Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100113

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Progress in Disaster Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/pdisas

Review Article

Tsunami evacuation processes based on human behaviour

in past earthquakes and tsunamis: A literature review
⁎
Fumiyasu Makinoshima a, , Fumihiko Imamura b, Yusuke Oishi a
a
Fujitsu Laboratories Ltd., 4-1-1 Kamikodanaka, Nakahara-ku, Kawasaki, Kanagawa 211-8588, Japan
b
International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Tohoku University, 468-1 Aoba, Aramaki-aza, Aoba-ku, Sendai, Miyagi 980-8572, Japan

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: Understanding the evacuation behaviour in tsunamis offers important knowledge to consider for evacuation, counter-
Received 31 March 2020 measures and preparedness for future tsunamis. With this background, various aspects of evacuation behaviour have
Received in revised form 10 June 2020 been investigated in past earthquake and tsunami events, but have not been organised to provide an overview of the
Accepted 11 June 2020
general tsunami evacuation process. In this paper, we reviewed 39 reports and articles that surveyed actual human re-
Available online 14 June 2020
sponses in past 22 tsunami-related events and organised the existing findings on human behaviour during tsunamis
Keywords:
into a theoretical framework: a tsunami evacuation process that describes general human behavioural components
Tsunami and notifications during tsunami events. The framework illustrates the continuous psychological and physical process
Evacuation in tsunami evacuation and the dynamical transition of notifications during tsunamis. Since the tsunami evacuation
Human behaviour process provides a clear overview of the components of the tsunami evacuation process, it enables researchers design
Evacuation process survey questions for comprehensive investigations of tsunami evacuations and leads a deeper and more comprehen-
sive understanding of human behaviour in tsunamis that will contribute to consider more appropriate evacuation pre-
paredness for future tsunamis.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Framework for describing tsunami evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Reviewed materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2. Framework to organise findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Tsunami evacuation process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Early period. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.2. Mid period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.3. Late period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Individual activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. Risk cognition stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. Response activity stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.3. Evacuation movement stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.4. Additional activity and evacuation stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: f.makinoshima@fujitsu.com. (F. Makinoshima).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2020.100113
2590-0617/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
F. Makinoshima et al. Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100113

1. Introduction evacuation processes that can be helpful in designing more comprehensive

Tsunamis generally need time to reach coastal areas and cause damage
there. During this lead time, various types of information, including natural
signs, official warnings and social cues, are issued via various communica-
tion channels, and such information is perceived and processed by coastal
residents with diverse backgrounds. This diversity in information and indi-
vidual demographics leads to diverse behaviour during the lead time. Ap-
propriate evacuation behaviours during the lead time can largely mitigate
the loss of human life, particularly in mega-tsunamis. Thus, understanding
the evacuation behaviours in tsunamis is essential for planning non-
structural countermeasures and preparedness for future tsunami events.
Human responses, including evacuation behaviour, have also been
recognised as an important research topic and surveyed in broad areas
[1], and there is a variety of findings in various disasters such as earth-
quakes [2], tornadoes [3], floods [4] and fires [5]. Although the character-
istics of evacuation (e.g., lead-time for evacuation) differ according to the
type of disasters, there are several common human response processes,
such as sensing threats and processing information for decision-making
for protective actions. Based on the findings, the common processes were
organised as theoretical frameworks such as the Protective Motivation The-
ory (PMT) [6] and the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) [7]. Such
frameworks have been applied to human responses to various hazards, such
as earthquakes [8], hurricanes [9] and floods [10], to better understand
human behaviours during disasters, but few studies have considered tsu-
namis [11,12]. Consequently, most behaviours observed in past tsunami-
related events have not been linked to such a framework and thus are not
organised. In addition, although such frameworks describe how individuals
conduct protective actions, the transition of responses and protective ac-
tions under dynamically changing notifications during the hazard events
is not well expressed. An additional tsunami-specific framework that de-
scribes tsunami evacuation processes while also organising the existing
findings into an evacuation timeline would offer a clearer overview of
human responses during tsunami disasters. Additionally, although rich sur-
vey results and findings are available, especially in Japan, wherein many
tsunamis have been experienced, such knowledge has not been shared in-
ternationally due to language barriers. The combined findings should pro-
vide a clear overview of tsunami evacuation processes and enhance the
existing theoretical frameworks.
In this paper, we reviewed a total of 39 reports and publications for 22
earthquake or tsunami events. Then, we organise the previous findings on
human behaviour in past events into a framework: a tsunami evacuation
process that describes general human behavioural process during tsunamis.
The tsunami evacuation process provides a clear overview of tsunami
evacuation surveys and determining possible future research directions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces
the framework of the tsunami evacuation process. Section 3 explains the
components of the tsunami evacuation process with existing findings ob-
tained from reports and papers regarding human behaviours in past earth-
quake and tsunami events. Section 4 discusses future research direction
based on the literature review. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Framework for describing tsunami evacuation
2.1. Reviewed materials
It is considered that intended evacuation behaviours reported in surveys
before tsunami events occur largely differ from the actual evacuation be-
haviours since human behaviour changes due to the timing of hazards strik-
ing, and the intended behaviours are obtained under certain scenario
settings. Therefore, only reports and papers that investigated actual
human behaviours during past earthquake or tsunami events are reviewed
in this paper. Evacuation behaviours in cases where a tsunami is expected
due to an earthquake but where no significant tsunami is observed are
also discussed. However, note that surveys that investigate evacuation pref-
erences (e.g., Fraser et al., 2013 [13]; Arce et al., 2017 [14]) are also impor-
tant for understanding human behaviour since these surveys reveal a clear
gap between intended and actual behaviours once hazards strike.
To provide a comprehensive review, we first listed the past tsunami
events from the 1960 Chilean tsunami to the present. Then, we collected re-
ports and papers that investigated actual human behaviours during the past
tsunami-related events. To collect the materials, a keyword search was con-
ducted in scientific literature databases by using keywords such as “evacu-
ation”, “tsunami”, and “survey” in both English and Japanese. Since survey
reports by officials are often not contained in scientific literature databases,
we also conducted searches with a general web search engine using the
same keywords. Following this procedure, we collected 39 reports and
papers in both Japanese and English for 22 past earthquake or tsunami
events. Table 1 summarises the list of past tsunami events and the number
of reports in the literature for each event, and the spatial distribution of the
reviewed events are illustrated in Fig 1. Note that there were additional de-
structive tsunami events, such as the 1964 Good Friday earthquake in
Alaska, but only the events for which survey focusing on evacuation behav-
iours were available are listed here. In Table 1, the Magnitudes of the events
are based on USGS database [15], and the maximum water height and tsu-
nami casualty order are based on NOAA database [16]. The locations of the
events indicate the epicentre of the earthquakes based on USGS database

Table 1
List of 39 reports and publications for 22 earthquake and tsunami events.
Event Mw Maximum water height (m) Tsunami casualty order # Reviewed materials

1960 Chilean earthquake and tsunami 9.5 25.0 ~2,000 1 [17]

1993 Earthquake and tsunami off southwest Hokkaido 7.8 32.0 ~200 1 [18]
1999 Ambrym earthquake and tsunami 7.5 6.6 ~5 1 [19]
2003 Earthquake off Miyagi Prefecture 7.0 none none 3 [20–22]
2003 Earthquake and tsunami off Tokachi 8.3 4.4 none 1[23]
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami 9.1 50.9 ~230,000 5 [24–28]
2005 Nias-Simeulue earthquake and tsunami 8.6 4.2 ~10 1[28]
2006 Java earthquake and tsunami 7.7 20.90 ~800 2 [27,29]
2006 and 2007 Kuril Islands sequential earthquake 8.3, 8.1 21.9, 0.4 none 2 [30,31]
2007 Solomon Islands earthquake and tsunami 8.1 12.1 ~50 1 [32]
2009 Samoa earthquake and tsunami 8.1 22.35 ~200 4 [11,27,33,34]
2010 Chilean earthquake and tsunami 8.8 29.0 ~150 3 [35–37]
2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami 9.1 38.9 ~18,000 8 [38–45]
2012 Sumatra earthquake and tsunami 8.6 1.08 none 2 [12,46]
2013 Cook Strait sequential earthquakes 6.5, 6.5 0.07, 0.08 none 1 [47]
2014 Iyonada earthquake 6.3 none none 1 [48]
2014 Chilean earthquake and tsunami 8.2 4.63 none 2 [49,50]
2016 Kaikōura earthquake and tsunami 7.8 6.9 none 1 [51]
2016 Fukushima earthquake and tsunami 6.9 1.44 none 1 [52]
2018 Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami 7.5 10.73 ~4000 1 [53]

2
F. Makinoshima et al.
Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of the reviewed events. The location of the event indicates the epicentre of the earthquake. The dense area is visualised in the enlarged view. Some
gaps of past evacuation experiences or findings are found at some areas.
[15]. We can find that the reviewed events concentrate in the Pacific
Ocean, and some gaps of past evacuation experiences or findings are
found in some areas such as the west coast of the United States and the
Australian coasts.
2.2. Framework to organise findings
Since the tsunami evacuation process comprises various components,
and most of existing research focuses on some specific components, a
framework would be useful for organising these findings to provide a
clear view of the tsunami evacuation process. Because the main purpose
here is to map existing findings on tsunami response behaviours and evac-
uations to a timeline to provide an overview of the tsunami evacuation pro-
cess rather than to explain the decision-making mechanism of each
protective action undertaken during tsunamis, we consider that the frame-
work for describing evacuation behaviours that is originally developed in
the context of building evacuation behaviours (Galea et al., 2017 [54]) to
be suited for a basis for the tsunami evacuation process. The six phases of
the evacuation can be found in [55]. However, the adopted framework con-
siders parallel structure of notifications and individual actions rather than
sequential process, and it focuses more on individual behavioural pro-
cesses. The original framework considers that the whole evacuation process
consists of two broad phases, response phase and evacuation movement
phase, and it describes the transition of human behaviour from perception
of notifications and risk to conducting evacuation movements. Although
the original framework can be basically applied to broader evacuation
behaviours, we made some modifications to describe the tsunami evacua-
tion behaviours as revealed in the reviews in the following section.
Fig. 2 illustrates the tsunami evacuation process. Since the types of
notifications in tsunamis transition over the lead time, we consider 3 stages
of notifications: early, mid and late stages of the notification. Therefore, we
considered the parallel structure of notifications and individual activities in
contrast to the original framework in which the notification stage precedes
the cognition stage. Due to the continuous notifications, a continuous risk
3
Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100113
cognition stage is considered in our evacuation process. Additionally, in
tsunamis, even after people evacuated to safe places, some people take ad-
ditional actions, such as returning to their homes, which are dangerous
places. To include this behaviour, we added an additional activity and evac-
uation stage to the framework. Although the observed behaviours within
the process differ according to the length of the lead time for a tsunami,
the framework can be applied for both near-field and far-field tsunamis.
The details of the each stage are described in the following section with
findings from past events.
3. Tsunami evacuation process
3.1. Notifications
When massive tsunamis are generated by the sudden displacement of
ocean surface due to natural phenomena such as earthquakes, landslides
and volcanic eruptions, evacuation behaviours are necessary to save lives
from tsunamis. In many cases, there is a lead time between tsunami gener-
ation and tsunami arrival at coastal areas where tsunami disasters occur.
During this lead time, various types of information notifying of possible tsu-
nami risks are issued in coastal areas. For far-field tsunamis, there is long
lead time available for notifications. For example, during the 2011 Tohoku
tsunami event, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center issued a warning for
Hawaii 7 hours before its arrival [56]. When a warning is quickly dissemi-
nated and the time for response is long, the warning can reach many people.
In the 2010 Chilean tsunami event, a region-wide survey [35] in Japan re-
ported that 98.4% of the respondents recognised the tsunami warning.
3.1.1. Early period
For near-field, earthquake-induced tsunamis, the first signal is strong
ground shaking. Many survey results can be found that support strong
ground shaking can become a cue for anticipating possible tsunami or de-
ciding to evacuate [11,18,20–23,33,38–40,46,49,51,53]. For people inside
buildings, ground shaking causes them to go outside where they can easily
F. Makinoshima et al.
Fig. 2. Tsunami evacuation process.
access the additional cues prompting tsunami evacuations [50]. On the
other hand, some research reports the cases that ground shaking did not
functioned as a cue prompting evacuations [24,25]. Gaillard et al., 2008
[25] discussed a difference in behaviour among three ethnic groups in re-
sponse to the earthquake, i.e., the earthquake was interpreted as a sign
for a tsunami in some communities but not in others. As discussed in a
later section, this difference in interpreting notifications can emerge from
differences in risk cognition. For far-field tsunami or tsunami-earthquake
in which the ground shaking is only weakly felt, the earthquake cannot
be perceived well, and ground shaking cannot become a notification [29].
Based on the observation of an earthquake or tsunami, disaster-
related information such as official warnings or evacuation orders are
issued for coastal residents through media such as radios, TVs, and so-
cial media [26]. The tsunami warning systems have been developed
worldwide with experiences in the past tsunami catastrophes and evo-
lution of science and technology (e.g., development of tsunami obser-
vation technologies and numerical simulations) [57]. Although it is
still difficult to precisely and rapidly estimate the tsunami in some
cases such as large earthquakes or tsunami-earthquakes [58], in gen-
eral, modern tsunami warning systems can assess the impact of a tsu-
nami within a short period after its generation, and many surveys
support that such warnings or evacuation guidance from officials can
be a major cue for responses [11,17,23,30,31,35,38–40,46,49,51,52].
However, underestimating the impact of a tsunami can lead to a misun-
derstanding of the tsunami risk, resulting in evacuation delays [59].
Furthermore, warnings sometimes fail to be disseminated due to the
vulnerability factors in a chain of emergency management [60].
3.1.2. Mid period
After receiving the cues in the early period, some people start to take re-
sponse behaviours, which can function as social cues in the mid period.
Major cues from local residents during this period are informal communica-
tions. Many surveys of past events have reported that social cues such as
call for evacuation by family members or neighbours [11,18,23,30,31,34,
38–40,51], and seeing other people evacuating [11,25,34,40,46,53] within
4
Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100113
the informal communication network can trigger for responses. Lindell et al.
[11] surveyed both initial and additional information sources for the tsunami
and reports the increased prevalence of such cues for the additional informa-
tion. This finding is consistent with the structure of the presented framework
and support the framework considering the transitions of information and be-
haviours along a timeline. In addition to the statistical evidence of social cues,
the detail communications within the informal network are available from in-
terview results in some qualitative studies. The survey in 1993 tsunami event
[18] introduce a narrative in which a neighbour persuaded a woman who ini-
tially did not anticipate the tsunami to evacuate with them and guided her to a
higher ground. In another narrative in [18], a person who also did not initially
consider the possibility of a tsunami decided to evacuate due to a call for evac-
uation by family members. Bird et al. [27] reports that many people
interviewed regarding tsunami events in 2004 and 2006 mentioned that
they evacuated often after getting the advises by neighbours. Dudley et al.
[33] summarised the narratives from interviews regarding a 2009 tsunami
event, for which similar narratives were provided, i.e., “The village chief rang
the bell which alerted villagers to danger”, “Children in the village had been taught
about tsunamis in school and began yelling “tsunami” and evacuating”, “When he
felt the quake he rushed to warn tourist at the Taufua Beach Fales where he
worked”. Okumura et al. [34] conducted interviews for the 2009 tsunami
event and discussed a collective effect (i.e., leading evacuees and calls for
evacuation caused more people to evacuate) as a reason for a relatively
small number of casualties caused by the event. For the 2011 tsunami
event, a successful case that social cue played an important role to save lives
is known as “Kamaishi Miracle” in which educated students saved the sur-
rounding adults who had less awareness of the tsunami [41].
In parallel to the emergence of social cues, initial warnings in the early
period can be updated based on offshore or coastal tsunami observations,
and the updated warnings or evacuation orders are disseminated. During
the 2016 Fukushima earthquake and tsunami, the Japan Meteorological
Agency elevated the initial tsunami advisory to a tsunami warning for
Miyagi prefecture based on coastal tsunami observations [61]. As a result
of the warning update, a sudden increase of evacuation departures during
the event was confirmed [52].
F. Makinoshima et al.
3.1.3. Late period
In the late period, tsunamis start to affect the coastal areas, and unusual
sea level changes can be observed as natural signs [24]. It is not always true
that a receding wave firstly arrives since the formation of the tsunami varies
depending on its source mechanism, however, sighting of receding sea as a
cue for responses is commonly reported in past surveys. Bird et al. [27]
discussed the common misunderstanding that the water always recedes be-
fore a tsunami hits the coast based on their interviews for the 2004 and
2006 tsunami events. Gaillard et al. [25] reported that 37% of respondents
in Air Pinang observed a receding ocean during the 2004 event. In the sum-
mary of the interview for the 2009 event [33], descriptions such as “She
looked at the sea and saw only black lava rocks, the water had receded.”,
“When she saw the water receding, she started running” and “Her husband
saw the sea receding and began running inland with their two children” can be
found. Okumura et al. [34] introduced a story in which, during the 2009
tsunami, a man who was told to watch the sea saw the receding sea surface
and decided to evacuate. In the survey of Lindell et al. [11], 9.2% of respon-
dents reported “seeing tsunami wave” as a type of additional information
they received during the 2009 event.
The last cue notifying people of an approaching tsunami is sighting the
landing tsunami or hearing unusual sounds due to the approaching tsu-
nami. Shuto [62] reports the sounds generated by the tsunami that have
been linked to thunderbolts or locomotives during the Sanriku tsunamis
in 1896 and 1933. Regarding the 2004 tsunami event, Gregg et al. [24]
found that 69% of the respondents saw unusual change in the ocean, and
55% of the respondents heard unusual sounds just before the tsunami
landed. Gaillard et al. [25] showed that 33% of interviewees in Kajhu
heard the sound which is linked to a plane flying overhead during the
2004 tsunami event. Many similar experiences also can be found in the
summary of the interview survey for the 2009 tsunami event [33]; for
example, “When he actually saw the first wave, he picked up one of their
children and started running”, “She heard people screaming and looked to
see the wave, which appeared like a “cloud””, “She saw the wave “higher
than coconut trees” and described noises that sounded like “war and machine
guns””, “The first sign of the tsunami was the sound “like large motor vehicles
in low gear”” and “Then she heard a noise like an airplane about to take off”.
For the 2011 Tohoku event, a small number of respondents reported the
such cues become a trigger for their evacuations [39,40]. Since a safe
evacuation becomes difficult after perceiving this kind of sign, espe-
cially for devastating tsunamis, the degree of perception of such direct
cues in the late period should be low if an immediate evacuation was
conducted.
3.2. Individual activities
3.2.1. Risk cognition stage
The notifications are perceived by local residents who have diverse de-
mographics (e.g., knowledge of earthquakes and tsunamis, past experience
of tsunami disaster) and environmental backgrounds (e.g., initial location,
being working, neighbour’s behaviours) and motivate diverse risk cogni-
tion and response activities. Even with the same information or demo-
graphics, the degree of perceived risk and response behaviours are
different due to the diverse backgrounds.
As discussed in the early notification stage, the initial evaluation of the
potential tsunami threat is made based on the perceived ground shaking in
case of near-field tsunamis. As observed in the survey for the 2004 tsunami
event [25], the interpretation of the ground shaking varies among individ-
uals and groups. Previous findings have suggested that the existence of
knowledge or culture linking earthquakes to tsunamis is an essential for
people to interpret the natural signs. Gaillard et al. [25] explained the dif-
ferent responses among different ethnic groups based on the existence of
a disaster subculture in local communities in addition to cultural, econom-
ical and political constraints. Mcadoo et al. [28] also introduced the notable
effect of the existence of such culture during the 2004 tsunami. For the
2007 tsunami event, Mcadoo et al. [32] investigated the differences in mor-
tality demographics in different areas and discuss the importance of
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Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100113
indigenous knowledge for better responses and mitigating the tsunami
loss. The importance of such cultures or indigenous knowledge for appro-
priate responses has also been confirmed in other events, such as the
1999 tsunami event [19] and the 2010 tsunami event [36].
Individual past experiences also have an effect on threat perceptions.
According to the survey for the 1993 tsunami event [18], 72.4% of the re-
spondents in Okushiri anticipated a tsunami immediately after the earth-
quake because they had experienced the 1983 Japan Sea earthquake and
tsunami. Another 14.7% of respondents had not directly experienced the
1983 event, but anticipated the tsunami based on stories passed down
through their community. Transferred knowledge or experience also can af-
fect threat perceptions. On the other hand, past experience can also lead to
a misunderstanding of threats. Yoshii et al. [30] conducted a questionnaire
survey in coastal cities in Hokkaido regarding serial tsunami events in 2006
and 2007 that revealed the lower evacuation rate during the second event.
An additional question confirmed that 34.5% of residents responded that
they did not evacuate, even under official warnings, because the 2006 tsu-
nami was small. In Fraser et al. [47], the possible effect of warning fatigue
[63] on tsunami expectations is mentioned in regard to the 2013 sequential
earthquake events. The survey for the 2011 event revealed the negative ef-
fect of past experience. The region-wide survey in Tohoku [38] reported
that 21.5% of respondents answered that they did not evacuate since they
had not experienced a severe tsunami in the past. Goto et al. [39] investi-
gated why people in two local communities did not evacuate during the
2011 event and discussed that the low expectations of the tsunami are likely
caused by the lack of recent experience of destructive tsunamis combined
with the initially underestimated warning.
Even when precise and concrete tsunami risk information such as tsu-
nami heights is presented from warnings, people misunderstand the infor-
mation if they do not have enough knowledge of tsunamis. Ushiyama &
Noda [37] investigated evacuation intentions after the 2010 Chilean tsu-
nami event by asking the following question: How high does the prediction
of a tsunami have to be before you will evacuate to higher grounds? In
Iwate and Miyagi, only 11.4% of people planned to evacuate for a tsunami
under 2 m, and only 41.0% of residents would evacuate for a tsunami with a
predicted height over 10 m. This result indicated that quantitative tsunami
forecasts might cause residents who do not have enough tsunami knowl-
edge to misunderstand the tsunami risks.
These misunderstandings arise not only from a lack of knowledge, but
also, potentially, from mental biases. It is difficult to identify whether
such mental biases affect risk perceptions or evacuation behaviours ob-
served in the past events; however, a common human response to disaster
warnings, i.e., disbelief, can be found [1]. This tendency is also often re-
ferred to as the normalcy bias [64]. Some studies have discussed the effect
of such biases on tsunami expectations [47] as well as the gap between tsu-
nami expectations and perception of the tsunami risk [22].
Some studies have reported the tendency that local residents to perceive
tsunami risk based on their geographical location. Goto et al. [39] investi-
gated the reason why residents did not evacuate during the 2011 tsunami
event and found that 31% of respondents did not evacuate because they
did not think the tsunami would reach their location. Goto et al [46] also
investigated an evacuation behaviour during the 2012 tsunami event. A
spatial analysis of the evacuation rates showed that the evacuation rate
was higher in coastal zones (reaching approximately 90%) than in inland
zones (only 54 to 73%). In the survey by Fraser et al. [47] for sequential
earthquake events in 2013, many respondents stated that they did not evac-
uate because they lived in places that were high enough to avoid being af-
fected by a tsunami. Ikeda et al. [49] analysed the relation between
evacuation behaviours of local residents and their geographical situations
(e.g., elevation, distance from the shoreline, spatial distribution) using
GIS. The result showed that the people who did not evacuate tended to be
found at elevations of approximately 20 m, which is near the inland edge
of the evacuation zone.
Although this paper focuses on the response phase during the disaster, it
is important to mention the warming process since the ability to appropri-
ately interpret notifications can be sophisticated during the warming
F. Makinoshima et al.
process in the preparedness phase of the disaster management cycle [65].
Recently, several tools for estimating evacuation risks using GIS-based
method [66–70] and agent-based simulations [42,71–74] have been devel-
oped. Prior risk perception provided by these tools is expected to enhance
the risk awareness before the actual events. Additionally, some studies
have suggested that participation in drills [43] and educations [41] can
enhance response capabilities.
3.2.2. Response activity stage
According to the diverse degree of perceived tsunami risks, the response
activity can also become diverse. In an ideal evacuation process, the re-
sponse activity should be minimum such that the time available for the
evacuation movement stage increases. Nevertheless, not only preparations
for evacuation but also various response activities for evacuation have been
observed in past tsunami events. Interestingly, some common response
activities have been confirmed in different countries.
A major pattern of the response activity is collecting information
[11,20,21,38,47,48,51]. People seek additional information to decide to
shift to the evacuation movement stage. In addition to disaster information
such as official warnings or evacuation orders, some people gather informa-
tion through communications with family members or their neighbours.
Another major response activity is attempting to confirm the safety of
family members or relatives and to gather them [11,18,38,44,46,47,51].
This activity is likely to be observed in tsunamis during daytime when fam-
ily members are separated due to their daily activities. Such behaviour can
serve as a part of the evacuation behaviours in the case where destinations
(e.g., schools or relatives’ homes) are located on higher grounds. In the
2011 Tohoku tsunami in particular, regional and massive movements of
people to confirm the safety of their families using vehicles were observed.
The Japan Broadcasting Corporation [44] conducted an analysis of
anonymised GPS location data during the 2011 event in Tohoku coastal
areas. In the city of Natori, GPS statistics showed that approximately
21,000 people were inside the inundation area when the earthquake oc-
curred. If the appropriate evacuation behaviours were conducted, the pop-
ulation in the inundation area would be lower. However, according to the
data, even though the population decreased over the first 20 min, the pop-
ulation inside the inundation area exceeded the initial population 40 min
after the earthquake occurred. According to the analysis, population in-
creases in the inundation area were observed in a total of 24 cities in the
Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures. They explained this phenome-
non in terms of picking-up behaviour, i.e., local residents who received tsu-
nami warnings returned to their homes to evacuate with their family
members.
Once people decide to evacuate after perceiving the possible tsunami
threat, they might take preparatory actions for the evacuation. The survey
during the 2009 tsunami event [11] reported that 26% of respondents an-
swered “pack and emergency kit” as a response behaviour. Goto et al.
[39] reported 52% of respondents in Yamada town collected important
goods and locked their houses before evacuating or being caught by the tsu-
nami during the 2011 tsunami event. The same response was observed also
in Ishinomaki city (26%) in their survey. Harnantyari et al. [53] shows that
95% of respondents made preparations to evacuate when they knew about
the approaching tsunami during the 2018 tsunami event.
Responses linked to religion have been reported in some cases. Gaillard
et al. [25] reported that some people prayed in response to the earthquake
during the 2004 tsunami event. The qualitative description “Following the
earthquake she started to pray” can be found also in the 2009 tsunami
event [33].
If people cannot perceive any tsunami risks, they return to their daily
activities (e.g., cleaning their houses) and do not shift to the evacuation
movement stage. For example, a survey [39] for the 2011 tsunami event
showed that 18% of respondents in Ishinomaki answered “Picking up
items scattered by the earthquake” as a response before the evacuation.
Some people do not decide to evacuate until they receive direct cues in
the late period of notifications.
6
Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100113
3.2.3. Evacuation movement stage
The evacuation movement phase begins with the end of the response ac-
tivities. If the local residents can quickly perceive the tsunami risks and re-
sponse activities are the minimum, this enables them to have a longer time
for the evacuation movement phase. At the beginning of the evacuation
movement phase, people make decisions on the destination, an evacuation
route, and an evacuation mode; then, they start their evacuation move-
ments. In general, at a minimum, an evacuation plan includes a destination,
a route of travel, and a means of evacuation [75].
Few surveys exist on evacuation destinations because evacuees gener-
ally head toward high ground or strong buildings nearby. However, some
systematic surveys have been reported. Yoshii et al. [30] reported that
the dominant response for evacuation destinations during the 2006 and
2007 tsunami events included high outdoor locations that were not under
a tsunami threat, designated evacuation sites such as public halls or schools,
and the homes of relatives or friends that were not under a tsunami threat.
Lindell et al. [11] reported that most of the respondents in their survey for
the 2009 tsunami evacuated to a different community from their initial lo-
cations, and their destinations included parks (38.9%), the homes of rela-
tives (31.1%), friends (11.7%) and churches (11.1%). Public shelters
(5.6%) were not popular during the event. They discussed the geographical
feature of the study area as a possible reason for the observed tendencies.
The regional survey in Japan for the 2010 Chilean tsunami [35] reported
that the popular evacuation sites during the event were public halls and
schools that were designated evacuation sites (34%), high outdoor grounds
under no tsunami threat (21.6%) and homes of relatives or friends (25%).
Another region-wide survey [38] for the 2011 tsunami event confirmed
that the majority of the respondents evacuated to designated evacuation
sites such as public halls or schools (36.5%) or to higher grounds
(35.9%). Shelter-in-place (3.4%) and relatives’ houses (8.9%) were not
popular options. Similarly, another survey in a specific area [42] for the
2011 event reported that the popular destinations were non-designated
higher places (42.2%) and designated shelters or buildings (25%).
Harnantyari et al. [53] reported a similar tendency during the 2018 tsu-
nami event: many respondents evacuated to nearby high ground or to pub-
lic facilities. McCaughey et al. [12] focused on the preference for tsunami
vertical evacuation buildings and found that the majority of the respon-
dents preferred to evacuate to inland destinations rather than to the evacu-
ation buildings during the 2012 tsunami event. The analysis suggested that
respondents felt that buildings were unsafe and thought that they would be
able to reach inland destinations in time.
Because surveys of evacuation routes are relatively costly, few surveys
exist that focus on evacuation routes. Makinoshima et al. [42] compiled ob-
served traffic jams in Kesennuma during the 2011 event and found that
major traffic jams were observed, especially on main roads that carry
large volumes of traffic on typical days. Goto et al. [46] collected 785 evac-
uation routes during the 2012 tsunami event and compiled them in GIS.
The compiled routes indicated that people tend to evacuate using the
main roads rather than the shortest route. They discussed that the traffic
concentration on main roads expanded the traffic jams.
Surveys on evacuation modes are relatively common. The recom-
mended evacuation mode during tsunamis is on-foot evacuation since the
occurrence of the traffic jams and their corresponding delays can become
critical risks, as experienced during the 2011 tsunami event [40,42,45];
however, a preference for vehicular evacuation has been observed in past
events [11,18,30,35,38,40,42,48,52]. In Indonesia, evacuation by motor-
bike was a dominant mode rather than vehicles [46]. Therefore, it is indi-
cated that the evacuation mode choice reflects the characteristics of the
daily trips of the survey area. Reasons for the vehicular evacuation prefer-
ence in tsunamis have been discussed in some previous studies. Yoshii
et al. [30] argue that the cold temperature during winter in the target
area might generate the vehicular evacuation tendency during the event,
i.e., the evacuees can stay warm in their vehicles. Lindell et al. [11] argued
that a high ratio of vehicle usage could occur because vehicles are portable
assets and the evacuees were unaware of traffic jams along the evacuation
routes. The region-wide survey for the 2011 event [38] asked reasons for
F. Makinoshima et al.
vehicular evacuation and found that evacuees used their vehicles because
they usually use vehicles for daily trips (37.4%), they thought they would
be caught by the tsunami without a vehicle (35.8%), they wanted to evac-
uate with family members (28%), and the safe place was distant from
their location (23.5%). Togawa et al. [52] investigated the reasons for ve-
hicular usage during the 2016 tsunami in Ishinomaki and Watari, which ex-
perienced the 2011 tsunami. The popular reasons for vehicular usage were
as follows: “Because safe places are far and I would never reach them on
time if I did not evacuate without a car”, “Because I ordinarily use a car
to move around”, “Because my car is a precious asset”, “To receive informa-
tion on the car radio/TV”, “To evacuate family/relatives/neighbours”, and
“To stand the cold”. The response regarding evacuation distance was more
common in Watari where is located in a plane area far from higher ground.
In contrast to the events reported above, on-foot evacuation was dominant
mode during the 2018 tsunami event [53]. Harnantyari et al. [53]
discussed that this result can be explained by relatively low rate of car own-
ership and the congestion along the evacuation routes caused by evacuating
crowd.
3.2.4. Additional activity and evacuation stage
Even once people have completed their evacuation movements, people
occasionally take additional activities and evacuation movements. After the
completion of evacuation movements, local residents meet and communi-
cate with other evacuees at evacuation sites. This communication occasion-
ally causes local residents, especially those who conducted a quick
evacuation, to realise that they are less prepared compared to other evac-
uees for long-term sheltering. For example, the survey report for the 1993
tsunami event [18] included a narrative in which a woman saw an acquain-
tance having a large bag and returned to her home to pick up valuables. The
survey report also presented similar narratives in which people initially
evacuated to a high ground but returned the home to get the car or to
free a leashed dog. This return causes an additional evacuation movement
phase with inadequate lead time. Additionally, in case of the first evacua-
tion sites are not enough safe against tsunamis, people have to take addi-
tional evacuation behaviours [38]. To ensure safety from a tsunami, it is
essential to conduct a quick evacuation and to remain at safe locations
until the safety is officially confirmed.
4. Discussion
The organised existing observations or findings within the presented
framework successfully illustrated the general timeline of response and
evacuation behaviours during tsunami events. The behaviours organised
within each component of the framework have both similarities and differ-
ences across events. The comparisons of the observed behaviours should
help to clarify the cultural or event-specific differences as well as universal
human behaviour tendencies in tsunamis; however, such clarity is still lim-
ited for some components of the evacuation process because the items in
evacuation surveys vary. As reviewed in this work, although the perspec-
tives on evacuation vary in previous studies, most existing studies focus
on evacuation departures (or the relationship between risk cognition and
evacuation departure), which makes it difficult to understand the overall
evacuation process. Not only investigating the evacuation departures and
movement but also studying response behaviours and response time are
keys to evaluating the entire evacuation process [54]. In this context, the
presented framework would be useful to comprehensively design survey
items for future tsunami events, which would enable comparative studies
to improve our understanding of human behaviours during tsunamis. More-
over, understanding the decision-making for the response and evacuation
behaviours organised in the present work is also important. The investiga-
tion of factors influencing the decision-making processes behind the ob-
served behaviours such as those in PADM [7], combined with the
components in the presented framework could lead to a deeper understand-
ing of human behaviour during tsunamis. If the common items from differ-
ent cultural and environmental backgrounds were surveyed widely and
globally in different areas and for different events, then comparative studies
7
Progress in Disaster Science 7 (2020) 100113
could be conducted to clarify the cultural or event-specific differences in
human behaviour during tsunamis, as we have confirmed in different inter-
pretation of natural signs of tsunamis. A deeper and comprehensive under-
standing of human behaviour in tsunamis helps us to consider more
appropriate evacuation preparedness for future tsunamis considering actual
human behaviour characteristics, and will contribute to mitigating the
number of tsunami casualties in future events.
5. Conclusion
This paper presented a comprehensive literature review on studies of
human behaviour in past tsunami events and organised the findings into
a tsunami evacuation process framework. A total of 39 reports and surveys
in 22 past earthquake and tsunami events were reviewed, and the findings
on human behaviours during tsunamis were organised into a theoretical
framework that describes the human behaviours that can generally be ob-
served during past tsunami events. The present evacuation framework is
useful for understanding the general timeline of notifications and corre-
sponding responses and evacuation procedures during tsunamis.
In tsunami events, people generally follow the tsunami evacuation pro-
cess: getting notifications, risk recognition, response activity and evacua-
tion movement. In the notification stage, various information, including
natural signs, disaster information, and social cues, are issued over the
lead time. These notifications are processed by diverse individuals, and
the tsunami risk is recognised. Even with the same information, the per-
ceived degree of tsunami risk differs due to the diverse backgrounds of in-
dividuals such as cultural backgrounds. Since the recognition stage is a
psychological work, psychological biases are included in the risk interpreta-
tions. In parallel, people perform various actions to respond to the event,
such as collecting further information and gathering with family or rela-
tives. After performing response actions, people shift to the evacuation
movement stage if they believe that an evacuation is necessary. Short cog-
nition and response stages enable people to conduct quick evacuations. At
minimum, the evacuation movement stage must include a destination, a
route of travel and an evacuation mode. Even after the evacuation move-
ment is complete, additional activities such as returning homes to pick up
valuable can be observed as additional activities. To ensure safety and pro-
tect lives, it is essential not to conduct additional activities until officials
confirm that the area is safe.
The presented framework can help to identify gaps for further research
and in designing more comprehensive survey items for studying future
events to achieve a better understanding of human behaviours during
tsunamis.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their
valuable comments. This research was supported by a Grant-in-Aid for JSPS
Research Fellow (17J03690) in Japan.
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