A0iJLD Endsley1995

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Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems

Mica R. Endsley
Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 1995 37: 32
DOI: 10.1518/001872095779049543
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HUMAN FACTORS, 1995, 37(1), 32-64
Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in

Dynamic Systems
MICA R. ENDSLEY,t Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas
This paper presents a theoretical model of situation awareness based on its role in
dynamic human decision making in a variety of domains. Situation awareness is
presented as a predominant concern in system operation, based on a descriptive
view of decision making. The relationship between situation awareness and nu-
merous individual and environmental factors is explored. Among these factors,
attention and working memory are presented as critical factors limiting operators
from acquiring and interpreting information from the environment to form situ-
ation awareness, and mental models and goal-directed behavior are hypothesized
as important mechanisms for overcoming these limits. The impact of design fea-
tures, workload, stress, system complexity, and automation on operator situation
awareness is addressed, and a taxonomy of errors in situation awareness is intro-
duced, based on the model presented. The model is used to generate design impli-
cations for enhancing operator situation awareness and future directions for situ-
ation awareness research.
INTRODUCTION vironments and the utility of using a model of

decision making that takes SA into account, and
The range of problems confronting human fac-
(b) a theory of SA that expands on prior work in
tors practitioners has continued to grow over
this area (Endsley, 1988a, 1990c, 1993b). True
the past 50 years. Practitioners must deal with
SA, it will be shown, involves far more than
human performance in tasks that are primarily
merely being aware of numerous pieces of data.
physical or perceptual, as well as consider hu-
It also requires a much more advanced level of
man behavior involving highly complex cogni-
situation understanding and a projection of fu-
tive tasks with increasing frequency. As technol-
ture system states in light of the operator's per-
ogy has evolved, many complex, dynamic
tinent goals. As such, SA presents a level offocus
systems have been created that tax the abilities
that goes beyond traditional information-
of humans to act as effective, timely decision
processing approaches in attempting to explain
makers when operating these systems. The op-
human behavior in operating complex systems.
erator's situation awareness (SA) will be pre-
SA can be shown to be important in a vari-
sented as a crucial construct on which decision
ety of contexts that confront human factors
making and performance in such systems hinge.
practi tioners.
In this paper I strive to show (a) the impor-
Aircraft. In the area with perhaps the longest
tance of SA in decision making in dynamic en-
history, SA was recognized as a crucial com-
modity for crews of military aircraft as far back
1 Requests for reprints should be sent to Mica R. Endsley,
Department ofIndustrial Engineering, Texas Tech University,
as World War I (Press, 1986). SA has grown in
Lubbock, TX 79409. importance as a major design goal for civil,
© 1995, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. All rights reserved.

SITUATION AWARENESS THEORY March 1995-33
commercial, and military aircraft, receIvmg ing loss of life, such as in the case of the U.S.S.
particular emphasis in recent years (Federal Vincennes. Incorrect SA concerning an incoming
Aviation Administration, 1990; U.S. Air Force aircraft (from confusing identification signals
57th Fighter Wing, 1986). In the flight environ- and a lack of direct information on changes in
ment, the safe operation of the aircraft in a man- altitude) led to the downing of a commercial air-
ner consistent with the pilot's goals is highly de- liner and subsequent loss of all aboard. From
pendent on a current assessment of the changing reports of the accident (Klein, 1989a), it appears
situation, including details of the aircraft's op- that the decision makers' SA was in error (per-
erational parameters, external conditions, navi- ceived hostility of the incoming aircraft), not the
gational information, other aircraft, and hostile decision as to what to do (if hostile, warn off and
factors. Without this awareness (which needs then shoot down if not heeded). This is an im-
to be both accurate and complete), the air- portant distinction that highlights the criticality
crew will be unable to effectively perform their of SA in dynamic decision making.
functions. Indeed, as will be discussed further, Other. Many other everyday activities call for
even small lapses in SA can have catastrophic a dynamic update of the situation to function
repercussions. effectively. Walking, driving in heavy traffic, or
Air traffic control. In a related environment, operating heavy machinery surely call for SA.
air traffic controllers are called on to sort out Roschelle and Greeno (1987) reported that ex-
and project the paths of ever-increasing num- perts in solving physics problems rely on the de-
bers of aircraft in order to ensure goals of min- velopment of a situational classification. Gaba,
imum separation and safe, efficient landing and Howard, and Small (1995, this issue) describe
takeoff operations. This taxing job relies on the the role of SA in medical decision making. As
SA of controllers who must maintain up-to-date humans typically operate in a closed-loop man-
assessments of the rapidly changing locations of ner, input from the environment is almost al-
aircraft (in three-dimensional space) and their ways necessary.
projected locations relative to each other, along The need for SA applies in a wide variety of
with other pertinent aircraft parameters (desti- environments. Acquiring and maintaining SA
nation, speed, communications, etc.). becomes increasingly difficult, however, as the
Large-systems operations. The operators of complexity and dynamics of the environment in-
large, complex systems such as flexible manu- crease. In dynamic environments, many deci-
facturing systems, refineries, and nuclear power sions are required across a fairly narrow space
plants must also rely on up-to-date knowledge of of time, and tasks are dependent on an ongoing,
situation parameters to manage effectively. In up-to-date analysis of the environment. Because
their tasks, operators must observe the state of the state of the environment is constantly chang-
numerous system parameters and any patterns ing, often in complex ways, a major portion of
among them that might reveal clues as to the the operator's job becomes that of obtaining and
functioning of the system and future process maintaining good SA. This task ranges from
state changes (Wirstad, 1988). Without this un- trivial to one of the major factors determining
derstanding and prediction, human control operator performance. In analyzing the deci-
could not be effective. sion making of tactical commanders, Kaempf,
Tactical and strategic systems. Similarly, fire- Wolf, and Miller (1993, p. 1110) reported that
fighters, certain police units, and military com- "recognizing the situation provided the chal-
mand personnel rely on SA to make their deci- lenge to the decision maker," confirming SA's
sions. They must ascertain the critical features cri ticali ty .
in widely varying situations to determine the In each of the domains discussed, operators
best course of action. Inaccurate or incomplete must do more than simply perceive the state of
SA in these environments can lead to devastat- their environment. They must understand the

34-March 1995 HUMAN FACTORS
integrated meaning of what they are perceiving egies may become more important in these cases
in light of their goals. Situation awareness, as as forming an assessment of the situation be-
such, incorporates an operator's understanding comes more challenging.
of the situation as a whole, forming a basis for Given that SA plays such a critical role in de-
decision making. Researchers in many areas cision making, particularly in complex and dy-
have found that expert decision makers will act namic environments, there is a need to more ex-
first to classify and understand a situation, implicitly incorporate the concept into human
mediately proceeding to action selection (Klein, factors design efforts. A theory of SA that clearly
1989b; Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-Cirocco, defines the construct and its relation to human
1986; Lipshitz, 1987; Noble, Boehm-Davis, and decision making and performance is needed to
Grosz, 1987; Sweller, 1988). fulfill this mission.
There is evidence that an integrated picture of
A MODEL OF SITUATION AWARENESS
the current situation may be matched to proto-
typical situations in memory, each prototypical Because direct research on SA itself is limited
situation corresponding to a "correct" action or and has been conducted only in recent years, a
decision. Dreyfus (1981) presented a treatise thorough and rigorously defined theory may not
that emphasized the role of situational under- yet be possible. The present objective is to define
standing in real-world, expert decision making, a common ground for discussion using the infor-
building on the extensive works of deGroot mation that is available in order to provide a
(1965) in chess, Mintzburg (1973) in managerial starting point for future work on SA.
decision making, and Kuhn (1970) in science. In This information will be presented in a frame-
each of these areas the experts studied used pat- work model-a model that is descriptive of the
tern-matching mechanisms to draw on long- SA phenomenon and that synthesizes informa-
term memory structures that allowed them to tion from a variety of areas. It will explicitly
quickly understand a given situation. They then address certain attributes of the construct. Spe-
adopted the course of action corresponding to cifically, Klein (1989b) stated that a desired the-
that type of situation. Hinsley, Hayes, and Si- ory of situation awareness should explain dy-
mon (1977) have found that this situation clas- namic goal selection, attention to appropriate
sification can occur almost immediately, or, as critical cues, expectancies regarding future
Klein (1989b) has pointed out, it can involve states of the situation, and the tie between situ-
some effort to achieve. ation awareness and typical actions. Within this
In his studies of fire ground commanders, context, it is the goal of this effort to delineate
Klein (1989b) found that a conscious delibera- what SA is and what it is not, to provide an
tion of solution alternatives was rare. Rather, understanding of the mechanisms that underlie
the majority of the time, experts focused on clas- the construct, and to discuss the factors that
sifying the situation in order to immediately may influence it. The implications of the model
yield the appropriate solution from memory. for design, error investigation, and future re-
Kaempf et al. (1993) reported that of 183 deci- search will be discussed. (This discussion will be
sions by tactical commanders, 95% used this illustrated by examples of SA from the aircraft
type of recognition decision strategy, involving domain; however, it applies equally to other
either feature matching to situation prototypes contexts presented earlier.)
(87%) or story building (13%). Although much of
A Model
this work emphasizes the decision processes of
experts,- novices must also focus a considerable Figure 1 provides a basis for discussing SA in
amount of their effort on assessing the state of terms of its role in the overall decision-making
the environment in order to make decisions. Co- process. According to this model, a person's
hen (1993) pointed out that metacognitive strat- perception of the relevant elements in the

• Svatem Capabiily
• Interface Design
• a:
stress Workload
• Complexity
• Automation
Task/System Fac:tof$
P8fceptlon Projection PetfDm'tClnce

C~eheNlon
Of E1emenh 01 CLrlllfIt Of Fulu'e Decision Of
state Ollhe Actions
Erwfrorrnent In Current SlluoIlon Slona
Slluollon
lav.! 1 I.IBU I.I:tIU
Individual Factors
• Goals a:
Objectives
• Preconceptions
(Expectations)
long Term (Automaltclly)
Memory stores
• AbllilIes
• Experlence
• Training
Figure 1. Model of situation awareness in dynamic decision making.
environment, as determined from system dis- which it provides it. All system designs are not
plays or directly by the senses, forms the basis equal in their ability to convey needed informa-
for his or her SA. Action selection and perfor- tion or in the degree to which they are compat-
mance are shown as separate stages that will ible with basic human information-processing
proceed directly from SA. abilities. Other features of the task environment,
Several major factors are shown to influence including workload, stress, and complexity, may
this process. First, individuals vary in their abil- also affect SA. The role of each of these individ-
ity to acquire SA, given the same data input. ual and system factors in relation to SA will be
This is hypothesized to be a function of an indi- addressed.
vidual's information-processing mechanisms,
Definitions and Terminology
influenced by innate abilities, experience, and
training. In addition, the individual may possess Contrary to Sarter and Woods (1995, this is-
certain preconceptions and objectives that can sue), who believe that developing a definition of
act to filter and interpret the environment in SA is futile and not constructive, I believe it is
forming SA. first necessary to clearly define SA. The term has
SA will also be a function of the system design lately become the victim of rather loose usage,
in terms of the degree to which the system pro- with different individuals redefining it at whim,
vides the needed information and the form in leading to the recent criticism that SA is the

36--March 1995 HUMAN FACTORS
"buzzword of the '90s" (Wiener, 1993, p. 4). Un- arately. (This stance also differs from that taken
less researchers stick to a clear, consistent by the U.S. Air Force [Judge, 1992], which has
meaning for the term, the problem will present a adopted a definition of SA that includes action
significant handicap to progress. and decision making, in contrast to most prior
In conjunction with the model, therefore, a research on SA.)
few issues will be stated explicitly to clarify the Similarly, SA is presented as a construct sep-
present formulation of SA. As a matter of con- arate from others that may influence it. Atten-
sistent terminology, it is first necessary to dis- tion, working memory, workload, and stress are
tinguish the term situation awareness, as a state all related constructs that can affect SA but that
of knowledge, from the processes used to achieve can also be seen as separate from it. Subsuming
that state. These processes, which may vary any of these constructs within the term situation
widely among individuals and contexts, will be awareness loses sight of the independent and in-
referred to as situation assessment or as the pro- teractive nature of these factors. SA and work-
cess of achieving, acquiring, or maintaining SA. load, for instance, have been shown to vary in-
(This differs from recent efforts by Sarter and dependently across a wide range of these
Woods [1995, this issue], who view SA as "a va- variables (Endsley, 1993a), although workload
riety of cognitive processing activities," in con- may have a negative effect on SA in certain sit-
trast to most past definitions of SA, which have uations. These factors will be addressed more
focused on SA as a state of knowledge. I am in explicitly in a later section.
full agreement with Adams, Tenney, and Pew Although numerous definitions of SA have
[1995, this issue] that there is great benefit in been proposed (Endsley, 1988a; Fracker, 1988),
examining the interdependence of the processes most are not applicable across different task do-
and the resultant state of knowledge; however, mains. For the most part, however, they all
in order to clarify discourse on SA, it is impor- point to "knowing what is going on." Referring
tant to keep the terminology straight.) to Figure 1, I will use the following general def-
Furthermore, SA as defined here does not en- inition of SA (Endsley, 1987b, 1988b):
compass all of a person's knowledge. It refers to
Situation awareness is the perception of the el-
only that portion pertaining to the state of a dy- ements in the environment within a volume of
namic environment. Established doctrine, rules, time and space, the comprehension of their
procedures, checklists, and the like-though im- meaning, and the projection of their status in
the near future.
portant and relevant to the decision-making
process-are fairly static knowledge sources Each of the three hierarchical phases and pri-
that fall outside the boundaries of the term. mary components of this definition will be de-
In addition, SA is explicitly recognized as a scribed in more detail.
construct separate from decision making and
Levell SA: Perception of the Elements in
performance. Even the best-trained decision
the Environment
makers will make the wrong decisions if they
have inaccurate or incomplete SA. Conversely, a The first step in achieving SA is to perceive
person who has perfect SA may still make the the status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant
wrong decision (from a lack of training on elements in the environment. A pilot would
proper procedures, poor tactics, etc.) or show perceive elements such as aircraft, mountains,
poor performance (from an inability to carry out or warning lights along with their relevant char-
the necessary actions). SA, decision making, and acteristics (e.g., color, size, speed, location). A
performance are different stages with different tactical commander needs accurate data on the
factors influencing them and with wholly differ- location, type, number, capabilities, and dy-
ent approaches for dealing with each of them; namics of all enemy and friendly forces in a
thus it is important to treat these constructs sep- given area and their relationship to other points

of reference. A flexible manufacturing system certain location allows a fighter pilot or military
operator needs data on the status of machines, commander to project that the aircraft is likely
parts, flows, and backlogs. An automobile driver to attack in a given manner. This provides the
needs to know where other vehicles and obsta- knowledge (and time) necessary to decide on the
cles are, their dynamics, and the status and dy- most favorable course of action to meet one's
namics of one's own vehicle. objectives. Similarly, an air traffic controller
needs to put together information on various
Level 2 SA: Comprehension of the
traffic patterns to determine which runways
Current Situation
will be free and where there is a potential for
Comprehension of the situation is based on a collisions. An automobile driver also needs to
synthesis of disjointed Levell elements. Level 2 detect possible future collisions in order to act
SA goes beyond simply being aware of the ele- effectively, and a flexible manufacturing system
ments that are present to include an under- operator needs to predict future bottlenecks and
standing of the significance of those elements in unused machines for effective scheduling.
light of pertinent operator goals. Based on SA, therefore, is based on far more than sim-
knowledge of Level 1 elements, particularly ply perceiving information about the environ-
when put together to form patterns with the ment. It includes comprehending the meaning of
other elements (gestalt), the decision maker that information in an integrated form, compar-
forms a holistic picture of the environment, ing it with operator goals, and providing pro-
comprehending the significance of objects and jected future states of the environment that are
events. For example, a military pilot or tactical valuable for decision making. In this aspect, SA
commander must comprehend that the appear- is a broad construct that is applicable across a
ance of three enemy aircraft within a certain wide variety of application areas, with many un-
proximity of one another and in a certain geo- derlying cognitive processes in common.
graphical location indicates certain things
about their objectives. The operator of a power Elements
plant needs to put together disparate bits of data
From a design standpoint, a clear understand-
on individual system variables to determine
ing of SA in a given environment rests on a clear
how well different system components are func-
elucidation of the elements in the definition-
tioning, deviations from expected values, and
that is, identifying which things the operator
the specific locus of any deviant readings. In
needs to perceive and understand. These are spe-
these environments a novice operator might be
cific to individual systems and contexts, and as
capable of achieving the same Level I SA as
such are the one part of SA that cannot be de-
more experienced decision makers but may fall
scribed in any valid way across arenas. Although
far short of also being able to integrate various
the pilot and power plant operator each relies on
data elements along with pertinent goals in or-
SA, it simply is not realistic or appropriate to
der to comprehend the situation.
expect the same elements to be relevant to both.
Level] SA: Projection of Future Status Nonetheless, these elements can be, and should
be, specifically determined for various classes of
The ability to project the future actions of the
systems.
elements in the environment-at least in the
Endsley (l993c) presented a methodology for
very near term-forms the third and highest
accomplishing this and described such a delin-
level of SA. This is achieved through knowledge
eation for air-to-air fighter aircraft. Examples of
of the status and dynamics of the elements and
elements in this arena include
comprehension of the situation (both Level I
and Level 2 SA). For example, knowing that a a. Level I: location, altitude, and heading of
threat aircraft is currently offensive and is in a ownship and other aircraft; current target;

detections; system status; location of ground actly which aspects of the environment are im-
threats and obstacles portant for SA.
b. Level 2: mission timing and status; impact of
system degrades; time and distance available An operator's SA needs to incorporate infor-
on fuel; tactical status of threat aircraft (offen- mation on that subset of the environment that is
sive/defensive/neutral) relevant to tasks and goals. Within this bound-
c. Level 3: projected aircraft tactics and maneu-
vers, firing position and timing. ary, the elements may be further subdivided
into levels of importance for SA or may assume
One may also talk about awareness of certain
a relevance continuum, depending on the prob-
subcategories of SA (usually system specific),
lem context. In a piloting context, for example,
which include requirements across all three lev-
the relevance of different aircraft will depend on
els of SA. For instance, spatial awareness or geo-
their location and speed relative to ownship and
graphical awareness is frequently of concern in
the pilot's goals (e.g., response to an immediate
aircraft. Mode awareness, as discussed by Sarter
threat, tactics determination, or long-term mis-
and Woods (1995, this issue), is another example
sion replanning); a different amount of rele-
of a subset of SA that may be of concern in cer-
vance may be indicated for different goals. In
tain systems, across all three levels (e.g., "What
other contexts, such as manufacturing or power
is it doing, why is it doing that, what will it do
plant environments, relevance of elements may
next?").
be determined by the spatial, temporal, or func-
Time tional relationships of elements to goals.
In this way, elements may vary in their rele-
Several other aspects of SA should be men- vance across time, although they do not gener-
tioned at this point. First, although SA has been ally fall out of consideration completely. At least
discussed as a person's knowledge of the envi- some SA on all elements has been found to be
ronment at a given point in time, it is highly needed, even if this conveys merely that the el-
temporal in nature. That is, SA is not necessarily ement is not very important at the moment. For
acquired instantaneously but is built up over instance, while in close combat, many pilots re-
time. Thus it takes into account the dynamics of port that they are interested only in where their
the situation that are acquirable only over time opponent is. Too frequently, however, though
and that are used to project the state of the en- they are successful in avoiding enemy missiles,
vironment in the near future. So although SA they end up flying into the ground with lethal
consists of an operator's knowledge of the state results (Kuipers, Kappers, van Holten, van Ber-
of the environment at any point in time, this gen, and Oosterveld, 1989; McCarthy, 1988). In
knowledge includes temporal aspects of that en- order to know that they can afford to pay less
vironment, relating to both the past and the attention to altitude than to enemy aircraft, pi-
future. lots need to know that they are at least above a
certain level at all times. A certain amount of SA
Space
on other elements is required at all times in a
It has been observed that SA is highly spatial similar manner.
in many contexts. Pilots and air traffic control-
lers, for instance, are concerned with the spatial Team SA
relationships among multiple aircraft, and this
information also yields important temporal It is possible to talk about SA in terms of
cues. Many other fields may also be concerned teams as well as individuals. In many situa-
with the spatial as well as functional relation- tions several individuals may work together as a
ships among system components. In addition to team to make decisions and carry out actions. In
its aspect as a frequent "element" of SA, spatial this case one can conceive of overall team SA,
information is highly useful for determining ex- whereby each team member has a specific set of

SA elements about which he or she is concerned, SA of the team has suffered and performance
as determined by each member's responsibili- may suffer as well unless the discrepancy is cor-
ties within the team. rected. How that information transmission oc-
SA for a team can be represented as shown in curs-the process of achieving SA-can vary. It
Figure 2. Some overlap between each team may constitute a verbal exchange or separate,
member's SA requirements will be present. It is direct viewing of displays, with each individual
this subset of information that constitutes much independently acquiring information on the sta-
of team coordination. That coordination may oc- tus of the aircraft. Higher levels of SA that may
cur as a verbal exchange, as a duplication of dis- not be directly presented on displays may be
played information, or by some other means. As communicated verbally, or, if the team mem-
such, the quality of team members' SA of shared bers possess a shared mental model (Salas,
elements (as a state of knowledge) may serve as Prince, Baker, and Shrestha, 1995, this issue),
an index of team coordination or human- each team member may achieve the same
machine interface effectiveness. higher-level SA without necessitating extra ver-
Overall team SA can be conceived as the de- bal communication. Mosier and Chidester
gree to which every team member possesses the (1991), for example, found that better-per-
SA required for his or her responsibilities. This forming teams actually communicated less than
is independent of any overlaps in SA require- did poorer-performing teams. In this case, the
ments that may be present. If each of two team degree to which each team member has accurate
members needs to know a piece of information, SA on shared iterns could serve as an index of
it is not sufficient that one knows perfectly but the quality of team communications (i.e., each
the other not at all. Every team member must member's ability to achieve the goal of commu-
have SA for all of his or her own requirements or nication as efficiently as possible).
become the proverbial chain's weakest link.
Link to Decision Making
For instance, in an aircraft cockpit, both the
pilot and copilot may need to know certain In addition to forming the basis for decision
pieces of information. If the copilot has this in- !Ilaking as a major input, SA may also impact
formation but the pilot in charge does not, the the process of decision making itself. There is
considerable evidence that a person's manner of
characterizing a situation will determine the de-
cision process chosen to solve a problem. Mank-
telow and Jones (1987) reviewed the literature
concerning deductive problem solving and
showed, through numerous studies, that the sit-
uation parameters or context of a problem
largely determines the ability of individuals to
adopt an effective problem-solving strategy. It is
the situation specifics that determine the adop-
tion of an appropriate mental model, leading to
the selection of problem-solving strategies. In
the absence of an appropriate model, people will
often fail to solve a new problem, even though
they would have to apply the same logic as that
used for a familiar problem.
Other evidence suggests that even the way a
given problem is presented (or framed) can de-
Figure 2. Team situation awareness. termine how the problem is solved (Bettman

and Kakkar, 1977; Herstein, 1981; Sundstrom, environment as they affect the operator's ability
1987; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The sim- to achieve SA.
plest explanation for this is that different prob- Although some researchers have continued to
lem framings can induce different information argue that relatively little is known about SA
integration (situation comprehension), and this (Sarter and Woods, 1991), this belies the vast
determines the selection of a mental model to amount of highly pertinent work that has been
use for solving the problem. Thus it is not done-specifically, research devoted to more
only the detailed situational information (Level general aspects of human cognition. Although
1 SA) but also the way the pieces are put to- members of the psychology community con-
gether (Level 2 SA) that direct decision strategy tinue to debate the exact structure and nature of
selection. information-processing mechanisms, a detailed
discussion of various theories regarding each
Link to Performance
lies beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, the
The relationship between SA and perfor- relationship between SA and these mechanisms,
mance, though not always direct, can also be as generally understood, will be explored.
predicted. In general, it is expected that poor In combination, the mechanisms of short-
performance will occur when SA is incomplete term sensory memory, perception, working
or inaccurate, when the correct action for the memory, and long-term memory form the basic
identified situation is not known or calculated, structures on which SA is based. Figure 3 shows
or when time or some other factor limits a per- a schematic description of the role of each of
son's ability to carry out the correct action. For these structures in the SA process.
instance, in an air-to-air combat mission, Ends-
Preattentive Processing
ley (1990b) found that SA was significantly re-
lated to performance only for those subjects who According to most research on information
had the technical and operational capabilities to processing (for a review see Norman, 1976, or
take advantage of such knowledge. The same Wickens, 1992a), environmental features are ini-
study found that poor SA would not necessarily tially processed in parallel through preattentive
lead to poor performance if subjects realized sensory stores in which certain properties are
their lack of SA and were able to modify their detected, such as spatial proximity, color, sim-
behavior to reduce the possibility of poor per- ple properties of shapes. or movement (Neisser,
formance. Venturino, Hamilton, and Dvorchak 1967; Treisman and Paterson, 1984), providing
(1989) also found that performance was pre- cues for further focalized attention. Those ob-
dicted by a combination of SA and decision jects that are most salient, based on preatten-
making (fire-point selection) in combat pilots. tively registered characteristics, will be further
Good SA can therefore be viewed as a factor that processed using focalized attention to achieve
will increase the probability of good perfor- perception. Cue salience, therefore, will have a
mance but cannot necessarily guarantee it. large impact on which portions of the environ-
ment are initially attended to, and these ele-
HUMAN PROPERTIES AFFECTING AND
ments will form the basis for the first level of SA.
UNDERLYING SA
Attention
Within this basic model of SA, I will discuss
the factors underlying and influencing the SA The deployment of attention in the perception
process. This discussion will first focus on char- process acts to present certain constraints on a
acteristics of the individual, including relevant person's ability to accurately perceive multiple
information-processing mechanisms and con- items in parallel and, as such, is a major limit on
structs that playa role in achieving SA. It will SA. Direct attention is needed for not only per-
proceed to factors related to the system and task ceiving and processing the cues attended to but

SITUATION AWARENESS THEORY March 1995--41
SITUATION AWARENESS
SHORT TERM WORKING
SENSORY STORE MEMORY
PATTERN
MATCHING!
CATEGORIZATION
LONG TERM
MEMORY LEARNING! MEMORY STORAGE
RESPONSE FEEDBACK
Figure 3. Mechanisms of situation awareness (reprinted from Endsley, 1988a).
also the later stages of decision making and re- that target. In addition to highly salient cues
sponse execution. In complex and dynamic en- catching one's attention, therefore, people are
vironments, attention demands resulting from active participants in determining which ele-
information overload, complex decision making, ments of the environment will become a part of
and multiple tasks can quickly exceed a person's their (Level 1) SA by directing their attention
limited attention capacity. based on goals and objectives and on the basis of
Operators of complex systems frequently em- long-term and working memory (each of which
ploy a process of information sampling to cir- will be discussed in more detail).
cumvent this limit. They attend to information In a study of pilot SA, Fracker (1989) showed
in rapid sequence following a pattern dictated that a limited supply of attention was allocated
by the portion of long-term memory concerning to environmental elements based on their abil-
relative priorities and the frequency with which ity to contribute to task success. Because the
information changes (Wickens, 1992a). Working supply of attention is limited, more attention to
memory also plays an important role, allowing some elements (resulting in improved SA on
one to modify attention deployment on the basis these elements), however, may mean a loss of SA
of other information perceived or active goals on other elements once the limit is reached,
(Braune and Trollip, 1982). For example, percep- which can occur rather quickly in complex en-
tion of a strange noise may prompt a pilot to vironments. In an investigation of factors lead-
look at the engine status indicator. When in- ing to fighter aircraft accidents involving con-
volved in the goal of shooting at an enemy air- trolled descent into the terrain, Kuipers et al.
craft, attention may be directed primarily at (1989) cited lack of attention to primary flight

instruments (56%) and too much attention to expectation about what they will encounter that
target planes during combat (28%) as major predisposes them to perceive the information
causes. Focusing on only certain elements led to accordingly. They will process the information
a lack of SA and fatal consequences. faster if it is in agreement with those expecta-
In addition to information sampling, it may tions and will be more likely to make an error if
be possible to work around attention limits in it is not (Jones, 1977).
other ways to some degree. Kahneman (1973) Long-term memory stores also playa signifi-
stated that attentional resources can be in- cant role in classifying perceived information
creased somewhat by physiological arousal into known categories or mental representations
mechanisms. Further relief to attention limita- as an almost immediate act in the perception
tions can be provided through people's ability to process (Hinsley et aI., 1977). Categorization is
divide their attention under certain circum- based on integrated information and typically
stances. Wickens's multiple resource theory occurs in a deterministic, nearly optimal man-
(1992a) provides a model for determining which ner (Ashby and Gott, 1988). The classification of
types of information can be most easily attended information into understood representations
to in parallel. Damos and Wickens (1980) also forms Level 1 SA and provides the basic build-
found that attention sharing is a skill that can be ing blocks for the higher levels of SA.
learned and that some people excel at it over With well-developed memory stores, very fine
others. In addition, limitations of attention may categorizations may be possible. For instance,
be circumvented to some degree through the de- an experienced pilot will be able to classify ob-
velopment of automaticity. served aircraft into exact models (e.g., F-18c vs.
F-18d). This highly detailed classification pro-
Perception
vides the pilot with access to detailed knowledge
In addition to affecting the selection of ele- about the capabilities of the aircraft (from long-
ments for perception, the way in which informa- term memory). A novice may not be able to
tion is perceived is directed by the contents of make this level of classification and would con-
both working memory and long-term memory. sequently have less information from the same
Advanced knowledge of the characteristics, data input.
form, and location of information, for instance, The cues used to achieve these classifications
can significantly facilitate the perception of in- are important to SA. With higher levels of ex-
formation (Barber and Folkard, 1972; Bieder- pertise, people appear to develop knowledge of
man, Mezzanotte, Rabinowitz, Francolin, and critical cues in the environment that allow them
Plude, 1981; Davis, Kramer, and Graham, 1983; to make very fine classifications. The develop-
Humphreys, 1981; Palmer, 1975; Posner, Nissen, ment of memory structures for this process will
and Ogden, 1978). That is, one's preconceptions be discussed more fully subsequently. At this
or expectations about information will affect the juncture it is important to note that the classi-
speed and accuracy of the perception of that in- fication made in the perception stage (right or
formation (Jones, 1977, pp. 38-39). wrong, detailed or gross) is a function of the
Repeated experience in an environment al- knowledge available for making such classifi-
lows one to develop expectations about future cations and will produce the elements of
events. In the aircraft environment, premission Levell SA.
briefings typically build up preconceptions
Working Memory
about what will be encountered during the mis-
sion. An air traffic controller's report of traffic at Once perceived, information is stored in work-
a particular altitude or a bill of lading that ac- ing memory. In the absence of other mecha-
companies a shipment in a manufacturing envi- nisms (such as relevant long-term memory
ronment each develops in recipients a certain stores), most of a person's active processing of

information must occur in working memory. that can be filled in with the particulars for the
New information must be combined with exist- case being considered. A script-a special type
ing knowledge and a composite picture of the of schema-provides sequences of appropriate
situation developed (Level 2 SA). Projections of actions for different types of task performance
future status (Level 3 SA) and subsequent deci- (Schank and Abelson, 1977). Ties between sche-
sions as to appropriate courses of action must mata and scripts can greatly facilitate the cog-
occur in working memory as well. In this cir- nitive process because an individual does not
cumstance, a heavy load is imposed on working have to actively decide on appropriate actions at
memory, as it is taxed with simultaneously every turn but will automatically know the ac-
achieving the higher levels of SA (Levels 2 and tions to take for a given situation based on its
3), formulating and selecting responses, and car- associated script.
rying out subsequent actions. A related concept is the mental model. Rouse
Wickens (1984, p. 201) has stated that predic- and Morris (1985) defined mental models as
tion of future states (the culmination of good SA) "mechanisms whereby humans are able to gen-
imposes a heavy load on working memory by erate descriptions of system purpose and form,
requiring the maintenance of present condi- explanations of system functioning and ob-
tions, future conditions, rules used to generate served system states, and predictions of future
the latter from the former, and actions that are states" (p. 7). They stated that experts will de-
appropriate to the future conditions. Fracker velop mental models in a shift from representa-
(1987) hypothesized that working memory con- tional to abstract codes. From this definition,
stitutes the main bottleneck for SA. This is most mental models can be described as complex
likely the case for novices or those dealing with schemata that are used to model the behavior of
novel situations. systems. Therefore, a mental model can be
viewed as a schema for a certain system.
Long-Term Memory
Related to this is the situational model (or sit-
In practice long-term memory structures can uation model), a term used by VanDijk and
be used to circumvent the limitations of working Kintsch (1983) and by Roschelle and Greeno
memory. The exact organization of knowledge (1987), which will be defined as a schema depict-
in long-term memory has received diversified ing the current state of the system model (and
characterization, including episodic memory, often developed in light of the system model).
semantic networks, schemata, and mental mod- Rasmussen (1986) also used the term internal dy-
els. This discussion will focus on schemata and namic world model with the same general mean-
mental models that have been discussed as im- ing. The terms situation model and situation
portant for effective decision making in a num- awareness will be defined here as equivalent.
ber of environments (Braune and Trollip, 1982; A situation model (i.e., SA) can be matched to
Rasmussen and Rouse, 1981) and that are hy- schemata in memory that depict prototypical
pothesized to play an important role in SA. situations or states of the system model. These
Schemata provide coherent frameworks for prototypical classifications may be linked to as-
understanding information, encompassing sociated goals or scripts that dictate decision
highly complex system components, states, and making and action performance. This provides a
functioning (Bartlett, 1932; Mayer, 1983). Much mechanism for the single-step, "recognition-
of the details of situations are lost when infor- primed" decision making described earlier. This
mation is coded in this manner, but the infor- process is hypothesized to be a key mechanism
mation becomes more coherent and organized whereby people are able to efficiently process a
for storage, retrieval. and further processing. A large amount of environmental information to
single schema may serve to organize several sets achieve SA. A well-developed mental model pro-
of information and as such will have variables vides (a) knowledge of the relevant elements of

the system that can be used in directing atten- for the behavior of particular systems or do-
tion and classifying information in the percep- mains, the model will provide (a) for the dy-
tion process, (b) a means of integrating the ele- namic direction of attention to critical cues, (b)
ments to form an understanding of their expectations regarding future states of the envi-
meaning (Level 2 SA), and (c) a mechanism for ronment (including what to expect as well as
projecting future states of the system based on what not to expect) based on the projection
its current state and an understanding of its dy- mechanisms of the model, and (c) a direct, sin-
namics (Level 3 SA). gle-step link between recognized situation clas-
For example, a pilot may perceive several air- sifications and typical actions.
craft (considered to be important elements per Development. Schemata and mental models
the mental model) recognized as enemy fighter are developed as a function of training and ex-
jets (based on critical cues) that are approaching perience in a given environment. A novice in an
in a particular spatial arrangement (forming area may have only a vague idea of important
Levell SA). By pattern-matching to prototypes system components and sketchy rules or heuris-
in memory, these separate pieces of information tics for determining the behavior he or she
may be classified as a particular recognized air- should employ with the system. With experi-
craft formation (Level 2 SA). According to an ence, recurrent situational components will be
internally held mental model, the pilot is able to noticed along with recurrent associations and
generate probable attack scenarios for this type causal relationships. This forms the basis for
of formation when in relation to an aircraft with early schema or model development.
the location and flight vector of his or her own- Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard
ship (Level 3 SA). Based on this high-level SA, (1986) provided a thorough description of the
the pilot is then able to select prescribed tactics development of mental models. According to
(a script) that dictate exactly what evasive ma- their description, an individual will learn (a)
neuvers should be taken. categorization functions that allow people to
The key to using these models to achieve SA map from objects in the real world to a repre-
rests on the ability of the individual to recognize sentative category in their mental model, and
key features in the environment--critical cues- (b) model transition functions that describe how
that will map to key features in the model. The objects in the model will change over time. By
model can then provide for much of the higher repeatedly comparing the predictions of their
levels of SA (comprehension and projection) internal model with the actual states of the sys-
without loading working memory. In cases in tem, individuals will progressively refine their
which scripts have been developed for given pro- models to develop more specific and numerous
totypical situation conditions, the load on work- categorization functions which allow for more-
ing memory for generating alternative behav- accurate predictions based on detailed object
iors and selecting among them is even further characteristics and better transition functions
diminished. for these specialized categorizations. This pro-
A major advantage of this mechanism is that cess enables people to progressively refine their
the current situation need not be exactly like one classification of a perceived object from an air-
encountered before. This is a result of categori- craft to fighter aircraft to F-18 to F-18c and gives
zation mapping (a best fit between the charac- them a more refined idea of the behavior and
teristics of the situation and the characteristics capabilities of the aircraft (in order to provide
of known categories or prototypes). Of prime im- predictions). Their explanation also provides for
portance is that this process can be almost in- two more features that are important to recog-
stantaneous because of the superior abilities of nized attributes of situation awareness: default
human pattern-matching mechanisms. When an information and confidence levels.
individual has a well-developed mental model Default information. Holland et al.'s (1986)

explanation includes a toQ-morphism" in which is a degree of uncertainty associated with the

default information for the system is provided in mental model's transition function that will pro-
a higher layer of the model (i.e., a more general vide confidence levels associated with predic-
level of classification). These default values may tions from the model. Similarly, one could hy-
be used by individuals to predict system perfor- pothesize a degree of uncertainty associated
mance unless some specific exception is trig- with the validity of features used to make the
gered, in which case the appropriate transition mapping from the real world to categories in the
function for that more detailed classification model. For example, if three sources of informa-
will be used. For example, a pilot will make de- tion indicate a certain object is an apple but one
cisions based on general knowledge of how source indicates it is an orange, the object may
fighter aircraft maneuver if the specific model of be characterized in the internal model as an ap-
aircraft is not known. This feature allows people ple but with an uncertainty factor attached to it.
to operate effectively on the basis of often lim- VanDijk and Kintsch (1983), in work on
ited information. speech understanding, have conceptualized a
In addition, default values for certain features context model that allows uncertainties to be
of a system can be used if exact current values linked to information from various sources and
are not known. Fighter pilots, for example, usu- taken into account in the decision process as
ally get only limited information about other well as the stated facts. Borrowing this concept,
aircraft. They therefore must operate on default any given situation model may include a context
information (e.g., it is probably a MIG-29 and feature representing the degree of uncertainty
therefore likely traveling at certain approximate regarding the mapping of world information to
speed). When more details become available, the internal model and the projections based on
their SA becomes more accurate (e.g., knowl- the model. This feature allows people to make
edge of the exact airspeed), possibly leading to decisions effectively, despite numerous uncer-
better decisions, but they are still able to make tainties, yet small shifts in factors underlying
reasonable decisions without perfect informa- the uncertainties can dramatically change re-
tion. This provision of mental models allows ex- sultant conclusions (Norman, 1983).
perts to have access to reasonable defaults that
Automaticity
provide more effective decisions than those of
novices who simply have missing information In addition to developing mental models with
(or poorer defaults). In many cases, experts may experience, a form of automaticity can be ac-
incorporate this type of default information in quired. Automatic processing tends to be fast,
forming SA. autonomous, effortless, and unavailable to con-
Confidence level. A second important aspect of scious awareness in that it can occur without
situation awareness concerns a person's confi- attention (Logan, 1988). Thus automaticity of
dence level regarding that SA. People may have certain tasks can significantly benefit SA by pro-
a certain confidence level regarding the accu- viding a mechanism for overcoming limited at-
racy of information they have received based on tention capacity.
its reliability or source. The confidence level as- In relation to SA, automaticity poses an im-
sociated with information can influence the de- portant question, however. To what degree do
cisions that are made using that information people who are functioning automatically have
(Norman, 1983). An important aspect of SA, SA? SA, by definition, involves one's level of
therefore, is the person's confidence concerning awareness, which implies consciousness of that
that SA, a feature that has been cited by both information. With automaticity, however, cer-
pilots and air traffic controllers (Endsley, 1993c; tain features of cognitive processing occur below
Endsley and Rodgers, 1994). conscious awareness.
Holland et al. (1986) hypothesized that there Logan (1988) provided a detailed discussion of

automaticity in cognitive processing that he what is still available to awareness. The one ex-
maintained occurs through a direct-access, sin- ception to this statement is the possibility of
gle-step retrieval of actions to be performed processing based on subliminal stimuli, which
from memory. This description of automaticity have been shown to modify affective processes.
is consistent with the previous discussion on the Evidence for the role of subliminal stimuli on
use of schemata and mental models for match- typical dynamic decision making, as opposed to
ing recognized classes of situations to scripts for affective processes, however, is less apparent.
actions. In this process, "attention to an object is In addition, the degree to which automatic
sufficient to cause retrieval of whatever infor- processing occurs without any attention or
mation has been associated with it in the past" awareness has been questioned. Reason (1984)
(Logan, 1988, p. 587)-that is, to activate the argued that a minimum level of attention is re-
schema or mental model. quired for all activity-even automatic pro-
When processing in this way, an individual cesses-in order to bring appropriate schemata
appears to be conscious of the situational ele- into play at the right times and to restrain un-
ments that triggered the automatic retrieval of wanted schemata from interfering. At this very
information from memory (SA), but he or she low level of attention, there would be nq aware-
probably will not be conscious of the mecha- ness (equated with consciousness) of the de-
nisms used in arriving at the resultant action tailed procedures. Once a plan has been put into
selection. That is, a person will know the Levell motion, it serves to execute scripts and process
elements (e.g., there is an engine problem), even schema as instructed.
though he or she may not be aware of or be able An example of the possibility of decision mak-
to articulate the critical cues that led to that ing without conscious SA is that of a person
knowledge (e.g., a slight change in engine pitch; driving home from work who follows the same
Nisbett and Wilson, 1977) and may not be able predetermined path, stops at stoplights, re-
to identify the process used to arrive at a deci- sponds to brake lights, and goes with the flow of
sion because it was directly retrieved from traffic, yet can report almost no recollection of
memory as the appropriate script for that situ- the trip. Did this person truly operate with no
ation (Bowers, 1991; Manktelow and Jones, conscious awareness? Or, is it that only a low
1987). As expressed by Dreyfus (1981), the indi- level of attention was allocated to this routine
vidual knows the what but not the how. If asked task, keying on critical environmental features
to explain why a particular decision was made, that automatically evoked appropriate actions?
an individual will usually have to construct The low level of consciousness simply did not
some rationale using logical processes to pro- provide sufficient salience to allow that partic-
vide an explanation of the action he or she ac- ular drive home to be retrieved from memory as
tually chose in an automatic, nonanalytic man- distinguishable from a hundred other such trips.
ner (through the direct link of prototypical I would argue, in agreement with Reason (1984),
situations to scripts). The state of the situation that this latter alternative is far more likely.
itself (SA), however, can still be verbalized as it Several authors in support of this view have
is in awareness. (This process has direct impli- found that when effortful processing is not used,
cations for the measurement of SA, which is ad- information can be retained in long-term mem-
dressed in the following article in this issue.) ory and can affect subject responses (Jacoby and
This account is consistent with Nisbett and Dallas, 1981; Kellog, 1980; Tulving, 1985).
Wilson's (1977) review of people's awareness of The major implications of the use of auto-
and ability to report on mental events. In all of matic processes are (a) good performance with
the cases presented by Nisbett and Wilson, it minimal attention allocation, (b) significant dif-
would appear that the how becomes occluded ficulty in accurately reporting on the internal
through the use of automatic processes but the models used for such processing and possibly on

reporting which key environmental features decision maker then selects activities that will
were related, and (c) unreliability and inaccu- bring the perceived environment into line
racy of reporting on processes after the fact. with his or her plans and goals based on that
Based on this discussion, automaticity is theo- understanding.
rized to provide an important mechanism for Simultaneously with this top-down process,
overcoming human information-processing lim- bottom-up processing will occur. Pattems in the
itations in achieving SA and making decisions in environment may be recognized that will indi-
complex, dynamic environments. cate that new plans are necessary to meet active
The primary hazard created by automatic goals or that different goals should be activated.
cognitive processing is an increased risk of being In this way a person's current goals and plans
less responsive to new stimuli, as automatic pro- may change to be responsive to events in the
cesses operate with limited use of feedback. A environment. The altemating of top-down and
lower level of SA could result in atypical situa- bottom-up processing allows a person to process
tions, decreasing decision timeliness and effec- effectively in a dynamic environment.
tiveness. For example, when a new stop sign is This process also relates to the role of mental
suddenly erected on a familiar route, many peo- models and schemata. The model in Figure 4 can
ple will initially proceed through the intersec- be used to visualize the relationship. Mental
tion without stopping, as the sign is not part of models of systems can be seen to exist as set
their automatic process and is not heeded. (although slowly evolving) memory structures.
Independently, individuals form a set of goals
Goals
that relate to some system. These goals can be
SA is not generally thought of as a construct thought of as ideal states of the system that they
that exists solely for its own sake. SA is impor- wish to achieve. The same set of goals may exist
tant as needed for decision making regarding frequently for a given system or may change of-
some system or task. As such, it is integrally ten. Conversely, a set of goals may relate to more
linked with both the context and the decisions than one system model. A person's current
for which the SA is being sought; it is fundamen- goal(s), selected as the most important among
tally linked with a person's goals. Goals form the competing goals, will act to direct the selection
basis for most decision making in dynamic en- of a mental model. The selected goals will also
vironments. Furthermore, more than one goal determine the frame (Casson, 1983), or focus, on
may be operating simultaneously, and these the model that is adopted.
goals may sometimes conflict (e.g., "stay alive" Plans are then devised for reaching the goal
and "kill enemies"). In most systems, people are using the projection capabilities of the model. A
not helpless recipients of data from the environ- plan will be selected whose projected state best
ment but are active seekers of data in light of matches the goal state. When scripts are avail-
their goals. able for executing the selected plan, they will be
In what Casson (1983) has termed a top-down employed (Schank and Abelson, 1977). When
decision process, a person's goals and plans di- scripts are not available, actions will have to be
rect which aspects of the environment are at- devised to allow for plan completion. Again, the
tended to in the development of SA. That infor- projection capabilities of the system model will
mation is then integrated and interpreted in be used to accomplish this.
light of these goals to form Level 2 SA. The ob- As an ongoing process, an individual observes
servation of each of three parameters of a system the current state of the environment, with his
is not in itself meaningful. When integrated and or her attention directed to environmental fea-
viewed in the context of what they indicate tures by the goal-activated model and inter-
about the goal of operating the system in a given preted in light of it. The model that is active
manner, however, they become meaningful. The provides a future projection of the status of key

I
MENTAL directs selection
I
MODEL of model
(IDEAL STATE)
- -
.~'.......
" b~-.::s;:: ..lfI' GOALS l-
I-' -
on situation model
I
match of plan
projections to desired
goals directs selection "" ••••• (PROJECTED STATE)
,...
PLANS I-
-
I
match of desired plan
directs I
to existing scripts (OUTCOME)
action
••• actions devised SCRIPTS --
through projection
when no scripts exist
directs ~
directs selection
comprehension
and revision of
projection
sys tem model
l.& expectations ACTIONS
(SITUATION MODEL)
directs
SITUATION attention
AWARENESS to key
features
rerceptiOI\
~
ENVIRONMENT
Figure 4. Relationship of goals and mental models to situation awareness.
environmental features and expectations con- tanee of goals, as each goal can have antecedent
cerning future events. When these expectations rules governing situation classes in which each
match that which is observed, all is well. When needs to be invoked over the others. When mul-
they do not match because values of some pa- tiple goals are compatible with each other, sev-
rameter are different or an event occurs that eral may be active at once. When goals are in-
should not, or an event does not occur that compatible, their associated priority level for
should, this signals to the individual that some- the identified situation class determines which
thing is amiss and indicates a need to change shall be invoked. Similarly, plans may be al-
goals or plans because of a shift in situation tered or new plans selected if the feedback pro-
classes, a revision of the model, or selection of a vided indicates that the plan is not achieving
new model. results in accordance with its projections, or
This process can also act to change current when new goals require new plans. Through
goal selection by altering the relative impor- learning, these processes can also serve to create

better models, allowing for better projections in tion, and decision making. A threat assessment
the future. model might include information as to what
To give a detailed example cifthis process in a patterns of threats and threat movements con-
military aircraft environment, a pilot may have stitute offensive versus defensive activities, for
various goals, such as stay alive, kill enemy air- example. Future threat movements might be
craft, and bomb a given target. These general predictable from the model based on current
goals may have more specific subgoals, such as threat movements and known tactics. Appropri-
navigate to the target, avoid detection, avoid ate tactics for countering given threat actions
missiles, and employ missiles. The pilot would might also be resident in the form of scripts,
choose between goals (and subgoals) based on simplifying decision making.
their relative importance and the existing situ-
ation classification. Staying alive is a priority Summary
goal. for example, which usually is active (ex-
To summarize the key features of SA in this
cept in extreme kamikaze circumstances). A pi-
model, a person's SA is restricted by limited at-
lot may alternate between the goals of bombing
tention and working memory capacity. Where
a target and killing an enemy aircraft based on
they have been developed, long-term memory
the predetermined criticality of each goal's suc-
stores, most likely in the form of schemata and
cess to the current mission and the specifics of
mental models, can largely circumvent these
the situation (which would convey the likeli-
limits by providing for the integration and com-
hood of each goal's success).
prehension of information and the projection of
The current goal would indicate the model
future events (the higher levels of SA), even on
and frame to be active. A model for the goal of
the basis of incomplete information and under
missile employment might direct attention to-
uncertainty. The use of these models depends on
ward key environmental features, such as dy-
pattern matching between critical cues in the
namic relative positions of own and threat air-
environment and elements in the model. Sche-
craft (location, altitude, airspeed, heading, flight
mata of prototypical situations may also be as-
path), and current weapon selection, including
sociated with scripts to produce single-step re-
weapon envelope and capabilities, current prob-
trieval of actions from memory. SA is largely
ability of kill, and rate of change of probability
affected by a person's goals and expectations
of kill. If this model was active, the pilot would
which will influence how attention is directed,
be inclined to seek out and process those key
how information is perceived, and how it is in-
elements of the environment. Use of the result-
terpreted. This top-down processing will oper-
ant situation model (SA), in conjunction with
ate in tandem with bottom-up processing in
the missile employment model, would allow the
which salient cues will activate appropriate
pilot to determine how best to employ the air-
goals and models. In addition, automaticity may
craft relative to the enemy aircraft and missile
be useful in overcoming attention limits; how-
launch timing (plans and actions).
ever, it may leave the individual susceptible to
While carrying out this goal. the pilot will also
missing novel stimuli that can negatively af-
be alert to critical features that might indicate
fect SA.
that a new model should be activated. If the pi-
lot detected a new threat, for example, the acti- TASK AND SYSTEM FACTORS
vated goals might change so that the pilot would
cease to operate on the missile employment A number of task and system factors can also
model, and a threat assessment model would be be postulated to influence an individual's ability
activated consistent with that goal. The model to achieve SA. Although a full list of these factors
selected, if detailed enough, would be used to has yet to be determined, a few major issues
direct situation comprehension, future projec- would seem apparent.

System Design the needed information from the environment.

The second major issue involves the display in-
Figure 5 shows the sequence by which a per- terface for providing that information to the
son gains acceSs to information from the envi- operator.
ronment (Endsley, 1990a). Some information
may be acquired directly. In many domains of Interface Design
interest, however, an intervening system senses
The way in which information is presented via
information and presents it to a human opera-
the operator interface will largely influence SA
tor. In this process, transmission error, defined
by determining how much information can be
as a loss of information, can occur at each
acquired, how accurately it can be acquired, and
transition.
to what degree it is compatible with the opera-
First of all, the system may not acquire all of
tor's SA needs. Hence, SA has become a topic of
the needed information (el). Most aircraft sys-
great concern in many human factors design ef-
tems, for example, even those with the latest ra-
forts. In general, one seeks designs that will
dar, do not provide complete tracks on all air-
transmit needed information to the operator
craft. Nor do they provide everything the pilot
without undue cognitive effort. In this light,
would like to know about those aircraft that are
mental workload has been a consideration in de-
detected. Similarly, most systems will acquire
sign efforts for some time. At the same time, the
only certain information, based on the design-
level of SA provided (the outcome of that pro-
er's understanding of what is required and tech-
cess) needs to be considered.
nologicallimitations.
Determining specific design guidelines for im-
Of the information acquired by the system,
proving operator SA through the interface is the
not all of it may be displayed to the operator
challenge fueling many current research efforts.
(e2). This may be because the interface is either
Several general interface features can be hy-
not set up to display certain information or only
pothesized to be important for SA, based on the
subsets can be displayed at anyone time. Fre-
model presented here.
quently, the operator can determine to a certain
degree which subset of data is displayed (and 1. As attention and working memory are limited,
also in some systems in which data are ac- the degree to which displays provide information
quired). Finally, of the information displayed by that is processed and integrated in terms of Level
2 an? 3 SA requ~rements will positively affect SA.
the system and that directly acquirable from the For Instance, directly portraying the amount of
environment, there may be incomplete or inac- !ime an? distance available on the fuel remaining
curate transmission to the human operator (e3 In an aircraft would be preferable to requiring
the pIlot to calculate this information based on
and e4) because of perceptual, attention, and lower-level data (e.g., fuel, speed, altitude, etc.).
working memory constraints, as discussed 2. The degree to which information is presented in
terms of the operator's major goals will positively
earlier.
affect SA. Many systems provide information that
The first external issue influencing SA, there- is technology oriented-based on physical system
fore, is the degree to which the system acquires parameters and measurements (e.g., oil pressure
I r
~ e4
e1 e2 e3
Real System Interface SA
World Knowledge Knowledge
FIgure 5. Situation awareness inputs (adapted from Endsley, 1990a).

or temperature). To improve SA, this information that support parallel processing of information
needs to be SA oriented. That is, it should be or- should directly benefit SA. For example, the ad-
ganized so that the information needed for a par- dition of voice synthesis or three-dimensional au-
ticular goal is colocated and directly answers the dio cues to the visually overloaded cockpit is pre-
major decisions associated with the goal. For ex- dicted to be beneficial on this basis.
ample, for the goal of weapons employment, fac-
tors such as opening/closing velocity, weapon se- These recommendations may not appear that
lected and firing envelope, probability of kill, radically different from those that have been es-
target selected, and time to employment would be
poused, at least singularly, elsewhere. This is be-
relevant elements that should be presented in an
integrated form for this goal. cause the SA theory described here rests on var-
3. Considering that mental models and schemata ious information-processing constructs that
are hypothesized to be key tools for achieving the
have been discussed for some years. The value
higher levels of SA in complex systems, the criti-
cal cues used for activating these mechanisms added by the SA concept is as a means of inte-
need to be determined and made salient in the grating these constructs in terms of the opera-
interface design. In particular those cues that will
tor's overall goals and decision behavior. As
indicate the presence of prototypical situations
will be of prime importance. Kaplan and Simon such, this provides several advantages in the de-
(1990) found decision making is facilitated if the sign process.
critical attributes are perceptually salient.
4. Designs need to take into consideration both top- 1. The integrated focus of SA provides a means of
down and bottom-up processing. In this light, en- designing for dynamic, goal-oriented behavior,
vironmental cues with highly salient features will with its constant shifting of goals. Traditional de-
tend to capture attention away from current goal- sign approaches (Meister, 1971) have focused on
directed processing. Salient design features, such task analysis, which works fairly well for fixed,
as those indicated by Treisman and Paterson sequential tasks but does not provide the mecha-
(1984), should be reserved for critical cues that nisms or flexibility necessary for dealing with dy-
indicate the need for activating other goals and namic tasks and fluctuating goals. By focusing at
should be avoided for noncritical events. the level of operator goals, the degree to which
S. A major problem for SA occurs when attention is multiple goals may be operating simultaneously
directed to a subset of information and other im- can be considered and the precursors to goal ac-
portant elements are not attended to, either inten- tivation represented. Thus a more compatible
tionally or unintentionally (Endsley and Bolstad, representation of operator behavior can be gener-
1993). It is hypothesized that designs that restrict ated for creating "user-centered" designs.
access to SA elements (via information filtering, 2. It provides a means of moving from a focus on
for instance) will contribute to this problem. A providing operators with data to providing oper-
preferred design will provide global SA-an over- ators with information. When focusing on data,
view of the situation across operator goals-at all all of the integration, comprehension, and projec-
times, while providing the operator with detailed tion is still up to the operator. When focusing on
information related to his or her immediate goals, information, the design focus is on presenting
as required. Global SA is hypothesized to be im- what the operator really needs to know in the for-
portant for determining current goals and for en- mat it is needed in, thus allowing the operator to
abling projection of future events. achieve more SA at a given level of workload. By
6. Although filtering out information on relevant SA presenting the Level I, 2, and 3 SA requirements
elements is hypothesized to be detrimental, the associated with each goal or subgoal, this can be
problem of information overload in many systems accomplished.
must still be considered. The filtering of extrane- 3. It provides a means of incorporating into the de-
ous information (not related to SA needs) and re- sign a consideration of the interplay of elements,
duction of data (by processing and integrating wherein more attention to some elements may
low-level data to arrive at SA requirements) come at the expense of others. Many design guide-
should be beneficial to SA. lines are at the level of the specific component
7. One of the most difficult and taxing parts of SA is (e.g., a dial or audio signal's characteristics). Yet
the projection of future states of the system. This the real challenge in designing systems arises
is hypothesized to require a fairly well developed when the components must be integrated. The SA
mental model. System-generated support for pro- provided to the operator as a result of the combi-
jecting future events and states of the system nation of system components becomes the goal of
should directly benefit Level 3 SA, particularly for the integration process.
less-experienced opera tors. 4. Perhaps most important, this integrated level of
8. The ability to share attention between multiple focus provides a means for assessing the efficacy
tasks and sources of information will be very im- of a particular design concept that an examina-
portant in any complex system. System designs tion of underlying constructs (attention, working

memory, etc.) does not provide. As an integrated Eysenck, 1982; Hockey, 1970). Under perceived
system, the degree to which a particular design danger, a decrease in attention has been ob-
provides SA (as a resultant state) can be deter-
mined after all these other factors, with their as- served for peripheral information (i.e., those as-
sociated trade-offs and interactions, have come pects that attract less attentional focus; Bacon,
into play. 1974; Weltman, Smith, and Egstrom, 1971).
The number of possible display formats, tech- Broadbent (197l) found that there was an in-
nologies, and design concepts that have been or creased tendency to sample dominant or proba-
may be contemplated for improving SA are too ble sources of information under stress. Sheri-
numerous to mention. A few major design is- dan (1981) has termed this effect cognitive tunnel
sues, however, pose a serious enough challenge vision.
to SA across numerous systems to warrant spe- This is a critical problem for SA, leading to the
cial consideration: stress, workload, complexity, neglect of certain elements in favor of others. In
and automation. many cases, such as in emergency conditions, it
is those factors outside the operator's perceived
Stress
central task that prove to be lethal. A United
Several types of stress factors exist that may Airlines DC-8 crashed in Portland, Oregon, in
act to influence SA, including (a) physical stress- 1978 when it ran out of fuel. It was reported that
ors-noise, vibration, heat/cold, lighting, atmo- the captain, preoccupied with a landing gear
spheric conditions, drugs, boredom or fatigue, problem, neglected to keep track of fuel usage
and cyclical changes; and (b) social psychologi- (National Transportation Safety Board, 1979).
cal stressors-fear or anxiety, uncertainty, im- Many similar incidents of attentional narrowing
portance or consequences of events, aspects of can be found.
task affecting monetary gain, self-esteem, pres- Premature closure, arriving at a decision
tige, job advancement or loss, mental load, and without exploring all information available, has
time pressure (Hockey, 1986; Sharit and Salv- also been found to be more likely under stress
endy,1982). (Janis, 1982; Keinan, 1987; Keinan and Fried-
Mandler (1982) stated that these stressors "are land, 1987). This includes considering less infor-
effective to the extent that they are perceived as mation (Janis, 1982; Wright, 1974) and attend-
dangerous or threatening" (p. 91). That is, they ing more to negative information (Wright, 1974).
are stressors only if the person perceives them as Several authors have found that scanning of
being stressing. A large interpretive component stimuli under stress is scattered and poorly or-
exists in the process. A certain amount of stress ganized (Keinan, 1987; Keinan and Friedland,
may actually improve performance by increas- 1987; Wachtel. 1967).
ing attention to important aspects of the situa- Complex tasks with multiple input sources ap-
tion. A higher amount of stress can have ex- pear to be particularly sensitive to the effects of
tremely negative consequences, however, as stressors (Broadbent, 1954; Jerison, 1957, 1959).
accompanying increases in autonomic function- Woodhead (1964) found that performance decre-
ing and aspects of the stressors can act to de- ments that occurred during intermittent noise
mand a portion of a person's limited attentional stress took place during the information input
capacity (Hockey, 1986). stage. It would seem, then, that stress signifi-
Stressors can affect SA in a number of differ- cantly affects the early stage of the decision-
ent ways. The first, and probably most wide- making process that is involved in the assess-
spread, finding is that under various forms of ment of the situation. It is expected that stress
stress, people tend to narrow their field of atten- will significantly influence SA on this basis, be-
tion to include only a limited number of central ginning with the initial perception of environ-
aspects (Bacon, 1974; Baddeley, 1972; Bartlett, mental elements (Levell).
1943; Callaway and Dembo, 1958; Davis, 1948; A second way in which stress may affect SA is

through decrements in working memory capac- working hard but is successful in achieving an
ity and retrieval (Hockey, 1986). Wickens, accurate and complete picture of the situation.
Stokes, Barnett, and Hyman (1988) found that Thus SA and workload are hypothesized to di-
optimality of performance was negatively af- verge because of characteristics of the system
fected by stress only on decision tasks with a design, tasks, and the individual operator. If the
high spatial component, however, and not on operator is exerting effort at attaining SA and if
those with purely a high working memory or the demands associated with this task and oth-
long-term memory component. ers exceed the operator's limited capacity, only
The degree to which working memory decre- then will a decrement in SA be expected.
ments will affect SA depends on the resources
Complexity
available to the individual operator. In tasks in
which achieving SA involves a high working A major factor creating a challenge for opera-
memory load, a significant impact on SA Levels tor SA is the increasing complexity of many sys-
2 and 3 would also be expected. In the Vincennes tems. System complexity is hypothesized to neg-
incident, the systems operators had to rely on atively affect both operator workload and SA
working memory to calculate whether an in- through factors such as an increase in the num-
coming aircraft was ascending or descending. ber of system components, the degree of inter-
Their error in believing the incoming aircraft action between these components, and the dy-
was descending could have been associated with namics or rate of change of the components. In
reduced working memory capacity in a stressful addition, the complexity of the operator's tasks
combat environment. If long-term memory may increase through the number of goals,
stores are available to support SA, less effect tasks, and decisions to be made in regard to the
will be expected. system.
Each of these factors will increase the amount
Workload of mental workload required to achieve a given
level of SA. When that demand exceeds human
In many dynamic systems, high mental work- capabilities, SA will suffer. This complexity may
load is a stressor of particular importance, so be somewhat moderated by the degree to which
much so that at least one major approach to SA the operator has a well-developed internal rep-
measurement combines workload features (sup- resentation of the system to aid in directing at-
ply and demand of operator resources) with intention, integrating data, and developing the
formation features (Taylor, 1989). Endsley higher levels of SA, as these mechanisms may be
(1993a), however, demonstrated independence effective for coping with complexity.
between these two constructs across a wide
range of values. That is, the following may exist: Automation
A lack of SA has been hypothesized to underlie

(1) Low SA with low workload: The operator may
have little idea of what is going on and is not the out-of-the-Ioop performance decre.ment that
actively working to find out because of inatten- can accompany automation (Carmody and
tiveness, vigilance problems, or low motivation. Gluckman, 1993; Endsley, 1987a; Wickens,
(2) Low SA with high workload: If the volume of
information and number of tasks are too great, 1992b). System operators working with automa-
SA may suffer because the operator can attend tion have been found to have a diminished abil-
to only a subset of information or may be ac- ity to detect system errors and subsequently per-
tively working to achieve SA, yet has erroneous
or incomplete perception and integration of form tasks manually in the face of automation
information. failures as compared with manual performance
(3)High SAwith low workload: The required infor- on the same tasks (Billings, 1991; Moray, 1986;
mation can be presented in a manner that is easy
to process (an ideal state). Wickens, 1992a; Wiener and Curry, 1980). Al-
(4) High SA with high workload: The operator is though some of this problem may result from a

loss of manual skills under automation, SA is erator has poor SA, thus increasing the proba-
also a critical component. bility of undesirable performance. Errors in SA
Operators who have lost SA may be slower to can be discussed in terms of the presented
detect problems and also will require extra time model. It is not the intention here to discuss all
to reorient themselves to relevant system pa- types of human error, for which several taxono-
rameters in order to proceed with problem di- mies exist (Norman, 1983; Rasmussen, 1986;
agnosis and assumption of manual performance Reason, 1987) but, rather, to investigate the fac-
when automation fails. This has been hypothe- tors that can lead to breakdowns in the SA por-
sized to occur for a number of reasons: (a) a loss tion of the decision-making process. These
of vigilance and increase in complacency asso- breakdowns can occur from either incomplete
ciated with the assumption of a monitoring role SA-knowledge of only some of the elements-
under automation, (b) the difference between or inaccurate SA-erroneous knowledge con-
being an active processor of information in man- cerning the value of some elements. The discus-
ual processing and a passive recipient of infor- sion will be separated into those factors
mation under automation, and (c) a loss of or affecting SA at each of its three levels.
change in the type of feedback provided to op- Level J SA. At the very lowest level, a person
erators concerning the state of the system under may simply fail to perceive certain information
automation (Endsley and Kiris, in press). In that is important for SA in the assigned task (in-
their study, Endsley and Kiris found evidence complete SA). In the simplest case, this may re-
for an SA decrement accompanying automation sult from a lack of detectability or discrimina-
of a cognitive task that was greater under full bility of the physical characteristics of the signal
automation than it was under various levels of in question, from some physical obstruction pre-
partial automation. Lower SA in the automated venting perception (visual barrier, auditory
conditions corresponded to a demonstrated out- masking, etc.), or from a failure of the system
of-the-Ioop performance decrement, supporting design to make the information available to the
the hypothesized relationship between SA and operator. Accurate, reliable weather informa-
automation. tion for aircrew is frequently lacking, for in-
SA may not suffer under all forms of automa- stance. The crew of a Northwest Airlines DC-9
tion, however. Wiener (1993) and Billings (1991) attempted to take off from Detroit unaware that
have stated that SA may be improved by sys- the aircraft flaps were retracted, leading to the
tems that provide integrated information death of 154 people (National Transportation
through automation. In commercial cockpits, Safety Board, 1988). A partial reason cited for
Hansman et al. (1992) found that automated this lack of knowledge was the failure of a take-
flight management system input was superior to off warning system to alert the crew to the prob-
manual data entry, producing better error de- lem with the flaps. (In addition, the crew failed
tection on clearance updates. Automation that to fully execute a checklist, thus they did not
reduces unnecessary manual work and data in- directly check the flaps themselves.)
tegration required to achieve SA may provide In extreme cases, the only cue a person will
benefits to both workload and SA. The exact have regarding the presence of certain informa-
conditions under which SA will be positively or tion will coincide with the occurrence of an er-
negatively affected by automation need to be ror. Rasmussen (1986) gave the example of a
determined. person not realizing that it is icy until he or she
slips. In this case, the condition could be dis-
ERRORS IN SA cerned only in conjunction with the error and
not sufficiently in advance to allow for behavior
From an operational point of view, there is modification to prevent the error. In other cases,
major concern about situations in which the op- because of luck, no error may result from the

lack of SA; however, the potential for error brought on by stress or heavy workload can lead
would rise significantly. to a lack of SA on all but the factor at hand. In
In many cases in which SA is incomplete, the 1972 an L-1011 commercial airliner went down
relevant signals or cues are readily discernible in the Florida Everglades because all of the crew
but not properly perceived by the subject. The members were so focused on a problem with the
failure of the Northwest Airlines crew to manu- nose gear indicator that they failed to notice
ally check flap status would fall into this cate- that the aircraft was descending. Ninety-nine
gory. There can be several underlying causes for lives were lost (National Transportation Safety
not perceiving available information. Many Board, 1973). A major problem with attentional
complex environments present an overabun- narrowing is that often a person will be sure he
dance of information. Data sampling should or she is attending to the most important infor-
maintain a fair degree of accuracy on each of the mation, but there is no way to know whether or
relevant variables (Wickens, 1992a), in which not that assumption is valid without having
case errors in SA would be small (determined by some idea of the value of the other elements. In
the amount of change in each variable between other cases, the normal sampling strategy has
successive samples) and distributed across the merely been interrupted and not reactivated in a
various variables of concern. Failures in infor- timely manner. In either case, attentional nar-
mation sampling are commonplace, however, rowing can lead to serious errors in SA.
and may result from the lack of an adequate Inaccurate SA-the belief that the value of
strategy or internal model for directing sam- some variable is different from what it actually
pling. Wickens (1992a) has also noted that hu- is-can also occur. In relation to Levell SA, this
mans have several general failings in sampling, would occur through the misperception of a sig-
including misperception of the statistical prop- nal-for instance, seeing a blue light as green
erties of elements in the environment and limi- because of ambient lighting or seeing a 3 as an 8
tations of human memory (forgetting what has on a dial. Exemplifying this problem is the in-
already been sampled). The phenomenon of vi- stance in which a Boeing 737 hit power lines
sual dominance can act as a further limit; audi- near Kansas City. Missouri, because the pilot
tory information is less likely to be processed in misidentified lights north of the runway as the
some situations (Posner, Nissen, and Klein, runway approach lights (National Transporta-
1976). tion Safety Board, 1990). Erroneous expecta-
Furthermore, some people appear to be better tions can be a major contributor to these
than others at dividing their attention across misperceptions.
different tasks (Damos and Wickens, 1980). Mar- Level 2 SA. SA errors are most often the result
tin and Jones (1984) have found cognitive errors of an inability to properly integrate or compre-
to be significantly correlated with capabilities hend the meaning of perceived data in light of
in distributing attention across tasks. So, al- operator goals. Orasanu, Dismukes, and Fischer
though environmental sampling can be an ef- (1993) described five National Transportation
fective means of coping with excessive SA Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft accident reports.
demands, human limitations in sampling, atten- In all five cases, sufficient environmental cues
tion, and attention sharing can lead to signifi- were present, but the aircrew did not determine
cant Level 1 SA errors. their relevance to important goals.
This problem is compounded by the addition This misreading of cues can occur for several
of stress, which can affect the information input reasons. A novice will not have the mental mod-
stage through premature closure, changes in els necessary for properly comprehending and
factors attended to, and deterioration of the integrating all of the incoming data or for deter-
scanning process. The narrowing of attention mining which cues are actually relevant to

established goals. Fischer, Orasanu, and Mon- Even when a person has selected the correct
talvo (1993) found that less-effective crews model with which to interpret and integrate en-
lacked sensitivity to contextual factors, indicat- vironmental stimuli, errors can occur. Certain
ing a failure to recognize prototypical situa- pieces of data may be mismatched with the
tions. In the absence of a good internal model, model or not matched at all, resulting in a fail-
one must accept low SA and thus be compro- ure to recognize a prototypical situation (Klein,
mised in decision making, develop a new model, 1989b; Manktelow and Jones, 1987). The NTSB
or adapt an existing model to the task at hand. (1981) noted that several aircraft conflicts were
SA errors will exist in the form of inaccurate or related to the fact that air traffic controllers re-
incomplete Level 2 SA when the adapted or ceived the same aural signal for both conflict
newly developed model fails to match the new alerts and low-altitude warnings. In this case,
environment. inadequate perceptual salience of the signals
In other cases, a person may incorrectly select probably prevented an immediate correct
the wrong model from memory, based on a sub- match of cue to model.
set of situational cues, and use this model to in- In addition, SA errors could occur from over-
terpret all perceived data. Mosier and Chidester relying on the default values embedded in a
(1991) found evidence that aircrews made "rec- model (Manktelow and Jones, 1987). In general,
ognitional, almost reflexive judgments, based when new situations are encountered in which
upon a few, critical items of information; and the known default values are not appropriate,
then spent additional time and effort verifying the model is modified to include the new class of
its correctness through continued situational in- situations. Before this occurs, or if cues received
vestigation." This strategy can be effective. have not flagged the specific situation type, sig-
Mosier and Chidester found that the best- nificant SA errors can occur by incorrectly as-
performing crews obtained a substantial portion suming defaults for some variables. The newly
of their information after making a decision. developed French Airbus 320 crashed during a
However, if the wrong mental model is ini- low flyover demonstration in 1988. The inquiry
tially selected, based on a subset of cues, a rep- noted that the pilot may not have been ade-
resentational error may occur. These errors can quately aware of effects on handling perfor-
be particularly troublesome, as pointed out by mance when flying near the angle-of-attack lim-
Carmino. Idee. Larchier Boulanger. and Morlat its of the aircraft and may have been relying on
(I 988). They noted that realizing that the wrong the much-advertised envelope protection de-
model is active can be very difficult because new signed into the new aircraft (Ministry of Plan-
data are interpreted in light of the model. Diffi- ning, Housing, Transport and Maritime Affairs,
culties in recognizing the error may also be com- 1989). In terms of this paper, a refined model for
pounded by confirmation bias (Fracker, 1988). the specific aircraft capabilities had not yet been
Thus data that should indicate one thing are developed, and the pilot had to rely on a general
taken to mean something quite different based understanding of envelope protection.
on the incorrect model. When no model exists at all, Level 2 SA must
Klein (I 993) reported on errors in medical de- be developed in working memory. An inability
cision making in which successive symptoms to perform this integration in an accurate,
continued to be interpreted into an existing di- timely manner-resulting from insufficient
agnosis even though they clearly pointed to a knowledge or working memory limitations, par-
different diagnosis. Fracker also pointed out ticularly under stres~an also lead to inaccu-
that an incorrect model may be selected initially rate or incomplete SA.
because of representativeness and availability Level 3 SA. Finally, Level 3 SA may be lack-
biases. ing or incorrect. Even if a situation is clearly

understood, it may be difficult to accurately new, nonhabitual goal is suppressed, and seeing
project future dynamics without a highly devel- the store sign does not conjure the associated
oped mental model. Klein (1989b) has noted goal of stopping. While the habitual schema is
that some people simply are not good at mental operating, the person either is not receptive to
simulation. Lack of a good model and attention the nonhabitual cues or does not generate the
and memory limitations would account for this. appropriate higher-level SA from the perception
Simmel and Shelton (1987) described the prob- of the cues because the appropriate schema is
lems pilots have in determining potential conse- suppressed.
quences of assessed situations. Amalberti and Detection of SA errors. A real issue concerns
Deblon (1992) and MacMillian, Entin, and how people know when their SA is in error. Very
Serfaty (1993) noted, however, that experts fre- often they may be completely unaware of how
quently determine possible future occurrences much they do not know or of the inaccuracy of
in order to plan ahead. their internal representation of the situation.
General factors. A few general underlying fac- The main clue to erroneous SA will occur when
tors may also lead to SA errors at all three levels. a person perceives some new piece of data that
Martin and Jones (1984) pointed out that people does not fit with expectations based on his or her
who have trouble with distributed attention internal model. When a person's expectations do
may be having trouble in maintaining multiple not match with what is perceived, this conflict
goals. This could lead to considerable SA prob- can be resolved by adopting a new model, revis-
lems in complex systems, in which the ability to ing the existing model, or changing one's goals
juggle goals on the basis of incoming informa- and plans to accommodate the new situation
tion is a necessity. An inability to keep multiple classification (Manktelow and Jones, 1987). The
goals in mind could seriously degrade an oper- inappropriate choice could easily sabotage SA
ator's receptivity to highly pertinent data re- efforts for some time.
lated to the neglected goal, leading to significant If the new data can be incorporated into the
errors. model, this may merely indicate that a new pro-
A second major type of error affecting SA re- totypical situation (state of the model) is present
lates to the role of habitual schemata (or auto- that calls up different goals and plans accord-
maticity). In the normal course of events, habit- ingly. If the new data cannot easily fit into the
ual schemata will be automatically activated existing model, the model may be revised. A
based on the presence of environmental cues. common problem is whether to continue to re-
While the schema is active, environmental cues vise the existing model to account for the new
will be processed in a predetermined manner. data or choose an alternate model that is more
When a change needs to be made, however, appropriate. For the latter to occur, something
problems can occur. A person leaving work and about the data must flag that a different situa-
getting into the car may automatically embark tion is present. Without this flag, the person may
on the "drive home" schema. If on a particular persist in a representational error whereby the
day the person wishes to stop at the store, he or data continue to be misinterpreted in light of the
she must change or interrupt the schema. Often, wrong model. Of course, if the inadequacy of the
however, the person arrives home to realize the existing model is recognized but no appropriate
desired detour was completely forgotten. new model exists, significant errors may still oc-
Although this has been termed a slip of action cur while a new model is being developed.
(Reason, 1984), it can also be shown to be re-
CONCLUSIONS
lated to SA. Under normal circumstances, envi-
ronmental cues (the store sign) will be processed This paper presents a model of SA, including
in light of current goals (stop at the store). While various mechanisms and factors hypothesized to
habitual schemata are operating, however, the be important for its generation. Based on this

model, a taxonomy of SA errors was generated. 1. The degree to which relevant features of the envi-
The model also presents a means of conducting ronment are available to the operator either di-
rectly or through the system's displays fundamen-
future research on SA. tally affects a person's ability to achieve SA.
2. The way in which information is presented via the
Theoretical Hypotheses operator interface will affect a person's ability to
achieve SA.Specific features hypothesized to pos-
Several characteristics of individuals and sys- itively impact SA include: integrated and goal-
tems have been presented that are believed to oriented information presentation, salience of
affect a person's ability to acquire and maintain critical cues, support for parallel processing of in-
formation, elimination of unneeded information
SA. In terms of information-processing mecha- and reduction in salience of noncritical informa-
nisms available to individuals, the following key tion, presentation of global information across
features affecting SA are hypothesized: goals and detailed information on current goals,
and system support for projection of future events
1. The way in which attention is directed across and states.
available information is critical to achieving SA 3. Although small amounts of stress may improve
(particularly in dynamic and complex systems in SA through an increase in arousal and attention,
which attention is overloaded). excessstress will negatively affect SAthrough dis-
2. In the absence of long-term memory structures, ruptions in acquiring information and, in some
SAwill be constrained by the limitations of atten- cases, through reductions in working memory
tion and working memory. capacity.
3. Schemata and mental models are presented as 4. SA and workload are hypothesized to be essen-
mechanisms for (a) directing attention in the per- tially independent across a wide range of these
ception process, (b) providing a means of integrat- constructs. Only under high levels of perceived
ing and comprehending perceived information, workload will decrements in SA be expected.
and (c) projecting the future states of the environ- 5. Increases in perceived system complexity are ex-
ment. These mechanisms allow decision makers pected to negatively affect both workload and SA
to develop SAwhen they have only limited infor- unless moderated by the presence of a mental
mation from the environment. model for dealing with that complexity.
4. A person's expectations or preconceptions about 6. Automation of human decision making and active
future events and environmental features, as gen- system control is hypothesized to negatively af-
erated from mental models, instructions, and com· fect operator SA, leading to out-of-the-Ioop per-
munications, will influence the perception pro- formance problems. Automation of peripheral
cess and the interpretation of what is perceived. tasks (e.g., data integration) is expected to posi-
5. SA is viewed as being generated from a combina- tively affect SA by reducing the load on limited
tion of goal.directed (top-down)and data-directed working memory.
(bottom-up) processing. As such, it will be af-
fected by both the operator's current goals and Directions for Future Research
the presence of salient environmental cues.
6. The operator's current goals will act to direct the The model presented provides an integrated
selection of a mental model and the focus (or framework for conceptualizing the SA construct,
frame) taken on the model. thus providing a common ground for mov·
7. Knowledge of critical cues in the environment is
highly important for (a) directing the selection of ing forward. As such, it provides several
active goals from among possible operator goals capabilities.
(and thus mental model selection) and (b) pattern SA requirements. The model can be used to
matching with schemata of prototypical situa-
tions according to the current model. generate a means of determining SA require-
8. Automaticity is presented as an additional mech· ments (elements) for individual domains of in-
anism for overcoming attention and working terest. The criticality of operator goals in the SA
memory limitations. When operating with auto-
maticity, it is expected that operators will have process dictates that SA requirements (at all lev-
reduced awareness of environmental factors els) are dependent on the operator's goals in re-
(lower SA), particularly for those elements out- lation to the system. Thus a goal-directed task
side the automated sequence, and thus will
be more likely to make errors under novel analysis methodology is indicated in which the
circumstances. requirements for system data, the comprehen-
In addition, several characteristics of systems sion and integration of that data, and the pro·
and tasks are hypothesized to influence an indi- jection of future states are determined for each
vidual's ability to achieve SA. of the operator's major goals and subgoals.

A methodology for conducting this type of namics. SA-oriented training would focus on
analysis has been developed and applied to air- training operators to identify prototypical situ-
to-air fighter aircraft (Endsley, 1993c), advanced ations of concern associated with these models
bombers (Endsley, 1989a), and air traffic control by recognizing critical cues and what they mean
(Endsley and Rodgers, 1994). In many domains, in terms of relevant goals.
designers are working with only simple informa- As SA is not a passive process, the skills re-
tion requirements, without determining how the quired for achieving and maintaining good SA
information needs to be integrated to support need to be identified and formally taught in
operator goals. This methodology can be applied training programs. Factors such as how to em-
to these domains to determine the SA require- ploy a system to best achieve SA (when and
ments for systems. where to look for what), appropriate scan pat-
Individual abilities. Endsley and Bolstad terns, or techniques for making the most of lim-
(1994) found evidence of fairly stable differences ited information need to be determined and ex-
between individuals in their ability to achieve plicitly taught in the training process. This type
SA given the same system. Based on the present of focus greatly supplements traditional tech-
model, variations in SA abilities were hypothe- nology-oriented training that concentrates
sized to arise from individual differences in (a) mainly on the mechanics of how a system
spatial abilities; (b) attention sharing; (c) mem- operates.
ory, including working memory capacity and In addition, the role of feedback in the learn-
long-term memory stores; (d) perceptual skills, ing process may be exploited. It may be possible
including perceptual speed, encoding speed, vig- to provide feedback on the accuracy and com-
ilance, and pattern-matching skills; and (e) pleteness of operator SA as a part of training
higher-order cognitive skills, including analytic programs. This would allow operators to under-
skills, cognitive complexity, field independence, stand their mistakes and better assess and inter-
and locus of control. Testing these hypotheses on pret the environment, leading to the develop-
a group of experienced fighter pilots, Endsley ment of more effective sampling strategies and
and Bolstad found strong evidence for the im- better schemata for integrating information.
portance of spatial skills and perceptual skills Training techniques such as these need to be ex-
and partial support for the importance of atten- plored and tested to determine methods for im-
tion-sharing and pattern-matching skills. proving SA with existing systems.
More studies are needed to expand these find- Design. Several general hypotheses and rec-
ings to a larger, broader population. In addition, ommendations concerning how to design sys-
the degree to which such capabilities generalize tems to enhance SA were generated by the
across different domains, indicating a general model. More research is needed to apply, test,
SA skill or ability, needs to be determined. The and expand on these recommendations in rela-
identification of basic human abilities that are tion to the design of specific systems in various
important for SA may be useful for improving domains. Several factors need to be determined,
operator SA through either selection or training. including ways to determine and effectively de-
Training. Programs directed at improving op- liver critical cues; ways to ensure accurate ex-
erator training by making it "SA oriented" can pectations; methods for assisting operators in
also be generated from the model. (See Endsley, deploying attention effectively; methods for pre-
1989b, for a detailed discussion.) They can be venting the disruption of attention, particularly
developed to instruct operators to identify the under stress and heavy workload; and ways to
important characteristics of mental models in develop systems that are compatible with oper-
specific domains, such as the components, dy- ator goals.
namics and functioning of the components and Research is being conducted to investigate a
projection of future actions based on these dy- host of new technologies and designs being

60--March 1995 HUMAN FACTORS
considered for future systems, including three- more precise specification of mental models
dimensional visual and auditory displays, voice have been expounded by Wilson and Rutherford
control, expert systems, helmet-mounted dis- (1989). If mental models are truly" mechanisms
plays, and virtual reality. This model should be whereby humans are able to generate descrip-
useful for generating hypotheses concerning the tions of system purpose and form, explanations
effect of new technologies on SA in the context of of system functioning and observed system
a particular domain and system interface. states, and predictions of future systems states,"
Through controlled testing and an objective de- as described by Rouse and Morris (1985, p. 7),
termination of the impact of these concepts on then three of the four criteria (system function-
SA, specific design guidelines for their imple- ing, states, and predictions) can be determined
mentation, alone and in conjunction with one by examining situation models (SA) across var-
another, can be established. ious contexts or states of the model. This type of
SA construct. Future research on the SA con- effort may help create a better understanding of
struct is greatly needed. Several major hypoth- the nature of mental models in specific domains.
eses have been formulated concerning underly- SA measurement. The ability to objectively
ing information-processing mechanisms. The measure SA is seen as critical for future progress
role of each of the major components needs to be in this field. It provides a means of evaluating
formally tested and explored. In addition, em· the efficacy of design concepts and technologies,
pirical data are needed on SA as a whole in order providing diagnostic data for design iteration,
to better understand and validate the hypothe- and a means of evaluating and developing train-
sized interactions and integration of individual ing concepts. It also provides a means of re-
factors. SA has been presented as a three-level searching the SA construct, investigating the
concept. The relative importance of these levels impact of various factors in SA, and explicitly
needs to be established. How critical of a role testing the hypotheses concerning SA. Without
does projection play, for instance? How is this capability, no real progress in the area of SA
higher-level SA generated from lower-level design or theory can be made. Methodologies for
data? Mental models and goals are hypothesized measuring SA are discussed in the subsequent
here as critical mechanisms, but they need fur- paper (Endsley, 1995, this issue), based on the
ther exploration. model presented here.
Research is also needed to better understand
Summary
the processes operators use to achieve SA. The
way in which information is acquired by indi- A model of SA has been presented in relation
viduals and teams needs to be determined to to decision making in complex systems. Build-
identify successful techniques for coping with ing on research in naturalistiC decision making,
complex, dynamic systems. Useful critical cues a person's SA is viewed as a critical focal point
that may be vital to achieving good SA (or cues of the decision process. In this role, SA is pre-
that lead to poor SA via the representational er- sented as a general construct, applicable across
ror) need to be determined. The degree and a wide variety of environments and systems.
nature of individual differences in such pro- SA is viewed as consisting of a person's state
cesses are not widely known at this point, except of knowledge about a dynamic environment. It
anecdotally. incorporates the perception of relevant ele-
In addition, the concept of SA may be useful in ments, comprehension of the meaning of these
researching other constructs. For instance, situ- elements in combination with and in relation to
ation models (or SA), which are a virtual reflec- operator goals, and a projection of future states
tion of system models, may shed some light on of the environment based on this understanding.
the concept of a mental model. Problems with Using this knowledge, individuals with good
the nebulous use of the term and the need for SA will have a greater likelihood of making

appropriate decisions and performing well in diabolical. In L. P. Goodstein, H. B. Anderson, and S. E.

Olsen (Eds.), Tasks, errors and mental models (pp. 240-250).
dynamic systems. By learning more about SA London: Taylor & Francis.
requirements and the SA construct as a whole, Carmody, M. A., and Gluckman, J. P. (1993). Task-specific ef-
fects of automation and automation failure on perfor-
more effective interface designs and training mance, workload and situational awareness. In R. S.
programs can be established to support decision Jensen and D. Neumeister (Eds.), Proceedings of the Sev-
enth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology (pp.
making in complex environments. 167-171). Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, Depart-
ment of Aviation.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Casson, R. W. (1983). Schema in cognitive anthropology. An-
nual Review of Anthropology, 12, 429-462.
I would like to thank Chris Wickens, Mark Rodgers, Bob Cohen, M. S. (1993). Metacognitive strategies in support of rec-
Blanchard, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful ognition. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergo-
comments on an earlier version of this paper. In addition, I'd nomics Society 37th Annual Meeting (pp. 1102-1106). Santa
like to recognize the contributions of numerous individuals Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.
who have provided stimulating dialogue on SA over many Damos, D., and Wickens, C. D. (1980). The acquisition and
years, including Mark Chignell, Roy Cohen, Lee Fracker, Mike transfer of time-sharing skills. Acta Psychologica, 6, 569-
Majors, and Bob Taylor, to name a few. 577.
Davis, D. R. (1948). Pilot error. London: HMSO, Great Britain
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Human Factors: The Journal of the

Human Factors and Ergonomics

Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems

The online version of this article can be found at:

Human Factors and Ergonomics Society

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Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in

INTRODUCTION vironments and the utility of using a model of

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P8fceptlon Projection PetfDm'tClnce

Figure 1. Model of situation awareness in dynamic decision making.

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Figure 3. Mechanisms of situation awareness (reprinted from Endsley, 1988a).

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explanation includes a toQ-morphism" in which is a degree of uncertainty associated with the

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Figure 4. Relationship of goals and mental models to situation awareness.

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System Design the needed information from the environment.

FIgure 5. Situation awareness inputs (adapted from Endsley, 1990a).

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A lack of SA has been hypothesized to underlie

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appropriate decisions and performing well in diabolical. In L. P. Goodstein, H. B. Anderson, and S. E.

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