STATCON MODULE 6

Verba Legis
1. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Civil
Service Commission
Facts:

On August 30, 2001, De Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as Financial Management
Specialist IV of TIDCORP (government-owned and controlled corporation), but it was disallowed by
Director Leticia Bugtong because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not included in
the DMBs Index of Occupational Service. TIDCORPs Executive Vice President Jane Tambanillo appealed
the invalidation of De Guzman’s appointment to Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC-National Capital
Region. According to Tambanillo, RA 8494, which amended TIDCORPs charter, empowers its Board of
Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing patter, and to approve its own
compensation and position classification system and qualification standards.

All positions in TIDCORP shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and
qualification standards approved by TIDCORP Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis
and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board
no more than once every 4 years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on
productivity and profitability. TIDCORP shall be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on
compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall, however, endeavor to make
the system to conform as closely as possible to the principles and modes provided in RA 6758.

TIDCORP argued that the CSC’s interpretation of the last sentence of Section 7 of RA 8494 is misplaced.

TIDCORP emphasizes, that the provisions of RA 6758, which the CSC applied to TIDCORP, is a general
law, while TIDCORP charter, RA 8494, is a special law. In interpreting conflicting provisions of a general
law and a special law, the provisions of the two laws should be harmonized to give effect to both. But if
these provisions cannot be reconciled, then the special law shall prevail because it is a qualification to
the general rule. Further, RA 8494 is a later expression of Congress intent as it was enacted 9 years after
RA 6758 was approved, and should therefore be construed in this light in its relation with the latter. A
new statute should be interpreted in connection with those already existing in relation to the same
subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretandi – To interpret and harmonize laws is the best method of
interpretation.

RULING:

Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plan and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. The plan-meaning rule or
verbal egis is derived from the maxim index animi sermo est – speech is the index of intention, and
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express
its intent and preclude the court from construing differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute.
STATCON MODULE 6

The meaning of endeavor means to devote serious and sustained effort and to make an effort to do (an
attempt to achieve a goal). The use of to endeavor in the context of RA 8494 means that despite
TIDCORP’s exemption from laws involving compensation, position classification and qualification
standards, it should still strive to conform as closely as possible with the principles and modes provided
in RA 6758. The phrase “as closely as possible,” which qualifies TIDCORP’s duty to “endeavor to
conform,” recognizes that the law allows TIDCORPT to deviate from the Position Classification Act, but it
should still try to hew closely with its principles and modes. Had the intent of Congress been to require
TIDCORP to fully, exactly and strictly comply with the Position Classification Act, it would have so stated
in unequivocal terms. Instead, the mandate it gave TIDCORP was to endeavor to conform to the
principles and modes of RA 6758, and not to the entirety of this law.

Dura lex sed lex – the law is harsh but it is the law
2. Olympio Revaldo v. People of the Philippines

Facts:

Petitioner Olympio Revaldo was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood
lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. June 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Maasin,
Province of Leyte Philippines, the accused, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft of flat lumber with a value of 1,730 Php, without any legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation from proper government authorities.

Maceda, the person in charge of the operations section of the PNP in Maasin, Southern Leyte, testified
that on June 18, 1992, at around 11:00 in the morning, he went with Chief Alejandro Rojas, SPO3 Talisic
and SPO3 Nicasio Sunit to the house of petitioner to verify the report of Sunit that petitioner had in his
possession lumber without the necessary documents. They were not armed with a search warrant on
that day. They confiscated 20 pieces of lumber of different varieties lying around the vicinity of the
house of the petitioner.

Sept. 5, 1997, the RTC-branch 25 rendered judgement convicting petitioner of the offense charged and
sentencing him. August 23, 2004, the CA affirmed the judgement of the trial court. The CA ruled that
motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of lumber without legal
documents gives rise to criminal liability.

Ruling:

Under section 80 of the Forestry Code, personnel of PNP can seize the forest products cut, gathered or
taken by an offender. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without the necessary documents
when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession
and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents
therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere
possession of forest products without the proper documentation consummates the crime. The law may
be harsh but it is the law. Violation of Sec 68 of Forestry Code is punished as Qualified Theft with
penalties imposed under Art 309 and 310 of the RPC.
STATCON MODULE 6

3. Arnel Sagana v. Richard Francisco

Facts:

December 13, 1994, Petitioner Arnel Sagana filed a Complaint for Damages before the RTC of Quezon
City and raffled to Branch 99. Petitioner alleged that on Novermber 20, 1992, respondent Francisco, with
intent to kill and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh. As a
result, petitioner incurred medical expenses and suffered wounded feelings, and was compelled to
engage the services of a lawyer, due to respondent’s refusal to pay said expenses. Petitioner thus
demanded payment of 300,000 Php as actual damages, 150,000 Php as moral damages, 50,000 Php
exemplary damages and 50,000 Php as attorney’s fees.

January 31, 1995, Process Server Panlasigui attempted to serve summons at respondent’s address but
was unsuccessful. In his server’s return, Panlasigio stated that he tried to personally serve the summons
to respondent at his given address. However, occupant of that house told him that respondent is
unknown at said address. Panlasigui also declared that diligent efforts were exerted to serve the
summons but these proved to be futile. RTC also attempted to serve summons to respondent’s office
through registered email but respondent failed to pick up the summons on 3 notices.

August 25, 1995, Process Server Iconar tried to serve the summons at the address of the respondent but
the same result. According to Iconar’s handwritten notation on the summos, he was informed by
Michael Francisco, the brother of respondent, that the respondent no longer lived at the said address,
however he left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco.

November 10, 1995 Petitioner filed a motion to declare defendant in default, alleging that despite
service of summons, respondent still failed to file an answer.

February 16, 1996, Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty. Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and
Motion denying that he received summons or that he was authorized to receive summons on behalf of
his brother. He alleged that the substituted service did not comply with Section 8, rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.

October 4, 1996, the RTC issued Order denying Michael Francisco’s manifestation and motion for lack of
merit. Judgement is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and hereby orders defendant to pay plaintiff.

November 23, 1999, respondent Richard Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he received a
copy of the trial court’s Decision on Novermber 9, 1999; that the same was contrary to the law, facts
and evidence and praying that this appeal be given due course.

August 13, 2003 the Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed Decision granting the appeal and
setting aside the Decision of the trial court. The appellate court held that the service of summonbs was
irregular and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before the trial court. Since it did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, the trial court’s decision was void.

Issue:

Whether thre was a valid service of summons upon the respondents

Ruling:
STATCON MODULE 6

Yes, there was a valid service of summons upon the respondent. The purpose of summons is twp-fold:
to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and to notify the defendant that an action has
been commenced so that he may be given an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. Under
the circumstances of this case, we find that respondent was duly apprised of the action against him and
had every opportunity to answer the charges made by the petitioner. However, since respondent
refused to disclose his true address, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him.
Considering that respondent could not have received summons because of his own pretenses and has
failed to provide an explanation of his purported new residence, he must now bear the consequences.

It is, at times, difficult to reconcile the letter of the law with its spirit. Thus, it is not altogether surprising
that two competing values are usually discernable in every controversy – the principle of dura lex sed lex
versus the notion that technicalities should yield to broader interests of justice. In our rules of
procedure, for instance, judges often struggle to find a balance between due process considerations and
a liberal construction to secure a just disposition of every action.

Statues must be capable of interpretation

4. Miriam Defensor-Santiage v. COMELEC
Facts:

Respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective
officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of
the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokartikong
Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition
on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
etc., filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the
Delfin petition rising the several arguments: (1) constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend
the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; (2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof.
Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s initiative.
The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

Ruling:

Sec. 2 of Art XVII of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executory, thus, without implementing legislation
the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Reso No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. It has been an established rule that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people’s
initiative.
STATCON MODULE 6

The lifting of the terms was held that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution
such as synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However,
considering the Court’s decision in the above issue, the issue of whether the petition is a revision or
amendment has become academic.

5. Rodolfo G. Navarro v. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita

Facts:

October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law RA 9355 Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands. December 3, 2006, COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of
the creation of the province under the Local Government Code. The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative
votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of
Surigao del Norte and Province of Dinagat Islands.

November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds.
Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner filed another petitioner for certiorari
seeking to nullify RA 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new
province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the
people fo Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation, and
rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area
of 802.12 square km only and a population of 16,951, failing to comply with Sec. 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the Local Government Commission.

May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised 3 main arguments to challenge the above Resolution: (1) the
passage of RA 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the
exemption form territorial contiguity, when intended province consist of two or more islands, included
the exemption from the application of the minimum land requirement and; (3) that the Operative Fact
Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
appropriate time to file the motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.

September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19
of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgement. They alleged
that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was note yet existent. They
averred that priot to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unawre of the proceedings in this case.

October 15, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case
had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
STATCON MODULE 6

(Note: The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID)

Ruling:

Yes. The Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-pledged province,
enacted in RA 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the
creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its
plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9 of the
LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted RA 9355 creating the Island of Dinagat.

The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive
in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into accounts its average annual income of
82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government finance, which
is four times the minimum requirement of 20 Million for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic
services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.

Ratio legis est anime – the spirit rather the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit
or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that
which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Courts ought not to interpret
and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.

6. Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner Atong Paglaum, along with 51 other party-list groups and organization were disqualified by
COMELEC from participating in may 13, 2013 party-list election, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-
list organizations. The COMELEC excluded from participating in May 2013 party-list elections those that
did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional and sectoral groups or organization must
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors and (2) all nominees must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.

Issue:

Whether the party-list system is exclusive for sectoral parties only

Whether major political parties are prohibited from participated in party-list elections

Whether only member of the sector can be party-list nominees

Ruling:

1. No. Sec. 5 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 expresses that the party-list system
is composed of 3 groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the 3 groups: (1)
national parties and orgs; (2) regional parties or orgs; (3) sectoral parties or orgs.
STATCON MODULE 6

And thus, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED, and further remanding the
COMELEC that all the present petitions are for them to determine who are qualified to register
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision

Literal import must yield to intent

7. Automotive Parts & Equipment Company v. Jose Lingad
Facts:

In the petition for declaratory relief, then Secretary of Labor, Jose Lingand and then Director of Bureau
of Labor, Jose Lingad and then Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, Ruben Santos being named as
respondents, appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated alleged that it was duly
incorporated on January 5, 1961 and that from the start of its operation, employees were paid on a daily
and monthly basis. April 12, 1965, RA 4180 as an amendatory act took effect and that respondents
construed its provision “in such a way to require the petitioner to increase the salaries of all the monthly
paid employees of the petitioner to a minimum of 180 Php (not 152 Php) which according to them is the
applicable minimum wage rate.”

Petitioner believes that Sec 19 of RA 602 refers to and applies to employers in business prior to and at
the time of enactment Act and that the prohibition thereof against reduction of supplements as
envisioned in Sec 19 should not be applied prospectively to employers coming into existence
subsequent to the effective date of said Act.

The lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: “Sec 2 of RA 4180 provides that any provision of law
previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act that is inconsistent with any provision of this Act
is hereby repealed. Sec 19 of RA 602 is not inconsistent with RA 4180 and has not been repealed; on the
other hand the provision of Sec 19 RA 602 not being inconsistent with RA 4180 were deemed and
impliedly re-enacted.”

Issue:

Whether Sec 19 of RA 602 is applicable to the petitioner in connection with enforcement of the
provisions of RA 4180

Ruling:

Section 19 of RA 602 is applicable to petitioner. Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give
words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. A literal reading of a
legislative act which could be thus characterized is to be avoided if the language thereof can be given a
reasonable application consistent with the legislative purpose. In the apt language of Frankfurter: “A
decent respect for the policy of Congress must save us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not
disingenuous prupose.”

8. United States v. Toribio

Facts:
STATCON MODULE 6

Appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao, without a
permit from the municipal treasure of the municipality where it was slaughtered, in violation of the
provisions of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle.

In the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the
provisions of Act 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without permit.

It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition
contained in Section 30 and the penalty imposed in Section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption in a municipal slaughter and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for food in a
municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and it is urged
that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal slaughterhouse, neither the
prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to the case.

Issue:

Whether Sec 30 and 33 of RA 1147 applies in the case

Ruling:

No. The act primarily seeks to protect “large cattle” of the Philippine islands against theft and to make
the recovery easy and return of such cattle to their proper owners when lost, strayed or stolen. Where
the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the
object of which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would tent to
render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to
attain by its enactment.

9. Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy

10. Comendador v. Renato De Villa

Facts:
STATCON MODULE 6

Petitioners are officers of AFP and were chared with violations of Articles of War in relation with their
alleged participation in a failed coup d’etat. The charges against them are violations of Articles of War 67
(Mutiny), AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the RPC (Murder). A pretrial investigation
was constituted before being referred to the General Court Martial (GCM). The petitioners were given
several opportunities to present their side of the pretrial investigation, however, PTI panel resolved to
recommend that charges be referred to the GCM, due to failure of the petitioners to submit their
counter affidavits. The PTI panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM no. 14 without waiting for
the petitioners to submit their defense. Failure of pretrial investigation does not deprive a GCM of
jurisdiction as PTI is only directory and not mandatory. In the GCM No. 14 on May 15 1990 hearing,
petitioner manifested that they were exercising their rights to raise peremptory challenges against the
President and members of the General Court Martial No. 14. They invoked Art 19 of Commonwealth Act
408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued
under PD 39. Petitioner seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory right
granted by Art 18 of Articles of War.

Issue:

Whether right to peremptory challenge provided by Art 18 of Com. Act 408 has been discontinued under
PD 39.

Ruling:

Petitioners have peremptory right. When the martial law ended, GO No. 8 was revoked and military
tribunals were dissolved. The reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased. President Marcos General Order
No. 9 to empower Chief of Staff of the AFP to create military tribunals was issued to implement GO No.
8. This decree disallowed Peremptory challenge. When President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045
proclaiming the termionation of martial law, GO 8 also ended military tribunals were dissolved and upon
final determination of pending cases. With this PD 39 automatically ceased.