TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE

PHILIPPINES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013

FACTS:
August 30, 2001, Arsemio de Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as Financial
Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled corporation
(GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment was included in
TIDCORP’s Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) for August 2001, which was submitted to the
CSC – Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Field Office.

September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman’s appointment because
the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included in the DBM’s Index of
Occupational Service.

TIDCORP’s Executive Vice President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De

Guzman’s appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC- NCR. According to Tambanillo,
Republic Act No. 8494, which amended TIDCORP’s charter, empowers its Board of Directors to
create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve its own compensation
and position classification system and qualification standards.

CSC-NCR Director Padilla denied Tambanillo’s appeal because De Guzman’s appointment failed
to comply with Section 1, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, which requires that the
position title of an appointment submitted to the CSC must conform with the approved Position
Allocation List and must be found in the Index of Occupational Service. Since the position of
Financial Management Specialist IV is not included in the Index of Occupational Service, de
Guzman’s appointment to this position must be invalid.

TIDCORP’s President and CEO Joel C. Valdes sent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David
a Letter appealing Director Padilla’s decision to the CSC-Central Office (CO). Valdes reiterated
TIDCORP’s argument that RA 8494 authorized its Board of Directors to determine its own
organizational structure and staffing pattern, and exempted TIDCORP from all existing laws on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards.

In its Resolution No. 30144, the CSC-CO affirmed the CSC-NCR’s decision that de Guzman’s
appointment should have complied with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, as amended by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 15. Rule III, Section 1(c) is explicit in requiring that the position title
indicated in the appointment should conform with the Position Allocation List and found in the
Index of Occupational Service. Otherwise, the appointment shall be disapproved. In disallowing
De Guzman’s appointment, the CSC-CO held that Director Bugtong was simply following the
letter of the law.

TIDCORP moved to reconsider the CSC-CO’s decision, but this motion was denied, prompting
TIDCORP to file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA. The petition asserted that the CSC-
CO committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 030144 and Resolution No.
031037.
CA denied TIDCORP’s petition and upheld the ruling of the CSC-CO in Resolution No. 30144
and Resolution No. 31037. The CA noted that filing a petition for certiorari was an improper
recourse; TIDCORP should have instead filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. The CA, however, brushed aside the procedural defect, ruling that the assailed
resolutions should still stand as they are consistent with law and jurisprudence.
In its present petition for review on certiorari, TIDCORP argued that the CSC’s interpretation of
RA 8494 is misplaced

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 8494 command TIDCORP to follow issued requirements pursuant to the
Position Classification Act despite its exemption from laws involving position classification.

HELD:
No, under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
plain-meaning rule or verba legis is derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the
index of intention) and rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature
in a statute correctly express its intent and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The phrase "to endeavour" means to "to devote serious and sustained effort" and "to make an effort
to do." It is synonymous with the words to strive, to struggle and to seek. The use of "to endeavour"
in the context of RA 8494 means that despite TIDCORP’s exemption from laws involving
compensation, position classification and qualification standards, it should still strive to conform
as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided in RA 6758. The phrase "as closely
as possible," which qualifies TIDCORP’s duty "to endeavour to conform," recognizes that the law
allows TIDCORP to deviate from the Position Classification Act, but it should still try to hew
closely with its principles and modes. Had the intent of Congress been to require TIDCORP to
fully, exactly and strictly comply with the Position Classification Act, it would have so stated in
unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavour to conform to the
principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this law.
OLYMPIO REVALDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, (A w/ Mod)
G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in
violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code.

June 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Maasin, Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, the
accused, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess 96.14
board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal
document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government
authorities.

Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section of the PNP in Maasin, Southern Leyte,
testified that on 18 June 1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with Chief Alejandro Rojas,
SPO3 Melquiades Talisic and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit to the house of petitioner to verify the report of
Sunit that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the necessary documents. They were not
armed with a search warrant on that day.They confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different varieties
lying around the vicinity of the house of petitioner.

September 5, 1997, the RTC-Branch 25 rendered judgment convicting petitioner of the offense
charged and sentencing him.

August 23 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the
lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was legal.

HELD:
Yes, even without a search warrant, the personnel of the PNP can seize the forest products cut,
gathered or taken by an offender pursuant to Section 80 of the Forestry Code.

Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents when the police
officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and
ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents
therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere
possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex
sed lex. The law may be harsh but that is the law.

On the penalty imposed by the lower courts, we deem it necessary to discuss the matter. Violation
of Section 68 of the Forestry Code is punished as Qualified Theft with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
ARNEL SAGANA, Petitioner, vs. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, Respondent
GR No. 161952 October 2, 2009

FACTS:
On Dec.13, 1994, Arnel Sagana filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon City. He
alleged that on November 20, 1992, Richard Francisco, with intent to kill, shot him with a gun
hitting him on the right thigh.

On January 31, 1995, process server Manuel Panlasigui attempted to personally serve the summons
to respondent, Francisco, at his address: No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was
unsuccessful because the occupant, who refused to give his identity, said that the respondent is
unknown at the said address. Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve summons to
respondent’s office through registered mail on February 9, 1995. However, despite three notices,
the respondent failed to pick up the summons.

The Trial Court then dismissed the case on account of “petitioner’s lack of interest to prosecute”,
noting that the petitioner did not take any action since the filing of the Server’s Return on 8
February 1995. In response, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that he
exerted efforts to locate the respondent and that respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St.,
Baesa, Quezon City. The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on August 4,
1995, conditioned upon the service of summons on the respondent within 10 days from receipt of
the Order.

Thus, on August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at the respondent’s
address but was told by Michael Francisco, the respondent’s 19-year old brother, that the
respondent no longer lived at the said address. As such, Iconar left a copy of the summons to
Michael Francisco.

On November 10, 1995, the petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, since the
respondent still failed to file an Answer despite the service of summons. The trial court granted
the Motion, finding that the summons was validly served through his brother, Michael, and allowed
the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court
documents were furnished to respondent at his address.

On March 1, 1996, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty. Bernardo
Q. Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the summons or that he
was authorized to receive the summons on behalf of his brother. He alleged that the substituted
service did not comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons was not
served at the defendant’s residence or left with any person who was authorized to receive it on
behalf of the defendant. Michael Francisco also asserted in an Affidavit of Merit that his brother
had left their residence in March 1993, and that respondent would only call by phone, or write his
family without informing them of his address.

Thereafter, Michael Francisco submitted his respective Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In his
Rejoinder, he attached a copy of an Affidavit prepared by the respondent, dated December 23,
1992, where he declared himself a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. The affidavit was notarized
by Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, the same lawyer who represented respondent’s brother before the
trial court.

The trial court denied Michael Francisco’s Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, holding
that: “plaintiff had already sent numerous pleadings to defendant at his last known address. As
also pointed out by [petitioner] in his Opposition, movant has not adduced evidence, except his
affidavit of merit, to impugn the service of summons thru him. Movant herein also admits that
defendant communicates with him through telephone. Movant, therefore, being a person of
sufficient age and discretion, would be able, more likely than not, to inform defendant of the fact
that summons was sent to him by the court.”

On 20 September 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff.

On November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that
he received a copy of the trial court’s Decision on November 9, 1999, and that the same was
contrary to the law, facts, and evidence, and prayed that his appeal be given due course.

On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective briefs, a copy of
which was sent to respondent by registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City.

The respondent attended the preliminary conference on September 3, 2002, but the parties failed
to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, on August 13, 2003, the appellate court rendered the
Decision granting the appeal and setting aside the Decision of the trial court on the grounds that
the service of summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before the
trial court. The trial court’s decision was void since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he alleged that respondent did, in fact,
reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion, petitioner submitted the original copy of
the envelope containing respondent’s Notice of Appeal, which indicated respondent’s return
address to be No. 36 Sampaguita St. Nonetheless, on January 29, 2004, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether there was valid service of summons upon the respondent.

HELD:
YES. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find there was proper substituted service
of summons upon the respondent.

Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court provided:

Section 8. Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

The personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although unsuccessfully.
The trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place of work, but to no
avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's return, the
process server's notation, as well as the records of the case. Moreover, respondent’s claim that he
moved out of their residence on March 1993 without informing his family of his whereabouts
despite the regular calls and letters is incredulous. It is even more implausible when the respondent
admitted to receiving the trial court’s decision on September 20, 19999 which was sent to No. 36
Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City, and that his Notice of Appeal indicated the same address. He
also admitted to receiving a copy of the appellate court’s order for a preliminary conference which
was also sent to the same address. Finally, it is unbelievable that, since respondent and his brother
was assisted by the same lawyer, none of them was able to inform respondent of the receipt of
summons.

Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when respondent left and then returned to his original
home, if he actually did leave his home.

The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and
to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity
to be heard on the claim against him.

Under the circumstances of this case, the respondent was duly apprised of the action against him
and had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner. However, since he refused
to disclose his true address because of his own pretenses, it was impossible to personally serve
summons upon him.

It is, at times, difficult to reconcile the letter of the law with its spirit. Thus, it is not altogether
surprising that two competing values are usually discernable in every controversy - the principle
of dura lex sed lex versus the notion that technicalities should yield to broader interests of justice.
In our rules of procedure, for instance, judges often struggle to find a balance between due process
considerations and a liberal construction to secure a just disposition of every action. In such cases,
where a measure of discretion is permitted, courts must tread carefully, with due consideration of
the factual milieu and legal principles involved. In so doing, we take steps - sometimes tentative,
sometimes bold - to apply prior experience and precedent towards an eventual just resolution. It is
these principles that animate our decision in the instant case.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, (D)
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

FACTS:
October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355
(An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).

December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory

plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code
(LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the
approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).

November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical
grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for
being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected,
would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del
Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich
resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area
of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section
10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.

May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended
province consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the
minimum land area requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the
instant case.

July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that
the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution
of this case.

September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2,
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment.
They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet
existent. They averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the
proceedings in this case.
October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this
case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 valid.

HELD:
Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged
province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which,
with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-
IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into
that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A.
No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.

The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average
annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00
for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence
as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of
becoming a province. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according
to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its
letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit
differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within
the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS:
The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by
52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their
desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections

December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political
party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC, on
7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official.

Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).

39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the COMELEC
to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:
No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court
adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings
in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the
COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows
again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open
to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the
first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-
list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude,
by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will
these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude
them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving
as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from
being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941
AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY v. JOSE B. LINGAD, (D)
G.R. No. L-26406, October 31, 1969

FACTS:
In the petition for declaratory relief, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose B. Lingad and the then
Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, Ruben F. Santos being named as respondents, appellant
Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated alleged that it was duly incorporated on
January 5, 1961 and that from the start of its operation, its employees were paid on a daily and
monthly basis.

April 21, 1965 the aforesaid amendatory act took effect and that respondents construed its
provision "in such a way as to require the petitioner to increase the salaries of all the monthly paid
employees of the petitioner to a minimum of P180.00 (not P152.00) which according to them is
the applicable minimum wage rate for the monthly paid employees.

Petitioner sought to justify its refusal to abide by the interpretative bulletin of respondents
requiring the increase to a minimum of P180.00 a month for employees paid on a monthly basis
in this wise: The petitioner believes that Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 particularly that portion
prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to employees in excess of the minimum wage established
in the Act only refers and applies to employers in business prior to and at the time of enactment
Act and that the prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements as envisioned in Sec 19
should not be applied prospectively to employers coming into existence subsequent to the effective
date of said Act.

The lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: "Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 4180 provides that 'Any
provision of law previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act that is inconsistent with any
provision of this Act is hereby repealed.' Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A.
No. 4180 has not been repealed; on the other hand, the provisions of Section 19 of R.A. No. 602
not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 were deemed and impliedly re-enacted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court decided the matter correctly.

HELD:
Yes, the lower court decided the matter correctly. Even if the plain legislative purpose so evident
on the face of the statute is not to vitalize and implement what the Constitution enjoins, still there
is no escape from an equally authoritative principle of statutory construction that bars acceptance
on what appellant would foist upon the judiciary as an acceptable interpretation. "It is fundamental
that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the
judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, decided in 1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice
between conflicting theories falls on that which best accords with the letter of the law and with its
purpose. The next year, in an equally leading decision, United States v. Toribio, there was a caveat
against a construction that would tend 'to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator.'
If the interpretation offered by appellant would be considered acceptable, then there would be a
negation of the above purpose of the amendatory act increasing the minimum wage law. That
would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster its policy. It must be rejected.
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TORIBIO ABANTO, Defendant-Appellant.
G.R. No. 5266. February 16, 1910

FACTS:
Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of
Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered
a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was
slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration,
branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for
agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle
in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore,
he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his
carabao in his dwelling. Respondent said that the statute is unconstitutional and in violation of the
Philippine Bill which provides that “no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle,
is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power and unconstitutional.

HELD:
It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal
liberties. To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear (1) that
the interest of the general public requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against theft to make it easy for the recovery and
return to owners, which encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle.

Also, several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the Philippine islands
which threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces seventy, eighty and
even one hundred percent of their local carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the
prices of carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft became rampant due to
the luxurious prices of these work animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the food production of
the country which prompted the government to import rice from its neighboring countries.

As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the
production of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work
animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of carabaos in the country as well as to
redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. It was also the same reason why large cattles
fit for farm work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption.
Further, the court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer,
For to do otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers.

Obviously, the provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed strictly for the
promotion of general welfare and public interest. These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid
exercise of police power.

The SC affirmed the decision of the trial court.

SY TIONG SHIOU v. SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, (G)
G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009

FACTS:
February 3 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation), a
family corporation doing business under the name and style Guan Yiac Hardware, submitted a
letter to the corporation’s Board of Directors (Board) statingthat Felicidad Chan Sy did not make
cash deposits to any of the corporation’s banks from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus
the total bank remittances for the past years were less than reflected in the corporate financial
statements, accounting books and records. Finally, Juanita Tan sought to be free from any
responsibility over all corporate funds.

April 5, 2003, Banaria, Banaria & Company in its report, the accounting firm attributed to the
Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994 to 2002.

April 15, 2003, a demand letter was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy. On the same date, the
children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and other
important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly transferred residence and ceased
reporting to the corporation. Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery
against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila.

July 1, 2003, the corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for Accounting
and Damages against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete and true
accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by the company since 1993 and for the
restitution of the said amount.The complaint also prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling a stockholders’ meeting on the
ground of lack of authority.

September 9, 2003, the Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint,
praying that their attached Third Party Complaint be allowed and admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou
and his spouse. In the said third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou and
Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation’s claim for misappropriating corporate funds.

October 8, 2003, the trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint, and
forthwith directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.

January 16, 2004, their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were
not furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a court order, which resulted in their
having been declared in default for failure to file their answer to the third-party complaint; thus,
they instead filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.61The
appellate court declared that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules).
ISSUE:
Whether or not a third-party complaint is prohibited by the Interim Rules.

HELD:
No, the third-party complaint should be allowed. For while a third-party complaint is not included
in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may
be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. Statutes, including rules, should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved
and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits intended. A statute should
therefore be read with reference to its leading idea, and its general purpose and intention should
be gathered from the whole act, and this predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import
of particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as a
reason for expanding the signification of others, so that the interpretation may accord with the
spirit of the entire act, and so that the policy and object of the statute as a whole may be made
effectual and operative to the widest possible extent. Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than the
letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in the rules in this case, must be read
according to its spirit and intent
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, (G)
G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991

FACTS:
The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their
alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office
Order No. 16 to investigate the petitioners.

January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed to the
petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements
of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled
hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel
to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a Motion for Summary Dismissal.
February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days to submit their
respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory
challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act
No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under
P.D. No.39.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.

HELD:
Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to peremptory challenge was
originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).

November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This
decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.

January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state
of martial law throughout the Philippines. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution
of the military tribunals created there under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of
the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial
law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied
in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to
peremptory challenge.
GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS v. MAYOR ANGELO M. BARBA,
G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996

FACTS:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On
March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States.

To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward
Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made
to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government
Code, disapproved the resolution “for the reason that the authority and power to appoint
Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8,
1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the
other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same position.
June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo
warranto and prohibition.

July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent Palafox
by respondent Mayor Barba.

ISSUE:
Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?

HELD:
The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the
recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas
where the vacancy occurs.

The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent
Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is
entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by
member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial
governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand,
respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor
and not the provincial governor who appointed him.
PARAS v COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169

FACTS:
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October
1995, A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent
COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view
of the petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December
16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for
injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the
court dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution
date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this
petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government
code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the
scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday
of May 1996.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of
the Local Government Code.

HELD:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Paras’ interpretation of the law is
too literal that it does not accord with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that
the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held that the “regular local election”
refers to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.
KAREN E. SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,
G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997

FACTS:
Karen E. Salvacion, herein petitioner, then 12 years old, was coaxed and lured by private
respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott to go with him in his apartment, where she was detained for
four days from February 4 to 7, 1989; and was raped 10 times (once on February 4 and 3 times a
day from February 5-7). Aside from the criminal case for serious illegal detention and 4 counts of
rape filed by the Makati investigating fiscal, the petitioner along with her parents, file in Regional
Trial Court (RTC) a civil case for damages with preliminary attachment against Bartelli, which the
court then granted.

A notice of garnishment was served to China Banking Corporation, where the dollar account of
the private respondent was deposited, by the Deputy Sheriff of Makati. But respondent bank
invoking Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it and later
on invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, to the effect that the dollar deposits of
defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body. In a letter
in response to the inquiry of the counsel of petitioners to Central Bank, it is stated that the provision
in Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 is absolute in application and that it does not
admit of any exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended.

March 29, 1990, after hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners,
Petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit.

ISSUES:
Whether the dollar bank deposit of Greg Bartelli in China Bank Corporation be exempted from
attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body

HELD:
No, the provisions of Section 133 of CB Circular No. 960 are hereby held to be inapplicable to
this case because of its peculiar circumstances and the Court requires respondents to comply with
the writ to execution and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y
Northcott in such amount as would justify the judgment. In fine, the application of the law depends
on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of CB Circular
No 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court.
Legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a
foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guessed like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in
case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended for right and justice to prevail. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this
is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. v. PNOC,
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008

FACTS:
December 23, 2002, PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of
money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected
was the petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was
still a member of its board of directors.

Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located
in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s motion,
the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of
the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter,
respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondent’s
employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last
known address.

Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons.
Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said
motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging
that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.

Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution with the
clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioner’s answer because the same was filed
way beyond the reglementary period.

Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that the court committed grave
abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, failure to
furnish him with copies of its orders and processes and upholding technicality over equity and
justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner with copies of
orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings

HELD:
No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file an Omnibus Motion to
Admit Attached Answer. The disputed order of September 11, 2003 was a finding that the Santos
was in default for failure to file an answer or pleading within the period fixed. It is illogical to
notify him of the order simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found
on his last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos
could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. His residence
or whereabouts is not known and he cannot be located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no
way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not
require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance
with logic, common sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it may, a copy of the September
11, 2003 order was still mailed to him at his last known address but it was unclaimed.
PEDRO SANTILLON v. PERFECTA MIRANDA,
G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965

FACTS:
November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence,
leaving one son, Claro Santillon, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro
acquired several parcels of land located in that province.

Four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition
to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda
and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition
were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive
properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her
undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and
Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition
pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and
not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta
Miranda was appointed administrator of the estate.

March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of partition
and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.

April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the
New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal
share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him.
Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled
under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro
claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

June 28, 1961, the court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which is hereby ruled and
ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse
Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share
for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner
of the conjugal properties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the word “children” in Art. 996 can also be interpreted as “child” in accordance
with Art. 892?

HELD:
Yes, it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. So Art. 996
could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left,
the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the
article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would
be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child".
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article
834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs
governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate
children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child
(exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's
desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.