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Managing multicultural societies

Bhikhu Parekh

To cite this article: Bhikhu Parekh (1997) Managing multicultural societies, The Round Table,
86:344, 523-532, DOI: 10.1080/00358539708454386

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 The Round Table (1997), 344 (523-532)

MANAGING
MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETIES
BHIKHU PAREKH

Contemporary multiculturality is historically unique and cannot adequately be

analysed within the framework of the nation state. In Europe, where the nation
state was invented and which coerced the rest of the world to accept it, it is now
being busily dismantled. Leaders of the non-Western world should reflect on the
European experience and evolve forms of political organisation within a better-
suited framework. A plural society needs to strike the right balance between the
demands of unity and diversity, following basic principles under which communi-
ties can feel secure, and affirm their identity in uncoerced interactions while
ensuring that their members can interact as fellow citizens in a shared public
realm. It is only when a political community cultivates the spirit of responsible
and common citizenship that it is able to sustain its unity and diversity. If a
plural society is to hold together, it needs a shared self-understanding and
national identity. Political unity does not require homogeneity, and is best
preserved in a climate of flourishing and self-confident cultural diversities.

LMOST ALL SOCIETIES TODAY ARE MULTICULTURAL, that is,

A they consist of several distinct and self-conscious cultural communities.
Managing them is not easy. The cultural communities cherish their identities
and rightly wish to preserve these. However they must also find enough in
common to enable them to live together as a single community. How do we
reconcile the demands of diversity on the one hand and social unity and
cohesion on the other?
Multicultural societies are, of course, not new to our age. They have existed
in premodern times as well. However four factors distinguish contemporary
multicultural societies. First, contemporary multiculturality is both wider and
deeper. It is wider because cultural diversity covers a much larger area of
human existence than before, and deeper because it is grounded in profound
differences about the conceptions of the good life. Whatever their differences,
most premodern societies were religious, and shared in common many of their
important moral beliefs and social practices. This is not the case today.
Bhikhu Parekh is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Hull in England. This article is
based on the address delivered as the Guest of Honour at the annual Convocation of the University
of Delhi in April 1997. The author is grateful to the Vice-Chancellor, Professor V. R. Mehta, for the
invitation, and to Peter Lyon for suggesting that the suitably revised address might be of wider
interest.

523
 MANAGING MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
Second, contemporary multiculturality is more defiant. In premodern times
minority communities generally accepted their subordinate status, and remained
confined to the social and even the geographical spaces assigned them by the
dominant groups. Thanks to the domination of democratic ideas, they today
demand equality of status, rights, power, and the opportunity to shape the civil
and political life of the wider society.
Third, contemporary multiculturality occurs in the context of increasing glob-
alization powered mainly by Western governments and multinational corpora-
tions. Globalization is a paradoxical phenomenon. On the one hand, it leads to
homogenization of ideas, institutions, and forms of life. On the other hand it
also leads to heterogeneity. It encourages migrations of individuals and even
communities, and diversifies every society. It also provokes fears about the loss
of a society's identity, and stimulates resistance and rediscovery or invention of
indigenous traditions. Since a society is more likely to succeed in global
competition if it has something distinctive to offer, globalization also encour-
ages it to devise new forms of distinguishing itself. Contemporary multicultur-
ality is thus embedded in an immensely complex dialectical process, and
heavily bound up with global economic and political forces.
Finally, contemporary multiculturality occurs against the background of
nearly three centuries of the culturally homogenizing nation state. In almost all
premodern societies the individual's culture was deemed to be an integral part
of his identity, in just the same ways as his body was. The cultural communities
were therefore widely regarded as the bearers of rights and generally left free to
follow their customs and practices. This was as true of the Roman as the
Ottoman and Habsburg empires.
The modern state represented a very different view of social unity. It was
born twins with and suffused by the spirit of liberal individualism, and was a
distinctly liberal institution. Accordingly, it set about dismantling long-estab-
lished communities, and reuniting the 'emancipated' individuals in terms of a
centralized structure of authority grounded in a shared political, and in many
cases even a shared national culture. It recognized only the individuals as the
bearers of rights, nationalized its citizens, insisted on equality (which it equated
with uniformity), and represented a homogeneous legal space made up of
identical political units regulated by identical institutions. All individuals had
equal, that is, the same rights. And this was also true of the territorial units into
which the state might be divided. If any of these units had different needs and
required more or different kinds of rights, the demand was deemed to violate
the principle of equality and rejected. The modern state had a persistent
tendency to become a nation state, which was not a new 19th century phe-
nomenon as some historians and political philosophers argue but inherent in the
very self-understanding of the modern state. Since the state required cultural
and social homogenization as its necessary basis, it has for nearly three
centuries sought to mould the wider society in that direction. Thanks to this, we
have become so accustomed to equating unity with homogeneity and equality
with uniformity that we feel morally and emotionally disorientated with a deep
and defiant diversity.
Although the mode of securing social unity represented by the modern state
has much to be said for it, it is culturally specific, entails considerable moral
524
 MANAGING MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
and physical violence, and only makes sense in a culturally and socially homo-
geneous society. In a highly diverse society, it runs into all kinds of problems.
Some groups of people might refuse to see themselves as individuals or as indi-
viduals only, and might press for communal or what are clumsily called collec-
tive rights. Different communities might have different needs, and demand
different rights and powers. To rule these out in the name of a narrow definition
of equality is not only to provoke resistance but also to deny them justice.
Again, different communities might have different customs and practices, and
might find it difficult to agree on a common body of laws concerning culturally
significant areas of life. Since such common laws are not culturally neutral and
often represent the customs and practices of a specific community, they can
easily become a vehicle of domination by the majority community. Karl Marx
argued, no doubt with some exaggeration, that in a class divided society the
state cannot be economically impartial, and represents a subtle way of institu-
tionalizing and legitimizing the rule of the dominant class. Something similar
can also happen in a culturally plural society. The allegedly neutral state can
easily become a subtle vehicle of enshrining the domination of a specific
cultural community.
I have so far argued that contemporary multiculturality is historically unique,
and that we cannot adequately deal with it within the framework of the nation
state. Indeed the Europeans who invented the institution of the nation state, and
coaxed or coerced the rest of the world into accepting it, are themselves busy
dismantling it. They do not yet know what should take its place, but even the
most ardent nationalists among them realize that it can no longer go on in its
current form. Leaders of the non-Western world therefore need to decolonize
their political imagination, and boldly and creatively explore new forms of
thought and institutional structures. This does not mean that they should ignore
the European political experience or discard the modern state, for those who
ignore history are often condemned to repeat it. Rather they need to reflect on
the European experience, subject the state to a sociohistorical critique, and
evolve forms of political organization that retain its emancipatory potential
within a framework better suited to their societies.
I am not convinced that the idea of the civilizational state that has gained
currency in India in recent decades passes the test. It is, of course, a bold idea
and shows the vitality of Indian thought. However, to the best of my know-
ledge, none of its advocates has defined it with requisite clarity, let alone
sketched its institutional structure. Besides, Indian civilization is not a simple
and homogeneous whole. It is not the same in all parts of the country, it is
composed of several different strands, and it has traditionally sanctioned prac-
tices of which we today strongly disapprove. This raises the question as to
whose or what version of the Indian civilization is to underpin the state, and
what we are to do with those who take a different view of it. I also fear that the
kind of combination of politics and culture that the advocates of the civiliza-
tional state propose might end up emasculating and even corrupting both the
Indian state and the Indian culture.
How then should we think about our political predicament? What is the best
way to conceptualize and cope with deep, defiant and organized cultural diver-
sities? Since I cannot here sketch even the outlines of answer, I shall be content
525
 MANAGING MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
with a few general observations.
A plural society needs to strike a right balance between the demands of unity
and diversity. If it privileges unity and ignores or marginalizes diversity, it
provokes resistance and endangers the very unity it seeks. If, on the other hand,
it makes a fetish of diversity and is frightened to regulate and limit it, it lacks
the capacity to reconcile the conflicting demands of different groups and to hold
the society together, and again risks disintegration. How to reconcile the
demands of unity and diversity cannot be specified in the abstract, for the mode
of reconciliation obviously varies from society to society. Some societies, such
as India, seem able to live with a greater range of diversity than others, and are
content with a diffused sense of unity characteristics of both the Indian civiliza-
tion and Hinduism. Others, such as much of western Europe, can live with indi-
vidual differences but not organized diversity, and feel threatened in the
absence of an organized, institutionalized, clearly defined, and singular source
of unity.
In spite of these differences, no mode of reconciling the demands of unity
and diversity is likely to succeed if it ignores certain basic principles. Every
political community needs to provide autonomous spaces in which its different
communities can feel secure and both affirm and negotiate their respective iden-
tities in their uncoerced interactions with each other. This may take many forms
such as the freedom to regulate their internal affairs themselves and to set up
appropriate cultural and educational institutions, with state support and subsidy
when appropriate. If a community is territorially concentrated, its autonomy
might also require that it should enjoy rights and powers not required by
communities with different needs. When the Meach Lake Agreement in Canada
acknowledged Quebec as a 'distinct society' and gave it powers not available to
other provinces, when the Constitution of Malaysia granted Borneo a 'special
status', or when India conferred on some North Eastern states and Kashmir
special powers and privileges, the countries concerned showed considerable
political wisdom. In terms of the standard theory of the state advocated by
European legal and political philosophers, these countries were open to the
charge of violating the principle of equality. However the authors of the provi-
sions rightly concluded that formal and mechanical equality sometimes violated
the principle of justice, and that even justice, though a very important political
value, needed to be traded off against such other political values as stability,
legitimacy, promotion of diversity, and giving the citizens a cultural stake in the
state.
While ensuring its constituent communities secure cultural spaces, a political
community also needs to ensure that their members are willing and able to
interact as fellow-citizens in a shared public realm. To be a citizen is to be co-
sovereign, to be in charge of the destiny of one's country along with one's
fellow-citizens. Citizenship has three dimensions. It is a legal status entailing
obvious civil and political rights. It is a political practice, a way of thinking
about and participating in the conduct of public affairs. And thirdly, it is a
historical relationship, a mode of integrating oneself into the ongoing life of
one's community, owning its past and its future, and seeing oneself as both an
heir to the country's history and an architect of its future. To be a citizen is to
be willing and able to play all three roles. In the ultimate analysis, a political
526
 MANAGING MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
community is not some transcendental entity but a body of citizens thinking and
living in a certain way. They are the political community, and it is the quality
of their citizenship that determines the quality of the collective political life.
Since the practice of citizenship involves being concerned about the quality
of collective life, it is an autonomous identity, and requires one to rise above
thought not to reject or deny one's narrow ethnic, religious and other identities.
Insofar as we act as citizens, we are nothing more, and of course nothing less,
than members of a specific political community. We share a common public
realm, deliberate about collective affairs in a common public language, and
relate to each other not as Hindus or Muslims, Christians or Jews, but as fellow-
members of a specific community. This is very like what a judge does in a court
of law. He forgets that the defendant standing before him is his son or his wife,
or a person belonging to a different religion. He abstracts away those identities
of his own and the defendant's that are irrelevant to their judicial relationship.
Citizenship is both a judicial and deliberative practice, and has a similar
• character.
A citizen necessarily needs to acquire certain qualities of intellect and
character if he is to be a good and responsible citizen. His intellectual virtues
include such things as knowledge of the history and political institutions of his
community, familiarity with the issues in dispute, the capacity for political
judgement, reasonableness, prudence, and ability to make and receive argu-
ments. And his moral virtues include public spirit, a strong sense of justice, a
passionate concern neither to do nor to tolerate injustice to others, civility,
moderation, tolerance, and a measure of altruism.
It is only when a political community cultivates the spirit of responsible and
common citizenship that it is able to sustain both its unity and diversity.
Common citizenship and secure space for cultural diversity are complementary
and regulate each other. Without the former, diversity lacks a guiding principle,
a moderating influence, a common bond, and becomes subversive and a source
of constant anxiety. Without a secure and flourishing diversity, common
citizenship becomes thin, lacking in moral and cultural depth, and in constant
danger of politicizing all areas of social life.
The intellectual and moral virtues of citizenship are obviously not acquired at
birth, nor picked up in the ordinary course of life. They are not generally
acquired in the family either, for its ethos is quite different, and is in its
standard form too patriarchal and authoritarian to cultivate the virtues required
in a liberal and egalitarian public realm. Nor are the virtues of citizenship
necessarily acquired in civic associations as many enthusiastic advocates of
civil society maintain, for these associations are often pressure groups single-
mindedly pursuing narrow sectional interests and involve people at an age when
they are too old to change their fixed ways. This is not to deny the importance
of civic associations, only to highlight their limitations.
The best places to acquire the virtues of citizenship are educational institu-
tions, especially the schools and, to a lesser extent, the colleges and universities.
They are public institutions, act as bridges between the private and the public
realm, are subject to collective control, and involve working and living together
with people of diverse backgrounds, religions, ideologies and interests. As such
they are cradles of citizenship in a way that other social institutions are not.
527
 MANAGING MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
This important lesson was painfully learned by great Western states, which
naturally made education one of their central concerns. Sometimes they used
educational institutions to impose a common national ideology and even to
promote narrow nationalism. But these are eliminable aberrations, and do not
detract from the fact that educational institutions are indispensable foundations
of a well-organized political community.
Sadly the important lesson is ignored by many a non-Western society,
including India. No Indian government has fully appreciated either the com-
munity-building significance of education, or its vital role in cultivating appro-
priate political virtues in future citizens. Many of its schools lack a core
national curriculum, ignore political education, do little to bridge cultural and
other divisions, and do not adequately ground their pupils in the country's
culture and history. What is no less worrying, it has allowed all manner of
schools to proliferate without the slightest thought as to how such a fragmented
and uncoordinated educational system can ever create common citizenship.
This is not at all to say that a good case cannot be made out for religiously,
ethnically and linguistically based schools; in fact they can play a vital role in
nurturing diversity and building up minority self-esteem. However such schools
hinder common and responsible citizenship unless they share a common
curriculum and a common ethos, aim at broadly similar intellectual and moral
virtues, and form part of a well-thought out educational framework.
In many societies the institutions of the state represent the final court of
appeal. If citizens cannot be sure of securing justice from them, they are left
with no alternative but to take the law into their own hands, and we cannot
blame them if they do so. It is vital, indeed the absolute presupposition of every
political community, that the institutions of the state should be widely perceived
to be legitimate. While authority inheres in the office and is ultimately derived
from the constitution, legitimacy is derived from people's confidence and
willing support. Unlike authority, legitimacy therefore has to be won daily by
ensuring that those in authority exercise it impartially and fairly. The state loses
its legitimacy when its institutions act in a partial and biased manner,
supporting one group but not another, coming down heavily on the minor
peccadilloes of one group but conniving at the major misdeeds of another. In
the modern state, four institutions, namely the civil service, the police, the
army, and the courts of law lie at its heart. They constitute what Hegel rightly
called the universal class, that is, a class embodying, exercising and living up to
the norms inherent in the universality of the state. It is therefore vital that these
institutions are manned by individuals of merit and integrity, that their exercise
of authority is regulated by clearly defined procedures, that their actions be
above suspicion, and that their acts of partiality are subjected to severest
censure and punishment. When we talk of state-building, we basically mean
that we should assiduously cultivate an appropriate professional ethos in these
four institutions, and firmly insulate them against all forms of partisan political
pressure. I do not know of any multicultural society many of whose problems
and tragedies are not caused by the blatant partisanship of the institutions of the
state.
If a plural society is to hold together, it clearly needs a shared self-under-
standing, a conception of what it is and stands for, a national identity. And if the
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 MANAGING MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
society is to ensure both unity and diversity, its national identity should affirm
and reflect its plural composition. National identity, a much used term in
contemporary political discourse, is a complex concept, and often misunder-
stood. It has nothing to do with national essence, spirit or soul, for no such thing
exists, nor with what 19th century writers called national character or culture,
for no community shares an identical character and no culture is an undifferen-
tiated and monolithic whole. National identity does not imply agreed national
goals, for these are necessarily subject to dispute and constant redefinition. And
it does not entail an identical view of the country's history either, for its history
is necessarily complex and contested, open to divergent narratives, and likely to
prove deeply divisive if reduced to a crisp and simple-minded formula.
Basically national identity is articulated in terms of three components. First,
the Constitution or the constitutive principles of a political community. The
Constitution represents the collective self-understanding of the community, the
common platform on which its members have agreed to live together. No
Constitution can be permanent, and it needs to be changed as the community's
self-understanding changes. However, until that occurs, the Constitution
remains the community's minimal basis of unity, and provides the framework
within which all disagreements including those about the Constitution itself are
to be resolved. The German philosopher Jiirgen Habermas is right to stress the
importance of what he calls 'constitutional patriotism'.
The second dimension of national identity has to do with the way a political
community imagines itself. Political communities are highly complex entities.
They involve millions of people whom one never sees but with whose fate
one's own is closely tied up and for whom one is expected to pay taxes, make
sacrifices, and even die. Political communities also encompass countless past
and future generations, to whom again one is bound by close ties. Since the
political community spans past, present and future and involves unseen
millions, it requires a remarkable act of imagination. Indeed the political
community is lived in and created by the imagination, and is in that sense an
imagined community. It is ultimately the way it is imagined, including both the
style in which it is imagined and the content of the imagination.
Unlike the intellect which is necessarily articulated and is only at home in the
language of thoughts, imagination is necessarily articulated in the language of
images and myths. Not surprisingly myths and images play a vital role in
constituting and defining a community's self-understanding and identity.
Indeed there is no community known in history which has not sought to
embody its collective identity in its myths and images. Myths and images are
forms of self-projections. They crystallize and offer highly condensed accounts
of how the community imagines itself, what it takes to be unique to it and repre-
sents its distinctive contribution to the world. Since no community likes to think
low of itself, its dominant myths are generally though not always benign. Myths
are three-dimensional in nature. They are cognitive because they assert some-
thing about the community and are not fictitious in nature. They are affective
because they arouse emotions, and conative because they inspire action.
Let me give an example. The British see themselves as fair, decent, entrepre-
neurial, at their best when their back is against the wall, and so on. These are
obviously myths and self-projections. They are neither wholly true nor wholly
529
 MANAGING MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
false, and can be supported by some obviously selective evidence. However
they reflect qualities the British like about themselves and wish to preserve.
They also form the basis of their self-respect and self-esteem. Since the British
define themselves in terms of these qualities, they seek to live up to them, and
feel or can be made to feel embarrassed and guilty when they don't. As they
live up to their images of themselves, they get increasingly moulded in the
image of their images, and become what they would like to become. Images are
not only self-projections but also tools of self-creation.
What is true of Britain is also true of other countries. The United States is
dominated by such pervasive myths as the manifest destiny, the land of liberty,
and the idea of equal opportunity as reflected in every American's alleged
potential to move from the 'log-cabin to the White House'. Indians imagine
theirs as a synthetic, tolerant and plural civilization, and think that these
qualities represent their unique contribution to the world. None of these self-
representations is wholly true but none is totally false either. These images
inspire them to live up to their demands, guide their conduct, and become
sources of embarrassment and guilt when they are found wanting. Gandhi
invoked them freely to secure inter-communal harmony, and more recently
many sensitive Hindus were deeply embarrassed that some of them should even
have contemplated destroying a mosque.
Myths and images then are an integral part of national identity and a common
currency of political and social discourse. The rationalists among us feel
troubled by the fact that these 'irrational' elements play such an important part
in a country's life, but this is a mistaken even an irrational response. Collective
life is necessarily lived in imagination, and hence it is only rational that it
should be structured by myths and images. Furthermore myths have a cognitive
content, and can and should be criticized, challenged, and replaced over time by
others. Since the dominant myths of every society seek to represent it at its best,
they are generally forces for good or can be made so.
The third component of national identity has to do with the way one relates to
one's community. Identity is not a property, something we possess, but a
relationship, a form of identification. National identity is about whether we
identify with a community, see it as ours, are attached to it, and feel bonded to
our fellow-members in a way in which we are not bonded to outsiders. It
implies that however deep our disagreements and frustrations, we care enough
for each other to want to continue to live together. Such commitment leads to
mutual trust and goodwill, breeds a spirit of relaxed tolerance, and ensures that
not every disagreement is feared as a source of subversion and secession. The
commitment to the community clearly cannot be permanent and unconditional.
I cannot be one of you if you refuse to accept and treat me as one of you, and I
cannot be committed to you if you do not make a similar commitment to me.
This shared sense of common belonging is embodied in and nurtured by such
emotional symbols of collective identification as the national anthem, the flag,
national ceremonies, rituals, and monuments to the dead heroes. These symbols
play an important part in nurturing and vivifying national identity. They are
symbols of our community and not any other, and thus give it an unmistakable
and tangible presence. They integrate us into the life of our community and link
us to its past and future. They also mobilize political emotions, and give
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 MANAGING MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
constitutional patriotism an emotional and cultural depth. The symbols have the
further advantage that they are purely formal and require no substantive
commitment to a specific view of the country's history. Once I have demon-
strated my commitment to the community by identifying with its cherished
symbols, I have proved my loyalty to it and need do no more. In a multicultural
society national symbols should clearly have a multicultural orientation and
content. While they cannot avoid being embedded in the majority community's
collective memories, they need to reflect the presence and be capable of
evoking the loyalty of all major groups.
The dispute about national identity is ultimately about who belongs to the
country and who does not, who is a legitimate and equal part of it and who is
not, who is included and who is excluded. When Malaysians debate whether
their country is 'Malay Malaysia' or 'Malaysian Malaysia', they are debating
the importance to be given to the Malay community. 'Malay Malaysia' makes
the Malays the sole legitimate owners of the country, and treats the Chinese, the
Indians and others as second class citizens, no doubt entitled to full legal
protection but not to participate as equals in the determination of the country's
identity. Disputes between the advocates of Arab Sudan versus African Sudan,
Christian Lebanon versus Muslim Lebanon, Algerian Algeria versus Arabic-
Muslim Algeria, white and Christian Britain versus multi-ethnic Britain, and
Hindu India versus Indian India have a similar thrust. In each case one party
offers an exclusive and the other an inclusive definition of national identity.
The exclusive definition, which is generally favoured by the dominant group,
alienates minorities and even some sections of the dominant group, and
threatens national unity.
In the light of what I have said, national identity is a matter of moral and
emotional identification with a specific group of people sharing its constitutive
principles, and participating in its collective self-understanding. Thus to be an
Indian is to commit oneself to one's fellow-Indians, to base one's relations with
them on the principles and values of the Indian Constitution, and to share and
live up to the self-image of the Indians as a specific kind of people sharing a
distinct civilization. India cannot be a cohesive political community if it asks
for anything more or anything less.
As people of India look back at 50 years of their post-independence history,
they can take legitimate pride in the fact that while such multicultural societies
as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have disintegrated, they have managed to
remain intact. However they cannot be sure of the future. Industrialization,
liberalization and globalization are bound to intensify regional and ethnic
disparities, discontinuity with the past, and worries about the country's cultural
integrity. If they are to navigate their way into the future successfully, they need
to bear in mind the following important lessons of their own and Western
history.
Political unity does not require cultural homogeneity, and is best preserved in
a climate of flourishing and self-confident cultural diversities. Different parts of
the country have different needs, and we should not feel uneasy with an asym-
metrical federation in which different states enjoy different powers. Indians
should also cherish the great cultural and political contributions of their minori-
ties, ensure them equal opportunities, and integrate them more fully and equally
531
 MANAGING MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES
into the national life than they have done so far. All this needs to be done in a
manner that the majority Hindu community can be persuaded to support.
However just a policy might be, it remains ineffective and contentious unless it
enjoys popular legitimacy. Although the ideas of majority and minority are
central to democracy, they must be jxanscended and moderated by a deeper
sense of common belonging. Indians therefore need to pay far more attention
than they have done so far to cultivating common citizenship by appropriately
redesigning their educational institutions.
They should not lose touch with their past either. It is really depressing that,
the collected works of such writers as Kalidas, Bhavabhuti and Bana, and the
collected plays, poetry and short stories of classical Sanskrit and medieval
Muslim literature are not available in any of the Indian languages. This denies
the youth access to a vital part of the national cultural heritage, and augurs ill
for inter-generational continuity.
India also needs to take a balanced view of its past. History is an intensely
political discipline, and it is striking that in its current form it emerged at the
same time as the modern state. A deeply contested past leads to an equally
contentious future. India should therefore confront its past with honesty and
charity, know what to forget and what to remember, and evolve a historical
narrative that all Indians can be reasonably expected to share. Above all, it
should develop an inclusive definition of its national identity so that Indians of
all religious, ethnic, linguistic and regional affiliations can enthusiastically
subscribe to it and feel at home in the country.

532