Professional Documents
Culture Documents
v.
DIVISION: CR B
MARIO ENRIQUE FERNANDEZ SALDANA
The State of Florida, by and through the undersigned Assistant State Attorney, files this response
in objection to the Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify the Fourth Judicial Circuit Office of the State
Attorney (“Motion”). In support of this objection, the State of Florida would show the following grounds:
A. Introduction
The Defendant’s Motion improperly, and without lawful grounds, seeks to disqualify the prosecutor
and the entire State Attorney’s Office of the Fourth Judicial Circuit based upon a third-party vendor’s
inadvertent and brief oversight in uploading a massive amount of data to an eDiscovery platform without
labeling the confidential communications. The oversight, which involved uploading a few emails and one
text between the Defendant and his attorney(s), was an unintentional act by the third-party vendor. The
prosecutor, once notified, observed the oversight quickly, and consistent with her ethical duties, contacted
the defense teams to alert them to the oversight and immediately disabled the platform to ensure none of
the emails or the text were reviewed by anyone. No one from the prosecution team or the State Attorney’s
Office reviewed any privileged emails or texts. Courtesy, cooperation, integrity, fair play, and abiding by
a sense of honor are paramount for preserving the integrity of the profession and to ensuring fair, efficient,
and effective administration of justice for the public. The prosecutor’s actions in quickly correcting a
third-party vendor’s oversight and shutting down the platform, which prevented dissemination of the
emails and the text, while alerting the parties involved, was consistent with the professionalism that all
The State obtained search warrants for the cell phones and devices of Mario Saldana (“Saldana”)
and Shanna Gardner (“Gardner”). Jesse Dreicer (“Dreicer”) and Hank Coxe (“Coxe”) filed a motion for
protective order to prevent the State from reviewing the search warrant returns on all devices based on
invocation of marital privilege and attorney-client privilege. A hearing was held before the Honorable
Judge Charbula. The State was successful regarding the invocation of the marital privilege. The State and
the defendants reached an agreement regarding the issue of attorney-client privilege. The State obtained
an independent agent from the Secret Service (“Agent”) to act as a taint agent for all the devices and all
downloads. All returned data was sent to the Agent, who removed all attorney-client communications
which included e-mails and texts messages. The Agent used a list of provided names, phone numbers, and
e-mail addresses from both law firms: Tassone, Dreicer & Hill (“Tassone Firm”) and Bedell, Dittmar,
Devault, Pillans & Coxe (“Bedell Firm”). During the investigation, the State only reviewed the de-tainted
The State also obtained a Google search warrant for Saldana, which resulted in a return with
multiple folders for Google categories, one of which was titled “emails.” The State “walled off” the file
titled “emails” in each return until the data could be sent to the taint Agent. The emails obtained from the
Google search warrant are still in the process of being reviewed by the taint Agent. However, the other
Google files were reviewed, which included photos, videos, and documents. Within one of the file folders
from the Google search return for Saldana, there was a document titled “Confidential Communications,”
which contained a spreadsheet with text messages between Henry Tenon (“Tenon”) and Saldana. There
were no attorney names, phone numbers, or emails listed on the spreadsheet. There were no attorney-
The State utilized Nextpoint, a cloud-based eDiscovery and document review platform, to create
a portal where the data could be uploaded once it was de-tainted. Nextpoint sent a team to assist the State
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in uploading the discovery onto the platform. Nextpoint wanted to use an “original source” as much as
possible for the uploading process, which means they would upload the data from its original source rather
than from a copy of the original source to preserve the meta data that is included on an original source.
During the uploading process, Nextpoint inadvertently uploaded the original source of the search warrant
returns for the Google data as they had been stored on the detective’s computer, which were unredacted,
The original Google search warrant returns for the “emails” folder that were downloaded to the
detective’s computer have not been viewed by anyone from the State or from law enforcement. In fact,
the original search warrant returns for the “emails” folder remain zipped and compressed on the detective’s
computer. Additionally, the email folder is encrypted in such a way that even if opened, the contents of
the folder cannot be viewed without running it through special software to view it, otherwise, it would just
be raw data. Regardless, neither the State, nor law enforcement, have viewed any attorney-client
communications. This fact could have been easily discovered had anyone from the Tassone firm bothered
to ask the State. Once the State became aware of the disclosure of emails during the upload to the platform,
the process was halted at approximately four (4) terabytes of data and all parties were prevented access to
the platform. The State confirmed with the Public Defender’s Office that they did not view any of the
attorney-client emails. In fact, the Public Defender’s Office has not even activated access to the Nextpoint
platform. The State also confirmed with the Baez firm that although the data had been downloaded, only
police reports had been viewed; and no attorney-client emails had been viewed. Although it is the State’s
position, which is argued below in greater detail, that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary because
Saldana has failed to carry his burden in establishing actual prejudice, and thus has failed to demonstrate
grounds to disqualify the prosecutor or the State Attorney’s Office, should this Honorable Court disagree,
Nextpoint can testify about user downloads and reviews from the platform.
C. Saldana’s allegations
In section (i) of the Motion, the Defendant alleges that the court must disqualify the assigned assistant
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state attorney from prosecuting the defendant where the assistant state attorney obtained attorney-client
privileged information against the defendant and expressed intent to use such information against the
defendant at trial. (Motion, 9). In support of the Motion, the defense attorneys cite Martinez, Reeves, and
Nunez. (Motion, 9-10). In section (ii) of the Motion, the Defendant alleges that the court must disqualify
the entire state attorney’s office from prosecuting the defendant where the members of the state attorney’s
office disbursed attorney-client privileged information intended to use against the defendant at trial.
(Motion, 11). In support of the Motion, the defense attorneys cite Castro, Fitzpatrick, Martinez, Nunez,
Popejoy, and/or Reaves to support his request to disqualify the prosecutor and to disqualify the Office of
Codified in §90.502, Florida Statutes (2023), “[t]he attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law.” Nelson v. State, 347 So.3d 86, 88
(Fla. 3rd DCA 2021), citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The privilege was
developed to encourage “full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Id. at 89. The
burden of establishing that the attorney-client privilege rests on the party claiming it.” Id.
The case sub judice involved an unusual fact pattern because generally when the State downloads a
communications on the devices because there has not been an arrest; and thus, an attorney has not yet been
hired. However, Saldana, of note, obtained a lawyer before he was arrested, which allegedly resulted in
attorney-client communications being on his phone and computer. Although the emails and the text at
issue in the instant case occurred prior to charges being brought against Saldana, the State concedes
relationship does not necessarily mean Saldana has established an attorney-client privilege regarding all
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The policy behind the attorney-client privilege, to promote freedom of consultation with legal
advisors, being an “exception to the general duty to disclose” and an “obstacle to the investigation of the
truth,” “ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle. Hoyas v. State, 456 So.2d 1225, 1228 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984). Saldana has failed to prove every
email at issue involved attorney-client privileged information. For example, the Google document that
Dreicer alleges Saldana forwarded to his attorney that contained texts between Saldana and Tenon is not
a privileged document because no attorney was privy to the texts at their creation. To the contrary, no
attorney was privy to the texts between Saldana and Tenon until they were transferred to the attorney,
which was after they had been created and sent between Saldana and Tenon. The texts at issue are dated
from approximately September 2021 through July 2022. Documents which are given by a client to an
attorney while seeking legal advice are privileged in the hands of the attorney only if they were privileged
in the hands of the client. (Emphasis added). Tober v. Sanchez, 417 So.2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982).
No privilege having been accorded the emails between Saldana and Tenon when they were sent to each
other, none can be conferred by merely transferring them to Saldana’s attorney. Id. See also Jenney v.
Airdata Wiman, Inc., 846 So.2d 664, 667 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2003), wherein the court held that the plaintiff
cannot seriously contend that a document is protected by the attorney-client privilege simply because the
plaintiff subsequently gave a copy of a nonprivileged document to her attorney as such does not convert
The party bringing a motion to disqualify bears the burden of proving the grounds for
motion to disqualify a prosecutor is properly denied when there was no benefit to the prosecution and no
detriment to the defendant. McWatters v. State, 36 So.3d 613, 636 (Fla. 2010) (defendant’s motion to
disqualify the prosecutor for listening to privileged calls was denied because it was clear the defendant
knew the calls were being recorded and the calls did not provide any benefit to the prosecution and was
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not used to the detriment of the defendant). Of note, the cases cited by Saldana are factually distinguishable
In Castro, the defendant’s first defense attorney (“Tatti”) was subsequently hired by the state
attorney’s office to prosecute capital cases. Castro v. State, 597 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1992). The current
prosecutor called Tatti to discuss responses he could make to Castro’s pending motions. Id. Tatti testified
that he only discussed legal case law that he had uncovered in a different case. Id. The trial court denied
the motion to disqualify. Id. The appellate court reversed the penalty phase and held that the integrity of
the judicial process was brought into question because an attorney who previously represented a defendant
In Nunez, the technology director recorded and broadcast the confidential conversation between
the attorney and the defendant as they waited for a zoom hearing to begin. Nunez v. State, 665 So.2d 301
(Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The prosecutor acknowledged that he was in the courtroom during the broadcast but
claimed he was not really listening. Id. Subsequently, the prosecutor indicated he was going to use the
recording at trial. Id. The district court held that although the entire state attorney’s office could not be
In Popejoy, the defense attorney was hired by the state attorney’s office. Popejoy v. State, 597
So.2d 335 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1992). After being hired by the state, Popejoy’s prior defense attorney was seated
at the state’s table during a hearing. Id. The court held that the law is unequivocal that an attorney cannot
participate in the prosecution of a person he or she previously represented in a criminal case. Id.
In Reaves, the current prosecutor previously represented the defendant in a different criminal case.
Reaves v. State, 574 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1991). The court noted that reversal would not be required if the prior
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lawyer hand handled a perfunctory task, such as a bond hearing. Id. However, the court cautioned the state
attorney’s office to properly screen the lawyer from other prosecutors. Id.
In the instant case, unlike in Castro, Popejoy, or Reaves, the prosecutor did not previously
represent Saldana. Additionally, and unlike in Nunez, the prosecutor can establish through forensic
evidence that the emails and the text that were downloaded to the detective’s computer as part of the
search warrant return were never unzipped. Allowing an outside vendor to oversee the uploading of the
data to the platform, which resulted in alleged privileged emails being uploaded and unlabeled, is not
grounds for disqualification of the prosecutor. See Meggs in and for Second Judicial Circuit of Florida v.
McClure, 538 So.2d 518, 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), wherein the court held that disqualification is not a
proper remedy for poor judgment. Therefore, the State submits that this Honorable Court should deny
Saldana’s Motion to disqualify the prosecutor because he has failed to demonstrate prosecutorial
misconduct because he has failed to prove that anyone from the prosecution team or law enforcement read
Saldana has the burden of proving demonstrable and actual prejudice. The disqualification of
government counsel is a drastic measure, and a court should hesitate to impose it cavalierly, even if
imposed as a sanction, unless disqualification is necessary. State v. Hayes, 997 So.2d 446, 448 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2008). A trial court cannot grant a motion to disqualify based upon an appearance of an impropriety
to uphold the integrity, confidence and independent of the third branch of the government. Id.
In the case sub judice, Saldana has failed to prove actual prejudice. In his motion, Saldana alleges
that the prosecutor indicated an intent to use confidential information at trial. (Motion, 10). However, the
evidence the prosecutor referenced, although labeled by Saldana as “confidential,” was in fact not
confidential as explained above. Additionally, as discussed above, the prosecutor has not reviewed the
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emails or text at issue, and thus has no plans to use any of them at trial. No actual prejudice results when
the evidence at issue is not used at trial. See Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 991 (Fla. 2001), wherein the
court noted that although the prosecutor’s action in approving an unlawful warrantless search of the
defendant’s jail cell was of grave concern, and the decision carried with it the potential to undermine the
essential fairness of our system of justice based on an adversarial system with procedures for gathering
evidence and searching for the truth, nevertheless, no specific prejudice resulted in the state attorney’s
office participating in the prosecution because the evidence unlawfully gathered was not used at the
defendant’s trial. Because the prosecutor has not reviewed the emails or text at issue, and has no intention
G. Disqualification of the entire office would violate the separation of powers doctrine
Saldana also wants this Honorable Court to disqualify the entire State Attorney’s Office because
the prosecutor allegedly provided prejudicial information related to the pending criminal charges.
(Motion, 11 and 13). In support of his allegation that this Honorable Court should disqualify the entire
Office of the State Attorney, the Defendant cites Fitzpatrick and Martinez. However, as discussed below,
In Fitzpatrick, the defendant spoke with a defense attorney while in jail but did not hire him.
Subsequently, the defense attorney became a prosecutor. State v. Fitzpatrick, 464 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 1985).
The Florida Supreme Court held that imputed disqualification of the entire state attorney’s office is
unnecessary when the record establishes that the disqualified attorney did not provide prejudicial
information relating to the pending criminal charge and did not personally assist in the prosecution of the
case. Id. In the case sub judice, Saldana has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor either personally
reviewed prejudicial information or that the prosecutor provided prejudicial information to anyone else in
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(ii) State v. Martinez
In Martinez, the prosecutor listened to two jail calls between the defendant and his lawyer. State
v. Martinez, 4 So.3d 712 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). During the call, the defense attorney discussed several
subjects including trial planning and the testimony of several witnesses who had already been called at
trial and some that might be helpful. Id. The prosecutor discussed the calls with other prosecutors
throughout the office. Id. The trial court disqualified the state attorney’s office, and the State filed a
petition for writ of certiorari. The appellate court dismissed the writ and held that it would not be sufficient
to simply disqualify the prosecutor involved because the calls had been discussed with others throughout
the office. Id. Again, in the case sub judice, Saldana has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor either
personally reviewed prejudicial information or that the prosecutor provided prejudicial information to
anyone else in the State Attorney’s Office. Furthermore, as held in Martinez, such information would not
be sufficient to disqualify either the prosecutor or the entire state attorney’s office. Regardless, an entire
office, which is what the Defendant is requesting, cannot be disqualified because one member of the office
may have a disqualifying interest. Meggs in and for Second Judicial Circuit of Florida v. McClure, 538
In his Motion, Saldana claims that the disclosure of privileged information in the instant case is more
severe because at least twenty-five individuals, including co-defendant Tenon, obtained the e-mails.
However, as discussed above, computer forensic evidence demonstrates that no one accessed the e-mails
or the text at issue. Imputed disqualification of the entire state attorney’s office is unnecessary when the
record establishes that the prosecutor did not provide prejudicial information relating to the case because
a state attorney’s office is not like a law firm. Lot v. State, 13 So.3d 1121 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2009). Instead,
an appellate court cannot uphold an entire State Attorney’s Office being forced by an entirely separate
branch of the state government to recuse itself from exercising its constitutional prerogative to prosecute
a criminal matter in a county unless actual prejudice is shown. State v. Hayes, 997 So.2d 446, 448 and 450
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(Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Thus, disqualification of the State Attorney’s Office is proper only if specific
prejudice can be demonstrated. Farina v. State, 680 So.2d 392, 395 (Fla. 1996).
(iv) Saldana failed to demonstrate actual prejudice sufficient to disqualify the entire office
Actual prejudice is something more than the mere appearance of impropriety. Id. Therefore,
disqualification of a State Attorney’s Office is appropriate only to prevent the accused from suffering
prejudice he otherwise would not have. Id. at 396. In Farina, the prosecutor asked the clerk’s office to
assign a case to another division so that he could obtain a specific judge, which the clerk agreed to do even
though the request was contrary to an administrative order controlling the assignment of cases. Id. at 395.
The Florida Supreme Court noted that although they did not condone the prosecutor’s actions, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disqualify the entire State Attorney’s Office because the
judge ultimately did not try the case, and thus, there was no actual prejudice. Id. at 395-396.
Under Florida’s Constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility and
the State Attorney has complete discretion in deciding whether and how to prosecute a case. State v.
Bloom, 497 So.2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986), citing Art. II, §3, Fla. Const. The core of prosecutorial discretion is the
decision whether to charge an individual with a criminal offense in the first place. In re Wild, 994 F.3d
1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2021). The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle, which dates back
centuries, that the executive branch has executive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
prosecute a case. Id. Courts have imposed a substantial burden on defendants seeking the recusal or
and broad concerns about the effective administration of justice. U.S. v. Goff, 2009WL223369, 2 (U.S.
Middle District, Ala. N.D. 2009). The tenth circuit held that it can only rarely – if ever – imagine a scenario
in which a district court could properly disqualify an entire prosecutor’s office and such disqualification
is almost always reversible error. U.S. v. Bolden, 353 F.3d 870, 875-876 (10th Cir. 2003). If the
disqualification of one government attorney could serve as the predicate for the disqualification of the
entire office, the administration of justice would be irreparably damaged. Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford
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v. U.S., 756 F.2d 249, 254 (2nd Cir. 1985). Screening procedures such as recusal of the affected attorney
and building a ‘wall’ between the affected attorney and the rest of the office is sufficient to remedy any
conflict of interest one attorney in the office might have. Goff at 2. Thus, because disqualification of the
entire office would violate the separation of powers, this Honorable Court should deny Saldana’s Motion
H. Remedies
A remedy is only necessary if this Honorable Court finds that there was actual prejudice in the State’s
brief and unlabeled disclosure of the emails and text on the discovery platform before the platform was
disabled. However, the State’s position is that a remedy is unwarranted because the State rebutted
Saldana’s claim of actual prejudice. Regardless, the only two remedies Saldana has offered this Honorable
Court are to disqualify the prosecutor and to disqualify the entire Office of the State Attorney.
Disqualification of the prosecutor is an improper remedy because no one from the prosecution team, law
enforcement, or co-defendants accessed the emails or the text at issue. Furthermore, disqualification of an
entire state attorney’s office should be rare, and will usually result in a reversible error, because the
Because the State does not know what the emails or text contain, and because speculation is an
insufficient basis to grant relief, as an alternative to the remedies requested by Saldana, the State proposes
that this Honorable Court could review the emails and text at issue in camera to determine whether they
contain privileged attorney-client communications. If this Court determines that the emails and text do
contain privileged communications, a viable alternative remedy would be to suppress the State’s use of
the emails or text at trial. Of note, the State has already prohibited access to the emails and text at issue
from the discovery platform. Additionally, this Honorable Court could hold a hearing wherein the State
can use computer forensics to demonstrate that the e-mails and the text were not reviewed by the
prosecution team or law enforcement, which would rebut Saldana’s allegation of actual prejudice.
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I. Conclusion
Saldana’s Motion is based upon an incorrect assertion that the prosecution team, law enforcement,
or co-defendants accessed emails and a text that contained attorney-client communications. Disregarding
the incorrect assertion, and the fact the Motion is based on speculation, this Honorable Court is confronted
with a single inquiry – whether Saldana has proven sufficient facts to justify the disqualification of the
prosecutor and the extraordinary action of ordering the disqualification of the entire State Attorney’s
Office of the Fourth Judicial Circuit. For the reasons argued above, the answer to that inquiry is a
resounding no because the breach in the upload process was quickly identified and immediately
neutralized. Thus, not only has Dreicer failed to prove sufficient facts to justify disqualifying the entire
State Attorney’s Office, but he has also failed to prove sufficient facts to justify disqualifying the
prosecutor. Furthermore, if a breach of privileged information occurred, Dreicer has failed to demonstrate
that other remedial measures would not be appropriate. Wherefore, the State respectfully requests that this
Honorable Court deny Saldana’s Motion to Disqualify in its entirety. The State also prays that the defense
will, in the future, ask the State simple questions rather than filing spurious motions.
MELISSA NELSON
STATE ATTORNEY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing response has been e-filed and e-served to the
Defendant’s attorneys, Frank J. Tassone, Esquire, Jesse N. Dreicer, Esquire, James P. Hill, Esquire, and
Shannon L. Day, Esquire, at jesse@tassonelaw.com, and a courtesy copy was e-served to the court, on
MELISSA NELSON
STATE ATTORNEY
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