Trace the historiographical trends while understanding the origins of the First World War.

INTRODUCTION
Ruth Heing writes that the war that broke out in August 1914, was not initially expected to be
long-drawn. The larger scene proposed that the tensions in Europe seemed to be reduced. But
this perspective was largely misleading. The European government had not made any extensive
plans to sustain those affected by the aftermath of the war. They did not have proper plans of
rescue from the devastations of the economic and military standstill. From the very beginning of
the year 1900, conflicts had already started rising. European nations were losing stability with a
series of crises that were mounting friction until to peak in year 1914. The understanding of the
events of the world war from the very beginning of the early 20th century, with the governments
justifying their actions and decisions for waging the war. This essay attempts to understand these
trends through research in recent historiography and provides a context to the reasoning behind
the origin of the First World War. The historiographical debate on the origins of the First World
War from 1914 onwards presents various narratives shaped by political concerns focused on the
international character of it despite having distinct national and regional characters as well. This
essay will cover the changing perspectives of historians on World War 1.

BACKDROP- OVERVIEW
We see the first world war peak in the second decade of the 20th century. Towards the end of the
19th century, one can already see alliances being formed, and to some extent, a level of
divisiveness emerging, creating an environment for the emergence of separate power blocs. Just
like after the unification of Germany, it engaged in a triple alliance with Austria-Hungary and
Italy. Several such mobilizations can be summarised as wars between the allies and the central
powers. The Allies were the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. The United States later
joined this side as well. The Central Powers were Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman
Turkey.

DEBATE DURING THE WAR- WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

Even before the war had broken out, the leaders had begun to push the responsibility for the
emergence of the war on their future enemies. Most leaders, however, engaged in the war
generally declared their war and the aggression that they wage as a form of defense. For instance,
Oskar Von Montlong, the head of the Press Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conveyed
that they at Vienna had no intention of waging war or conquests and that they just wanted to
defend themselves front the threat from the criminals who are disrupting the peace for Europe
targeting and blaming Serbia for creating unrest across Europe. Serbia in response to these
statements made statements that reflected Austro-Hungarian blame when it comes to criminal
conspiracy. The debate continues about who is in charge of the moral responsibility of violating
the norms of international politics by waging war.
THE INTERWAR YEARS
Who was responsible for the initial breakout of the war was a stark question at the face of
historians on the origin of the world war. This promoted important discussions on “war guilt”.
American historians like Bernadotte Schmitt, Sidney Fay, and William Langer were some of
the prominent faces in the historiographical debate in the 1920s. Bernadotte Schmitt on the
basis of the arguments of Eugen Fischer and Pierre Renouvin, argues that the debate has to be
conducted with ample knowledge and good temper. This focus on good temper was also
highlighted by Renouvin, who warned against a dogma being established. He intended that the
historian’s responsibility is not to fix but only to furnish the circumstances that declared the
international and development politics.

THE GERMAN RESPONSIBILITY- VERDICT OF VERSAILLES

Germany in article 231 of the Versailles peace treaty took up the responsibility for the loss and
damage to the Allied and the associated governments and their nationals. The treaty singled out
German Kaiser for the blame of disrupting the sanctity of international morality and treaties and
it was attempted to bring Kaiser down with a trial. The situation before 1914, according to the
Germans was motivated by the aggressiveness in play influenced by Russia, France, and Britain.
The findings of Article 231 were never really accepted by the Weimar Republic and they devised
a way of escaping to pay the war reparations by showcasing that the detested war-guilt clause
was a lie. After several working committees were set up to understand the origin of the war, the
German interpretation conveyed that it was the Serbian government’s aggression linking their
proximity to Black Hand assassins. And since this threat was posed by Germany’s ally Austria.
There was no other option at the hand of Germany but to support. However, Woodrow Wilson,
states that “the secret diplomacy and the selfish greed of the pre-war European great powers had
brought them into collision in 1914”. His stance was that it is only changing view of
international relations that would improve the reduced chances of wars in the future stressing
the need of establishing a League of Nations in the peace treaties, which he proposed in the Paris
peace conference.

THE GREAT WAR- ACCIDENTAL OR AN IMPERIALIST PLAN?

Another crucial debate attempts to understand if the war was imperialist or if was it just
accidental. In the write-up by Lenin, Imperialism- The highest stage of Capitalism, in 1916,
he drew a link between imperialism and the Great War. He argued that it could have been
possible because of the intensified rivalries between the emerging financial monopolies in
European countries back then. The communists and socialists throughout Europe in the 1920s
and 1930s added to the conversations establishing connections between capitalism and War. So,
the internal conflicts for access to raw materials and territories between the states bound with a
capitalist mode of production being seen as the sole reason for the war is not an adequate
argument based on non-Marxist historians. The caution was that even in the pre-capitalist
times and including non-capitalist nations, there are ample instances of Wars, so for them
it did not make much sense to say that capitalism or imperialism was the primary cause for
the origin of the Great War. To add, to it, contradicting what Lenin argued, the countries
like Austria and Serbia which were quite actively involved in the war, could hardly be
called Capitalist.

Lenin’s arguments of new economic imperialism with some of the policies devised by the
nations like Britain, France, and Germany and even trading interests in Africa and the Far East
could be considered responsible for causing economic and political tensions which the domestic
government was unable to resolve initially and might have given rise to international tension but
these disputes were mostly resolved by the beginning decade of the 20th century. A bigger threat
to international stability was rather the instability and threat posed by the traditional imperial
rivalries, struggling for powers in areas marked important from a strategic and military point of
view.

IMPACT OF RISING MILITARISM AND AGGRESSION?

Both Marxist and American reasoning of the origins of the world war argues that no nation
could be solely declared as responsible for the origin of the war. So, if guilt had to be
appropriated it had to be, it had to be shared. David Llyod George, British Prime Minister from
1916-1922 argues in this regard that there was no general will of waging war, the crises just
escalated and a war broke out, which no country intended to go for. L.C.F. Tuner adds to this
and argues in his “Origins of the First World War (1967)” that there were miscalculations drawn
in various European nations, especially Germany, and the leaders that were representing the
civilians of the nation, were too late by the time they realized the military implications of
their decisions. Gerhard Ritter, a renowned historian in Germany argues how the impacts of
militarism in Germany and the growing power of the military elites and leaders in
Wilhemine Germany could have resulted in the war eventually. David Stevenson argues that
the German government was aware of the possibility of Russia being drawn into the Austro-
Serbian conflicts and hence prepared itself for a war-like situation to emerge out of its support to
its Austrian ally. Similarly, France was also ready to face war at the cost of her alliance with
Russia These arguments attempt to imply that certain events like this went out of control and
military considerations overpowered the diplomatic ones and resulted in the war.

According to Bernadette Schmitt, the conflict existing between minorities who were unhappy
and the existing governments was responsible for the origin of the Great War in 1914. Several
other historians point out Austria’s foreign policy as exclusively defensive. Austria wished to
maintain peace in the Balkans and worked to prevent any change in managing the power there
thus Austria was on a rigorous project of self-preservation.

F.R. Bridge argues how Russia and Austria-Hungary were constantly drawn into conflicts
because of common security interests. But what still acted as a stabilizing factor was the
Turkish Empire in South-East Europe, acting as a “shock-absorber” in the diplomatic
scene. But this buffer was removed during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and avoiding
serious conflicts became inevitable and Austria’s problems escalated.

German government’s reluctance to extend support to Austrian interests during the Balkan
Wars is perceived by many historians as an important factor. This is because, with such an
action, Austria began to find itself isolated when a threat from Serbia was mounting against its
head. German decision-making also played an important role, especially after the assassination
of Franz Ferdinand in June. The German interest in earning diplomatic and military profits
expanded the conflict from a European lens to the world context.

One of the most prominent historians who make attempts to understand the origins of the war is
Luigi Abertini. He explained the diplomatic history approach of the interwar years. The
uniqueness of his work is the peculiarity with which he notes the decisions of individuals who
were at the root of bringing the catastrophe to Europe. No matter how much the historians try
they get affected by the political backdrop. For instance, the opinions of the widely-known
historian, William Dawson have been influenced by the German Office’s War Guilt section and
made them revise their stance of how Prussian militarism was the root cause of the war and made
them shift from the German War guilt.

The World War lasted for more than four years but the major development in the war are
scattered throughout. The Turkish Empire crumbled as soon as the Austro-Hungarian and
Russian Empires fell apart. It was only in 1917 when the United States entered the war that
Britain and France were able to drive the German armies from France and Belgium away. The
war expenses and far-reaching consequences of the world war that were realized in 1918, were
not expected in 1914. So, the countries who were taken in charge of the ravages of the war had to
be responsible for these far-reaching consequences until 1918.

THE FISCHER DEBATE

A professor of History at Hamburg University, Fritz Fischer’s book was published in England in
1966 called Germany’s Aims in the First World War. His work talked about the annexationist or
expansionist behavior of Germany. Fischer made three assertions which were widely critiqued
by other scholars. Firstly, the acceptance of the German government that its support of Serbia
against Austria would wage severe difficulties and cause a major European war. Secondly, some
historiographical research comes from the period after the second world war, when looked back
argues that the Imperial government not only predated the outbreak of the war but also showed a
possibility of a plan of Nazi conquest post-1933. The third assertion, says that Germany's
expansionism was less dependent on the socio-economic and political situation before the war
and more on its domestic position. But since Fischer posed a major responsibility to Germany as
responsible for the war, which enraged several critics. The Weimar German government
canceled the funding for a lecture tour that Fischer had to undertake in revenge. Ritter and
Egmont Zechlin criticized Fischer’s use of sources and the revisionist accounts of the origin of
war. There could be multiple interpretations of documents. There was a great emphasis on the
socio-political structure of Wilhemine Germany in Fischer’s research. Fischer’s second major
work came in 1969, he drew a detailed documentary where he showcased a “strong will to war”
on the part of German leaders in pre-war times. He countered the argument that Germany acted
from war only to protect its interests against a growing threat. He claimed that the domestic,
social, and political factors were crucial in framing Germany’s aggressive policy after 1911 as
they waged war as realized their aspirations are being threatened by the policies of France,
Russia, and Britain.

The primacy of domestic policy and German fear of encirclement-

Ranke, a German historical scholar viewed that Germany’s foreign policy from 1870, dictated
its internal policies. But by 1970, this view is reversed. It was rather the domestic policies that
shaped the foreign policy of Germany. Historians argue that Germany was dominated by a
generation of the pre-industrial elite who were primarily Prussian junkers and they resorted to
their privileged social and political positions that were coming from conservatism thoughts and
they showed constant opposition to new ideas and thoughts. They saw the future through a very
pessimistic lens. Fischer argues that the German power elite had the determination to resist all
constitutional and socio-political changes in Reich. This led to the adoption of aggressive
policies.

Towards the later 20th century, John Moses in The Politics of Illusion highlights how many
historians agreed with Fischer’s assertions without dissent and believe that Germany was
deliberately responsible for unleashing the war although to what extent that is still uncertain.
Similarly, James Joll, by 1984 in his book had agreed that German rulers had accepted the war
was inevitable by December 1912 but there are disagreements based on the war-council meetings
of December 1912. These debates happen over the importance of the War Council and the extent
to which it was supporting and planning the war from that time. John Rohl argues that the war
council meeting was an important stage in discovering the German plans for the war against the
Entente powers. Berghahn argues that the importance of domestic and external factors is
both crucial in shaping the history of the origin of the war and they should be considered
independently.

The pessimistic vision of the German leaders played a large role in shaping their actions.
Russia in early July was not prepared for war, but Kaiser in Germany feared the point when
Russia completes the railroads in Poland, they would become tough competitors. Hence,
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg also agreed that they should wage the war before they are
attacked. And, as intended, this huge military expansion of Germany instigated strong
reactions from France and Russia. As Russia attempted in mobilising a massive army, France
was modernizing the military equipment that it had. The relationship between Britain and France
was also thus increasing. Russia was largely spread westward too. And German leaders began
facing difficulties in gaining mass consensus for a military conflict with Russia.
Herman and Stevensons stress the successive diplomatic crises post-1906 apart from discussing
the German ambitions. They discussed the ties between the emerging power blocs. He
emphasizes how military power became an important factor in decision-making across the
councils in Europe. These two authors also shed light on how crises escalated after the first
Moroccan crisis of 1906 and shaped the rivalries of the power blocs. Russian strength and
Balkan rivalries are also stressed by Harman while he is analyzing the causation for the origins
of the world war. The collection of the several military confrontations that were happening at the
face of countries, made the war inevitable.

All in all, the origins of the First World War were driven by a huge number of factors. This essay
hence discussed the range framing a narrative from different historiographical perspectives
speaking of the role of militarism, imperialism, the diplomatic and domestic policies, and
international relations at play and from all the historiographies with a particular focus on the
Fischer debate to understand why the Great War was inevitable.

Bibliography

1. Mulligan, William: The Historiography of the Origins of the First World War, in 1914-
1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter
Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson,
issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2016-11-30
2. Heing Ruth, The Origins of the First World War; 3rd Edition, Routledge, Taylor, and
Francis group; London and Newyork, 2002
3. Kramer, Alan. “Recent Historiography of the First World War (Part I).” Journal of
Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue
d’histoire Européenne Contemporaine 12, no. 1 (2014): 5–28.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26266110.

Submitted by-

Bidisha Maharana

Semester-VI

BA (Hons) History

IPCW, DU