Q. Discuss the origins of the First World War.

The outbreak of the First World War is one of the most controversial and debated
subjects in history. The immediate origins of the war can be seen in terms of the
crisis following the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the
Austro-Hungarian throne in Sarajevo, Bosnia on 28th June 1914. Austria, who
believed Serbia was behind this, sent a humiliating ultimatum to Serbia on 23rd
July, which was not accepted in its entirety. Following a series of diplomatic
maneuvers including Russian mobilization, Germany finally declared war on
Russia on 1st August, leading to the First World War. However, in order to
understand the context which allowed this crisis to precipitate into a World War,
we need to review the conditions in Europe in the preceding decades.

The historical debate on the origins of the war has been affected by the prevailing
political climate and by the urge to find out who was primarily responsible. The
official report on the origins of the war, written by the victorious powers, and
presented to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 concluded that the war was
premeditated by Germany and resulted from acts deliberately committed in order
to make it unavoidable. This German war guilt is enshrined in Article 231 of the
Treaty of Versailles.

The debate over whether Germany intended an offensive war of territorial

expansion or a defensive war is still debated. In 1961, Fritz Fischer, a German
historian published Griff nach der Weltmacht in which he apportioned chief
responsibility to Germany for preparing and launching World War I. According to
him, the German desire for territorial expansion and desire to break free of its
diplomatic encirclement culminated in the war. Fischer stated that Germany was
ready to go to war at any cost in order to establish herself as a Great Power. He
further alleged that Germany even went to the extent of provoking her allies into
instigating war. He attempted to show that Germany was pursuing an aggressive
policy, inspired by economic interests and designed to achieve world power.
Fischer tried to show that German desire to go to war was a product of the
prevailing social and economic situation in such a sense that personalities and
individuals are of little importance to the event. Fischer never deviated from his
basic line of thinking that Germany was eager to make up for the disadvantage
suffered as a result of entering late into world politics and this would have made
war inevitable. In his view there was a continuity in German objectives from 1900
to the Second World War, although the link between the two is implied rather

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than spelt out. Fischer questioned the taboo of German innocence, built up in
Germany over five decades.

Fischer’s work was criticized by Gerhard Ritter, a German historian, who saw
Fischer’s work as an act of national disloyalty. Ritter had admitted that German
war-guilt literature needed revision but did not accept Fischer’s thesis. Ritter also
criticized Fischer for applying what he saw as a basically Marxist approach to
history without actually being openly Marxist as this would have made him
unpopular. According to him Germany had no desire for world domination and its
main aim was to support its ally Austria-Hungary. Ritter has also accused Fischer
of ignoring the environment of the time and of not comparing the different kinds
of foreign imperialism including that of the USA and Japan. Ritter’s analysis is
significant if one is to analyse the Fischer thesis in the context of the European as
well as the global situation of the later decades of the 19th century. From this point
of view we can identify Germany and Italy in Europe and USA and Japan as the
revisionist powers on the global scene, giving the situation a global character and
drawing an obvious parallel with the situation of World War II. In this sense we
can see that aggression was not the prerogative of any one country. The imperial
aspirations that Germany has been accused of were also experienced by the other
Great Powers. The clearest example of this is the feeble pretexts on which Britain
and USA entered the war.

There are many other views as well on the extent of responsibility that needs to
be apportioned to Germany for the war. Geiss suggests that the main long-term
cause of the First World War was the German desire for Weltpolitik. John Rohl
sees the origins of the war in the German government’s pursuit of a pre-existing
plan to split the Triple Entente or provoke a European war. Most historians
however reject the idea of a pre-planned German war. The argument of a
defensive German war has been articulated by scholars such as Egmont Zechelin
and Karl Erdmann.

During the interwar years, the idea of collective responsibility for the outbreak of
the war came to become the orthodox interpretation. Lloyd George, the British
Prime Minister suggested that ‘all the nations of Europe slithered over the edge
of the boiling cauldron of war in 1914’. The debate over origins began to move
away from apportioning guilt towards an assessment of long-term causes. The
interwar period was the golden age of the study of international relations and
various types of long term causes, including the alliance system and old-style

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diplomacy, imperial rivalry and the growth of militarism, nationalism and the
arms race were advanced.

The origins of the First World War however need to be understood broadly in
terms of the new imperialism of the 19th century, the rise of militarism and the
unique system of alliances that built up in Europe in the decades preceding the
war. A brief look at the conditions in the Balkans will also help in understanding
why Europe went to war on this issue.

European imperialism was not a new phenomenon and can be traced back to the
15th century. ‘New imperialism’ of the 19th century however was a qualitative
departure from the earlier forms of imperialism in terms of intensity, scope as
well as consequence. The expansion of Europe overseas in the 19th century, which
gathered force in the 1870s following the unifications of Italy and Germany and
the defeat of Napoleon III, led to new imperialist rivalries among the great powers
and to the belief that the balance of power had to be regarded as a worldwide
question and not one limited to Europe alone. The movement of imperial
expansion has been explained in a number of different ways, and different
theories give varying importance to economic, social, cultural and strategic
factors. Among the earliest theories explaining imperialism were those that
linked new imperialism with economic factors and saw imperialism as arising out
of modern capitalism.

JA Hobson, a British liberal economist, in a pamphlet titled ‘Imperialism’ (1902)

argued that the main motive for imperialism was finance capitalism. According to
him, advanced capitalist societies in the West were marked by an unequal
distribution of wealth and this concentrated surplus capital would exert pressure
on their respective home governments to seek outlets abroad for investment
avenues. This could become a political force for colonization. Lenin too argued
that with the industrial development of Europe and the concentration of capital
in fewer and fewer hands, financers were finding it ever more difficult to invest
their money profitably. The European market was saturated and consequently it
became essential to find new fields of investment overseas. This need, according
to Lenin forced the European powers to divide the world between them in a
struggle for new industrial markets and new areas in which to invest. The result
was increased rivalry, so that according to him, imperialism necessarily led to
war. Lenin believed that German monopoly capital was behind German foreign
policy.

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Some like Rosa Luxemburg, the Polish revolutionary, argued in ‘The Accumulation
of Capital’ (1913) that the nature of modern industrial capitalism inevitably led
to rivalries, which would lead to imperialism, which in turn would lead to war.
Karl Kautsky however argued against the claim of inevitability and believed that
imperialism could be avoided if governments chose to democratize their
institutions. Rudolph Hilfirding, an Austrian Marxist in Finance Capital (1910) too
saw no inevitable link between finance capitalism and war believed that the
government could allow surplus capital to be absorbed by the economy.

JA Schumpeter however argues that imperialism was a pre-capitalist, atomistic

phenomenon and denies any link that capitalism may have with imperialism. The
link between the two can also be questioned when we see that two of the most
aggressively imperialist countries of the late 19th century – Russia and Italy were
severely capital deficit. Even between France and Germany, it was France that was
more imperialist even when it was lagging behind Germany in terms of
industrialization. We can see therefore that capitalism played a crucial role in
imperialism but its effects cannot be generalized and definitely no inevitable
causative relation between the two can be established.

Imperialism has also been seen in terms of extra-economic origins. CJH Hayes
emphasized the political climate of Europe, which was one of mass-based
nationalism. He also refers to the importance of public opinion and nationalist
sentiment. Others have emphasized military and strategic factors, such as the
need to secure defensible frontiers. Military factors however cannot be seen as
divorced from economic considerations of even questions of national prestige.

James Joll has emphasized the idea of sub-imperialism. He argued that once
colonies were launched, they took on their own momentum and developed vested
interests which pushed for imperialism. Governments occupied areas in order to
stop other governments from moving in; the strategic needs of existing colonies
demanded the safeguarding of their boundaries and of the routes to them, so that
the imperialist powers felt obliged to acquire more territory. The case of the
French colonization of Algiers where the considerations of the French military
administrators in Algeria pushed for the colonization of Morocco is a good
example.

Many have also seen cultural factors in the rise of imperialism, in terms of the role
of religion. In the 19th century, many colonial ventures began as missionary
activity. The desire of Christian missionaries to convert the heathen led to the

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establishment of centres of European influence in remote parts of the world. This
was related also to the European sense of superiority and these ideas in
conjunction with the civilizing mission of the Christian faith served as a
justification for imperialism. These ideas were used to create a common ‘scale of
civilization’ and served the interests of European imperialist ambitions. This can
be related to the concepts of the White Man’s Burden and the moral imperative
for empire. An urge for scientific discovery and exploration of unknown territory
also helped to open up Africa. It should of course be noted that trade, missionary
activity and exploration were inextricably involved with each other. Imperialism
however needs to be considered in its specific context, which varied from country
to country and time to time. Imperialism was a dynamic process, and there was
interaction between the imperialists and the colonies.

In the 1870s, imperialism was focused mainly in Africa and East Asia. In 1885
Bismarck organized a Conference at Berlin, which culminated in the Treaty of
Berlin where it was decided that the Great Powers would now have ‘spheres of
influence’, in Africa and China and territories would be divided peacefully. The
impact of this treaty was immediately felt in Africa leading to the ‘Scramble for
Africa’. In roughly 15 years, almost the entire the continent with the exception of
Liberia, Ethiopia and the two Boer Republics was divided between the European
powers. By the early 20th century imperialist rivalries among the European
powers were amply evident. Britain was in conflict with France over Egypt, with
Germany in South Africa, and with Russia over Persia. In the Pacific Russia was in
conflict with Japan. There was also the Franco-German rivalry over Morocco and
finally Russia and Germany were in conflict over the Balkans, the area which was
to provide the immediate background to World War I.

A lot has been written about the German desire in this period to attain a Great
Power status and to be an active bulwark against revolution and democracy. In
the case of Germany the desire for a colonial empire was one aspect of a deep
sense of uneasiness and dissatisfaction about Germany’s place in the world at the
end of the 19th century. Bismarck, although he had occasionally encouraged the
colonialist lobby for his domestic or diplomatic ends, he was fundamentally
disinterested in colonial expansion. Weltpolitik meant for the Germans in the
1890s the invention of a new world mission for Germany worthy of her industrial,
technological, cultural and military strength. Germany began the construction of
a massive navy and this soon made Britain suspicious.

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Konne Zilliacus argued that no European nation went to war in 1914 due to treaty
obligations, moral issues or the rights of small nations, but to defend imperialist
interests, which consisted of the private interests of finance and monopoly
capital. However, the point to be noted however is that virtually all these rivalries
had been dealt with before 1914, and therefore one cannot make a direct link
between imperialist rivalries and the First World War. It should also be noted that
there was no linear one-to-one relationship between colonial rivalries and
cooperative alliances. Britain and French relations within and outside the
European continent illustrate this dichotomy well.

James Joll writes that there were three ways in which the imperialist movement
directly affected the relations between the European states and contributed to the
atmosphere which made war possible. Firstly, the international alignments
adopted over colonial questions often cut across the pattern of international
relations that had emerged in Europe itself in the years after the Franco-Prussian
war. Secondly, specific agreements on particular colonial questions sometimes
led to a more general entente, as in the case of Britain’s settlement of outstanding
colonial disputes with France and Russia. Thirdly, the colonial rivalries and arms
race which accompanied them affected the whole of international life,
encouraging doctrines of racial superiority and giving support to he crude
evolutionary theories which interpreted the relations between states in terms of
the struggle for survival, by then widely accepted as governing the world of
nature. Therefore if we look for a link between imperialist rivalries and World
War I, we see that it was only indirect. With the rapid growth of colonial empires
in the late 19th century, nationalism itself came to be defined in terms of colonial
assets and imperialism. Alliances only came into play when the final conflict
erupted in 1914.

The outbreak of war is a question related to the balance of power. In the years
preceding the First World War, a number of alliances had emerged and Europe
was divided into two power blocks. Traditionally the outbreak of the war is
viewed as a chain reaction, whereby Europe was fated to war due to these
alliances. In order to understand how these alliances operated and what the
nature of international relations was in this period, we can briefly look at the
major players on the international scene in this period and the imperatives that
guided their foreign policy.

After 1870 Germany, France, Britain, Austria-Hungary and Russia were

undoubtedly the great powers of Europe, with Italy staking a claim to be regarded

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as one of them. The balance of power in Europe consisted in the shifting balance
between them and in the various alignments they adopted.

Britain in the 1870s followed an isolationist policy. She had been the first country
to experience the economic benefits of the industrial revolution and was still the
leading trading nation in the world. Britain’s interests were mainly outside
Europe and her strategy was dominated by the fact that she ruled India and
needed to protect this Asian possession. For this reason she was suspicious of
Russia’s eastward expansion into Asia and was also therefore concerned with the
fate of the Balkans. The eastern question was temporarily resolved following the
Congress of Berlin in 1878; however the rise of Germany on the continent was
now a source of concern for her.

For France, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany in 1870 was a constant
factor in her foreign policy up to 1914 and ensured that France would always side
against Germany in any international alignment. However within a few years of
the defeat in 1870 France had regained her position among the Great Powers of
Europe.

The case of Austria-Hungary was more complicated. The Habsburg emperor

Franz Joseph had lost Lombardy in 1859 and Venetia in 1866. At the same time
the war with Prussia in 1866 had finally destroyed the possibility of the
Habsburgs playing a leading role in Germany. In 1867 the Emperor made a
compromise (Ausgleich) with the Hungarian nationalist leaders by which the
empire was transformed into a Dual monarchy, with Hungary linked to Austria
simply by the fact that they had the same sovereign and that the conduct of foreign
and military affairs was in the hands of joint ministries. Austria now also had to
come to terms with the heterogeneous races which made up the empire.
Inhabited by different races – Germans, Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Slovenes,
Croats, Italians and others – and with widely differing levels of economic
development, it was the emperor and the imperial army and administration
which alone gave it any sort of unity. The growth of national states in this period,
therefore inevitably raised the problem of national minorities.

The Italian Risorgimento, the movement for unification, was one of the great
liberal causes of the century. Italian unification however had been political rather
than social and economic. The result in the generation which grew up after the
achievements of the Risorgimento was a growing disillusionment about Italian life

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and politics and a growing desire for a radical change, whether by a revolution or
by a war for national expansion.

This brings us to Germany, the other newly unified nation, which was to be a key
player in the international scene in the decades following its unification. The years
between 1860 and 1871 had been a period of extraordinary industrial growth in
Germany. The unification of Germany, bringing as it did the removal of the last
barriers to internal trade as well as a common banking and currency system,
helped to speed the industrial development which was already underway before
1870. Germany’s preponderance in the new balance of power in Europe was
therefore firmly based on industrial and demographic factors. The immediate
effect of the establishment of the Reich was to change the power balance in
Europe. Traditionally, Europe had always had a weak centre and the unification
of Germany combined with rapid industrialization, military power and
bureaucratic efficiency lent Germany a position of almost latent hegemony over
the continent. Post 1871 the pressure of foreign trade and the increasing
participation of Germany in world markets created an increased demand for a
German role in world politics, an ideal that would acquire the cult slogan name
weltpolitik.

Germany’s emergence as a great power was largely Bismarck’s work and he had
realized that the preservation of peace was in Germany’s interest, and he declared
Germany, ‘a satiated power’. Although by no standards a pacifist, Bismarck was a
rational thinking statesman who has always warned against the ill-consequences
of Germany being drawn into a European conflict. In pursuance of this policy
Bismarck sought to cement Germany’s position in Europe through diplomacy
rather than aggression, an approach which was in the mould of Metternich’s
conservatism. Initially, Bismarck had tried to revive the Holy Alliance between the
three conservative states of Austria, Russia and Germany with the purpose of
preventing a conflict between these three states, especially since they were not
natural allies. In 1873 he had proclaimed the Dreikaiserbund or the League of
Three Nations.

The origins of the alliance system as was seen in the years preceding the war can
be traced to Bismarck’s foreign policy in his years as the imperial chancellor of
Germany between 1870 and 1890. What was different about this policy of
alliances was that earlier alliances were only made before wars and lasted
through the duration of the war. The alliances that Bismarck envisioned were to
be forged in peacetime with no immediate prospect of war for reasons of security.

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The reasons for Bismarck’s policy were largely pragmatic. Bismarck wanted to
maintain a balance of power in Europe between the five Great Powers – Britain,
Russia, Germany, Austria and France in order in order to safeguard German
interests against a hostile coalition. He especially sought to isolate France. ‘Always
try to be one of the three in a world of five great powers’, was the maxim on which
his foreign policy was based.

An alliance with Britain and France could not materialize and even Russia was not
willing to commit herself to a Germany which was increasingly being perceived
as a threat. It was only the alliance with Austria-Hungary which was able to work.
In 1879 the Dual Alliance was formed between Germany and Austria-Hungary by
a secret treaty. In the search for a third power, Germany had to settle for Italy,
with which a secret Triple Alliance was forged in 1882. In 1887 a Reinsurance
Treaty was signed with Russia, which guaranteed secret neutrality of Russia in
the event of a conflict. After 1890 when Bismarck was dismissed, German foreign
policy changed to one of Weltpolitik. The policy of assurance towards other
European countries was ended and the spirit of the Dual Alliance changed from
being an alliance for defence to being a springboard for Germany’s own ambitions.
It was also used by Italy to bolster her efforts in the Libyan war against Turkey
and by Austria in her Balkan policy.

With this change in policy a new system of counter alliances also began to emerge.
In 1893 a Dual Alliance was made between France and Russia. An alarmed Great
Britain began its quest for allies in the Pacific with the Anglo-Japanese treaty of
1902, clearly directed against Russia. In 1904 a Dual Entente was signed between
Britain and France, based on a colonial settlement whereby Britain and France
got a free hand in Egypt and Morocco respectively. In 1907 the Anglo-Russian
Entente was signed and colonial claims in Persia, Tibet and Afghanistan were
settled. It should be noted that these alliances were by and large agreements and
not definite military alliances. Therefore their importance should not be
exaggerated.

The formation of such alliances undoubtedly led to increased tensions in Europe.

The secret nature of these treaties added to the suspicion. Alliances however
could not automatically lead to war and conversely alliances could contribute to
peace by acting as a deterrent against possible aggressors. It was the change in
the nature of these alliances from defensive to aggressive that made a difference.
The theory of two balancing power blocs actually implies preservation of balance
of power and thereby preservation of peace. AJP Taylor points out that the pre-

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1914 alliances were so precarious and fragile that they cannot be seen as the
major cause of war. This indicates that a fundamental problem which contributed
to the outbreak of the war was the lack of a fully effective balance of power in
Europe, not its existence. Alliances were important, but as James Joll has argued
no European power really accepted that the alliance system consisted of two firm
and balanced power blocs and no major European power subscribed to the idea
that the alliance system was a complete deterrent against war. Each power made
wrong calculations about the likely behaviour of its alliance opponents.

While the specific terms of the alliances were kept secret, the knowledge of the
very existence of these alliances determined direction of mobilization plans. It
seems that the alliance system raised expectations about likely allies in a future
war, and influenced the military plans of each power. However each nation
seemed to base its decision for war on an assessment of national interests, which
were linked to alliances, but were not, in all cases, determined by them. The
alliance system determined extensive timetables which were chalked out in
planning for war. It is to this extent that a link can be drawn between the alliance
system and the outbreak of the First World War.

The growth of militarism is the years preceding the outbreak of the war, has also
been perceived as a factor leading up to the war. Militarism refers to the arms
build up and escalation of tension before the war. Europe has been viewed as an
‘armed camp’ from 1870 to 1914. Michael Howard argues that each
announcement of increased armaments’ expenditure by a European power before
1914 was viewed as a threat by its perceived rival, and thus created an
atmosphere of mutual fear and suspicion which played a major part in creating
the mood for war in 1914. However, the idea that a buildup of arms naturally leads
to war remains dubious. The belief that high expenditure on arms leads to a desire
for war remains unproved. Niall Ferguson has claimed that the role of the arms
race in encouraging the First World War has been greatly exaggerated.

Many historians believe that the considerations of the leading powers regarding
the balance of power was a much greater influence than a simple build up of arms
on policy during the July crisis. According to LFC Turner the crisis cannot
understood without knowledge of the balance of military power, military
planning and strategy. The balance of power in the Balkans was turning sharply
against Austria-Hungary and this was a vital factor which caused her to argue for
a ‘preventive war’ to weaken Serbia. AJP Taylor argued that the outbreak of the
First World War was caused almost entirely by rival plans for mobilization by the

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European powers. All European powers had developed detailed war plans in
expectation of war. Military planners believed in a swift mobilization of forces and
lightning offensives. However the relationship between military plans and actual
decisions for war is complicated.

When considering militarism as a cause for the war, we should also consider it in
the context of a cultural phenomenon as well. Militaristic language in which war
was glorified as good, leading to rebirth and peace seen as degenerate came to
affect the language of international relations in this period. When the war broke
out it was greeted with hysterical enthusiasm over all European capitals.

The early years of revolutions in France, Hungary and Italy, which were finally
suppressed in 1848, had left an ideological legacy which would have a far reaching
impact on the future of Europe. The crushing of the revolution represented the
climax of an idealistic approach to society and politics which drew from the
enlightenment, which championed the idea of a rational universe. The liberals of
the enlightenment had championed ideas such as the importance of the
individual, private property, rule of law and the implementation of peaceful
change. The revolutions seemed to refute the very fundamental premises of
liberal thought which had dominated politics till then.

The roots to the militaristic attitude of the late 19th and early 20th century can be
seen in what has been seen by many as the crisis in the liberal, Enlightenment,
rational values, which in turn was being translated into politics. This challenge
can be seen as a kind of neo-Romanticism. This kind of a mindset found
expression in both ends of the ideological spectrum. On the Left Marxism seeped
in a violent rhetoric of class war saw an extreme like the Syndicalism of George
Sorel. On the right, this was reflected in the rise of a new brand of irrational
politics, to be shaped by the elites who would use irrational means like myths to
move the masses. The age of mass politics was finally ushered in to stay. The elitist
concept of democracy was replaced by the concept of universal male suffrage.
Many like Bismarck spoke with great skepticism about the great years of romantic
idealism. Perhaps it was Bismarck’s statement that ‘the politics of Germany would
no longer be decided by ideas and assembly speeches but by blood and iron’ that
truly marked the end of liberal ideology and the introduction of a brand of
irrational politics. The cultural crisis of this period was therefore a crisis in liberal
values and explains much of world politics in this era.

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When we see those thinkers whose ideas percolated down to the masses and also
contributed in a most powerful way to the creation of a militaristic environment
in this period, the names of Charles Darwin and Friedrich Nietzsche stand out.
Charles Darwin’s (1809-1882) Origin of Species challenged the Christian
conception of origins and placed the origins of species in a competitive process of
natural selection. Darwin’s ideas were later adapted as Social Darwinism, which
applied Darwin’s ideas to society and argued that society also evolved through
struggle and therefore class struggle was perceived as natural. Friedrich
Nietzsche (1844-1900) believed that life was a constant struggle, and existence
fundamentally chaotic. He believed that there was no absolute morality. Struggle
as a moral obligation was central to his thought. As a part of evolution, he believed
that the pinnacle of development was the ‘superman’ or ubermensch. Nietzsche
saw in this superior man the natural urge to dominate, and in them he saw
potential tyrants as well. The ideas of Nietzsche and Darwin were distorted,
vulgarized and popularized and used to justify later philosophies such as Nazism
and Fascism. This was the kind of language that permeated down to the masses.

These new ideas provided a rhetoric in which international relations came to be

debated, but it should be clarified that this language didn’t create the war itself.
The effect of these ideas can however be seen in the manner people were
responding to the European situation. Militaristic ideas also explain the unnatural
hysteria on the eve of the war.

The role of national self-determination in the origins of the war has been another
important area of debate. Martel has argued that the First World War grew out of
a clash between ‘Slav nationalism’ and the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian
Empire. This type of interpretation which sees the Balkan crisis in the context of
the long running ‘Eastern Question’ views the First World War as one which was
fought for the future of Central and Eastern Europe. According to this view the
primary responsibility for beginning the war is shared between Austria-Hungary,
which wanted to restore its prestige, and Serbia which stood in a good position to
benefit from European rivalry in the region. John Leslie, a British historian
however has cast doubt on the importance of the Austro-Serb quarrel. He points
out that Austria-Hungary can be held responsible for planning a local Austro-Serb
conflict, linked to the question of Balkan nationalism. Germany however was not
interested in this quarrel and deliberately used it as an opportunity to launch the
European war.

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Balkan nationalism, which emerged in the late 19th and early 20th century, has
been traditionally viewed as an outburst of oppressed European Christians
against Muslim Turkish domination, in ethnic and religious terms. Due to the
unique isolated Balkan terrain, the dominant form of consciousness in this region
was village patriotism. There was also a divide between the rural areas dominated
by people of Slav origin and the urban areas populated largely by Greeks. The
identity of the people was asserted at two levels. The first was the ethnic identity
based on linguistic differences and the second was the religious identity. The
Ottoman Empire of the 17th century was multi-ethnic and multi-religious, in
which ethnic identities could be preserved more easily. Hardening of religious
identities was only witnessed late in the 19th century.

An important element of Balkan nationalism was the peasantry, who had high
participation levels due to their religious millenarianism. A second important
element was the intellectual class who began to espouse modern values of
nationalism. Early Balkan nationalism was understood in the context of
Enlightened Despotism. Libertarian Enlightenment of the time of Napoleon and
the French Revolution also influenced Balkan nationalism. Another strand which
flowed into this was the Romantic reaction to Enlightenment, with its focus on
culture and preservation of tradition. The local Turkish Chiefs or Pashas were also
an important element in the emergence of Balkan nationalism. Due to the vast
nature of the Ottoman state, there was invariably a struggle between these power
local officers and the central government at Istanbul. It was in this conflict that
these governors often chose to foster Balkan nationalism to serve as a tool.
Muhammad Ali in Egypt and Ali Pasha in Greece were such powerful governors.

The most important element in Balkan nationalism was however the role of the
Great Powers, in what they termed as the ‘Eastern Question’. This Eastern
question concerned the disposal of the Balkans after the decline of the Ottoman
Empire. In this region increasing Russian interests were witnessed and Russia
began to lay claims to the Balkans for strategic reasons, on religious and racial
grounds. As a part of the racial argument, Russia encouraged Pan-Slavism in the
Balkans. Austria-Hungary too was deeply concerned with the question of
nationalism in this region primarily because it was a multi-ethnic region where
Balkan nationalities often overlapped with ethnic identities.

Among the most dominant Balkan states was Serbia. The Serbs were a Slav people
who had been conquered in the 14th century by the Turks. The Serbian capital,
Belgrade was dominated by the Local Provincial Governors or Pashas, who were

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engaged in a power struggle for Serbian autonomy. In 1804, they revolted against
Turkish rule. Their outrage was directed against the Christian nobility who were
loyal to the Turks. The Christian nobles decided to appeal to Russia for help.
Between 1815 and 1830 under Russian pressure, the Pashas were replaced by the
Christian notables. In 1830, Serbia was also granted autonomy. In 1878 following
a Russo-Turkish war, Serbia was declared an independent state at the Congress
of Berlin. For Serbia however this was not the realization of her nationalism and
she sought to unite all Slavs into a Yugo-Slav union with Russian help. It was the
Austrian insecurity at this that led directly to the World War.

While the Balkan question was an old one, in the 20th century the situation had
become more volatile. Austria had begun to feel threatened by the very existence
of Serbia. Till the time of Metternich and Bismarck, Austria had been reined in.
However following the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, the character of German
foreign policy changed to a more aggressive stance and under the new approach
of Weltpolitik no attempts were made any longer to rein in either Austria or
Russia. The Dual Alliance was in fact used now to urge the Austrians on to a
forward policy in the Balkans. The new German foreign policy, among other
things took the form of a challenge to Britain, as a part of which Germany started
building a huge navy. The second was the expansion of German power on the
continent through what was called the Mitteleuropa Policy, which aimed at
concrete economic dominance over the European continent. Thirdly, the new
German foreign policy also used the Dual Alliance to push for intervention in the
Balkans.

The other European powers were also disconcerted by the rhetoric adopted by
Germany in their expansionist drive. There was a constant feeling that Germany
had arrived late on the scene, and therefore there was a sense of urgency and
aggressiveness in her policies. Germany’s deliberate escalation of crises which
could have been controlled such as the Moroccan and Bosnian crises also added
to this feeling. Germany’s declaration of war in 1914 at Russian mobilization was
also seen in similar light. Germany of course saw 1914 as a defensive struggle
against her perceived encirclement.

Bosnia, which had been conquered by the Turks in the 15th century, was at the
core of the Austrian-Serb rivalry as both of them desired to control Bosnia. In
1878 at the Congress of Berlin, Bosnia had been placed under Austrian rule.
Austria began to fear the impact of the Young Turk movement in the
predominantly Muslim Bosnia, and in 1908 annexed Bosnia. Russia and Serbia

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immediately protested. However Germany now threatened Russia with the
prospect of a European war if she decided to intervene, forcing Russia to step
down. At the same time in Serbia, terrorist groups began to emerge with the aim
of carrying out terrorist activities to liberate Bosnia. This forms the background
to the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo. Austria was now
assured of Germany’s support (‘blank cheque’) against Russia and Serbia. In the
crisis following the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand therefore, both
Germany and Russia now knew they could not turn back. Russia began to mobilize
her troops and on this pretext, Germany declared war on Russia on 1st August and
on France on 3rd August. .

On 4th August, Britain declared war on Germany. While Britain’s real reason for
entering the war was to prevent a disruption of continental balance of power, her
official pretext was German entry into neutral Belgium. USA too entered the war
on the pretext of the German submarine blockade. It is interesting to see that as
status quo powers both Britain and USA were able to enter the war on idealistic
grounds, in which they were almost as aggressive as Germany.

Recent works have tried to suggest a link between different kinds of economic
pressures and the outbreak of the First World War as well. Paul Kennedy has
suggested that economic interests are a key reality behind diplomacy. In this view
politicians have autonomous freedom to pursue foreign policy and even make
vital decisions for war, without reference to economic interest groups in society.
However the economic and industrial resources of each nation ultimately
determine the success or failure of these decisions. This implies that economics
plays a vital role.

There is also the view of Carl Strikwerda who argues that the crisis of 1914 needs
to be understood within a framework which investigates whether all European
leaders actually believed that political and military power were essential to
economic success. He shows a very high level of economic cooperation and
integration in Europe prior to 1914. Most industrialists desired mutually
beneficial economic relations and many wanted greater economic integration
within European trade and financial sectors. The most significant influence over
foreign policy was thus exercised by the political leaders and not the
industrialists. Thus the link between economic imperatives and Great Power
status can be questioned.

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 The above discussion suggests that any single explanation for the outbreak of war
is likely to be too simple. While in the final crisis of July 1914 the German
government acted in a way that made war more likely, the enthusiasm with which
war was greeted in all the belligerent countries and the assumption by each of the
governments concerned that their vital national interests were at stake, were the
result of an accumulation of factors – intellectual, social, economic and even
psychological as well as political and diplomatic – which all contributed to the
situation in 1914.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
➢ James Joll – Europe Since 1870
➢ Frank McDonough – The Origins of the First and Second World Wars
➢ AJP Taylor – The First World War
➢ Dwight E. Lee (Ed.) – The Outbreak of the First World War
➢ David Thomson – Europe Since Napoleon
➢ Koch (ed.) – The Origins of the First World War
➢ Paul Kennedy – The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers

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