Statutory Construction
MODULE 6: LITERAL INTERPRETATION AND DEPARTURE THEREFROM
A. Literal Interpretation
As a general rule, the intent of legislature to be ascertained
and thereafter given effect is the intent expressed in the
language of the statute.
Index animi sermo: speech is the index of intention.
 Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum
Verba legis is a constitutional construction principle which
means that wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013
The principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
KEYWORDS: Appointment, meaning of endeavor
FACTS:
 Arsemio de Guzman was appointed on a permanent
status as Financial Management Specialist IV of
TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC).
 Director Bugtong disallowed De Guzman’s
appointment because the position of Financial
Management Specialist IV was not included in the
DBM’s Index of Occupational Service.
 TIDCORP’s Executive Vice President Jane U.
Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De Guzman’s
appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC-
NCR. According to Tambanillo, Republic Act No. 8494,
which amended TIDCORP’s charter, empowers its
Board of Directors to create its own organizational
structure and staffing pattern, and to approve its own
compensation and position classification system and
qualification standards.
CSC-NCR Director Padilla denied Tambanillo’s appeal

because De Guzman’s appointment failed to comply
with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 40, which requires that the position title of an
appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with
the approved Position Allocation List and must be
found in the Index of Occupational Service. Since the
position of Financial Management Specialist IV is not
included in the Index of Occupational Service, de
Guzman’s appointment to this position must be invalid.
 Valdes reiterated TIDCORP’s argument that RA 8494
authorized its Board of Directors to determine its own
organizational structure and staffing pattern, and
exempted TIDCORP from all existing laws on
compensation, position classification and qualification
standards.
 In its Resolution No. 30144, the CSC-CO affirmed the
CSC-NCR’s decision that de Guzman’s appointment
should have complied with CSC Memorandum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow
issued requirements pursuant to the Position Classification
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Act despite its exemption from laws involving position
classification.
HELD:
No, under the principles of statutory construction, if a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
This plain-meaning rule or verba legis is derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) and rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intent and preclude the court from construing it differently.
The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure.
The phrase "to endeavour" means to "to devote serious and
sustained effort" and "to make an effort to do." It is
synonymous with the words to strive, to struggle and to
seek.
The use of "to endeavour" in the context of RA 8494 means
that despite TIDCORP’s exemption from laws involving
compensation, position classification and qualification
standards, it should still strive to conform as closely as
possible with the principles and modes provided in RA 6758.
The phrase "as closely as possible," which qualifies
TIDCORP’s duty "to endeavour to conform," recognizes that
the law allows TIDCORP to deviate from the Position
Classification Act, but it should still try to hew closely with its
principles and modes. Had the intent of Congress been to
require TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply with
the Position Classification Act, it would have so stated in
unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP
was to endeavour to conform to the principles and modes
of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this law.
 Dura lex sed lex
The law may be harsh but that is the law.
Olympio Revaldo v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009
Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex.
The law may be harsh but that is the law.
KEYWORDS: illegal possession of lumber without permit,
mala prohibita
FACTS:
 Petitioner Olympio Revaldo was charged with the
offense of illegal possession 96.14 board feet of
premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68
of the Forestry Code.
Value: P1,703.53; Pieces: 21
 The petitioner was a carpenter who specialized in
furniture making. On June 18, 1992, policemen,
without search warrant, arrived at his house and
inspected and seized the lumber therein.
 Petitioner admitted to the police that he had no
permit to possess the lumber because they were only
given to them by his aunt (Bolo), uncle (Bug-os) and
mother-in-law (Tenio). Seven pieces were actually
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Statutory Construction
leftover lumber from a divider he worked on before.
Petitioner said he will use the lumber to repair his
dilapidated house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be acquitted
1. SC affirmed the decision of the trial court and the CA.
The Forestry Code provides that mere possession of forest
products without the proper documents consummates the
crime (Section 68). In addition, the law authorizes the PNP
to arrest even without warrant any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined therein (Section 80). In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to produce the necessary permit
authorizing him to possess the lumber.
Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law.
Plain View Doctrine
Objects falling in “plain view” of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence
Arnel Sagana v. Richard A. Francisco
G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009
The principle of dura lex sed lex versus the notion that
technicalities should yield to broader interests of justice.
KEYWORDS: Petitioner not receiving summons
FACTS:
 Petitioner Arnel Sagana filed a Complaint for
Damages alleging that respondent Richard A.
Francisco, with intent to kill and without justifiable
reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right
thigh. As a result, petitioner incurred medical expenses
and suffered wounded feelings, and was compelled
to engage the services of a lawyer, due to
respondent’s refusal to pay said expenses. Petitioner
thus demanded payment for actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
 Several summons was sent to the respondent’s given
address, however the occupant of that house told him
that respondent is unknown at said address.
 Process Server again tried to serve the summons at the
address of the respondent but no avail. According to
Iconar’s handwritten notation on the summons, he
was informed by Michael Francisco, respondent’s
brother, that respondent no longer lived at said
address. However, he left a copy of the summons to
Michael Francisco.
 The trial court issued an Order finding that the
summons was validly served to respondent through his
brother, Michael. It thus declared respondent in
default and allowed petitioner to present his evidence.
Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court
documents were furnished to respondent.
 Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo
Q. Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and Motion
denying that he received the summons or that he was
authorized to receive summons on behalf of his
brother. He alleged that the substituted service did not
comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
 The trial court issued an Order denying Michael
Francisco’s Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit.
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Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
hereby orders defendant to pay plaintiff.
 Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he
received a copy of the trial court’s Decision that the
same was contrary to the law, facts, and evidence,
and praying that his appeal be given due course.
 The Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed
Decision granting the appeal and setting aside the
Decision of the trial court. The appellate court held
that the service of summons was irregular and such
irregularity nullified the proceedings before the trial
court. Since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent, the trial court’s decision
was void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid service of summons upon
the respondent.
HELD:
Yes, there was a valid service of summons upon the
respondent.
The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant and to notify the
defendant that an action has been commenced so that
he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim
against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we find
that respondent was duly apprised of the action against
him and had every opportunity to answer the charges
made by the petitioner. However, since respondent
refused to disclose his true address, it was impossible to
personally serve summons upon him. Considering that
respondent could not have received summons because of
his own pretenses, and has failed to provide an
explanation of his purported "new" residence, he must now
bear the consequences.
It is, at times, difficult to reconcile the letter of the law with
its spirit. Thus, it is not altogether surprising that two
competing values are usually discernable in every
controversy – the principle of dura lex sed lex versus the
notion that technicalities should yield to broader interests
of justice. In our rules of procedure, for instance, judges
often struggle to find a balance between due process
considerations and a liberal construction to secure a just
disposition of every action.
B. Departure from literal interpretation
 Statutes must be capable of interpretation
Statute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise
inoperative.
Court must use every authorized means to ascertain the
intent of the statute and give it an intelligible meaning. If
effort is impossible to solve the doubt and dispel the
obscurity of a statute, if no judicial certainty can be had as
to its meaning, the court is not at liberty to supply nor to
make one.
If statute fails to express a meaning, judicial modesty
forbids court from assuming and from supplying a meaning
thereto.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeatquam pereat:
that interpretation as will give the thing efficacy is to be
adopted. A law should be interpreted with a view to
upholding rather than destroying it.
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Statutory Construction
Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation.
R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle
III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law.
KEYWORDS: Amending the Constitution by People’s
Initiative
FACTS:
 Private respondent filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a “Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
order
(1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all
over the country;
(2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and
the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution,
in newspapers of general and local circulation; and
(3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of
the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
 Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated
powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed
to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and
inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is
void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not:
(1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal,
(2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and
(3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid.
HELD:
1) NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The
conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main
thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national
and local laws.
2) R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared
void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation.
R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle
III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law.
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 Ratio legis et anima
Moving away from the literal interpretation
Maxims:
ratio legis et anima legis (the reason of the law is its soul);
ratione cessat lex et cessat lex (when the reason of the law
ceases, the law ceases)
Presumption: The letter of the law is its body; the spirit
(reason), the soul; and the construction of the former
should never be so rigid and technical as to destroy the
latter.
Rodolfo G. Navarro v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for
what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not
within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute.
KEYWORDS: creating the province
FACTS:
 The President approved into law Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands).
 The COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite
for the ratification of the creation of the province
under the Local Government Code (LGC). The
plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes. With the approval of the people from
both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and
the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).
 Petitioners filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed
the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
 Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for
certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of
Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would
unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a
large chunk of the provincial territory.
 Movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments
to challenge the above Resolution, namely:
(1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as
an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the
LGC;
(2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity,
when the intended province consists of two or
more islands, includes the exemption from the
application of the minimum land area
requirement; and
(3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is
applicable in the instant case.
 The Court denied the Motion and issued an order for
Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this
case had become final and executory.
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Statutory Construction
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 valid.
HELD:
Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of
Dinagat to become a full-fledged province, enacted R.A.
No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area
requirement, which, with respect to the creation of
provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the
LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers,
Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when
it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of
Dinagat.
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the
law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,
for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is
not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but
not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit
differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is
as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal,
courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and
its legislators
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
The quoted constitutional texts are both terse and general
in their terms. However, they are not, in fact, as bare as
they would seem, as the words used carry meanings and
intents expressed during the deliberations and the voting
that took place to determine what the Constitution would
exactly provide.
KEYWORDS: disqualification of partylist groups
FACTS:
 The Comelec disqualified 52 party-list groups and
organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections, particularly those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and
sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sectors; AND (2)
all nominees must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent.
 Aggrieved by the disqualification, said part-list groups
via Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari
and Prohibition, alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the Comelec.
HELD:
Purpose Behind the Party-list Innovation
Unmistakably, the quoted constitutional texts are both terse
and general in their terms. However, they are not, in fact,
as bare as they would seem, as the words used carry
meanings and intents expressed during the deliberations
and the voting that took place to determine what the
Constitution would exactly provide.
Basic in understanding the constitutional text is the intent
that led to the modification of the system of legislative
district elections that the country has used even before the
1935 Constitution.
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 Literal import must yield to intent
If there’s two conflicting theories, courts choose which best
accords with the spirit or intent of the law.
Conscience and equity should always be considered in the
construction of a statute.
The spirit and intendment of the law must prevail over its
letter.
- Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire: words
ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the
intent to the words.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come
within its spirit or intent.
Limitation of rule
What is within the spirit of a statute even if not within the
letter is applicable only if there is ambiguity in the
language of the law.
Automotive Parts & Equipment Company v. Jose B. Lingad
G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969
The choice between conflicting theories falls on that which
best accords with the letter of the law and with its purpose
KEYWORDS: increasing of salaries due to enactment of a
new law
FACTS:
 Automotive Parts & Equipment Company,
Incorporated alleged that it was duly incorporated on
1961 and that from the start of its operation, its
employees were paid on a daily and monthly basis.
 The aforesaid amendatory act took effect and that
respondents construed its provision "in such a way as
to require the petitioner to increase the salaries of all
the monthly paid employees of the petitioner.
 Petitioner sought to justify its refusal to abide by the
interpretative bulletin of respondents requiring the
increase to a minimum a month for employees paid
on a monthly basis in this wise: The petitioner believes
that Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 particularly that portion
prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to employees
in excess of the minimum wage established in the Act
only refers and applies to employers in business prior to
and at the time of enactment of the Act and that the
prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements
as envisioned in Sec 19 should not be applied
prospectively to employers coming into existence
subsequent to the effective date of said Act.
 The lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: "Sec.
2 of R.A. No. 4180 provides that 'Any provision of law
previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act
that is inconsistent with any provision of this Act is
hereby repealed.' Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being
inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 has not been repealed;
on the other hand, the provisions of Section 19 of R.A.
No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 were
deemed and impliedly re-enacted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court decided the matter
correctly.
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Statutory Construction
HELD:
Yes, the lower court decided the matter correctly.
Even if the plain legislative purpose so evident on the face
of the statute is not to vitalize and implement what the
Constitution enjoins, still there is no escape from an equally
authoritative principle of statutory construction that bars
acceptance on what appellant would foist upon the
judiciary as an acceptable interpretation. "It is
fundamental that once the policy or purpose of the law
has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the
judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, decided in 1909, it has been
our constant holding that the choice between conflicting
theories falls on that which best accords with the letter of
the law and with its purpose. The next year, in an equally
leading decision, United States v. Toribio, there was a
caveat against a construction that would tend 'to defeat
the purpose and object of the legislator.'
If the interpretation offered by appellant would be
considered acceptable, then there would be a negation
of the above purpose of the amendatory act increasing
the minimum wage law. That would be to defeat and
frustrate rather than to foster its policy. It must be rejected.
United States v. Toribio
15 Phil. 85 (1910)
Topic: Literal import must yield to intent
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two
or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest
intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which
the statute was enacted…
KEYWORDS: slaughtering of cattles without permit
FACTS:
 Toribio was found by the trial court of Bohol violating
Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating
the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large
Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit
for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human
consumption.
 Appellant Toribio slaughtered or caused to be
slaughtered his carabao without a permit from the
municipal treasurer of the municipality.
 It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province
of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is
no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for
appellant contends that under such circumstances
the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor
penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit
of the municipal treasure.
 Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to
slaughter the animal but was not given one because
the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural
work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter
said carabao in a place other than the municipal
slaughterhouse.
 Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under
Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for
agricultural work can be slaughtered.
 Appellant also contended that the act constitutes a
taking of property for public use in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain without providing for the
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compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for
it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private
property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition and the penalty imposed in
Act No. 1147 is limited only to the slaughter of large cattle
at the municipal slaughterhouse.
HELD:
1. NO. The prohibition and penalty imposed in Act No. 1147
applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured
from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the killing
for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
without such permit.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two
or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest
intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for which
the statute was enacted, and a construction should be
rejected which would tend to render abortive other
provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which
the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
Sy Tiong shiou v. Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy
G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009
KEYWORDS: failure to make deposits in a corporation
FACTS:
 Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons,
Inc. (the corporation) submitted a letter to the
corporation’s Board of Directors stating that Felicidad
Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the
corporation’s banks thus the total bank remittances
for the past years were less than reflected in the
corporate financial statements, accounting books
and records. Finally, Juanita Tan sought to be free
from any responsibility over all corporate funds.
 Banaria, Banaria & Company in its report, the
accounting firm attributed to the Spouses Sy
P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and
disbursements from 1994 to 2002.
 A demand letter was subsequently served on the
Spouses Sy. On the same date, the children of the
Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash,
postdated checks and other important documents.
After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly transferred
residence and ceased reporting to the corporation.
Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint
for robbery against the Spouses Sy.
 The corporation filed its Amended Complaint for
Accounting and Damages against the Spouses Sy
praying for a complete and true accounting of all the
amounts paid to, received and earned by the
company since 1993 and for the restitution of the said
amount.
 The Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-
Party Complaint, praying that their attached Third
Party Complaint be allowed and admitted against Sy
Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party
complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou and
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Statutory Construction 2022

Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation’s - This may happen when the purpose of the statute sought
claim for misappropriating corporate funds. to be achieved by it is accomplished, or the mischief
sought to be repressed is prevented, by an act or event
 Tthe trial court granted the motion for leave to file the independent of the statute itself.
third-party complaint, and forthwith directed the
issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan. B/Gen. Jose Comendador v. Gen. Renato S. De Villa
G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991
 Their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou
and Juanita Tan were not furnished with the copies of
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the
several pleadings, as well as a court order, which
reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
resulted in their having been declared in default for
failure to file their answer to the third-party complaint;
KEYWORDS: AFP’s participation in the failed coup d’ etat
thus, they instead filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
 The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the
 The Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong
Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
Shiou and Juanita Tan. The appellate court declared
participation in the failed coup d' etat
that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
 A Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel issued a uniform
Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules).
subpoena individually addressed to the petitioners.
The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of
ISSUE:
the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and
Whether or not a third-party complaint is prohibited by the
death and medical certificates of victims of the
Interim Rules.
rebellion.
HELD:
 At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners
No, the third-party complaint should be allowed.
challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file
For while a third-party complaint is not included in the
their objections in writing through a Motion for
allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones.
Summary Dismissal.
Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the
well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every
 The PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
petitioners 5 days to submit their respective counter-
the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
 The petitioners manifested that they were exercising
their right to raise peremptory challenges against the
Statutes, including rules, should be construed in the light of
president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking
the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled,
suppressed and they should be given such construction as
however, that peremptory challenges had been
will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure
discontinued under P.D. No.39.
the benefits intended.
Peremptory means final and absolute, without needing
A statute should therefore be read with reference to its
any underlying justification.
leading idea, and its general purpose and intention should
be gathered from the whole act, and this predominant
ISSUE:
purpose will prevail over the literal import of particular
Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to
terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a
peremptory challenge.
limitation upon some and as a reason for expanding the
signification of others, so that the interpretation may
HELD:
accord with the spirit of the entire act, and so that the
Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge.
policy and object of the statute as a whole may be made
effectual and operative to the widest possible extent.
The right to peremptory challenge was originally provided
Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law
under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).
determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in the rules
in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent
When President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39
(Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction,
Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals).
 Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.
When reason of law ceases, the law itself ceases
President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
- raton legis est anima: the reason of the law is its soul. termination of the state of martial law throughout the
Philippines. With the termination of martial law and the
The reason behind the law is the heart of the law. dissolution of the military tribunals created there under, the
Reason of the law plays a decisive role in its construction. reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.
- A statute may render a prior law devoid of reason.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the
- Where a later law has a purpose in conflict with that of a reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante
prior statute on the same subject, the latter has lost all rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold
meaning and function and has ceased to exist. that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in
P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of

Kat Atienza | 6
Statutory Construction
martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived
and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge
 Supplying legislative omission
Where a literal import of the language of a statute shows
that words have been omitted that should have been in
the statute in order to carry out its intent and spirit, clearly
ascertainable from the context, the court may supply the
omission to make the statute conform to the obvious intent
of the legislature or to prevent the act from being absurd.
Rule is corollary with the rule that what is within the spirit of
the law is within the law.
Governor Rodolfo C. Farinas v. Mayor Angelo M. Barba
G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996
KEYWORDS: authority and power to appoint
FACTS:
 Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. He resigned after going
without leave to the United States.
 To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a
recommendation for the appointment of Edward
Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor
Barba.The resolution, containing the recommendation,
was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of
the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act
under this provision of the Local Government Code,
disapproved the resolution “for the reason that the
authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan
members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the
Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On
June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed petitioner
Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the
other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed
respondent Edward Palafox to the same position.
 Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos
Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition.
 The trial court rendered its decision, upholding the
appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent
Mayor Barba.
ISSUE:
Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance
with what procedure?
HELD:
The person who has the power to appoint under such
circumstance is the Governor upon the recommendation
of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither
petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was
appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding
paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was
vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo.
2022
For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the
provincial governor, he was not recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand,
respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the
provincial governor who appointed him
 Construction to avoid absurdity
General terms of a statute should be so limited in their
application as not to lead to absurdities. It is presumed that
the legislature intended exceptions to its language which
would avoid absurd consequences.
Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut evitetur
inconveniens et absurdum: Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is
to be adopted.
Where literal adherence to the language would result to
absurdity, the court has the power to supply or omit the
words from a statute in order to prevent an absurd result.
Courts test the law by its result. There are laws which are
generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstance.
Courts are not bound to apply them in slavish obedience
to their language.
A law should not be interpreted so as not to cause injustice.
Where a term is defined in a statute, the court may not
construe it to exclude what is included therein as to restrict
its scope.
Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.
KEYWORDS: recall election
FACTS:
 Petitioner Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of
Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last
regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his
recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered
voters of the barangay.
 Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent
COMELEC resolved to approve the petition,
scheduled the petition and set the recall election. The
COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in
view of petitioner's opposition.
 The COMELEC set anew the recall election. To prevent
the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a
petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a
temporary restraining order. After conducting a
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining
order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner
and his counsel to explain why they should not be
cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the
barangay recall election was without COMELEC
approval.
 The COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the
recall election, hence, the instant petition for certiorari
with urgent prayer for injunction.
Kat Atienza | 7
Statutory Construction 2022

 Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Karen E. Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, China
Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise Banking Corporation and Greg Bartelli y Northcott
known as the Local Government Code, which states G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997
that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official's assumption to office or
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended for right
election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January
and justice to prevail.
13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by
KEYWORDS: minor lured by a foreigner, dollar account
Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996,
and every three years thereafter.
FACTS:
 Karen E. Salvacion, then 12 years old, was coaxed
ISSUE:
and lured by private respondent Greg Bartelli y
Whether or not the recall election is valid.
Northcott to go with him in his apartment, where she
was detained for four days and was raped 10 times.
HELD:
Aside from the criminal case for serious illegal
No, the recall is not valid.
detention and 4 counts of rape filed by the Makati
investigating fiscal, the petitioner along with her
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
parents, file in Regional Trial Court (RTC) a civil case for
statute must be interpreted with reference to the
damages with preliminary attachment against Bartelli,
context,i.e., that every part of the statute must be
which the court then granted.
considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
 A notice of garnishment was served to China Banking
Corporation, where the dollar account of the private
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective
respondent was deposited, by the Deputy Sheriff of
local official to recall election once during his term of office.
Makati. But respondent bank invoking Republic Act
Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a)
No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment
merely designates the period when such elective local
served on it and later on invoked Section 113 of
official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during
Central Bank Circular No. 960, to the effect that the
the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to
dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt
petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe
process or process of any court, legislative body,
the novel provision of the Local Government Code on
government agency or any administrative body.
recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of
the people before the end of his term. And if the SK
 In a letter in response to the inquiry of the counsel of
election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three
petitioners to Central Bank, it is stated that the
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the
provision in Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
purview of the phrase "regular local election", as
960 is absolute in application and that it does not
erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election
admit of any exception, nor has the same been
can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of
repealed nor amended.
the Local Government Code.
 The court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners,
Petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to
Petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit.
absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case,
the Court made the following admonition: We admonish
ISSUES:
against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
Whether the dollar bank deposit of Greg Bartelli in China
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
Bank Corporation be exempted from attachment,
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in
garnishment or any other order or process of any court,
"the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth. The spirit,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative
rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
body
hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according
to its spirit and intent.
HELD:
No, the provisions of Section 133 of CB Circular No. 960 are
 Construction in favor of right and justice hereby held to be inapplicable to this case because of its
Any doubt in the construction of a statute should be peculiar circumstances and the Court requires respondents
resolved in favor of right and justice. to comply with the writ to execution and to release to
petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
The fact that a statute is silent, obscure or insufficient with Northcott in such amount as would justify the judgment.
respect to a question before the court will not justify the
latter from declining to render judgment thereon. In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of
its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section
Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius 113 of CB Circular No 960 which exempts from attachment,
detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which was restated garnishment or any other order or process of any court.
with ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con Legislative body, government agency or any
daño de otro. Courts invoke these principles when the administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
statutes are silent or obscure in order to arrive at a solution transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
that would respond to the vehement (passionate) urge of aggrieved by a foreign guessed like accused Greg Bartelli.
conscience. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which
provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or
In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
tip the scales which the court believes will best promote body intended for right and justice to prevail. Simply stated,
the public welfare in its probable operation as a general when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
rule or principle.

Kat Atienza | 8
Statutory Construction
fundamental solutions that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience.
 Law does not require the impossible
•Nemo tenetur ad impossible – the law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility
•Impossibilium nulla obligation est – no obligation to do an
impossible thing
•Impossible compliance versus Substantial compliance
(as required by law)
Pedro T. Santos, Jr. v. PNOC
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008
The law does not require that the impossible be done.
Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted
in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common
sense, reason and practicability
KEYWORDS: unpaid car loan
FACTS:
 PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a
complaint for a sum of money against petitioner
Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount
sought to be collected was the petitioner’s unpaid
balance of the car loan advanced to him by
respondent when he was still a member of its board of
directors.
 Personal service of summons were made to petitioner
but failed because the latter cannot be located in his
last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the trial court
allowed service of summons by publication.
Respondent caused the publication of the summons
in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the
affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of
respondent’s employee to the effect that he sent a
copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner’s
last known address.
 Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed
period despite the publication of summons. Hence,
respondent filed a motion for the reception of its
evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion
and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and
formal offer of its evidence.
 Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging that the
affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to
comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
 Trial court denied the said motion and held that the
rules did not require such execution with the clerk of
court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioner’s
answer because the same was filed way beyond the
reglementary period.
 Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for
certiorari contending that the court committed grave
abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to
improper service of summons, failure to furnish him
with copies of its orders and processes and upholding
technicality over equity and justice.
ISSUE:
2022
Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial
court to furnish Petitioner with copies of orders and
processes issued in the course of the proceedings
HELD:
No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he
had to file an Omnibus Motion to Admit Attached Answer.
The disputed order was a finding that the Santos was in
default for failure to file an answer or pleading within the
period fixed. It is illogical to notify him of the order simply on
account of the reality that he was no longer residing
and/or found on his last known address and his
whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons.
Santos could not reasonably demand that copies of orders
and processes be furnished him. His residence or
whereabouts is not known and he cannot be located.
In the case at bar, there is obviously no way notice can be
sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to
him. The law does not require that the impossible be done.
Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted
in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common
sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it may, a copy
of the September 11, 2003 order was still mailed to him at
his last known address but it was unclaimed.
 Number and gender of words
When the context of a statute so indicates, words in plural
include the singular, and vice versa.
A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a
singularperson or thing, just as a singular word may
embrace two or more persons or things
 Art. 996 CC – (law on succession) such article also
applies to a situation where there is only one child
because “children” includes “child”
 ElectionCode–“candidate” comprehends “some
candidates” or “all candidates”
 On gender – the masculine, but not the feminine,
includes all genders, unless the context in which the
word is used in the statute indicates otherwise
Santillon v. Miranda
G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965
it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural
include the singular.
KEYWORDS: Child vs Children
FACTS:
 Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving one
son, Claro Santillon, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda.
During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of
land located in that province.
 Four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a
petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said
petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda
and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario
Corrales on the following grounds:
(a) that the properties enumerated in the
petition were all conjugal, except three parcels
which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her
exclusive properties;
Kat Atienza | 9
Statutory Construction 2022

(b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two

documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided
share in most of the properties enumerated in
the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario;

(c) that administration of the estate was not

necessary, there being a case for partition
pending; and

(d) that if administration was necessary at all, the

oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the
petitioner was better qualified for the post. It
appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta
Miranda was appointed administrator of the
estate.

 The court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty

days, a project of partition and distribution of all the
properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.

 Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to

resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with
respect to their respective rights in the estate.

 The court issued an order, the dispositive portion of

which is hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate
succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the
surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-
HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2)
share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after
deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the
conjugal properties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the word “children” in Art. 996 can also be
interpreted as “child” in accordance with Art. 892?

HELD:
Yes, it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in
plural include the singular.

So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If

the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the
surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child."

Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the

ground that "child" is not included in "children," the
consequences would be tremendous, because "children"
will not include "child".

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference

from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the
Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies,
the first, where the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where
the widow or widower survives with only one child
(exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second
situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to
promulgate just one general rule applicable to both
situations.

Kat Atienza | 10
Statutory Construction
MODULE 7: IMPLICATIONS
I. Necessary Implications
•So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced
•StatCon rule: to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
Implication
•Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much
apart thereof as that which is expressed
•Ex necessitate legis – from the necessity of the law
•Every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege
• In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus – greater
includes the lesser
Necessity
 includes such inferences as may be logically be drawn
from the purpose or object of the statute, from what
the legislature must be presumed to have intended,
and from the necessity of making the statute effective
and operative
 excludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, or
desirable must be consistent with the Constitution or to
existing laws an implication which is violative of the
law is unjustified or unwarranted
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
v. United Planners Consultants, Inc.
G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015
FACTS:
 Petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau
(LMB), entered into an Agreement for Consultancy
Services (Consultancy Agreement) with respondent
United Planners Consultants, Inc. in connection with
the Land Resource Management Master Plan Project
(LRMMP).
 Under the Consultancy Agreement, petitioner
committed to pay a total contract price of
P4,337,141.00, based on a pre-determined
percentage corresponding to the particular stage of
work accomplished.
 Respondent completed the work required, which
petitioner formally accepted. However, petitioner was
able to pay only 47% of the total contract price.
 For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy
Agreement despite repeated demands, respondent
file a Complaint against petitioner. Upon motion of
respondent, the case was subsequently referred to
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause of the
Consultancy Agreement, which petitioner did not
oppose.
The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award (Arbitral

Award) in favor of respondent, directing petitioner to
pay.
 Unconvinced, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the Arbitral Tribunal merely
noted without any action, claiming that it had already
lost jurisdiction over the case after it had submitted to
the RTC its Report together with a copy of the Arbitral
Award.
2022
 Petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of
the Special ADR Rules, resulting in the dismissal of
petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED.
Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,” institutionalized
the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADR
System) in the Philippines.
The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption
by the Supreme Court of any ADR system as a means of
achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving cases
pending before all courts in the Philippines. Under Section
17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, no motion for
reconsideration or new trial may be sought, but any of the
parties may file a motion for correction of the final award.
Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the
life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be
nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While
it appears that the Special ADR Rules remain silent on the
procedure for the execution of a confirmed arbitral award,
it is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’ procedural
mechanisms cover not only aspects of confirmation but
necessarily extend to a confirmed award’s execution in
light of the doctrine of necessary implication which states
that every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege.
In Atienza v. Villarosa, the doctrine of necessary implication
was explained, thus: No statute can be enacted that can
provide all the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a particular situation.
What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-
embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for
the unfolding of events of the future. So-called gaps in the
law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine
of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which
is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective
rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences
as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right
or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right
or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the
lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper inest et
minus.
Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc. v. Hon. Undersecretary
Bienvenido E. Laguesma
G.R. No. 116194, February 2, 2000
KEYWORDS:
FACTS:
 Association of professional supervisory office and
technical Employees Union, a labor organization
affiliated with the trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (APSOTEU-TUCP) file petition for certification
election of supervisory employees of SRBI.
Kat Atienza | 11
Statutory Construction
 The med-arbiter set the certification election
conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP. SRBI
filed a motion to dismiss the union’s petition.
 Respondent members were not managerial
employees but supervisory employees which are
allowed to join, form or assist their own union (art 245
labor code).
 Med-arbiter denied the motion.
 SRBI appealed to the secretary of labor and
employment about the med-arbiter's decision, but
then secretary denied.
 Med-arbiter scheduled the certification election, the
SRBI filed a motion to suspend but then, it was denied.
 SRBI seeking the cancellation of the respondents union
registration before Dole regional office; argued that
APSOTEU-TUCP members are managerial and
confidential employees who were prohibited from
joining, organizing unions, but then dole denied.
 Then SRBI filed petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the court for the annulment of the resolution of
dole in favor of the order of med-arbiter w/c denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss respondent union's
petition for cert. election.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the members of the union are managerial
and or highly placed confidential employees.
2Whether or not the med-arbiter may validly order the
holding of a certification of election upon the filing of a
petition for certification by a registered union despite the
petitioner's appeal.
HELD:
Court denied the Petition.
Art 212 Labor Code defines managerial and supervisory
employees. Petitioner failed to show that the employees in
question recommend the hiring and appointing of his
subordinates well as the power to recommend any
promotions and or increase salaries, and other powers such
as transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline. Cashiers, accountants, and acting chief loans
department of Art 245 of labor code does not directly
prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union
activities. However, in doctrine of necessary implication the
disqualification of managerial employees equally applies
to confidential employees.
Petitioner does not state who among the employees has
access to information specifically relating to its labor and
relation policies.
II. Grant of power includes incidental power
As a rule, where a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise
of one or the performance of the other is also conferred.
The incidental powers are those which are necessarily
included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the
power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not
embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto.
Power conferred by law upon an administrative officer to
issue rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of a
statute he is called upon to execute includes the authority
to delegate to a subordinate officer the performance of a
particular function, absent any express or implied provision
to the contrary.
2022
Carmelo F. Lazatin v. HRET
G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988
KEYWORDS:
FACTS:
 During the canvassing of votes, Private respondent
Lorenzo Timbol objected to the inclusion of certain
election returns. But since the Municipal Board of
Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought
his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19,
1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the
winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga.
However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the
canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On
May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as
Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in
the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners
proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent
also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from
assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the
second petition so petitioner was able to assume
office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the
COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab
initio. Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of
petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private
respondent filed in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.
 Petitioner argued that the private respondent’s protest
had been filed late citing Sec 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code. However the HRET filed that the protest
had been filed on time in accordance with Sec 9 of
the HRET Rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
Yes, the court ruled that the petitioner’s reliance on Sec
250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. The
COMELEC’s exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election
of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)].
expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and
the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate
rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction,
including the period for filing election protests before it, is
beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows
from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This
is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission
It is a settled rule of construction that where a general
power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence
of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of
Kat Atienza | 12
Statutory Construction
its exclusivepower to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is
well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period
within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded
not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but,
more importantly, on the clear language of the
Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having
been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the
latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear
the case.
Cemco Holdings, Inc. v. National Life Insurance Company
of the Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007
KEYWORDS:
FACTS:
 Union Cement Corporation (UCC) has two principal
stockholders UCHC with shares amounting to 60.51%,
and petitioner Cemco with 17.03%. Majority of UCHCs
stocks were owned by BCI with 21.31% and ACC with
29.69%. Cemco, on the other hand, owned 9% of
UCHC stocks. BCI informed the Philippine Stock
Exchange (PSE) that it and its subsidiary ACC had
passed resolutions to sell to Cemco the BCIs stocks in
UCHC equivalent to 21.31% and ACCs stocks in UCHC
equivalent to 29.69%. as a result of petitioner Cemcos
acquisition of BCI and ACCs shares in UCHC,
petitioners total beneficial ownership, direct and
indirect, in UCC has increased by 36% and amounted
to at least 53% of the shares of UCC.
 As a consequence the PSE, inquired to SEC as to
whether the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of the
Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code
is not applicable to the purchase by petitioner of the
majority of shares of UCC.The SECs Corporate Finance
Department responded to the query of the PSE that
while it was the stance of the department that the
tender offer rule was not applicable, the matter must
still have to be confirmed by the SEC en banc.
Thereafter, SEC confirmed that the SEC en banc had
resolved that the Cemco transaction was not covered
by the tender offer rule.
 Feeling aggrieved by the transaction, respondent
National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines,
Inc., a minority stockholder of UCC, sent a letter to
Cemco demanding the latter to comply with the rule
on mandatory tender offer. Cemco, however, refused.
Respondent filed a complaint with the SEC asking it to
reverse its Resolution and to declare the purchase
agreement of Cemco void and praying that the
mandatory tender offer rule be applied to its UCC
shares.
 In a Decision the SEC ruled in favor of the respondent
by reversing and setting aside its Resolution and
directed petitioner Cemco to make a tender offer for
UCC shares to respondent and other holders of UCC
shares similar to the class held by UCHC in
accordance with Section 9(E), Rule 19 of the Securities
Regulation Code.
 Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
challenging the SECs jurisdiction to take cognizance
2022
of respondents complaint and its authority to require
Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares, and
arguing that the tender offer rule does not apply. The
Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the
ruling of the SEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the SEC has jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint.
HELD:
Yes, The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. SEC was
acting pursuant to Rule 19(13) of the Amended
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities
Regulation Code
Another provision of the statute, which provides the basis of
Rule 19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code, is Section
5.1(n), viz:
[T]he Commission shall have, among others, the
following powers and functions: x x x (n) Exercise
such otherpowers as may be provided by law as
well as those which may be implied from, or which
are necessary orincidental to the carrying out of,
the express powers granted the Commission to
achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws.
The foregoing provision bestows upon the SEC the general
adjudicative power which is implied from the express
powers of the Commission or which is incidental to, or
reasonably necessary to carry out, the performance of the
administrative duties entrusted to it. As a regulatory agency,
it has the incidental power to conduct hearings and render
decisions fixing the rights and obligations of the parties.
And as held by the Court of Appeals:
We must bear in mind in interpreting the powers
and functions of the SEC that the law has made
the SEC primarily a regulatory body with the
incidental power to conduct administrative
hearings and make decisions. A regulatory body
like the SEC may conduct hearings in the exercise
of its regulatory powers, and if the case involves
violations or conflicts in connection with the
performance of its regulatory functions, it will have
the duty and authority to resolve the dispute for
the best interests of the public
III. What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly
Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et
per obliquum
what cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done
indirectly
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water
District
G.R. No. 166471, March 22, 2011
KEYWORDS:
FACTS:
 Petitioner Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC)
was organized to provide domestic water services in
Brgy. Twang, La Trinidad, Benguet. Respondent La
Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a government owned
and controlled corporation, a local water utility
created under PD No. 198, authorized to supply water
for domestic, industrial and commercial purpose
within municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
Kat Atienza | 13
Statutory Construction 2022

 October 9, 2000, TMPC filed with National Water

Resources Board an application for Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a
waterworks system in Brgy. Tawang LTWD claimed that
under Sec. 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise
is exclusive.

 August 15, 2002, the NWRB held that LTWD’s franchise

cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are
unconstitutional under Sec. 2, Art. XII.

 October 1, 2004, upon appeal of LTWD to the RTC, the

latter cancelled TMPC’s CPC and held that Sec. 47 of
PD No. 198 is valid; that the ultimate purpose of the
Constitution is for the State, through its authorized
agencies or instrumentalities, to be able to keep and
maintain ultimate control and supervision over the
operation of public utilities. What is repugnant to the
Constitution is a grant of franchise exclusive in
character so as to preclude the State itself from
granting a franchise to any other person or entity than
the present grantee when public interest so requires.

 November 6, 2004, RTC denied the motion for

reconsideration filed by TMPC.

ISSUE:
Whether RTC erred in holding that Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is
valid

HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Quando
aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum –
Those that cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly. Under Sec. 2 and 11, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution, The President, Congress, and Court cannot
create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character
by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district
and Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create
franchises that are exclusive in character. Sec. 47 of PD no.
198 is in conflict with the above-mentioned provision of the
Constitution. And the rule is that in case of conflict
between the Constitution and a statute, the former prevails,
because the constitution is the basic law to which all other
laws must conform to.

Kat Atienza | 14
Statutory Construction
MODULE 8: INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
I. In General
A word or phrase used in a statute may have an ordinary,
generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or trade
meaning.
Which meaning should be given depends upon what the
legislature intended. As a general rule in interpreting the
meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful
review of the whole law is involved, as well as the
intendment of law, ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a
particular provision alone, must be made to determine the
real intent of the law.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001
As a general rule in interpreting the meaning and scope of
a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law is
involved, as well as the intendment of law. The statute must
be considered as a whole to determine the real intent of
the law.
FACTS:
 Former President Joseph Estrada was prosecuted
under RA 7080 (Plunder Law), as amended by RA7659
(plunder law).
 He challenges the law as unconstitutional for
(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (uncertain,
indefinite)
(b) it violates the right of due process of the
accused as it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and,
(c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code/ or that whether Plunder is a malum
prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power
of Congress to so classify it
All of which are clear violations of the fundamental rights of
the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Secs. 1,2, and 4, these are the provisions wherein Estrada
claimed that it infringes constitutional boundaries.
Sec. 1 defines the ill-gotten wealth
Sec. 2 defines the crime of Plunder
Sec. 4 is about the rule of evidence
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. -Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount
or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Xxx
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing
the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused
in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
2022
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy
 (Hence in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law,
courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act
with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of
the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last
resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a
statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question
of constitutionality.)
 Estrada also points to the failure of the law to provide
for the statutory definition of the terms "combination"
and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series
of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1 and Sec. 2,
and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions
supposedly render the Plunder Law unconstitutional
for being vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against him (a violative of right to due process)
ISSUE:
1) Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being
vague.
2) Whether a facial review (contends that a law is
unconstitutional as written, that is, on its face) of the validity
of the Plunder Law is proper.
3) Whether the crime of plunder, as defined in RA 7080, is a
malum prohibitum.
HELD:
1) The court held that the provisions of Plunder Law is not
vague or ambiguous. It clearly show the elements of the
crime that are easily understood.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely
because of the employment of general terms or the failure
to define the terms used.
There is no constitutional or statutory command requiring
the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle that words of a
statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification, unless the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning
to those words.
Combination - the result or product of combining;
the act or process of combining.
Series - a number of things or events of the same
class coming one after another
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be
two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the
same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1
As for “pattern” in Sec. 4, this term was sufficiently defined
in Sec. 4
Kat Atienza | 15
Statutory Construction
The petitoner’s reliance on the “void-for-vague” doctrine is
misplaced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute
which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law."
2) A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague
statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
"chilling effect" upon protected speech.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are
inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
As to violation of right to due process:
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of the accused in
criminal prosecutions to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty. Rather than proving each criminal act done, it is
enough that the prosecution proves beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt acts indicative of the crime.
3) Plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when
the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se (and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala
in se.)
Petition denied. RA 7080, otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
Jose Jesus M. Disini, jr. v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014
FACTS:
 Several consolidated (14) petitions seek to declare
several provisions of RA 10175 (Cybercrime Prevention
Act) being unconstitutional and void.
 The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and
use of the cyberspace.
 And because linking with the internet opens up a user
to communications from others, the ill-motivated can
use the cyberspace for committing several crimes, like
hacking, illicit trafficking in sex.
 For this reason, the government has a legitimate right
to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain and
punish wrongdoings.Hence this Cybercrime Law.
 But petitioners claim that this law will violate their
freedom of expression and access to information.
They cite 21 provisions on the said law and also the
related articles of the RPC on the crime of libel.
Sec 4(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as
defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as
2022
amended, committed through a computer system or any
other similar means which may be devised in the future.
 Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal
code and the libel provisions of the cybercrime law
carry with them the requirement of “presumed
malice” even when the latest jurisprudence already
replaces it with “actual malice” as a basis for
conviction.
 Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice”
infringes freedom of expression.
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law
enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be
authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic
means traffic data in real-time associated with specified
communications transmitted by means of a computer
system.
 Petitioners point out that the phrase "due cause" has
no precedent (example) in law or jurisprudence and
that whether there is due cause or not is left to the
discretion of the police. Replying to this, the Solicitor
General asserts that Congress is not required to define
the meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.
 Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section
12 for being violative of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the certain provisions of the law are
unconstitutional?
HELD:
1) The Court held that Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the
Act were unconstitutional.
It found that Section 4(c)(3) restricted freedom of
expression by prohibiting the unsolicited transmission of
commercial communications, such as spam.
Section 12 was declared in violation of the right to privacy
because it lacked sufficient specificity and definiteness in
collecting real-time computer data.
Section 19 was found to violate the rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which gave the
government the authority to restrict or block access to
computer data without a judicial warrant.
Statutory Construction:
Void-for-vagueness Issue:
The Court held that this doctrine apply only to free speech
cases. Section 12 on its own, neither regulates nor punishes
any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional.
Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet
users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom
of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or
abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in
a fuzzy way
When void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of
speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-
forvagueness doctrine is acceptable.
Generally, the overbreadth and vagueness doctrine is
inapplicable in ‘facial” challenges to penal statutes not
involving free speech. In an “as applied” challenge, the
Kat Atienza | 16
Statutory Construction
petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right
must assert his own right, not that of third persons.
This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.
Exceptions: A petitioner may for instance mount a “facial”
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he
claims no violation of his own right under the assailed
statute where it involves free speech on the grounds of
overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the “chilling
effect” on protected speech that comes from statutes
violating free speech. A person who does not know
whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from
speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The
overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.
II. General rules of interpretation
Atty. Reynante B. Orceo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190779, 26 March 2010
What is generally spoken shall be generally understood
and general words shall be understood in general sense
FACTS:
 Atty. Reynante B. Orceo contended the validity of
Resolution No. 8714; in particular, the term “firearm” to
include airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the
election gun ban.
Under Section 2 (b) of Resolution No. 8714, the
term "firearm" includes "airgun, airsoft guns, and
their replica/imitation in whatever form that can
cause an ordinary person to believe that they are
real." Hence, airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations are included in the gun ban
during the election period from January 10, 2010 to
June 9, 2010.
 Petitioner claims that he is a real party-in-interest,
because he has been playing airsoft since the year
2000, making him liable for an election offense.
 Petitioner contends that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in including "airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations" in the definition of "firearm" in the
resolution, since there is nothing in R.A. No. 7166 that
mentions "airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations”
 Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding
moments among family members. Families are
entitled to protection by the society and the State
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They
are free to choose and enjoy their recreational
activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot
be abridged by the COMELEC.
 On the other hand, COMELEC asserted that
constitutional freedoms are not absolute, and may be
abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and
important interests.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the
term “firearm” in Section 2(b) of RA 8714?
2022
HELD:
NO. COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
including airsoft guns in R.A. No. 8714. However, the
replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are
excluded from the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714,
because they are not subject to any regulation, unlike
airsoft guns.
A word of general significance in a statute is to be taken in
its ordinary sense and comprehensive sense, unless it is
shown that the word is intended to be given a different or
restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be
generally understood and general words shall be
understood in a general sense.
The term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 was intended for
purposes of the gun ban during the election period. The
inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” and their
resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the
possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear,
intimidation or terror during the election period.
An ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish between
a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of
a voter, whether brought about by the use of a real gun or
a recreational gun which is sought to be averted.
Dispositive Portion:
Replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns are
hereby declared excluded from the term "firearm" in
Resolution No. 8714.
The petition is DISMISSED in regard to the exclusion of airsoft
guns from the term "firearm" in Resolution No. 8714. Airsoft
guns and airguns are covered by the gun ban during the
election period.
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Hon. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996
FACTS:
 An information was filed on June 5, 1991 by the DOJ
with Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging
respondent-petitioner Ri Chuy Po with the violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No.
277 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines) with
the following details: That on or about the 3rd day of
April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in
Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there wilfully,
feloniously and unlawfully, have in his possession
truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa, without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.
 Petitioner-respondent filed in the a Motion to Quash
and/or to Suspend Proceedings for the criminal case,
based on, inter alia, the information does not charge
an offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed to
timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber
falls within the purview of the said section, the same
may not be used in evidence against him for they
were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of the petitioner is correct that
lumber is different from timber
Kat Atienza | 17
Statutory Construction
HELD:
The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the
information against petitioners, although not mentioned in
express terms as among the prohibited articles under
Revised Forestry Code, must be understood in its ordinary
and common usage. Lumber is to be understood as a
processed log or timber. Since the law makes no distinction
between raw or processed timber, neither should the court.
Ubi lex non distinguere debemus. Thus, petitioners were
correctly charged.
III. Where the law does not distinguish
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus - where
the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
 Corollary principle: General words or phrases in a
statute
 Should ordinarily be accorded their natural and
general significance
 General term or phrase should not be reduced into
parts and one part distinguished from the other to
justify its exclusion from operation.
 Corollary principle: where the law does not make
any exception, courts may not except something
therefrom, unless there a compelling reason to justify it.
 Application: when legislature laid down a rule for one
class, no difference to other class.
Presumption: that the legislature made no qualification in
the general use of a term.
Republic of the Philippines v. Daisy R. Yahon
G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014
FACTS:
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the
issuance of protection order under the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 3 otherwise known as the
"Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt.
Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who
retired in January 2006. A temporary protection order (TPO)
was issued. The TPO directed among other orders that the
retirement,pension and other benefits of Sgt. Yahon is to be
withheld until further orders from the court to ensure
spousal support in favor of Daisy Yahon. However, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center contended
that half of the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon cannot be
given to the respondent as it is from a military institution.
The petitioner contended that money due to government
employees is not liable to the creditors of the said
employees in the process of garnishment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be
subject to the ruling of the court to provide for the financial
spousal support of respondent.
HELD:
Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the
financial spousal support of respondent. As a rule in
statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish,
the court should not distinguish. As section 8 (g) of RA No.
9262 used the general term 'employer', it includes in its
coverage the military institution, which is the employer of
Sgt Yahon.
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Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC) v. Erma
Yballe
G.R. No. 196156, January 15, 2014
 The respondents are nurses and midwives employed in
VCMC. They are rank and file employees. An illegal
strike was commenced by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is
not a legitimate labor organization. The respondents
participated in the said illegal strike. The respondents
were dismissed because of such.
 The CA, however, found thatrespondents cannot be
considered to have committed illegal acts since their
participationwas limited to the wearing of arm bands.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the dismissal of the employees is valid
HELD:
Paragraph 3, Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides
that ". . . [a]ny union officer who knowingly participates in
an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status . . ."In the Decision dated December 7,
2011, we declared as invalid the dismissal of MCCH
employees who participated in the illegal strike conducted
by NAMA-MCCH-NFL which is not a legitimate labor
organization. Since there was no proof that the
complainants committed any illegal act during the strike,
they may not be deemed to have lost their employment
status by their mere participation in the illegal strike. On the
other hand, the union leaders (Nava group) who
conducted the illegal strike despite knowledge that NAMA-
MCCH-NFL is not a duly registered labor union were
declared to have been validly terminated by petitioner.
We stress that the law makes a distinction between union
members and union officers. The law grants the employer
the option of declaring a union officer who participated in
an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses
the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers
from service.
Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
 Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a
petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the
Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a
judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in
substance, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
set the case for initial hearing. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear
on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion
was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the
petition considering that, based on the allegations
therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended
Petition, which the court granted.
 The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In
ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan
should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law
“does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce,
whether they are in the country or living abroad, if
they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country” and that unless Filipinos “are
Kat Atienza | 18
Statutory Construction
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos’
family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal capacity to
enter into contracts and civil relations, including
marriages.”
 On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It
held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was
Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree they obtained makes
the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with
Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al. ruling
that the meaning of the law should be based on the
intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative
intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of
injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married
to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was
Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
 The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or
her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.
RULING:
Yes. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that
an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s
Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the
foreign divorce.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding.
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be
proved. Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the
burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it,
as well as her former husband’s capacity to remarry, fall
squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family
relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
By reasons of the foregoing, CA decision was affirmed. The
case was remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence
as to relevant Japanese laws on divorce.
IV. Disjunctive and Conjunctive Words
Word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from each other.
Antonio D. Dayao v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193643, January 29, 2013
FACTS:
At bench are consolidated petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of
the Resolutions of the COMELEC. The individual petitioners
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are dealers of different brands of liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) while petitioner FPII is an association comprised of
entities engaged in various industries in the country.
Individual petitioners lodged before the COMELEC a
complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA's registration as a
party-list organization. They were later on joined by FPII as a
complainant-in-intervention. in essence that LPGMA does
not represent a marginalized sector of the society because
its incorporators, officers and members are not
marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are
actually marketers and independent re-fillers of LPG.
LPGMA countered that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution does not require that party-list representatives
must be members of the marginalized and/or
underrepresented sector of the society.
ISSUE:
WON the Constitution and the Party-List System Act (RA
7941) require that incorporators, officers and members of a
party-list must be marginalized or underrepresented citizens.
HELD:
There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the
complaint for cancellation. . For the COMELEC to validly
exercise its statutory power to cancel the registration of a
party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1)
due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group
concerned; and (2) any of the enumerated grounds for
disqualification in Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 exists.
The legal meaning of the term "and/or" between "refusal"
and "cancellation" should be taken in its ordinary
significance "refusal and/or cancellation" means "refusal
and cancellation" or "refusal or cancellation". It has been
held that the intention of the legislature in using the term
"and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be
used interchangeably.
The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given to both
the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or" or that one
word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the
other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the
legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is
used to avoid a construction which by the use of the
disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of
several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive
"and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone.
Hence, effect shall be given to both "refusal and
cancellation" and "refusal or cancellation" according to
how Section 6 intended them to be employed. The word
"and" is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union; it
is pertinently defined as meaning "together with", "joined
with", "along or together with."The use of "and" in Section 6
was necessitated by the fact that refusal and cancellation
of party-list registration share similar grounds, manner of
initiation and procedural due process requirements of
notice and hearing. With respect to the said matters,
"refusal" and "cancellation" must be taken together. The
word "or", on the other hand, is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the
other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed
in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive
word.29 As such, "refusal or cancellation", consistent with
their disjunctive meanings, must be taken individually to
mean that they are separate instances when the
COMELEC can exercise its power to screen the
qualifications of party-list organizations for purposes of
participation in the party-list system of representation.
That this is the clear intent of the law is bolstered by the use
simply of the word "or" in the first sentence of Section 6 that
"the COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
Kat Atienza | 19
Statutory Construction
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition.
People of the Philippines v. Antonio Comadre
G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004
FACTS:
Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey
Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio (drinking grioup) were having
a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s
father (Jaime). As the drinking session went on, Robert and
the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano (appellants) walking. The
three stopped in front of the house. While his companions
looked on, Antonio suddenly throw a hand grenade,
ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Drinking group were
hit by shrapnel (fragments of the grenade) and slumped
unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the
Hospital. However, Robert died before reaching the
hospital. TC: appellants guilty of complex crime of murder
with multiple attempted murder.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in convicting the appellants?
HELD:
Only Antonio is liable for the crime. It was established that
prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime
Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to
identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre,
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano because there was a
lamppost in front of the house and the moon was bright.
No conspiracy. Only Antonio is liable for the crime. When
Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand
grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely
looked on without uttering a single word of
encouragement or performed any act to assist him.
Gonzales v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 28196, November 9, 1967
FACTS:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives (HOR) passed Resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3 i.e.
to increase the seats of the lower house from 120 to 180; to
convoke a Constitutional Convention of 1971; and to
amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can
become delegates themselves to the Convention.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill which upon approval
by the President on June 17,1967 became Republic Act No.
4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3
be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Hence, two cases were filed against this act of Congress:
One is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary
injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales. Another one is by
PHILCONSA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolution of Congress acting as
constituent assembly violates the constitution.
HELD:
Yes, Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended,
reads: "The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of
three -fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the
HOR voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
2022
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification." Pursuant to this provision, amendments to
the constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or
by a convention called by Congress for that purpose.
Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives
propose amendments or call a convention therefor but
may not avail of both. Also the election must be a special
election, not a general election.
V. Noscitur a sociis
where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is found or
with which it is associated.
People of the Philippines v. Isidro Flores
G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010
FACTS:
AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just
a few months old. BBB is married to appellant, Isidro Flores.
BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m.
to 2:00 a.m. for six 6 days a week. In February 1999 at
around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping
inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch
her thighs. The following day, at around the same time,
and while BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA
from her legs up to her breast. Two weeks after the incident,
AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and
saw appellant holding a knife against her neck; he
penetrated her twice, despite of AAA’s resistance and on
account of his threats to kill her and BBB. AAA recounted
that appellant raped her at least three times a week at
around the same time until 15 October 2002, when she was
14 years old. After the last rape incident, AAA did not go
home after school and instead went to the house of her
friend, Marvin, who advised her to report the incident.
ISSUE:
Whether qualifying/aggravating circumstance is present in
the case to qualify death penalty.
HELD:
For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying
circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be
convicted for two counts of simple rape, and not qualified
rape. The appellant cannot be considered as the guardian
falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision
introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall
either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his
liaison is with respect to the aunt of AAA. Since both logic
and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a
custodian, the court cannot impose the death penalty
contemplated for a real guardian.
Cesar M. Carandang v. Vicente Santiago
G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955
FACTS:
The petitioner seeks the help of the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari to annul the order of Judge Vicente
Santiago suspending the civil case filed by the petitioner
against Tomas Valenton, Sr. and Tomas Valenton, Jr. to
await the result of a criminal case filed by said petitioner
against the defendants In his contention, Judge Santiago
stated that trial of the civil action must await the result of
the criminal case on appeal. The court anchored its
decision on the contention of the defendants that the
plaintiff cannot invoke article 33 since the defendants were
Kat Atienza | 20
Statutory Construction
charged with frustrated homicide and not for physical
injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of the court of first instance is
correct.
HELD:
No. The supreme court in its ruling decided in favor of the
appellant, the term physical injuries just like the words
defamation and fraud mentioned in the aforementioned
article were used in its generic sense. It does not pertain to
the “physical injury” stated in the Revised Penal Code,
since the defendant in his attempt to kill the plaintiff
caused him bodily injury the court deemed it proper for the
plaintiff to invoke article 33 of the Civil Code.
VI. Ejusdem generis
General rule: where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same
class or where the latter follow the former, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to, persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
Purpose: give effect to both particular or general words, by
treating the particular words as indicating the class and the
general words as indicating all that is embraced in said
class, although not specifically named by the
particular words.
Principle: based on proposition that had the legislature
intended the general words to be used in their generic and
unrestricted sense, it would have not enumerated the
specific words.
Presumption: legislators addressed specifically to the
Particularization
Limitations of ejusdem generis
Requisites:
 Statute contains an enumeration of particular &
specific words, followed by general word or phrase
 Particular and specific words constitute a class orare
the same kind
 Enumeration of the particular & specific words is not
exhaustive or is not merely by examples
 There is no indication of legislative intent to give the
general words or phrases a broader meaning
 Rule of ejusdem generis, is not of universal application;
it should use to carry out, not defeat the intent of the
law.
Emeteria Liwag v. Happy Glen Loop Homeowners’
Association, Inc.
G.R. No. 189755, July 4, 2012
FACTS:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen
Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo
Realty Corporation. The former fai led to settle its debts with
the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over se
veral parcels of land in the Subdivision including the
receivables from the lots alre ady sold. As the successor,
Marcelo presented to lot buyers the National Housing
Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement Regulatory Co
mmission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the
subdivision. The said wat er facility has been the only
source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In
September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to
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Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. C350099 was issued to the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is
considered an “open space” as defined in P. D. 1216.
HELD:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an
“open space.” The Court used the basic statutory
construction principle of ejusdem generis to det ermine
whether the area falls under “othersimilarfacilities and
amenities” since P.D. 1216 makes no specificmention of
areas reserved for water facilities. Ejusdem generis - stat es
that where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and sp ecific words of the same
class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to incl
ude or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of
the same kind or class a s, those specifically mentioned.
Applying that principle, the Court found out that th e
enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common
welfare ofthe community.There fore,the phrase
“othersimilarfacilities and amenities” should be interpreted
in like manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was
used for the benefit of the community. W ater is a basic
necessity, without which, survival in the community would
be impos sible
Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 33471, January 31, 1972
FACTS:
The whole controversy revolves around a vessel and its
cargo. On January 7, 1989, the vessel M/V "Star Ace,"
coming from Singapore laden with cargo, entered the Port
of San Fernando, La Union (SFLU) for needed repairs. The
vessel and the cargo had an appraised value, at that time,
of more or less Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000).
When the Bureau of Customs later became suspicious that
the vessel’s real purpose in docking was to smuggle its
cargo into the country, seizure proceedings were instituted
under S.I. Nos. 02-89 and 03-89 and, subsequently, two
Warrants of Seizure and Detention were issued for the
vessel and its cargo.
ISSUE:
Whether Urbino's claim is a preferred lien in this case.
HELD:
First of all, the Court finds the decision of the RTC of Manila,
in so far as it relates to the vessel M/V "Star Ace," to be void
as jurisdiction was never acquired over the vessel. In filing
the case, Urbino had impleaded the vessel as a defendant
to enforce his alleged maritime lien. This meant that he
brought an action in rem under the Code of Commerce
under which the vessel may be attached and sold.
However, the basic operative fact for the institution and
perfection of proceedings in rem is the actual or
constructive possession of the res by the tribunal
empowered by law to conduct the proceedings. This
means that to acquire jurisdiction over the vessel, as a
defendant, the trial court must have obtained either actual
or constructive possession over it. Neither was
accomplished by the RTC of Manila.
VII. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius and casus omissus
The express mention of one person, thing or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others.
Rule may be expressed in a number of ways:
 Expressum facit cessare tacitum
Kat Atienza | 21
Statutory Construction 2022

What is expressed puts an end to that which is was subject to the 3% miller’s task. HELD: Sec. 168 of the
implied where a statute, by its terms, is expressly 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only
limited to certain matters, it may not, by to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-
interpretation or construction, be extended to products and desiccated coconuts, whether in their
other matters. original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or
 Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis operator of the factory or by the miller himself. Where the
A thing not being excepted must be regarded as law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it
coming within the purview of the general rule applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all
those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio
 Expressio unius est exclusion alterius alterius.
The expression of one or more things of a class
implies the exclusion of all not expressed, even
though all would have been implied had none Coconut Oil Refiners Assn., Inc. v. Torres,
been expressed; opposite the doctrine of G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005
necessary implication
FACTS:
Application of expression unius rule
The petitioner seeks to declare Republic Act No. 7227 as
Generally used in construction of statutes granting powers,
unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free
creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights,
(and duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital and
imposing rights & forfeitures, as well as statutes strictly
equipment. It reads: The Subic Special Economic Zone shall
construed.
be operated and managed as a separate customs territory
ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital
Limitations of the rule
within, into and exported out of the Subic Special
1. It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in
Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax
statutory construction
and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. [RA 7227, Sec 12 (b)]. Petitioners contend that
2. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, no more
the wording of Republic Act No. 7227 clearly limits the
than auxiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored
grant of tax incentives to the importation of raw materials,
where other circumstances indicate that the
capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal
enumeration was not intended to be exclusive.
protection clause of the Constitution. They asserted that
private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not
3. Does not apply where enumeration is by way of
different from the retail establishments located outside.
example or to remove doubts only.
ISSUE:
Doctrine of casus omissus
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7227 is valid on the
A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
ground that it violates the equal protection clause.
mustbe held to have been omitted intentionally.
HELD:
The maxim operates only if and when the omission has
The SC ruled in the negative. The phrase ‘tax and duty-free
been clearly established, and in such a case what is
importations of raw materials, capital and equipment was
omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction, be
merely cited as an example of incentives that may be
included therein.
given to entities operating within the zone. Public
respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim
Exception: where legislature did not intend to exclude
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners
theperson, thing or object from the enumeration. If
impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does
such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the court may
not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.
supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent
The petition with respect to declaration of
of the legislature and will not do violence to its language
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 97-A cannot be,
likewise, sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not violated by a legislation which was based on
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner of reasonable classification.
Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 147749, June 22, 2006
The Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v.
FACTS: San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic Province of Cebu
corporation engaged in the business of milling, G.R. No. 141386, November 29, 2001
manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other
allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the
FACTS:
Commissioner of Internal Revenue miller’s tax and
In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on
manufacturer’s sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for
Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, it appeared that the
taxable year 1987 particularly on SPMC’s sales of crude oil
salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers
to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the
appointed by the province for the extension classes were
deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and
charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to
edible oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed the
the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province.
assessments. The Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC
Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the
appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax
province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries
Appeals by way of a petition for review. The CTA cancelled
of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to
SPMC’s liability for deficiency manufacturer’s tax on the
the provincial SEF.
sales of corn and edible oils but upheld the Commissioner’s
assessment for the deficiency miller’s tax. SPMC elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals, CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: WON SPMC’s sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM

Kat Atienza | 22
Statutory Construction
ISSUE:
Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits
of public school teachers to the Special Education Fund
HELD:
Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer
for the compensation of teachers handling extension
classes. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
allocation of the SEF for the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes logically implies the
hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be
compensated for their services. The doctrine of Expressio
unius est exclusion alterius and casus omissus cannot be
invoked because what is controlling is the intent of the
legislature in the interpretation of a statute. Indeed, the
operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged
principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended only
for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of teachers
appointed by the local school boards in connection with
the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.
With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a
reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government
Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects
for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated.
VIII. Reddendo singula singulis
Variation of the doctrine of last antecedent
• Referring each to each;
• Referring each phrase or expression to its
appropriate object,
or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the word
should be taken distributively.
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice
G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011
FACTS:
Two impeachment complaints were filed against
Ombudsman Gutierrez, both were based betrayal of
public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The
House Plenary referred the two complaints to the House of
Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the
House of Representative Committee on Justice issued a
Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in form and
substance. Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez
contended that the issued the Resolution violated the one-
year bar provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5
of the Constitution.
HELD:
The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The
object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singula
singulis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the
term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-
quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of
one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate.
It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to
initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it.
However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in
the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate,
which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin.
On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has
a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in
the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1)
there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a
Member of the House of Representatives or by a private
citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either
2022
reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution
of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the
resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same
complaint by the House of Representatives which either
affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides
a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds
the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House
"initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That
is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment
"case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
City of Manila v. Laguio
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development
Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. City of Manila passed an ordinance which prohibits
the establishment of certain businesses in Malate. Thereafer,
MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order7 with the lower court. MTDC prayed that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
WON the Ordinance is unconstitutional
HELD:
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental
personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges.
It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its
operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And
not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had
no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra
vires, null and void. The rule is that the City Council has only
such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which
are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof.
Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that
the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence
is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the
rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is
particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes
as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or
punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict
construction.
IX. Provisos, Exceptions and Saving Clauses
Provisos, generally
to limit the application of the enacting clause, section or
provision of a statute, or except something, or to qualify or
restrain its generality, or exclude some possible ground of
misinterpretation of it, as extending to cases not intended
by legislature to be brought within its purview.
Rule: restrain or qualify the generality of the enacting
clause or section which it refers.
Purpose: limit or restrict the general language or operation
of the statute, not to enlarge it.
Location: commonly found at the end of a statute, or
provision & introduced, as a rule, by the word “Provided”.
Kat Atienza | 23
Statutory Construction
Determined by: What determines whether a clause is
a proviso is its substance rather than its form. If it performs
any of the functions of a proviso, then it will be regarded as
such, irrespective of what word or phrase is used to
introduce it.
Proviso may enlarge scope of law
It is still the duty of the courts to ascertain the legislative
intention and it prevails over proviso.
Thus it may enlarge, than restrict
Proviso as additional legislation
Expressed in the opening statement of a section of a
statute
Purpose:
 To limit generalities
 Exclude from the scope of the statute
whichotherwise would be within its terms
What proviso qualifies
General rule: qualifies or modifies only the phrase
immediately preceding it; or restrains or limits the
generality of the clause that it immediately follows.
Exception: unless it clearly appears that the legislature
intended to have a wider scope
Saving clause
 Provision of law which operates to except from the
effect of the law what the clause provides, or save
something which would otherwise be lost.
 Used to save something from effect of repeal of
statute
 Legislature, in repealing a statute, may preserve in the
form of a saving clause, the right of the state to
prosecute and punish offenses committed in violation
of the repealed law.
 Where existing procedure is altered or substituted
by another, usual to save proceedings under the old
law at the time the new law takes effect, by means of
saving clause
 Construed: in light of intent by legislature
 Given strict or liberal meaning depending
nature of statute.
Ricardo Fernandez v. NLRC
G.R. No. 106090, February 28, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired as a laborer at the D.M. Consunji, Inc
on 1974.He became a skilled welder and worked for
private respondent until March 23, 1986 when his
employment was terminated on the ground that the
project petitioner had been assigned to was already
completed and there was no more work for him to do.
ISSUE:
whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the Labor Arbiter's decision by
dismissing the complaints for illegal dismissal, one of which
is petitioner's, on the finding that they were project
employee.
2022
HELD:
Petitioner claims that the proviso in Article 280 蜉 of the
Labor Code supports his claim that he should be regarded
as a regular employee. No, the proviso in the second
paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code has recently
been explained in Mercado v. NLRC, where it was held
that said proviso deems as regular employees only those
"casual" employees who have rendered at least one year
of service regardless of the fact that such service may be
continuous or broken. It is not applicable to "project"
employees, who are specifically excepted therefrom. The
general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or
modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or restrain
or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately
follows. Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately preceding
part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to the
statute itself or to other sections thereof. The only exception
to the rule is where the clear legislative intent is to restrain
that or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding it but
also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself
as a whole.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania De
Seguros
G.R. No. L-14880, April 29, 1960
FACTS:
Respondent Filipinas Compania de Seguros, an insurance
company, is also engaged in business as a real estate
dealer. On January 4, 1956 (respondent)- in accordance
with the single rate then prescribed under Section 182 of
the National Internal Revenue Code paid amount of
P150.00 as real estate dealer’s fixed annual tax for the year
1956. Subsequently said Section 182 of the Code was
amended by Republic Act No. 1612, which took effect on
August 24, 1956, by providing a scale of graduated rates:
P150 if the annual income of the real estate dealer is P4,000
but does not exceed P10,000; P300 if such annual income
exceeds P10,000 but does not exceed P30,000; and P500 if
such annual income exceeds P30,000. On October 23,
1957, petitioner informed respondent that “R.A. No. 1856
which took effect June 22, 1957 amended the date of
effectivity of R.A. No. 1612 to January 1, 1957. However, the
said amendment applies only to fixed taxes on occupation
and not to fixed taxes on business. “Hence, petitioner
insisted that respondent should pay the amount of P350.00
as additional real estate dealer’s fixed annual tax for the
year 1956.
on
ISSUE:
Whether RA 1612 be given a retroactive effect.
HELD:
Since the respondent has paid the annual tax then
prescribed for the year 1956, to require it to pay the
additional tax provided in RA 1612 would result in the
imposition upon respondent of a tax burden to which it was
not liable before the enactment of said amendatory act,
thus rendering its operation retroactive rather than
prospective, which cannot be done, as it would
contravene Section 21 of said Act as well as the
established rule regarding the prospectivity of operation of
statutes.
Kat Atienza | 24
Statutory Construction
Arenas v. City of San Carlos
G.R. No. 34024, April 5, 1978
FACTS:
Arenas was a judge of San Carlos City. He instituted a
petition for mandamus against City of San Carlos. He
alleged that SC City is a 3rd class city; CONTENTION: That
under RA 5967 provides that the basic salary of 2nd and
3rd class cities shall be 18 000 per annum. He was receiving
monthly salary of 1 000: 350 of national government while
650 by the city government and that it was short of 500. He
was entitled to salary differential of 9 500. He requested the
respondent to enact the necessary budget and pay him
but refused. CONTENTION: (Respondent) Admitted and
denied the allegations: That city judge shall at least be 100
pesos less than that of city mayor. CFI dismissed the petition.
CONTENTION #2 (Petitioner) THAT if the last proviso of Sec 7,
RA 5967 would be interpreted as the controlling measure
for fixing the salary of the city judges, Then the principal
provision of SEC 7 of fixing the salary of city judge higher
than city mayor would be useless that since it is the
intention to increase the salary of city judge, then the last
proviso should give way to the preceding provisions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the deficiency of
his salary.
HELD:
The intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act No.
5967 was that the salary of a city judge should not be
higher than the salary of the city mayor. The saving clause
"Provided, however, That the salary of a city judge shall be
at least P100.00 per month less than that of the city mayor"
qualifies the earlier provision which fixes the salary of city
judges for second and third class cities at P18,000.00 per
annum. Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City
(Pangasinan) was receiving an annual salary of P13,200.00,
the respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an
annual salary of P18,000.00 for the petitioner as city judge
of the said city.
Chartered Bank of India v. C. A. Imperial
G.R. No. L-17222, March 15, 1921
FACTS:
Philippine National Bank brought suit in the CFI of the City
of Manila against Umberto de Poli, Henry Hunter Bayne
and J.G. Lawrence to compel defendants to deliver to it
goods and merchandise described in the mortgage
executed. Immediately after filing the complaint, PNB’s
lawyer asked the clerk of court to issue a writ ordering the
sheriff to seize the goods described in the affidavit. The
order having been issued under the seal of court, the sheriff
proceeded and seized the goods and merchandise in the
warehouse of de Poli. The Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China, the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation and W.F. Stevenson & Co., Ltd. Filed a petition
in the office of the clerk of the court in which they asked
Umberto de Poli be declared insolvent under the provisions
of Act No. 1956. The sheriff, then, took charge and
possession of all properties except those exempted from
execution. Chartered Bank of India prayed for a
reconsideration and annulment of the writ of attachment
issued against Umberto de Poli and that all further
proceedings should be suspended until a decision has
been rendered by the court as to the discharge of the
insolvent debtor.
ISSUE:
Which provision is controlling in this case?
2022
HELD:
To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the
insolvency law, every section, provision and clause of a
statue must be expounded in reference to every other.
Thus, Sec. 60 should be understood in reference with the
other provisions of the same law, and as such the PNB falls
under the exception to Sec. 60 as stated in the other
provision of the same law.
Roberto S. Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001
FACTS:
In 1991-1992, petitioners, together with former First Lady
Imelda Marcos, were charged with 25 information at the
RTC for dollar salting. The complaints alleged that
petitioners maintained foreign exchange abroad without
prior authorization from and failed to report earnings or
receipt to the Central Bank. Meanwhile, CB circular No.
1318 revised the rules governing non-trade foreign
exchange transactions and Circular No. 1353 deleted the
requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign
exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking
system. Both circulars contained a saving clause
exempting from its coverage pending criminal actions
involving violations of Circular No. 960 and Circular No.
1318, respectively.
HELD:
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal
of Circular No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same
reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or
profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions.
Second, even the most cursory glance at the repealing
circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both
contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal
of Circular No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions
for violation of the latter Circular. A saving clause operates
to except from the effect of the repealing law what would
otherwise be lost under the new law. In the present case,
the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and
1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the
State to prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the
repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are either
pending or under investigation.
Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 159268, October 27, 2006
FACTS:
Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Balagtas, for
brevity) is a duly organized and existing cooperative under
the laws of the Philippines. Balagtas hired Josefina G.
Hipolito-Herrero as part time manager in its office in Sulok,
Bulacan. Balagtas created a branch office at Wawa,
Balagtas, Bulacan. Josefina was required to report at the
said Wawa branch before reporting to her office at Sulok.
Thereafter, the board members contemplated closing its
Wawa Branch Office. In one of their monthly meeting,
Josefine informed them that she intends to take a leave of
absence. After awhile, the board of members resolved to
close its Wawa Branch. Josefina did not report to work
anymore. Later on, she filed her resignation. Almost nine (9)
months thereafter, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE:
WON cooperatives are exempted from filing a cash or
surety bond
Kat Atienza | 25
Statutory Construction
HELD:
It must be kept in mind that the enactment of the
Cooperative Code is pursuant to the State’s declared
policy of fostering the “creation and growth of
cooperatives as a practical vehicle for prompting self-
reliance and harnessing people power towards the
attainment of economic development and social justice.”
In line with this, certain benefits and privileges were
expressly granted to cooperative entities under the statute.
Considering that the provision relates to “tax and other
exemptions,” the same must be strictly construed. This
follows the well-settled principle that exceptions are to be
strictly. An express exception, exemption, or saving clause
excludes other exceptions. Express exceptions constitute
the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no
other exception will be implied. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislative body would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not
to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.
MODULE 9: STATUTES CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE AND
IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES
I. Statutes construed as a whole
Generally, Statute is passed as a whole
 It should have one purpose and one intent
 Construe its parts and section in connection with other
parts
 Why? To “produce” a harmonious whole
Never:
 Divide by process of etymological dissertation (why?
Because there are instances when the intention
of the legislative body is different from that of the
definition in its original sense)
 Separate the words (remember that the whole point
of this chapter is to construe it as a whole)
 Separate context
 The whole point of this part is to construe the whole
statute and its part together
Aquino v. Quezon City
G.R. No. 137534, August 3, 2006
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation
G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007
People of the Philippines v. Luisito D. Bustinera
G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004
MODULE 10: MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES
Article 5, New Civil Code
Acosta v. Adaza
G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007
Luis K. Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
Florante S. Quizon v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008
MODULE 11: STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
Generally
2022
whether a statute is to be given a strict or liberal
construction will depend upon the following:
 The nature of the statute
 The purpose to be subserved
 The mischief to be remedied
Purpose: to give the statute the interpretation that will best
accomplish the end desired and effectuate legislative
intent
Strict construction, generally
 Construction according to the letter of the statute,
which recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes
the language used in its exact meaning, and
admits no equitable consideration
 Not to mean that statutes are construed in its
narrowest meaning
 It simply means that the scope of the statute shall not
be extended or enlarged by implication,
intendment, or equitable consideration beyond the
literal meaning of its terms
 It is a close and conservative adherence to the
literal or textual interpretation
The antithesis of liberal construction
Liberal construction, defined
Equitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a statute
to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent,
or promote justice
Not to mean enlargement of a provision which is clear,
unambiguous and free from doubt
It simply means that the words should receive a fair and
reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent, spirit
and purpose of the law
Liberal construction applied, generally
Where a statute is ambiguous, the literal meaning of
the words used may be rejected if the result of adopting
said meaning would be to defeat the purpose of the law
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
That construction is to be sought which gives effect to the
whole of the statute – its every word
I. Statutes strictly construed
 Penal laws
Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused cannot be
enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or any
equitable consideration. The language of a penal statutes
cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms in order to carry into effect the general purpose for
which the statute was enacted. Resolved in favor of the
person accused of violating the statute. No person should
be brought within the terms of a statute who is not clearly
within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal
which is not clearly made so by the statute.
The rule that penal statutes are strictly construed does not
mean that every penal law must be so narrowly construed
as to defeat the law itself; it merely means that they are
not to be construed so strictly as to nullify or destroy the
obvious purpose of the legislature. Be construed with such
strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the
defendant and at the same time preserve the obvious
intention of the legislature. It will endeavor to effect
substantial justice.
Kat Atienza | 26
Statutory Construction
Careful scrutiny safeguard the rights of the accused. Two
reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which
operates in favor of a party accused under its provision is
to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of
themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be
criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression
of the legislative intent to make them such.
Reason why penal statutes are strictly construed.
Law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual; the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which
mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited. The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a
guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality
but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts.
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010
Gerardo R. Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008
 Statutes in derogation of rights
People in republican state enjoy certain rights, which are
either inherent or guaranteed by the constitution or
protected by law; rights are not absolute, and the state, in
the exercise of its police power, may enact legislations
curtailing or restricting their enjoyment. As these statutes
are in derogation of common or general rights, they are
generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases
clearly within their scope or purpose.; two reasonably
possible constructions, one which would diminish or restrict
fundamental right of the people and the other of which
would not do so, the latter construction
Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. Mandaluyong,
G.R. No. 135087, March 14, 2000
Philacor Credit Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue
G.R. No. 169899, February 06, 2013
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kudos Metal
Corporation
G.R. No. 178087, May 5, 2010
Mapulo Mining Association v. Hon. Fernando Lopez
G.R. No. L-30440, February 7, 1992
 Statutes granting privileges
Statutes granting advantages to private persons or entities
have in many instance created special privileges or
monopolies for the rantees and have thus been viewed
with suspicion and strictly construed; public advantage is
gained by the grant, it narrowly appears to be secondary
significance compared with the advantage gained by the
grantee. Strict construction requires that those who invoke
a special privilege granted by the statute must comply
strictly with its provisions. Privilegia recipient largam
interpretationem voluntati consonam concedentis, or
privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will
of him who grants them.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company
G.R. No. 140230, December 15, 2005
2022
Raoul B. Del Mar v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 138298, November 29, 2000
Republic of the Philippines v. Kerry Lao Ang
G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012
 Exceptions and provisos
As a rule, exceptions should be strictly but reasonably
construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly
warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
general provision rather than the exception. The court will
not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication,
and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others,
although it is always proper in determining the applicability
of this rule to inquire whether, in the particular case, it
accords with reason and justice. Similarly, a statute, rule or
situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of
warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictly
construed. A preference is an exception to the general rule
and it is what its name implies.
A proviso should be interpreted consistently with the
legislative intent. The reason is that the legislative purpose
set forth in the general enactment expresses the legislative
policy and only those expressly exempted by the proviso
should be freed from the operation of the statute.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. The Court of Appeals,
Central Vegetable Manufacturing Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 107135, February 23, 1999
Geologistics, Inc. v. Gateway Electronics Corporation
G.R. Nos. 174256-57, March 25, 2009
II. Statutes Liberally Construed
General social legislation Implement the social justice and
protection-tolabor provisions of the Constitution are known
as general welfare legislations. These statutes are
construed liberally. General welfare legislations, the courts
will be guided by more than just an inquiry into the letter of
the law as against its spirit and will ultimately resolve any
doubt in favor of the persons whom the law intended to
benefit. Labor laws, tenancy laws, land reform laws and
social security laws. However, while general welfare
legislations are construed liberally in favor of those
intended to be benefited, this principle holds true only
when there is doubt or ambiguity in the law and not when
the law itself is clear and free doubt. Workingman’s welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that ‘all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
Based on the premise that the statute is ambiguous.
Re: Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits Under
Republic Act No. 9946
A.M. No. 14155-Ret., November 19, 2013
Maria Obra v. SSS
G.R. No. 147745, April 9, 2003
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
The Coca-Cola Export Corporation v. Clarita P. Gacayan
G.R. No. 149433, December 15, 2010
Kat Atienza | 27
Statutory Construction 2022

Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of

Appeals
G.R. No. 165155, Apr 13, 2010

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. BASF Coating

G.R. No. 198677, November 26, 2014

Ramon A. Syhunliong v. Teresita Rivera

G.R. No. 200148, June 4, 2014

Kat Atienza | 28