider had a responsibility for the safe provision of services, and for
compliance with the laws and regulations promulgated by the State. These laws and regulations were the
means by which the State implemented the provisions of the Annexes, and fulfiled its obligations under the
Convention.
2.4.3 Recalling the previous discussions on certification, the conference noted that the regulatory
function should, to the extent possible, be separated from the service provision function, even where both
functions were the responsibility of a single State civil aviation authority. Compliance with the regulatory
provisions should be monitored by a safety oversight mechanism, to ensure that the regulatory objectives and
requirements were effectively met. The methods of safety oversight should include safety regulatory approval,
audit and/or inspection.
2.4.4 The conference noted that the implementation of safety regulation would be a new task for
many States, as there had not been the same emphasis on the need for a separate regulatory function in the
era when the provision of ATS was generally the direct responsibility of the State civil aviation authority. The
conference also emphasized the need for the establishment of coordination mechanisms between regulators,
for the purposes of harmonization of procedures and sharing of information.
2.4.5 The conference agreed that, with the introduction of requirements for safety management,
the establishment of a safety regulatory function had assumed even greater importance. While it had been
noted during the discussions on safety management under Agenda Item 2.1 that the ongoing management of
safety was the responsibility of the ATS service provider, it was agreed that there was a need for independent
oversight of the safety management practices and safety performance of the provider.
2.4.6 The conference was advised that one chapter of the draft Manual on Safety Management for
Air Traffic Services had been devoted to safety regulation, and that in this chapter, the importance of the
separation of the regulatory and ATS service provision functions had been emphasized.
2.4.7 The conference noted that for a safety oversight system to be effective, it must have adequate
resources. The conference agreed that States should be encouraged to establish ATM safety oversight
capabilities and procedures, and to ensure that the necessary resources to perform the task, including an
adequate number of competent staff, were provided. Therefore the conference agreed on the following
recommendation:
Recommendation 2/7 — Safety oversight capabilities and procedures
That ICAO encourage States to develop ATM safety oversight capabilities

and procedures.
2.4.8 The conference agreed that, with regard to new ATM/CNS developments, there was a need
to adopt a more formalized approach to the development of SARPs and Regional Supplementary Procedures
with respect to their safety assessment and validation. The safety validation of new SARPs and Regional
Supplementary Procedures undertaken at ICAO level should be documented as a reference for future
developments and could provide the foundation for safety assessments conducted by individual States.
2.4.9 The attention of the conference was drawn to a related problem concerning notification and
publication of differences between national regulations and practices and ICAO SARPs and Procedures.
Safety oversight by the safety regulatory authority would identify non-compliance by an ATS service
provider with regulations and practices of the State. However, it was recognized that there were a significant
number of instances of State regulations and practices being different from those specified in ICAO SARPs
and PANS.
2.4.10 The conference noted the requirements of Article 38 of the Convention concerning
notification of differences to ICAO, and the requirements of Annex 15 — Aeronautical Information Services
concerning publication of differences. The conference was informed that the existence of differences which
had not been notified to ICAO or published in national AIPs was considered to be a significant safety issue
by pilots operating internationally. It was recognized that the introduction of provisions requiring mandatory
notification of differences for other than Standards would require an amendment to the Convention. However,
the existing Standard in Annex 15 concerning this did require States to publish, in their AIPs, significant
differences between national regulations and practices, and ICAO Standards, Recommended Practices and
Procedures.
2.4.11 The conference noted that a truly seamless operational environment, as envisaged in the ATM
operational concept, would require that phraseologies and operating procedures did not change when crossing
boundaries. Thus, while publication of differences would contribute to safety by raising pilot awareness of
the differences, the long-term aim should be to achieve standardization.
2.5 THE GLOBAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN
2.5.1 The conference was provided with information on the scope and status of the ICAO Global
Aviation Safety Plan (GASP). It was noted that through GASP, ICAO was able to perform a coordinating role
with respect to the various safety initiatives under way worldwide. ICAO’s role within the GASP included
facilitating the communication of safety-related information between governments and industry, endeavouring
to ensure that the various safety programmes being undertaken worldwide were complementary rather than
competitive, and ensuring that they addressed regional as well as global aviation safety concerns in a
comprehensive and systematic manner.
2.5.2 The conference recalled that the objectives of the GASP were to:
a) reduce the number of accidents and fatalities irrespective of the volume of air traffic; and
b) decrease worldwide accident rates, particularly in those regions where they remain high.
2.5.3 The conference noted that GASP was not a single programme, but acted as an umbrella
document for the safety-related activities of the Organization. Because aviation is a dynamic industry with
constantly emerging technologies which often introduce new problems and safety challenges, it was
recognized that at any given time, there could be known safety issues which had not yet been adequately
addressed, and identified safety fixes that had not been widely implemented. To reflect these realities, the
GASP needed to be periodically reviewed to ensure it remains relevant.
2.5.4 The conference was advised that the Air Navigation Commission met with leaders of the
aviation industry periodically. The interchange of ideas and information at these meetings helped identify
emerging safety issues and possible responses thereto. These meetings also provided an opportunity for the
aviation industry to review the GASP and to provide inputs towards its further development. The Commission
also carried out a formal review of the GASP annually and updated it as required. Progress reports on the
development of the GASP are also presented to regular Sessions of the Assembly.
2.5.5 The conference noted the information on GASP, and expressed its appreciation for the fact
that it had been provided, and re-affirmed, on behalf of the States and organizations represented, a
commitment to GASP.
2.6 SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE

ATM INFRASTRUCTURE
2.6.1 Under this agenda item, the conference discussed security of the aviation infrastructure,
focussing particularly on response procedures for air traffic controllers in the various phases of unlawful
interference.
2.6.2 The conference was informed that ICAO had developed numerous SARPs, together with
supporting guidance material, that had implications for security and that in its review of security requirements
in the air navigation field, the Air Navigation Commission concluded that there was a need to ensure the
development of safety and security provisions to be fully coordinated.
2.6.3 The conference was also informed of ICAO’s work on an Aviation Security Plan of Action
which had the objective of strengthening aviation security. The plan, approved by the Council in June 2002,
contains an air navigation programme which, inter alia, included a comprehensive review of the sixteen
Annexes under the responsibility of the Air Navigation Bureau (ANB). The conference was advised that
during its last session of 2003, the Commission would undertake a review of the air navigation part of the
ICAO Aviation Security Plan.
2.6.4 The conference noted the action undertaken by ICAO on security issues in the air navigation
field and expressed its strong support for the objective that the Air Navigation Commission had set out for
the harmonization of aviation safety and aviation security. The conference therefore agreed on the following
recommendation:
Recommendation 2/8 — Harmonization of aviation safety and aviation

security
That ICAO:
a) continue its efforts to encourage and monitor the harmonization of

aviation safety and aviation security; and
b) encourage States to monitor the impact of aviation security measures on

aviation safety, and to take action as necessary.
2.6.5 Recognizing that air traffic controllers could play an important role in dissemination of
critical information among other things, and that the interaction between flight crew and air traffic controllers
was critical during unlawful interference events, the conference agreed on the need for ICAO to develop
in-flight emergency response procedures for air traffic controllers as a counter to the threat of unlawful
interference to aircraft. This need had arisen from the realization that the international civil aviation support
services system was not designed to cope with the extreme form of unlawful interference perpetrated in
September 2001.
2.6.6 The conference noted that although there were clear security-related demands on air traffic
controllers specified in several ICAO documents, it could be concluded that they lacked specificity. Guidance
material directly related to management of in-flight emergencies was also lacking. Therefore, there was a need
to develop response procedures that differentiated between emergency circumstances where a flight crew was
or was suspected of being in control of an aircraft and where hijackers were known to have taken over
in-flight control. The need for air traffic controllers to be properly trained on relevant procedures, which
should take into account human factors principles, was stressed. Additionally, the issue of legal responsibility
of the individual controller and of the service provider and associated liability concerns were raised. The
conference agreed that these issues would have to be addressed as work was progressed.
2.6.7 The conference noted that there would be a need for coordination between all parties
involved, including civil, military and other security authorities of the State. The conference also agreed that
the establishment of a regional focal point for ATM-related security matters would help ensure effective
coordination.
2.6.8 The conference observed that rapid and effective information transfer was necessary between
ATS units and rescue coordination centres (RCCs) that may have to assume operational responsibility if the
affected aircraft impacted terrain or water. This could require an extension to the existing provisions of Annex
12 — Search and Rescue, to broaden the role of RCCs in emergency response.
2.6.9 In consideration to the above, the conference agreed on the following recommendation:
Recommendation 2/9 — In-flight emergency response procedures for

air traffic controllers
That, consistent with the ICAO Aviation Security Plan of Action and the
ATM operational concept, ICAO consider developing in-flight emergency
response and coordination procedures for air traffic controllers, together with
training guidance, related to the distinctly different types and phases of
unlawful interference. These procedures and guidance material should allow
for the different conditions which exist in States.
2.6.10 While not detracting from the need for more comprehensive provisions for ATC as described
above, the conference noted that it was important not to lose sight of the underlying problem. Security began
on the ground, therefore the most important focus for security needed to be on identifying security threats
before the aircraft became airborne.
2.6.11 The conference was also informed of the criticality of maintaining the integrity of computer
and communications systems used in aviation and the efforts made in several States to address these issues.
It was noted that there was a need for coordination between all parties involved and it was proposed that there
would be merit in establishing regional focal points for collecting and disseminating information on computer
and communications system security as a means of improving overall security of these systems. The
conference was supportive of all these efforts and agreed that the Air Navigation Commission should take
them into account when updating the air navigation part of the ICAO Aviation Security Plan of Action.
————————
Agenda Item 3: Air traffic management (ATM) performance targets for safety, efficiency and
regularity and the role of required total system performance (RTSP) in this
respect
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.1.1 Under this agenda item, the conference considered the establishment of performance targets
for ATM as well as the concept of required total system performance (RTSP).
3.2 PERFORMANCE TARGETS FOR ATM
Required communication performance (RCP)
3.2.1 ICAO activities to develop a concept of RCP in the provision of air traffic services (ATS)
were reviewed. It was noted that in 1996 the Aeronautical Mobile Communications Panel, during its
consideration of general aspects in the future evolution of the very high frequency digital link (VDL), had
seen RCP as a set of performance parameters, the values of which would determine the operational
requirements for communication systems in the various phases of flight. The conference was informed that
the panel had agreed upon the urgent need to assess the various technical options of communication systems
against such a set of parameters. In follow-up, the Air Navigation Commission had tasked the Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Panel (subsequently renamed as the Operational Data Link Panel (OPLINKP)) to
develop the concept of RCP.
3.2.2 It was noted that before the advent of data communication systems for ATS, voice
communications were assessed on the basis of actual performance, as it usually was readily evident when
performance became degraded or was unavailable. With data link, however, these indications were not
provided in the same way. The acceptance of data communications as a technology for communications,
navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management (CNS/ATM) systems, in addition to voice
communications, meant that a formal method of determining and specifying communication performance
suitable for a variety of ATS functions was desired. Such a concept should be seen as a complement to
collision risk modelling.
3.2.3 The conference noted a number of key characteristics of RCP, the most significant of which
were that the concept was performance based, human-centred, operationally significant and independent of
specific technologies.
3.2.4 It was noted that in 2001, States and international organizations had been consulted on the
RCP operational concept developed by OPLINKP, with a majority of responses indicating broad support for
the operational concept of RCP. The conference was informed that the OPLINKP was continuing work on
the task and was expected to report on substantial progress by 2005.
3.2.5 On the basis of its discussions, the conference agreed that further work was needed to develop
means to specify performance requirements appropriate for the assumptions made by separation studies,
particularly with regard to controller intervention and pilot-initiated weather deviations, within the framework
provided by the RCP concept. It was also agreed that there was a need for further work on the relationship
of the RCP concept to interoperability, as well as efforts in the areas of standardization of RCP types and
allocations, assessment of the adequacy of international air traffic services procedures for new CNS/ATM
environments and safety performance monitoring.
3.2.6 Recognizing the important position States and planning and implementation regional groups
(PIRGs) would have in ensuring an orderly and coordinated implementation of RCP, the conference noted
that ongoing work by OPLINKP would continue to concentrate on how RCP would provide regional planning
and implementation groups with a basis for the development of documents, procedures, and programmes to
introduce the use of RCP in the airspace planning methodology. In this regard, State and regional support for
performance-based planning was seen as an essential first step in advancing to the implementation stage.
3.2.7 In light of the urgent need for global harmonization of communication performance
measures, the conference recommended that ICAO give high priority to progress the work of enabling RCP
implementation, while ensuring full consistency with the broader concept of RTSP being developed in
parallel:
Recommendation 3/1 — Required communication performance (RCP)
That ICAO:
a) continue the development of Standards and Recommended Practices

(SARPs), procedures and guidance material on RCP; and
b) investigate areas for further work to determine the relationship of the

RCP concept to separation studies and interoperability, the
standardization of RCP types and allocations, the adequacy of ATS
functions and procedures for new CNS/ATM environments, as well as
requirements for safety performance monitoring.
Performance metrics and ATM
3.2.8 During further discussions on performance targets for ATM, several presentations were made
on work undertaken with regard to the analysis of economic performance, including quality, efficiency of
service and establishment of benchmarks.
3.2.9 The conference was made aware of ongoing work within ICAO seeking to define the future
involvement of the Organization with regard to the development and use of performance metrics in the
provision of ATM and related services. It was noted that the Manual on Air Navigation Services Economics
(Doc 9161), containing guidance material on organizational, managerial and financial aspects of the operation
and provision of air navigation services (ANS), was under revision and being expanded. On the basis of work
undertaken in several States, the manual would eventually provide a general description of best practices in
benchmarking and performance measurement, however, without going into detail or trying to define any
parameters. The guidance would be non-prescriptive, encouraging States to publish their particular
performance measures in order to facilitate user consultation.
3.2.10 It was stressed that substantial benefits stood to be gained from the introduction of a strong,
transparent and independent performance review system; for example, a 10 per cent improvement in
cost-effectiveness equalled, in Europe alone, a potential saving of some i 600 Million a year. It was also
emphasized that in the analysis of economic performance of ATM, transparency was seen as an essential
component of a performance review system to ensure the cost-effectiveness of air navigation services and to
support target setting and performance processes.
3.2.11 The conference noted that expectations of the airlines sometimes went further than among
other members of the ATM community. In this context, the conference recognized that although safety was
paramount, efficiency and regularity were still crucial to the development of a sustainable, efficient and
cost-effective air transport system. The efficiency of an ATM service provider in delivering a service,
including equipment and staffing, had a profound effect on the cost of that service to the airspace user.
Although many elements relating to ATM efficiency and regularity could not yet be established
mathematically, they were nevertheless measurable, and should be evaluated through observation and
benchmarking. In this context it was essential that the highest degree of openness and transparency be
maintained.
3.2.12 The point was also raised, however, that economic indicators alone were not sufficient, but
that other factors like the number of trained staff and safety recommendations addressed also were important
measurements related to performance.
3.2.13 The conference recognized that some caution would be appropriate in relation to
benchmarking, keeping in mind the need for diversity, that all locations and States were not immediately
comparable and that not only quantitative but also qualitative aspects should be considered. On the other
hand, what was not measured would stand little chance of being improved.
3.2.14 It was pointed out that a system of quality management could easily be added to the safety
management systems currently being implemented. This would encourage an atmosphere of continuous
improvement among air traffic services providers.
3.2.15 The conference noted progress as regards the analysis of economic performance of ATM and
benchmarking, and recommended that ICAO continue its work in this field, including an assessment of the
need for worldwide standardization of minimum reporting requirements.
Recommendation 3/2 — Standardization of minimum reporting

requirements
That ICAO continue its work in the field of economic performance of ATM
and benchmarking, and assess the need for worldwide standardization of
minimum reporting requirements in relation to information disclosure.
3.3 THE CONCEPT OF RTSP
Introduction
3.3.1 The conference reviewed the results of the work of the Air Traffic Management Operational
Concept Panel (ATMCP) to date on the subject of performance and required total system performance
(RTSP). The panel had identified air traffic management performance, including the notion of RTSP, as a key
aspect of the ATM operational concept and had therefore decided to introduce RTSP in the operational
concept. The purpose of the discussion was to clarify and develop the next steps of RTSP development on
the basis of the initial arguments related to the feasibility of RTSP as a method to measure performance of
the ATM system.
3.3.2 It was pointed out that the performance work undertaken by the ATMCP was only of an
initial nature, and that further substantial work remained, in order to have the subject of ATM performance
covered at the desired level of clarity.
Need for performance orientation
3.3.3 The conference agreed that safety was the overriding aspect of performance in aviation.
3.3.4 It was noted that ATM was increasingly being discussed in terms of performance.
Corporatization and a more structured regulatory environment, were placing increasing pressure on
accountability. In this respect, it was agreed that at all levels, communicating performance objectives and
achievements would facilitate positive dialogue between the parties involved.
3.3.5 It was further agreed that it was essential that systems be developed in terms of objectives
to be achieved. The absence of performance objectives at the appropriate level of abstraction on the one hand
and a lack of understanding of the effect of changing the objectives on the other, would likely significantly
hamper the decision-making process.
ATM performance concepts
3.3.6 The conference recognized that an essential prerequisite for the development of a complex
system was an understanding of the nature of its performance. A hierarchy of five levels of concepts relating
to ATM performance was recognized, as follows:
Level 1: Political and socio-economic requirements

safety, security, environmental efficiency, costs, etc.
Level 2: RASP
safety, throughput, delay, predictability, flexibility, etc.
Level 3: RTSP
Rf1P RfnP Actual
on operational functions/entities
set of characteristics Performance
Measurement
& Monitoring
}
Level 4: System requirements

for an airspace and/or type of users {...} {...}
sets of consistent enabler requirements, e.g. RNP, RCP, etc.
Level 5: Standards and specifications

(technologies)
tech SARPs, MOPS, standards, IOS90xy, etc.
9
Figure 1. Hierarchical ATM performance concept
3.3.7 It was agreed that performance should be seen from many perspectives, such as safety and
cost, as well as from the points of view of requirements, system design and specifications, and should include
actual assessment and monitoring. The conference therefore endorsed the hierarchy of performance concepts
as depicted in the diagram as a sound basis for all future work in this field.
3.3.8 Level 1 of the figure above represented the high-level political and socio-economic
expectations of society and/or the air transport sector, of a future ATM system. The measures necessary to
meet these expectations should then govern the design of the system. More specifically, these general
expectations addressed the technical, economic, environmental and other concerns relative to the effective
operation of the ATM system and included, in particular, the areas of safety, security, environmental
efficiency, cost-effectiveness, capacity, access and equity, general efficiency, flexibility, predictability, global
interoperability and participation by the entire ATM community.
3.3.9 It was noted that expectations could be difficult to meet. Therefore, compromises would have
to be negotiated throughout the development process of the ATM system, with a view to maximizing the
relative advantages of that system for each of the stakeholders involved.
3.3.10 The ATM performance specification level, entitled the required ATM system performance
(RASP) level, defined a second set of indicators of users’ expectations which concerned the overall ATM
system’s operational services provided at the users’ interface level. These could be considered as indicators
of sub-objectives of the Level 1 expectations from a specific ATM system operational performance
perspective.
3.3.11 The conference agreed that, in more general terms, RASP metrics should provide a set of
high-level operational objectives for changing the global ATM system at its highest level of specification
(e.g. operational objectives to mitigate effects on the environment, in balance with safety and regularity).
Hence, RASP could be considered as a set of mission requirements for the ATM system aimed at achieving
a top-level system operational objective.
3.3.12 It was noted that the RASP requirements might in some cases be very high and perhaps not
technically and financially feasible, in which case the RASP requirements would need preliminary validation.
The purpose of this validation would be to establish those requirements for the system that would be
realistically achievable in the event that sufficient resources were not available to ensure the best indicators
in accordance with cost/effectiveness criteria. The possibility could not be ruled out that the acceptable range
for the RASP requirements would not correspond to available technical and financial resources. In such cases,
having taken air traffic safety as the priority, it would be necessary to adjust the value of the remaining RASP
requirements.
3.3.13 The conference noted that Level 3, which covered the overall performance metrics for the
ATM core system functions specified at the highest level, was entitled the required total system performance
(RTSP) level. The ATM core system functions or concept components (airspace organization and
management, aerodrome operations, demand/capacity balancing, traffic synchronization, airspace user
operations, conflict management and ATM service delivery management) were parts of the entire ATM
system divided into functions, the combination and integration of which represented the global ATM system.
The conference emphasized the importance of considerations related to environment. The need to fulfil safety
requirements within environmental constraints might have an impact on efficiency, capacity or regularity.
3.3.14 RTSP was related to the performance of services provided by the ATM concept components.
In this context, the term “service” referred to the implementation of a functionality of the ATM system in a
given environment. It was agreed that requirements should be kept abstract enough to allow for flexibility
in implementing choices, while preventing the proliferation of particular solutions. It was not, however,
possible to address requirements independently from the different implementation options. RTSP was thus
linked to system requirements (Level 4). To build this link, RTSP should provide indicators that would allow
an assessment of the appropriate technical means for implementing operational scenarios, i.e. ways to realize
implementation of concept components or other parts of the ATM system.
3.3.15 The conference noted that performance metrics could eventually be applied to many parts
of the ATM system. In this context, it was noted that Level 4 defined performance metrics for information
management, data processing services and CNS operational services. It was entitled System Requirements
and allowed, in particular, the introduction, within an appropriate architecture/hierarchy of system elements,
of performance concepts such as RCP and required navigation performance (RNP). Other required
performance measures could be identified, such as required monitoring performance (RMP) to specify the
capability to monitor the traffic situation in a given environment, or required planning performance (RPP)
to specify the capability of predicting the future position of aircraft.
3.3.16 Subject to further validation, Levels 3 and 4 could be modelled using an identical template
of characteristics, to permit the combination or separation of functional elements as needed, thus allowing
for the determination of the key requirements for RTSP, for a given environment and traffic level.
3.3.17 Level 5 dealt with specific technologies and methodologies to implement Level 4.
3.3.18 It was suggested that the above hierarchy and the overall performance model provided a
suitable structure for discussing performance. At the same time, it should assist the organization of the work
and individual contributions from various bodies and partners, such as States, regional bodies and the
Secretariat with respect to establishing a harmonized and generally acceptable basis for the development of
performance requirements.
3.3.19 The conference agreed that performance metrics should be developed within the ICAO
framework and future agreement reached on the definition of metrics for the different objectives to be reached
for Levels 1 and 2, as well as on guidance material for setting targets at the global, regional and State levels.
Furthermore, the overall framework and guidance material on RTSP should be further developed and
maintained by an appropriate body within ICAO.
3.3.20 It was further agreed that the definition of requirements for specific aspects of CNS/ATM,
i.e. the individual elements of RTSP (Level 3) and lower layers, should be assigned to the relevant technical
bodies, working in close coordination with each other as well as the body referred to above.
3.3.21 The conference recognized that a further important phase, that of planning the
implementation activities related to RTSP, was mainly within the purview of the PIRGs and States, with an
overall coordination role for ICAO within the framework of the Global Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM
Systems (Doc 9750). These activities would include the definition of performance targets at the appropriate
level depending on the general policy adopted. Performance metrics for RTSP implementation would be
selected either from a list defined at the global level or from locally-available options, as warranted by local
traffic density. In this respect, the conference emphasized the importance of different regions following
identical definitions of the performance model; however, it was also recognized that the comprehensive
definition of a common global framework would require some time. PIRGs and States should therefore be
encouraged to begin moving to a performance driven planning process which would, however, have to be
harmonized with globally-applicable definitions of the performance model as a common global framework,
as they become available.
3.3.22 The conference agreed that monitoring was an important aspect of the overall performance
framework and that it therefore should be addressed at the appropriate level. Because effective monitoring
provided an essential feedback which, on the basis of lessons learned, could significantly improve
performance via benchmarking and dissemination of good practices, the conference agreed that guidance for
measurements and standards for information disclosure and guidelines for monitoring should be established
by ICAO and consistently applied by States.
3.3.23 The conference recognized that a performance orientation in ATM was fundamental, and
agreed that it would be feasible to establish a performance framework which included the concept of RTSP.
However, these were new notions, and they addressed complex systems. It would be necessary to develop
the different layers of the model as well as the different related functions and services in much greater detail
in order to ascertain the validity of this model. It was particularly stressed that for RASP and RTSP, while
safety was the paramount aspect, it was one of several expectations that also included the environment,
efficiency, and regularity, and that all these aspects would require careful balancing.
3.3.24 The conference agreed that more work was also needed to identify, among other things, the
main functions within the individual concept components of the ATM operational concept, and analyse which
requirements would be imposed on them and how, collectively, they would meet expectations. It had to be
established further how each operational function would be supported by technical functions, thus
complementing the model with descriptions of interdependencies between the different functions. Moreover,
the origins of expectations and functions must be clarified; what exactly would meet their requirements; what
might counteract their original intent and what were the dependencies and interactions between these issues.
The development of a causation model dealing with these and other related issues might provide a deeper
system engineering understanding of ATM than was possible on the basis of currently available information.
3.3.25 The future work concerned all layers, from an understanding of future expectations suggested
for Level 1 and how they could be met collectively, to the preparation of the standardization material for the
next generation of technical systems, governed by Level 5. Progress must be made simultaneously on all
levels to some extent. However, priority should be given to the clarification of the issues of the upper layers
of the hierarchy, the understanding of how the ATM system behaved and generated performance. Also, the
definition of indicators and targets were priority issues, as these aspects were currently not developed to
sufficient maturity and because it was precisely this knowledge that would allow further decisions to be made
for all other levels with greater confidence than in the past. This, in turn, would significantly accelerate the
pace of modernization of ATM.
3.3.26 The conference re-affirmed that the definition of the future global ATM system should be
based on specific performance objectives to be met and monitored, as well as on the related operational and
technical requirements, which would aim at achieving the agreed performance. The following
recommendation was agreed:
Recommendation 3/3 — Performance framework
That ICAO, in consultation with the other members of the ATM community:
a) formulate the performance objectives and targets for a future global

ATM system;
b) continue the definition of related performance metrics and elementary

characteristics in the context of the overall behaviour of the ATM
system; and
c) coordinate and harmonize all related contributions within the overall

performance framework initiated by the Air Traffic Management
Operational Concept Panel, including definitions, standards for
reporting requirements, information disclosure and guidance for
monitoring.
————————
Agenda Item 4: Capacity-enhancement measures
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.1.1 Under this agenda item, the conference recalled the problems being experienced by a number
of regions as a result of increasing air traffic demand and limited capacity, and considered some of the efforts
being made at both the global and regional levels to enhance capacity and to establish a more efficient
operating environment. Additionally, noting the necessary function ICAO provisions played in enabling a
more efficient and effective use of available airspace, the role of such provisions was examined.
4.1.2 The conference reviewed global and regional principles and guidelines for States and
planning and implementation regional groups (PIRGs) to consider when developing capacity-enhancement
measures and the relationship between capacity-enhancement and safety, with a particular emphasis on
runway safety. In view of the extent the field of capacity enhancements could cover, the conference also took
the opportunity to review and assess particular strategies, some of which had already been considered by
individual States and/or regions to support enhanced capacity in the near term.
4.2 GLOBAL MEASURES
4.2.1 The conference recognized that in many areas, demand often exceeded the available capacity
of the air navigation system, resulting in significant negative consequences not only to the aviation industry,
but also to general economic health. Over the long term, this required the implementation of an ATM system
that allowed maximum use to be made of enhanced capabilities provided by technical advances, based on the
principle of collaborative decision making (CDM). Over the last ten years in particular, most States and all
ICAO regions had embarked on implementation programmes intended to improve aviation operations by
making use of new technologies. The conference noted, however, that the conclusions reached under Agenda
Item 1 underscored the need for a comprehensive concept of an integrated and global ATM system, based
on clearly-established requirements. This concept, in turn, would form the basis for the development of ATM
requirements and the coordinated implementation of CNS/ATM technologies.
ATM operational concept
4.2.2 The conference noted that the ATM operational concept and all enablers to enhance capacity
and improve aircraft operations, such as 4-dimensional trajectory and ADS-B, would need to be adaptable
to the unique operational environment and needs of the different States and regions. Additionally, there was
a range of economic, legal, political, financial, environmental and institutional issues that varied from region
to region. The conference further noted that the planning processes at the global, regional and national levels
should provide a well-understood, manageable and cost-effective sequence of improvements that kept pace
with user needs, culminating in a system meeting safety, security, capacity, efficiency and environmental
demands. The ATM operational concept provided the basis from which the ATM requirements, objectives
and benefits would be derived, thereby providing the foundation for the development of regional and national
ATM implementation plans.
4.2.3 It was recognized that States and regions were different from each other with different
requirements needing different solutions, which was a fundamental aspect of the ATM operational concept.
At the same time, plans of all States needed to be aligned to the greatest extent possible, to ensure that
solutions were internationally standardized and integrated, and did not unnecessarily impose multiple
equipment carriage requirements in the air components of the ATM system, or multiple systems on the
ground.
4.2.4 In many areas, simple solutions based on regional harmonization or cooperation across
homogeneous areas could provide satisfactory short- or medium-term responses while in other areas more
complex ATM systems and sophisticated political and legal arrangements might be required. The conference
also noted that the PIRGs had made considerable progress on implementing CNS/ATM systems and, in some
cases, had worked inter-regionally to progress global initiatives. In this respect, a number of initiatives were
recalled including the introduction of reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) over the South China
Sea (to be extended over the Middle East and the Bay of Bengal), combined with the Europe, Middle East,
Asia ATS Route Structure South of the Himalayas (EMARSSH). These inter-regional coordinated initiatives
had brought about substantial benefits to both ATS providers and users. The conference also noted a proposal
for the Asia and Pacific Regions to commence planning for further airspace capacity enhancements and, in
particular, the implementation of required navigation performance (RNP) 4 operations, to cater for future air
traffic growth. In this respect, it was acknowledged that during the regional planning process, States and
aircraft operators would have an important role to play in following through with the necessary operational
approval process. The need was also stressed that States should adhere to the ICAO provisions as contained
in ICAO Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services and the Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Air Traffic
Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444) when implementing RNP and not develop abnormal values or track
spacings.
4.2.5 The discussion highlighted the importance placed on coordination between the regions. The
conference noted that existing mechanisms already provided the opportunity for States and PIRGs to advance
inter-regionally those capacity-enhancing procedures that were likely to have a follow-on effect on their
neighbours. The already existing inter-regional coordination mechanisms were recalled; however, the
conference acknowledged that other coordination mechanisms should be utilized, including informal interface
coordination meetings. The conference concluded its discussion with the following recommendation:
Recommendation 4/1 — Harmonization of air navigation systems

between regions
That ICAO:
a) maintain, and develop further, a coordination mechanism between

regions for planning and implementation of capacity-enhancing
measures and ATM performance improvement between regions for a
harmonized evolution aimed at enhancing aviation efficiency and safety;
b) be systematically involved in any regional initiatives aiming at

enhancing ATM capacity and performance; and
c) urge States, who have not already done so, to establish national
CNS/ATM coordination and implementation committees, with a point of
contact to be made known to the respective ICAO Regional Office, so as
to facilitate harmonized transition to CNS/ATM systems.
ICAO provisions
4.2.6 It was recalled that the globally accepted framework for the harmonization of civil aviation
were the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), which covered procedures of worldwide
applicability. These SARPs, contained in ICAO Annexes were complemented by Procedures for Air
Navigation Services (PANS) which specified, in greater detail than the SARPs, the actual procedures to be
applied by ATS units. To accommodate specific needs on a regional basis, the development of international
civil aviation was further governed by regional air navigation plans (ANPs), which set forth in detail the
facilities and services to be provided by States pursuant to Article 28 of the Convention. Complementing the
ANPs were the ICAO Regional Supplementary Procedures (SUPPs, Doc 7030), which formed the procedural
part of the ANPs to meet those needs in specific areas, which were not covered in worldwide provisions.
4.2.7 As safety, regularity and efficiency of air traffic, to a large extent, depended on the uniform
application of procedures on a global basis, the conference recognized that it was of paramount importance
that Regional Supplementary Procedures were not in conflict with the provisions contained in the Annexes
and PANS. Further, they must either specify detailed regional options for those provisions or promulgate a
regional procedure of justifiable operational significance, additional to existing provisions in Annexes or
PANS, and should furthermore avoid variations in text of procedures with similar intent applicable to more
than one area. More specifically, it was important that Regional Supplementary Procedures should indicate
a mode of implementing procedural provisions in Annexes and PANS, as distinct from a statement or
description of required facilities and services as published in the ANPs. The conference noted that Regional
Supplementary Procedures may also indicate permissible additions to provisions in Annexes and PANS.
4.2.8 The conference further noted, however, that some States, in their efforts to develop and
implement capacity-enhancing procedures, sought to utilize the Regional Supplementary Procedures as a
means of harmonizing such procedures among neighbouring States. In several cases, the proposals had
contravened provisions already contained in the Annexes and/or PANS, and such proposals could not be
considered.
4.2.9 The conference agreed that as a long-term goal, the implementation of an ATM system that
allowed maximum use to be made of enhanced capabilities provided by technical advances held the key to
a safe and efficient global ATM system. The ATM operational concept addressed what was needed to
increase user flexibility and maximize operating efficiencies in order to increase system capacity and improve
safety levels in the future system. This long-term goal was therefore preferable to using intermediate measures
implemented in an ad hoc fashion on a regional basis.
4.2.10 Although it was appreciated that accommodating regional needs for capacity enhancement
within the framework of existing SARPs and PANS was not always expeditious, the conference agreed that
it was vital that States and PIRGs continued to propose procedures for capacity-enhancement to ICAO with
a view to possibly amending global provisions rather than implementing on a regional basis. Ultimately, this
would avoid the danger of disparity with existing ICAO provisions.
Performance-driven planning process
4.2.11 The conference was informed of current efforts to improve ATM service provision in Europe,
within the framework of a performance-driven top-down planning process (as documented in the European
Convergence and Implementation Plan (ECIP)). The ECIP was part of a process, where planning decisions
were based on benefits rather than technology, and took as its foundation the need to set and attain
quantifiable and measurable ATM performance targets for the ATM key performance areas. In its initial
phase the process had been applied to capacity enhancement.
4.2.12 The conference noted that the process was consistent with the ICAO Air Navigation
Plan/Facilities and Services Implementation Document (ANP/FASID) process, as well as the ICAO Global
Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750), as far as operationally applicable.
4.2.13 It was further noted that the IATA member airlines supported a performance-driven planning
approach that incorporated the widespread, consistent, and timely implementation of currently available ATM
capacity improvements.
4.2.14 The conference noted that some PIRGs were already applying some of the elements of the
European approach, particularly with regard to collaborative links within the ATM community. Nevertheless,
the conference also agreed that the approach might serve as a model that each PIRG could study for possible
application in its respective region. The conference therefore agreed on the following recommendation:
Recommendation 4/2 — Investigation of performance-driven planning

and implementation methods
That States study the approach to planning and implementation commonly

adopted by European States, with a view to the possible application of its
elements in their respective regions.
4.2.15 The importance of collaborative decision-making and global air traffic flow management in
improving capacity and ATM provisions over large areas was stressed. The efforts of several States that had
been working closely together in this respect were presented. The conference recognized that the overall goals
and benefits of these efforts were already being realized by these States, which included the provision of a
seamless system traversing international boundaries, based on shared information to enhance security and
ATM effectiveness. The conference noted that the section of the operational concept dealing with
demand/capacity balancing was very much aligned with the work being accomplished and that the work on
global demand/capacity balancing should be prioritized as an important facilitator of the sought-after seamless
ATM system. The conference therefore endorsed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 4/3 — Collaborative decision-making and global

demand/capacity balancing
That ICAO:
a) develop SARPs and procedures for global air traffic flow and capacity
management based on the concept of demand/capacity balancing as
described in the operational concept; and
b) develop guidance material for States to implement global

demand/capacity balancing techniques based on collaborative
decision-making processes, and sharing of aviation information in
accordance with the operational concept.
4.2.16 The view was expressed that the prevalent practices of night curfew at some airports had led
to restrictive air traffic handling capacity situations. Such restrictions, with increasing traffic volumes,
resulted in air traffic congestion and imbalances in the utilization of the aviation infrastructure. In noting the
sentiment conveyed, the conference recalled that ICAO policies and practices related to environmental
protection were contained in Assembly Resolution A33-7, with particular reference being made to a
“balanced approach” to aircraft noise management in Appendix C to the Resolution.
4.3 REGIONAL MEASURES
Single European Sky
4.3.1 The conference was informed of efforts in some parts of the European Region to address the
unique problems that the region faced with respect to increasing air traffic and the problems associated with
this increase. The initiative came to be known as “Single European Sky” and was first used by the transport
ministers of the European Union (EU) following a proposal by the European Commission. Additionally, the
intense increase in traffic was beginning to stretch the system. The subsequent agreement led to the
development of harmonized rules on service provider certification, charging, cross-border airspace
organization and management, increased cooperation between civil and military, and standardization of
equipment. Standardized licensing was called for, facilitating air traffic controllers to be employed in other
Member States where shortages were occurring, as was a more uniform airspace to streamline safety
procedures and save fuel by allowing aircraft to fly more direct routes.
4.3.2 Whilst the Single European Sky initiative was developed to deal with the unique problems
of a particular region, the conference recognized that the project, or parts of it, might be adaptable to other
regions or for global use as part of the ongoing effort to achieve an interoperable and more seamless global
ATM system. Nevertheless, the conference also recognized that it was appropriate that a more thorough
investigation, analysis and review of the progress achieved as well as difficulties encountered would need
to be undertaken to determine if, where and how, the project could be adapted for global use, or perhaps, for
use by other regions. The conference therefore agreed on the following recommendation:
Recommendation 4/4 — Investigation and analysis of the “Single

European Sky” approach to global
harmonization
That ICAO follow the progress of the “Single European Sky” project for
possible use in other homogeneous regions or at the global level.
Runway safety programme
4.3.3 Information was presented to the conference on work currently under way, or planned,
relating to runway safety. The conference noted that several States and international organizations, including
ICAO, had embarked on extensive programmes to improve the situation with respect to runway incursions.
The conference noted that the Air Navigation Commission had identified several critical areas that it felt had
to be investigated and which had a relation to overall runway safety. These included: radiotelephony
phraseology, language proficiency, ATC procedures, standards and performance requirements for equipment,
aerodrome lighting and markings, aerodrome charts, operational aspects, situational awareness and human
factors.
4.3.4 On completing an overview of relevant ICAO provisions and guidance, the conference noted
that extensive work had already been accomplished. The conference also noted that ICAO had embarked upon
a worldwide education and awareness campaign which encouraged States to implement the relevant
provisions and runway safety programmes. In this regard, the conference was informed that the campaign had
begun with the development of an ICAO interactive CD-ROM toolkit, which would include references to
relevant ICAO SARPs and other available documentation on runway safety programmes, videos, electronic
versions of posters, etc. ICAO had also commenced a series of seminars on runway safety and ATS safety
management in the different ICAO regions.
4.3.5 With respect to the significant work already under way in some States and regions, a number
of similar proposals were tabled encouraging ICAO to undertake an international approach, which could lead
to an effective global solution. Specifically, the availability of standardized runway incursion information
was recommended as an essential step towards achieving worldwide risk reduction and improving risk
management of runway incursions. The view was expressed that standardization of the definition of a runway
incursion, a runway incursion severity and error type categorization taxonomy, and a runway incursion
database would provide the following benefits:
a) the development of improved global runway incursion statistical and trend information
to support a wider range of risk identification; and
b) improvement of risk management worldwide.
4.3.6 The conference’s attention was also drawn to the results of the work of both Transport
Canada and NAV CANADA in analysing the phenomenon of increasing runway incursions. According to
the Transport Canada report in this respect, a number of factors were potentially responsible for the upward
trend in runway incursions, including increasing traffic volume, capacity-enhancing procedures to deal with
the increasing traffic, airport layouts and human factors. Briefly, the report concluded that:
a) the potential for a runway incursion increased more rapidly than the traffic volume;
b) many aerodrome improvement projects had resulted in a more complex aerodrome

layout which, together with inadequate aerodrome design, marking and lighting, and a
lack of standard taxi routes, had worsened the situation; and
c) the effects of increased traffic volume, capacity-enhancing procedures and aerodrome

physical layout may simultaneously exacerbate the runway incursion potential at certain
aerodromes; and human error was the mechanism that translates potential occurrences,
based on the factors above, into actual occurrences.
4.3.7 Following a survey of pilots and air traffic controllers conducted in 2001 regarding specific
runway safety issues and analysis of the available data, runway incursions had been identified as one of the
most serious safety issues in airport operations. The resulting European Action Plan for the Prevention of
Runway Incursions consisted of the survey findings and contained more than fifty recommendations with
supporting material. It was also noted that the Action Plan underlined the need to amend some ICAO
provisions. The conference noted that the Action Plan was in the process of being formally distributed
through the national aviation safety authorities of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) Member
States.
4.3.8 The conference agreed that the implementation of runway safety programmes by States
would be an important step to addressing safety of operations at aerodromes, and that the action by ICAO
currently under way or planned, would provide the necessary support for such an exercise. In this respect,
the conference noted that the ICAO CD-ROM toolkit might also be a more effective tool in terms of access
and maintenance than the development of traditional guidance material. In particular, the material contained
in the European Action Plan was considered useful for integration into the toolkit. The discussion also
highlighted the importance States placed on the harmonization of radiotelephony speech and the improvement
of the use of radiotelephony phraseology. The importance of all States to implement phraseologies published
in the PANS-ATM, in particular those related to runway safety, was stressed.
4.3.9 The conference agreed that ICAO should develop a formal definition of “runway incursion”.
It was also agreed that ICAO should standardize a runway incursion severity and error type categorization
taxonomy, that is harmonized, to the extent possible with existing classifications, and include such a
taxonomy into a suitable database. Categorization would help define and measure risk, and the availability
of data in a common database would allow for more powerful statistical analyses. In this respect, the
conference noted that further enhancement of the ICAO’s Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) system
would facilitate the reporting of runway incursion occurrences by States.
4.3.10 The conference also recognized that any link between capacity-enhancing procedures and
a potential increase in runway incursions should be dealt with through the appropriate safety studies that
would be conducted when a State was considering such procedures. The conference was informed that a
number of States would jointly aim at utilizing guidance contained in the soon to be published ICAO Manual
on Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) to support appropriate capacity
safely, in all weather conditions. The conference noted that the European Community and its Member States
had initiated the action of implementing the use of the A-SMGCS Manual and, in particular, that part
concerned with surveillance and control functions, for the installation of such a system at European airports.
In this regard, the conference was informed that ICAO had an established task (ATM-9703) in the Technical
Work Programme (TWP) of the Organization in the Air Navigation Field to continue to advance the
operational requirements for A-SMGCS and that such emerging provisions would take account of research
and development programmes in a number of States.
4.3.11 With respect to the proposal for the inclusion of requirements for communications and air
side driver training for personnel who operate on or near the runway, the conference was of the view that such
action warranted further consideration in the context of the ongoing effort to review ICAO requirements and
guidance.
4.3.12 In concluding its discussion on these topics, the conference agreed to the following
recommendations:
Recommendation 4/5 — Runway safety programmes
That States:
a) take appropriate actions to improve runway safety worldwide through

the implementation of runway safety programmes;
b) collect and share runway incursion incidents in accordance with

Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Chapter 8,
Accident Prevention Measures; and
c) take into consideration that part of the ICAO Manual on Advanced

Surface Movement Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) related
to surveillance and control functions, when implementing such systems
at airports.
Recommendation 4/6 — Capacity-enhancing procedures
That States, when considering capacity-enhancing procedures at aerodromes,

conduct appropriate safety studies and take due consideration of the effect on
runway safety.
Recommendation 4/7 — Global runway incursion risk management
That ICAO:
a) urgently progress the development of a formal definition for “runway

incursion” as a prerequisite for further actions to be taken in this
domain; and
b) enhance the Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) system to

incorporate a common categorization taxonomy of runway incursion
severity, error type and/or factors that contribute to incursions.
Rectification of deficiencies in the air navigation field
4.3.13 The conference recalled efforts by ICAO, PIRGs and States in pursuing the elimination of
deficiencies in the air navigation field and the implementation of all regional air navigation plans to further
improve the existing levels of safety. Furthermore, the 33rd Session of the ICAO Assembly
(September/October 2001), through Resolution A33-16, had urged States to apply the political will to take
the remedial action identified by universal safety oversight audit programme (USOAP) audits, to correct the
deficiencies identified in the regional planning process and related activities, and to promulgate the necessary
regulations to implement the safety systems developed under the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP).
4.3.14 In an effort to take advantage of the momentum already evident, it was proposed that States
and users be urged to review their respective lists of identified deficiencies to ensure validity. Furthermore,
plans indicating actions intended and time frames for the elimination of deficiencies in air navigation facilities
and services, as listed by PIRGs, should then be formulated and forwarded to ICAO. As a final step in the
reporting process, the regional office should be systematically notified of the rectification of deficiencies and
receive confirmation from the user which originally identified the deficiency.
4.3.15 The conference noted that many deficiencies had continued to persist for a number of years,
thus causing concern. Furthermore, States should increase their efforts to overcome the delay in mitigating
the air navigation deficiencies identified by the respective PIRG and resolve cases of non-implementation of
regional plans. It was further noted that while a proper reporting mechanism for deficiencies existed,
additional mechanisms in the monitoring and reporting of corrective actions taken and progress towards the
elimination of deficiencies were necessary. Within the context of a list of deficiencies, the view was expressed
that rectification of deficiencies by States should follow a prioritization process where deficiencies related
to SARPs and procedures should be eliminated in that order.
4.3.16 On concluding its discussion, the conference agreed to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 4/8 — Rectification of air navigation deficiencies

That ICAO:
a) urge States to:
1) review their respective lists of identified deficiencies and inform

the ICAO Regional Office of those that have been eliminated;
2) formulate and forward an action plan and timetable for rectification

of outstanding deficiencies to the respective ICAO Regional Office
for review; and
3) identify areas, if any, where the establishment of multinational

agreements or informal coordination groups may contribute to the
resolution of deficiencies;
b) encourage users of air navigation facilities and services to report to the

respective regional office once they note that the remedial action on the
deficiency they had reported has been taken; and
c) continue to provide assistance to States for the purpose of rectifying

deficiencies.
Flight level harmonization
4.3.17 The conference was invited to consider the need to harmonize flight level assignment
procedures wherever reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) was being applied through the worldwide
adoption of the system of cruising levels specified in Annex 2 — Rules of the Air, Appendix 3, Table of
Cruising Levels. Of particular concern were operations at the interface between airspaces where different
units of measurement were used. Information was presented that illustrated that when the common cruising
levels structure and corresponding vertical separation minima, expressed in metres or feet, as outlined in
Annex 2 were adhered to, the maximum difference in cruising level experienced by any aircraft transitioning
between metres and feet was 23 m (75 ft). By contrast, on some regional boundaries where this conversion
was made today using State-specific procedures for conventional vertical separation (500 m or 2 000 ft), the
cruising level difference was as great as 287 metres (941 ft) and averaged over 165 m (541 ft). Differences
between individual ATS units cruising level procedures were mitigated in many cases by sterilization of
altitudes within one or both flight information regions. With the introduction of RVSM, however, the latitude
to mask differences in this manner would almost be eliminated. Further, this practice limited capacity and
flexibility as States and regions moved towards a more dynamic CNS/ATM environment.
4.3.18 The conference recalled that substantial consideration of existing transition procedures in
operations in the interface airspaces mentioned above had been made by ICAO in the past. Nevertheless, the
conference agreed that the introduction of RVSM should warrant further consideration of the issue.
4.3.19 The conference concluded its discussion with the following recommendation:
Recommendation 4/9 — Harmonization of flight level assignment

methodology across flight information region
boundaries
That relevant States, when planning for the introduction of reduced vertical
separation minimum (RVSM) at interfaces between airspaces where different
units of measurement are used, taking into account relevant operational and
technical considerations, should apply a common cruising levels structure in
accordance with the tables of cruising levels expressed in metres or feet, as
Recommendation 4/10 — Tables of cruising levels
That ICAO continue to study the common cruising levels structure, as

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Agenda Item 5: Review of the outcome of the ITU World Radio Conference (2003) (WRC-2003)
and its impact on aeronautical electromagnetic spectrum utilization
5.1 INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION

(ITU) WORLD RADIOCOMMUNICATION
CONFERENCE 2003 (WRC-03)
5.1.1 Preparation for WRC-03
5.1.1.1 The conference was informed that ICAO Contracting States, international organizations and
the ICAO Secretariat had participated actively in the international preparatory meetings for the World Radio
Conference (2003) (WRC-03), organized by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), regional
telecommunication organizations1 and the Aeronautical Communications Panel (ACP) Working Group F.
Such participation, as urged in Assembly Resolution A32-13 (see Appendix A), was essential to secure that
significant elements of the ICAO position, which had been developed by the Air Navigation Commission and
approved by Council, were incorporated by the regional telecommunication organizations in their proposals
to the WRC-03. It was recognized that the inclusion of aeronautical experts in the national delegations and
the active participation of international organizations and ICAO to the WRC-03 had contributed significantly
to the favourable results that were obtained.
5.1.1.2 The conference noted that during the preparation for the WRC-03, ICAO had organized
various regional preparatory meetings to review and address developments by States and regional
telecommunication organizations and to consider updates to the ICAO position. These regional meetings were
held in conjunction with meetings of AMCP Working Group F, which developed the draft ICAO position,
and were critical in the development of the updates to the ICAO position, in particular with regard to the
inclusion of regional considerations.
5.1.2 Results of WRC-03 on key aeronautical items
5.1.2.1 The conference was informed that some countries had deleted their name from a number of
footnotes allocating certain aeronautical bands to non-aeronautical services. It was noted that further deletions
of country names should be encouraged at WRC-07.
5.1.2.2 The WRC-03 had re-affirmed the need to keep the frequency band 5 091 - 5 150 MHz
available for aeronautical radionavigation on a shared basis with the fixed satellite service with priority being
given to assignments necessary for international standard systems for the aeronautical radionavigation service
(such as the microwave landing system (MLS)). No new assignments to the fixed satellite service would be
made after 2012 and at 2018 the fixed satellite service would become secondary. The conference noted that
these arrangements might be revised around 2011.
5.1.2.3 Revisions to the band 5 150 - 5 725 MHz involved the existing allocations, on a primary
basis, to the aeronautical radionavigation service in the band 5 150 - 5 250 MHz and 5 350 - 5 470 MHz. The
WRC-03 granted a worldwide allocation to the mobile service in the band 5 150 - 5 250 MHz. The conference
also upgraded the radiolocation service from a secondary to a primary service in the band 5 350 - 5 470 MHz.
To date, the band 5 150 - 5 250 MHz was not used for aviation and the band 5 350 - 5 470 MHz was used
1
Asia-Pacific Telecommunity (APT), Arab Spectrum Management Group (ASMG), European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunication Authorities (CEPT), Commisión Interamericana de Telecommunicaciones (CITEL) and African
Telecommunication Union (ATU)
for airborne weather radar. Regulatory provisions were adopted to protect the aeronautical use of the band
5 350 - 5 470 MHz .
5.1.2.4 The radiolocation service in the band 2 900 - 3 100 MHz had been upgraded to a primary
service. This band was shared with aeronautical primary surveillance radar systems. Regulatory provisions
were adopted to protect the aeronautical use of this band.
5.1.2.5 Open issues from WRC-00 (2000, Istanbul, Turkey) concerning the introduction of
allocations to the radionavigation satellite service (RNSS) in the bands 1 164 - 1 215 MHz and 1 215 -
1 300 MHz had been reviewed. In the band 1 164 - 1 215 MHz an aggregate equivalent power flux density
for all RNSS satellite systems operating in this band had been established in order to protect the distance
measuring equipment (DME) from harmful interference. In the band 1 215 - 1 300 MHz regulatory measures
had been incorporated in the radio regulations to ensure that the RNSS shall neither cause interference to nor
claim protection from the aeronautical radionavigation service, which was using this band for primary
surveillance radar systems. In this regard it was noted that the ITU would continue studies related to the
protection of these radar systems.
5.1.2.6 WRC-03 had also introduced in the band 108 - 117.975 MHz an allocation to the
Aeronautical Mobile (R) service on a primary basis, limited to systems that transmit navigational information
in support of air navigation and surveillance functions in accordance with recognized international standards.
This allocation enabled the use of this band for the ICAO standard ground-based augmentation system
(GBAS) and VHF digital link (VDL) Mode 4. It was stipulated that these systems shall not cause harmful
interference to instrument landing system (ILS) and VHF omnidirectional radio range (VOR), which were
also using this band. However, until all issues relating to compatibility with FM broadcast stations operating
below 108 MHz would be addressed in the ITU, the use of the band 108-112 MHz by VDL Mode 4 was not
allowed.
5.1.2.7 In summary, the conference noted with appreciation that the results of WRC-03 were very
favourable to aviation and that the extensive preparatory work and participation by States had contributed
significantly to the successful outcome. The conference was informed that further work on the outcome of
the WRC-03 (addressing protection of radar and FM compatibility aspects as reported in 5.1.2.4 and 5.1.2.5
above) would be undertaken within the ITU-R study groups.
5.2 PREPARATION FOR THE WRC-07
5.2.1 WRC-03 also developed the agenda for the next World Radiocommunication Conference,
which is expected to be held in 2007. The conference noted the following items of critical concern to aviation
were on the agenda of this WRC-07:
5.2.1.1 Agenda Item 1.1 of WRC-03 would request from administrations to delete their country
footnotes or to have their country name deleted from footnotes, if no longer required. Among other things,
deletion of footnotes such as footnote RR 5.362B which limit global navigation satellite service (GNSS)
implementation in some countries were encouraged by ICAO.
5.2.1.2 Agenda Item 1.2 would consider allocations and regulatory issues related to the earth
exploration-satellite (passive) service, space research (passive) service and the meteorological satellite
service. International civil aviation would need to ensure that such allocations did not limit current
aeronautical usage or future enhancements to aviation systems.
5.2.1.3 Agenda Item 1.3 would consider the upgrade (used for ground-based radar and airborne
weather radar) of the radiolocation service to a primary allocation in the bands 9 000 - 9 200 MHz and
9 300 - 9 500 MHz, and the introduction of a primary allocation to the Earth exploration-satellite service
(active) and the space research service (active) in the band 9 300 - 9 500 MHz . International civil aviation
would need to insure that this upgrade is made in such a manner that current and future aeronautical
operations are fully protected.
5.2.1.4 Agenda Item 1.6 of WRC-07 would consider additional allocations for the aeronautical
mobile (R) service in parts of the bands between 108 MHz and 6 GHz, and to study current satellite-frequency
allocations that will support the modernization of civil aviation telecommunication systems. In this
connection the conference noted that in particular elements of the operational concept requiring additional
radio-frequency spectrum, including the effect of introduction of additional services and traffic growth, the
implementation or transition time frame as well as the need to secure global allocations would need special
attention. The conference noted that this agenda item might also be used to study the spectrum needs of the
universal access transceiver (UAT), the potential for airport network and location equipment, aeronautical
fixed links in the 5 091 - 5 150 MHz band, and allocations for new technologies to support aeronautical
mobile communications requirements.
5.2.1.5 Agenda Item 1.6 of WRC-07 would also include a review on the need of some developing
countries which still lack an appropriate communication infrastructure that meets the evolving requirements
of modern civil aviation (ITU Resolution 415 refers). In this regard the conference noted that current satellite
frequency allocations that could meet aeronautical requirements to support the modernization of civil aviation
telecommunication systems in these countries and in particular those radio frequencies that could be used to
support both ICAO communications, navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management (CNS/ATM)
systems and other, non-aeronautical, telecommunication services would also need to be addressed. The
conference noted that this issue would be addressed further in ICAO.
5.2.2 The full agenda for the WRC-07 is reproduced in Appendix B.
5.2.3 Noting that the ITU and regional telecommunication organizations would be conducting
international preparatory meetings for WRC-07, as they had done for WRC-03 (section 5.1.1.1 refers), the
conference agreed that ICAO Contracting States, international organizations and the ICAO Secretariat should
continue their active participation in such meetings, as urged by Assembly Resolution A32-13.
5.2.4 Considering the experience gained during the successful preparation for the WRC-03, the
conference developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 5/1 — Preparation for WRC-2007
That ICAO
a) urge States and international organizations to continue their efforts on

implementation of the relevant elements of Assembly
Resolution A32-13 and in particular participate in the preparatory work
of the ITU and the regional telecommunication organizations for
WRC-07; and
b) continue to assign high priority to the tasks relating to the protection and
availability of radio-frequency spectrum allocated to aeronautical
services and in particular actively participates in the relevant activities

of the ITU-R and of the regional telecommunication organizations.
5.2.4.1 The conference was informed that ICAO would ensure any required cooperation and
participation of all ICAO Regional Offices in the ICAO preparatory activities.
5.2.5 Schedule for developing the ICAO position for WRC-07
5.2.5.1 The conference noted that the draft ICAO position for WRC-07 was expected to be reviewed
by the Air Navigation Commission during the second quarter of 2004. This would enable the Council to
review and approve the ICAO position in the first quarter of 2005. If required, the ICAO position would be
further updated shortly before WRC-07, in the light of developments during the preparatory activities.
5.3 RADIO-FREQUENCY SPECTRUM PLANNING

MECHANISMS
5.3.1 The conference was informed that a spectrum policy framework had been set up in the
European Union. This framework consolidated the EU position in the international radio-frequency spectrum
coordination process, notably for ITU WRCs. Under this framework, the CEPT coordinated the technical
negotiations for Europe for all sectors, including aviation, and the European Commission provided policy
guidance, political support and EU-wide regulatory implementation of specific results of WRC. The
conference further noted that a new spectrum management mechanism had been set up by Eurocontrol to
coordinate the development of the aeronautical European aviation position for WRCs.
5.3.2 The conference was presented with views that there was a fragmentation of activities related
to spectrum management and frequency assignment planning over various working groups in the ACP and
between the ACP and the NSP. As a consequence, panel members might be required to participate in multiple
ICAO groups. The conference agreed that the Secretariat, as a matter of urgency, should conduct a thorough
review of the working arrangements for spectrum and frequency management and should develop proposals
for streamlining and/or consolidating the various spectrum-related activities, to the maximum extent possible.
5.4 USE OF SHARED FREQUENCY BANDS
5.4.1 The conference recognized the requirement to ensure that adequate spectrum be available
to sustain the long-term viability of the existing VOR, ILS and DME infrastructure, including the ability to
provide MLS as a long-term replacement for ILS. The development of a coordinated plan for the shared use
of these bands with new systems or services would be necessary to establish a methodology for the
implementation of these new systems while giving due priority to the existing systems. After it would have
been demonstrated to what extent reliance can be placed upon GNSS, it might be feasible to reduce some of
the requirements for existing systems.
5.5 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE IN

AERONAUTICAL COMMUNICATION AND
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
5.5.1 The conference noted that due to the increased use of radio systems, both within and outside
aviation, harmful electromagnetic interference to aeronautical communication and navigation systems had
been a long-standing aviation concern. This concern had been heightened by the introduction of new
aeronautical systems.
5.5.1.1 It was recognized that the introduction of new aeronautical systems must take place under
conditions that ensured compatibility with existing systems, in particular those operating in the same or
adjacent band, through the application of appropriate frequency assignment planning criteria. As part of the
aircraft installation process, it was essential to ensure that no harmful interference was caused to any aircraft
system.
5.5.1.2 It was further recognized that the increased use of non-aeronautical radio and other electronic
equipment, including portable electronic devices that could be brought on board aircraft, had increased the
level of potential interference to aeronautical systems. The standards for these systems, which were often
claimed to radiate low-power RF energy, were normally agreed by international telecommunication and
standards organizations.
5.5.1.3 The conference recognized the importance of addressing interference issues for aviation and
the need for action by States, ICAO and international organizations together. This interference falls broadly
into three categories:
a) aeronautical sources;
b) non-aeronautical sources; and
c) malicious interference.
5.5.1.4 It was noted that, since compatibility issues between ILS/VOR and FM broadcasting had
become an urgent problem in several ICAO regions, material should be developed to assist States in assessing
potential interference from FM broadcasting stations.
5.5.1.5 The conference noted the problem of interference produced in the VHF COM band by
aeronautical sources, including the transmission by aircraft outside the designated service area and the
permanent transmission due to stuck microphones. An expert group should work (urgently) on these sources
of interference and produce SARPs or guidance material, aiming at reducing their occurrence. In addition the
problem of intentional interference in the VHF COM band, which constitutes a real threat, should also be
addressed by a group of experts in order to develop guidelines aiming to mitigate the associated risk.
5.5.1.6 The conference was informed that EUROCAE had completed a draft report on interference
from passenger carried portable electronic devices2 and that this report should be taken into consideration
when studying the above issues. The conference was also informed that RTCA had initiated a similar study,
using the EUROCAE study as a basis.
2
Report on electromagnetic compatibility between passenger-carried portable electronic devices (PEDs) and aircraft system (WG58
ED118)
5.5.2 The conference agreed that ICAO’s involvement in these areas was critical and needed to
be intensified in order to ensure that relevant regulatory provisions would protect all aeronautical
communication and navigation systems from harmful interference as electromagnetic interference to
aeronautical communication and navigation systems would present a potential flight safety problem and
actual interference in most cases would be required to be removed without delay.
5.5.3 The conference noted that some States had developed strategies, to control this type of
interference at a national level. These included:
a) Preventive action. Spectrum users were brought together to raise awareness of the
potential risk to civil aviation resulting from interference and identifying known ways
to minimize such interference. This could be supplemented by monitoring frequencies
in operational use and identifying potential sources of interference; and
b) Remedial action. Ground and airborne equipment could be deployed for the detection
of interference sources which were detected by the monitoring station when it is beyond
line-of-sight of the interfering station.
5.5.4 The conference recognized that it was necessary to develop guidance material to assist States
in implementing means to control interference.
5.5.5 Accordingly, the conference developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 5/2 — ICAO activities on interference
That ICAO;
a) intensify its activities to secure protection of aeronautical

communication, navigation and surveillance systems from the adverse
effects of electromagnetic interference and develops guidance material,
as necessary;
b) develop material to assist States in assessing interference from FM

broadcasting stations;
c) support the relevant activities of the ITU and regional

telecommunication and standards-making organizations; and
d) develop guidance material on the control and removal of interference to

aeronautical systems.
————————
Appendix A to the Report on Agenda Item 5 5A-1
APPENDIX A
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A32/13
A32-13: Support of the ICAO policy on

radio frequency spectrum matters
Whereas ICAO is the specialized agency of the United Nations responsible for the safety, regularity
and efficiency of international civil aviation;
Whereas ICAO adopts international Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for aeronautical
communications systems and radio navigation aids;
Whereas ITU is the specialized agency of the United Nations regulating the use of the radio
frequency spectrum;
Whereas the ICAO position, as approved by the Council, for ITU World Radiocommunication
Conferences (WRCs) is the result of the coordination of international aviation requirements for radio
frequency spectrum;
Recognizing that the development and the implementation of the CNS/ATM systems and the safety
of international civil aviation could be seriously jeopardized unless aviation requirements for allocations of
radio frequency spectrum are satisfied and protection of those allocations is achieved;
Recognizing that support from ITU member administrations is required to ensure that the ICAO
position is supported by the WRC and that aviation requirements are met;
Considering the urgent need to increase such support due to the growing demand for spectrum and
aggressive competition from commercial telecommunications services;
Considering the increased level of ITU WRC preparation activities associated with the biennial WRC
regime;
Considering Recommendations 7/3, 7/5 and 7/6 of the Special Communications/Operations

Divisional Meeting (1995) (SP COM/OPS/95);
The Assembly:
1. Urges Contracting States and international organizations to support firmly the ICAO position at
WRCs and in regional and other international activities conducted in preparation for WRCs by the following
means:
a) undertaking to provide for aviation interests to be fully integrated in the development of their
positions presented to regional telecommunications fora involved in the preparation of joint
proposals to the WRC;
5A-2 Appendix A to the Report on Agenda Item 5
b) including in their proposals to the WRC, to the extent possible, material consistent with the ICAO
position;
c) supporting the ICAO position at WRC-2000 to retain the frequency band 1 559-1 610 MHz for
exclusive use by the Aeronautical Radionavigation Service and the Radionavigation Satellite
Service;
d) undertaking to provide aviation authorities to fully participate in the development of States'

positions; and
e) ensuring, to the maximum extent possible, that their delegations to WRCs include representatives
of their civil aviation administrations or other officials who are fully prepared to represent aviation
interests;
2. Requests the Secretary General to bring to the attention of ITU the importance of adequate radio
frequency spectrum allocation and protection for the safety of aviation; and
3. Instructs the Council and the Secretary General, as a matter of high priority within the budget
adopted by the Assembly, to ensure that the resources necessary to support increased participation by ICAO
to international and regional spectrum management activities are made available.
————————
Appendix B to the Report on Agenda Item 5 5B-1
APPENDIX B
RESOLUTION 802 (WRC-03)
AGENDA FOR THE 2007 WORLD RADIOCOMMUNICATION CONFERENCE
The World Radiocommunication Conference (Geneva, 2003),
considering
a) that, in accordance with No. 118 of the Convention, the general scope of the agenda for a world
radiocommunication conference should be established four to six years in advance and a final agenda
shall be established by the Council two years before the conference;
b) Article 13 of the Constitution relating to the competence and scheduling of world

radiocommunication conferences and Article 7 of the Convention relating to their agendas;
c) the relevant Resolutions and Recommendations of previous world administrative radio conferences
(WARCs) and world radiocommunication conferences (WRCs),
recognizing
a) that this Conference has identified a number of urgent issues requiring further examination by
WRC-07;
b) that, in preparing this agenda, many items proposed by administrations could not be included and
have had to be deferred to future conference agendas,
resolves
to recommend to the Council that a world radiocommunication conference be held in 2007 for a period of
four weeks, with the following agenda:
1. on the basis of proposals from administrations, taking account of the results of WRC-03 and the
Report of the Conference Preparatory Meeting, and with due regard to the requirements of existing and future
services in the bands under consideration, to consider and take appropriate action with respect to the
following items:
1.1 requests from administrations to delete their country footnotes or to have their country name deleted
from footnotes, if no longer required, in accordance with Resolution 26 (Rev.WRC-97);
1.2 to consider allocations and regulatory issues related to the Earth exploration-satellite (passive)
service, space research (passive) service and the meteorological satellite service in accordance with
Resolutions 746 (WRC-03) and 742 (WRC-03);
1.3 in accordance with Resolution 747 (WRC-03), consider upgrading the radiolocation service to
primary allocation status in the bands 9 000 - 9 200 MHz and 9 300 - 9 500 MHz and extending by up to
200 MHz the existing primary allocations to the Earth exploration-satellite service (active) and the space
research service (active) in the band 9 500 - 9 800 MHz without placing undue constraint on the services to
which the bands are allocated;
5B-2 Appendix B to the Report on Agenda Item 5
1.4 to consider frequency-related matters for the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond
IMT-2000 taking into account the results of ITU-R studies in accordance with Resolution 228
(Rev.WRC-03);
1.5 to consider spectrum requirements and possible additional spectrum allocations for aeronautical
telecommand and high bit-rate aeronautical telemetry, in accordance with Resolution 230 (WRC-03);
1.6 to consider additional allocations for the aeronautical mobile (R) service in parts of the bands between
108 MHz and 6 GHz, in accordance with Resolution 414 (WRC-03) and, to study current satellite frequency
allocations, that will support the modernization of civil aviation telecommunication systems, taking into
account Resolution 415 (WRC-03);
1.7 to consider the results of ITU-R studies regarding sharing between the mobile-satellite service and
the space research service (passive) in the band 1 668 - 1 668.4 MHz, and between the mobile-satellite service
and the mobile service in the band 1 668.4 - 1 675 MHz in accordance with Resolution 744 (WRC-03);
1.8 to consider the results of ITU-R studies on technical sharing and regulatory provisions for the
application of high altitude platform stations operating in the bands 27.5 - 28.35 GHz and 31 - 31.3 GHz in
response to Resolution 145 (WRC-03), and for high altitude platform stations operating in the bands
47.2 - 47.5 GHz and 47.9 - 48.2 GHz in response to Resolution 122 (Rev.WRC-03);
1.9 to review the technical, operational and regulatory provisions applicable to the use of the band
2 500 - 2 690 MHz by space services in order to facilitate sharing with current and future terrestrial services
without placing undue constraint on the services to which the band is allocated;
1.10 to review the regulatory procedures and associated technical criteria of Appendix 30B without any
action on the allotments, the existing systems or the assignments in the List of Appendix 30B;
1.11 to review sharing criteria and regulatory provisions for protection of terrestrial services, in particular
terrestrial television broadcasting services, in the band 620 - 790 MHz from BSS networks and systems, in
accordance with Resolution 545 (WRC-03);
1.12 to consider possible changes in response to Resolution 86 (Rev. Marrakesh, 2002) of the
Plenipotentiary Conference: “Coordination and notification procedures for satellite networks” in accordance
with Resolution 86 (WRC-03);
1.13 taking into account Resolutions 729 (WRC-97), 351 (WRC-03) and 544 (WRC-03), to review the
allocations to all services in the HF bands between 4 MHz and 10 MHz, excluding those allocations to
services in the frequency range 7 000 - 7 200 kHz and those bands whose allotment plans are in
Appendices 25, 26 and 27 and whose channelling arrangements are in Appendix 17, taking account of the
impact of new modulation techniques, adaptive control techniques and the spectrum requirements for HF
broadcasting;
1.14 to review the operational procedures and requirements of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety
System (GMDSS) and other related provisions of the Radio Regulations, taking into account Resolutions 331
(Rev.WRC-03) and 342 (Rev.WRC-2000) and the continued transition to the GMDSS, the experience since
its introduction, and the needs of all classes of ships;
1.15 to consider a secondary allocation to the amateur service in the frequency band 135.7 - 137.8 kHz;
1.16 to consider the regulatory and operational provisions for Maritime Mobile Service Identities (MMSIs)
for equipment other than shipborne mobile equipment, taking into account Resolutions 344 (Rev.WRC-03)
and 353 (WRC-03);
1.17 to consider the results of ITU-R studies on compatibility between the fixed-satellite service and other
services around 1.4 GHz, in accordance with Resolution 745 (WRC-03);
1.18 to review pfd limits in the band 17.7 - 19.7 GHz for satellite systems using highly inclined orbits, in
accordance with Resolution 141 (WRC-03);
1.19 to consider the results of the ITU-R studies regarding spectrum requirement for global broadband
satellite systems in order to identify possible global harmonized FSS frequency bands for the use of Internet
applications, and consider the appropriate regulatory/technical provisions, taking also into account
No. 5.516B of the Radio Regulations;
1.20 to consider the results of studies, and proposals for regulatory measures regarding the protection of
the Earth exploration-satellite service (passive) from unwanted emissions of active services in accordance
with Resolution 738 (WRC-03);
1.21 to consider the results of studies regarding the compatibility between the radio astronomy service and
the active space services in accordance with Resolution 740 (Rev.WRC-03), in order to review and update,
if appropriate, the tables of threshold levels used for consultation that appear in the Annex to Resolution 739
(WRC-03);
2. to examine the revised ITU-R Recommendations incorporated by reference in the Radio Regulations
communicated by the Radiocommunication Assembly, in accordance with Resolution 28 (Rev.WRC-03),
and to decide whether or not to update the corresponding references in the Radio Regulations, in accordance
with principles contained in the Annex to Resolution 27 (Rev.WRC-03);
3. to consider such consequential changes and amendments to the Radio Regulations as may be
necessitated by the decisions of the conference;
4. in accordance with Resolution 95 (Rev.WRC-03), to review the Resolutions and Recommendations

of previous conferences with a view to their possible revision, replacement or abrogation;
5. to review, and take appropriate action on, the Report from the Radiocommunication Assembly
submitted in accordance with Nos. 135 and 136 of the Convention;
6. to identify those items requiring urgent action by the Radiocommunication Study Groups in
preparation for the next world radiocommunication conference;
7. in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention:
7.1 to consider and approve the Report of the Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau:
— on the activities of the Radiocommunication Sector since WRC-03;
— on any difficulties or inconsistencies encountered in the application of the Radio

Regulations; and
— on action in response to Resolution 80 (Rev.WRC-2000);
7.2 to recommend to the Council items for inclusion in the agenda for the next WRC, and to give its
views on the preliminary agenda for the subsequent conference and on possible agenda items for future
conferences, taking into account Resolution 803 (WRC-03),
further resolves
to activate the Conference Preparatory Meeting and the Special Committee on Regulatory/Procedural Matters,
invites the Council
to finalize the agenda and arrange for the convening of WRC-07, and to initiate as soon as possible the
necessary consultations with Member States,
instructs the Director of the Radiocommunication Bureau
to make the necessary arrangements to convene meetings of the Conference Preparatory Meeting and to
prepare a report to WRC-07,
instructs the Secretary-General
to communicate this Resolution to international and regional organizations concerned.
————————
Agenda Item 6: Aeronautical navigation issues
6.1 GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS)

DEVELOPMENT STATUS BASED ON REPORTS FROM
STATES, SERVICE PROVIDERS AND INDUSTRY
ORGANIZATIONS
6.1.1 Introduction
6.1.1.1 When inviting States and international organizations to the Eleventh Air Navigation
Conference (State letter ST 12/1-02/58 refers), ICAO drew particular attention of States, service providers
and organizations involved in the development of GNSS and its elements to the need for providing, under
Agenda Item 6, relevant supporting information on these activities.
6.1.1.2 In response to ICAO’s request, a number of States and service providers presented to the
conference information concerning modernization of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and GLObal
NAvigation Satellite System (GLONASS) and development of the new core satellite constellation GALILEO.
The conference was also informed of the status of satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) in the United
States, Europe, Japan and India. Also presented were the reports concerning ground-based augmentation
system (GBAS) and ground-based regional augmentation system (GRAS).
6.1.1.3 The conference reviewed information in the following order: core satellite constellations,
satellite-based augmentation systems and ground-based augmentation systems.
6.1.2 Core satellite constellations
GPS
6.1.2.1 The conference was informed that the space segment of the Global Positioning System (GPS)
consisted of twenty four satellites in operational status. The conference was also informed that the United
States had developed a plan for the modernization of GPS. One of the principle objectives of modernization
is to provide additional coded civil signals. A second civil signal, known as L2C will be broadcast at the
1227.6 MHz frequency, and a third civil signal, known as L5, will be at 1176.45 MHz. The new, more robust
civil code to L2 will begin in 2004. The addition of a third civil signal (L5) designed for aviation and other
safety-of-life uses will be available beginning in 2006. Based on the current 2004 budget schedule, an initial
operational capability for dual frequency navigation will occur in 2010 (calendar year), based on a
constellation of eighteen satellites broadcasting the new civil code on L2. Similarly, the L5 signal should be
available on eighteen GPS satellites by late 2013.
GLONASS
6.1.2.2 The conference was informed that the space segment of the GLONASS system at the time
of the conference consisted of eleven satellites, eight of which operated without restrictions. The conference
was also informed that, in August 2001, the Government of the Russian Federation had adopted a ten-year
federal special programme for maintaining and further developing GLONASS. The programme includes the
development of the new-generation satellites GLONASS-M, the fist of which will be launched together with
two GLONASS satellites in the fourth quarter of 2003. Further evolution will include the development of an
advanced satellite GLONASS-K with a lifetime of ten to twelve years, improved accuracy performance and
an additional navigation signal in the band 1 164 - 1 215 MHz. The GLONASS-K satellite will be
considerably lighter than existing versions, making it possible to reduce by several times the costs of
deploying and maintaining the orbital segment of the system.
6.1.2.3 Deployment of the orbital segment will be phased as follows:
Phase 1: In 2006 the orbital segment will be increased to 18 satellites, some of which will
be GLONASS-M satellites with an increased lifetime and improved performance.
Phase 2: After 2006 the orbital segment will be deployed and maintained at the level of 24
satellites by launching GLONASS-K satellites.
6.1.2.4 It was also reported that gradual transfer of system operation to lower portions of the
currently occupied bands would continue in accordance with the existing agreements to secure eletromagnetic
compatibility with the Radioastronomy and Mobile Satellite Service.
GALILEO
6.1.2.5 The conference was informed that European States, recognizing the strategic importance of
satellite navigation, its potential applications and the current GNSS shortcomings, had decided to develop
a European GNSS capability in a two-step approach through the implementation of an SBAS known as
European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) to cover the short and medium term needs,
and of a satellite navigation constellation (GALILEO) to support multimodal user needs for the longer term.
The GALILEO program will deploy a full European satellite constellation, under civil control, that will
strengthen the robustness of satellite navigation, alleviate a number of institutional concerns and should
further facilitate a full transition to satellite navigation. The GALILEO stakeholders had already established
and support further international and bilateral cooperation in the system development. The use of the services
offered by GALILEO would rely on the availability of ICAO Standards.
6.1.2.6 Alongside an open service similar to the GPS Standard Positioning Service, GALILEO would
offer new features to improve and guarantee services supporting the critical, safety-of-life or commercial
applications. GALILEO services would be required to be fully compatible and interoperable at the user level
with other GNSS services, with no common failure mode between systems. The combined use of GALILEO
and other GNSS elements would offer better performances for all users worldwide.
6.1.2.7 The GALILEO satellite services would be provided worldwide and independently from other
systems by combining the signals broadcast by the GALILEO satellites. There was a wide range of possible
applications with different operational requirements that had been grouped around five reference services:
GALILEO Open Service (OS), Safety-of-Life (SoL), Commercial Service (CS), Public Regulated Service
(PRS) and Support to Search and Rescue (SAR).
6.1.2.8 The conference noted that the GALILEO preliminary system design phase was completed
and that the European Space Agency (ESA) was preparing development contracts for deployment of the
infrastructure, including the launching of the first test satellites.
6.1.2.9 The GALILEO infrastructure would be implemented in three phases:
a) development and validation phase (2002-2005);
b) deployment phase (2006-2007); and
c) operational phase (from 2008).

6.1.3 Satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS)
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
6.1.3.1 The conference noted with appreciation that, on 10 July 2003, WAAS was commissioned
for use in all phases of air navigation in the United States national airspace system (NAS) including one class
of instrument approach with both lateral and vertical guidance (lateral navigation (LNAV)/vertical navigation
(VNAV)). WAAS performance had consistently demonstrated 1 m horizontal and 1.5 m vertical accuracy.
WAAS initial operating capability (IOC) provided users with the capability to fly approaches with vertical
guidance throughout the United States NAS. This initial WAAS capability also provided improved guidance
to users in the en-route and departure domains. LNAV/VNAV is an approach procedure with vertical
guidance with nominal minimums of a 105 m (350 ft) decision height and 1.25 mile visibility. Over
700 LNAV/VNAV procedures had been published for WAAS operations. The WAAS service area is the
continental United States and portions of Alaska. In the CAR/SAM Regions, WAAS test bed trials are being
conducted.
6.1.3.2 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had improved the approach capability of WAAS
through terminal instrument procedure optimization. This improvement consisted of a new approach
procedure with vertical guidance called LPV, which is compliant with Annex 10 performance requirements
for APV I1. LPV provided lateral approach guidance performance equivalent to instrument landing system
(ILS) localizer performance. This represented a significant improvement over LNAV/VNAV resulting in
lower approach minima for most runways. LPV procedures have nominal minimums of 75 m (250 ft) decision
height and 0.5 mile visibility with proper lighting. LPV would make the vertical guidance safety benefit
accessible to the general aviation community, thus directly enhancing the flying safety for general aviation
aircraft and other WAAS users.
6.1.3.3 WAAS final operating capability (FOC), with LPV capability, throughout an expanded
service area, is expected by December 2007. WAAS Category I precision approach capability, would await
the availability of the second GPS aviation frequency, L5 (1176.45 MHz). According to the current plan,
enough GPS satellites with L5 capability would be on orbit by 2013 so as to be operationally usable by
aviation. The FAA plans to upgrade WAAS to use L5 prior to this time.
European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS)
6.1.3.4 The conference was informed that the EGNOS project, as implemented by the European
Tripartite Group (ETG), formed by ESA, European Commission and Eurocontrol, represented the first
European contribution to the GNSS. EGNOS would provide and guarantee navigation signals for
aeronautical, maritime and land mobile trans-European network applications. On behalf of the Tripartite
Group, the European Space Agency was responsible for the system design, development and technical
validation of an Advanced Operational Capability (AOC) of the EGNOS system. The technical validation
is to be completed in 2004, to enable operational use of the EGNOS signal for safety-of-life applications in
2005. Possible evolution scenarios of EGNOS after 2004 were being assessed.
6.1.3.5 EGNOS would provide improved services with respect to GPS, in terms of accuracy (from
20 metres to 1 - 2 metres), service guarantee (via integrity signal) and availability (via additional ranging
signals). It would operate on the GPS L1 frequency. Initial service areas would be the European Civil
Aviation Conference area, and could be later extended to include other regions. EGNOS would meet, through
1
Annex 10, Volume I, Chapter 3, 3.7.2.4
enhancing GPS and GLONASS, many of the current positioning, velocity and timing requirements of the
land, maritime and aeronautical modes of transport in the European Region.
6.1.3.6 For civil aviation, EGNOS would comply with RTCA DO 229C and ICAO SBAS SARPs
requirements and would provide in ECAC an aviation service from en route through APV-II (vertical alert
limit = 20 m; horizontal alert limit = 40 m).
6.1.3.7 An evaluation of the EGNOS service outside the core ECAC area in the AFI Region was
successfully being conducted, initially through the deployment of an EGNOS system test bed (ESTB) ranging
and integrity monitoring stations (RIMS) in the Western and Central Africa areas by the ASECNA (Agency
for Air Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar) in cooperation with the States involved. The follow up
phase of the AFI Region work plan included the deployment of a RIMS network throughout other areas in
the AFI Region and the preparation for EGNOS operational implementation.
6.1.3.8 In the CAR/SAM Regions, EGNOS trials were conducted under an ICAO technical
cooperation project. To carry out the trials based on the ESTB-signal, three reference stations were deployed
in the region and connected to the ESTB. The EGNOS-type trials provided useful information in support of
the GREPECAS activities in the definition of the GNSS strategy for the region. Areas of cooperation with
the WAAS trials had been identified.
Multifunctional transport satellite-based augmentation system (MSAS)
6.1.3.9 The conference noted that, in accordance with the Future Air Navigation System (FANS)
concept endorsed at the Tenth Air Navigation Conference in 1991, the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB)
had been developing multifunctional transport satellite (MTSAT) and MTSAT Satellite-based Augmentation
System (MSAS). MTSAT was designed as a geostationary satellite with both a meteorological and an
aeronautical mission.
6.1.3.10 The aeronautical mission consists of two functions: aeronautical mobile satellite service
(AMSS) and GNSS satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) to provide aircraft with GPS augmentation
information uplinked to the geostationary satellite from ground facilities. The MSAS function of the MTSAT
would be fully compliant with the ICAO SARPs. Technical details not specified in SARPs were coordinated
through the activities of SBAS Interoperability Working Group (IWG). Thus, the MSAS was fully
interoperable with other SBAS services.
6.1.3.11 After the launch failure of MTSAT-1 (the first MTSAT) JCAB procured an alternate satellite,
MTSAT-1R which would be launched in early 2004. The second MTSAT, MTSAT-2 would be launched in
2005. After completion of the certification, MSAS would be commissioned and be operational using only
MTSAT-1R from 2005. Dual operation by MTSAT-1R and MTSAT-2 would be commissioned in 2006.
6.1.3.12 Two aeronautical satellite centres would be engaged in controlling MTSATs. MSAS master
control stations (MCSs) had been installed at the two aeronautical satellite centres. To provide MSAS service
over the Japanese FIR, ground monitor stations (GMSs) had been installed at four air route traffic control
centres. To secure a long base line for accurate orbit determination of MTSATs, two monitor and ranging
stations (MRSs) were installed in Hawaii, United States and Canberra, Australia. There was also a MRS at
each aeronautical satellite centre.
6.1.3.13 In normal operation, users would be able to receive two SBAS signals with different PRN
codes. Each signal would be uplinked from a different MCS and through a different satellite. In the event of
failure of one of the satellites, the MCS currently uplinking through the failed satellite would switch to the
other satellite. Thus, even in these abnormal conditions the user avionics would still be able to receive the
two SBAS signals. The conference noted that this architecture provided the assurance of highly redundant
and reliable SBAS service.
6.1.3.14 Since the MSAS signal would be broadcast by MTSAT over most of the Asia/Pacific Region,
the MSAS service area could be easily expanded if GMSs were installed in the MTSAT coverage area and
dedicated ground lines were connected to MCSs. In this connection, the conference noted with appreciation
that JCAB offered free MSAS service to the Asia/Pacific States in order to achieve a global, seamless, safer
and more reliable air navigation system in this region.
GPS and GEO Augmented Navigation (GAGAN)
6.1.3.15 The conference was informed by India that the Airports Authority of India (AAI) and Indian
Space Research Organisation (ISRO) had jointly undertaken a programme for the development and
implementation of the GPS and GEO Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) system, to cater to the satellite
navigation augmentation requirements for aircraft operators and air traffic services (ATS) providers in the
Indian airspace, including the Indian oceanic airspace, as well as large parts of the Asia/Pacific Region.
6.1.3.16 The GAGAN programme would be implemented in three phases:
a) 1st phase: Technology demonstration systems (TDS): A minimum configuration

system which would demonstrate the capability of the system to support up to precision
approach (Category I) over a limited region of Indian airspace and would serve as a
proof of concept. The TDS phase will be completed by 2005.
b) 2nd phase: Initial experimental phase (IEP): In this phase TDS would be expanded to
cover the entire Indian airspace and requisite redundancies would be added to the
system. The IEP would be completed in a period of one year after the development of
TDS.
c) 3rd phase: Final operational phase (FOP): During this phase the GAGAN programme
is expected to be matured. The system would be put to extensive trial operation and
would be evaluated with respect to ICAO SARPs before declaring the system
operational. This phase is expected to be completed in one year after IEP.
6.1.3.17 In late 2003, after completing a detailed payload design review, ISRO was in the process of
procurement of critical components for fabrication of the navigational payload which will be put in GSAT-4
satellite to be launched in 2005 and put in 82 degree East orbital slot.
6.1.3.18 Due to the fact that India is situated close to the equator, ionospheric activities would have
a significant effect on received GPS signals over Indian airspace. To adequately assess the effect of
ionosphere on GPS signals and to minimize its effect, development of an ionospheric model had been initiated
based on ionospheric data collected from a large number of locations over an extended period of time.
Keeping this in view, it was planned to establish twenty Stations for collection of ionospheric data spread
over the whole country.
6.1.3.19 The conference noted that GAGAN had been designed to meet the ICAO SARPs and to be
interoperable with WAAS, EGNOS and MSAS.
6.1.4 Ground-based augmentation system (GBAS)
Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)
6.1.4.1 The conference recalled that the local area augmentation system (LAAS) was the
ground-based augmentation system (GBAS) developed in the United States to provide for all categories of
precision approach (PA) capability, precise position, velocity, and time (PVT) data in the terminal area
(GBAS positioning service) and surface operations to suitably equipped aircraft.
6.1.4.2 The initial implementation of LAAS would support both Category I instrument approaches
and the GBAS positioning service at selected airports. The FAA awarded a contract in April 2003 for the
design, development and production of the LAAS ground facility.
6.1.4.3 After validating the system design, the FAA planned to install a limited number of ground
systems throughout the United States National Airspace. LAAS IOC is expected by September 2006. The
FAA coordinated with the aircraft operators to identify the procedures that would fully exploit the LAAS
capabilities to improve airspace utilization and provide the lowest possible approach visibility minima.
6.1.4.4 The end state for LAAS is the provision of Category II/III approach and landing service, and
most of the longer-term development efforts are aimed at achieving this goal. Near-term efforts are focused
on achieving Category III without the use of a second frequency in the airborne receiver. This would be
followed by the incorporation of the benefits from GPS modernization, in particular the additional frequency
L5.
6.1.4.5 In addition, exploration of how LAAS could facilitate more efficient terminal area operations
is expected to result in future LAAS applications such as guided departures, complex approach paths, guided
missed approaches and surface movement guidance and control.
Ground-based Regional Augmentation System (GRAS)
6.1.4.6 The conference recalled that the ground-based regional augmentation system (GRAS) had
been presented to the ICAO GNSS Panel (GNSSP) in 1999 as an alternative to SBAS and GBAS and that
the GNSSP had been requested to develop SARPs for GRAS. The conference was informed that validation
of draft SARPs for GRAS was being progressed with the aim of presenting the completed validation to the
Navigation Systems Panel (Working Group of the Whole) in May 2004.
6.1.4.7 The conference was also informed that Australia had built a GRAS test bed to facilitate the
validation of the GRAS SARPs. GRAS differential and integrity data was being gathered using SBAS
methodology but was uplinked to aircraft in the GBAS message format via a network of stations using VHF
broadcast. The test bed showed that GPS augmented by GRAS could provide en route, terminal area and
approach with vertical guidance navigation.
6.2 NAVIGATION POLICY ISSUES IN THE LIGHT OF

PRESENT AND ENVISAGED GNSS SERVICES AND
ARCHITECTURES, INTEGRATION AND BACK-UP
OPTIONS
6.2.1 Introduction
6.2.1.1 The current ICAO strategy for the introduction of communications, navigation, and
surveillance/air traffic management (CNS/ATM) systems envisages a gradual transition from the current
terrestrial navigation infrastructure to the increased use of a satellite navigation infrastructure. The initial step
of this transition has been supported by the development of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
(SARPs) for the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and publication of procedures and criteria for
operations using Basic GNSS receiver.2
6.2.1.2 GPS was already being extensively used worldwide for aircraft navigation. This use included
both Oceanic and domestic primary means en route, GPS non-precision approaches, GPS-based separation
standards and area navigation (RNAV) and required navigation performance (RNP) operations. In Europe,
it was being used as a means of compliance with basic RNAV (B-RNAV) requirements. SBAS was coming
on-line with the commissioning of the United States’ Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and the
introduction into operation of other SBASs in Europe, Japan and India in the 2004 - 2006 time frame. GBAS
developments were progressing, initially to support Category I precision approach.
6.2.2 The role of GNSS in provision of aeronautical navigation

services and transition strategy considerations
6.2.2.1 The conference received information on developments in States indicating an increasing role
satellite navigation was playing in provision of air navigation services. One State presented its plans for
phasing out some existing terrestrial facilities, beginning with the decommissioning of non-directional radio
beacons (NDBs) as the equipage of commercial fleets and general aviation progresses. Several other States
also indicated their planning for gradual decommissioning of terrestrial navaids as the reliance on satellite
navigation increases.
6.2.2.2 The conference was also informed of a common aviation position in the European region
which was being developed with the participation of airspace users and air navigation service providers. The
ultimate goal envisaged was a sole navigation service to be achieved with GNSS provided that this service
would be proven to be safe, secure and the most cost beneficial solution.
6.2.2.3 This information was supplemented by the airline position on aeronautical navigation needs
which supported GNSS as the primary radio navigation system for positioning and timing in the near future.
The airspace users urged States, in close collaboration with airspace users, to move rapidly from the current
ground-based system to a cost-effective, harmonized and interoperable space-based radio navigation system
capable of being used in all airspaces during all phases of flight. Airlines position also encouraged
implementation of GNSS procedures, in a coordinated manner, with a view to achieving as soon as possible
worldwide navigation capability from en-route down to at least Category I minima.
6.2.2.4 Based on the general consensus to expedite transition to satellite navigation the conference
discussed a proposal for the development of a strategy that sets the basis for transition to a future worldwide
navigation service centred around the use of GNSS. It was recognized however that the Global Air Navigation
Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750) and the Regional Air Navigation Plans represent strategic documents
that meet the intent of such a proposal. The conference agreed to reconfirm the transition objectives and to
establish a set of conditions to be met in the course of transition (see section 6.3 below).
2
The term “Basic GNSS receiver” designates GNSS avionics that at least meet requirements for a GPS receiver in Annex 10,
Volume I, and specifications of RTCA DO-208 or EUROCAE ED-72A, as amended by FAA TSO-C129A or JAA TGL 3 (or
equivalent).
6.2.2.5 The conference addressed near-term objectives in the transition process. It was noted from
information presented on the status of GNSS development that one satellite-based augmentation system,
namely the United States WAAS became operational in mid-2003, and three other SBASs were planned to
become operational in the 2004 - 2006 time frame. APV operations based on WAAS were being introduced,
and States were making plans for introduction of these operations upon the commissioning of other SBASs.
6.2.2.6 The conference reviewed information presented on the planned implementation of approaches
with vertical guidance (APV) in some States. The programme in one State envisaged the deployment of such
approaches in phases. The work being carried out with a view to complementing conventional approach and
landing aids, in particular the instrument landing system (ILS), would involve:
a) approval of non-precision approaches based on the use of aircraft-based augmentation

system (ABAS);
b) evaluation of the use of APV procedures with barometric vertical guidance; and
c) lastly, the operational benefits provided through the use of APV approach and landing
procedures with SBAS vertical guidance for all airspace users.
6.2.2.7 In addition, several States and international organizations reported on significant activities
in the Caribbean, South American and African Regions to evaluate SBAS performance using WAAS and
EGNOS test bed. Support to these trials rendered by service providers and preliminary results were
appreciated, and the conference agreed that these activities should be promoted.
6.2.2.8 Based on the above, a proposal was made that the airspace users should be encouraged to
equip with SBAS receivers3 to take advantage of their superior performance over Basic GNSS receivers and
the improved service availability. Another proposal was also presented advocating the adoption of
SBAS-based APV operations as a global requirement. The intent of the proposals was supported and the
conference agreed to encourage States and service providers, airspace users and the manufacturing industry
to work together towards the above goals. The conference therefore developed the following
recommendation:
Recommendation 6/1 — Transition to satellite-based air navigation
That:
a) ICAO continue to develop as necessary provisions that would support

seamless GNSS guidance for all phases of flight and facilitate transition
to satellite-based sole navigation service with due consideration of
safety-of-flight, technical, operational and economics factors;
b) air navigation service providers move rapidly, in coordination with
airspace users, with a view to achieving, as soon as possible, worldwide
navigation capability to at least APV I performance; and
c) States and airspace users take note of the available and upcoming SBAS
3
The term “SBAS receiver”designates GNSS avionics that at least meet requirements for a SBAS receiver in Annex 10, Volume I,
and specifications of RTCA DO-229C, as amended by FAA TSO-C145A/146A (or equivalent).
navigation services providing for APV operations and take necessary

steps towards installation and certification of SBAS capable avionics.
6.2.3 GNSS vulnerabilities and sole navigation service
6.2.3.1 The conference was presented with a navigation strategy for the area of the European Civil
Aviation Conference (ECAC) Member States which identified a transition to an area navigation (RNAV)
environment supported by global navigation satellite system (GNSS). Consideration of the costs of the
transition to such an environment together with the need to ensure failure survival indicated that there would,
for the foreseeable future, remain a need for ground-based navigation aids and the consequent requirement
to ensure continued spectrum protection for these aids.
6.2.3.2 Having agreed that spectrum availability aspects of the strategy should be addressed, as
necessary, under its Agenda Item 5, the conference discussed the GNSS potential to become the sole
navigation service. The discussion focussed on some uncertainties that remain in respect to the GNSS
potential to become the sole navigation service due to its potential failure modes, their corresponding impact
on the ATM operations of the ECAC Member States, and mitigation possibilities.
6.2.3.3 The conference was made aware that the Global Positioning System (GPS) without any
augmentation had already been accepted as a means of providing a basic RNAV capability en route
throughout the ECAC area. This has been possible because of the ability to revert to conventional navigation
using ground-based navigation aids such as VOR/NDB. The availability of GALILEO as a second satellite
system complementing GPS, both having additional navigation signals, was expected to allow further reliance
upon GNSS, thereby enabling VOR/NDB decommissioning and relying upon RNAV based on GNSS and
DME.
6.2.3.4 However, whilst the GPS plus GALILEO might provide the basis upon which a total RNAV
environment might be predicated, it had still to be proven that such a solution would be cost effective in the
light of the potential need for carrying dual RNAV systems to meet continuity and availability requirements.
Since many aircraft were equipped with only single RNAV or flight management system (FMS) equipment,
the timescale by which a cost-effective transition to a total RNAV environment could therefore be
considerably extended.
6.2.3.5 Studies in the ECAC area had suggested that, as a reversionary option for the interim
2010 - 2015 time-scale, it might be more cost-effective to ensure the required level of continuity-of-service
by retaining the current VOR environment to support reversionary navigation using dual VOR avionics
installations on the aircraft than it would be with dual RNAV/FMS equipment and dual sensor input. If these
initial results were confirmed, the expected decommissioning of VOR in that period might not be possible.
6.2.3.6 Having reviewed this information, the conference recognized that future developments were
expected to considerably reduce the risks associated with a sole GNSS service. Whilst GNSS is expected to
be used for all phases of flight, some failure modes would remain that could prevent a total reliance upon
GNSS. It was noted that in the context of operations within the ECAC area, there was work on-going to
identify means and associated mitigation strategy by which a gradual move towards sole service might
become possible. However, the ability to reach that ultimate objective and the time-scale are still uncertain
and must be addressed urgently.
6.2.3.7 The conference then reviewed the results of GNSS vulnerability study carried out by the
Global Navigation Satellite System Panel (GNSSP) at the request by the Air Navigation Commission. It was
observed that studies had been carried out over the recent years by several highly qualified institutions
addressing GPS vulnerabilities while the report presented to the conference attempted to consider same issues
in the context of GNSS, GPS being one of the core elements of GNSS. Various vulnerabilities of GNSS,
evaluation of operational risks, means of prevention of system outages and guidance on mitigation of such
outages were presented and appreciated.
6.2.3.8 The conclusion of the study that, to date, no vulnerabilities had been identified that
compromise the ultimate goal of transition to GNSS as a global system for all phases of flight was noted by
the conference, with the understanding that the assessment of GNSS vulnerability aspects and mitigation
alternatives should continue. It was agreed that States were responsible for developing appropriate mitigation
techniques for GNSS outages and that the study results presented to the conference could serve as useful
guidance for States in assessing the GNSS vulnerability and selecting appropriate mitigations. The conference
therefore developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 6/2 — Guidelines on mitigation of GNSS

vulnerabilities
That States in their planning and introduction of GNSS services:
a) assess the likelihood and effects of GNSS vulnerabilities in their

airspace and utilize, as necessary, the mitigation methods as outlined
in the guidelines contained in Appendix A to the report on
Agenda Item 6;
b) provide effective spectrum management and protection of GNSS

frequencies to reduce the possibility of unintentional interference;
c) take full advantage of on-board mitigation techniques, particularly

inertial navigation;
d) where determined that terrestrial navigation aids need to be retained

as part of an evolutionary transition to GNSS, give priority to
retention of DME in support of INS/DME or DME/DME RNAV for
en-route and terminal operations, and of ILS or MLS in support of
precision approach operations at selected runways; and
e) take full advantage of the future contribution of new GNSS signals

and constellations in the reduction of GNSS failures and
vulnerabilities.
6.2.3.9 It was suggested that the recommended guidelines should be considered for inclusion in the
GNSS Manual which, in its draft form, was made available to the conference for information. The suggestion
was noted by the Secretariat.
6.2.3.10 During the review of GNSS vulnerabilities, a number of concerns was raised in regard to the
ionospheric effects in equatorial regions. Several States reported that they had established data collection
programmes and proposed that ICAO assess the results of such studies and provide appropriated guidance
to States. The conference encouraged continuation of these efforts and exchange of data between States and
regions, noting that such data exchange was already taking place in some international expert groups, e.g. the
SBAS Interoperability Working Group (IWG). The conference therefore developed the following
recommendation:
Recommendation 6/3 — Assessment of atmospheric effects on SBAS

performance in equatorial regions
That ICAO, in order to aid the work on mitigation of ionospheric effects on

SBAS performance in equatorial regions, assess the results of data collection
being carried out in States and develop appropriated guidance material.
6.2.3.11 The conference also reviewed a proposal to consider the need for standardization of an
automated means to report GNSS outages and determine the effects of an outage on GNSS operations. In this
regard, the conference noted information on the example software posted on the ICAO Web site
(http://icaosec.icao.int, group name_NSP, directory_links) to demonstrate a prediction tool which can support
flight planning and NOTAM generation. Having appreciated this initiative, the conference was of the opinion
that a uniform application of such tools was essential and developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 6/4 — Automated means for reporting and assessing

the effects of outages on GNSS operations
That ICAO consider standardization of an automated means of monitoring

and reporting scheduled and unscheduled GNSS outages and assessing their
effects on GNSS operations and develop, as necessary, the requisite
provisions.
6.2.4 RNP and RNAV issues
6.2.4.1 The conference was informed of a number of open issues surrounding different definitions
and concepts related to required navigation performance (RNP) and area navigation (RNAV). Further
concerns were raised that, despite efforts to develop and implement a cost-effective global definition of RNP,
it was unlikely that the harmonization of the concept and requirements in this area could be achieved in the
near future. The rationale for these concerns included dependance of most RNAV systems upon ground
infrastructure which was location dependent, the potential for a variety of required RNAV functionalities
associated with the same RNP types in various ATC environments, and avionics versatility driven by cost
effectiveness considerations or resulting from evolutionary development of RNAV/FMS systems. The
conference recognized the complexity of the issues involved and shared these concerns.
6.2.4.2 In this regard, one State informed the conference that it was currently implementing
performance-based RNAV procedures and airspace restructuring to take advantage of aircraft navigation
capabilities to fly more accurate and predictable flight paths through its airspace. Performance-based RNAV
would result in increased levels of navigation accuracy and flight path predictability, leading to improved
efficiency and capacity. This State was also implementing required navigation performance (RNP) approach
procedures and developing a strategy for the introduction of RNP for other phases of flight. In the context
of the above, it also expressed concern about a state of affairs with RNP and RNAV concepts.
6.2.4.3 The conference was informed that on 10 June 2003, during consideration of the report of the
fourth conference of the Global Navigation Satellite System Panel (GNSSP/4), the Air Navigation
Commission had agreed that, as proposed in GNSSP/4 Recommendation 1/1, action should be taken to
establish a focal point for the resolution of the issues identified. It had been noted during consideration of this
matter that there was an urgent need to address these issues in order to ensure a harmonized approach to the
further development of RNP and RNAV. Accordingly, a new air navigation study group named as the
Required Navigation Performance Study Group (RNPSG)4 had been established. Several States and
international organizations attending the conference expressed their commitment to support the work of
RNPSG.
6.2.4.4 In supporting the above action, the conference also noted that air navigation service providers
were making investments in their navigation infrastructure as they implement new RNAV and RNP
procedures. As these procedures were developed and used, States were modifying separation standards to
account for enhanced aircraft navigation capability, and redesigning airspace for best use of these new
procedures. The schedule for implementation of new requirements should be coordinated to align with
infrastructure investments and to allow operators sufficient time to equip with the needed capabilities. In this
connection, the conference stressed an urgent need for global harmonization of performance-based navigation
concepts and requirements and the leading role of ICAO in this harmonization activities. It was suggested
that by the end of 2004, a framework should be developed for the resolution of issues identified by GNSSP/4,
particularly RNP definitions and terminology, and other issues relating to the implementation of
performance-based navigation operations. By the end of 2005, the operations approval criteria, the obstacle
clearance criteria, and the separation criteria for performance-based navigation operations should be defined
or updated, as appropriate. Accordingly, the conference developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 6/5 — Early resolution of issues arising from

implementation of RNAV and RNP
That ICAO as a matter of urgency address and progress the issues associated
with the introduction of RNP and RNAV.
6.2.5 Advanced GNSS capabilities

and new technology alternatives
6.2.5.1 The conference was presented with information on the status of initial GNSS implementation
in one State. It was stressed that the key motivation for the introduction of satellite navigation services was
the ability of new services to solve airspace issues and increase the availability of instrumental flight
procedures. A number of distinctive features of GNSS was elaborated as enablers of improvements in terms
of accessibility, flexibility in terminal area operations and RNAV coverage, particularly in mountainous
(obstacle rich) environments or under other constraints (e.g. noise abatement requirements). Accordingly, the
conference was presented with a proposal that ICAO needs to focus on updating and development of
Standards and procedures providing for realization of GNSS operational and safety benefits including those
associated with advanced system capabilities.
6.2.5.2 The conference was cautioned that the current state of development of ICAO technical
Standards was still insufficiently advanced to support those capabilities in the near term. Specifically, the
conference was informed that the development of the relevant GNSS performance requirements for such
capabilities currently under way within the Navigation Systems Panel (NSP) was expected to be completed
in 2007. Hence, development of the corresponding GNSS SARPs could only be completed after 2007 with
procedures and criteria to follow. Concerns were also expressed that some of the additional developments that
were proposed might entail substantial indirect costs to the user community. However, the conference noted
4
Following the Eleventh Air Navigation Conference, this study group was renamed as the Required Navigation Performance and
Special Operational Requirements Study Group (RNPSORSG).
that not all the proposed developments were necessarily of a challenging technical nature and that some States
were already engaged in studies of proposed capabilities. The conference therefore developed the following
recommendations:
Recommendation 6/6 — Advanced GNSS RNAV procedure design
That ICAO develop RNAV procedures supported by GNSS for both fixed and
rotary wing aircraft, enabling lower operating minima in obstacle rich or
otherwise constrained environments.
Recommendation 6/7 — Curved GNSS RNAV procedures
That ICAO develop RNAV procedures supported by GNSS for fixed wing
aircraft, providing high track and velocity keeping accuracy to maintain
separation through curves and enable flexible approach line-ups.
6.2.5.3 In follow-up to the above discussion, the conference’s attention was drawn to the significant
inertial capability that existed in the world’s aircraft and to benefits that can be derived from integrated
GNSS/INS applications. It was recalled that such applications were recognized as a valuable mitigation in
conference deliberations of GNSS vulnerabilities. It was also noted that many aircraft used inertial data to
complement performance of ILS in precision approach and landing operations, and, similarly, the integration
of GNSS with INS can enhance navigation performance in terms of accuracy, integrity, availability and
continuity.
6.2.5.4 The conference noted, however, that realization of full benefits of GNSS/INS integration was
constrained by the lack of standardization of system capabilities and its characteristics, particularly coasting
times that constitute an essential factor of risk assessment and mitigation strategies. The conference, therefore,
developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 6/8 — GNSS/INS integration
That ICAO develop provisions for the integration of GNSS/INS in order to

reduce the vulnerability of GNSS to RF interference and aid the development
of advanced GBAS capabilities.
6.2.5.5 The conference reviewed the feasibility assessment of GNSS-based Category II/III approach
and landing and aerodrome surface operations. It was recalled that the current Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPs) for GBAS provide augmentation to the core satellite constellations of GLONASS and GPS
and support Category I precision approach. GALILEO would be added to the core satellite constellations and
its local component would be standardized as an amendment to the GBAS SARPs at a later date. It was also
noted that a goal of GBAS development in support of Category II/III operations was to enable the evolution
of the basic Category I architecture to Category III minimizing changes to the basic system and ensuring
backwards compatibility with existing Category I avionics.
6.2.5.6 The assessment results had indicated that Category II/III capability would be achieved in the
2010-2015 time frame depending on the GBAS architecture and performance requirements. The final
outcome of the ongoing development of the performance requirements and standards would also influence
the complexity of the future GBAS architecture supporting Category II/III approach and landing operations
and when it would be generally available. Expressing concerns over possible complexity of the future GBAS
architecture, the conference however supported a conclusion that the benefits of having a single system which
can provide guidance in all phases of flight justified continued work on the resolution of technical and
operational issues involved.
6.2.5.7 The conference was also made aware of current studies in States in support of advanced
surface movement guidance and control systems (A-SMGCS) and the work in the Navigation Systems Panel
which was focussing on the application of GNSS as a position sensor for A-SMGCS.
6.2.5.8 The conference considered a proposal to develop requirements and provisions for a GNSS
augmentation system to be used in support of A-SMGCS applications and based on the same technologies
that are used for ADS-B. In the discussion, concerns were expressed over the use of the same systems for
ADS-B and A-SMGCS because of perceived single point-of-failure considerations. It was also questioned
whether there was a need for and feasibility of integrating ADS-B and GNSS augmentation systems that had
already been defined in ICAO SARPs. In this connection, it was argued that the proposed approach, by using
a common augmentation would ease the integration of air and surface movement in the new ATM
environment. Although the proposal received some support, the conference was not in a position to
recommend it for further study by ICAO.
6.2.5.9 A proposal for ICAO to define requirements and develop appropriate provisions in support
of a ground-based autonomous back-up to GNSS was reviewed. The proposal made use of the ICAO standard
VDL Mode 4 system to provide, by range measurements from VDL Mode 4 transmissions, an independent
back-up for GNSS service. Interest in the proposed approach was expressed by some delegations, while others
questioned its maturity and feasibility. Issues with on-board integration, both from a human factors and an
avionics point of view were also raised. In conclusion, there was consensus that the proposal should be noted
and referred to an appropriate ICAO body. This was noted by the Secretariat who would bring it to the
attention of the Navigation Systems Panel (NSP).
6.2.5.10 The conference was informed of the results of trials conducted in the European Region to
validate a new GNSS terrestrial regional augmentation concept, the EGNOS Terrestrial Regional
Augmentation Network (ETRAN). With this concept, a subset of the EGNOS data is broadcast through
terrestrial networks. The results presented to the conference where based on the use of VDL Mode 4 as the
supporting network. The use of terrestrial links compensates for limitations in EGNOS satellite signal
availability, for instance at northern latitudes. The conference noted that, while the concept was similar to that
underlying the GRAS for which SARPs are currently under development by the NSP, certain differences
existed. The differences included the use of different physical layers. It was observed that the results provided
to the conference included useful supporting information for the validation of certain aspects of the GRAS
currently under standardization by ICAO. The conference noted the results achieved within the ETRAN
programme and encouraged presentation of these results to an appropriated ICAO body. The Secretariat
indicated the information would be brought to the attention of the NSP.
6.2.6 Pre-operational experiences
6.2.6.1 The conference received information from a number of States and regional organizations
regarding trials being carried out in the Caribbean, South American and African Regions at the regional and
national levels to collect data for the definition of the GNSS architectures in these regions. A three-stage
GNSS implementation strategy in the AFI Region and the initial results of the EGNOS test bed trials
conducted in the region were reported to the conference. The conference was also presented with the
information on trials involving WAAS and EGNOS test beds in the CAR/SAM States.
6.2.6.2 The lessons learnt and proposals stemming from the experiences gained were reviewed by
the conference. These concerned a broad range of issues, including human resources, regional training
capabilities, the need for integration of technical cooperation projects and financing aspects. The conference
was made aware of ICAO activities and groups addressing these issues. The conference also noted with
appreciation the support States involved in the development of WAAS and EGNOS were providing within
the framework of the SBAS test bed trials. To encourage the continuation of these activities, the conference
Recommendation 6/9 — Support of and participation in SBAS

pre-operational implementation activities
That:
a) States that develop and introduce satellite-based augmentation systems

and other SBAS service providers commence or continue to provide
their technical and financial support and participation in the activities
leading to the extension of their SBAS service areas into neighbouring
States and Regions; and
b) States participating in SBAS implementation activities coordinate with

other participating States to optimize their effort, minimize duplication
of service and facilitate participation of service providers.
6.2.7 Other related issues
6.2.7.1 Concerning the issue of legal and institutional aspects of GNSS referred to in
AN-Conf/11-WPs/143, 153 and 160, the conference agreed that neither the scope nor the agenda presented
a suitable opportunity for discussions on those topics. Therefore, the conference, assisted by the President
of the Council, Dr. A. Kotaite and the Director of the Legal Bureau, agreed to note the information and views
contained in the above referenced papers and agreed that they should be referred to the ICAO Council for
urgent consideration and action as deemed appropriate by that ICAO body.
6.2.7.2 Concerning the issue of economics aspects of GNSS referred to in AN-Conf/11-WP/107, the
conference agreed that neither the scope nor the agenda presented a suitable opportunity for discussions on
this topic. After receiving an update report of Air Navigation Services Economics Panel (ANSEP) work by
the secretary of the panel, the conference noted some principles and assumptions endorsed by ANSEP to be
applied for cost allocation between civil aviation and other users, in particular that basic GNSS services
should be provided free of direct users charges and that any cost allocation of GNSS services should take
place at the regional level. The conference concluded that the information and the views contained in the
above reference paper should be brought to the attention of ANSEP.
6.3 AMENDMENTS ON AERONAUTICAL NAVIGATION

SUBJECTS IN RELEVANT ICAO DOCUMENTS
INCLUDING THE GLOBAL AIR NAVIGATION PLAN FOR
CNS/ATM SYSTEMS (DOC 9750), ANNEX 10 —
AERONAUTICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS AS NECESSARY
6.3.1 Proposed updates to the ICAO Strategy for the introduction

and application of non-visual aids to approach and landing
in Annex 10, Volume I
6.3.1.1 The conference was presented with updates, developed by the Global Navigation Satellite
System Panel (GNSSP) at the request of the Air Navigation Commission (ANC), to the ICAO Strategy for
the introduction and application on non-visual aids to approach and landing in Annex 10, Volume I,
Attachment B. The conference was advised that proposed amendments to the strategy took account of
developments in aeronautical navigation since the strategy was approved by the COM/OPS Divisional
Conference in 1995. In particular, the progress was contemplated in the development of GNSS and
introduction of GNSS-based operations.
6.3.1.2 In addressing proposed amendments the conference agreed that the general objectives of the
strategy were still valid and not affected by any developments since 1995. Accordingly, the conference
extended the applicability for the updated strategy until 2020.
6.3.1.3 The conference was reminded that the current strategy had introduced a notion of generic
criteria for approach, landing and departure operations which was intended to facilitate the application of
emerging technologies for precision approach and landing operations. The development of the Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) for GNSS-based precision approach operations had shown that the required
navigation performance (RNP) concept did not replace the need for detailed system-specific SARPs. Such
SARPs for GNSS to support Category I precision approach were developed after the concept had been
introduced, and additional standards were under development for Category II/III. Having noted that with the
adoption of GNSS SARPs three standard aids were established, providing for the whole variety of precision
approach and landing operations, the conference agreed that no new precision approach and landing systems
need to be standardized. References to the generic RNP criteria for precision approach and landing were no
longer deemed necessary and therefore deleted in the proposed amendment to the strategy.
6.3.1.4 The conference reviewed the strategy based on the latest information available and its
previous deliberations. The most significant changes concerned the following areas:
a) there had been some significant advances in the implementation of Category III MLS;
b) approach with vertical guidance (APV) with satellite-based augmentation reached

operational capability;
c) GNSS with ground-based augmentation capable of supporting Category I operations did

not progress as projected and was expected to become operational by 2006.
Development of performance requirements and SARPs for GNSS ground-based
augmentation system (GBAS) to support Category II and III operations was in progress.
However, it was not possible at the time to give an accurate forecast when an operational
capability would be available. Thus, availability time frames were changed from
2005 - 2015 to 2010 - 2015;
d) there had been some significant developments related to the multi-mode receiver
(MMR). Multi-mode receiver industry Standards had been developed and MMRs had
been fielded with ILS and basic GNSS functions. Other MMR functions such as MLS
and GBAS were under development and expected to be available in the near future;
e) as MMR was only one specific implementation of airborne landing capability, a more
generic notion of multi-modal capability was introduced;
f) as transition to GNSS as a global system for all phases of flight was recognized to be a
long-term objective. Thus, the frequency bands allocated to ILS, MLS and GNSS needed
to be protected indefinitely. A statement to this effect was included in the strategy; and
g) Standards and criteria for approach and landing with vertical guidance (APV) were
available or under development. APV procedures based on various technologies offered
operational benefits and enhanced safety compared with non-precision approaches,
particularly in regard to prevention of CFIT incidents/accidents. Thus, the strategy was
expanded to include general information to this effect.
6.3.1.5 In reviewing proposed amendments to the strategy, the conference was presented with and
noted the IATA position on non-visual aids for Category II/III approach and landing. Taking IATA’s views
into account, the conference agreed to update the strategy as shown in Appendix B to the report on this
agenda item. The conference therefore developed the following recommendation:
RSPP Recommendation 6/10 — Amendment to Annex 10, Volume I,

Attachment B — Updating the strategy for
introduction and application of non-visual
aids to approach and landing
That Attachment B to Annex 10, Volume I be amended as shown in

Appendix B to the report on Agenda Item 6.
6.3.2 Amendments to the Global Plan
6.3.2.1 The conference reviewed a proposal developed by the GNSSP to amend the navigation parts
of the Global Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750) including, inter alia, updates to the
document to reflect recent developments in the global navigation satellite system (GNSS).
6.3.2.2 The proposed amendments were based on the following key considerations:
a) a vision of GNSS is evolving away from the concepts of supplementary, primary or sole
means of navigation (using a single system) to the concept of multiple sensors to be used
for area navigation and approach, landing and departure operations, where GNSS
elements are regarded as individual sensors;
b) the goal of transition to GNSS, which removes the requirement for conventional
ground-based navigation aids, is maintained for the GNSS-based navigation and future
ATM environments where this goal can be safely and cost-effectively achieved;
c) the need for some or all conventional ground-based navigation aids during the transition
is maintained until such time when the requirements for safe and cost-effective
operations using GNSS are met; and
d) the need to retain conventional ground-based navigation aids during the transition does
not imply a requirement to add ground-based NAVAIDs in less developed regions when
introducing GNSS-based operations unless it is demonstrated that the safe
implementation of particular operations demand such additional NAVAIDs.
6.3.2.3 The conference developed additional amendments that were included in the proposal to take
account of its earlier discussions concerning:
a) vulnerability of GNSS to interference and the need for means of mitigation;
b) enhanced role of DME and INS/IRS in the provision of navigation service; and
c) importance of RNAV and RNP in the realization of GNSS benefits.
6.3.2.4 The conference also considered a proposal to amend the time lines for implementation of
CNS/ATM systems for the AFI Region which were contained in Part II of the Global Plan. It was stated that
the originally expected pace of implementation has not been achieved, particularly in the AFI Region due to
a number of factors such as delays in the availability and installation of appropriate avionics and lack of
funding.
6.3.2.5 Arising from the above, the AFI States extended their time frame for CNS/ATM systems
implementation up to 2015. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective of the region was a navigation system based
on satellite navigation for all phases of flight. As far as augmentation was concerned, any deployment was
to be in line with the regional policy as defined and approved by AFI Planning and Implementation Regional
Group (APIRG). It was noted that strategy had detailed an evolutionary path from existing constellations
through a minimal SBAS providing over the whole AFI Region a non-precision approach capability with
vertical guidance at the 20 m vertical accuracy and vertical alert limit of 50 m (APV-I).
6.3.2.6 The conference took note of the information provided on the implementation objectives and
plans. Concerning the proposed amendments to the implementation time lines, it was noted that similar
changes may be proposed by other ICAO regions and that all such changes should be consolidated and
reflected in the next edition of the document.
6.3.2.7 In concluding its consideration of the subject, the conference updated the Global Plan as
shown in Appendix C to this agenda item and developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 6/11 — Amendment to the Global Plan — Navigation
That:
a) the Global Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM Systems (Doc 9750) be
amended as shown in Appendix C to the report on Agenda Item 6; and
b) updated CNS/ATM systems implementation time lines contained in

Part II of the Global Plan be reviewed by the Regional Implementation
Group and consolidated for incorporation in the next edition of the
Global Plan.
6.4 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF

AERONAUTICAL NAVIGATION SERVICES
6.4.1 Concept of using combinations of independent satellite

navigation systems and their augmentations
6.4.1.1 The conference was presented with the results of study carried out by the Global Navigation
Satellite System Panel (GNSS) at request by the ICAO Air Navigation Commission. The study indicated that
the increasing number of GNSS signals and constellations would offer significant benefits to civil aviation
in terms of improved robustness and performance, simplification of GNSS ground architecture and alleviation
of institutional concerns. The study also cautioned that the introduction of these new elements would raise
some technical, economical and institutional issues.
6.4.1.2 The conference recalled that information presented on GNSS development (Section 6.1 of
this report refers) had indicated that GPS would be enhanced by providing additional signals and modernized
satellites. It was also reported that modernized GLONASS satellites with improved characteristics would be
added to the constellation. Further, a new constellation called GALILEO which would provide three signals
and a worldwide integrity function was being developed by Europe. It was understood that for any new signal
and/or constellation, an additional time period of one to two years would probably be needed for the purpose
of validation and certification by civil aviation authorities before new GNSS elements could be used for
safety-of-life applications. This implied that the operational use of new signals and combined constellations
service could start in the 2010 — 2015 time-frame.
6.4.1.3 The conference recognized that the implementation of a multiplicity of different possible
combinations of elements would result in overall system complexity and negative economic impact
particularly on the user side and concluded that this can be avoided by the thorough assessment and selection
of the most promising combinations for general implementation. Accordingly, the conference developed the
following recommendation:
Recommendation 6/12 — Development of guidance material on

applications of new GNSS elements and their
combinations
That ICAO, in developing standards for new GNSS elements and signals,
address the issues associated with the use of multiple signals and their
combinations, and develop guidance on the most promising combinations of
GNSS elements.
6.4.1.4 The conference was apprised that current GNSS avionics automatically select which satellites
and augmentation elements to use. It was noted in this regard that State regulations could require or prohibit
the use of certain future GNSS elements or their combinations in some airspaces. The conference agreed that
such a situation could result in significant costs for users in terms of additional cockpit controls and
procedures, crew training and maintenance support or become a safety issue due to human factors
considerations. It also agreed that these potential repercussions require ICAO to encourage States, in their
planning for implementation of GNSS services, to avoid limitations on the use of specific GNSS elements
for institutional reasons. The conference therefore developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 6/13 — Potential constraints on using multiple GNSS

signals
That States, in their planning for implementation of GNSS services, take full
advantage of future benefits accrued from using independent core satellite
constellations, other GNSS elements and their combinations, and avoid
limitations on the use of specific system elements.
6.4.1.5 Having completed the review of the study results documented for the conference’s
consideration, the conference concluded that the document represented a useful overview of benefits from,
and issues associated with the introduction of new elements of GNSS. Accordingly, the conference agreed
this overview to be included in Appendix D to the report on this agenda item.
6.4.2 GNSS services in the 960 - 1 215 MHz band
6.4.2.1 The conference recalled that in its discussion on mitigation of GNSS vulnerabilities and
benefits offered by the future development of GNSS, the introduction and use of additional “second civil”
frequencies was emphasized on a number of occasions. In this regard, it was noted that the United States had
decided to implement a second GPS civil frequency, known as L5, in the band 1 164.45 - 1 188.45 MHz. In
parallel with this decision, GALILEO signals would also utilize spectrum in the 1 164 - 1 215 MHz frequency
range. The Russian Federation also reported plans to introduce an additional signal(s) in this frequency range
as a part of the GLONASS modernization programme. These signals would be introduced in accordance with
the ITU allocation of the 960 - 1 215 MHz band to the radionavigation satellite service (RNSS) on the
conditions specified in ITU Radio Regulations, Footnote 5.328A (MOD-03) and Resolution 609 (WRC-03).
6.4.2.2 The conference was reminded that the band 960 - 1 215 MHz, which continues to be
allocated to the aeronautical radionavigation service (ARNS), was being heavily used by ICAO standardized
distance measuring equipment (DME).
6.4.2.3 The conference was made aware of a potential for interference to GNSS receivers in the
1 164.45 - 1 188.45 MHz band and to a lesser extent (due to the frequencies being used for special national
allocations) in the 1 197.14 - 1 215 MHz band. The level and hence impact of interference was related to how
many pulses transmitted by DME ground transponders in these portions of the band can interfere with the
aircraft GNSS antenna (the airborne interrogators do not operate at these frequencies).
6.4.2.4 The conference agreed that, in cases where the shared use of DME and GNSS in the same
frequency band may lead to unacceptable interference, ways of mitigating the interference, while maintaining
the aeronautical radionavigation services, need to be considered. This could be achieved by:
a) modifying future DME installations to reduce the quiescent squitter rate as practicable
(Annex 10, Volume I, Chapter 3, paragraph 3.5.4.1.5.6 refers);
b) by making greater use of Y-channel DMEs; and
c) by re-assigning the current frequencies where practicable.
6.4.2.5 The conference therefore developed the following recommendation:

Recommendation 6/14 — GNSS services in the 960 - 1 215 MHz band
That,
a) States be encouraged to take into account the need to minimize potential

interference to GNSS services in their planning of the deployment of
DMEs; and
b) an appropriate ICAO body be tasked to review the issues listed in

paragraph 6.4.2.4 of the report on Agenda Item 6.
6.4.3 Review of Annex 10 SARPs for ground-based radio

navigation aids in the light of present and planned GNSS
services
6.4.3.1 The conference was presented with the results of the preliminary review of Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) in Annex 10, Volume I undertaken by the GNSS Panel at the request of
the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) in order to assess the need for updates of the document in the light
of present and planned GNSS services. The objective of the review was to identify the areas where additional
work should be initiated to investigate the impact of potential changes to the Standards and develop draft
amendments to the Annex if necessary.
6.4.3.2 The conference noted that future implementation of GNSS capable of providing global
navigation coverage and area navigation (RNAV) capabilities in support of all phases of flight would overlay
a number of capabilities and functions delivered by the existing radio navigation aids defined in Annex 10.
The identified candidate parts with the potential to require modifications were generally those where SARPs
may become redundant through the introduction of GNSS or alternatively where the Standards in their present
form may prove problematic in the transition to satellite navigation.
6.4.3.3 The conference also noted that, although these candidate parts were identified with the focus
on GNSS-related aspects, a number of the potential updates were resulting from the increasing application
of ground-based navigation aids in support of RNAV operations.
6.4.3.4 The conference agreed that further work is required to investigate the feasibility of amending
SARPs and guidance material in Annex 10, Volume I taking into account the potential for reduction of
redundant navigation functionalities and protection considerations, and to develop draft amendments to the
Annex as necessary. The issues to be addressed included:
a) general review of protection dates;
b) changes to DME specifications, taking account of the increasing use of this system in
support of terminal RNAV operations and the use of DME/DME RNAV as a back up
option to GNSS;
c) requirements for DME/P;
d) requirements for MLS/RNAV and updates of MLS specifications; and

e) updates of guidance material on DME, ILS and VOR service volumes and frequency
planning.
6.4.3.5 Based on the above, the conference developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 6/15 — Updating of SARPs for radio navigation aids

in Annex 10, Volume I
That ICAO undertake a review of SARPs and guidance material in Annex 10,
Volume I in the areas identified in paragraph 6.4.3.4 of the report on Agenda
Item 6.
6.4.3.6 Noting the scope of Volume I of Annex 10, the conference acknowledged close correlation
and connection between Recommendations 6/14 and 6/15.
6.4.4 Enhanced data integrity for RNAV and

GNSS-based operations
6.4.4.1 The conference was made aware that, during the first GNSS procedure and RNAV operation
implementation trials, deficiencies revealed in the quality of the aeronautical data in airborne systems had
included errors and/or discrepancies between the data encoded in the computer-based navigation system and
the data published in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). It was noted that the main sources of
errors were as a result of non-compliance with the data quality provisions in Annex 15 during the origination
phase, and the alteration of data during the various processes of the aeronautical data chain.
6.4.4.2 It was further noted that, although ICAO had developed SARPs that govern various aspects
of processing electronic aeronautical information, it could not prevent flight critical data from being processed
manually. Although several initiatives had been launched to address the problem of data integrity, especially
in the context of RNAV implementation, there were no coordinated system or applicable standards to make
sure that the required levels of data integrity are met all the way through the aeronautical data chain, from
origination to end-use. The conference was also informed of some discrepancies between the industry and
the ICAO data quality requirements for accuracy, integrity and resolution.
6.4.4.3 In the discussion of issues raised, safety aspects of aeronautical data quality, particularly the
integrity of data for RNAV and GNSS-based operations, were emphasized by many States and international
organizations. In this regard, the conference stressed an urgent need for ICAO to develop guidance material
covering the acquisition of data from various sources, processing and assessment of the overall quality. It was
suggested the material should also address detecting the data corruption events (alteration of the data by a
given organisation without acknowledgement to the other involved organisations) in the aeronautical data
chain. It was also suggested that the task of harmonization of Annex 15 data quality requirements and
corresponding industry standards be endeavoured without delay.
6.4.4.4 In follow up to suggested actions, the conference was made aware of work under way in
ICAO to address the shortcomings tabled before the conference. In particular, the conference noted the
progress of a task (AIS-9401) of the Technical Work Programme (TWP) of the Organization in the Air
Navigation Field which included, among other things, the development of guidance material for the
application by the aeronautical information services of the ISO 9000 standard series that would provide for
the quality assurance of aeronautical information. The conference was advised that this work was approaching
the final stage and the Quality Management System Manual for AIS/MAP Services was to be completed by
the end of 2003. The conference also noted that in accordance with a recommendation of the Global
Navigation Satellite System Panel (GNSSP/4 Recommendation 3/4), the Navigation Systems Panel (NSP)
had been requested to develop specific proposals towards harmonization of ICAO and industry standards for
aeronautical data used in support of GNSS-based operations.
6.4.4.5 Having noted the above, the conference developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 6/16 — Completion of guidance material on

application of data quality SARPs in
Annex 15
That ICAO give high priority to the completion of guidance material for the
data quality assurance including the data processing from origination to
end-use.
6.4.5 Proposals for the future development of GNSS navigation

services in the regions
6.4.5.1 In conclusion of its deliberations on aeronautical navigation issues, the conference reviewed
information on the Asia/Pacific Regional strategies for navigation services and proposals for the future
regional development of GNSS navigation services.
6.4.5.2 The conference noted the strategy for the provision of precision approach and landing
guidance systems and the strategy for the implementation of GNSS navigation capability in the Asia/Pacific
Region that had been adopted by the Fourteenth Meeting of the ASIA/PAC Air Navigation Planning and
Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG/14).
6.4.5.3 In regard to information and proposals developed and presented pursuant to Conclusion 11/54
of the Eleventh Meeting of the CAR/SAM Regional Planning and Implementation Group (GREPECAS/11),
the conference appreciated the progress in the trials and planning for GNSS navigation services. It agreed that
the resulting experiences and challenges may be of general interest for other regions. These included activities
in the development of regional satellite navigation service that can be progressed with small investments due
to regionally coordinated efforts and committed participation of States. Human resource training and
financing issues were noted as major challenges in implementing complex technology systems such as GNSS.
6.4.5.4 The conference was informed that ICAO was using of three different mechanisms to provide
assistance to States for the implementation of CNS/ATM systems on continuous basis. These included Special
Implementation Projects, Technical Cooperation Projects and International Financial Facility for Aviation
Safety. In addition, ICAO was undertaking periodical technical visits to States, developing regional guidance
material and conducting regional workshops.
6.4.5.5 In concluding its discussions on aeronautical navigation issues, the conference once again,
in line with its Recommendation 6/1, emphasized the need for ICAO, States, airspace users and other parties
concerned to continue work towards the safe and efficient global navigation system for all phases of flight.
————————
APPENDIX A
GUIDELINES ON GNSS VULNERABILITY AND MITIGATION

METHODS INCLUDING TERRESTRIAL, AIRBORNE AND
PROCEDURAL SOLUTIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 GNSS is being progressively introduced throughout the world and has the potential to meet
performance requirements for all phases of flight, obtaining safety and efficiency benefits through the
navigation domain. As GNSS operations become prevalent, it is essential that the service providers identify
the vulnerabilities of this system and develop the necessary mitigations. This paper identifies the
vulnerabilities of GNSS and the corresponding mitigations that can be applied when appropriate. In
developing this paper, several other vulnerability studies have been considered and their concerns and
recommendations addressed. Most vulnerabilities discussed are common to other navigation systems
providing aeronautical radio navigation service, but those systems are outside the scope of this paper.
2. GNSS SIGNAL VULNERABILITIES
2.1 Interference
2.1.1 GNSS core satellite constellations and satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) signals
are vulnerable due to their relatively low received signal power since GNSS signals originate from satellites
and each satellite’s signal covers a large fraction of the Earth’s surface. While the very high frequency (VHF)
data broadcast of a ground-based augmentation system (GBAS) is more difficult to interfere (its signal power
is similar to that of terrestrial navigation aids), GBAS service depends on the core satellite signals. Interfering
signals are limited to line-of-sight propagation. For example, the interference region at 600 m (2 000 ft) above
ground level is inherently limited to approximately 110 km (60 NM) for a ground-based interferer.
2.1.2 The GNSS Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) require a specified level of
performance in the presence of levels of interference as defined by the receiver interference mask. These
interference levels are generally consistent with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
regulations. Interference at levels above the mask may cause loss of service but such interference is not
allowed to result in hazardous or misleading information.
2.1.3 Unintentional interference. The majority of reported GNSS interference events have been
traced to on-board systems, and experience with GNSS installation has identified several sources of
unintentional interference (e.g. spurious emissions or harmonics of VHF communications equipment and the
out-of-band and spurious emissions from satellite communications equipment). Portable electronic devices
can also cause interference to GNSS and other navigation systems.
2.1.3.1 Ground-based sources of interference currently include mobile and fixed VHF
communications, point-to-point radio links operating in the GNSS frequency band, harmonics of television
stations, certain radar systems, mobile satellite communication systems and military systems. The likelihood
of such interference depends on State spectrum regulation, frequency management and enforcement within
each State or region.
2.1.4 Intentional interference. Because of the low power of GNSS signals, it is possible for low
power transmitters to jam the GNSS signal. While there have been no recorded instances of intentional
jamming directed at civil aircraft, the possibility of intentional interference must be considered and evaluated
as a threat.
2.2 Spoofing
2.2.1 Spoofing is the intentional corruption of the navigation signals to cause aircraft to deviate
and follow a false flight path. Spoofing of satellite-based GNSS signals is technologically much more
complex than spoofing of conventional ground-based navigation aids. Spoofing of the GBAS data broadcast
is as difficult as spoofing conventional landing aids.
2.2.2 While spoofing can theoretically cause misleading navigation for a particular aircraft, it is
very likely to be detected through normal procedures (e.g. by monitoring of flight path and distance to
waypoints and by radar surveillance). Ground proximity warning systems (GPWS) and aircraft collision
avoidance systems (ACAS) provide additional protection against collision with the ground and with other
aircraft. In view of the difficulty in spoofing GNSS and the fact that unique operational mitigations are not
deemed necessary, spoofing is not further addressed in this paper.
2.3 Ionospheric and other atmospheric effects
2.3.1 Heavy precipitation attenuates GNSS satellite signals by only a small fraction of 1 dB and
does not impact operations. Tropospheric effects are addressed by system design and do not represent a
vulnerability issue. There are two ionospheric phenomena that must be considered: rapid and large
ionospheric changes, and scintillation. Ionospheric changes result in range errors that must be accounted for
in system design. Scintillation may result in temporary loss of GNSS signals from one or more satellites.
2.4 Other vulnerabilities
2.4.1 The GNSS ground and space segment vulnerabilities also need to be considered. There is a
risk of an insufficient number of satellites in a given constellation due to lack of resources to maintain a
constellation, launch failure(s) or satellite failure. Constellation control segment failure or human error can
potentially cause the failure of multiple satellites within a constellation.
2.4.2 Another risk is service interruption or degradation during a national emergency situation,
where each State has the freedom of action as authorized by the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(Article 89 refers). If signal denial is limited to a specific area, jamming of all civil GNSS signals would occur
but the affected airspace would be closed to civil air traffic regardless. Another less likely situation would
involve degradation or denial of core satellite or satellite augmentation signals throughout the coverage area.
3. ASSESSING GNSS OUTAGE RISKS
3.1 There are two principal aspects to be considered in the evaluation of the operational risks
associated with GNSS vulnerabilities:
a) the likelihood of GNSS outage; and
b) the impact of GNSS outage.

3.2 By considering these aspects as a function of airspace, air navigation service providers can
determine whether mitigation is required and, if so, to what level. Mitigation is required for outages with
major impacts having a moderate to high likelihood of occurrence.
3.3 Assessing likelihood of GNSS outage
Interference
3.3.1 Unintentional interference. Operational experience is the best way to assess this risk. The
likelihood of unintentional interference is often a function of geography. Large cities with significant radio
frequency (RF) interference sources, industrial sites, etc., are more prone to the unintentional interference than
remote regions. This interference is very unlikely in remote regions.
3.3.2 Intentional interference. Each State must consider the motivation to interfere with GNSS in
determining the likelihood of intentional interference. The motivation may be driven by potential damage to
a region and the operational impact on aviation and non-aviation applications. If there is minimal impact, the
threat potential is low since there is no motivation to interfere. The extent of potential impacts may grow as
applications using GNSS expand and the dependence on GNSS increases.
Ionospheric effects
3.3.3 Rapid and large changes in the ionosphere are frequently observed near the geomagnetic
equator, but their effect is not large enough to impact en-route through non-precision approach operations.
For approach with vertical guidance (APV) and precision approach (PA) operations, the effects of these
changes can be assessed and mitigated when designing augmentation systems. In equatorial regions, the
availability of APV and PA operations using a single GNSS frequency may be limited.
3.3.4 Ionospheric scintillation is insignificant at mid-latitudes. In equatorial regions, and to a lesser

extent at high latitudes, scintillation may result in the temporary loss of one or more satellite signals.
Operational experience in equatorial regions has shown that the probability of loss of existing GNSS service
is remote due to the relatively large number of satellites in view. Scintillation can interrupt reception of
broadcasts from a SBAS geostationary orbit (GEO) satellite.
3.4 Assessing impact of GNSS outage
3.4.1 The impact of a GNSS outage on navigation services depends on the following factors:
a) type of airspace: remedial action timing is more critical for a terminal area than for high
altitude en-route airspace, and, for en-route airspace, is more critical for airspace where
more stringent separation minima is established;
b) air traffic density: in regions with high traffic density, reliance on radar vectoring or
pilot procedures may be impractical due to workload;
c) level of service: for less demanding operations dead reckoning may be all that is
required to proceed to an area where GNSS service is available;
d) availability and equipage of other navigation systems: aircraft that can navigate with
other means will not be affected;
e) radar surveillance: if primary or secondary radar is available, ATC will be able to

provide more assistance to assure separation and divert to alternate airports;
f) extent of outage: the geographic extent and duration of a service interruption;
g) outage assessment: the ability of the air navigation service provider to quickly assess the
extent of the service outage; and
h) weather conditions: while it is prudent to assume instrument meteorological conditions

(IMC) when assessing outage impacts, the geographic extent of IMC and the
meteorological parameters assumed in any analysis should be realistic.
3.4.2 The impact of a GNSS outage on other services should also be considered. GNSS is
frequently used as a source of precision timing information within communication and radar systems, and
may be used for automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) services. Timing vulnerabilities can be addressed
through system design, and ADS applications are outside the scope of this paper.
4. REDUCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF GNSS OUTAGES
4.1 Installation and operation
4.1.1 On-aircraft interference can be prevented by proper installation of GNSS equipment, its
integration with other aircraft systems (e.g. shielding, antenna separation, out-of-band filtering) and
restrictions on the use of portable electronic devices on board aircraft.
4.2 Spectrum management
4.2.1 Spectrum management. Effective spectrum management is the primary means of mitigating
unintentional interference from man-made transmitters. Operational experience has indicated that the threat
of unintentional interference can become a rare event if effective spectrum management is applied. There are
three aspects of effective spectrum management:
a) creation of regulations/laws that control the use of spectrum;
b) enforcement of those regulations/laws; and
c) vigilance in evaluating new RF sources (new systems) to ensure that they do not
interfere with GNSS.
4.2.2 Interference location and termination. The ability to locate the interferer and terminate the
interference to GNSS without delay is a critical aspect. The primary method of detecting interference is
through pilot reporting. As many aircraft may experience outage simultaneously when interference first
occurs, an automated method of reporting the outage (e.g. an automatic data link message) would reduce
workload and facilitate defining the outage area and locating the interferer. Interference detection systems
may be implemented in aircraft and on the ground.
4.3 New signals and constellations
4.3.1 New signals and core satellite constellations will significantly reduce the vulnerability of
GNSS. The use of the stronger signals and diverse frequencies planned for GPS, GLONASS and GALILEO
will effectively eliminate the risk of unintentional interference, since it is highly unlikely that such an
interference source would simultaneously affect more than one frequency. Additional satellites (including
multiple constellations) will eliminate the risk of the complete outage of GNSS due to scintillation, and
multiple frequencies will mitigate the impact of ionospheric changes. Future GEO satellites will mitigate the
effect of ionosphere on SBAS by using satellites which lines of sight are separated by at least 45°. More
robust GNSS signals and new frequencies make it more difficult to intentionally interfere with all GNSS
services. Additional core satellite constellations mitigate the risk of system failure, operational errors or
discontinuance of service. They may also continue to provide global service in the unlikely event that a
provider of one GNSS element modifies or denies service due to a national emergency situation.
4.3.2 Robust system management and funding are essential to continued operation of GNSS
services and mitigate the system vulnerabilities identified in paragraph 2.4, except for the potential for global
interruption of service due to a national emergency. An effective means of avoiding a global interruption of
service is for service providers to adopt a policy of specific area denial in the event of national emergency.
5. MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF GNSS OUTAGES
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 There are three principal methods currently available to mitigate the effects of GNSS outages
on aircraft operations:
a) by taking advantage of inertial navigation systems and GNSS receiver technologies;
b) by employing procedural (pilot or ATC) methods; and
c) by taking advantage of terrestrial radio navigation aids used as a backup to GNSS or

integrated with GNSS.
5.1.2 By adopting an effective strategy using one or more methods identified in this section, a
service provider will not only ensure safe aircraft operations in case of GNSS outages but will also discourage
the attempts of intentional interference by reducing the potential effects of these attempts.
5.2 Inertial navigation systems and receiver technologies
5.2.1 Inertial navigation system (INS) provides a short-term area navigation capability after the
loss of GNSS or other position updating. Many air transport aircraft are already equipped with INSs and
inertial systems become more affordable and accessible to operators with smaller, regional aircraft. This
capability should therefore be considered when evaluating the need for terrestrial aids as mitigations for
GNSS outages.
5.2.2 There are also technologies that add robustness to GNSS receivers to mitigate interference.
Anti-jam technologies include advanced antennas (e.g. spatial nulling) and receiver signal processing
techniques. As the cost of these technologies decreases, they may become more affordable alternatives to
inertial navigation systems for small aircraft.
5.3 Procedural methods
5.3.1 If there is no other navigation system available in case of GNSS outage in non-radar airspace,
aircraft can revert to dead reckoning, as most new aircraft navigation systems include an automatic dead
reckoning capability. When possible, pilots can revert to visual navigation, exit the affected area or land at
a suitable airport. In the event the GNSS capability is lost, ATC can assess the potential for loss of lateral
separation and, where possible, use vertical separation instead.
5.3.2 The same procedures can be used in radar airspace, with the additional possibility for ATC
to vector aircraft through the affected area, depending on the ATC workload and the number of impacted
aircraft. For many current terminal operations, aircraft are already radar vectored to intercept a precision
approach path.
5.3.3 In uncontrolled non-radar airspace, pilots can communicate with each other via air-to-air
channel to maintain separation and attempt to determine the geographical extent of the outage.
5.3.4 Successful reliance on procedural means to assure separation and diversion depends upon
all of the factors in paragraph 3.4. The most significant consideration is the extent to which aircraft are
equipped with another means of navigation, such as inertial navigation.
5.3.5 Procedures and training for pilots and air traffic controllers should address the vulnerability
of GNSS and identify how to respond effectively to interference and implement alternative procedures, and
to report interference occurances and their location.
5.4 Terrestrial radio navigation aids
5.4.1 Currently, one of the most effective means of mitigating a GNSS outage is for aircraft to
revert to using terrestrial navigation systems. As the transition to GNSS is accomplished and the terrestrial
infrastructure is reduced, increased reliance will be placed on the other mitigation techniques. The operational
capability required from a terrestrial infrastructure will evolve as GNSS operations become predominant and
airspace and procedures rely increasingly on area navigation (RNAV) operations. A DME infrastructure can
be used to provide an area navigation service for en-route and terminal operations for aircraft equipped with
flight management systems that use multiple DMEs. This same capability can be used for RNAV approach
operations if the DME coverage is sufficient.
5.4.2 For those cases where reversionary navigation does not provide an RNAV capability, the
workload to transition to alternative routes and procedures must be considered. However, once the operations
on these alternative routes are established, operations can continue as long as required in the event of
sustained interference.
5.4.3 If it is determined that an alternate precision approach service is needed, instrument landing
system (ILS) or microwave landing system (MLS) may be used. This would likely entail retaining a minimum
number of such systems at an airport or within an area under consideration.
6. CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Unintentional interference. The likelihood and operational effect of interference varies with
the environment. Unintentional interference is not considered a significant threat provided that States exercise
proper control and protection over the electromagnetic spectrum for both existing and new frequency
allocations. Furthermore, the introduction of GNSS signals on new frequencies will ensure that unintentional
interference does not cause the complete loss of GNSS service.
6.2 Intentional interference. The risk of intentional interference depends upon issues that must
be addressed by States. For States that determine that the risk is unacceptable in specific areas, safety and
efficiency can be maintained by adopting an effective mitigation strategy through a combination of on-board
mitigation techniques (e.g. use of INS), procedural methods and terrestrial navigation aids.
6.3 Ionosphere. Scintillation can cause loss of GNSS satellite signals in the equatorial and auroral
regions, but is unlikely to cause complete loss of GNSS service and will be mitigated with the addition of new
GNSS signals and satellites. Ionospheric changes may limit the SBAS and GBAS services that can be
provided in the equatorial region using a single GNSS frequency, and must be considered when designing
the augmentation systems.
6.4 Other vulnerabilities. Independently managed constellations, funding, and robust system
design will significantly mitigate system failure, operational errors, and discontinuance of service.
6.5 States should assess the GNSS vulnerability for their airspace and select appropriate
mitigations depending on the airspace in question and the operations that must be supported. These
mitigations can ensure safe operations in transition to GNSS and enable States to avoid the provision of new
terrestrial navigation aids, reduce existing terrestrial navigation aids, and discontinue them in certain areas.
ATTACHMENT
EXAMPLE GNSS VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
Guidelines for evaluating the impact and likelihood of a GNSS outage is provided in section 3 of this paper.
This appendix provides two examples of how this methodology can be applied to existing GNSS operations.
These examples do not take into account future GNSS signals or constellations.
1. Congested airspace — Mid-latitudes. The following example applies to the existing GNSS
operations in airspace with a high density of aircraft operations, and a mid-latitude region with effective
spectrum management.
1.1 Unintentional interference. Unintentional interference has been encountered in North

America and Europe. In North America, there have been seven confirmed cases of interference to GPS in the
last few years. Based on operational experience, unintentional interference is unlikely but cannot be
neglected.
1.2 Intentional interference. For current operations, there is no significant motivation to

deliberately interfere with GNSS. No case of intentional interference in civil environment has been reported
so far. The likelihood of this interference is negligible for existing operations. The threat of intentional
interference may change over time as reliance on GNSS increases.
1.3 The impact of interference is to cause a GNSS outage within the line of sight of the interferer.
The majority of air carrier operators in these regions are equipped with inertial navigation and/or an FMS with
a DME/DME RNAV capability. DME facilities are available in the majority of airspace. While some aircraft
are not equipped with an independent RNAV capability, safety for these aircraft can be maintained and
operations can continue, perhaps with reduced efficiency. Therefore, a unintentional and intentional
interference have a moderate impact.
1.4 Spoofing. There is no significant threat due to spoofing, and the impact would be moderate.
1.5 Ionospheric effects. For mid-latitudes, ionospheric scintillation that causes loss of GNSS
positioning has never been experienced, so the likelihood of occurrence is negligible. There would be no
operational impact due to the short duration of the event and the available terrestrial navigation aids and high
level of equipage to use those aids.
1.6 Summary. Table 1 summarizes the likelihood and operational impact of the vulnerabilities
that have been identified. The table maps the likelihood of occurrence against the operational impact. The
State should mitigate any vulnerability that is remote and has a severe impact, or probable and has any impact
(the area bounded by a bold line in the table). In addition, consideration should be given to vulnerabilities that
are remote and have a moderate impact.
2. Remote areas — Equatorial. The following example applies to the existing GNSS
operations in remote airspace with a low density of aircraft operations in an equatorial region with effective
spectrum management.
2.1 Unintentional interference. Most sources of unintentional interference are less likely in
remote regions. With effective spectrum management, the likelihood of interference in these areas may be
negligible. The impact of outage may be moderate to severe due to unavailability of radar services.
2.2 Intentional interference. Intentional interference has not been encountered, and there is no
significant motivation to deliberately interfere with GNSS given the low density of operations and the remote
areas. The likelihood of this interference is considered to be negligible for existing operations. The threat of
intentional interference may change over time as reliance on GNSS increases. The impact of intentional
interference is the same as unintentional interference.
2.3 Spoofing. There is no significant threat due to spoofing, and the impact would be moderate.
2.4 Ionospheric effects. For equatorial regions, ionospheric scintillation that impacts GNSS
performance is likely to occur. The operational effect is moderate, since it is typically a degradation in
performance and not a complete loss of navigation capability. In the event that a complete loss of positioning
occurs, it does not persist for very long and the low density of operations ensures continued safety.
2.5 Summary. Table 2 summarizes the likelihood and operational impact of the vulnerabilities
that have been identified. The most significant issue is the potential for ionospheric scintillation. States should
take action to reduce the impact of this effect. This can be accomplished through:
a) operational procedures that ensure continued operation during brief GNSS outages; and
b) continued research on the duration and likelihood of severe scintillation.
Table 1. Congested airspace — Mid-latitudes
Operational impact
No impact Moderate impact Severe impact
Ionospheric effects Intentional
Negligible interference;
Spoofing;
Likelihood
Unintentional
Remote interference
Probable
Table 2. Remote areas — Equatorial
Operational impact
No impact Moderate impact Severe impact
Unintentional and
intentional
Negligible
interference;
Spoofing;
Likelihood
Remote
Ionospheric
Probable effects
3. When the analysis shows there is no critical vulnerabilities, implementation of spectrum

management measures is still essential to reduce, as much as possible, the occurrences of service
interruptions.
————————
APPENDIX B
DRAFT AMENDMENT TO
ANNEX 10, VOLUME I
NOTES ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE AMENDMENT
The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text with a line through it and new text highlighted
with grey shading, as shown below:
1. Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it. text to be deleted
2. new text to be inserted
3. Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it new text to replace existing text
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES
AERONAUTICAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ANNEX 10
TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
VOLUME I — RADIO NAVIGATION AIDS
...
ATTACHMENT B. STRATEGY FOR INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATION

OF NON-VISUAL AIDS TO APPROACH AND LANDING
(see Chapter 2, 2.1)
1. Introduction
1.1 Various elements have an influence on all weather operations in terms of safety, efficiency and
flexibility. The evolution of new techniques requires a flexible approach to the concept of all weather
operations to obtain full benefits of technical development. To create this flexibility a strategy enables,
through identification of its objectives and thoughts behind the strategy, incorporation of new technical
developments or ideas into this strategy.
1.2 The strategy does not assume a rapid transition to a single globally established system or
selection of systems to support approach and landing operations. The strategy is intended to accommodate
future systems or system architectures to be standardized and certified for international use in addition to the
present standard non-visual aids.
2. Objectives of strategy
The strategy must:
a) maintain at least the current safety level of all weather operations;
b) retain at least the existing level or planned improved level of service;
c) maintain global interoperability;
d) provide regional flexibility based on co-ordinated regional planning;
e) be applicable until at least the year 2015 ; and

f) take account of economic, operational and technical issues.
3. Considerations
3.1 General
The following considerations (as of the SP COM/OPS/95 Meeting) are based on the assumption that the
operational requirement and the required commitment are available and the required effort is applied.
3.2 Standardization considerations
a) A concept which describes the performance criteria for approach, landing and departure operations
in generic terms is under development;
b) acceptance and introduction of the generic performance criteria is expected to facilitate the
application of emerging technologies for the approach, landing and departure phases of flight; and
c) introduction of the generic performance criteria for approach, landing and departure operations will
not eliminate the need for safety and interoperability-related SARPs, and these SARPs are to be
developed to support the generic performance criteria.
3.3 ILS-related considerations
a) There is a risk that ILS Category II or III operations cannot be safely sustained at specific locations;
b) operators must equip with ILS receivers which meet the interference
immunity performance standards by 1 January 1998 (Annex 10, Volume I, Chapter 3, 3.1.4);
c) expansion of ILS is limited by channel availability (40 channels);
d) many aging ILS ground installations will need to be replaced; and
e) in most areas of the world, ILS can be maintained in the foreseeable future.
3.4 MLS-related considerations
a) MLS Category I is operational;
b) Category II capable ground equipment is certified

; and
c) Category III capable ground equipment is available

.
3.5 GNSS-related considerations
a ) GNSS with augmentation has been demonstrated, for at least two

States, to meet accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability requirements for Category I precision
approach ;
b) GNSS with differential augmentation has been demonstrated, for at least two States, to meet accuracy
requirements for Category II and III approach and landing operations, and integrity, continuity and
availability requirements are under evaluation for such operations;
f ) it is not expected that an internationally accepted GNSS with augmentation as required may be
available for Category II and III operations before the 2005 -2015 time frame.
c) technical and operational issues associated with GNSS approach, landing and departure operations
must be solved in a timely manner;
d ) institutional issues associated with GNSS approach, landing and departure operations must be solved
in a timely manner;
e) it is expected that an internationally accepted GNSS with augmentation as required may be available
for Category I operations within the 2000-2005 time frame; and
3.6 Emerging technologies-related considerations
Emerging technology systems are expected to contribute to improved service performance. Only core systems
(ILS, MLS and GNSS with augmentation as required) are considered to play a major role in supporting all
weather operations.
3.7 Multi-mode receiver (MMR)-related

considerations
The MMR (also known as multi-mode avionics landing system (MMALS)) can provide a means for a flexible
transition. For maximum flexibility, this receiver is expected to include critical landing functions in a single
box. A multi-mode airborne capability could
equally be used;
b) the multi-mode receiver is under development and is expected to become available for progressive
implementation within the 1997-2002 time frame; and
c) the MMR, with a high integrity data link, can support GNSS operations. The differential GNSS data
link could be integrated into the MMR.
3.8 Other considerations
a) There is an increasing demand for Category II and III operations; and
b ) while a single step transition is preferable, i n

some States it may not be possible to make this transition towards new technology systems
(e.g. GNSS Category II/III) without losing the current level of Category II or III operations.
4. Strategy
Based on the considerations above and a need to consult aircraft operators and international organizations
as appropriate, the global
strategy is to:
a) continue ILS operations to the highest level of service as long as operationally acceptable and
economically beneficial;
b) implement MLS where operationally required and economically beneficial

;
c ) promote the use of MMR or equivalent airborne capability to maintain aircraft

interoperability ;
d) validate the use of GNSS, with such augmentations as required, to support approach and departure
operations, including Category I operations, and implement GNSS for such operations as appropriate;
e) complete feasibility studies for

Category II and III operations,
based on GNSS technology, with such augmentations as required. If feasible, i mplement GNSS for
Category II and III operations where operationally acceptable and economically beneficial;
and
f ) enable each region to develop an implementation strategy for future systems in line with the
global strategy.
————————
Appendix C to the Report on Agenda Item 6 6C-1
APPENDIX C
DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO THE GLOBAL AIR NAVIGATION PLAN

FOR CNS/ATM SYSTEMS (DOC 9750)
NOTES ON THE PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT
1. The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text with a line through it and new
text highlighted with grey shading, as shown below:
Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it. text to be deleted
new text to be inserted
Text to be deleted is shown with a line through it new text to replace existing text
6C-2 Appendix C to the Report on Agenda Item 6
GLOBAL AIR NAVIGATION PLAN FOR CNS/ATM SYSTEMS
...
Editorial Note.— The table of contents is reproduced in part and expanded to highlight, in bold, the
parts of the document that are affected by this amendment.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
...
PART I. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND

GENERAL PLANNING PRINCIPLES
Chapter 1. Introduction to CNS/ATM
...
A brief look at CNS/ATM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-1-3

Communications
Navigation
Surveillance
Air traffic management
...
Chapter 2. ICAO’S planning structure for CNS/ATM
...
APPENDIX A. Statement of ICAO policy on CNS/ATM systems

implementation and operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-2-7
1. Universal accessibility
2. Sovereignty, authority and responsibility of Contracting States
3. Responsibility and role of ICAO
4. Technical cooperation
5. Institutional arrangements and implementation
6. Global navigation satellite system
...
Chapter 4. Air traffic management
...
Chapter 6. Navigation systems

Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-1
Required navigation performance (RNP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-1
Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-1
GNSS augmentations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-2
Avionics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-3
WGS-84 coordinate system and aeronautical databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-3
Evolutionary introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-3
Systems to support approach, landing and departure operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-3
General transition issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-6-4
...
Chapter 12. Organizational and international cooperative aspects

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-12-1
Organizational forms at the national level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-12-1
Specific operational and technical organizational aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-12-2
General
Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Services (AMSS) — implementation and option selection
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)
Air traffic management (ATM)
...
PART I
Operational Concept and General Planning Principles
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION TO CNS/ATM
...
A BRIEF LOOK AT CNS/ATM
...
Navigation
1.20 Improvements in navigation include the progressive introduction of area navigation (RNAV)
capabilities along with the global navigation satellite system
(GNSS)
.
These systems provide for worldwide navigational coverage and are being used for worldwide en-route
navigation and for non-precision approaches. With appropriate augmentation systems and related procedures,
it is expected that these systems will also support most precision approaches.
1.21
GNSS,
as specified in Annex 10, will provides a high-integrity,
high-accuracy and all-weather worldwide navigation service. The successful implementation of
GNSS would enable aircraft to navigate in all types of airspace, in any part of the world,
offer ing the possibility for many States to dismantle some or all
of their existing ground-based navigation infrastructure. However, the removal of conventional radio
navigation aids should be considered with caution and after a safety assessment has demonstrated that an
acceptable level of safety can be met and after consultation with users through the regional air navigation
planning process.
Editorial Note.— Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

...
Amend Navigation section of Figure I-1-2 as follows:
Navigation
! High-integrity, high-reliability, all-weather navigation services

worldwide
! Improved four-dimensional navigation

accuracy
! C ost savings from reduction or non-implementation

of ground-based navigation aids
! Better airport and runway utilization
! Provision of non-precision approach/precision approach NPA/PA

capabilities at presently non-equipped airports
! R educed pilot workload
...
Chapter 2
ICAO’S PLANNING STRUCTURE FOR CNS/ATM
...
APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER 2
STATEMENT OF ICAO POLICY ON CNS/ATM SYSTEMS

IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATIONS
Approved by Council (C 141/13) on 9 March 1994
...
6. GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE

SYSTEM
The global navigation satellite system (GNSS) should implemented as an evolutionary progression
from existing global navigation satellite systems, including the United States’ global positioning system
(GPS) and the Russian Federation’s global orbiting navigation satellite system (GLONASS), towards an
integrated GNSS over which Contracting States exercise a sufficient level of control on aspects related to its
use by
civil aviation. ICAO shall continue to explore, in consultation with Contracting States, airspace
users and service providers, the feasibility of achieving a civil internationally controlled
GNSS .
...
Chapter 4
AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
...
Note.— Chapter 4 is under review on the basis of material developed by the Air Traffic
Management Operational Concept Panel (ATMCP). Proposed amendments to this
chapter will be presented separately. Tables I-4 will be deleted in revised Chapter 4.
...
Chapter 6
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
REFERENCES
Annex 10 Aeronautical Telecommunications

Guidelines for the Introduction and Operational
Use of the Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) (Circular 267)
Manual on Required Navigation Performance
(RNP) (Doc 9613)
Annex 11 Air Traffic Services
OBJECTIVES
6.1 The navigation element of CNS/ATM systems is meant to provide accurate, reliable
and seamless position determination capability, worldwide, through
introduction of satellite-based aeronautical navigation.
REQUIRED NAVIGATION
PERFORMANCE (RNP)
6.2 Modern aircraft are increasingly equipped with RNAV , the use of which facilitates a
flexible route system. Also, by using the concept of RNP, the need for selection between competing systems
can be avoided. However, international standardization of navigation techniques, which are in wide use
internationally, is still required.
6.3
The RNP concept for

en-route operations has been approved by ICAO (Annex 11, Chapter 2) and
has been extended to cover approach,
landing and departure operations.
6.4 RNP is a statement of navigation performance accuracy within a defined airspace based on the
combination of the navigation sensor error, airborne receiver error, display error and flight technical error.
6.5 RNP types for en-route operations are identified by a single accuracy value defined as the
minimum navi-gation performance accuracy required within a specified containment level. The en-route RNP
types are described in Doc 9613.
6.6 The RNP types for approach, landing and depar-ture operations are defined in terms of required
accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability of navigation. While some RNP types contain accuracy
specification of lateral performance only (i.e. similar to en-route), other types also include lateral and vertical
performance specifications. The types similar to en-route specification are intended for operations such as
non-precision approach or departure. Most RNP types for approach and landing operations do require vertical
containment based on navigation system information.
GLOBAL NAVIGATION
SATELLITE SYSTEM (GNSS)
6.7 The GNSS is a worldwide position and time determination system, which includes one
or more satellite constellations, aircraft receivers, and system integrity monitoring, augmented
as necessary to support the RNP
for the actual phase of operation.
6.8 The satellite navigation systems in operation are the global positioning system (GPS) of the
United States and the g LObal orbiting na vigation s atellite s ystem (GLONASS) of the Russian
Federation. Both systems were offered to ICAO as a means to support the evolutionary development of
GNSS. In 1994, the ICAO Council accepted the United States’ offer of the GPS, and in 1996 it accepted the
Russian Federation’s offer of GLONASS.
6.9 The GPS space segment is composed of twenty-four satellites in six orbital planes.
The satellites operate near-circular 20 200 km (10 900 NM) orbits at an incli-nation angle of 55 degrees to
the equator, and each satellite completes an orbit in approximately 12 hours.
6.10 The GLONASS space segment consists of twenty-four operational satellites and
several spares. GLONASS satellites orbit at an altitude of 19 100 km with an orbital period of 11 hours and
15 minutes. Eight evenly spaced satellites are arranged in each of the three orbital planes, inclined 64.8
degrees and spaced 120 degrees apart.
GNSS AUGMENTATIONS
6.11 To overcome inherent system limitations and to meet the performance

requirements (accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity of service) for all phases of flight
, GPS and GLONASS require varying degrees of augmentation.
Augmentations are classified in three broad categories: aircraft-based, ground-based and satellite-based (see
Table I-6-1).
Aircraft-based augmentations
6.12
One type of aircraft-based augmentation
(ABAS) is called receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM), which can be used
if there are more than four satellites with suitable geometry in view. With five satellites in view, five
independent positions can be computed. If these do not match, it can be deduced that one or more of the
satellites are giving incorrect information. If there are six or more satellites in view, more independent
positions can be calculated and a receiver may then be able to identify one faulty satellite and exclude it from
the position determination calculations.
6.13 Other aircraft-based augmentations can also be implemented and are usually termed aircraft
autonomous integrity monitoring (AAIM). An inertial navigation system, for example, can aid GNSS during
short periods when the satellite navigation antennas are shadowed by the aircraft during manoeuvres or during
periods when insufficient satellites are in view. Augmentation techniques particularly useful for improving
availability of the navigation function also include altimetry-aiding, more accurate time sources or some
combination of sensor inputs combined through filtering techniques.
Ground-based augmentations
6.14 For g round-based augmentation systems (GBAS), a monitor is located at or near the
airport where precision operations
are desired. Signals
are sent directly to the aircraft in the vicinity (approximately 37 km (20 NM)). These
signals provide corrections to increase the position accuracy locally along with satellite
integrity information. This capability requires data link(s) between the ground and the aircraft
.
Satellite-based augmentations
6.15 It is not practical to provide coverage with ground-based systems for all phases of flight.
One way to provide augmentation coverage over large areas is to use satellites to transmit augmentation
information. This is known as satellite-based augmentation (SBAS).
6.16 The provision of satellite-based augmentation by geostationary satellites has certain limitations
and therefore cannot be expected to support all phases of flight, especially precision approach
and landing of higher categories. Since these satellites orbit above the equator, their signals would not be
available in polar regions and may be masked by aircraft structure or terrain. This suggests that other GNSS
augmentation satellite orbits and/or ground-based augmentation might need to be considered to alleviate these
shortcomings .
AVIONICS
6.17 Simple GPS or GLONASS receivers that do not include RAIM

capability (or similar forms of integrity monitoring) generally cannot meet the
requirements for all phases of flight.
6.18 Multi-sensor systems, using GNSS as one of the sensors, are expected to be in use
for the foreseeable future. Such navigation systems generally exhibit better levels of
performance than the individual sensor or stand-alone systems. Aircraft using multi-sensor navigation
systems, such as integrated GNSS/IRS or GNSS/IRS/FMS, may be certified as meeting levels of RNP
which could not be obtained
by use of GPS or GLONASS alone.
WGS-84 COORDINATE SYSTEM AND

AERONAUTICAL DATABASES
6.19 The successful global implementation of satellite navigation is predicated on the existence
of a coordinate and procedures database of a very high quality . Accurate
satellite navigation is only possible when the ground-derived coordinates,
calculated coordinates, and the satellite system-derived
coordinates use the same geodetic reference system.
6.20 In support of evolving satellite-based technology, ICAO adopted

WGS-84 as the common geodetic reference datum for civil aviation with an applicability date of 1 January
1998 (Annex 15). Implementation of WGS-84 involves, among other things, the
transformation of existing coordinates and reference datums

to WGS-84.
6.21 Aeronautical databases are built and updated through the use of surveys of existing
navigation aids, position fixes and runway thresholds and through the design of new routes or approach
procedures. Systems are to be in place to ensure the quality (accuracy, integrity and resolution) of position
data from the time of the survey, to the submission of information to the next intended user. Aeronautical
databases must be updated on a regular basis.
EVOLUTIONARY INTRODUCTION
6.22 GNSS implementation will be carried out in an evolutionary manner, allowing gradual
system improvements to be introduced. Near-term applications of GNSS are intended to enable the early
introduction of satellite-based en-route navigation , using the
existing satellite systems (GPS and GLONASS) and primarily aircraft-based
augmentations
.
6.23 Medium-term applications will make use of existing satellite navigation systems with
any augmentation, or combination of augmentations required for operation in a particular phase
of flight. Longer-term applications will apply to future GNSS.
6.24 Three levels are generally accepted for the introduction of GNSS-based operations:
a) supplemental-means GNSS must meet accuracy and integrity requirements for a given
operation or phase of flight; availability and continuity require-ments may not be met. Other
navigation systems supporting a given operation or phase of flight must be on board;
b) primary-means GNSS must meet accuracy and integrity requirements, but need not meet full
availability and continuity of service requirements for a given operation or phase of flight.
Safety is achieved by limiting operations to specific time periods and through appropriate
procedural restric-tions. Other navigation systems can be retained on board to support the
primary-means GNSS;
c) sole-means GNSS must allow the aircraft to meet, for a given operation or phase of flight,
all four requirements: accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity of service.
SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT APPROACH,

LANDING AND DEPARTURE OPERATIONS
Editorial Note.— Original paragraph 6.25 has been moved and modified. It is now paragraph 6.28.
6.26 The terminology in 6.24 applies to the required state of avionics equipage and the ability
of aircraft to meet RNP requirements with, in case of “sole means”, no other navigation equipment on board.
It is also related to the intended operation (or phase of flight). Operational approvals for aircraft are therefore
issued for particular operations and normally identify specific conditions or restrictions to be applied. To this
end they may vary from State to State .
6.27 GNSS sole-means approval is therefore a necessary, but not sufficient,

condition for termination of present radio navigation
services.
A number of aircraft
may be approved for sole-means GNSS navigation for particular operations or phases of flight. However, he
air traffic service provider must provide a navigation service to all users concerned to support
all phases of flight . It is
therefore necessary to harmonize withdrawal of conventional navaids with the introduction of GNSS
navigation service. These considerations are not applicable to airspace where present navaids
are not available and GNSS alone can be introduced to benefit
GNSS-equipped users.
6.28 When introducing GNSS-based services, each State shall identify the elements of GNSS
that are provided (e.g. GPS, GLONASS, SBAS, GBAS ) and
develop an implementation plan. Where navigation services such as VOR, DME and ILS already exist, States
could credit the economic savings associated with the decommissioning of ground-based navigational aids.
The cost of implementing SBAS and GBAS should be tied to the provision of user benefits and increased
airspace efficiency associated with area navigation and the potential to support lower decision altitude/height
to more runways.
6.29 Advantages of GNSS services include the use of GPS/ABAS

for en-route and non-precision approach operations where the coverage of ground-based
navigation aids does not exist or is limited. In such an environment, GNSS would become the only
navigation service as soon as it is introduced. SBAS-based precision approach capability
to runways that currently only have a non-precision approach capability will

provide further advantages in terms of increased safety and operational efficiency.
6.30 Several technical concerns have been raised with respect to the reliance on GNSS services.
Principal among them is the possibility for intentional interference, or jamming, that has the potential to
disrupt GNSS navigation services over relatively large areas. States and air navi-gation service providers
should develop plans to reduce the likelihood of such occurrences, to detect and eliminate sources of
interference and to ensure that aircraft can continue to operate safely during periods when GNSS signals are
disrupted. Depending on the traffic density in a given airspace and the degree of integration and automation
of the air navigation system, a safety assessment might demonstrate the need for navigational information
derived from different independent sources to address certain threats such as intentional jamming.
6.31 Other risk areas are expected to be mitigated as GNSS continues to evolve to a more
comprehensive service, such as the introduction of additional signals for aeronautical use on GPS and
GLONASS satellites, aug-mentation system improvements, and the introduction of additional satellites and
satellite systems. Each State will have to evaluate the effectiveness of the mitigation tech-niques applied in
its airspace to determine if it is acceptable to rely on GNSS alone for the provision of navigation service.
SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT APPROACH,

LANDING AND DEPARTURE OPERATIONS
6.25 The standard non-visual aids for precision approach and landing are defined in Annex 10,
Volume I, Chapter 2. It is intended that the introduction and application of these non-visual aids will be in
accordance with the global strategy set forth in Annex 10, Volume I, Attachment B.
This strategy will :
a) continue ILS operations to the highest level of service as long as operationally acceptable
and economically beneficial;
b) implement MLS where operationally required and economically beneficial;
c) promote the use of multi-mode receivers (MMR) or equivalent airborne capability to

maintain aircraft interoperability;
d) validate the use of GNSS, with such augmentations as required, to support approach and
departure operations, including Category I operations, and implement GNSS for such
operations as appropriate;
e) complete feasibility studies for Category II and III operations, based on GNSS technology,
with such augmentations as required. If feasible, implement GNSS for Category II and III
operations where operationally acceptable and economically beneficial; and
f) enable each region to develop an implementation strategy for future systems in line with the
global strategy.
...
GENERAL TRANSITION ISSUES
6.32 Guidelines for transition to the future systems encourage equipage by users for the earliest
possible accrual of systems benefits. Provision and carriage of terrestrial and satellite-based navigation
equipment are required during the transition period when the reliability and availability of a new system must
be proven. Appendix A to this chapter lists the guidelines that States, regions, users, service providers and
manufacturers should consider when developing GNSS or when planning for its implementation.
APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER 6
GUIDELINES FOR TRANSITION TO NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
• GNSS should be introduced in an evolutionary manner with

increasing benefits commensurate with improve-ments in navigation service. These
benefits should culminate in GNSS sole-means operations.
• The ground infrastructure for current navigation systems must remain available during the transition
period.
• States/regions should consider segregating traffic according to navigation capability and granting
preferred routes to aircraft with better navigation performance
.
• States/regions should coordinate to ensure that

separation standards and procedures
for appropriately equipped aircraft are introduced approximately simultaneously in each

FIR through which major traffic passes.
• In planning the transition to GNSS, the following issues must be considered:
a ) schedule for provision and/or adoption of a GNSS service, including aircraft and operator
approval processes;
b ) extent of existing ground-based radio navigation services;
c ) strategy for transition schedule to GNSS capability (i.e. benefits-driven or mandatory);
d ) appropriate level of user equipage with GNSS capability;
e) provision of other air traffic services (i.e. surveillance and communications);
f ) density of traffic/frequency of operations; and
g ) mitigation of risks associated with radio frequency interference

.
...
Chapter 12
ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATIVE ASPECTS
...
Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS)
12.11 The GNSS will initially be composed of a satellite system that provides standard positioning
service and system augmentation , which may either have wide area or local area coverage. System
augmentation is required for meeting certain performance criteria that may be imposed.
Positioning signals are being offered free of charge by the two provider States concerned: at least up to the
year 2010 by the Russian Federation (the GLONASS system) and, for the foreseeable future, with six years’
advance notice of any change to that policy, by the United States (the GPS system). Both these systems are
military systems, which are being made available for civilian use. Until these systems are
replaced by (civilian) systems requiring financial commitments from the civil establishment worldwide, the
provision, as opposed to the use, of the standard positioning service does not appear to be dependent on
organizational issues needing to be addressed by States other than the two provider States.
12.12 Systems augmentation gives rise to somewhat different considerations. For example, wide
area augmentation could be provided by the same State(s) or entity that operates a satellite
constellation providing global standard positioning service. However, a group of States or a regional
organization might also undertake to operate the augmentation satellite service required, either by themselves
or by contracting with a commercial or government organization to do so on their behalf. Thus, the same type
of options as outlined in 12.8 above apply. In each instance, costs would be incurred that would presumably
need to be recovered. From an organizational point of view, such augmentation would in fact be a
multinational facility or service to which the guidance material on the provision and operation of
multinational facilities and services, which is addressed later in this chapter, could apply, as long as the
augmentation is primarily to serve civil aviation. On the other hand, if civil aviation is only going to be a
minority user of the augmentation services provided, and the entity will provide augmentation services
worldwide, a joint concerted approach through, for example, ICAO, a regional air navigation services
providers association, or an international aviation user association, for dealing with the service provider, may
be the most appropriate.
12.13 Augmentation with local coverage would most likely not require international involvement
provided that the facility meets the specifications and Standards required for it to be listed as an international
civil aviation facility. The facility itself could be provided by the national or local government or under
contract by a commercial entity.
...
————————
Appendix D to the Report on Agenda Item 6 6D-1
APPENDIX D
OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND ISSUES RELATING TO THE FUTURE

COMBINATIONS OF INDEPENDENT SATELLITE NAVIGATION
SYSTEMS AND THEIR AUGMENTATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPs) have been developed for both Global Positioning System (GPS) and GLObal NAvigation
Satellite System (GLONASS) for L1 signals and for aircraft-based (ABAS), satellite-based (SBAS) and
ground-based (GBAS) augmentations systems.
1.2 In the future, GPS will be enhanced by providing additional signals and will possibly include
a worldwide integrity function. GLONASS-M satellites with improved characteristics will be added to the
constellation and subsequently new generation GLONASS-K satellites will be launched. A new constellation
called GALILEO is also being developed by Europe and will provide three signals and a worldwide integrity
function.
1.3 A number of benefits for the civil aviation users can be expected from the use of these
additional signals and constellations. The existing systems can be combined to improve robustness and
therefore increase the ability to meet performance requirements in the presence of interference or system
failures. In addition, increased performance can be obtained in nominal conditions when using combination
of signals from independent systems. This means that, for some regions, the use of combined constellation
is likely to offer navigation service levels that previously required the use of augmentation systems. Finally,
the availability of multiple constellations could alleviate institutional concerns about relying on a single
service provider.
1.4 The introduction of these new elements also raises some technical, economical and
institutional issues that need to be addressed in order to take full credit of the opportunities offered.
2. OPPORTUNITIES FROM NEW SIGNALS AND

CONSTELLATIONS
2.1 Implementation time frames
2.1.1 As of September 2003, the estimates of service delivery for the various constellations and
new signals are as follow:
a) GPS/L1: available;
b) GPS/L5: Initial operational capability - 2012, Full operational capability - 2015;
c) GLONASS/L1: available (number of operational satellites is limited);
d) GLONASS/L3: planned availability from 2008;

6D-2 Appendix D to the Report on Agenda Item 6
e) GALILEO/L1: planned availability from 2008 ;
f) GALILEO/E5a: planned availability from 2008; and
g) GALILEO/E5b: planned availability from 2008.
2.1.2 For any new signal/constellation, an additional time period of one to two years would
probably be needed for the purpose of validation/certification by civil aviation authorities before approving
signals use for safety-of-life applications. This implies that the operational use of new signals and combined
constellations service could start in the 2010 time frame.
2.1.3 ICAO planning for GNSS standardization involves development and validation of SARPs
for the above-mentioned elements of GNSS as the development of these elements progresses.
2.2 Technical and operational opportunities
2.2.1 Assessment of GNSS vulnerability and mitigation methods (AN-Conf/11-WP/17 refers)

indicates that there is inherent merit in making satellite navigation as robust as possible against interference.
In this respect, each of the new GNSS signals will be more resistant to interference than GPS/L1 due to higher
power and wider bandwidth, resulting in better interference rejection capability. Moreover, all signals
intended for safety-of-life applications will benefit from the protection provided through International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) allocation within the aeronautical radionavigation service (ARNS) bands.
2.2.2 Frequency diversification is also a very effective mitigation against unintentional

interference, since it is highly unlikely that such an interference source would simultaneously affect more than
one frequency. Indications have been received that all core constellations (GPS, GLONASS and GALILEO)
will provide services on multiple frequencies, and any combination of two of these constellations make
available at least one non-common frequency.
2.2.3 Atmospheric effects will also be mitigated in a very effective way when a combination of
constellations is used. The impact of signal loss which exists today in equatorial regions and at a lesser extent
at high latitudes under severe ionospheric scintillation conditions will be significantly mitigated when more
satellites are in view. This could be achieved by combining at user level the different measurements from
different constellations.
2.2.4 With single frequency satellites, GBAS and SBAS must correct for errors induced by the
ionosphere. Multiple frequencies from each satellite support this error correction in the receiver. When
combining constellations, availability and continuity of service limitations currently related to the events such
as ionospheric scintillation, system maintenance, space segment failures or terrain/building masking (e.g. for
GNSS-based surface operations) will be alleviated due to the larger number of satellites in view.
2.2.5 In areas where integrity data is not provided (by SBAS or future core constellations),
performance improvement may be obtained by combining measurements from multiple constellations with
ABAS, albeit with less robustness. This will obviate the need for SBAS deployment in some instances and
simplify SBAS architecture in other cases.
2.2.6 Some States are already considering potential benefits of increasing GNSS robustness
through frequency diversity with a single constellation. Combining the different signals of at least two of
these constellations at user level would further enhance the robustness, improve performance and also
seriously mitigate the institutional concerns issued from the use of a single constellation.
2.3 Institutional opportunities
2.3.1 There are non-technical reasons for the use of multiple constellations . These reasons can
include institutional concerns about the control and maintainability of a single constellation, the threat of
service denial, and the possibility of a major failure in a core constellation. The availability of multiple,
independent constellations from independent service providers will in particular allow that:
a) satellite navigation services can continue to provide their nominal performance despite
a lack of funding resources to maintain a specific constellation, technical difficulties
with operation of the constellation, launch failures, or destruction resulting from
emergency situations;
b) navigation service can be maintained on a worldwide basis, even if the performance of

a single constellation is degraded or denied in the whole coverage area during a national
emergency situation, as recognized by the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(Article 89 refers). In this case an independently managed second constellation could
continue to provide service; and
c) navigation service can be maintained even in the case of signal interruption or major
modification of one satellite constellation, a mid-term service interruption of one
constellation or the decision of one satellite constellation provider to discontinue
provision of the service.
3. CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE

INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL INDEPENDENT
CONSTELLATIONS AND AUGMENTATIONS
3.1 Complexity related to using

multiple combinations of elements
3.1.1 The introduction of independent constellations and augmentation system elements introduces
technical complexity. This must be managed properly in both the technical and operational domains to ensure
that aircraft operators obtain the benefits described above and that these benefits exceed costs.
3.1.2 Complexity could increase, as GNSS evolves, if there will be a proliferation of airborne
receivers that use different combinations of independent GNSS elements in different ways. It is also
anticipated that there will be architectures that further enhance capability by integrating GNSS with inertial
systems. The market will naturally preclude architectures that use combinations failing to provide economic
benefits, but fragmentation could undoubtedly occur. Air navigation services providers, aircraft operators and
manufacturers will have to work together to match capability to required navigation performance and
published approach procedures in order to maximise benefits.
3.1.3 It was suggested that air navigation service providers would require a real time indication
of whether various combinations of GNSS system elements support published levels of service, accounting
for users with various capability levels. This approach stems from the current system monitoring philosophy,
where the air navigation service provider can monitor individual terrestrial aids and where each aid provides
a defined service. However such approach probably will not suit future GNSS operations, in particular when
multiple signals and constellations are introduced. Therefore the current status monitoring concept should
be revisited.
6D-4 Appendix D to the Report on Agenda Item 6
3.1.4 The standardisation of a multiple combination of elements could become difficult to manage
for ICAO, depending on the implementation strategy for SARPs introduction. The best option could be to
standardize the new signals individually supplementing SARPs with guidance material on the use of these
new signals and signal combinations.
3.2 System cost for aircraft operators and service providers
3.2.1 From the user’s prospective, the introduction of additional signals and constellations will
require replacement of existing receivers and aircraft antennas. These receivers and antennas will be more
complex and will likely cost more than the current generation of GNSS avionics. However, with the
continuous advances in receiver technology, these cost increases are likely to be relatively modest.
3.2.2 The most viable strategy for aircraft operators could be to retrofit only when a business case
is positive. The cost of retrofitting could be reduced if manufacturer’ designs allow for software or simple
hardware upgrades. The other part of this strategy would be to procure new aircraft with avionics that match
the state of GNSS development. This will require advance knowledge of standards and plans for the
introduction of new signals.
3.2.3 In the case of GBAS, a system capable of augmenting two core constellations
(e.g. GPS/GLONASS or GPS/GALILEO) may be more expensive due to the increased complexity in
reference receivers and antenna elements. On the other hand, service providers using relatively new GBAS
equipment, which augments a single constellation, would not rush to introduce new equipment and take
decisions for system upgrades primarily based on nominal life cycle considerations.
3.2.4 In order to minimise the potential cost impact and to maximise the benefits, ICAO, in
developing standards for new GNSS elements and signals, should develop recommendations on the most
promising combinations of elements and signals.
3.3 Repercussions of regulatory restrictions
3.3.1 Current GNSS avionics automatically select which satellites and augmentation elements to
*
use . In the future, State regulations could require or prohibit the use of certain GNSS elements or their
combinations. Such situation could result in significant costs for users in terms of additional cockpit controls
and procedures, crew training and maintenance support. If each independent GNSS element had to be
selected, the avionics interface would become very complicated. Crew training for use of this interface and
system operation modes that should be selected in various parts of airspace would be costly. Furthermore,
a complex avionics interface could increase pilot workload and become a safety issue.
3.3.2 These potential repercussions require ICAO to encourage States, in their planning for
implementation of GNSS services, to avoid limitations on the use of specific GNSS elements for institutional
reasons.
*
This is true with the exception of GBAS precision approach that has a channel selection capability to direct the receiver to use a
specific GBAS augmentation system.
4. CONCLUSIONS
4.1 GPS, GLONASS and GALILEO will offer independently operated satellite constellations
and independent signals. Thus, GNSS service failures when a combination of constellations is implemented
will be extremely unlikely.
4.2 Therefore, the increasing number of GNSS signals and constellations offers significant
benefits to civil aviation in terms of improved robustness, as well as performance improvements, GNSS
ground architecture simplification and alleviation of institutional concerns.
4.3 The implementation of a multiplicity of different possible combinations of elements would

result in overall system complexity and negative economic impact particularly on the user side. This problem
can be avoided by the thorough assessment and selection of the most promising combinations for general
implementation.
4.4 If the issues related to the use of independent core satellite constellations, other GNSS
elements and their combinations are properly addressed, the introduction of new constellations and additional
signals will facilitate the transition to GNSS as a global system for all phases of flight.
4.5 ICAO, in developing Standards for new GNSS elements and signals, will address the issues
associated with the use of multiple signals and their combinations, and develop guidance on the most
promising combinations of GNSS elements.
————————
Agenda Item 7: Aeronautical air-ground and air-to-air communications
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.1.1 Under this agenda item, the conference reviewed the developments on aeronautical mobile
communications since the Tenth Air Navigation Conference and in particular considered the planned
evolution of existing communication systems and the potential development of future ones in the framework
of the global air traffic management operational concept.
7.2 BACKGROUND
7.2.1 The conference recalled that in September 1991, the Tenth Air Navigation Conference had
met to consider and endorse the concept of a future air navigation system, as developed by the Special
Committee on Future Air Navigation System (FANS) to meet aviation needs well into the next century.
7.2.2 The conference noted with appreciation that since the Tenth Air Navigation Conference,
ICAO technical bodies had conducted significant development work addressing the communications issues
identified by the FANS Committee and by the Tenth Air Navigation Conference. As a result, several
amendments to Annex 10 had been introduced, including:
a) Amendment 70 (applicability date: 9 November 1995), including new Standards and

Recommended Practices (SARPs) for the aeronautical mobile-satellite service (AMSS);
b) Amendment 71 (applicability date: 7 November 1996), including specifications for the

Mode S data link, material relating to the introduction of 8.33 kHz channel spacing,
changes to material related to the protection of air-ground communications in the VHF
band and technical specifications relating to the RF characteristics for the VHF digital
link (VDL);
c) Amendment 72 (applicability date: 6 November 1997), including SARPs and guidance

material for VHF digital link (VDL-Mode 2);
d) Amendment 73 (applicability date: 5 November 1998), including material relating to the

ATN and changes to specifications of the Mode S data link and subnetwork;
e) Amendment 74 (applicability date: 4 November 1999), including SARPs for HF data

link;
f) Amendment 75 (applicability date: 2 November 2000), including changes to the AMSS

SARPs introducing a new antenna type, a new voice channel type and enhanced
provisions for interoperability among AMSS systems; changes to the VDL SARPs to
reduce potential interference to current VHF voice communication systems caused by
VDL transmitters; and changes to the VHF voice communication SARPs to enhance
immunity to interference from VDL transmitters on board the same aircraft;
g) Amendment 76 (applicability date: 1 November 2001), including ATN system

management, security and directory services; integrated voice and data link system
(VDL Mode 3); and data link satisfying surveillance applications (VDL Mode 4);
h) Amendment 77 (applicability date: 28 November 2002), including changes to SARPs

addressing issues encountered during tests and operational trials of the Mode S data link
subnetwork; and
i) Amendment 78 (expected to become applicable in November 2003), including

consequential amendments to ATN SARPs relating to the inclusion of VDL Modes 3
and 4 in the table of priorities.
7.2.3 Work had also been conducted on the optimal use of aeronautical radio spectrum, the
maintenance of communications systems standards to ensure continued viability and the examination of future
requirements and systems to meet the increasing demands of ATM.
7.2.4 The conference recognized that, notwithstanding the developments over the last decade,
elements of the shortcomings that had been identified by the FANS Committee were still present, including,
inter alia:
a) disparate services and procedures resulting from differing systems and limited system
and decision support tools;
b) a reliance on increasingly congested voice radio communications for air-ground

exchanges;
c) limited facilities for real-time information exchange between ATM, aerodromes and
aircraft operators, resulting in less than optimal responses to real-time events and
changes in the users’ operational requirements;
d) the limited ability to maximize benefits for aircraft with advanced avionics; and
e) the long lead-times involved in developing and deploying improved systems in aircraft
fleets or in the ground infrastructure.
7.2.5 It was noted that a number of activities were being conducted to address those limitations:
a) in its participation to International Telecommunication Union (ITU) activities, ICAO

was actively supporting the introduction of additional radiofrequency spectrum
allocations to meet requirements for increased communication capacity and new
applications. In parallel, ICAO was also promoting the development of new techniques
to increase the efficiency of use of the existing aeronautical spectrum allocation;
b) with regard to the provisions for voice and data communications systems contained in
Annex 10, ICAO activities focused on ensuring that SARPs were up to date and
applicable and interoperable on a global basis; and
c) with respect to future digital voice and data communications systems, research and
development work on air-ground communications was being monitored, including the
use of new modulation schemes, protocols, and frequency bands.
7.2.6 The conference noted that these activities would be continued to enable international civil
aviation to meet future communication requirements in a spectrum-efficient manner and enable gradual
implementation of the ATM operational concept.
7.3 IMPLEMENTATION STATUS AND PROGRAMMES
7.3.1 The conference was provided with information on status of the activities undertaken by
several States and international organizations towards the operational implementation of various air-ground
data links in support of air traffic services (ATS) applications.
7.3.2 A summary of the information is shown in the following paragraphs.
7.3.3 Implementation of air-ground data links in Japan
Transition to VDL
7.3.3.1 The conference was informed that the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) was in the
process of studying the future implementation of VDL Mode 3, recognizing that ATS providers needed a
reliable and high-speed VHF voice and data communication system and that the rapid growth in air traffic
required a dramatic increase of VHF channel capacity. The Electronic Navigation Research Institute (ENRI)
had been working on research and development (R&D) of the VDL Mode 3 system since 1998 and would
be conducting actual flight tests for evaluation of data link performance and voice quality in 2003.
Transition to AMSS
7.3.3.2 The conference noted that, in order to cope with the rapid increase of international traffic in
North Pacific (NOPAC), JCAB had decided to develop a new aeronautical satellite system called
multifunctional transport satellite (MTSAT) in 1994. In addition to its SBAS functions (Section 6.1.3 refers),
the MTSAT system also supported aeronautical mobile-satellite service (AMSS) functions. The AMSS
function of MTSAT system was fully compliant with the AMSS SARPs and fully supported all types of
aeronautical communications defined by ICAO.
7.3.3.3 The conference was informed that there would be two aeronautical satellites, MTSAT-1R
and MTSAT-2 available for the Asia and Pacific Region. There were also two aeronautical satellite centres
where two GESs were implemented in each centre. The instantaneous switch over between two satellites and
four GESs fully assured in the MTSAT. This redundant architecture would provide highly reliable AMSS
to users, which would strongly support the reduction of the lateral and longitudinal separations over NOPAC
and Central Pacific (CENPAC). With the MTSAT-1R scheduled for launch in early 2004, JCAB intended
to apply 50 NM longitudinal separation minimum using DS/CPDLC for appropriately equipped aircraft. With
the MTSAT-2 scheduled for launch in early 2005 and obtaining operational experiences, JCAB would further
reduce the longitudinal separation minimum to 30 NM.
7.3.3.4 The ATS messages through MTSAT system in Japanese FIR would be handled by JCAB in
the same manner as very high frequency (VHF) and high frequency (HF) voice communications in the current
ATS environment, whereas the aeronautical operational control (AOC), aeronautical administrative
communication (AAC) and aeronautical public communications (APC) messages would be handled separately
by a service provider (SITA). JCAB had signed an operational agreement with Inmarsat, which was providing
AMSS services worldwide, in order to assure full interoperability between MTSAT and the Inmarsat system.
Therefore, the aircraft earth station (AES) currently operating in the Inmarsat system would be able to use
the MTSAT system without any modification to aircraft systems by simply adding MTSAT data to their
satellite data unit (SDU).
7.3.4 Data link flight information services (DFIS) applications

in China
7.3.4.1 The conference was informed that China had commenced operations at Hong Kong
International Airport on the dissemination of the ATIS and VOLMET via data link (D-ATIS and
D-VOLMET) and on pre-departure clearance (PDC) delivery to aircraft via data link. Aircraft equipped with
the appropriate aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) and the required software
(compliant to AEEC Specifications 618, 620, 622 and 623) could access and/or receive the full script of the
D-ATIS, D-VOLMET and PDC messages. China was considering to extend the D-ATIS and PDC delivery
services via data link to other major airports in China. At the same time, use of other data link technologies,
including ACARS over aviation VHF link control (AOA) and VHF digital link (VDL) was being explored.
7.3.4.2 The conference noted that the known intrinsic limitation of the ACARS system did not have
a significant impact on information of broadcast nature, such as DFIS, as information could be accessed at
the will of the pilots in advance. The implementation of DFIS through the ACARS system could also promote
more efficient utilization of avionics that were already available. The identified operational and/or safety
benefits gained as a result of these applications of data link flight information services were noted with
appreciation.
7.3.5 Implementation of ICAO air-ground data link by ARINC
HFDL
7.3.5.1 The conference was informed that ARINC had initiated service of its SARPs-compliant
HFDL system in January 1998. During 2003, fourteen geographically diverse HFDL ground stations,
transmitting on 30 active frequencies, would provide near global (with the exception of Antarctica) air-ground
data link coverage. An adaptive frequency management programme changed the active frequencies at each
site in response to atmospheric conditions, such as day-night temperature changes and ionospheric anomalies,
to achieve optimum propagation and to avoid interference with nearby HFDL ground stations or HF voice
stations. ARINC would expand site configurations as required by equipage and usage growth. There were
nearly 300 aircraft equipped with HFDL (mostly transmitting for AOC and AAC). Operational availability
exceeded 99 per cent with an uplink message success rate greater than 97 per cent. An operational trial of
HFDL in support of waypoint position reporting was under way in the North Atlantic.
VDL
7.3.5.2 In 2002, ARINC had installed and deployed thirteen VDL Mode 2 ground stations to provide
coverage for the US FAA’s CPDLC Build 1 programme in the Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center
(ARTCC). The associated infrastructure included redundant ATN air-ground and ground-ground routers.
Deployment of VDL Mode 2 (in an ATN environment) by ARINC was planned in Europe for the operational
use of CPDLC at the Maastricht Upper Area Control Center (UACC) . Further deployment was also foreseen
in Japan.
7.3.6 SITA AIRCOM data link service
7.3.6.1 The conference was informed that SITA VHF AIRCOM service provided near global
coverage with over 700 VHF stations deployed in over 170 countries around the world. The service was used
by over 5 000 aircraft on a daily basis, primarily for AOC.
7.3.6.2 The SITA Satellite AIRCOM Data Link service was being used by over 1 500 aircraft that
generated an average of 50 000 kilobits of traffic on a daily basis and provided global coverage (except polar
regions) via the Inmarsat geo-stationary satellites. The service was currently used in ACARS mode but had
been capable of providing AMSS SARPs-compliant services since its launch.
7.3.6.3 Both the VHF and Satellite AIRCOM services supported FANS-1/A operations. The SITA
deployment of VDL Mode 2 services had started in 2001. At present there were 25 sites with operational
VDL Mode 2 service and this number would increase to over 40 sites by the end of the first quarter of 2004.
7.3.7 FAA’s next generation air/ground communications

(NEXCOM) and Capstone programmes
NEXCOM
7.3.7.1 The conference noted that VDL Mode 3 had been selected by the United States FAA for its
NEXCOM programme to fulfil requirements for added spectrum capacity, replacement of ageing air-ground
communication infrastructure, high-integrity secure and interference-free data path. To facilitate transition,
development of a ground-based multi-mode digital radio (MDR) capable of VDL Mode 3, and analog
25 kHz/8.33 kHz operation had been undertaken. Final operational approval of the radio was in progress.
7.3.7.2 Three manufacturers were developing multi-mode avionics that would incorporate VDL
Mode 3 for the commercial air transport, business aviation and general aviation markets. The Certification
Branch of the FAA was currently developing technical standard orders (TSO) to support the installation
approval process of the users. A system demonstration involving pre-production avionics and the ground test
bed was scheduled at the William J. Hughes Technical Centre for November 2003. The production version
of these radios would be certified and available for purchase beginning in 2005.
7.3.7.3 A rapid development effort of the ground system was under way and a full-scale development
of the ground system was scheduled to begin in early 2005 and continue through 2007 allowing for first
implementation of a fully digital air-ground infrastructure in selected sectors by 2009.
Capstone
7.3.7.4 As part of the United States FAA’s Capstone programme, there were over 180 aircraft in
Alaska equipped with universal access transceiver (UAT)1. Additionally, ten ground stations had been
installed. In January 2001, the FAA had approved the use of UAT/ADS-B to support “radar-like services”
for equipped aircraft in areas of Western Alaska without radar coverage. This represented the first operational
use of ADS-B to support air traffic services. The Capstone programme was planning to upgrade the installed
avionics and ground stations to comply with UAT RTCA MOPS. Additionally, the programme planned to
award new contracts for 200 additional avionics suites to equip aircraft in Southeast Alaska and for 30 new
ground stations.
7.3.8 Air-ground data link implementation in Europe
7.3.8.1 Information on the LINK 2000+ Programme launched by the European Organisation for the
Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) was presented to the conference, addressing the objectives of the
programme, its time scales and the modalities of the data link implementation in Europe. The conference
1
UAT is a broadcast data link designed for ADS-B applications. SARPs development for the UAT is under way within the
Aeronautical Communications Panel (ACP).
noted that the objective of the programme was to implement air-ground data link services for air traffic
control (ATC) in the core area of Europe, based on the aeronautical telecommunication network (ATN) and
VHF digital link Mode 2 (VDL Mode 2). The selected technology combination had been successfully used
by EUROCONTROL in operational trials.
7.3.8.2 The conference was informed that the programme concentrated on the implementation of
controller-pilot data link communications for en-route ATC, including ATC communication management
used to transfer aircraft silently between sectors or centres, ATC clearances used to request and issue ATC
clearances and ATC microphone check, used to alert pilots about a blocked voice frequency. In addition it
provided a migration path to ATN/VDL Mode 2 for services already existing over ACARS, such as DCL,
D-ATIS and oceanic clearance.
7.3.8.3 The EUROCONTROL Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre would provide the services
from 2003 onwards, followed by other centres of the described region in 2006 and 2007. This stepped
implementation of data link equipped centres would allow pilots to get accustomed gradually to data link
operations and is not considered a disadvantage. The controller-pilot data link communications would reduce
controller and aircrew workload and voice congestion. The conference noted that full benefits of data link
would only become available when a large majority of flights was equipped and that; therefore,
EUROCONTROL was investigating the possible need for a mandate for data link equipage.
7.3.9 Modernization of aeronautical communications in India
7.3.9.1 The conference noted that, considering the increase in air traffic growth over Indian terrestrial
airspace, the oceanic airspace of the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea and advent of new technology and
infrastructure in the data communication, the Airports Authority of India (AAI) had drawn plans to improve
air-ground communication infrastructure using satellite technology in accordance with the regional
communications, navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management (CNS/ATM) plan. Implementation of
the plan was being carried out in phases.
7.3.10 Modernization of the Brazilian VHF data link

communications services
7.3.10.1 The conference was informed that the Brazilian DATACOM system was an air-ground digital
communication system operating in the VHF band and aimed at reducing the amount of voice
communications through automatic data transmission. The system allowed exchange of ATS, AOC and AAC
messages between ground users (ATC facilities and airlines) and aircraft. The system was based on ACARS
technology. A modernization programme was under way, aimed at introducing VDL Mode 2 technology to
optimize data link traffic in those sites already approaching saturation levels. Departure clearance and digital
ATIS air traffic services would be supported.
7.4 ADS-B DATA LINKS
7.4.1 The conference recalled that automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) was
defined in Annex 10 as a surveillance technique in which aircraft automatically provided, via a broadcast
mode data link, data derived from on-board navigation and position-fixing systems, including aircraft
identification, four-dimensional position, and additional data as appropriate.
7.4.2 Progress in the development of an ADS-B concept of use had been discussed under Agenda
Item 1, which focused on the role of ADS-B as an enabling concept in support of a global ATM operational
concept. In that context, it had been noted that one of the constraints to be taken into account as a part of the
activities leading to the implementation of ADS-B was the availability of standardized technology. Thus, the
conference proceeded to address some of the associated issues from a technical standpoint.
7.4.3 Comparative analyses/data link evaluations
7.4.3.1 The conference was informed that, at the request of the Air Navigation Commission (ANC),
the Aeronautical Mobile Communications Panel (AMCP) had considered a comparative analysis of the
following three ADS-B data links:
a) secondary surveillance radar (SSR) Mode S extended squitter;
b) VHF digital link (VDL) Mode 4; and
c) universal access transceiver (UAT).
7.4.3.2 In the course of the analysis, the data links had been assessed and compared against a number
of criteria. The criteria used included those considered in earlier assessments of data links for surveillance
applications carried out by AMCP, criteria derived from RTCA minimum aviation system performance
standards (MASPS) for ADS-B, and additional criteria supplied by the European Organisation for the Safety
of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) to the joint FAA/EUROCONTROL Technical Link Assessment Team
(TLAT). In order to evaluate system performance in several different air traffic situations, two air traffic
scenarios (a high-density one and a low-density one) had been used as representative of future environments.
The conference noted with appreciation the substantive amount of effort invested and the wealth of technical
information provided in the analysis developed by the AMCP. It was noted that each of the three data links
could be seen to have relative advantages over the others with regard to some criteria.
7.4.3.3 The conference was also informed that over the past several years a number of States and
organizations had participated in activities to develop and evaluate ADS-B technologies and the operational
applications enabled by those technologies. One of these efforts was a cooperative activity between the
United States FAA and EUROCONTROL. This activity had included the evaluation of three candidate
ADS-B link technologies (i.e. Mode S extended squitter, VDL Mode 4, and UAT) and had been conducted
by the TLAT. In addition, further studies by a consortium of European companies had been funded by the
Directorate General for Energy and Transport of the European Commission.
7.4.3.4 The FAA had also conducted additional technical and economic studies that were focused
on the use of ADS-B within the United States. Likewise, EUROCONTROL had sponsored additional studies
focused on the European applications for ADS-B. In addition, the United States FAA and EUROCONTROL
had jointly sponsored a number of flight evaluations that had utilized single and multiple ADS-B link
technologies. Other States, such as Australia and Sweden had conducted ADS-B evaluations using a single
ADS-B link technology.
7.4.3.5 An APANPIRG ADS-B Study and Implementation Task Force had identified near-term
applications and benefits of ADS-B in the ASIAPAC region and reviewed the available ADS-B data link,
based on a comparison with ADS-B plans for other regions and avionics availability considerations.
7.4.4 Implementation decisions and recommendations at the

regional and national level
7.4.4.1 Following its review of comparative analysis/data link evaluation activities, the conference
was informed of a number of national and regional implementation decisions and recommendations
originating from several regions on the basis of the results of such activities.
United States link decision
7.4.4.2 The conference was informed that in 2002 the United States FAA had announced a decision
on the ADS-B links for use within the United States for the initial introduction of ADS-B services. Under this
decision the SSR Mode S extended squitter was to be used for air transport and other high-performance
aircraft while UAT was to be used on the typical general aviation aircraft. No actions had been taken to
require ADS-B equipage. The UAT had been selected to provide ADS-B and associated services for the
general aviation users because of its lower cost and greater uplink capacity, especially for flight information
services — broadcast (FIS-B) services.
European data link recommendation
7.4.4.3 The conference was informed that within EUROCONTROL, an ADS-B data link
recommendation for the short and medium term had been elaborated, concerning primarily a data link option
that could support ADS-B applications planned to be implemented in Europe in the time frame 2008 - 2012.
It called for, inter alia, the SSR Mode S extended squitter to be accepted as the logical choice to support the
early implementation of ADS-B applications (both air-to-ground and air-to-air) and to provide interoperability
with the United States, with deployment to begin as soon as practicable.
ADS-B Implementation in Sweden
7.4.4.4 The conference noted the implementation of ADS-B based on VDL Mode 4 in Sweden.
Initial applications covered A-SMGCS and surveillance in areas presently not covered by radar.
Australian ADS-B network
7.4.4.5 The conference was informed that, following operational trials conducted using ADS-B based
on the SSR Mode S extended squitter for ATC ground surveillance, Airservices Australia planned to install
a network of approximately twenty ADS-B ground stations across the non-radar areas of Australia to provide
nationwide coverage at and above flight level 300, complementing coverage from a radar network down the
east coast. The meeting noted that this plan was in line with the Asia/Pacific regional strategy.
Asia/Pacific regional strategies for ADS-B implementation
7.4.4.6 Following its review of available ADS-B data links (Sect. 7.4.3.5 refers), the ASIA/PAC Air
Navigation Planning and Implementation Regional Group (APANPIRG) ADS-B Study and Implementation
Task Force had unanimously recommended that the SSR Mode S extended squitter be used as the data link
for ADS-B radar like services in the ASIA/PAC Regions in the near future. Subsequently, the fourteenth
meeting of APANPIRG, held in August 2003, had endorsed the task force’s recommendation with the target
date of January 2006.
Phased implementation of ADS-B in the Russian Federation
7.4.4.7 The conference noted that the State Civil Aviation Authority of Russia had adopted the
concept and programme of the phased implementation of ADS-B in Russia based on VDL Mode 4. It was
planned to create a network of ADS-B ground stations. The equipment developed in the Russian Federation
was presently being certificated. Implementation of ADS-B would start in 2004 in the Tyumen region.
ADS in Mongolia
7.4.4.8 The conference noted that, based on findings from real-time simulations of a possible ADS
infrastructure, a recommendation had been made in Mongolia to implement VDL Mode 4 ground stations
supporting ADS-B to provide surveillance coverage for domestic traffic in the lower airspace.
Global and inter-regional considerations
7.4.4.9 The conference reviewed the future aeronautical mobile communication scenarios for data
link surveillance services developed by AMCP (section 7.5.1 refers). According to these scenarios, for high
density terrestrial areas ADS-B services would be supported by the SSR Mode S extended squitter in the
initial phase. Where the ATM service requirements or the RCP levels could not be met, a complementary data
link could be introduced using the UAT, or the VDL Mode 4, on the basis of regional agreements. For
oceanic and low/medium density areas, ADS-B services would be supported by the SSR Mode S extended
squitter, the UAT, or the VDL Mode 4 on the basis of regional agreements.
7.4.4.10 The conference was apprised of the position of the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) on the implementation of ADS-B and noted that IATA supported the identification of the SSR
Mode S extended squitter as the single, interoperable link in present regional transition plans, as the system
satisfied the requirements posed by the initial applications and was available and mature, enabling early
implementation. The conference was also informed that IFALPA supported the establishment of the SSR
Mode S extended squitter as the single interoperable link for initial implementation in order to gain
operational experience
7.4.4.11 In addressing inter-regional harmonization considerations, the conference noted that the FAA
and EUROCONTROL had undertaken to coordinate strategies for the introduction of the initial ADS-B
services within the United States and European airspace respectively. Common to both the United States and
the European strategies for the introduction of the initial ADS-B services was the use of the SSR Mode S
extended squitter as a common link technology for achieving interoperability in support of near-term ADS-B
applications. It was also recalled that, in the course of the development of the Asia Pacific strategy for the
implementation of ADS-B in the regions, a comparison with ADS-B plans had been performed.
7.4.4.12 Finally, with regard to avionics availability, it was noted that both Airbus and Boeing had
announced plans to equip new commercial air transport class aircraft with SSR Mode S transponders
supporting the transmission of SSR Mode S extended squitter for ADS-B. The most recent generation of
airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) and Mode S equipment had incorporated support for the
extended squitter and, given the global use of ACAS in air transport class aircraft, the widespread availability
of extended squitter based ADS-B services was becoming possible. The retrofit of commercial air transport
aircraft with extended squitter capability for ADS-B had already begun by some commercial operators.
7.4.5 Strategy for the near-term introduction of ADS-B
7.4.5.1 In reviewing the available information on implementation decisions, the conference noted
that one of the key factors in the decision making process at the national and regional level appeared to have
been the overriding requirement to ensure global interoperability while enabling the near term introduction
of ADS-B services. Such requirement was dictated by safety and efficiency reasons; was responsive to the
needs of the user community; and had been extensively embraced and supported throughout the industry.
7.4.5.2 The conference also noted that the majority of the States and international organizations that
had provided information on their implementation decisions or recommendations had selected the SSR
Mode S Extended squitter as an initial ADS-B link, based on a wide range of considerations, including but
not limited to technical ones. This convergence could form a sound basis for achieving the desired global
interoperability and the associated benefits. In this respect, the conference noted with appreciation the efforts
of States and regions that had fostered the convergence by endeavoring to coordinate their implementation
choices to the extent possible.
7.4.5.3 At the same time, the conference recognized that a significant number of States from several
regions might not be in a position to fully support such convergence on a global near-term solution at the
present time without further study and consideration. In particular, it was recognized that certain States might
not have identified a near term need for introducing ADS-B in their airspace; or might be still in the process
of selecting an appropriate ADS-B link technology; or might be conducting regional coordination in the
interest of regional harmonization before committing to a technology choice; or might have already identified
as their preferred technical solution one that was partly or wholly inconsistent with the implementation of the
SSR Mode S extended squitter. In this regard, the conference recognized that for the near term, other link
technologies supporting the initial introduction of ADS-B applications may optionally be used on a local or
regional basis either in addition to Mode S extended squitter or in lieu of Mode S extended squitter in support
of local or regional operations.
7.4.5.4 The conference agreed that the awareness of the substantive convergence achieved so far
could provide a useful supporting element in the decision process of States that had not made their selection
yet, in addition to the results of technical studies such as those conducted by AMCP, and to the information
made available by States and organizations that had already completed the decision process.
7.4.5.5 On the basis of the above considerations with regard to potential near term ADS-B solutions,
the conference developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 7/1 — Strategy for the near-term introduction of

ADS-B
That States:
a) note that a common element in most of the approaches currently adopted

for early implementation of ADS-B is the selection of the SSR Mode S
extended squitter as the initial data link; and
b) take into account this common element to the extent possible in their
national and regional implementation choices in order to facilitate global
interoperability for the initial introduction of ADS-B.
7.4.6 Support of longer-term ADS-B requirements
7.4.6.1 The conference recognized that, in the longer term, the current SSR Mode S extended squitter
technology may not be able to fully satisfy all of the requirements for ADS-B services in all airspaces. It was
therefore important to more fully define the evolution of the operational requirements for ADS-B; the
evolution of the air traffic environments in which ADS-B must operate; and the evolution of the use of the
1 090 MHz channel in order to determine whether a link with greater performance would be required. Any
long-term ADS-B solution would need to be integral with an overall long-term surveillance architecture that
supported the required surveillance performance (RSP) associated with a set of internationally standardized
ATS applications.
7.4.6.2 The long-term operational requirements would become the basis for ICAO to develop SARPs
for an internationally standardized set of ADS-B applications, supporting both air-air and air-ground services.
The conference confirmed that the continued development within ICAO of alternative ADS-B link
technologies was appropriate. However, it was felt that it was premature to select any specific long-term
ADS-B link architecture for the support of global aviation needs. In the development of such architectures,
care should be taken to ensure backward compatibility with the near term architecture and to make optimum
use of the available data links already standardized by ICAO (such as VDL Mode 4) or currently undergoing
standardization (such as the UAT). Other link technologies, or enhancements to existing ADS-B link
technologies, that might emerge in the future would also need to be taken into account. In considering any
candidate link technology, special attention should be paid to ICAO ADS-B operational requirements,
frequency spectrum availability and aircraft integration considerations.
7.4.6.3 On the basis of the above considerations with regard to potential longer term ADS-B
solutions, the conference developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 7/2 — Support of longer term ADS-B requirements
That
a) States recognize that in the longer term the current SSR Mode S
extended squitter technology may not be able to fully satisfy all of the
requirements for ADS-B services in all airspaces; and
b) ICAO continue development of technical standards for ADS-B link

technologies, including SSR Mode S extended squitter, VDL Mode 4
and UAT, with special attention being paid to ICAO ADS-B operational
requirements, frequency spectrum availability and aircraft integration
issues.
7.4.7 VDL Mode 4 considerations
7.4.7.1 The conference was presented with an overview of the aircraft aspects of multiple VHF
transmitter-receiver installations, with particular reference to co-site interference issues related to installation
of VDL Mode 4 equipment on large air transport class aircraft. The conclusions of the overview was that, in
order to accommodate on such aircraft VDL Mode 4 equipment for ADS-B applications, more onerous
precautions needed to be taken at the frequency planning level than those generally required to accommodate
other equipment operating in the VHF band.
7.4.7.2 The conference was informed by the Secretary that the issue was currently under the
consideration of the ACP, which had undertaken an assessment of the extent of the problem (including its
relevance to other VDL modes in addition to Mode 4) and of potential solutions or mitigations. The Secretary
also informed the conference that the recommendations offered in the paper with regard to frequency planning
would be submitted to the ACP for consideration.
7.5 FUTURE EVOLUTION OF CURRENT AERONAUTICAL

MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS
7.5.1 Future aeronautical mobile communication scenarios
7.5.1.1 The conference reviewed material developed by the AMCP discussing future aeronautical
mobile communications scenarios as might develop over the following two decades, and presenting some of
the issues to be investigated in connection with the scenarios. A set of diagrams summarizing the scenarios
is included in the appendix to the report on this agenda item. The conference concurred that the aeronautical
mobile communication infrastructure had to evolve in order to accommodate new functions and to provide
the adequate capacity and quality of services required to support evolving air traffic management (ATM)
requirements within the framework of the global ATM operational concept. It also noted that a major
constraint on the evolution of the infrastructure in high-density areas where the very high frequency (VHF)
spectrum was already heavily congested, or was approaching congestion, was the limited availability of
radiofrequency spectrum dedicated to aeronautical mobile communication services.
7.5.1.2 In its review of the AMCP material, the conference observed that the scenarios were based
on a three-step approach, whereby:
a) the first step was the introduction or the expansion of the voice and data link systems
that were already included in Annex 10 or which were already under development;
b) the second step was the definition and implementation of new terrestrial and/or satellite
systems that operated outside the VHF band. This step would be required only in some
high-density areas, where the VHF spectrum is expected to experience saturation despite
the introduction during the first step of more frequency efficient systems. This second
step would provide capacity that was initially complementary to VHF. By taking over
some communications services that were originally provided over VHF, this step would
then reduce VHF congestion; and
c) the third step was the introduction of a new global VHF system making use of the
spectrum that had been made available by the second step. This step would be envisaged
only in high-density areas, and only in the longer term.
7.5.1.3 The conference took particular note of the fact that the second and third step were intended
only to be applicable in high-density areas. The conference also noted that, while the purpose of the scenarios
was to reflect the likely evolution of the communication infrastructure over time for areas with different
traffic density, they were not intended to replace or pre-empt the relevant ICAO planning process, but merely
to provide a common basis for discussion of the way forward in the development of the infrastructure.
Separate scenarios were defined for voice and data link services. Within the data link service, separate
scenarios were defined for data link communications service and data link surveillance service. The data link
surveillance service in turn included automatic dependent surveillance — contract (ADS-C) and automatic
dependent surveillance — broadcast (ADS-B). For each of the services, three operational situations with
different constraints had been considered:
a) oceanic and low/medium density areas where only a limited ground-based

communication infrastructure can be efficiently deployed;
b) low/medium density areas where a full ground-based communication infrastructure can

be deployed; and
c) high density terrestrial areas.
7.5.1.4 The conference noted that in the course of the development of the scenarios a number of
issues had been identified as requiring further consideration.
7.5.1.4.1 A critical element of the three-step evolution path, particularly in high density areas, was
spectrum availability. During the first step, VHF spectrum needed to be made available for the introduction
of new services; during the second step, the transfer of services from the VHF band to other bands was
conditional on availability of appropriate spectrum in the new bands; during the third step, the introduction
of new VHF services was conditional on availability of sufficient spectrum in the VHF band.
7.5.1.4.2 The suitability of the present and future communication systems considered in the scenarios
to support the emerging ATM requirements and RCP levels needed to be assessed in quantitative terms as
a function of the operational environment.
7.5.1.4.3 Systems using different operational modes might give rise to different ATS operational
procedures that were optimized for system characteristics. As aircraft crossed boundaries between areas or
regions that operated different types of systems, pilots would be required to manage these procedures. Human
factors and human machine interfacing would have significant impacts on the efficiency and, ultimately, on
the safety of these new procedures.
7.5.1.4.4 The coexistence of multiple communication systems within each scenario and across different
scenarios posed technical, operational and economic challenges that needed to be addressed. In particular,
the definition of an on-board architecture supporting the integration of multiple systems should be
undertaken.
7.5.1.4.5 It was observed that the scenarios also included use of aircraft communications addressing
and reporting system (ACARS). In this regard, the conference was provided with information on the
increasing use of ACARS for digital ATIS and pre-departure/oceanic clearance as well as FANS-1/A avionics
package for controller-pilot data link communications (CPDLC) and ADS. It was noted that approximately
1 200 long haul aircraft had already been equipped with FANS-1/A and that airframe manufacturers were
considering the introduction of that technology to smaller single-aisle aircraft. It was recognized that real
operational benefits were being accrued through the use of the above-mentioned systems, mostly in
oceanic/low-density airspace and for specific type of operations. In high-density airspaces, safety
considerations may limit the use of ACARS/FANS-1/A for tactical CPDLC operations.
7.5.1.4.6 The conference was informed about issues faced by the business aviation community in
relation to the use of CPDLC/ADS. Specifically, it was stated that for business aviation there was no business
case for equipage. Furthermore, the appropriate avionics (based on FANS-1/A or ATN technologies) were
not yet available, and uncertainties associated with market and implementation plans of air navigation service
providers were preventing their development for business aircraft. The conference acknowledged the
aforementioned problems and their relevance to planning and implementation of CNS/ATM.
7.5.1.4.7 It was also noted that the provision of ATS data link applications via FANS-1/A had not been
subject to ICAO provisions. However, the Organization had promulgated to States its position on the early
use of the package and its relationship to the envisaged end state via a State letter in December 1994.
Similarly, guidance material on the operational accommodation of FANS-1/A aircraft in a system complying
with the ICAO end state had been promulgated to States via another State letter in October 1998. It was noted
that FANS-1/A continued to evolve technically through activities of relevant industry bodies.
7.5.2 Review of proposals on future development of air-ground

communications
7.5.2.1 The conference proceeded to consider a number of proposals addressing the future evolution
of current aeronautical mobile communications, referring to the scenarios discussed above as required to
assist in clarifying commonalities and divergences of the various proposals.
7.5.2.2 The conference noted information supporting the definition of a future communications
concept presented by Eurocontrol. The contribution stressed that present global development plans could and
should be harmonised in the near term through the use of multi-mode avionics capable of user-transparent
and seamless operations in all ICAO Regions and that the pursuit of future communications solutions was
best accomplished as a global activity. The future communications infrastructure should provide backward
compatibility with the present infrastructure; be capable of both voice and data services; be able to operate
in more than one band simultaneously in a spectrum efficient manner; be capable to provide expanded
capacity as the needs of the aviation community dictate; have minimum economic impact on airspace users;
and could potentially consist of more than one system (e.g. terrestrial and satellite). The conference noted that
Eurocontrol was exploring the potential of new technologies for aviation (e.g. wide band communication
systems based on evolving international telecommunications standards and satellite-based systems). This
would enable the financial benefits of commercial off the shelf (COTS) products to be realised, as well as
allowing the flexible and effective use of radio spectrum. It was also noted that commercial technology, which
offered the potential for attractive lower cost solutions to future aviation communications needs, might need
certain modification to meet aviation community standards or air traffic quality of service levels. Hence, the
convergence of aviation and commercial requirements needed to be promoted.
7.5.2.3 Another contribution stressed the need for ICAO to discuss the most appropriate VDL system
for ATS operation taking into consideration the future voice traffic and data link traffic within the limited
VHF frequency band for AMS, and to develop a transition plan for VDL on a global basis, once the selection
was made on VDL based on the technological advantages and cost/benefit analysis. Additionally, ICAO
should assist the transition to AMSS and encourage the use of AMSS for ATS in oceanic and remote airspace.
ADS/CPDLC trial operations through AMSS should also be promoted on a global basis, so that technical and
operational problems can be identified to ensure the smooth transition to actual ATS operations through
AMSS.
7.5.2.4 An approach emphasizing the need for an interoperable air/ground communications solution
from an airspace user’s perspective was introduced. It concluded that multi-mode avionics supporting ICAO
standardized systems could provide seamless VHF communications operation for international airspace users.
This approach would allow regions to mitigate spectrum congestion at a pace appropriate to their anticipated
usage. By maximizing service life of the VHF spectrum, it would minimize future investment costs and
increases availability of voice and data link communications options for service providers. The conference
was informed that, in the United States, it was projected that a VDL-3 implementation should exceed 30 years
of life expectancy. It was anticipated that, while in other high-density regions VHF band saturation could
occur by 2015, in other regions a minimum 20-year useful life extension for the VHF band could be achieved.
Thus, the use of multi-mode avionics should provide an effective solution for the aviation community and
would allow significant time for the aviation community to explore next generation communications options.
7.5.2.5 A proposal from the CAR/SAM Regions concerning the future development of air-ground
aeronautical communications noted that, according to the studies conducted by GREPECAS, the
implementation of VDL Mode 2 in the medium term was considered feasible to support data link applications,
such as CPDLC. The implementation of VDL Mode 3 or 4 would be subject to regional agreements, together
with other future data link options.
7.5.2.6 The conference was apprised of the position of IATA on aeronautical air-ground
communications needs, according to which future development of the VHF air-ground infrastructure should
converge to a single globally harmonized, compatible and interoperable system to reduce the proliferation
of solutions based on national or regional priorities. The conference noted that IATA encouraged the use of
VDL Mode 2 to sustain the growth in data communications and the introduction of 8.33 kHz when needed
to alleviate voice congestion. The conference also noted that IATA Member airlines did not support the
implementation of VDL Mode 3 considering the uncertain benefits and limited capacity gain. They also did
not support implementation of VDL Mode 4 as it would add to the proliferation of VHF system alternatives
and delay the needed overhaul of the VHF system.
7.5.3 Identification of common elements among the proposed

approaches
7.5.3.1 The conference noted that a variety of views had been presented with regard to the future
evolution of aeronautical mobile communications. It was recognized that, while to a certain extent that variety
could be attributed to different planning horizons being addressed by different contributions to the
conference, some differences remained even when comparable time frames were considered. For instance,
within the scope of the first of the three potential evolutionary steps outlined in the AMCP scenarios, namely
the introduction or expansion of the voice and data link systems already standardized by ICAO
(Section 7.5.1.2 refers), a number of different approaches were currently being followed in different regions.
When considering future evolution beyond the implementation of existing ICAO Standards towards the
development of new generations of aeronautical communication technologies, additional potential
divergences included matters as substantial as the proposed band of operation and the relative roles of
terrestrial versus satellite technology and of commercial telecommunication technology versus

purpose-developed aeronautical technology.
7.5.3.2 While the conference acknowledged that each of the alternatives under consideration was
valid and justifiable on its own terms, it was noted that the universally recognized benefits of harmonization
and global interoperability of air ground communications should not be lost sight of when pursuing
optimization of local solutions. Therefore, the conference agreed that an effort must be made to identify
common elements which could form the basis for a broad consensus on an evolutionary approach towards
global interoperability. It was expected that a detailed strategy for future evolution could realistically be
developed only by gradually building on such an evolutionary approach.
7.5.3.3 The conference recognized that one such common element was the widespread recognition
that in some high-density regions, after an initial period in which continued operation of current standard
ICAO systems would be sustainable, saturation of the VHF band would become a real issue, and that
measures should be taken with some urgency to address it. However, perception of the amount of urgency
varied from region to region. In this regard, the conference agreed that it would be useful if forecasts of
anticipated saturation were conducted within ICAO to reach a consensus on the time frame in which it would
occur. Another common element identified was that the successful gradual introduction of data
communications should be continued to complement and replace voice for routine communications. The
conference also noted the emergence of multi-mode avionics, such as were being developed as a part of FAA
validation and verification program of the VDL-3 technology. Availability of such equipment, complying
with a wide range of ICAO Standards, could assist the transition towards global harmonization of air/ground
communications (which remained the ultimate goal of ICAO standardization), although it would not
necessarily provide a generally applicable remedy to communication capacity problems. In this regard, the
conference also noted that multi-mode receivers might not prove to be a cost-effective solution to overcome
regional differences, and that harmonization was normally the most effective way of assuring interoperability.
7.5.3.4 On the basis of this understanding, the conference developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 7/3 — Evolutionary approach for global

interoperability of air-ground communications
That States:
a) continue the use of currently implemented ICAO standardized systems

for VHF band voice and data communications until such time as either
saturation of the VHF band is approached or significant cost/benefit or
safety advantages are expected from the implementation of other
ICAO Standards;
b) continue efforts in maximizing efficient use of existing aeronautical

spectrum allocations through spectrum management measures;
c) continue the progressive deployment of data communications on the

basis of applicable ICAO Standards such as aeronautical
telecommunication network (ATN) using VDL Mode 2 as dictated by
evolving operational requirements with a view to complementing or
replacing voice communications for most routine communications;
d) provide a forecast of anticipated VHF band saturation in high-density

regions;
e) in view of the anticipated saturation of the VHF band for voice

communication, consider transition to spectrally more efficient ICAO
systems, and/or make increased use of data communications; and
f) investigate multi-mode avionics as a transitional method of achieving

interoperability of air/ground communications, where global
harmonization has not been achieved.
7.5.3.5 Another common theme that the conference recognized as emerging from various
contributions was the need to investigate the development of a future communication infrastructure, although
there was not full agreement on the time frame over which actual deployment of the infrastructure would be
required. This activity should include an investigation of the feasibility of new technology alternatives,
including solutions outside the VHF band and wide band communication systems based on evolving
international telecommunications standards and satellite-based systems. Exploration of such systems should
include an assessment of costs required to meet the safety critical standards of aviation, including certification
costs. Evolutionary developments of standardized ICAO systems should also be considered as candidates
components of the future infrastructure. The conference recognized that these activities should be guided by
operational needs and be conducted within the framework of the global ATM operational concept.
7.5.3.6 The conference therefore developed the following recommendation:
Recommendation 7/4 — Investigation of future technology alternatives

for air-ground communications
That ICAO
a) investigate new terrestrial and satellite-based technologies, on the basis

of their potential for ICAO standardization for aeronautical mobile
communications use, taking into account the safety-critical standards
of aviation and the associated cost issues;
b) continue evolutionary development of existing standardized ICAO

technologies with a view to increasing their efficiency and
performance; and
c) assess the needs for additional aeronautical spectrum to meet

requirements for increased communications capacity and new
applications, and assist States in securing appropriate additional
allocations by the ITU.
7.5.4 Guidelines on standardization of new aeronautical
communication technologies
7.5.4.1 In connection with its consideration of future technology alternatives, the conference
reviewed a proposed approach to ICAO standardization of new aeronautical communication technologies and
Recommendation 7/5 — Standardization of aeronautical communication

systems
That, for new aeronautical communication systems, ICAO:

a) continue to monitor emerging communication systems technologies but

undertake standardization work only when the systems meet all of the
following conditions:
1) can meet current and emerging ICAO ATM requirements;
2) are technically proven and offer proven operational benefits;
3) are consistent with the requirements for safety;
4) are cost-beneficial;
5) can be implemented without prejudice to global harmonization of

the CNS/ATM systems; and
6) are consistent with the Global Air Navigation Plan for CNS/ATM
Systems (Doc 9750)
b) include in Annex 10 provisions ensuring that the introduction of

mandatory carriage of new equipment be based only on appropriate
ICAO regional and inter-regional coordination; and
c) further limit SARPs for complex aeronautical systems to broad,

system-level, functional and performance requirements and better
capitalize on the work of other standard-making organizations so as to
reduce the complexity/size of technical provisions.
7.5.4.2 The conference also noted that aspects traditionally not fully taken into account in ICAO
standardization activities could have a significant impact on the successful implementation of a standard.
Such aspects included aircraft integration issues, cost and duration of the certification and operational
approval process and the viability of business case for implementation from an avionics vendor/air frame
manufacturer, airline and air traffic service provider perspective.
7.5.5 Use of VDL Mode 4 for point-to-point data communications
7.5.5.1 The conference was informed of concerns with the use of VDL Mode 4 to support
point-to-point data communications. It was recalled that ICAO State letter, AN 7/1.3.83-03/59, dated
27 June 2003, requested comments on a proposal for the amendment of Annex 10, Volume III. The proposed
amendment included the deletion of existing Note 4 to paragraph 6.1 of Annex 10, which indicated that VDL
Mode 4 SARPs apply to surveillance applications only. The letter noted that approval of the change would
result in adding another point-to-point data link operating in the VHF band and that the use of VDL Mode 4
as a point-to-point data link would satisfy the same requirements and desirable features as were already
included in the VDL Mode 3 data link, thereby introducing a proliferation of air/ground data links. The letter
indicated that the matter might be addressed by the conference, and that related recommendations from the
conference would be considered together with response from States to the letter.
7.5.5.2 The concerns presented to the conference, in addition to those related to the potential
proliferation of air/ground data links, included a number of technical issues/concerns and opposition from
industry. In the discussion, the conference noted that VDL Mode 4 would offer an air-to-air communication
facility which went beyond the requirements and desirable features already satisfied by VDL Mode 3; that
the ACP was working on the resolution of some of the technical issues highlighted; and that opposition from
industry was less extensive than reported.
7.6 STATEMENT BY THE INTERNATIONAL AIR

TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (IATA)
7.6.1 The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is honoured to participate in the 11th
Air Navigation Conference as the voice of 275 international carriers representing 98% of the international
scheduled traffic. Our formal policy development and approval process ensures that we confidently speak on
behalf of ALL of our members. We believe that the valuable debates and discussions has been open and frank,
and this committee has achieved significant progress on issues crucial to the future of aviation.
7.6.2 As highlighted by President of the Council of ICAO, Dr. Kotaite, airlines have been critically
affected by recent events. Therefore, IATA Members will only commit to implementing system solutions,
which have proven to be safe, beneficial and operationally justified. Implementation of unnecessary system
solutions, in particular equipment that duplicates functions onboard the aircraft are unacceptable. Such
unnecessary equipment, increases operating costs, increases user charges and reduces efficiency whilst
potentially, negatively impacting safety.
7.6.3 The airspace users, who have to bear the cost of such implementation onboard AND on
ground, find the idea of diverging into multiple communication systems unacceptable. The future
communication environment must be seamless in every sense of the word. Airspace users do expect
competitive services and competition in applications but not competing systems.
7.6.4 The implementation of VDL Mode 2 will improve the speed and data capacity to sustain the
growth in data link communication without increasing band congestion. Implementation of VDL Mode 3
and/or VDL Mode 4 cannot be justified, as they do NOT demonstrably provide overall benefits to airspace
users.
7.6.5 IATA remains committed to working with ICAO, States and Industry, to achieve a global,
seamless and harmonized communications environment for the benefit of all users of civil aviation.
————————
Appendix to the Report on Agenda Item 7 7A-1
APPENDIX
SCENARIO DIAGRAMS
On the diagrams the introduction of a service is associated with one of the following trigger
events:
a) capacity: increase of the telecommunication infrastructure capacity;
b) quality: improvement of quality of voice exchanges;
c) coverage: improvement of coverage;
d) ADS-B: automatic dependent surveillance broadcast;
e) FANS 1/A: Boeing/Airbus data link avionics applications;
f) CPDLC Ph 1: first set of SARPs-compliant CPDLC messages;
g) CPDLC Ph 2: second set of SARPs-compliant CPDLC messages; and
h) ARINC 623: departure/pre-departure clearance (DCL/PDC) and automatic terminal

information service (ATIS) character oriented data link applications.
7A-2 Appendix to the Report on Agenda Item 7
Figure A1. Voice services in oceanic and low/medium

density areas where only a limited ground-based
communication infrastructure can be deployed
Figure A2. Voice services in low/medium density areas where a full

ground-based communication infrastructure can be deployed
Figure A3. Voice services in high density areas

Figure A4. Data link communications services in oceanic and low/medium

density areas where only a limited ground-based communication
infrastructure can be deployed
Figure A5. Data link surveillance services in oceanic and low/medium

density areas where only a limited ground-based
Figure A6. Data link communications services in low/medium

density areas where a full ground-based
Figure A7. Data link surveillance services in low/medium

density areas where a full ground-based communication
infrastructure can be deployed
Capacity
Capacity CPDLC Ph 2 Systems outside VHF band:

Next Generation Satellite,
CPDLC Ph 1 Next Generation Terrestrial
VDL M3 or
ARINC 623 VDL M4 Capacity
(regional
decision) New
VHF
VDL M2 system
AOA
ACARS
Time
Figure A8. Data link communications services in high density terrestrial areas
Figure A9. Data link surveillance services in high density terrestrial areas
— END —
© ICAO 2004
7/04, E/P1/1270
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Doc 9828, AN-Conf/11

Montréal, 22 September – 3 October 2003

Approved by the Conference and

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

ELEVENTH AIR NAVIGATION CONFERENCE (2003)

Montreal, 22 September to 3 October 2003

2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF

3. RECOMMENDATIONS OTHER THAN FOR

Report Reference Action by Council (C) Recommendation Title

Approved the recommendation and requested the

1/2 1-4 ANC Coordination with military authorities

Approved the recommendation and requested the

Doc 9828, AN-Conf/11 Supplement No. 1

Report Reference Action by Council (C) Recommendation Title

Approved the recommendation and requested the Air

1/4 1-7 ANC Development of Standards and Recommended

Approved the recommendation and requested the

1/5 1-8 ANC Interoperability and seamlessness

Approved the recommendation and requested the

1/6 1-9 ANC Endorsement of the automatic dependent

Approved parts a) c) and d) of the recommendation and

Noted the intent of part b) of the recommendation and

1/7 1-10 ANC Ground and airborne automatic dependent

Approved the recommendation and requested the

Supplement No. 1 Doc 9828, AN-Conf/11

Report Reference Action by Council (C) Recommendation Title

Approved part a) of the recommendation and requested

Approved the intent of part b) of the recommendation

Approved part c) of the recommendation and requested

Noted the intent of the recommendation and requested

Noted the intent of the recommendation and requested

1/11 1-15 ANC Publication of the Global ATM Operational Concept

Noted the intent of the recommendation and requested

1/12 1-15 ANC Amendment of Chapter 4 of the Global Air

Approved the recommendation and requested the

Doc 9828, AN-Conf/11 Supplement No. 1

Report Reference Action by Council (C) Recommendation Title

Noted the recommendation and requested the Secretary

1/14 1-17 ANC Development of an ICAO air navigation plan

Approved the recommendation and requested the

1/15 1-18 ANC Implementation of airborne collision avoidance

Noted the recommendation, expressed its safety concern,

1/16 1-20 ANC Provisions related to airborne collision avoidance

Noted parts a) b) c) and e) of the recommendation and

Approved part d) of the recommendation and requested

2/1 2-3 ANC A framework for system safety

Approved the recommendation and requested the

Supplement No. 1 Doc 9828, AN-Conf/11

Report Reference Action by Council (C) Recommendation Title

Noted the recommendation and requested the Secretary

2/3 2-6 ANC Sharing of ATM accident and incident data

Approved part a) of the recommendation and requested

Approved part b) of the recommendation and requested

2/4 2-8 C The protection of sources of safety information

Approved the recommendation and requested the

2/5 2-8 ANC Monitoring of safety during normal operations

Approved the recommendation and requested the

2/6 2-11 ANC Safety certification of ATM systems

Approved the recommendation and requested the

2/7 2-12 ANC Safety oversight capabilities and procedures

Approved the recommendation and requested the

Doc 9828, AN-Conf/11 Supplement No. 1

Report Reference Action by Council (C) Recommendation Title

Noted part a) of the recommendation and requested the