East West University

GEN 226 / Lecture 2 (1)

British Rule in India: Some Basic Facts:

A. British Rule in India: 1765-1947:
British Rule in India began in 1757 after the Battle of Palashi
Initially in Bengal and later spread all over India
Initially rule of the English East India Company
From 1858 British Government took direct control
This ended the Company’s rule in India
In 1947 British rule in India finally came to an end

B. Consolidation of British Rule in India: 1765-1947:

Battle of Palashi: 1757
Battle of Buxar: 1764
Diwani or the Dual System: 1765
Regulating Act: 1773
Charter Act: 1833
India Act: 1858
Partition of Bengal: 1905

C. Important Governors/Governor-Generals/Viceroys: 1765-1947:

Lord Clive: 1758-60 / 1765-67
Warren Hastings: 1772-85 / 1813-25
Lord Cornwallis: 1786- 93 / 1805
Lord Bentinck: 1828-35
Lord Dalhousie: 1848-56
Lord Canning: 1858-62
Lord Curzon: 1899-1905
Lord Mountbatten: 1946-47

D. Indian Reaction and Anti-British Movements: 1760-1947:

Faqir - Sannyasi Rebellion: 1760-1800
Faraizi Uprising: 1804-57
Titu Mir’s Rebellion: 1830-31
Santal Rebellion: 1855-56
Indigo Revolt: 1859-62
Sepoy Mutiny: 1857
Partition of Bengal: 1905-11
Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movement: 1919-22
Quit India Movement: 1942
Independence Movement: 1946-47.

1
Lucknow Pact, 1916
Lucknow Pact, (December 1916), [was an] agreement made by the Indian National Congress headed by
Maratha leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak and the All-India Muslim League led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah; it
was adopted by the Congress at its Lucknow session on December 29 and by the league on Dec. 31,
1916. The meeting at Lucknow marked the reunion of the moderate and radical wings of the Congress.
The pact dealt both with the structure of the government of India and with the relation of the Hindu and
Muslim communities.

On the former count, the proposals were an advance on Gopal Krishna Gokhale’s “political testament.”
Four-fifths of the provincial and central legislatures were to be elected on a broad franchise, and half the
executive council members, including those of the central executive council, were to be Indians elected
by the councils themselves. Except for the provision for the central executive, these proposals were
largely embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919. The Congress also agreed to separate
electorates for Muslims in provincial council elections and for weightage in their favour (beyond the
proportions indicated by population) in all provinces except the Punjab and Bengal, where they gave
some ground to the Hindu and Sikh minorities. This pact paved the way for Hindu-Muslim cooperation in
the Khilafat movement and Mohandas Gandhi’s noncooperation movement from 1920.

[https://www.britannica.com/event/Lucknow-Pact]

2
Bengal Pact, 1923
Bengal Pact, (1923) [was] an agreement aimed at resolving the question of Hindu-Muslim differences.
Chitta Ranjan Das, a man of vision who sincerely believed in the principle of sharing political power with
the majority Muslim community of the province, came forward to take up the task of strengthening
relations between Hindus and Muslims.

After the calling-off of the non-cooperation movement and the boycott of Legislatures, a group of
leaders of the Indian Congress led by CR Das and Pandit Motilal Nehru started thinking in favour of
entering the Legislative Council. Their object was to follow a policy of uniform and continuous
obstruction from within the Council with a view to putting an end to the system of Dyarchy as
introduced under the Government of India Act of 1919. However, the annual session of the Indian
national congress, held at Gaya in December 1922, rejected the proposal of Council entry. The Gaya
session of the Congress was followed by the resignation of CR Das as the President of the organisation.
He then formed within the Congress a party called the Swarajya Party. In the election to the Bengal
Legislative Council held in 1923, the Swarajya Party achieved remarkable success. It became the largest
single party capturing 46 seats out of 139 in the Provincial Legislature. CR Das became its leader. Though
not in a majority, the Swarajists were in a position to prevent the formation of any ministry in Bengal. CR
Das declined the offer made by Lord Lytton, the Governor of Bengal, to form a new ministry.

CR Das sought the active cooperation of the Muslim members of the Bengal Legislative Council to make
his political programme successful. He held discussions with prominent Muslim leaders of Bengal and
early in December 1923 came to an agreement with them. The terms of the Pact, commonly known as
the Bengal Pact, were passed in the meeting of the Swarajist Party Councilors held on 16 December
1923. It was made clear in the meeting that the Pact would be effective only after the real foundation of
self-government in the province. The Pact was also passed in the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee
meeting held on 18 December 1923. The terms of the Pact included the following:

a) Representation in the Bengal Legislative Council would be on population basis with separate
electorates.
b) Representation in the local bodies would be on the proportion of 60 per cent to the majority
community and 40 percent to the minority community.
c) Regarding Government appointments, it was decided that fifty five percent of the appointments
should go to the Muslims. Till the above percentage was attained, 80 per cent of posts would go to the
Muslims and the remaining 20 percent should go to the Hindus.
d) No resolution or enactment would be allowed to be moved without the consent of 75 percent of the
elected members of the affected community.
e) Music in processions would not be allowed in front of the mosques.
f) No legislation in respect of cow killing for food would be taken up in the Council and endeavour
should be made outside the Council to bring about an understanding between the two communities.
Cow killing should be taken up in such a manner as not to wound the religious feelings of the Hindus and
cow killing for religious purpose should not be interfered with.

Soon after its announcement, the Pact created a great outcry among Hindus and Muslims in Bengal. Its
bold provisions offended middle class Bengali Hindus who opposed it stubbornly because they thought
that the implementation of the Pact would diminish their power and influence in political as well as in
administrative spheres. Surendranath Banerjea and BC Pal were among the Hindu leaders who stood up

3
against the Pact. The Hindu press of Bengal played a vital role in fomenting Hindu public opinion against
what they called a one-sided Pact. The members of his own community accused CR Das of opportunism
and even Muslim bias. He, however, remained firm in the face of all opposition. Emphasizing the
necessity of the Pact, he remarked that Swaraj would not come without Hindu-Muslim unity. He was
supported in his stance by a considerable number of Congressmen in Bengal. J M Sengupta, Subhas
Chandra Bose, Kiran Shankar Roy, Anil Baran Roy, Birendranath Sasmal and Pratap Chandra Guha were
prominent among them. He got whole-hearted support for his scheme from the majority of the Muslims
of Bengal. The latter welcomed the Pact wholeheartedly because in their opinion it was the sensible
solution to their problems. The Muslim leaders of Bengal held that, if implemented, the Pact would
strike at the root of communal strife. The Muslim press thanked those Hindu leaders for their greatness
in meeting the just demands of the Muslims through formulating the Pact in consultation with them. But
the Muslims were very disheartened when the Bengal Pact was rejected by the Coconada Session of the
Indian National Congress, held in December 1923. The decision of the Congress was characterised by
them as shortsighted and aggressively selfish.

Though the Indian Congress discarded the pact, CR Das tried his best to get the terms of the Pact ratified
by the Bengal Provincial Congress Conference held at Sirajganj in June 1924. Unfortunately his
premature death in 1925 came as a blow to the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity. His death was followed by
the repudiation of the Pact, even by some of his own followers. A large number of Bengali Muslim
politicians became shocked at this act and began to move away from the Congress as well as the
Swarajya Party.

The defection of the Muslims was marked by the formation of the Independent Muslim Party in 1926 by
some prominent Muslim leaders of the province like Moulvi Abdul Karim, Maulana Abdur Rauf, Khan
Bahadur Azizul Huq, M Abdullahil Baqi, Maulvi Asrafuddin Ahmed, Dr A Suhrawardy, A K Fazlul Huq and
others. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy became the Provisional Secretary of the Party. Indeed, from this
time on, the Muslims of Bengal began to reconsider their stand in Bengal politics. The result of all these
maneuverings was a revival of communal politics in the province around 1926. [Chitta Ranjan Misra]

[http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Bengal_Pact,_1923]

4
Communal Award, 1935
Communal Award [was] an official policy statement of the British Government in respect of the
composition of provincial legislatures as a further step towards the transfer of power to the Indian
people. The Award defined the methods of selection and the relative strength of representation of
various communities in the legislatures as they were expected to be formed under the provisions of the
Government of India Act 1935.

When the Indian leadership failed to come up with a constitutional solution of the communal issue at
the close of the second session of the Round Table Conference (1931) the British Prime Minister Ramsay
MacDonald made it clear that in the event of the failure of the several Indian communities and interests
to reach any agreement, His Majesty's Government would be compelled to apply a provisional scheme.
The Second Round Table Conference got off to an uncertain start in September 1931 with Mahatma
Gandhi attending as the sole Congress delegate and the princes demonstrating reluctance to enter a
federation. The Sikhs were represented by two delegates. Of the enlarged membership of 114 at this
conference, 51 were appointed to form the Minorities Committee assigned to make a recommendation
concerning communal representation and procedures to protect the rights of minorities. Progress within
the committee was made difficult by the tenacity with which the Muslim delegates held to the demand
for separate communal electorates. They claimed that seats in the legislatures of the Muslim majority
provinces of the Punjab and Bengal should be based on the actual population ratios there, while seats in
provinces in which Muslims were in a minority should be based on negotiated ratios weighted
favourably towards the Muslims in the manner of the Congress-Muslim League Pact signed in Lucknow
in 1916. Of the other major interests present at the second conference, the Muslims were able to win
the support of only the delegates of the so-called minor minorities, the Hindu Depressed classes, the
Anglo Indians and a section of the Indian Christians, each of whom found it of advantage to conjoin their
own claims with those of the Muslims. The Congress leader Mahatma Gandhi had been unsuccessful in
persuading the representative of the minorities to reach an agreed formula for representation.
Thereafter the representatives of the Muslims, the Depressed classes, the Indian Christians, the Anglo-
Indians and the British interests produced and submitted a joint statement which they claimed, should
stand or fall as a whole. The sole outcome of the second session was the widening of the cleavage
between the Congress and the minorities, especially the Muslim League. The initiative thus was passed
from the Indian National Congress to the British Government. MacDonald's statement of promise and a
warning was concretised some nine months later, after a final attempt to open the way to a negotiated
settlement through a consultative committee but before the start of the Third Round Table Conference,
in the form of a Communal Award. The Award announced on 16 August 1932 was officially spoken of as
Communal Decisions.

The Award was in the form of an arbitral settlement of the conflicting claims of various interests in
regard to the composition and method of election to the provincial legislatures. This involved not only
the question of the method of providing representation to the religious communities but also of the
relative strength to be accorded to each in relation to the other in every province, the method and
relative strength of representation of non-communal special interests, and the size of the legislative
bodies. The main consequence of the Award was the fragmentation of the Indian electorate still further.

The Award demarcated the following communal constituencies: general (composed of Hindus and other
residual communal groups), Muslim, Sikh, Indian Christian, Anglo-Indian, European, Hindu depressed
classes (with electors voting also in the general constituency), and tribal or backward areas. The right of

5
separate electorate was not only given to the Muslims of India but also to all the minority communities
in the country. The Award declared the untouchables as a minority, and thus the Hindu depressed
classes (dalita) were given a number of special seats to be filled from special depressed class electorates
in the area where their voters were concentrated. Under the Communal Award, the principle of
weightage was also maintained with some modifications in the Muslim minority provinces. Principle of
weightage was also applied for Europeans in Bengal and Assam, Sikhs in Punjab and North West Frontier
Province, and Hindus in Sind and North West Frontier Province. Though the Muslims constituted almost
56% of the total population of the Punjab, they were given only 86 out of 175 seats in the Punjab
Assembly. The Muslim majority in Punjab was thus reduced to a minority. The formula favoured the
Sikhs of Punjab, and the Europeans of Bengal the most. Special seats were designated for women within
the various communal categories to ensure their representation in the provincial legislature. The Award
also preserved some non-communal special constituencies, such as labour, commerce, landholders, and
universities.

The Award was not popular with any Indian party. Muslims were not happy with the Award, as it has
reduced their majority in Punjab and Bengal to a minority. Yet they were prepared to accept it. In its
annual session held in November 1933, the All India Muslim League passed a resolution that reads:
'Though the decision falls far short of the Muslim demands, the Muslims have accepted it in the best
interest of the country, reserving to themselves the right to press for the acceptance of all their
demands.'

On the other hand, the Hindus refused to accept the awards and decided to launch a campaign against
it. For them it was not possible to accept the untouchables as a minority. They organized the Allahabad
Unity Conference in which they demanded for the replacement of separate electorates by joint
electorates. Many nationalist Muslims and Sikhs also participated in the conference. The Congress
completely rejected the Award. Since the Award had also provided for separate electorates for the
Depressed classes, Gandhi wrote to the Prime Minister and asked for its revocation, failing which he
would undertake a fast-unto-death. The British Government realized that Gandhi had a point in that the
Depressed classes were an integral part of the Hindus, and therefore the government withdrew the
proposal. Thereafter Gandhi held negotiations with Dr. B R Ambedkar, the leader of the untouchables,
and managed to sign the Poona Pact under which the Depressed classes were given more seats from the
general Hindu quota than they had been provided under the Communal Award of 1932. [Masudur
Rahman Khan]

[http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Communal_Award]

6
Lahore Resolution, 1940
Lahore Resolution [was] adopted at the general session of the Muslim League. In 1940 Mohammed Ali
Jinnah called a general session of the All India Muslim League in Lahore to discuss the situation that had
arisen due to the outbreak of the Second World War and the Government of India joining the war
without taking the opinion of the Indian leaders, and also to analyse the reasons that led to the defeat
of the Muslim League in the general election of 1937 in the Muslim majority provinces.

Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy left with a small group of Muslim League workers for Lahore on 19 March
1940. A K Fazlul Huq led the Bengal Muslim League contingent and reached Lahore on 22 March. The
Chief Ministers of Bengal and the Punjab were two dominant figures in the conference.

Jinnah, in his speech, criticised the Congress and the nationalist Muslims, and espoused the Two-Nation
Theory and the reasons for the demand for separate Muslim homelands. His arguments caught the
imagination of the Muslim masses. Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Chief Minister of the Punjab, drafted the
original Lahore Resolution, which was placed before the Subject Committee of the All India Muslim
League for discussion and amendments. The Resolution, radically amended by the Subject Committee,
was moved in the general session by Fazlul Huq on 23 March and was supported by Choudhury
Khaliquzzaman and other Muslim leaders. The Lahore Resolution ran as follows:

That the areas where the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the Northwestern and Eastern
zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'independent states' in which the constituent units shall
be autonomous and sovereign.

The Resolution was adopted on 24 March with great enthusiasm. The Hindu Press dubbed it as the
'Pakistan Demand', after the scheme invented by Rahmat Ali, an Indian Muslim living at Cambridge. The
1940 resolution nowhere mentioned Pakistan and in asking for 'independent states' the spokesmen of
the League were far from clear what was intended. The Hindu press supplied to the Muslim leadership a
concerted slogan, which immediately conveyed to them the idea of a state. It would have taken long for
the Muslim leaders to explain the Lahore Resolution and convey its real meaning and significance to the
Muslim masses. Years of labour of the Muslim leaders to propagate its full importance amongst the
masses was shortened by the Hindu press in naming the Resolution as the 'Pakistan Resolution'. By
emphasizing the idea of Pakistan the Hindu press succeeded in converting a wordy and clouded lawyer's
formula into a clarion call.

The Muslims of Bengal, who were searching for an identity throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, finally found it in the Lahore Resolution. The Lahore Resolution gave them a sense
of nationhood. Henceforth the dominant theme in Muslim politics was not complaint against Hindu
injustice, but a demand for separate political existence.

On 15 April 1941 the Lahore Resolution was incorporated as a creed in the constitution of the All-India
Muslim League in its Madras session. It continued to be the League's creed until its dissolution after the
independence of Pakistan in 1947.

Indeed, from 1940 onward, Pakistan was the great talking point of the Indian independence debate.
When the cabinet mission arrived in India in March 1946 to consult Indian leaders and to help facilitate
self-government, the All India Muslim League decided to hold a three day Convention of the members of

7
the Central and Provincial Legislatures belonging to the Muslim League on 7 April at Delhi to reiterate
their 'Pakistan Demand'. The Working Committee of the Muslim League had appointed a Sub Committee
with Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, Hasan Ispahani, and others to draft a resolution to be placed before the
Convention. Choudhury Khaliquzzaman prepared a draft of the resolution, which was discussed with
other members and, after some minor changes here and there, was approved by the Sub Committee
and then by the Subject Committee. This resolution made a fundamental departure from the original
Lahore Resolution in using the word 'state' in the singular replacing the term 'states'.

The resolution that was placed before the Delhi Convention of Muslim Legislators in 1946 included the
principle that the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the Northeast and the Punjab, North West
Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the Northwest of India, namely Pakistan zones, where the
Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent 'state' and that an
unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay. The
Committee did not question the change.

The resolution was proposed in the open session by Suhrawardy and seconded by Choudhury
Khaliquzzaman. Abul Hashim claimed that he raised the voice of protest against the resolution on a
point of order in the Subject Committee on the previous day when Jinnah placed it before the
Committee. He maintained that the draft resolution looked like an amendment of the Lahore Resolution
though it had not been said or it was not placed in the form of amendment of the Lahore Resolution. He
claimed to have argued that the Lahore Resolution envisaged two sovereign states in Northeastern and
Northwestern zones of India, and the Resolution was accepted by the All-India Muslim League in its
Madras session of 1941 as the creed of that political party. He claimed to have insisted that the
Convention of the Muslim League legislators was not competent to alter or modify the contents of the
Lahore Resolution.

Jinnah at first took the plural 's' of the Lahore Resolution as an 'obvious printing mistake'. But when, on
Abul Hashim's insistence, the original minute book was checked, Jinnah found under his own signature
the plural 's'. Abul Hashim claimed that he had suggested for erasing the word 'one' and replace it with
'a'. Jinnah is said to have accepted Abul Hashim's suggestion. According to Hashim, Suhrawardy placed
in the open session of the Convention a modified form of the resolution on Jinnah's advice.

It may, therefore, appear that even after the Delhi Convention of the Muslim Legislators Jinnah was not
thinking in terms of amending the Lahore Resolution. The Subject Committee presided over by Jinnah
seemingly accepted the constitutional position that the Convention of the Muslim Legislators was not
the forum competent to amend the Lahore Resolution. Nor could Jinnah amend it after the General
Election in the country in which the Muslim League contested on the basis of the Lahore Resolution. He
assured the Muslim League leaders from Bengal who met him on a deputation that the Lahore
Resolution was not amended. At his Malbari Hill House on 30 July 1946 Jinnah encouraged Abul Hashim
to work on the basis of the Lahore Resolution. [Mohammad Shah]

[http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Lahore_Resolution]

8
Two-Nation Theory
Two-Nation Theory [was] a political doctrine rationalizing the division of India politically into two
independent nations' India and Pakistan. The concept was propounded by Muhammad Ali Jinnah in the
1940s on the eve of the winding up of the British rule in India. The doctrine has an electoral background.
The separate electorate system was introduced in phases for the Muslims and Hindus under the
constitutional reforms of 1909, 1919 and 1935. Under the separate electorate system, Muslims could
elect their own candidate to represent them in the provincial legislative councils and legislative
assemblies, political powers in the Muslim majority areas of India. Muslim Ministries were formed in
Bengal and in the North Western Provinces. Being installed in power through the separate electorate
system, some Muslim leaders now began to think turning the beneficial separate electorate system into
a separate nationalist thought called two-nation theory asserting that the Muslims of India formed a
separate nation altogether historically, culturally, intellectually, and socially. This idea was first
articulated by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) who first started the movement for Muslim self-
awakening and identity. Sir Syed Ahmed discouraged the Indian Muslim community to join the band
wagon of the Congress nationalist movement. He articulated that the Indian Muslims themselves
formed a nation and in their own interest should not ally themselves with the Congress-led movements
for self-rule. His idea found good reception from the colonial rulers, who needed allies to manage the
growing Indian nationalist movement launched by the Congress.

The congress non-co-operation of the Diarchy constitution at provincial level had alienated considerable
Muslim political elements from the nationalist politics of the Congress and consequently, the Muslim
League, which was moribund until 1929, became increasingly the vehicle of Muslim politics in Bengal
and also in other Muslim majority provinces. Poet and philosopher Sir Muhammad Iqbal's presidential
address at the Muslim League's conference in December 1930 laid the theoretical framework of the two
nation theory. He further elaborated his viewpoint of Muslim nationhood in a rejoinder to a statement
made by Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru at the London Round Table Conference stating that the attitude of the
Muslim delegation was based on 'reactionarism'. Iqbal concluded his rejoinder:

'In conclusion I must put a straight question to pundit Jawharlal, how is India's problem to be solved if
the majority community will neither concede the minimum safeguards necessary for the protection of a
minority of 80 million people, nor accept the award of a third party (Communal Award of British Prime
Minister McDonald); but continue to talk of a kind of nationalism which works out only to its own
benefit. This position can admit of only two alternatives. Either the Indian majority community will have
to accept for itself the permanent position of an agent of British imperialism in the East, or the country
will have to be redistributed on a basis of religious, historical and cultural affinities so as to do away with
the question of (separate) electorates and the communal problem in its present form.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, president of the Muslim League now in power in several provinces of India
including Bengal, explained his Two Nation Theory in its final form in his presidential address at Lahore
on March 22'23, 1940. He explained:

'It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam
and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and
distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common
nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has troubles and will lead India to destruction if
we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious

9
philosophies, social customs, and litterateurs. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and,
indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and
conceptions. Their aspect on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans
derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and
different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and
defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority
and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may
be so built for the government of such a state.

However, the idea of 'sovereign and sovereign states' was amended in the Muslim League Conference in
Calcutta in 1946 and resolved to establish a 'sovereign state of Pakistan' based on the Two Nation
Theory.

Most Pakistani historians explain Muslim separatism in terms of two-nation theory. According to them
there has not been ever noticed a period of Indian socio-cultural environment when the two-civilizations
developed a polity of commonalities. They may have developed some cultural commonalities here and
there, but on the whole the two cultures have followed separate courses throughout history. In drawing
this Hindu-Muslim divide they go in the past as far back as to Al-Beruni, who made remarks in his
account about the community-wise separate ways of life of the Hindus and Muslims of India. The Indian
nationalist historians, however, observe the consistent Hindu-Muslim unity in Indian history until the
British introduced separate electorate system to divide the Indians in communal lines. To prove the
hollowness of the Two Nation Theory, the Indian nationalist historians argue that the emergence of
Bangladesh through a war of liberation is the positive proof of the falsity of the Two Nation Theory.
Against this argument the supporters of Two Nation theory maintain that Bangladesh did not join India
and became independent according to the spirit and letters of the Two Nation Theory enshrined in the
Lahore Resolution, 1940. [Sirajul Islam]

[http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Two-Nation_Theory]

10
Victory of Labor Party in UK, 1945
The 1945 British General Election was held just after the Allied victory in Europe and the result was a
huge shock to wartime leader, Winston Churchill. For this general election, the Conservatives, led by
Churchill, had played on his inspirational wartime leadership skills – the man who had taken the country
to victory over the Germans. Winston Churchill had world-wide fame and respect. The Conservative's
major opponent, the Labour Party, was led by Clement Attlee – reasonably well known in this country
but not outside of it. The election date was set for July 5th 1945 and campaigning started on June 4th.
However, The result was not known until July 26th as there were many servicemen stationed abroad still
fighting against Japan who had the right to vote but the getting their results back to London took a long
time, thus holding the election up. One reason that Labour won the General Election in 1945 is that they
fully expected to win the election just because of Winston Churchill. Churchill was the Prime Minister
and Leader of the Conservative/ Labour Coalition during the war. Many believe that if Churchill wasn’t in
charge, Britain would be speaking German today. Due to this, the Conservatives fully expected the
British public to vote for their war time hero. However, Conservatives announced no plans to sort out
the problems that the country was in, such as poverty and unemployment, including the Great
Depression. Obviously because of this, people wanted change but the Conservatives were happy and
fully prepared to carry on running the country the way they did before the Second World War began.
While they were relying on Churchill, Atlee campaigned across the whole country, being driven in a
Standard motor car by his wife Violet, going door to door.

The Beveridge report was also something that contributed to Labour’s landslide victory in 1945. Even
though it was written in 1942, The Labour Party was very much associated with the report with it, with
their slogan "Freedom From Want". The Conservatives were less associated with the report and by
1945, were still associated with those who did well out of society. It was chaired by William Beveridge,
an economist, who identified five "Giant Evils" in society: squalor, ignorance, want, idleness and disease.
The main change that was promised in this report was the Welfare State, which made sure there was a
commitment to health, education, employment and social security in the United Kingdom. This
undertook policy measures to provide for the people of the United Kingdom "from the cradle to the
grave." They also planned the introduction of the NHS (National Health Service), which provided free
healthcare for everyone in the country, regardless of social class. As this would no doubt improve the
state that the country was in, many people voted for Labour because of this. Also the fact that the
Conservatives were publically against the report would not have helped their campaign.

Even though Labour was ‘classed’ as a ‘working class party’, many of the middle class population were
prepared to vote for them in 1945. This was because the country was in decline and the Conservatives
were doing nothing about it.

Another reason was the fact that the conservatives dealings with Hitler before the war at Munich
(Munich Agreement, country being led my Neville Chamberlain at the time) and the policy of
appeasement were now looked on in shame and blamed on the Conservatives, going as far as saying
that they caused the war.

[http://www.markedbyteachers.com/as-and-a-level/history/why-did-the-labour-party-win-the-
general-election-in-1945.html]

11
Cabinet Mission, 1946
Cabinet Mission arrived in India on 24 March 1946 to make negotiations with the recognised party
leaders towards self-government for India. Comprised of three members of the British Cabinet -
Secretary of State Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and AV Alexander - the Mission proposed a two-
tiered federal plan, which was expected to maintain national unity while conceding the largest measure
of regional autonomy. There was to be a federation of the provinces and the states with the federal
centre controlling only defense, foreign affairs and communications. At the same time, individual
provinces could form regional unions to which they could surrender, by mutual agreement, some of the
powers. The existing provincial assemblies were to be grouped into three sections while electing the
constituent assembly: Section 'A' for the Hindu majority provinces, Section 'B' and 'C' for the Muslim
majority provinces of the Northwest and Northeast (including Assam). The sections would have the
power to set up intermediate level executives and legislatures of their own.

Both the Indian national congress and the All India Muslim League accepted this plan. But the two could
not agree on the plan for an interim government, which was to convene a constituent assembly to
frame a constitution for the free, federal India. The two also put different interpretations on the Cabinet
Mission scheme to which they had agreed earlier. The League wanted grouping to be compulsory, with
Sections 'B' and 'C' developing into solid entities with a view to future entry into Pakistan. The Congress
argued that compulsory grouping contradicted provincial autonomy, and was not satisfied with the
Mission's clarification that grouping would be compulsory at first, but provinces might opt out after the
constitution had been framed and new elections held under it.

Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, who replaced Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as President of the Indian National
Congress, declared at a press conference on 10 July that the only commitment made by his party was to
participate in the Constituent Assembly elections, and 'there will be no grouping'. The League responded
on 29-30 July by withdrawing its earlier acceptance of the long-term plan and calling on the 'Muslim
nation' to go for a 'Direction Action' from 16 August to achieve Pakistan. Meanwhile, Lord Wavell's
efforts to set up a short-term coalition/interim government at the centre had also broken down.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah wanted a ratio of five Congress Hindus, five League Muslims, one Sikh, and one
scheduled caste representation in the proposed government. The Congress rejected it.

Lord Wavell, consequently, had to set up a caretaker government of officials alone on 4 July. But within
a few weeks the Viceroy began endeavouring to somehow get the Congress in the Interim Government
for fear of possible 'mass action', even if the League stayed out. On 2 September 1946 a Congress-
dominated interim government headed by Nehru was sworn in, who was still opposing compulsory
grouping. The Muslim League joined the Cabinet after some hesitation, but decided to boycott the
constituent assembly. So the Cabinet Mission Plan failed and on 20 February 1947 Clement Attlee, the
British Premier, declared the British intention to leave India by June 1948 resulting in the partition of
India in August 1947. [Mohammad Shah]

[http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Cabinet_Mission]

12
Cripps Mission, 1942 /
Plebiscite of 1946 / Provincial Elections, 1946
The breakdown of the Simla Conference resulted in an all-encompassing change in the political outlook
of India. The most imperative result that brought about a transformation in the society was the decision
of Provincial Elections during British India, 1946. The general election in Britain and the surrender of
Japan effected India to a great deal. The Labour Party secured a clear majority in the House of Commons
in the election in Britain. The Congress members congratulated and supported the Labour Party
although there was less enthusiasm among members of the Muslim League. After the election, the new
British Government was welcomed in India with goodwill. After the end of the Second World War, it
became urgent to find a permanent and lasting solution to India's constitutional problem.

Sir Stafford Cripps came to India, after the elections in Britain and was concerned regarding a
permanent settlement in the country. He wanted to hasten with the major issue relating to Pakistan. Sir
Stafford advocated that new elections should be held in India and that, with the representatives so
elected, a constituent assembly should be formed to work out a new free self-governing constitution for
British India. The Muslim League members supported the plan as it fitted with the view of their Working
Committee. The Congress members were in favour of a general Provincial election. But according to
them the elections would not be fair unless civil liberties were restored.

Lord Wavell, the then Indian Viceroy, was of the view that the Central and Provincial Legislature
elections would be held as soon as possible in India. This provincial election during British India would
help in the setting up of a constitution-making body. He also announced that after the elections, the
Viceroy would set an Executive Council that would have the support of the main Indian political parties.
Both the Muslim League and the Congress opposed the proposal. During the first week of August the
Viceroy held consultations with the provincial Governors, who agreed that the elections should be held
as soon as possible.

On 21st August 1945, two announcements were made by the Viceroy: firstly, that the elections to the
central and provincial Assemblies would be held in the winter of 1945, and secondly, the Viceroy would
pay a visit to England for consultation with His Majesty's Government. On 24th August Lord Wavell,
thus, went to London. The Viceroy had long discussions with the Secretary of State and the India
Committee of the Cabinet. The procedure for reaching a final constitutional settlement, the British
Government preferred the Cripps proposals for 'provincial option'.

The provincial Assemblies would have to provide the starting point for the creation of a body to frame
the future constitution. On the 19th September, Lord Wavell announced that His Majesty's Government
was determined to promote in union with the leaders of Indian opinion the early realisation of full self-
government in India. According to His Majesty's Government, during these preparatory stages, the
Government of India should proceed with its present work, and urgent economic and social problems
must be dealt with. Provincial Elections were necessary because after the elections, discussions would
be held with the Indian leaders and with the representatives of the Indian States to determine the form
in which way the constitution-making body should take. Thus, the viceroy appealed to the Indians to
make a united effort to develop a constitution that would be accepted as fair by all parties and interests
in India. However, the reactions of the two main parties were not favourable in this matter.

Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan declared that Muslims were not ready to accept any settlement unless a
separate homeland for them was formed. The All India Congress Committee characterised the proposal

13
of the Viceroy, as 'vague, inadequate and unsatisfactory' because it had not addressed the issue of
independence. Yet, the two parties launched huge election campaigns. According to both the major
parties of the country, this provincial election and its results would play a crucial role for the future of
India and also in determining the position of the two parties. The League wanted to sweep the Muslim
constituencies to prove that they were the sole representatives of the Muslims of Sub-continent, while
Congress wanted to prove that irrespective of religion, they represent all the Indians. The Government
of India and the provincial governments started preparations for holding the Provincial elections. The
decision was taken that elections to the central legislature would be held first; then elections to the
provincial legislatures where ministries were functioning, and lastly, elections to the legislatures in
provinces where ministries were not functioning would be held.

Both the Muslim League and the Congress propagated opposite slogans during their campaigns. The
Muslim League announced that it would fight the elections on the issue of Pakistan and the title of the
League to represent all the Muslims. Jinnah and other League members demanded that the provinces of
the Punjab, Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Bengal and Assam should be formed
into a separate sovereign State to be known as Pakistan. On the other hand, the Congress stood for
United India. The Congress tried to get the support of all the provincial and central Muslim parties who
had some differences with the League, and backed them in the elections.

Abul Kalam Azad approached Gandhiji with a plan for a communal settlement towards the end of August
1945. In addition to that, he pointed out that partition was against the interests of the Muslims
themselves. He suggested to the Congress that the future constitution of India must be federal with fully
autonomous units. There must be joint electorates both at the Centre and in the provinces, with
reservation of seats. He even opined that there must be parity of Hindus and Muslims in the central
legislature and the central executive till such time as communal suspicion disappeared and parties were
formed on economic and political lines. However, the Congress itself faced considerable organizational
difficulties in preparing for the elections. Many congress leaders were imprisoned and party funds and
property had in many cases been isolated. Another major problem that posed a serious threat during
the period was the Indian National Army members being deported to India at the end of the war. The
INA officers were put to public trial in Delhi and an Ordinance was promulgated setting up a Military
Tribunal for the purpose.

The first among the accused included a Hindu, a Muslim and a Sikh and the trial took place at the Red
Fort. The Congress took up the case of the accused and set up a panel of defence under Bhulabhai Desai,
which included Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Nehru. Demonstrations were held in different places, like
Madurai, Bombay, Calcutta, Lucknow and Lahore. The Muslim League also decided to associate itself
with the defence of the I.N.A. accused and thus the agitation spread all over the country. The holding of
the I.N.A. trials in Delhi resulted in a political unrest in the country. On the other hand, these trials
provided scope for propaganda against the Government, which the two parties used to full advantage. A
great deal of political heat had called forth the way in which the I.N.A. trials have been represented to
the public.

Meanwhile the elections to the central Legislative Assembly had been held and the complete results
became available towards the end of December 1945. The Congress won with a huge majority and was
able to sweep the polls for the non-Muslim seats. The Leagues managed to win all the 30 seats reserved
for the Muslims. The results of the provincial election held in early 1946 were not different. Congress
won most of the non-Muslim seats while Muslim League captured approximately 95 percent of the
Muslim seats. Both parties celebrated their victories and the Central Election Board of the Congress on 6

14
January 1946 declared that the Congress was the most representative organization in the country.
Jinnah made it clear that he would not take any part in an interim Government without a prior
declaration accepting the principle of Pakistan and parity with all other parties. He insisted on making of
two constitution bodies.

Another serious and important incident that took place during the time of the provincial election was
the revolt of certain R.I.N. personnel, which was followed by grave civil turmoil in Bombay. It started on
18 February and the Signal School in Bombay went on a hunger-strike in protest against what their
Central Strike Committee described as 'untold hardships regarding pay and food and the most
outrageous racial discrimination,' They were joined later by ratings from other naval establishments. The
Army and the Air Force were not unaffected.

The provincial elections were held first in the provinces of Assam, Sind, the North-West Frontier
Province and the Punjab. In Assam, the Congress won all the General territorial seats and the League
almost all the Muslim seats. The Congress Party captured fifty-eight out of 108 seats, was commissioned
to form the Government and Gopinath Bardolai became the premier. The ministry consisted of five
Hindus, one Indian Christian and one Nationalist Muslim. Two seats were offered to the Muslim League
on condition that it would agree to work the Congress parliamentary Programme, but the League
rejected the offer because of the inclusion of a non-League Muslim in the ministry. Another important
situation arose in Sind. The Muslim League captured twenty-seven seats, and one independent Muslim
joined the party after the elections. The Nationalist Muslims won three seats. The Congress secured
twenty-one and, of the remaining seats, three went to Europeans and one to an independent Labour
candidate.

After the Provincial elections of 1946, the Syed group formed a coalition with the Congress and the
Nationalist Muslims that resulted in the position of two parties with twenty-eight members each. Sir
Ghulam Hussain, leader of the Muslim leader of the Muslim But the offer to form a ministry was made
by the Governor to, League Party. This was regarded as an act of partisanship and was greatly resented
by Congress and nationalist opinion. Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah offered two Hindu seats to the
Congress Party, but the latter insisted that the offer should be addressed to Syed, the head of the
coalition. As it was an article of faith with the Muslim League not to have dealings with non-League
Muslims, the matter was not proceeded with.

[https://www.indianetzone.com/42/provincial_elections_during_british_india_1946.htm]

15
Calcutta Riot, 1946
Calcutta Riot, 1946 [was] a dreadful event (16 August 1946) with its tremendous negative impact on
Hindu-Muslim relations. The violence, highly organised in character, resulted from the hatred and
distrust between the two major communities.

16th August 1946 was selected as the direct action day when Muslims throughout the subcontinent
were to 'suspend all business' to support the Muslim League demand for Pakistan. On the other hand,
the Hindu popular opinion rallied round the anti-Pakistan slogan. Bengal's Congress leaders were not
necessarily Hindu communalists. But since most of the party's support came from the Hindus, a section
of Congressmen developed a strong sense of Hindu identity in view of the perceived threat from the
Pakistan movement. Their campaign certainly served to inflame the Hindu mind against the Direct
Action Day, which was likely to be particularly successful in Bengal, since it had a League ministry in power.

Disturbances started on the morning of 16 August when League volunteers forced Hindu shopkeepers in
North Calcutta to close their shops and Hindus retaliated by obstructing the passage of League's
processions. The League's rally at Ochterloney Monument on that day was considered as the 'largest
ever Muslim assembly'. The Muslim League Chief Minister in his address reportedly assured the
audience that the military and police had been 'restrained'. This was interpreted by the gathering as an
open invitation to commit violence on its rival community. The region most affected by the violence was
the densely populated sector of the metropolis bounded by Bowbazar Street on the south, Upper
Circular Road on the east, Vivekananda Road on the north and Strand Road on the west. Official
estimate put the casualties at 4,000 dead and 100,000 injured in the riot. Only on the 22nd Calcutta
became quiet except for some isolated killings. During Calcutta's earlier Hindu-Muslim clashes - notably
in 1918 and 1926 - the targets of collective violence were essentially symbols of class and colonial
oppression. But the 1946 crowd hardly demonstrated hostility against the government, police or
Europeans. While in earlier riots shops dealing with immediate consumer goods or items whose price
had just risen were mostly looted, in the riot of 1946 any shop was an object of attack, the only
discriminatory feature being Muslims exclusively pillaging Hindu shops and vice versa. Religious symbols
of the rival community were another victim of crowd violence. Unlike preceding riots, the women faced
assaults in 1946. Another novelty of the 1946 killing was attacks and murders committed by small
groups. The emphasis here was on revenge and control over the physical body of the enemy; the aim
was to cause the greatest possible humiliation, pain and suffering.

What is most unique about the 1946 riot is that it was conducted in the most organised manner. The
League mobilised all its frontal organisations to make the 'Day' a success. Special coupons for gallons of
petrol were issued in the names of League ministers to be used by their party functionaries. One
month's food ration for 10,000 people was allegedly drawn in advance to feed the League activists. Once
the riot began the Chief Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, accompanied by his political aids, spent
considerable time in the Police Control Room to allegedly shield Muslims from police operations. On the
other hand, Marwari merchants reportedly purchased arms and ammunitions from American soldiers,
which were later used during the riot. Acid bombs were manufactured and stored in Hindu-owned
factories long before the outbreak. Calcutta's Hindu blacksmiths were mobilised to prepare spearheads
and other weapons.

Aftermath The riots completely ramshackled the city life. Food and other essential supplies became
scarce, hyperinflation prevailed, and epidemics threatened the metropolis. Calcutta came to be divided

16
into 'communal zones', Hindus and Muslims avoiding each other's areas. For one whole year Calcutta
remained a scene of constant communal clashes. Indeed a nexus could rightly be traced between
communal outbreaks in Calcutta and Bihar. The circle was completed when the Punjab exploded in
March 1947.

Communalism at the popular level provided a new turn to India's institutional politics. The Muslim
League warned that civil wars on the Calcutta scale would occur in other parts of the country unless its
proposal for the Partition of India was accepted and the Congress suffered a setback and its leadership,
excepting Gandhi and Badshah Khan, accepted Partition of the country along religious lines as the 'only
alternative'. The turn that events had taken afterwards made a peaceful solution through an agreement
between the Congress and the Muslim League a far cry. [Suranjan Das] [Abridged]

[http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Calcutta_Riot,_1946]

17
Noakhali Riots, 1946
The Noakhali riots, were a series of semi-organized massacres, rapes, abductions and forced
conversions of Hindus to Islam and looting and arson of Hindu properties perpetrated by the Muslim
community in the districts of Noakhali in the Chittagong Division in October–November 1946, a year
before India's independence from British rule.

The massacre of the Hindu population started on 10 October, on the day of Kojagari Lakshmi Puja, and
continued unabated for about a week. It is estimated that a minimum of more than 5,000 Hindus were
killed, hundreds of Hindu women were raped and thousands of Hindu men and women were forcibly
converted to Islam. Around 50,000 to 75,000 survivors were sheltered in temporary relief camps in
Comilla, Chandpur, Agartala and other places. Around 50,000 Hindus remained marooned in the
affected areas under the strict surveillance of the Muslims, where the administration had no say.

Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Bengal, held a press conference in Kolkata on 16
October at which he acknowledged the forcible conversion, plunder and looting of Hindus in Noakhali.
While insisting that the incidents had stopped, he said he had no idea why the incidents had occurred.
He stated that it had become difficult for troops to move in because the canals had been jammed,
bridges were damaged and roads blocked. He contemplated dropping printed appeals and warnings
from the air instead of rushing in troops. On 18 October, Frederick Burrows, the Governor of Bengal,
along with Suhrawardy and the Inspector General of Police for Bengal, visited Feni by plane and flew
over the affected areas. Later, the Government of Bengal sent an official team to Noakhali and Tipperah
to assess the situation. The team consisted of Jogendra Nath Mandal the newly appointed Member-in-
Charge of Law in the Interim Government; Shamsuddin Ahmed, the Minister of Labour in the Bengal
Government; Abul Hashem, the Secretary of Bengal Provincial Muslim League; Fazlur Rahman; Hamidul
Haque Chowdhury; Moazzem Hossain; A. Malik and B. Wahiduzzaman.

When the news of the events in Noakhali reached the outside world, Indian social, religious and political
institutions came forward for relief and rescue operations. Notable among them were Bharat Sevashram
Sangha, Hindu Mahasabha, the Indian National Congress, the Communist Party of India, the Indian
National Army, Prabartak Sangha, Abhay Ashram, Arya Samaj and Gita Press. 30 relief organisations and
six medical missions performed relief work in Noakhali. In addition there were 20 camps under Gandhi's
"one village one worker" plan.

Mohandas Gandhi camped in Noakhali for four months and toured the district in a mission to restore
peace and communal harmony. Mohandas Gandhi played a role in cooling down the situation. He
toured the area with his aides, and was instrumental in calming the communal tension. However, the
peace mission failed to restore confidence among the survivors, who could not be permanently
rehabilitated in their villages. In the meantime, the Congress Party leadership accepted the Partition of
India and the peace mission and other relief camps were abandoned. The majority of the survivors
migrated to West Bengal, Tripura and Assam. [Abridged]

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noakhali_riots]

18
United Independent Bengal Movement, 1947
Suhrawardy-Kiron Shankar Roy-Sarat Bose Formula of Greater Bengal
United Independent Bengal Movement [was] a proposal to solve the communal question on the eve of
the termination of British rule in India. In April-May 1947 it became clear that the Partition of India was
a real possibility. Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, the Premier of the province of Bengal, formally launched
his idea of a sovereign state for undivided Bengal. Almost simultaneously Sarat Chandra Bose came
forward with his proposal for a Sovereign Socialist Republic of Bengal. There had been differences of
opinion between Suhrawardy and Sarat Bose regarding the sovereign status of Bengal, but the primary
motive of both of them was to prevent the partition of the province. While the former wanted a
completely independent state for united Bengal outside the union of India, the latter visualised Bengal
to be a socialist republic within the Indian union.

Both, however, vehemently protested the move for the partition of Bengal, initiated by most Congress
and Hindu Mahasabha leaders of the province. Some Hindu and Muslim leaders of Bengal supported
Suhrawardy and Sarat Bose in their move. Prominent among them were Kiran Shankar Roy (Leader of
the Congress Parliamentary Party in Bengal Assembly), Satya Ranjan Bakshi (Sarat Bose's Secretary),
Abul Hashim (Secretary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League), Fazlur Rahman (Revenue Minister of
the Province), Mohammad Ali Chaudhury (Finance Minister in Suhrawardy's cabinet) and others. For a
while, the proposal was discussed both at private and public level and negotiations took place among
Bengal leaders.

In fact, the concept of a sovereign independent Bengal had its origins in the past. The adoption of the
Lahore Resolution in March 1940 was a significant step towards highlighting the demand for separate
homelands for the Muslims of the two Muslim majority zones of India. But the Lahore Resolution
remained undefined until April 1946. To the Bengal League leaders, the Pakistan scheme was mainly a
proposal for the establishment of two sovereign and independent states in the two Muslim majority
zones of India. The majority opinion, represented by Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim, favoured some kind
of Greater Bengal consisting of the whole of Bengal and Assam plus an adjacent part of the district of
Purnea in Bihar which had a Muslim majority.

Khwaja Nazimuddin (an influential member of the working committee of Bengal as well as of All India
Muslim League) and Maulana Mohammad Akram Khan (President of Bengal Muslim League) were the
exponents of the minority opinion. They wanted a more homogeneous Pakistan excluding the Hindu-
majority Burdwan Division and including the rest of Bengal, the whole of Assam, and some portion of
the Purnea District in Bihar.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah came out officially with his views on the issue in the Muslim Legislators'
Convention at Delhi held on 7-9 April 1946. His definition of Pakistan led his followers in Bengal to
reconsider their earlier stand on Pakistan. They now began to support Jinnah’s stand for Akhand
Pakistan comprising the whole of Bengal and Assam in the North East and the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan
and the North West Frontier Province in the North West of India. But it seems probable that the Hashim-
Suhrawardy group of the Bengal League conceived the idea of East Pakistan in terms of an independent
and sovereign Greater Bengal since it was fully consistent with the scheme of Pakistan as envisaged in
the Lahore Resolution. Sometime later both Suhrawardy and Hashim, being influenced by this ideal,
initiated the move for a united independent Bengal through negotiations with provincial Congress

19
leaders like Sarat Bose and Kiran Shankar Roy. Indeed, Suhrawardy was imbued with such an idea long
before some Hindus organised a movement for partition and even before the Calcutta riot (1946).

After Attlee's February Declaration (1947) and the arguments advanced by the Indian national congress
for the partition of the Punjab and Bengal following the declaration, a few politicians of Bengal,
including Suhrawardy, thought of maintaining the integrity of the province as a sovereign state. They felt
the necessity of making Bengal a self-sufficient state with its own constitution. The Premier of Bengal
emphasised the formation of a coalition ministry in the province. He further emphasised that Bengal
belonged to the Bengalis and was indivisible. One portion of the province depended on the other and all
were entitled to participate in its administration. He hoped that all sections of the people of the
province would want to live and work for making Bengal a glorious land. Suhrawardy maintained that
independence would usher in a new era of peace and prosperity in Bengal. Hashim urged upon the
Congress and the Muslim leaders of Bengal to make joint efforts for the settlement of their affairs
peacefully and happily outside the aegis of the British administration. Among the Congress leaders of
the province, Sarat Bose shared the Premier's view on an undivided Bengal.

During the days of April-May 1947, the Hindu press and politicians began an intense movement for
partitioning Bengal. The British Declaration of February 1947 clearly foreshadowed the partition of India.
As it became clear to the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha leaders that the partition of the country was
inevitable, they insisted on retaining the Hindu-majority areas of Bengal and Hindu and Sikh majority
areas of Punjab within the union of India. The Bengal Provincial Congress Committee formally declared
in favour of partition of the province and the creation of a separate Hindu majority province (West
Bengal), which included Calcutta within the union of India. Almost simultaneously, the Bengal Provincial
Hindu Mahasabha took a resolution proclaiming its firm resolves that the Hindus of Bengal, at least the
ones in Hindu majority areas, should remain within the Union of India and should not be separated from
the rest of India. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee was able to win the majority of Bengal Congress and Bengal
Hindu representatives in the Central and Provincial Legislative Assemblies to his side. In a press
conference held in Delhi on 27 April 1947, Suhrawardy put forward his plan for a united independent
Bengal. Following him Abul Hashim declared his views on the same issue through a statement issued in
Calcutta on 29 April 1947. A few days later, Sarat Bose put forward his proposals for a Sovereign Socialist
Republic of Bengal.

These schemes were launched in an atmosphere of mutual distrust between the two major
communities of India in general and Bengal in particular. The Pakistan movement led by Jinnah had
become popular among the Muslims of Bengal in the post-Lahore Resolution days. The Bengal Provincial
Muslim League began to mobilise Muslim public opinion in support of the demand for Pakistan.
Congress and Hindu Mahasabha leaders of the province were alarmed at the prospect of the
'Pakistanisation' of the whole of Bengal. The inevitable increase in communal tensions made it difficult
for a Congress-League accord in the province. The situation was aggravated by the All India Muslim
League's recourse to the strategy of 'Direct Action' to achieve Pakistan. While direct action day was
observed peacefully in other provinces, it turned violent in Calcutta where the Government was under
the control of the Muslim League. It had a major impact on the formation of Hindu public opinion in
favour of the demand for the partition of the province.

Ultimately, Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha and the majority of the Congress leaders of the province
set aside the scheme of a sovereign Bengal. They mobilised a large section of Bengali Hindus against
Suhrawardy's move. They were of the opinion that it was nothing but a political strategy to establish
Pakistan in the whole of Bengal. The Hindu press did everything it could to convince Hindu opinion

20
against the united Bengal formula. The Hindu Mahasabha influenced Bengali Congressmen to campaign
against the move for an independent Bengal.

While the majority of the Bengal Congressmen were opposed to Suhrawardy's scheme for an
independent Bengal, the opinion in the League circles also came in favour of the partition. The majority
of the Bengal Muslim Leaguers, led by Khwaja Nazimuddin and Maulana Akram Khan, wanted Bengal to
be an integral part of the single state of Pakistan, and not an independent state. Nazimuddin, Akram
Khan and their followers were just as adamant as Jinnah about Pakistan. They firmly believed in Jinnah's
two nation theory.

In spite of the opposition from most Congress and League leaders, Suhrawardy and Hashim continued
their efforts to reach an agreement with Hindu leaders of the province on the basis of their schemes.
Suhrawardy met Frederick Burrows, Jinnah and Lord Mountbatten, at different times and had
satisfactory talks with them. Sarat Bose raised a voice of protest against the AICC's March resolution.
Kiran Shankar was convinced that if League leaders were prepared to come forward with some offer to
the Hindus, the province could still be kept unified. From the beginning of May 1947, the Bengal
unificationists thus came closer to each other. They met Gandhi with their proposals during the latter's
visit to Calcutta and sought his suggestions. They also tried to persuade the Congress and the League
High Commands to accept their views. Finally, a tentative agreement was reached at a meeting, held on
20 May 1947, in Calcutta among Bengali leaders who were favourable to the move for a united and
independent Bengal. The following were the terms of the agreement:

1. Bengal would be a Free State. The Free State of Bengal would decide its relations with the rest of
India.
2. The Constitution of the Free State of Bengal would provide for election to the Bengal Legislature on
the basis of a joint electorate and adult franchise, with reservation of seats proportionate to the
population among Hindus and Muslims. The seats set aside for Hindus and Scheduled Caste Hindus
would be distributed amongst them in proportion to their respective population, or in such manner as
may be agreed among them. The constituencies would be multiple constituencies and the votes would
be distributive and not cumulative. A candidate who got the majority of the votes of his own community
cast during the elections and 25 percent of the votes of the other communities so cast, would be
declared elected. If no candidate satisfied these conditions, that candidate who got the largest number
of votes of his own community would be elected.
3. On the announcement by His Majesty's Government that the proposal of the Free State of Bengal had
been accepted and that Bengal would not be partitioned, the present Bengal Ministry would be
dissolved. A new interim Ministry consisting of an equal number of Muslims and Hindus (including
Scheduled Caste Hindus) but excluding the Chief Minister would be formed. In this Ministry, Chief
Minister would be a Muslim and the Home Minister a Hindu.
4. Pending the final emergence of a Legislature and a Ministry under the new constitutions, Hindus
(including Scheduled Caste Hindus) and Muslims would have an
5. A Constituent Assembly composed of 30 persons, 16 Muslims and 14 non-Muslims, would be elected
by Muslim and non-Muslim members of the Legislature respectively, excluding Europeans.

After arriving at an agreement among them, Suhrawardy, kiran shankar roy and Sarat Chandra Bose
tried to secure the approval of the Congress and the League High Commands for the terms of the
tentative agreement. But the prevailing misunderstanding between the Congress and the League

21
leaders and the changing political situation completely unnerved the authors of the agreement. The
majority of the Congress and League leaders of Bengal denounced the terms of the agreement outright.
Influential Hindu dailies of Calcutta and the press belonging to the Khwaja group of the Bengal League
started campaigning against the terms of the agreement. While the Khwaja group thought that the
agreement would amount to a complete surrender to the Hindus, Congress and Hindu Mahasabha
leaders felt that it was designed entirely to extend the frontiers of Pakistan. On 28 May 1947, the
Working Committee of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League at its meeting under the Presidentship of
Akram Khan denounced the terms of the tentative agreement and reiterated its adherence to the
League demand for Pakistan and expressed full confidence in the leadership of Jinnah. The Bengal unity
formula received a further setback when, following the statement of the Congress Working Committee,
Kalipada Mukherjee, the General Secretary of the Bengal Congress discarded it through a statement
issued on 1 June 1947.

In all-India politics, the main opposition to the proposal for a sovereign independent Bengal came from
the Indian National Congress. Muslims in a united Bengal frightened the Congress High Command of the
possibility of permanent domination of Hindus. Both Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
were totally opposed to the concept of a sovereign Bengal. Nehru thought that through this scheme the
Muslim League in Bengal would force practically the whole of Bengal to join Pakistan. He further held
the view that if Bengal were to remain united it should continue to be a part of the Union of India. He
made it clear that Congress would regard a separate state of Bengal as an extension of Pakistan. Sardar
Patel too offered determined resistance to the move for Bengal unity. His correspondence with
influential Hindu leaders of Bengal during April-June 1947 indicates his role in directing Hindus to the
partition of the province as well as his fanatical opposition to the idea of a sovereign Bengal. He
condemned those Hindu leaders of Bengal who had got themselves involved in negotiations with the
Muslim League leaders of the province.

The approach of the Muslim League High Command to the terms of the tentative agreements was also
not favourable. True, Jinnah, was not totally opposed to the proposition. It is evident that he had once
offered some encouragement to the scheme. Considering the arguments of Mountbatten that in case of
a division of India there should be a partition of the Punjab and Bengal, Jinnah initially was ready to
agree to the proposal of a united independent Bengal. His primary consideration was to avert the
partition of Bengal; the possibility of a potential alliance between an independent Bengal and Pakistan in
the future was of secondary importance to him. But he could not finally settle his mind in favour of the
issue. Although apparently he had given his blessings to the move, several factors seemed to have been
responsible for making Jinnah reconsider his stand. He rejected the idea in the end, perhaps he felt that
it was after all a deviation from the creed of Pakistan. He was not interested in offering any concessions
such as joint electorate etc, as incorporated within the terms of the tentative agreement.

The Premier of Bengal had sincerely felt that the formation of a coalition Ministry in the province would
be an important step towards bringing the Hindus and Muslims of Bengal closer together as well as
preventing the province from being partitioned. But Jinnah never considered these issues to be matters
of great urgency. His veto to a coalition cabinet in Bengal proved to be fatal to the Suhrawardy-Bose
Formula.

The British were never totally allergic to the idea of a sovereign independent Bengal. Burrows, the
Governor of the province, were not at all in favour of the partition of the province. In fact, he was
inclined to the Suhrawardy- Bose Formula and had tried his best for its implementation to the last. The
Viceroy was also not unwilling to offer united Bengal the status of a Dominion along with India and

22
Pakistan. He had assured Suhrawardy that the British would accept any settlement about Bengal
approved by the League and the Congress High Commands. But the British had to look at the question
from an all India point of view. They were not eager to compromise the safety of the whole of India for
the interest of one province. Hence in the long run the failure of the scheme was inevitable. The final
blow to the concept was given when the Congress and the League High Commands accepted
Mountbatten Plan (the 3rd June Plan of 1947) for partition of India and for transfer of power to the two
Dominions of India and Pakistan. [Chitta Ranjan Misra]

[http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=United_Independent_Bengal_Movement]

-0-

23