G.R. No.
L-104776 December 5, 1994 FRANCISCO, JESUS GABAWAN, ROLANDO GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA,
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.
EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and
by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL
BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BIENVENIDO M.
CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, ROMEO
PATAG, RIZALINO REYES, IGNACIO DE VERA, SOLOMON B. REYES,
JOSE M. ABAN, EMIGDIO N. ABARQUEZ, ANTONIO ACUPAN, ROMEO
ACUPAN, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D. ALIGADO, MARTIN
AMISTAD, JR., ROLANDO B. AMUL, AMORSOLO ANADING, ANTONIO T.
ANGLO, VICENTE ARLITA, HERBERT AYO, SILVERIO BALATAZO,
ALFREDO BALOBO, FALCONERO BANAAG, RAMON BARBOSA, FELIX
BARCENA, FERNANDO BAS, MARIO BATACLAN, ROBERTO S. BATICA,
ENRICO BELEN, ARISTEO BICOL, LARRY C. BICOL, PETRONILLO
BISCOCHO, FELIX M. BOBIER, DIONISIO BOBONGO, BAYANI S.
BRACAMANTE, PABLITO BUSTILLO, GUILLERMO CABEZAS,
BIENVENIDO CADALIN, RODOLFO CAGATAN, AMANTE CAILAO,
IRENEO CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO, MANUEL CASTILLO, REMAR
CASTROJERES, REYNALDO CAYAS, ROMEO CECILIO, TEODULO
CREUS, BAYANI DAYRIT, RICARDO DAYRIT, ERNESTO T. DELA CRUZ,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO DE VERA,
MODESTO DIZON, REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S. DOMINGUEZ,
GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDO EBRADA, ANTONIO EJERCITO, JR.,
EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO ESCOTOTO, JOHN ESGUERRA, EDUARDO
ESPIRITU, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFO ESPIRITU, NESTOR M.
ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA, VALERIO EVANGELISTA, OLIGARIO
PACITO HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO HILARIO, HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTO
JARDINIANO, ANTONIO JOCSON, GERARDO LACSAMANA, EFREN U.
LIRIO LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL LORENZO, ALEJANDRO LORINO,
JOSE MABALAY, HERMIE MARANAN, LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL, NOEL
MARTINEZ, DANTE MATREO, LUCIANO MELENDEZ, RENATO MELO,
FRANCIS MEDIODIA, JOSE C. MILANES, RAYMUNDO C. MILAY,
CRESENCIANO MIRANDA, ILDEFONSO C. MOLINA, ARMANDO B.
MONDEJAR RESURRECCION D. NAZARENO, JUAN OLINDO,
FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES, PEDRO ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO ORDONEZ,
ERNIE PANCHO, JOSE PANCHO, GORGONIO P. PARALA, MODESTO
PINPIN, JUANITO PAREA, ROMEO I. PATAG, FRANCISCO PINPIN,
LEONARDO POBLETE, JAIME POLLOS, DOMINGO PONDALIS,
EUGENIO RAMIREZ, LUCIEN M. RESPALL, GAUDENCIO RETANAN, JR.,
TOMAS B. RETENER, ALVIN C. REYES, RIZALINO REYES, SOLOMON B.
REYES, VIRGILIO G. RICAZA, RODELIO RIETA, JR., BENITO RIVERA,
JR., BERNARDO J. ROBILLOS, PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSE ROBLEZA,
QUIRINO RONQUILLO, AVELINO M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO,
PEDRO SALGATAR, EDGARDO SALONGA, NUMERIANO SAN MATEO,
FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS, JR., GABRIEL SANTOS, JUANITO
SANTOS, PAQUITO SOLANTE, CONRADO A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO
SULTAN, ISAIAS TALACTAC, WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO
TEMPROSA, BIENVENIDO S. TOLENTINO, BENEDICTO TORRES,
MAXIMIANO TORRES, FRANCISCO G. TRIAS, SERGIO A. URSOLINO,
ROGELIO VALDEZ, LEGORIO E. VERGARA, DELFIN VICTORIA,
GILBERT VICTORIA, HERNANE VICTORIANO, FRANCISCO
VILLAFLORES, DOMINGO VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO VILLALOBOS,
ANTONIO VILLAUZ, DANILO VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO VILLANUEVA,
ANGEL VILLARBA, JUANITO VILLARINO, FRANCISCO ZARA, ROGELIO
AALAGOS, NICANOR B. ABAD, ANDRES ABANES, REYNALDO
ABANES, EDUARDO ABANTE, JOSE ABARRO, JOSEFINO ABARRO,
CELSO S. ABELANIO, HERMINIO ABELLA, MIGUEL ABESTANO,
RODRIGO G. ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE ACERES, REYNALDO
S. ACOJIDO, LEOWILIN ACTA, EUGENIO C. ACUEZA, EDUARDO
ACUPAN, REYNALDO ACUPAN, SOLANO ACUPAN, MANUEL P. ADANA,
FLORENTINO R. AGNE, QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P. AGUINALDO,
DANTE AGUIRRE, HERMINIO AGUIRRE, GONZALO ALBERTO, JR.,
CONRADO ALCANTARA, LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA, MARIANITO J.
ALCANTARA, BENCIO ALDOVER, EULALIO V. ALEJANDRO, BENJAMIN
ALEJANDRO, EDUARDO L. ALEJANDRO, MAXIMINO ALEJANDRO,
ALBERTO ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO, AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO
ALVAREZ, MANUEL C. ALVAREZ, BENJAMIN R. AMBROCIO, CARLOS
AMORES, BERNARD P. ANCHETA, TIMOTEO O. ANCHETA, JEOFREY
ANI, ELINO P. ANTILLON, ARMANDRO B. ANTIPONO, LARRY T.
ANTONIO, ANTONIO APILADO, ARTURO P. APILADO, FRANCISCO
APOLINARIO, BARTOLOME M. AQUINO, ISIDRO AQUINO, PASTOR
AQUINO, ROSENDO M. AQUINO, ROBERTO ARANGORIN, BENJAMIN O.
ARATEA, ARTURO V. ARAULLO, PRUDENCIO ARAULLO, ALEXANDER
ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO ARCIAGA, JOSE AREVALO, JUANTO AREVALO,
RAMON AREVALO, RODOLFO AREVALO, EULALIO ARGUELLES,
WILFREDO P. ARICA, JOSE M. ADESILLO, ANTONIO ASUNCION,
ARTEMIO M. ASUNCION, EDGARDO ASUNCION, REXY M. ASUNCION,
VICENTE AURELIO, ANGEL AUSTRIA, RICARDO P. AVERILLA, JR.,
VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOME AXALAN, ALFREDO BABILONIA,
FELIMON BACAL, JOSE L. BACANI, ROMULO R. BALBIERAN, VICENTE
BALBIERAN, RODOLFO BALITBIT, TEODORO Y. BALOBO, DANILO O.
BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO, JUAN A. BASILAN, CEFERINO BATITIS,
VIVENCIO C. BAUAN, GAUDENCIO S. BAUTISTA, LEONARDO
BAUTISTA, JOSE D. BAUTISTA, ROSTICO BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B.
BAUTISTA, TEODORO S. BAUTISTA, VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R.
BAYA, WINIEFREDO BAYACAL, WINIEFREDO BEBIT, BEN G. BELIR,
ERIC B. BELTRAN, EMELIANO BENALES, JR., RAUL BENITEZ,
PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO BERGONIO, ISABELO BERMUDEZ,
ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ, DANILO BERON, BENJAMIN BERSAMIN,
ANGELITO BICOL, ANSELMO BICOL, CELESTINO BICOL, JR.,
FRANCISCO BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL, ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIO
BILLIONES, TEOFILO N. BITO, FERNANDO BLANCO, AUGUSTO
BONDOC, DOMINGO BONDOC, PEPE S. BOOC, JAMES R. BORJA,
WILFREDO BRACEROS, ANGELES C. BRECINO, EURECLYDON G.
BRIONES, AMADO BRUGE, PABLITO BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES
BUENAVENTURA, BASILIO BUENAVENTURA, GUILLERMO
BUENCONSEJO, ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO BUTIONG, JR.,
HONESTO P. CABALLA, DELFIN CABALLERO, BENEDICTO
CABANIGAN, MOISES CABATAY, HERMANELI CABRERA, PEDRO
CAGATAN, JOVEN C. CAGAYAT, ROGELIO L. CALAGOS, REYNALDO V.
CALDEJON, OSCAR C. CALDERON, NESTOR D. CALLEJA, RENATO R.
CALMA, NELSON T. CAMACHO, SANTOS T. CAMACHO, ROBERTO
CAMANA, FLORANTE C. CAMANAG EDGARDO M. CANDA, SEVERINO
CANTOS, EPIFANIO A. CAPONPON, ELIAS D. CARILLO, JR., ARMANDO
CARREON, MENANDRO M. CASTAÑEDA, BENIGNO A. CASTILLO,
CORNELIO L. CASTILLO, JOSEPH B. CASTILLO, ANSELMO CASTILLO,
JOAQUIN CASTILLO, PABLO L. CASTILLO, ROMEO P. CASTILLO,
SESINANDO CATIBOG, DANILO CASTRO, PRUDENCIO A. CASTRO,
RAMO CASTRO, JR., ROMEO A. DE CASTRO, JAIME B. CATLI, DURANA
D. CEFERINO, RODOLFO B. CELIS, HERMINIGILDO CEREZO,
VICTORIANO CELESTINO, BENJAMIN CHAN, ANTONIO C. CHUA,
VIVENCIO B. CIABAL, RODRIGO CLARETE, AUGUSTO COLOMA,
TURIANO CONCEPCION, TERESITO CONSTANTINO, ARMANDO
CORALES, RENATO C. CORCUERA, APOLINAR CORONADO,
ABELARDO CORONEL, FELIX CORONEL, JR., LEONARDO CORPUZ,
JESUS M. CORRALES, CESAR CORTEMPRATO, FRANCISCO O.
CORVERA, FRANCISCO COSTALES, SR., CELEDONIO CREDITO,
ALBERTO A. CREUS, ANACLETO V. CRUZ, DOMINGO DELA CRUZ,
AMELIANO DELA CRUZ, JR., PANCHITO CRUZ, REYNALDO B. DELA
CRUZ, ROBERTO P. CRUZ, TEODORO S. CRUZ, ZOSIMO DELA CRUZ,
DIONISIO A. CUARESMA, FELIMON CUIZON, FERMIN DAGONDON,
RICHARD DAGUINSIN, CRISANTO A. DATAY, NICASIO DANTINGUINOO,
JOSE DATOON, EDUARDO DAVID, ENRICO T. DAVID, FAVIO DAVID,
VICTORIANO S. DAVID, EDGARDO N. DAYACAP, JOSELITO T. DELOSO,
CELERINO DE GUZMAN, ROMULO DE GUZMAN, LIBERATO DE
GUZMAN, JOSE DE LEON, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, NAPOLEON S. DE
LUNA, RICARDO DE RAMA, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, ALBERTO
DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA CRUZ, LEONARDO DELOS REYES, ERNESTO
F. DIATA, EDUARDO A. DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ, MELCHOR DIAZ, NICANOR S.
DIAZ, GERARDO C. DIGA, CLEMENTE DIMATULAC, ROLANDO
DIONISIO, PHILIPP G. DISMAYA, BENJAMIN DOCTOLERO, ALBERTO
STO. DOMINGO, BENJAMIN E. DOZA, BENJAMIN DUPA, DANILO C.
DURAN, GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO A. EDUARTE, GODOFREDO E.
EISMA, ARDON B. ELLO, UBED B. ELLO, JOSEFINO ENANO,
REYNALDO ENCARNACION, EDGARDO ENGUANCIO, ELIAS
EQUIPANO, FELIZARDO ESCARMOSA, MIGUEL ESCARMOSA,
ARMANDO ESCOBAR, ROMEO T. ESCUYOS, ANGELITO ESPIRITU,
EDUARDO S. ESPIRITU, REYNALDO ESPIRITU, ROLANDO ESPIRITU,
JULIAN ESPREGANTE, IGMIDIO ESTANISLAO, ERNESTO M. ESTEBAN,
MELANIO R. ESTRO, ERNESTO M. ESTEVA, CONRADO ESTUAR, CLYDE
ESTUYE, ELISEO FAJARDO, PORFIRIO FALQUEZA, WILFREDO P.
FAUSTINO, EMILIO E. FERNANDEZ, ARTEMIO FERRER, MISAEL M.
FIGURACION, ARMANDO F. FLORES, BENJAMIN FLORES, EDGARDO C.
FLORES, BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO, MANUEL S. FRANCISCO,
ROLANDO FRANCISCO, VALERIANO FRANCISCO, RODOLFO
GABAWAN, ESMERALDO GAHUTAN, CESAR C. GALANG, SANTIAGO N.
GALOSO, GABRIEL GAMBOA, BERNARDO GANDAMON, JUAN
GANZON, ANDRES GARCIA, JR., ARMANDO M. GARCIA, EUGENIO
GARCIA, MARCELO L. GARCIA, PATRICIO L. GARCIA, JR., PONCIANO
G. GARCIA, PONCIANO G. GARCIA, JR., RAFAEL P. GARCIA, ROBERTO
S. GARCIA, OSIAS G. GAROFIL, RAYMUNDO C. GARON, ROLANDO G.
GATELA, AVELINO GAYETA, RAYMUNDO GERON, PLACIDO
GONZALES, RUPERTO H. GONZALES, ROGELIO D. GUANIO, MARTIN V.
GUERRERO, JR., ALEXIS GUNO, RICARDO L. GUNO, FRANCISCO
GUPIT, DENNIS J. GUTIERREZ, IGNACIO B. GUTIERREZ, ANGELITO DE
GUZMAN, JR., CESAR H. HABANA, RAUL G. HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO
HERNANDEZ, JOVENIANO D. HILADO, JUSTO HILAPO, ROSTITO
HINAHON, FELICISIMO HINGADA, EDUARDO HIPOLITO, RAUL L.
IGNACIO, MANUEL L. ILAGAN, RENATO L. ILAGAN, CONRADO A.
INSIONG, GRACIANO G. ISLA, ARNEL L. JACOB, OSCAR J. JAPITENGA,
CIRILO HICBAN, MAXIMIANO HONRADES, GENEROSO IGNACIO,
FELIPE ILAGAN, EXPEDITO N. JACOB, MARIO JASMIN, BIENVENIDO
JAVIER, ROMEO M. JAVIER, PRIMO DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS,
CARLOS A. JIMENEZ, DANILO E. JIMENEZ, PEDRO C. JOAQUIN, FELIPE
W. JOCSON, FELINO M. JOCSON, PEDRO N. JOCSON, VALENTINO S.
JOCSON, PEDRO B. JOLOYA, ESTEBAN P. JOSE, JR., RAUL JOSE,
RICARDO SAN JOSE, GERTRUDO KABIGTING, EDUARDO S. KOLIMLIM,
SR., LAURO J. LABAY, EMMANUEL C. LABELLA, EDGARDO B.
LACERONA, JOSE B. LACSON, MARIO J. LADINES, RUFINO LAGAC,
RODRIGO LAGANAPAN, EFREN M. LAMADRID, GUADENCIO LATANAN,
VIRGILIO LATAYAN, EMILIANO LATOJA, WENCESLAO LAUREL,
ALFREDO LAXAMANA, DANIEL R. LAZARO, ANTONIO C. LEANO,
ARTURO S. LEGASPI, BENITO DE LEMOS, JR., PEDRO G. DE LEON,
MANOLITO C. LILOC, GERARDO LIMUACO, ERNESTO S. LISING,
RENATO LISING, WILFREDO S. LISING, CRISPULO LONTOC, PEDRO M.
LOPERA, ROGELIO LOPERA, CARLITO M. LOPEZ, CLODY LOPEZ,
GARLITO LOPEZ, GEORGE F. LOPEZ, VIRGILIO M. LOPEZ,
BERNARDITO G. LOREJA, DOMINGO B. LORICO, DOMINGO LOYOLA,
DANTE LUAGE, ANTONIO M. LUALHATI, EMMANUEL LUALHATI, JR.,
LEONIDEZ C. LUALHATI, SEBASTIAN LUALHATI, FRANCISCO LUBAT,
ARMANDO LUCERO, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, THOMAS VICENTE O.
LUNA, NOLI MACALADLAD, ALFREDO MACALINO, RICARDO
MACALINO, ARTURO V. MACARAIG, ERNESTO V. MACARAIG,
RODOLFO V. MACARAIG, BENJAMIN MACATANGAY, HERMOGENES
MACATANGAY, RODEL MACATANGAY, ROMULO MACATANGAY,
OSIAS Q. MADLANGBAYAN, NICOLAS P. MADRID, EDELBERTO G.
MAGAT, EFREN C. MAGBANUA, BENJAMIN MAGBUHAT, ALFREDO C.
MAGCALENG, ANTONIO MAGNAYE, ALFONSO MAGPANTAY, RICARDO
C. MAGPANTAY, SIMEON M. MAGPANTAY, ARMANDO M. MAGSINO,
MACARIO S. MAGSINO, ANTONIO MAGTIBAY, VICTOR V. MAGTIBAY,
GERONIMO MAHILUM, MANUEL MALONZO, RICARDO MAMADIS,
RODOLFO MANA, BERNARDO A. MANALILI, MANUEL MANALILI,
ANGELO MANALO, AGUILES L. MANALO, LEOPOLDO MANGAHAS,
BAYANI MANIGBAS, ROLANDO C. MANIMTIM, DANIEL MANONSON,
ERNESTO F. MANUEL, EDUARDO MANZANO, RICARDO N. MAPA,
RAMON MAPILE, ROBERTO C. MARANA, NEMESIO MARASIGAN,
WENCESLAO MARASIGAN, LEONARDO MARCELO, HENRY F.
MARIANO, JOEL MARIDABLE, SANTOS E. MARINO, NARCISO A.
MARQUEZ, RICARDO MARTINEZ, DIEGO MASICAMPO, AURELIO
MATABERDE, RENATO MATILLA, VICTORIANO MATILLA, VIRGILIO
MEDEL, LOLITO M. MELECIO, BENIGNO MELENDEZ, RENER J. MEMIJE,
REYNALDO F. MEMIJE, RODEL MEMIJE, AVELINO MENDOZA, JR.,
CLARO MENDOZA, TIMOTEO MENDOZA, GREGORIO MERCADO,
ERNANI DELA MERCED, RICARDO MERCENA, NEMESIO METRELLO,
RODEL MEMIJE, GASPAR MINIMO, BENJAMIN MIRANDA, FELIXBERTO
D. MISA, CLAUDIO A. MODESTO, JR., OSCAR MONDEDO, GENEROSO
MONTON, RENATO MORADA, RICARDO MORADA, RODOLFO MORADA,
ROLANDO M. MORALES, FEDERICO M. MORENO, VICTORINO A.
MORTEL, JR., ESPIRITU A. MUNOZ, IGNACIO MUNOZ, ILDEFONSO
MUNOZ, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ERNESTO NAPALAN, MARCELO A.
NARCIZO, REYNALDO NATALIA, FERNANDO C. NAVARETTE, PACIFICO
D. NAVARRO, FLORANTE NAZARENO, RIZAL B. NAZARIO, JOSUE
NEGRITE, ALFREDO NEPUMUCENO, HERBERT G. NG, FLORENCIO
NICOLAS, ERNESTO C. NINON, AVELINO NUQUI, NEMESIO D. OBA,
DANILO OCAMPO, EDGARDO OCAMPO, RODRIGO E. OCAMPO,
ANTONIO B. OCCIANO, REYNALDO P. OCSON, BENJAMIN ODESA,
ANGEL OLASO, FRANCISCO OLIGARIO, ZOSIMO OLIMBO, BENJAMIN
V. ORALLO, ROMEO S. ORIGINES, DANILO R. ORTANEZ, WILFREDO
OSIAS, VIRGILIO PA-A, DAVID PAALAN, JESUS N. PACHECO, ALFONSO
L. PADILLA, DANILO PAGSANJAN, NUMERIANO PAGSISIHAN,
RICARDO T. PAGUIO, EMILIO PAKINGAN, LEANDRO PALABRICA,
QUINCIANO PALO, JOSE PAMATIAN, GONZALO PAN, PORFIRIO PAN,
BIENVENIDO PANGAN, ERNESTO PANGAN, FRANCISCO V. PASIA,
EDILBERTO PASIMIO, JR., JOSE V. PASION, ANGELITO M. PENA,
DIONISIO PENDRAS, HERMINIO PERALTA, REYNALDO M. PERALTA,
ANTONIO PEREZ, ANTOLIANO E. PEREZ, JUAN PEREZ, LEON PEREZ,
ROMEO E. PEREZ, ROMULO PEREZ, WILLIAM PEREZ, FERNANDO G.
PERINO, FLORENTINO DEL PILAR, DELMAR F. PINEDA, SALVADOR
PINEDA, ELIZALDE PINPIN, WILFREDO PINPIN, ARTURO POBLETE,
DOMINADOR R. PRIELA, BUENAVENTURA PRUDENTE, CARMELITO
PRUDENTE, DANTE PUEYO, REYNALDO Q. PUEYO, RODOLFO O.
PULIDO, ALEJANDRO PUNIO, FEDERICO QUIMAN, ALFREDO L.
QUINTO, ROMEO QUINTOS, EDUARDO W. RACABO, RICARDO C. DE
RAMA, RICARDO L. DE RAMA, ROLANDO DE RAMA, FERNANDO A.
RAMIREZ, LITO S. RAMIREZ, RICARDO G. RAMIREZ, RODOLFO V.
RAMIREZ, ALBERTO RAMOS, ANSELMO C. RAMOS, TOBIAS RAMOS,
WILLARFREDO RAYMUNDO, REYNALDO RAQUEDAN, MANUEL F.
RAVELAS, WILFREDO D. RAYMUNDO, ERNESTO E. RECOLASO,
ALBERTO REDAZA, ARTHUR REJUSO, TORIBIO M. RELLAMA, JAIME
RELLOSA, EUGENIO A. REMOQUILLO, GERARDO RENTOZA,
REDENTOR C. REY, ALFREDO S. REYES, AMABLE S. REYES,
BENEDICTO R. REYES, GREGORIO B. REYES, JOSE A. REYES, JOSE C.
REYES, ROMULO M. REYES, SERGIO REYES, ERNESTO F. RICO,
FERNANDO M. RICO, EMMANUEL RIETA, RICARDO RIETA, LEO B.
ROBLES, RUBEN ROBLES, RODOLFO ROBLEZA, RODRIGO ROBLEZA,
EDUARDO ROCABO, ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDO
RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE ROMEO, ELIAS
RONQUILLO, ELISE RONQUILLO, LUIS VAL B. RONQUILLO, REYNOSO
P. RONQUILLO, RODOLFO RONQUILLO, ANGEL ROSALES, RAMON
ROSALES, ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO,
TEODORICO DEL ROSARIO, VIRGILIO L. ROSARIO, CARLITO
SALVADOR, JOSE SAMPARADA, ERNESTO SAN PEDRO, ADRIANO V.
SANCHA, GERONIMO M. SANCHA, ARTEMIO B. SANCHEZ, NICASIO
SANCHEZ, APOLONIO P. SANTIAGO, JOSELITO S. SANTIAGO, SERGIO
SANTIAGO, EDILBERTO C. SANTOS, EFREN S. SANTOS, RENATO D.
SANTOS, MIGUEL SAPUYOT, ALEX S. SERQUINA, DOMINADOR P.
SERRA, ROMEO SIDRO, AMADO M. SILANG, FAUSTINO D. SILANG,
RODOLFO B. DE SILOS, ANICETO G. SILVA, EDGARDO M. SILVA,
ROLANDO C. SILVERTO, ARTHUR B. SIMBAHON, DOMINGO SOLANO,
JOSELITO C. SOLANTE, CARLITO SOLIS, CONRADO SOLIS, III,
EDGARDO SOLIS, ERNESTO SOLIS, ISAGANI M. SOLIS, EDUARDO L.
SOTTO, ERNESTO G. STA. MARIA, VICENTE G. STELLA, FELIMON
SUPANG, PETER TANGUINOO, MAXIMINO TALIBSAO, FELICISMO P.
TALUSIK, FERMIN TARUC, JR., LEVY S. TEMPLO, RODOLFO S.
TIAMSON, LEONILO TIPOSO, ARNEL TOLENTINO, MARIO M.
TOLENTINO, FELIPE TORRALBA, JOVITO V. TORRES, LEONARDO DE
TORRES, GAVINO U. TUAZON, AUGUSTO B. TUNGUIA, FRANCISCO
UMALI, SIMPLICIO UNIDA, WILFREDO V. UNTALAN, ANTONIO
VALDERAMA, RAMON VALDERAMA, NILO VALENCIANO, EDGARDO C.
VASQUEZ, ELPIDIO VELASQUEZ, NESTOR DE VERA, WILFREDO D.
VERA, BIENVENIDO VERGARA, ALFREDO VERGARA, RAMON R.
VERZOSA, FELICITO P. VICMUNDO, ALFREDO VICTORIANO, TEOFILO
P. VIDALLO, SABINO N. VIERNEZ, JESUS J. VILLA, JOVEN
VILLABLANCO, EDGARDO G. VILLAFLORES, CEFERINO VILLAGERA,
ALEX VILLAHERMOZA, DANILO A. VILLANUEVA, ELITO VILLANUEVA,
LEONARDO M. VILLANUEVA, MANUEL R. VILLANUEVA, NEPTHALI
VILLAR, JOSE V. VILLAREAL, FELICISIMO VILLARINO, RAFAEL
VILLAROMAN, CARLOS VILLENA, FERDINAND VIVO, ROBERTO
YABUT, VICENTE YNGENTE, AND ORO C. ZUNIGA, respondents.
Gerardo A. Del Mundo and Associates for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Sayoc, Buenaventura, De los Angeles Law Offices for
BRII/AIBC.
Florante M. De Castro for private respondents in 105029-32.
QUIASON, J.:
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Administrator, et. al.," was
filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460; (2) to render a new
decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in default; (ii) declaring the said
labor cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders Corporation
(AIBC) and Brown and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of the
1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty. Florante M. de Castro
guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case No. L-86-05-460; and
(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the
motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo,
pp. 8-288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al.,
v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA
Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 and
L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-year prescriptive period under
the Labor Code of the Philippines instead of the ten-year prescriptive period
under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the
"three-hour daily average" formula in the computation of petitioners' overtime
pay; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the
motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo,
pp. 8-25; 26-220).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders
Corporation, et. al., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was filed
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA
Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and
L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of 149 claimants; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it
denied the motions for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-
230).
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified the
decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary benefits only to
149 claimants and (2) directed Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct
hearings and to receive evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA for
lack of substantial evidence or proof of employment.
Consolidation of Cases
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the Third Division
while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the Second Division. In the
Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second Division referred G.R. Nos.
104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted the
motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases with
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First Division
(G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30, Rollo, pp.
369-377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First
Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14 with G.R. No.
104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p.
1562).
I
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B.
Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract
workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims
arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case
No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by Atty. Gerardo del
Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is
engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a
service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired
portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and
Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary
differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the
SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing
prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the
accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the complaint
and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its answer.
On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and BRII, ordered
the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten days from receipt of the order
and the movants to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the bill of
particulars. The POEA Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial conference on
July 25, 1984.
On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and
Manifestation." On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out of the
Records", the "Complaint" and the "Compliance and Manifestation." On July
25, 1984, the claimants filed their "Rejoinder and Comments," averring, among
other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers and to attend
the pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that AIBC and
BRII had waived their right to present evidence and had defaulted by failing to
file their answers and to attend the pre-trial conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike Out
of the Records" filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the
deficiencies in the complaint pointed out in the order.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with the
Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the
POEA Administrator direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position
papers, after which the case should be deemed submitted for decision. On the
same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint for the same money
claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of whom were also
claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order dated
October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA direct
the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers after which the case
would be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for
time to file its comment on the "Compliance" and "Urgent Manifestation" of
claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion for extension of time
to file the comment.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that its motion
for extension of time was granted.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for
extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for
failure to file their answers.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying, among
other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend their complaint.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing
AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the reversal
of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the appeal,
claiming that it was dilatory and praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in
default.

On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended Complaint and/or
Position Paper" dated March 24, 1985, adding new demands: namely, the
payment of overtime pay, extra night work pay, annual leave differential pay,
leave indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits and their share of
forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA
Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the amended complaint (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).
On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary Judgment."
On the same day, the POEA issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file
their answers to the "Amended Complaint," otherwise, they would be deemed
to have waived their right to present evidence and the case would be resolved
on the basis of complainant's evidence.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper Class
Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated March 24,
1985." Claimants opposed the motions.
On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to
AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC, together
with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19, 1985,
NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator from hearing the labor cases and
suspended the period for the filing of the answers of AIBC and BRII.
On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to include
additional claimants in the case and to investigate alleged wrongdoings of
BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers.
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a complaint
(POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA,
demanding monetary claims similar to those subject of POEA Case No. L-84-
06-555. In the same month, Solomon Reyes also filed his own complaint
(POEA Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII.
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates asked
for the substitution of the original counsel of record and the cancellation of the
special powers of attorney given the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the claim to
enforce attorney's lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money claims (POEA
Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin,
a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed on
February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA Administrator,
it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed in the Supreme Court by
the claimants, namely — G.R. No. 72132 on September 26, 1985 and
Administrative Case No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the
Supreme Court issued a resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing
the POEA Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions and
oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to
decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), questioning
the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said order
required BRII and AIBC to answer the amended complaint in POEA Case No.
L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the
petition by informing AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be
resolved in the hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was filed on
September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants
against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC Commissioners. The
Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-
06-555. The second was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P.
Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor
and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos, Maximino N.
Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of violations of labor
laws.
On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
Resolution dated December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its
motion for suspension of the period for filing an answer or motion for extension
of time to file the same until the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of
the order of the NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC
en banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the complaint.
At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date
within which to submit their respective position papers. On June 24, 1987
claimants filed their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer," alleging that the
answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their
"Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with the POEA Order
of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their
position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants filed their "Ex-Parte Motion to
Expunge from the Records" the position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that
it was filed out of time.
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro filed their
memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988, AIBC
and BRII submitted their Supplemental Memorandum. On September 12,
1988, BRII filed its "Reply to Complainant's Memorandum." On October 26,
1988, claimants submitted their "Ex-Parte Manifestational Motion and Counter-
Supplemental Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of employments
and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a
"Consolidated Reply."
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in POEA
Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated cases, which awarded the
amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants.
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum For
Partial Appeal" from the decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also
filed its motion for reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of
Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC.
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," praying for the
dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII.
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to Complainants' Appeal
Memorandum," together with their "newly discovered evidence" consisting of
payroll records.
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their "Manifestation,"
stating among other matters that there were only 728 named claimants. On
April 20, 1989, the claimants filed their "Counter-Manifestation," alleging that
there were 1,767 of them.
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of the
Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed to appeal
on time and AIBC had not posted the supersedeas bond in the amount of
$824,652.44.
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve the labor
cases.
On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational Motion," praying that
all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their monetary claims for failure of private
respondents to file their answers within the reglamentary period required by
law.
On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in these
consolidated cases is modified to the extent and in accordance with the
following dispositions:
1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and listed in Annex "A"
hereof are dismissed for having prescribed;
2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby ordered, jointly and
severally, to pay the 149 complainants, identified and listed in Annex "B"
hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time of payment, of the total amount in US
dollars indicated opposite their respective names;
3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 complainants classified and
listed in Annex "C" hereof, who appear to have worked elsewhere than in
Bahrain are hereby set aside.
4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex "B", including those for
overtime work and favorably granted by the POEA, are hereby dismissed for
lack of substantial evidence in support thereof or are beyond the competence
of this Commission to pass upon.
In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and authority under
Article 218(c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, hereby directs
Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of this Commission to summon parties, conduct
hearings and receive evidence, as expeditiously as possible, and thereafter
submit a written report to this Commission (First Division) of the proceedings
taken, regarding the claims of the following:
(a) complainants identified and listed in Annex "D" attached and made an
integral part of this Resolution, whose claims were dismissed by the POEA for
lack of proof of employment in Bahrain (these complainants numbering 683,
are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the decision of POEA, subject of the appeals)
and,
(b) complainants identified and listed in Annex "E" attached and made an
integral part of this Resolution, whose awards decreed by the POEA, to Our
mind, are not supported by substantial evidence" (G.R. No. 104776; Rollo, pp.
113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 85-87; G.R. Nos. 105029-31, pp. 120-
122).
On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12
co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-44). The petition was
dismissed in a resolution dated January 27, 1992.
Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991 Resolution of the
NLRC were filed. The first, by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo;
the second, by the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by
AIBC and BRII.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the motions for
reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo
(G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro (G.R. Nos.
104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII (G.R. Nos. 105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC and
BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for our
approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of their respective petitions insofar
as the claimants-parties to the compromise agreements were concerned (See
Annex A for list of claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a compromise
agreement and the corresponding motions for the approval of the agreements
were filed by the parties and approved by the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio Abarquez
and 47 co-claimants dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,
pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin
and 82 co-petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose
M. Aban and 36 co-claimants dated September 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-
32, Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 407-516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio T. Anglo
and 17 co-claimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio Bobongo
and 6 co-claimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 813-
836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio A.
Evangelista and 4 co-claimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants Palconeri Banaag
and 5 co-claimants dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-
1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 655-675);
8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin Ambrosio
and 15 other co-claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo,
pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio Evangelista and 3 co-
claimants dated May 10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Quiterio R. Agudo
and 36 co-claimants dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
974-1190; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo J. Alonzo
and 19 co-claimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-
1235; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
Rollo, pp. 896-959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo C. Dayrit
and 2 co-claimants dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254;
G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 972-984);
13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante C. Aceres
and 37 co-claimants dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
1257-1375; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
Rollo, pp. 1280-1397); xxx xxx xxx

14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V. Abella and 27 co- 3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
claimants dated January 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II);
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as set
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B. Solano and six out in Part B of this Document.
co-claimants dated August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No. 104776;
G.R. Nos. 104911-14). b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and
Employer may, at his sole option, change or adjust such hours as maybe
III deemed necessary from time to time.

The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows: 4. TERMINATION

We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than fifty volumes now
comprising the records of these cases. From the records, it appears that the
complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-
appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various
dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various projects
undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in the Middle East, such as
Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in
Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the
Philippine Government, all the individual complainants signed standard
overseas employment contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter, reference
to the records would be sparingly made, considering their chaotic
arrangement) with AIBC before their departure from the Philippines. These
overseas employment contracts invariably contained the following relevant
terms and conditions.
PART B —
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the
Employer may, at his sole discretion, terminate employee's service with cause,
under this agreement at any time. If the Employer terminates the services of
the Employee under this Agreement because of the completion or termination,
or suspension of the work on which the Employee's services were being
utilized, or because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of such
work, or by change in the type of construction of such work. The Employer will
be responsible for his return transportation to his country of origin. Normally
on the most expeditious air route, economy class accommodation.
xxx xxx xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory completion
of contract, employee shall be entitled to 12-days vacation leave with pay. This
shall be computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of a year's service will be
computed on a pro-rata basis.

(1) Employment Position Classification :————————— b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for every year
(Code) :————————— of service for non-work connected injuries or illness. If the employee failed to
avail of such leave benefits, the same shall be forfeited at the end of the year
(2) Company Employment Status :————————— in which said sick leave is granted.
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on :—————————
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :————————— 11. BONUS
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :—————————
(6) Basic Hourly Rate :————————— A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :————————— payable only upon satisfactory completion of this contract.
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) :————————— 12. OFFDAY PAY
Months and/or
Job Completion
The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8 hours
regular pay. If work is performed on this day, all hours work shall be paid at
the premium rate. However, this offday pay provision is applicable only when
the laws of the Host Country require payments for rest day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were
deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his
Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law
for the Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August
16, 1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to
the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows (italics supplied only
for emphasis):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to
his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-five per centum
thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum of fifty per centum
thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be deemed to being from
seven o'clock in the evening until seven o'clock in the morning. . . .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
. . . an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on his weekly
day of rest if circumstances so require and in respect of which an additional
sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to him. . . .
Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official
holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal
wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous service with
his employer shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a period of not less than
21 days for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five
continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of
the proportion of his service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite
duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party
thirty days' prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly
paid workers and fifteen days' notice in respect of other workers. The party
terminating a contract without giving the required notice shall pay to the other
party compensation equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker
for the period of such notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fifteen days' wages for each year of the
first three years of service and of one month's wages for each year of service
thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon
a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service completed within a
year.
All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to the
Philippines at the time of the filing of these cases (R.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
59-65).
IV
The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First: — Whether or not complainants are entitled to the benefits provided by
Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
(a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are
entitled to the above-mentioned benefits.
(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a
more favorable treatment of alien employees) bars complainants from enjoying
its benefits.
Second: — Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is applicable in
these cases, whether or not complainants' claim for the benefits provided
therein have prescribed.
Third: — Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.
Fourth: — Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as
the decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the
requirements of due process;
(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was denied its right to due
process;
(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the POEA after these
cases were submitted for decision was valid;
(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root
International, Inc.;
(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial
evidence; k. Fringe benefits under B & R's "A Summary of Employee Benefits"
(Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
(e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages and formula
presented by the complainants-appellants are supported by substantial l. Moral and exemplary damages;
evidence;
m. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award;
(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond what the
complainants-appellants prayed for; and, if so, whether or not these awards n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit
are valid. of AIBC and the accreditation of B & R issued by POEA;

Fifth: — Whether or not the POEA erred in holding respondents AIBC and
Brown & Root jointly are severally liable for the judgment awards despite the
alleged finding that the former was the employer of the complainants;
(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root;
(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was a licensed
construction contractor precludes a finding that Brown & Root is liable for
complainants claims.
Sixth: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator's failure to hold respondents
in default constitutes a reversible error.
Seventh: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in dismissing the
following claims:
a. Unexpired portion of contract;
o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited practices), not excluding
reportorial requirements thereof.
Eighth: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not dismissing
POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity of suits (G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-55).
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised
Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and
admitted in evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion to
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case without
regard to the technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA
Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23, being more favorable and
beneficial to the workers, should form part of the overseas employment
contract of the complainants.

b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund; NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the
claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA
c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits; Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked elsewhere.

d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay; On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the filing of
the claims of the complainants was three years, as provided in Article 291 of
e. Area Differential Pay; the Labor Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri
f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits; Decree No. 23 of 1976.

g. Salary differential pay; On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the labor
cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple reason that not all the
h. Wage differential pay; complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore, the subject matter of the action,
the claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of common or general interest
i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS; to all the complainants.

j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;

On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal rules
of administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA
Administrator to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some
findings of fact were not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) some of
the evidence upon which the decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC
and BRII during the hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator that
BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims of the complainants and held
that BRII was the actual employer of the complainants, or at the very least, the
indirect employer, with AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA
Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct in
denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on the
Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the claims for
refund of the SSS premiums and refund of withholding taxes and the claimants
should file their claims for said refund with the appropriate government
agencies;
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the claims
which are not based on the overseas employment contracts nor the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976;
(3) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims for moral
and exemplary damages and nonetheless, the basis for granting said
damages was not established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of
their contract may be allowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were prematurely repatriated
prior to the expiration of their overseas contract was not established; and
(6) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the complaint for
the suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's recruitment license and the
cancellation of the accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L)
86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the ground that the claimants in
said case were also claimants in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of
dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA just resolved the
corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the
POEA did not pass upon the same claims twice.
V
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on the following
grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a
speedy disposition of their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed private respondents to file
their answers in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original
complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its own rules,
affirmed the action of the POEA Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC
and BRII in default and should have rendered summary judgment on the basis
of the pleadings and evidence submitted by claimants;
(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the labor
cases filed by AIBC and BRII cannot be considered a class suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten years; and
(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed POEA
Case No. L-86-05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro (Rollo, pp.
31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the disposition of the
labor cases, considering the great difficulty of getting all the records of the
more than 1,500 claimants, the piece-meal filing of the complaints and the
addition of hundreds of new claimants by petitioners;
(2) that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it was
impossible to prepare the answers within the ten-day period provided in the
NLRC Rules, that when the motion to declare AIBC in default was filed on July
19, 1987, said party had already filed its answer, and that considering the
staggering amount of the claims (more than US$50,000,000.00) and the
complicated issues raised by the parties, the ten-day rule to answer was not
fair and reasonable;

(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's finding that
there was no common or general interest in the subject matter of the
controversy — which was the applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23.
Likewise, the nature of the claims varied, some being based on salaries
pertaining to the unexpired portion of the contracts while others being for pure
money claims. Each claimant demanded separate claims peculiar only to
himself and depending upon the particular circumstances obtaining in his case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that prescribed by
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (three years) and not the one
prescribed by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA Case No.
L-86-05-460 should be dismissed, this being a private quarrel between the two
labor lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out the
joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2 and 11,
1992, claiming that all the claimants who entered into the compromise
agreements subject of said manifestations and motions were his clients and
that Atty. Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said
agreements. He also claimed that the claimants were paid less than the award
given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro collected additional attorney's fees
on top of the 25% which he was entitled to receive; and that the consent of the
claimants to the compromise agreements and quitclaims were procured by
fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution dated
November 23, 1992, the Court denied the motion to strike out the Joint
Manifestations and Motions dated September 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim to Enforce
Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants who entered into compromise
agreements with AIBC and BRII with the assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all
signed a retainer agreement with his law firm (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-
624; 838-1535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del Mundo to cite
Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for violation of
Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The said
lawyers allegedly misled this Court, by making it appear that the claimants who
entered into the compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De
Castro, when in fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against Atty.
De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the voiding of the quitclaims
submitted by some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorari on the
grounds that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied the three-
year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it
denied the claimant's formula based on an average overtime pay of three
hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during the
negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money claims in Bahrain as
shown in the Memorandum dated April 16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of
Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No.
104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the Philippines, a
special law, prevails over that provided in the Civil Code of the Philippines, a
general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the method of
computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not bound
by what appeared therein, because such memorandum was proposed by a
subordinate Bahrain official and there was no showing that it was approved by
the Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the averaging
method was discussed in the course of the negotiation for the amicable
settlement of the dispute and any offer made by a party therein could not be
used as an admission by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 and not the terms of the employment contracts; (2) granted claims for
holiday, overtime and leave indemnity pay and other benefits, on evidence
admitted in contravention of petitioner's constitutional right to due process; and
(3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for the 683 claimants
whose claims had been dismissed for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator
or NLRC itself. Lastly, they allege that assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976 was applicable, NLRC erred when it did not apply the one-year
prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).

VI
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32
All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they
disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the prescriptive
period.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise,
fixing the prescriptive period at three years as provided in Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking different
grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive period
applicable to the claims was three years, instead of ten years, as found by the
POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive period
was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred
to the ruling of NLRC that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was
the operative law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer to those
arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by the
Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights of the
workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso facto amended the worker's contracts of
employment. Respondents consciously failed to conform to these provisions
which specifically provide for the increase of the worker's rate. It was only after
June 30, 1983, four months after the brown builders brought a suit against B
& R in Bahrain for this same claim, when respondent AIBC's contracts have
undergone amendments in Bahrain for the new hires/renewals (Respondent's
Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to this instant
case is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
Art. 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten years from
the time the cause of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
Thus, herein money claims of the complainants against the respondents shall
prescribe in ten years from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all claims were filed
within the ten-year prescriptive period, no claim suffered the infirmity of being
prescribed (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the prescriptive period
is three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
the NLRC argued as follows:
The Labor Code provides that "all money claims arising from employer-
employee relations . . . shall be filed within three years from the time the cause
of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred" (Art. 291, Labor
Code, as amended). This three-year prescriptive period shall be the one
applied here and which should be reckoned from the date of repatriation of
each individual complainant, considering the fact that the case is having (sic)
filed in this country. We do not agree with the POEA Administrator that this
three-year prescriptive period applies only to money claims specifically
recoverable under the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291 gives no such
indication. Likewise, We can not consider complainants' cause/s of action to
have accrued from a violation of their employment contracts. There was no
violation; the claims arise from the benefits of the law of the country where they
worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as provided by the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that the applicability of said law
was one of characterization, i.e., whether to characterize the foreign law on
prescription or statute of limitation as "substantive" or "procedural." NLRC cited
the decision in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir.
[1955], where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a
case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from said Code. In said
case, the claims would have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not
under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not "specifically
intended to be substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law
of the forum should apply. The Court observed:
. . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign
country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was to
limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned,
of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains, we think that as a
yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose this test is the most
satisfactory one. It does not lead American courts into the necessity of
examining into the unfamiliar peculiarities and refinements of different foreign
legal systems. . .
The court further noted:
xxx xxx xxx
Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is entitled to succeed,
for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period of
limitation in question was specifically aimed against the particular rights which
the libelant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having
broad objectives, viz: "The present Code regulates the relations between
capital and labor, placing them on a basis of social justice, so that, without
injuring any of the parties, there may be guaranteed for labor the necessary
conditions for a normal life and to capital an equitable return to its investment."
In pursuance of these objectives the Code gives laborers various rights against
their employers. Article 623 establishes the period of limitation for all such
rights, except certain ones which are enumerated in Article 621. And there is
nothing in the record to indicate that the Panamanian legislature gave special
consideration to the impact of Article 623 upon the particular rights sought to
be enforced here, as distinguished from the other rights to which that Article is
also applicable. Were we confronted with the question of whether the limitation
period of Article 621 (which carves out particular rights to be governed by a
shorter limitation period) is to be regarded as "substantive" or "procedural"
under the rule of "specifity" we might have a different case; but here on the
surface of things we appear to be dealing with a "broad," and not a "specific,"
statute of limitations (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
92-94).
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to claims
"arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by
the Labor Code." They assert that their claims are based on the violation of
their employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
and therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as provided by Article
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines
a "borrowing law," which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that
where such kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the common-law
conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action
based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription
that shall be the governing law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after
the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract. (G.R. Nos.
105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This
is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement
of the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131
[1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense
that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the
characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court
applied the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law,
after finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on
prescription was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a
procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on
prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute."
Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation
as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing
statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations
to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]).
While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that
an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced
in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and
Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action
is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no
provision in the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or
contradictory to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine
Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced
ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of
Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum's public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553,
40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive
period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question
would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution
emphasized that:
The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.
(Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law,
the next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the filing of the
claims is three years, as provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided
by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article 291
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides:
Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever
barred.
xxx xxx xxx
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is
inapplicable to the cases at bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the
correct computation of overtime pay as provided in the collective bargaining
agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make any
reference as to the computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor
Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead insisted that work computation
provided in the collective bargaining agreements between the parties be
observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the
written contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period
provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A. No.
19933) provides:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be commenced
within three years after the cause of action accrued otherwise such action shall
be forever barred, . . . .
The court further explained:
The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No.
444 as amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime work is
solely based on said law, and not on a collective bargaining agreement or any
other contract. In the instant case, the claim for overtime compensation is not
so much because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended but because
the claim is demandable right of the employees, by reason of the above-
mentioned collective bargaining agreement.
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for
filing "actions to enforce any cause of action under said law." On the other
hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides the prescriptive
period for filing "money claims arising from employer-employee relations." The
claims in the cases at bench all arose from the employer-employee relations,
which is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the
collective bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive
period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to
money claims specifically recoverable under said Code, does not find support
in the plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants
in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising from the
employer's violation of the employee's right," as provided by the Labor Code
supported by the facial reading of the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
claimants aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June 6, 1984 with
POEA, the case was decided only on January 30, 1989, a clear denial of their
right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2) that NLRC and the POEA
Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp.
31-35).
Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution,
any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy
disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy
disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits
are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights
nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" has
been violated, thus:
In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been
violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other.
These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure
to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be
considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially
charged with the administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition
of cases.
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991), we held:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justified motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a copy
of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and BRII be
declared in default for failure to file their answers within the ten-day period
provided in Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and Regulations of the
POEA. At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to strike out
of the records the amended complaint and the "Compliance" of claimants to
the order of the POEA, requiring them to submit a bill of particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final
disposition in the administrative level after seven years from their inception,
cannot be said to be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
delays as to violate the constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases
of complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767
claimants. Said complaint had undergone several amendments, the first being
on April 3, 1985.
The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were
deployed in different areas, one group in and the other groups outside of,
Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling more than US$65 million according to
Atty. Del Mundo, included:
1. Unexpired portion of contract;
2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund; The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA Administrator were
interrupted several times by the various appeals, first to NLRC and then to the
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit; Supreme Court.

4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay; Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases were filed
against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases Nos.
5. Area Differential pay; L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on May 29, 1986
(POEA Case No. L-86-05-460). NLRC, in exasperation, noted that the exact
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits; number of claimants had never been completely established (Resolution, Sept.
2, 1991, G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new cases were
7. Salary differential pay; consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.

8. Wage Differential pay; NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in terminating the
proceedings, thus:
9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security System;
These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route towards
10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of Internal Revenue resolution had the parties and their counsel been more interested in pursuing
(B.I.R.); the truth and the merits of the claims rather than exhibiting a fanatical reliance
on technicalities. Parties and counsel have made these cases a litigation of
11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root's "A Summary of Employees emotion. The intransigence of parties and counsel is remarkable. As late as
Benefits consisting of 43 pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint); last month, this Commission made a last and final attempt to bring the counsel
of all the parties (this Commission issued a special order directing respondent
12. Moral and Exemplary Damages; Brown & Root's resident agent/s to appear) to come to a more conciliatory
stance. Even this failed (Rollo,
13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of amounts; p. 58).

14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in the
of AIBC and issued by the POEA; and disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which complained:

15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not excluding
reportorial requirements thereof (NLRC Resolution, September 2, 1991, pp.
18-19; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness and clarity
of some facts, the claimants were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC
for a bill of particulars. When claimants filed their "Compliance and
Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike out the complaint from the records for
failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the POEA
Administrator denied the motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered the
claimants "to correct the deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the complaint, the
records of employment of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved
from various countries in the Middle East. Some of the records dated as far
back as 1975.
It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in these consolidated
cases appear to be not only the individual complainants, on the one hand, and
AIBC and Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two lawyers for the
complainants, Atty. Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. Florante De Castro, have yet
to settle the right of representation, each one persistently claiming to appear
in behalf of most of the complainants. As a result, there are two appeals by the
complainants. Attempts by this Commission to resolve counsels' conflicting
claims of their respective authority to represent the complainants prove futile.
The bickerings by these two counsels are reflected in their pleadings. In the
charges and countercharges of falsification of documents and signatures, and
in the disbarment proceedings by one against the other. All these have, to a
large extent, abetted in confounding the issues raised in these cases, jumble
the presentation of evidence, and even derailed the prospects of an amicable
settlement. It would not be far-fetched to imagine that both counsel,
unwittingly, perhaps, painted a rainbow for the complainants, with the
proverbial pot of gold at its end containing more than US$100 million, the
aggregate of the claims in these cases. It is, likewise, not improbable that their
misplaced zeal and exuberance caused them to throw all caution to the wind
in the matter of elementary rules of procedure and evidence (Rollo, pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the listing of some
of the complainants in both petitions filed by the two lawyers. As noted by
NLRC, "the problem created by this situation is that if one of the two petitions
is dismissed, then the parties and the public respondents would not know
which claim of which petitioner was dismissed and which was not."
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be consolidated in
a "class suit" because "all the named complainants have similar money claims
and similar rights sought irrespective of whether they worked in Bahrain,
United Arab Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the Middle East"
(Rollo, pp. 35-38).
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court (Revised Rules of Court, Rule
3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain Law, many of
the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed
in Indonesia and Malaysia under different terms and conditions of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that inasmuch
as the first requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general
interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical
that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims in a
class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the
claims is the same (for employee's benefits), there is no common question of
law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many
of the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere.
Thus, each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims
of the other employees of defendants. The named claimants have a special or
particular interest in specific benefits completely different from the benefits in
which the other named claimants and those included as members of a "class"
are claiming (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears that each
claimant is only interested in collecting his own claims. A claimants has no
concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact,
that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered
into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. A principle
basic to the concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs brought on the record must
fairly represent and protect the interests of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants who
worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial
proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them under the Rules of Court
is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the
exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all
indispensable parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if the decision
secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the decision is
adverse to them, in which case the others who were impleaded by their self-
appointed representatives, would surely claim denial of due process.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA
Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De Castro guilty
of "forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities, falsification, duplicity and
other unprofessional activities" and his appearances as counsel for some of
the claimants as illegal (Rollo, pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to put
a stop to the practice of some parties of filing multiple petitions and complaints
involving the same issues, with the result that the courts or agencies have to
resolve the same issues. Said Rule, however, applies only to petitions filed
with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled "Additional
Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitioners and
Complainants." The first sentence of the circular expressly states that said
circular applies to an governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of the anti-
forum shopping rule to the lower courts and administrative agencies, said
circular took effect only on April 1, 1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical
conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no jurisdiction
to investigate charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December 14, 1992
was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim for attorney's fees
for legal services rendered in favor of the claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 841-844).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the court or
administrative agency which renders and executes the money judgment
secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause written notice
thereof to be delivered to his clients and to the adverse party (Revised Rules
of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The statement of the claim for the charging lien
of Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the administrative agency that
rendered and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante De Castro
and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
should be filed in a separate and appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14
Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not accepting their
formula of "Three Hours Average Daily Overtime" in computing the overtime
payments. They claim that it was BRII itself which proposed the formula during
the negotiations for the settlement of their claims in Bahrain and therefore it is
in estoppel to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain dated
April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states:
After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and the Area
Manager, Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the Summary of the
compensation offered by the Company to the employees in respect of the
difference of pay of the wages of the overtime and the difference of vacation
leave and the perusal of the documents attached thereto i.e., minutes of the
meetings between the Representative of the employees and the management
of the Company, the complaint filed by the employees on 14/2/83 where they
have claimed as hereinabove stated, sample of the Service Contract executed
between one of the employees and the company through its agent in (sic)
Philippines, Asia International Builders Corporation where it has been provided
for 48 hours of work per week and an annual leave of 12 days and an overtime
wage of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly wage.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company in its computation reached the following averages:
A. 1. The average duration of the actual service of the employee is 35
months for the Philippino (sic) employees . . . .
2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino (sic) employee is
US$2.69 . . . .
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3 hours plus in all public holidays
and weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of service as compensation for
the difference of the wages of the overtime done for each Philippino (sic)
employee . . . (Rollo, p.22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not prepared by them
but by a subordinate official in the Bahrain Department of Labor; (2) that there
was no showing that the Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved said
memorandum; and (3) that the offer was made in the course of the negotiation
for an amicable settlement of the claims and therefore it was not admissible in
evidence to prove that anything is due to the claimants.
While said document was presented to the POEA without observing the rule
on presenting official documents of a foreign government as provided in
Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be
admitted in evidence in proceedings before an administrative body. The
opposing parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and they could easily
verify its authenticity and accuracy.
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as contained in the
memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the 1989
Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to settle a claim is not an admission that
anything is due.
Said Rule provides:
Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an offer of compromise
is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against
the offeror.
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of the record
with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy. There is great public
interest in having the protagonists settle their differences amicable before
these ripen into litigation. Every effort must be taken to encourage them to
arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and counter-offers in the
negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But to bind a party to his offers,
as what claimants would make this Court do, would defeat the salutary
purpose of the Rule.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for
greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts
of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the host country
are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract." It quoted with
approval the observation of the POEA Administrator that ". . . in labor
proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor"
(Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it
refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts, which became the law
of the parties. They contend that the principle that a law is deemed to be a part
of a contract applies only to provisions of Philippine law in relation to contracts
executed in the Philippines.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII
themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to
said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable that those
stipulated therein. It was stipulated in said contracts that:
The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer, he will not
engage in any other business or occupation, nor seek employment with
anyone other than the Employer; that he shall devote his entire time and
attention and his best energies, and abilities to the performance of such duties
as may be assigned to him by the Employer; that he shall at all times be subject
to the direction and control of the Employer; and that the benefits provided to
Employee hereunder are substituted for and in lieu of all other benefits
provided by any applicable law, provided of course, that total remuneration and
benefits do not fall below that of the host country regulation or custom, it being
understood that should applicable laws establish that fringe benefits, or other
such benefits additional to the compensation herein agreed cannot be waived,
Employee agrees that such compensation will be adjusted downward so that
the total compensation hereunder, plus the non-waivable benefits shall be
equivalent to the compensation herein agreed (Rollo, pp. 352-353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more
felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the compensation to the
employee may be "adjusted downward so that the total computation
(thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation" therein agreed, another part of the same provision
categorically states "that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that
of the host country regulation and custom."
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted
against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor
the party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is
already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract
and the employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that there
was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees
signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power
(Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment contracts
in question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed
(Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a case, the foreign
law is adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including
questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be
observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d,
150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just
agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated
into their contract "as a set of terms." By such reference to the provisions of
the foreign law, the contract does not become a foreign contract to be
governed by the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as
a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private
International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-
703, [8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese,
Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the
parties' own choice of the applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151
F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some
relationship to the parties or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of
Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the contracts sought to be
enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because
the services were rendered in that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117 SCRA 486
(1982), the "Employment Agreement," between Norse Management Co. and
the late husband of the private respondent, expressly provided that in the event
of illness or injury to the employee arising out of and in the course of his
employment and not due to his own misconduct, "compensation shall be paid
to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitation of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Worker's Insurance
Act of registry of the vessel, whichever is greater." Since the laws of Singapore,
the place of registry of the vessel in which the late husband of private
respondent served at the time of his death, granted a better compensation
package, we applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII
is inapposite to the facts of the cases at bench. The issue in that case was
whether the amount of the death compensation of a Filipino seaman should
be determined under the shipboard employment contract executed in the
Philippines or the Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard employment
contract was controlling, the court differentiated said case from Norse
Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an express stipulation in
the employment contract that the foreign law would be applicable if it afforded
greater compensation.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their right to
due process when said administrative agency granted Friday-pay differential,
holiday-pay differential, annual-leave differential and leave indemnity pay to
the claimants listed in Annex B of the Resolution. At first, NLRC reversed the
resolution of the POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a finding that
the POEA Administrator failed to consider the evidence presented by AIBC
and BRII, that some findings of fact of the POEA Administrator were not
supported by the evidence, and that some of the evidence were not disclosed
to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the
case to the POEA Administrator for a new hearing, which means further delay
in the termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the validity of the
claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII complain of as being
irregular and a "reversible error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence submitted on
appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to have been "unilaterally
submitted by the claimants and not disclosed to the adverse parties" (Rollo,
pp. 37-39).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were submitted to the
POEA administrator by the claimants after the cases were deemed submitted
for resolution and which were taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator
in resolving the cases. While AIBC and BRII had no opportunity to refute said
evidence of the claimants before the POEA Administrator, they had all the
opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present their
counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII themselves
were able to present before NLRC additional evidence which they failed to
present before the POEA Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to
"use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process."
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis of the evidence
of both parties submitted before the POEA Administrator and NLRC, the latter
considered that it was not expedient to remand the cases to the POEA
Administrator for that would only prolong the already protracted legal
controversies.
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits instead
of remanding them to the trial court for the reception of evidence, where the
same can be readily determined from the uncontroverted facts on record
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 190
SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 127
SCRA 463 [1984]).
C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for 683 claimants listed
in Annex D of the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 whose claims had been
denied by the POEA Administrator "for lack of proof" and for 69 claimants listed
in Annex E of the same Resolution, whose claims had been found by NLRC
itself as not "supported by evidence" (Rollo, pp. 41-45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
which empowers it "[to] conduct investigation for the determination of a
question, matter or controversy, within its jurisdiction, . . . ."
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority under Article
218(c) to remand a case involving claims which had already been dismissed
because such provision contemplates only situations where there is still a
question or controversy to be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the technical rules of
procedure and evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by
administrative agencies (First Asian Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v.
Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152
SCRA 219 [1987]). This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before NLRC.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of procedure and
evidence in administrative proceedings, there are cardinal rules which must be
observed by the hearing officers in order to comply with the due process
requirements of the Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated in Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
VIII
The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on
the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon.
Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court,
dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of the
executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and
declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be
enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with
the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines
about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants
except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way
related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid
to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during
her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his
final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one
of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.
In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was
also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be
governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the
right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's
Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286,
49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but
these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL
LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE,
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE
OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-
HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also
no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines,
as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show
that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in
New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed
school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed
there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in,
and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he
again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the
following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts
be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the
parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese
Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April
1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December,
1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits
"AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473,
t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly
after the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which
he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the
St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short
visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that
he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of
California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is
used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on
Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the
United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed
his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by
acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same
thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has
acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where
he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile.
The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides
in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require
his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business
in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as
well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is
a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one
use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property
may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private
law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of
the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may
dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the
case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the
law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not
denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of
the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of
the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to
the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the
foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept
the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the
matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of
Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back
should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted
in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal
law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems
no compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal
law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids
going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory
avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at
that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit
more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead
that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And
still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this
choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the
legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be
accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the
Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the
woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected
the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen,
though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both
courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to
land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged.
In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile
of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce,
valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving
movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises
as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule
of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an
application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds
thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination
of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution
to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute
of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open
to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate
succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow
the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws
rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in
turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as
governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to
the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This
is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few
instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by
them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated
and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases
result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of
the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The
theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the
question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to
the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may
be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for
its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale
Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article
are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws
are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of
the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well.
According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application
of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall
respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute
shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place
where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain
that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate
of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the
law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would
distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile,
and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance
with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this
reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly,
each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves
a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state
where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding
legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is
consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary
has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile
are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property,
and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point:
'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It
had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of
civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of
accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed
out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained
the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for
residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason
demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are
bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must
enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof
and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and
its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not
be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national
law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in
the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws
rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when
a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was
a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its
own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law
of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton
vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.)
cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case
at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear
to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state
of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the
California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen
of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against
appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project
of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had
five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased
him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by
his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which
he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following
order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two
items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of
stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling
P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service
of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the
executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code,
it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower
court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise
the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a
conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application
of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on
the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights;
(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This
is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art.
11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied
in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from
this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will,
it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law,
is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs
or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner,
vs.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
For review1 is a dismissal2 of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child
custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del
Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994.
They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June
1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial
Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner
and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and
retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract
(Agreement4 ) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine
courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement.
Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order "relinquishing"
jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in
violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of
jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the
divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s motion
and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is
precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois court’s
retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order
awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is
binding on petitioner following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this
jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code6 prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction.7
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce
decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to
the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding
that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the
Agreement to justify its enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement
novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody from
sole (maternal) to joint;8 or (2) the Agreement is independent of the divorce
decree obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’
child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce
the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations
militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the
case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his
suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.9 An
action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the
Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions.10 Thus,
jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not
on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce
decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois
court retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry
the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s suit
seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions" of the divorce decree
but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies
beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement
which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of
agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.12 Otherwise, the contract is
denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the beginning."13
For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary
Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of
the Agreement’s joint child custody stipulations.14
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts
are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born
on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer
married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or
in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is
also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the
mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration,19 subject
only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the
Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between
respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes
Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also
been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the
father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or
separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses
live together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes
sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any
agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody
regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses.
Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical
reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to
take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother.
Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family
Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than
they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually
drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have
sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling
to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the
second paragraph of Article 213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provision’s
enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private
agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody
regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents. This
effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding
the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole
custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a
mother has seen her baby torn away from her."23 This ignores the legislative
basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived
of her child of tender age."24
It could very well be that Article 213’s bias favoring one separated parent
(mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes
incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or
hijacks decision-making between the separated parents.25 However, these
are objections which question the law’s wisdom not its validity or uniform
enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature,
not this Court. At any rate, the rule’s seeming harshness or undesirability is
tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter
such as granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements
are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second
paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on
the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of
disagreements.1avvphi1
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article
213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the child’s seventh year. From the
eighth year until the child’s emancipation, the law gives the separated parents
freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody
regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and
respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint
custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole
custody over Stephanie. Respondent’s act effectively brought the parties back
to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second paragraph of Article 213
of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not because
the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois
law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse26 - to support
the Agreement’s enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction
are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v.
Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is
bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.28 There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal
property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the
Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as
her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is
that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal
complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign
divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he no longer
qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints under Philippine
procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree
carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does
in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality, irrespective of who obtained the
divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its lack
of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the question
of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing
the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody regime under
Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child
custody proceedings – the best interest of the child.30 As the question of
custody is already before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing
the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest
of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage
of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best
serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This
disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody
proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best interest.31
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June
2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I agree with the reasons that the majority of the Court gave in support of the
decision, except one. I am uncomfortable with the proposition that an
agreement between the mother and the father on a joint custody over a child
below seven years of age is void for being contrary to law and public policy.
True, the law provides in Article 363 of the Civil Code that "No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure." The State can think up ways of
protecting the child. But the 1987 Constitution acknowledges in Article II,
Section 12, the natural and primary right and duty of parents to nurture their
children and that the State must support them in this respect.1
I submit that, in the matter of child custody, the mutual will of the child’s parents
takes precedence in the absence of circumstances that justify recourse to the
law. The law becomes relevant, only as a default, if a separated couple cannot
agree on the custody of their child. The law should not supplant parental
discretion or unnecessarily infringe on parental authority.
Parents have a natural and fundamental right to autonomy in the care, custody,
and upbringing of their children. The Family Code recognizes this in Article
209:
Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and
property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility
shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character
and well-being. (n)
The State ought not to interfere with the right of parents to bring up their child
unless its exercise causes potential harm to him. The State steps in, through
the law, only if there are compelling reasons to do so. State intrusion is
uncalled for where the welfare of a child is not jeopardized.
Regardless of marital circumstances, the mother and the father are presumed
to be fit and competent to act in the best interest of their child. They can agree
to share parental authority or, if you will, parental custody even as they decide
to live under separate roofs. In a voluntary joint custody the mother might want
to keep the child in her home during schooldays but allow the father to have
him on weekends. And they could agree on some device for arriving at a
consensus on where the child will study and how his spiritual needs are to be
attended to.
The law does not take away from a separating couple the authority and
competence to determine what is best for their child. If they resolve on their
own that shared parental custody is in their child’s best interest, then the law
and the courts have no business vetoing their decision. The parents enjoy a
primary right to make such decision. I cannot concede that, where the child is
below seven years of age, any agreement that diminishes the mother’s
absolute custody over him is void.
The second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code should not be read
as prohibiting separated couples from agreeing to a custody arrangement,
other than sole maternal custody, for their child of tender age. The statutory
preference for the mother’s custody comes into play only when courts are
compelled to resolve custody fights between separated parents. Where the
parents settle the matter out of court by mutual agreement, the statutory
preference reserved to the mother should not apply.
A reading of the entire text of Article 213 shows that the second paragraph
applies only to custody disputes that have reached the courtroom. Thus:
Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

It is unmistakable that the legislative policy is to vest the separated mother with
physical custody of the child under seven years old, in cases where the courts
are called upon to designate a parent for the exercise of parental authority.
The second sentence of the first paragraph and the second paragraph itself
merely qualify the general rule expressed in the first sentence that "parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court," in case of
parental separation.
In choosing the parent who will exercise parental authority, the court must take
into account all relevant considerations. One of these is the child’s age, as the
court is directed to give due regard to the child’s choice, if the child is more
than seven years of age. If the child, however, is below seven years of age,
the court cannot separate the child from the mother, except for compelling
reasons. This is the import of the entire provision.
Thus, no legislative policy is violated if separated parents are allowed to
voluntarily agree to a child custody arrangement other than sole maternal
custody. It is not the policy of the state to prohibit separated parents from
compromising on child custody even if the child is of tender age. On the
contrary, voluntary custody agreements are generally favored as it can only
work for the best interest of the child.
It is not logical to say that the Court would be subverting the legislative policy
of avoiding "a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her"
if separated parents are allowed to enter into a joint custody agreement. It can
hardly be said that a child is being "torn away" from the mother, if the mother
sees the wisdom and benefit of sharing custody of the child with the father.
The voluntary nature of the agreement negates any "deep sorrow" or sense of
deprivation that the mother may experience on account of her separation from
the child.
Consequently, if separated parents mutually stipulate to uphold some form of
joint authority over their children of tender age, it cannot in any way be
regarded as illegal or contrary to public policy. Joint parental authority and
custody is the norm and should be viewed as the more desirable custody
arrangement. It encourages continuing contact with and involvement of both
parents in the lives of their children. It can only redound to the minor’s greater
well-being and should thus be favored.
To declare that a joint custody agreement over minors of tender age
contravenes Philippine laws will only discourage separating couples from
sharing parental duties and responsibilities. It will render shared parenthood
illegal and unduly promote paternal alienation. It also presumes that separated
parents cannot cooperate and compromise for the welfare of their children. It
constitutes undue interference in the parents’ intrinsic right to direct their
relations with their child.
A joint custody agreement can of course never be regarded as permanent and
unbending. The situations of the mother or the father and even of the child can
change and render performance of such agreement no longer in the latter’s
best interest. If the parents disagree on what they think is best for the child,
recourse to the Court may be inevitable. But I suggest that the parent who
wants the joint custody agreement changed or set aside bears the burden of
showing to the court the new situations of the parties and how such
arrangement have become unfavorable or detrimental to the child under the
circumstances. This is a consequence of the presumption that contracts that
are valid remain valid unless shown otherwise.
Here, the agreement between petitioner Herald and his estranged wife
providing for joint custody of their then six-year-old child is a valid exercise of
parental discretion and authority. It is independent of the foreign divorce
decree and may be enforced or repudiated in this jurisdiction, since its object
is the custody of a Filipino-American minor residing in the Philippines. Although
Herald’s complaint before the trial court appears to be one for specific
performance, it is, at heart, an action for custody and enforcement of parental
rights. Being so, the Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction
over the action.
I concur in the decision subject to my above reservations.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 136804 February 19, 2003
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK,
petitioners,
vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside
the Court of Appeals’1 Decision of August 24, 1998 and Resolution of
December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 423102 affirming the trial court’s denial
of petitioners’ motion for partial summary judgment.
The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity)
filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila ("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly
for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking
account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to
signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his
account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by
stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York law and this law does
not permit any of Guerrero’s claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the
Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of
Guerrero’s claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees on the same ground alleged in its Answer.
The Bank contended that the trial should be limited to the issue of actual
damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden’s affidavit ("Walden
affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerrero’s New York bank account stipulated
that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero’s
claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York
authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Bank’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its
motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July 17, 1996, respectively.
The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
assailing the RTC Orders. In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals
denied the Bank’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden affidavit does
not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank
to support its motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and
jurisprudence as public documents defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the
Rules on Evidence, as follows:
"SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
x x x."
The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section
24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving foreign law:
"SEC. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Bank’s argument that Section 2,
Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to move with the supporting
Walden affidavit for partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court of
Appeals clarified that the Walden affidavit is not the supporting affidavit
referred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of genuine issue
between the parties. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if the Walden
affidavit is used for purposes of summary judgment, the Bank must still comply
with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to prove the foreign law.
The Issues
The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in -
"x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] PROOF OF FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE GIVEN BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANK’S] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES
FOREIGN LAW AS A FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND THEREBY ‘CANNOT
SERVE AS PROOF OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON BY
PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x x’."3
First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was
entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law bars
the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. Consequently, outright dismissal by summary
judgment of these claims is warranted.
Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements
of Rule 35 on summary judgments and those of a trial on the merits in
considering the Walden affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the
Walden affidavit is not hearsay since Rule 35 expressly permits the use of
affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing
affidavit to refute the facts contained in the Walden affidavit, he failed to show
the need for a trial on his claims for damages other than actual.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
"Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. – A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought
may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof."
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on
motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except
the amount of damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.4
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised
in the pleadings genuine, sham or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions
or admissions accompanying the motion?5
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as
not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.6
A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are
genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial. Guerrero’s complaint before
the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his
claim for damages. He is seeking damages for what he asserts as "illegally
withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the
Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification
problems, and unauthorized conversion of his account." In its Answer, the
Bank set up its defense that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual
relation bars the recovery of damages other than actual. Apparently, facts are
asserted in Guerrero’s complaint while specific denials and affirmative
defenses are set out in the Bank’s answer.
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case
based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to
the court. However, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Bank’s
motion for partial summary judgment as supported by the Walden affidavit
does not demonstrate that Guerrero’s claims are sham, fictitious or contrived.
On the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material
allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and there are substantial
triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or
where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.7 The resolution of
whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question
of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our courts.8 Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.9
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting
allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s
claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved
only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign
authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2)
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official
publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody
thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of
Appeals10 which held that:
"x x x:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above
rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel
Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court) does not exclude the presentation of other competent
evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the Supreme
Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San
Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code
and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were
contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law.
Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the
pertinent law of California as proved by the respondents’ witness. In that case,
the counsel for respondent "testified that as an active member of the California
Bar since 1951, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State
of California. When asked by the lower court to state the pertinent California
law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited
Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b) of the California Internal and Revenue Code as
published in Derring’s California Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co.,
Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was
offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in several naturalization cases,
it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on
reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the
prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable
action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the
authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate
General of Manila was held to be competent proof of that law." (Emphasis
supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal
or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause. These cases
involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and
quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand,
the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified
in open court.1a\^/phi1.net The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof
of New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also
because it does not state the specific New York law on damages. We
reproduce portions of the Walden affidavit as follows:
"3. In New York, "[n]ominal damages are damages in name only, trivial sums
such as six cents or $1. Such damages are awarded both in tort and contract
cases when the plaintiff establishes a cause of action against the defendant,
but is unable to prove" actual damages. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, § 3.32 at
294 (1993). Since Guerrero is claiming for actual damages, he cannot ask for
nominal damages.
4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I have reviewed
Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which does not use the phrase "temperate
damages" in its index. I have also done a computerized search for the phrase
in all published New York cases, and have found no cases that use it. I have
never heard the phrase used in American law.
5. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects of a Bank’s
relationship with its depositors. In this case, it governs Guerrero’s claim arising
out of the non-payment of the $18,000 check. Guerrero claims that this was a
wrongful dishonor. However, the UCC states that "justifiable refusal to pay or
accept" as opposed to dishonor, occurs when a bank refuses to pay a check
for reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible signature or
a forgery, § 3-510, Official Comment 2. ….. to the Complaint, MHT returned
the check because it had no signature card on …. and could not verify
Guerrero’s signature. In my opinion, consistent with the UCC, that is a
legitimate and justifiable reason not to pay.
6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of a justifiable
refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that "neither consequential or special or
punitive damages may be had except as specifically provided in the Act or by
other rule of law". UCC 4-103 further provides that consequential damages
can be recovered only where there is bad faith. This is more restrictive than
the New York common law, which may allow consequential damages in a
breach of contract case (as does the UCC where there is a wrongful dishonor).
7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to reputation and
mental distress are considered consequential damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v.
Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost profits);
Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374
N.Y.S..2d 868, 869-70 (4th Dep’t 1975) damage to reputation); Dobbs, Law of
Remedies §12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress cannot be
recovered for a breach of contract. Geler v. National Westminster Bank U.S.A.,
770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes, Ltd., 150
A.D.2d 860,540 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (3d Dep’t 1989) Martin v. Donald Park
Acres, 54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32 (2nd Dep’t 1976). Damage to
reputation is also not recoverable for a contract. Motif Construction Corp. v.
Buffalo Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.1a\^/phi1.net
9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase stock, New
York courts will not take into consideration the performance of the stock after
the breach. Rather, damages will be based on the value of the stock at the
time of the breach, Aroneck v. Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966, 456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559
(4th Dep’t 1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d 601, 449 N.E.2d 1276, 463 N.Y.S.2d
1023 (1983).
10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages if they
were the type that would naturally arise from the breach and if they were
"brought within the contemplation of parties as the probable result of the
breach at the time of or prior to contracting." Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of
Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989), (quoting Chapman v.
Fargo, 223 N.Y. 32, 36 (1918).
11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees unless they
are provided by contract or statute. E.g., Geler v. National Westminster Bank,
770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Camatron Sewing Mach, Inc. v. F.M.
Ring Assocs., Inc., 179 A.D.2d 165, 582 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dep’t 1992);
Stanisic v. Soho Landmark Assocs., 73 A.D.2d 268, 577 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281
(1st Dep’t 1991). There is no statute that permits attorney’s fees in a case of
this type.
12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of contract,
even where the plaintiff claims the defendant acted with malice. Geler v.
National Westminster Bank, 770 F.Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Catalogue
Service of …chester11 _v. Insurance Co. of North America, 74 A.D.2d 837,
838, 425 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dep’t 1980); Senior v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 110 A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (2d Dep’t 1985).
13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is alleged
and proven that the wrong supposedly committed by defendant amounts to a
fraud aimed at the public generally and involves a high moral culpability.
Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that
exemplary damages are not available for a mere breach of contract for in such
a case, as a matter of law, only a private wrong and not a public right is
involved. Thaler v. The North Insurance Company, 63 A.D.2d 921, 406
N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dep’t 1978)."12
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant’s personal
interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and
jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden
affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official
records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of
some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do
not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions
of foreign courts.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York
law and jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply with Section
24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts,
the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New
York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerrero’s failure to submit an opposing
affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent provision of Section 3,
Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did not make the submission of an opposing
affidavit mandatory, thus:
"SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. – The motion shall be served at
least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Emphasis
supplied)
It is axiomatic that the term "may" as used in remedial law, is only permissive
and not mandatory.13
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Bank’s motion
for partial summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just because he failed
to file an opposing affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary
judgment, although he did not present an opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not
have presented an opposing affidavit, as there was no need for one, because
the Walden affidavit did not establish what the Bank intended to prove.
Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or impliedly, the veracity of the
statements in the Walden affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving
New York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an opposing
affidavit. As the party moving for summary judgment, the Bank has the burden
of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact and that any
doubt as to the existence of such issue is resolved against the movant.14
Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to submit
an opposing affidavit considering that what the Bank seeks to be opposed is
the very subject matter of the complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing
affidavit to the Walden affidavit because his complaint itself controverts the
matters set forth in the Bank’s motion and the Walden affidavit. A party should
not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo
correctly denied the Bank’s motion for partial summary judgment. There is a
need to determine by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is
guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages under the applicable
laws.
This case has been delayed long enough by the Bank’s resort to a motion for
partial summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has successfully defeated the
very purpose for which summary judgments were devised in our rules, which
is, to aid parties in avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
August 24, 1998 and the Resolution dated December 14, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145587 October 26, 2007
EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN,
respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the October 18, 2000
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56120 which
affirmed the January 15, 1999 Decision3 and September 30, 1999 Resolution4
rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) (Third Division)
in POEA ADJ (L) 94-06-2194, ordering Expertise Search International (ESI),
EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. (EDI), and Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est.
(OAB) jointly and severally to pay Eleazar S. Gran (Gran) the amount of USD
16,150.00 as unpaid salaries.
The Facts
Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs).5 ESI is another recruitment agency which
collaborated with EDI to process the documentation and deployment of private
respondent to Saudi Arabia.
Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI
to work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.6
It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for curricula
vitae of qualified applicants for the position of "Computer Specialist."7 In a
facsimile transmission dated November 29, 1993, OAB informed EDI that, from
the applicants' curricula vitae submitted to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for
the position of "Computer Specialist." The faxed letter also stated that if Gran
agrees to the terms and conditions of employment contained in it, one of which
was a monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal) 2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may
arrange for Gran's immediate dispatch.8
After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment
contract9 that granted him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two
years. Gran was then deployed to Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on
February 7, 1994.
Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly
salary—his employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Information Sheet indicated USD
600.00 only. However, through the assistance of the EDI office in Riyadh, OAB
agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a month.10
After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment
was terminated through OAB's July 9, 1994 letter,11 on the following grounds:
1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency
primarily on your salary and contract duration.
2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment
agency[,] vide OAB letter ref. F-5751-93, dated October 3, 1993.12
3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or
instructions (non-submittal of daily activity reports despite several
instructions).
On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00
representing his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a Declaration13
releasing OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him.
After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint, on July 21, 1994,
against ESI/EDI, OAB, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, and Western
Guaranty Corporation with the NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City,
which was docketed as POEA ADJ (L) 94-06-2194 for underpayment of
wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
In his February 10, 1998 Decision,14 Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, to whom
Gran's case was assigned, ruled that there was neither underpayment nor
illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that there was no underpayment of salaries since
according to the POEA-Overseas Contract Worker (OCW) Information Sheet,
Gran's monthly salary was USD 600.00, and in his Confirmation of
Appointment as Computer Specialist, his monthly basic salary was fixed at SR
2,500.00, which was equivalent to USD 600.00.
Arbiter Caday also cited the Declaration executed by Gran, to justify that Gran
had no claim for unpaid salaries or wages against OAB.
With regard to the issue of illegal dismissal, the Labor Arbiter found that Gran
failed to refute EDI's allegations; namely, (1) that Gran did not submit a single
activity report of his daily activity as dictated by company policy; (2) that he
was not qualified for the job as computer specialist due to his insufficient
knowledge in programming and lack of knowledge in ACAD system; (3) that
Gran refused to follow management's instruction for him to gain more
knowledge of the job to prove his worth as computer specialist; (4) that Gran's
employment contract had never been substituted; (5) and that Gran was paid
a monthly salary of USD 850.00, and USD 350.00 monthly as food allowance.
Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter decided that Gran was validly dismissed from
his work due to insubordination, disobedience, and his failure to submit daily
activity reports.
Thus, on February 10, 1998, Arbiter Caday dismissed Gran's complaint for
lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, Gran filed an Appeal15 on April 6, 1998 with the NLRC, Third
Division. However, it appears from the records that Gran failed to furnish EDI
with a copy of his Appeal Memorandum.
The Ruling of the NLRC
The NLRC held that EDI's seemingly harmless transfer of Gran's contract to
ESI is actually "reprocessing," which is a prohibited transaction under Article
34 (b) of the Labor Code. This scheme constituted misrepresentation through
the conspiracy between EDI and ESI in misleading Gran and even POEA of
the actual terms and conditions of the OFW's employment. In addition, it was
found that Gran did not commit any act that constituted a legal ground for
dismissal. The alleged non-compliance with contractual stipulations relating to
Gran's salary and contract duration, and the absence of pre-qualification
requirements cannot be attributed to Gran but to EDI, which dealt directly with
OAB. In addition, the charge of insubordination was not substantiated, and
Gran was not even afforded the required notice and investigation on his
alleged offenses.
Thus, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and rendered a new
one, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE. Respondents Expertise
Search International, Inc., EDI Staffbuilders Int'l., Inc. and Omar Ahmed Ali Bin
Bechr Est. (OAB) are hereby ordered jointly and severally liable to pay the
complainant Eleazar Gran the Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual
payment of SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS
(US$16,150.00) representing his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract.
SO ORDERED.16
Gran then filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment17 on March 29, 1999 with
the NLRC and petitioner receiving a copy of this motion on the same date.18
To prevent the execution, petitioner filed an Opposition19 to Gran's motion
arguing that the Writ of Execution cannot issue because it was not notified of
the appellate proceedings before the NLRC and was not given a copy of the
memorandum of appeal nor any opportunity to participate in the appeal.
Seeing that the NLRC did not act on Gran's motion after EDI had filed its
Opposition, petitioner filed, on August 26, 1999, a Motion for Reconsideration
of the NLRC Decision after receiving a copy of the Decision on August 16,
1999.20
The NLRC then issued a Resolution21 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, ratiocinating that the issues and arguments raised in the
motion "had already been amply discussed, considered, and ruled upon" in the
Decision, and that there was "no cogent reason or patent or palpable error that
warrant any disturbance thereof."
Unconvinced of the NLRC's reasoning, EDI filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the CA. Petitioner claimed in its petition that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in giving due course to the appeal despite Gran's failure to perfect
the appeal.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA subsequently ruled on the procedural and substantive issues of EDI's
petition.

On the procedural issue, the appellate court held that "Gran's failure to furnish
a copy of his appeal memorandum [to EDI was] a mere formal lapse, an
excusable neglect and not a jurisdictional defect which would justify the
dismissal of his appeal."22 The court also held that petitioner EDI failed to
prove that private respondent was terminated for a valid cause and in
accordance with due process; and that Gran's Declaration releasing OAB from
any monetary obligation had no force and effect. The appellate court
ratiocinated that EDI had the burden of proving Gran's incompetence;
however, other than the termination letter, no evidence was presented to show
how and why Gran was considered to be incompetent. The court held that
since the law requires the recruitment agencies to subject OFWs to trade tests
before deployment, Gran must have been competent and qualified; otherwise,
he would not have been hired and deployed abroad.
As for the charge of insubordination and disobedience due to Gran's failure to
submit a "Daily Activity Report," the appellate court found that EDI failed to
show that the submission of the "Daily Activity Report" was a part of Gran's
duty or the company's policy. The court also held that even if Gran was guilty
of insubordination, he should have just been suspended or reprimanded, but
not dismissed.
The CA also held that Gran was not afforded due process, given that OAB did
not abide by the twin notice requirement. The court found that Gran was
terminated on the same day he received the termination letter, without having
been apprised of the bases of his dismissal or afforded an opportunity to
explain his side.
Finally, the CA held that the Declaration signed by Gran did not bar him from
demanding benefits to which he was entitled. The appellate court found that
the Declaration was in the form of a quitclaim, and as such is frowned upon as
contrary to public policy especially where the monetary consideration given in
the Declaration was very much less than what he was legally entitled to—his
backwages amounting to USD 16,150.00.
As a result of these findings, on October 18, 2000, the appellate court denied
the petition to set aside the NLRC Decision.
Hence, this instant petition is before the Court.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I. WHETHER THE FAILURE OF GRAN TO FURNISH A COPY OF HIS
APPEAL MEMORANDUM TO PETITIONER EDI WOULD CONSTITUTE A
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT AND A DEPRIVATION OF PETITIONER EDI'S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS WOULD JUSTIFY THE DISMISSAL OF
GRAN'S APPEAL.
II. WHETHER PETITIONER EDI HAS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT GRAN'S TERMINATION WAS
JUSTIFIABLE BY REASON OF INCOMPETENCE. COROLLARY HERETO,
WHETHER THE PRIETO VS. NLRC RULING, AS APPLIED BY THE COURT
OF APPEALS, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
III. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED BY WAY OF
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT GRAN'S TERMINATION WAS
JUSTIFIABLE BY REASON OF INSUBORDINATION AND DISOBEDIENCE.
IV. WHETHER GRAN WAS AFFORDED DUE PROCESS PRIOR TO
TERMINATION.
V. WHETHER GRAN IS ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES FOR THE
UNEXPIRED PORTION OF HIS CONTRACT.23
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit except with respect to Gran's failure to furnish EDI with
his Appeal Memorandum filed with the NLRC.
First Issue: NLRC's Duty is to Require Respondent to Provide Petitioner a
Copy of the Appeal
Petitioner EDI claims that Gran's failure to furnish it a copy of the Appeal
Memorandum constitutes a jurisdictional defect and a deprivation of due
process that would warrant a rejection of the appeal.
This position is devoid of merit.
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that failure of appellant to furnish a copy of
the appeal to the adverse party is not fatal to the appeal.
In Estrada v. National Labor Relations Commission,24 this Court set aside the
order of the NLRC which dismissed an appeal on the sole ground that the
appellant did not furnish the appellee a memorandum of appeal contrary to the
requirements of Article 223 of the New Labor Code and Section 9, Rule XIII of
its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Also, in J.D. Magpayo Customs Brokerage Corp. v. NLRC, the order of
dismissal of an appeal to the NLRC based on the ground that "there is no
showing whatsoever that a copy of the appeal was served by the appellant on
the appellee"25 was annulled. The Court ratiocinated as follows:
The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was a mere formal
lapse, an excusable neglect. Time and again We have acted on petitions to
review decisions of the Court of Appeals even in the absence of proof of
service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals as required by Section 1 of
Rule 45, Rules of Court. We act on the petitions and simply require the
petitioners to comply with the rule.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
The J.D. Magpayo ruling was reiterated in Carnation Philippines Employees
Labor Union-FFW v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 Pagdonsalan v.
NLRC,28 and in Sunrise Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC.29
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from these cases is that failure to furnish the
adverse party with a copy of the appeal is treated only as a formal lapse, an
excusable neglect, and hence, not a jurisdictional defect. Accordingly, in such
a situation, the appeal should not be dismissed; however, it should not be
given due course either. As enunciated in J.D. Magpayo, the duty that is
imposed on the NLRC, in such a case, is to require the appellant to comply
with the rule that the opposing party should be provided with a copy of the
appeal memorandum.
While Gran's failure to furnish EDI with a copy of the Appeal Memorandum is
excusable, the abject failure of the NLRC to order Gran to furnish EDI with the
Appeal Memorandum constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The records reveal that the NLRC discovered that Gran failed to furnish EDI a
copy of the Appeal Memorandum. The NLRC then ordered Gran to present
proof of service. In compliance with the order, Gran submitted a copy of Camp
Crame Post Office's list of mail/parcels sent on April 7, 1998.30 The post
office's list shows that private respondent Gran sent two pieces of mail on the
same date: one addressed to a certain Dan O. de Guzman of Legaspi Village,
Makati; and the other appears to be addressed to Neil B. Garcia (or Gran),31
of Ermita, Manila—both of whom are not connected with petitioner.
This mailing list, however, is not a conclusive proof that EDI indeed received a
copy of the Appeal Memorandum.
Sec. 5 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure (1990) provides for the proof and
completeness of service in proceedings before the NLRC:
Section 5.32 Proof and completeness of service.—The return is prima facie
proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon
receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his
mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the
postmaster, service shall take effect after such time. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, if the service is done through registered mail, it is only deemed
complete when the addressee or his agent received the mail or after five (5)
days from the date of first notice of the postmaster. However, the NLRC Rules
do not state what would constitute proper proof of service.
Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, provides for proofs of service:
Section 13. Proof of service.—Proof of personal service shall consist of a
written admission of the party served or the official return of the server, or the
affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist
of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section
7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by
such affidavit and registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry
return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu
thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee (emphasis supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, it is obvious that the list submitted by Gran
is not conclusive proof that he had served a copy of his appeal memorandum
to EDI, nor is it conclusive proof that EDI received its copy of the Appeal
Memorandum. He should have submitted an affidavit proving that he mailed
the Appeal Memorandum together with the registry receipt issued by the post
office; afterwards, Gran should have immediately filed the registry return card.
Hence, after seeing that Gran failed to attach the proof of service, the NLRC
should not have simply accepted the post office's list of mail and parcels sent;
but it should have required Gran to properly furnish the opposing parties with
copies of his Appeal Memorandum as prescribed in J.D. Magpayo and the
other cases. The NLRC should not have proceeded with the adjudication of
the case, as this constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The glaring failure of NLRC to ensure that Gran should have furnished
petitioner EDI a copy of the Appeal Memorandum before rendering judgment
reversing the dismissal of Gran's complaint constitutes an evasion of the
pertinent NLRC Rules and established jurisprudence. Worse, this failure
deprived EDI of procedural due process guaranteed by the Constitution which
can serve as basis for the nullification of proceedings in the appeal before the
NLRC. One can only surmise the shock and dismay that OAB, EDI, and ESI
experienced when they thought that the dismissal of Gran's complaint became
final, only to receive a copy of Gran's Motion for Execution of Judgment which
also informed them that Gran had obtained a favorable NLRC Decision. This
is not level playing field and absolutely unfair and discriminatory against the
employer and the job recruiters. The rights of the employers to procedural due
process cannot be cavalierly disregarded for they too have rights assured
under the Constitution.
However, instead of annulling the dispositions of the NLRC and remanding the
case for further proceedings we will resolve the petition based on the records
before us to avoid a protracted litigation.33
The second and third issues have a common matter—whether there was just
cause for Gran's dismissal—hence, they will be discussed jointly.
Second and Third Issues: Whether Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason of
incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience
In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the
OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are
governed by the employment contract. A contract freely entered into is
considered law between the parties; and hence, should be respected. In
formulating the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.34
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically
states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.).
Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the
termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is
treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge
or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to
know only domestic or forum law.35
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or
processual presumption comes into play.36 Where a foreign law is not pleaded
or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the
same as ours.37 Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us.
Petitioner EDI claims that it had proven that Gran was legally dismissed due
to incompetence and insubordination or disobedience.
This claim has no merit.
In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and
jurisprudence that the employer should prove that the dismissal of employees
or personnel is legal and just.
Section 33 of Article 277 of the Labor Code38 states that:
ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS39
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their
right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause
and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this
Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to
be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for
termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to
guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision
taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the workers to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the
regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of
proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on
the employer. x x x
In many cases, it has been held that in termination disputes or illegal dismissal
cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and
valid causes; and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal
was not justified and therefore illegal.40 Taking into account the character of
the charges and the penalty meted to an employee, the employer is bound to
adduce clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence to prove that the
dismissal is valid and legal.41 This is consistent with the principle of security
of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution and reinforced by Article 277 (b)
of the Labor Code of the Philippines.42
In the instant case, petitioner claims that private respondent Gran was validly
dismissed for just cause, due to incompetence and insubordination or
disobedience. To prove its allegations, EDI submitted two letters as evidence.
The first is the July 9, 1994 termination letter,43 addressed to Gran, from
Andrea E. Nicolaou, Managing Director of OAB. The second is an unsigned
April 11, 1995 letter44 from OAB addressed to EDI and ESI, which outlined
the reasons why OAB had terminated Gran's employment.
Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist
position because he had "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero
knowledge of [the] ACAD system."45 Petitioner also claims that Gran was
justifiably dismissed due to insubordination or disobedience because he
continually failed to submit the required "Daily Activity Reports."46 However,
other than the abovementioned letters, no other evidence was presented to
show how and why Gran was considered incompetent, insubordinate, or
disobedient. Petitioner EDI had clearly failed to overcome the burden of
proving that Gran was validly dismissed.
Petitioner's imputation of incompetence on private respondent due to his
"insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of the ACAD
system" based only on the above mentioned letters, without any other
evidence, cannot be given credence.
An allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation.
Incompetence may be shown by weighing it against a standard, benchmark,
or criterion. However, EDI failed to establish any such bases to show how
petitioner found Gran incompetent.
In addition, the elements that must concur for the charge of insubordination or
willful disobedience to prosper were not present.
In Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, we held that:
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the following twin
elements must concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been
willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.47
EDI failed to discharge the burden of proving Gran's insubordination or willful
disobedience. As indicated by the second requirement provided for in Micro
Sales Operation Network, in order to justify willful disobedience, we must
determine whether the order violated by the employee is reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee, and pertains to the duties which he had been
engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show that the
order of the company which was violated—the submission of "Daily Activity
Reports"—was part of Gran's duties as a Computer Specialist. Before the
Labor Arbiter, EDI should have provided a copy of the company policy, Gran's
job description, or any other document that would show that the "Daily Activity
Reports" were required for submission by the employees, more particularly by
a Computer Specialist.
Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local employment or recruitment
agencies and not the foreign employer, they should have adduced additional
evidence to convincingly show that Gran's employment was validly and legally
terminated. The burden devolves not only upon the foreign-based employer
but also on the employment or recruitment agency for the latter is not only an
agent of the former, but is also solidarily liable with the foreign principal for any
claims or liabilities arising from the dismissal of the worker.48
Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to
incompetence, insubordination, or willful disobedience.
Petitioner also raised the issue that Prieto v. NLRC,49 as used by the CA in
its Decision, is not applicable to the present case.
In Prieto, this Court ruled that "[i]t is presumed that before their deployment,
the petitioners were subjected to trade tests required by law to be conducted
by the recruiting agency to insure employment of only technically qualified
workers for the foreign principal."50 The CA, using the ruling in the said case,
ruled that Gran must have passed the test; otherwise, he would not have been
hired. Therefore, EDI was at fault when it deployed Gran who was allegedly
"incompetent" for the job.
According to petitioner, the Prieto ruling is not applicable because in the case
at hand, Gran misrepresented himself in his curriculum vitae as a Computer
Specialist; thus, he was not qualified for the job for which he was hired.
We disagree.
The CA is correct in applying Prieto. The purpose of the required trade test is
to weed out incompetent applicants from the pool of available workers. It is
supposed to reveal applicants with false educational backgrounds, and expose
bogus qualifications. Since EDI deployed Gran to Riyadh, it can be presumed
that Gran had passed the required trade test and that Gran is qualified for the
job. Even if there was no objective trade test done by EDI, it was still EDI's
responsibility to subject Gran to a trade test; and its failure to do so only
weakened its position but should not in any way prejudice Gran. In any case,
the issue is rendered moot and academic because Gran's incompetency is
unproved.
Fourth Issue: Gran was not Afforded Due Process
As discussed earlier, in the absence of proof of Saudi laws, Philippine Labor
laws and regulations shall govern the relationship between Gran and EDI.
Thus, our laws and rules on the requisites of due process relating to
termination of employment shall apply.
Petitioner EDI claims that private respondent Gran was afforded due process,
since he was allowed to work and improve his capabilities for five months prior
to his termination.51 EDI also claims that the requirements of due process, as
enunciated in Santos, Jr. v. NLRC,52 and Malaya Shipping Services, Inc. v.
NLRC,53 cited by the CA in its Decision, were properly observed in the present
case.
This position is untenable.
In Agabon v. NLRC,54 this Court held that:
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282,
the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the
employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30
days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2)
notices before their employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to
apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate
to the employees that their employment is being terminated. In between the
first and second notice, the employees should be given a hearing or
opportunity to defend themselves personally or by counsel of their choice.55
A careful examination of the records revealed that, indeed, OAB's manner of
dismissing Gran fell short of the two notice requirement. While it furnished
Gran the written notice informing him of his dismissal, it failed to furnish Gran
the written notice apprising him of the charges against him, as prescribed by
the Labor Code.56 Consequently, he was denied the opportunity to respond
to said notice. In addition, OAB did not schedule a hearing or conference with
Gran to defend himself and adduce evidence in support of his defenses.
Moreover, the July 9, 1994 termination letter was effective on the same day.
This shows that OAB had already condemned Gran to dismissal, even before
Gran was furnished the termination letter. It should also be pointed out that
OAB failed to give Gran the chance to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of a representative in accordance with Article 277 of the Labor
Code. Clearly, there was no intention to provide Gran with due process.
Summing up, Gran was notified and his employment arbitrarily terminated on
the same day, through the same letter, and for unjustified grounds. Obviously,
Gran was not afforded due process.
Pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Agabon,57 an employer is liable to pay
nominal damages as indemnity for violating the employee's right to statutory
due process. Since OAB was in breach of the due process requirements under
the Labor Code and its regulations, OAB, ESI, and EDI, jointly and solidarily,
are liable to Gran in the amount of PhP 30,000.00 as indemnity.
Fifth and Last Issue: Gran is Entitled to Backwages
We reiterate the rule that with regard to employees hired for a fixed period of
employment, in cases arising before the effectivity of R.A. No. 804258 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act) on August 25, 1995, that when the
contract is for a fixed term and the employees are dismissed without just
cause, they are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of their contract.59 On the other hand, for cases arising after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, when the termination of employment is without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall
be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term whichever is less.60
In the present case, the employment contract provides that the employment
contract shall be valid for a period of two (2) years from the date the employee
starts to work with the employer.61 Gran arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and
started to work on February 7, 1994;62 hence, his employment contract is until
February 7, 1996. Since he was illegally dismissed on July 9, 1994, before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, he is therefore entitled to backwages
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract, which was equivalent
to USD 16,150.
Petitioner EDI questions the legality of the award of backwages and mainly
relies on the Declaration which is claimed to have been freely and voluntarily
executed by Gran. The relevant portions of the Declaration are as follows:
I, ELEAZAR GRAN (COMPUTER SPECIALIST) AFTER RECEIVING MY
FINAL SETTLEMENT ON THIS DATE THE AMOUNT OF:
S.R. 2,948.00 (SAUDI RIYALS TWO THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT ONLY)
REPRESENTING COMPLETE PAYMENT (COMPENSATION) FOR THE
SERVICES I RENDERED TO OAB ESTABLISHMENT.
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT OAB EST. HAS NO FINANCIAL OBLIGATION
IN MY FAVOUR AFTER RECEIVING THE ABOVE MENTIONED AMOUNT
IN CASH.
I STATE FURTHER THAT OAB EST. HAS NO OBLIGATION TOWARDS ME
IN WHATEVER FORM.
I ATTEST TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THIS STATEMENT BY AFFIXING
MY SIGNATURE VOLUNTARILY.
SIGNED.
ELEAZAR GRAN
Courts must undertake a meticulous and rigorous review of quitclaims or
waivers, more particularly those executed by employees. This requirement
was clearly articulated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Land and
Housing Development Corporation v. Esquillo:
Quitclaims, releases and other waivers of benefits granted by laws or contracts
in favor of workers should be strictly scrutinized to protect the weak and the
disadvantaged. The waivers should be carefully examined, in regard not only
to the words and terms used, but also the factual circumstances under which
they have been executed.63 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court had also outlined in Land and Housing Development Corporation,
citing Periquet v. NLRC,64 the parameters for valid compromise agreements,
waivers, and quitclaims:
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable
settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the
waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must
be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. (Emphasis supplied.)
Is the waiver and quitclaim labeled a Declaration valid? It is not.
The Court finds the waiver and quitclaim null and void for the following reasons:
1. The salary paid to Gran upon his termination, in the amount of SR 2,948.00,
is unreasonably low. As correctly pointed out by the court a quo, the payment
of SR 2,948.00 is even lower than his monthly salary of SR 3,190.00 (USD
850.00). In addition, it is also very much less than the USD 16,150.00 which is
the amount Gran is legally entitled to get from petitioner EDI as backwages.
2. The Declaration reveals that the payment of SR 2,948.00 is actually the
payment for Gran's salary for the services he rendered to OAB as Computer
Specialist. If the Declaration is a quitclaim, then the consideration should be
much much more than the monthly salary of SR 3,190.00 (USD 850.00)—
although possibly less than the estimated Gran's salaries for the remaining
duration of his contract and other benefits as employee of OAB. A quitclaim
will understandably be lower than the sum total of the amounts and benefits
that can possibly be awarded to employees or to be earned for the remainder
of the contract period since it is a compromise where the employees will have
to forfeit a certain portion of the amounts they are claiming in exchange for the
early payment of a compromise amount. The court may however step in when
such amount is unconscionably low or unreasonable although the employee
voluntarily agreed to it. In the case of the Declaration, the amount is
unreasonably small compared to the future wages of Gran.
3. The factual circumstances surrounding the execution of the Declaration
would show that Gran did not voluntarily and freely execute the document.
Consider the following chronology of events:
a. On July 9, 1994, Gran received a copy of his letter of termination;
b. On July 10, 1994, Gran was instructed to depart Saudi Arabia and required
to pay his plane ticket;65
c. On July 11, 1994, he signed the Declaration;
d. On July 12, 1994, Gran departed from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and
e. On July 21, 1994, Gran filed the Complaint before the NLRC.
The foregoing events readily reveal that Gran was "forced" to sign the
Declaration and constrained to receive the amount of SR 2,948.00 even if it
was against his will—since he was told on July 10, 1994 to leave Riyadh on
July 12, 1994. He had no other choice but to sign the Declaration as he needed
the amount of SR 2,948.00 for the payment of his ticket. He could have
entertained some apprehensions as to the status of his stay or safety in Saudi
Arabia if he would not sign the quitclaim.
4. The court a quo is correct in its finding that the Declaration is a contract of
adhesion which should be construed against the employer, OAB. An adhesion
contract is contrary to public policy as it leaves the weaker party—the
employee—in a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation. Certainly, the employer is being
unjust to the employee as there is no meaningful choice on the part of the
employee while the terms are unreasonably favorable to the employer.66
Thus, the Declaration purporting to be a quitclaim and waiver is unenforceable
under Philippine laws in the absence of proof of the applicable law of Saudi
Arabia.
In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and
waivers of employees under Philippine laws, said agreements should contain
the following:
1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;
2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts,
which the employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise
amount;
3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in
English, Filipino, or in the dialect known to the employees—that by signing the
waiver or quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive the
benefits which are due them under the law; and
4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document
voluntarily, and had fully understood the contents of the document and that
their consent was freely given without any threat, violence, duress,
intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person.
It is advisable that the stipulations be made in English and Tagalog or in the
dialect known to the employee. There should be two (2) witnesses to the
execution of the quitclaim who must also sign the quitclaim. The document
should be subscribed and sworn to under oath preferably before any
administering official of the Department of Labor and Employment or its
regional office, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the NLRC or a labor attaché in
a foreign country. Such official shall assist the parties regarding the execution
of the quitclaim and waiver.67 This compromise settlement becomes final and
binding under Article 227 of the Labor Code which provides that:
[A]ny compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon with the assistance of
the Bureau of Labor Relations or the regional office of the DOLE, shall be final
and binding upon the parties and the NLRC or any court "shall not assume
jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance
thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained
through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.
It is made clear that the foregoing rules on quitclaim or waiver shall apply only
to labor contracts of OFWs in the absence of proof of the laws of the foreign
country agreed upon to govern said contracts. Otherwise, the foreign laws
shall apply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 18, 2000 Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 56120 of the Court of Appeals affirming the January 15, 1999
Decision and September 30, 1999 Resolution of the NLRC
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner EDI-Staffbuilders
International, Inc. shall pay the amount of PhP 30,000.00 to respondent Gran
as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO,
OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C.
ABORDO, respondents.
Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General and Jose A. Rico for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners pray that the order dated June 20, 1979
of the National Seamen Board, and the decision dated December 11, 1979 of
the Ministry of Labor be nullified and set aside, and that "if petitioners are found
liable to private respondent, such a liability be reduced to P30,000.00 only, in
accordance with respondent NSB's Standard Format of a Service Agreement."
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta
C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from
an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE
MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of
Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of his death
was receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00 (Petition, page 5).
In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and
time-off allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and
reliefs available in connection with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed
before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the
amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co.
(PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively,
should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. On the other hand,
petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case
because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay
private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death
benefits based on the Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim
should apply in this case.
The Hearing Officer III, Rebene C. Carrera of the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, after hearing the case, rendered judgment on June 20, 1979,
ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly and severally the following:
I. US$30,600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its equivalent
in Philippine currency as death compensation benefits;
II. US$500.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral
expenses;
III. US$3,110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees.
It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National Seamen Board
within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision.
Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. On December 11, 1979, the
Ministry rendered its decision in this case as follows:
Motion for reconsideration filed by respondents from the Order of this Board
dated 20 June 1979 requiring them to pay complainant, jointly and severally,
the amount of Thirty-four thousand and two hundred ten dollars ($34,210.00)
representing death benefits, funeral expenses and attorney's fees.
The facts in the main are not disputed. The deceased, husband of complainant
herein, was employed as a Second Engineer by respondents and served as
such in the vessel "M.T. Cherry Earl" until that fatal day in May 1978 when,
while at sea, he suffered an apoplectic stroke and died four days later or on 29
May 1978. In her complaint filed before this Board, Abordo argued that the
amount of compensation due her should be based on the law where the vessel
is registered, which is Singapore law. Agreeing with said argument, this Board
issued the questioned Order. Hence this Motion for Reconsideration.
In their motion for reconsideration, respondents strongly argue that the law of
Singapore should not be applied in the case considering that their
responsibility was not alleged in the complaint that no proof of the existence of
the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore was ever presented and that the
Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of
Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay complainant the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as death benefits based on this Board's
Memorandum Circular No. 25 which, they maintained, should apply in this
case.
The only issue we are called upon to rule is whether or not the law of Singapore
ought to be applied in this case.
After an exhaustive study of jurisprudence on the matter. we rule in the
affirmative. Respondents came out with a well-prepared motion which, to our
mind, is more appropriate and perhaps acceptable in the regular court of
justice. Nothing is raised in their motion but question of evidence. But evidence
is usually a matter of procedure of which this Board, being merely a quasi-
judicial body, is not strict about.
It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the course of
the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases that
a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law
of Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case. But it is our considered
opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to cases
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen
Board. For well-settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the policy
of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims
for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment,
the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. We
see no reason to deviate from this well-considered policy. Certainly not on
technical grounds as movants herein would like us to.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the Order
of tills Board dated 20 June 1979 affirmed. Let execution issue immediately.
In Section 5(B) of the "Employment Agreement" between Norse Management
Co. (PTE) and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, which is Annex "C" of the
Supplemental Complaint, it was stipulated that:
In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of
his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring whilst
on board any vessel to which he may be assigned, but not any other time, the
EMPLOYER win provide employee with free medical attention, including
hospital treatment, also essential medical treatment in the course of
repatriation and until EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. If such illness
or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's
services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated
by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or
whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to
employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's
Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's
Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the
late Napoleon B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under
Philippine Law or the law of registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater.
Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered P30,000.00 only by
the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case.
The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of
Restituta C. Abordo and, therefore, it forms part thereof. As it is familiar with
Singapore Law, the National Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice
of and in applying that law. In the case of VirJen Shipping and Marine Services,
Inc. vs. National Seamen Board, et al (L41297), the respondent Board
promulgated a decision, as follows:
The facts established and/or admitted by the parties are the following: that the
late Remigio Roldan was hired by the respondent as Ordinary Seamen on
board the M/V "Singapura Pertama," a vessel of Singapore Registry; that on
September 27, 1973, the deceased Remigio Roldan met an accident resulting
in his death while on board the said M/V "Singapura Pertama" during the
performance of his duties; that on December 3, 1973, the respondent Virjen
Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. paid the complainant Natividad Roldan the
amount of P6,000.00 representing Workmen's Compensation benefits and
donations of the company; that the amount of P4,870 was spent by the
respondent company as burial expenses of the deceased Remegio Roldan.
The only issue therefore remaining to be resolved by the Board in connection
with the particular case, is whether or not under the existing laws (Philippine
and foreign), the complainant Natividad Roldan is entitled to additional benefits
other than those mentioned earlier. The Board takes judicial notice, (as a
matter of fact, the respondent having admitted in its memorandum) of the fact
that "Singapura Pertama" is a foreign vessel of Singapore Registry and it is
the policy of this Board that in case of award of benefits to seamen who were
either injured in the performance of its duties or who died while in the course
of employment is to consider the benefits allowed by the country where the
vessel is registered. Likewise, the Board takes notice that Singapore maritime
laws relating to workmen's compensation benefits are similar to that of the
Hongkong maritime laws which provides that in case of death, the heirs of the
deceased seaman should receive the equivalent of 36 months wages of the
deceased seaman; in other words, 36 months multiplied by the basic monthly
wages. In the employment contract submitted with this Board, the terms of
which have never been at issue, is shown that the monthly salary of the
deceased Remigio Roldan at the time of his death was US$80.00; such that,
36 months multiplied by $80 would come up to US$2,880 and at the rate of
P7.00 to $1.00, the benefits due the claimant would be P20,160. However,
since there was voluntary payment made in the amount of P6,000 and funeral
expenses which under the Workmen's Compensation Law had a maximum of
P200.00, the amount of P6,200.00 should be deducted from P20,160 and the
difference would be P13,960.00.
WHEREFORE, the Board orders the respondent Virjen Shipping and Marine
Services, Inc. to pay the complainant Natividad Roldan the amount of
P13,960.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision. The Board also
orders the respondent that payment should be made through the National
Seamen Board.
The foregoing decision was assailed as null and void for allegedly having been
rendered without jurisdiction and for awarding compensation benefits beyond
the maximum allowable and on the ground of res judicata. This Court in its
resolution dated October 27, 1975 and December 12, 1975, respectively
dismissed for lack of merit the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration
in said G.R. No. L- 41297.
Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the
National Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters
or cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relations,
arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for
overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar with
pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation.
Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice and, "in
administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure — particularly of
evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply." (Oromeca Lumber
Co. Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 1188).
Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its
implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.
For lack of merit, this petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO
C. CRUZ, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view
of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental
law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took
an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision
of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance
of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking
of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either
of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of
alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino
citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said
commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he
does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And
provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is
commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed
forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign
country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino
citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection
with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected
as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for
quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution
dated April 27, 2000.6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's
decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being
such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as
a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the
fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his
natural-born status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino
who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a
natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore
allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with
out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as
natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in
Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of
being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds
of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who
at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To
be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become
a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is
satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated
rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63),
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3)
by direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization
is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who
wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications17 and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A.
473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services
in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the
Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630],
the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines. [Italics in the original.25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same
with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before
he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen
since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As
correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen"
was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to
obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers
who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those
"naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because
they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973
Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had
to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After
defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence:
"Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2)
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy
is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected
as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the
"sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is
merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's
judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of
a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO
C. CRUZ, respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan. I am convinced that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not
natural born citizen and, therefore, must be disqualified as a member of
Congress.
Who are natural-born citizens?
The laws on citizenship – its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and
immunities of citizens – have given rise to some of the most disputations and
visceral issues resolved by this Court. The problem is taken up connection with
the sovereign right of voters to choose their representatives in Congress.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not
posses the constitutional requirement of being a natural-born citizen of this
country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is qualified to be
elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status
as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960
to Filipino parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5,
1985, he enlisted in the United States Armed Forces and served the United
States Marine Corps. While in the service for almost five years, he applied for
naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District of California and
was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American
citizen. On October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged from the US
Marine Corps. He then decided to return to the Philippines.
Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by
rendering service to or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the
United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an
Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation ordered the cancellation of his Alien
Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him an Identification
Certificate.
The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department.
On January 18, 1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States.
In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.
He won and served as mayor for one term.
Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this
time declaring himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of
26,671 votes over candidate Antonio Bengson, III.
On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race
in the Second District of Pangasinan.
Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House
of Representative Electoral not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as
a member of the House of Representatives. That he should be a natural-born
citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution
which provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective
memoranda and supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision
holding that Cruz reacquired his natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation
in 1994 and declaring him duly elected representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
"As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies
thereof be sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of
Representatives, through the Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through
its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio."
On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
Decision but the same was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.
Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET
Decision on grounds that:
"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being
such in view of the loss and renuciation of such citizenship on his part.
"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as
a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally
and constitutionally restore his natural-born status."
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was
natural-born citizen of the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate
of Candidacy for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:
"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. xxx."
Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from
birth" contained in the above provisions.
Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must
start at a definite point and must be continuous, constant and without
interruption. The Constitution does not extend the privilege of reacquiring a
natural-born citizen status to respondent, who at one time, became an alien.
His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the benefits,
privileges and attributes of "natural-born" citizenship. When he reacquired his
citizenship in 1994, he had to comply with requirements for repatriation, thus
effectively taking him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-born
Filipino. For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers
to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since
he was born to Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the
innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he
was born to Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 2630 results in
his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its
literal sense, but more in its legal connotation.
The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They
were born as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs,2 the
Supreme Court traces the grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris,
and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and March 23, 1912, which is a
reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives
of other Insular possessions of the United States and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who could become citizens of the United
State under the laws of the United State, if residing therein."
It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the
11th of April, of parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who
continued to reside in this country are at the moment of their birth ipso facto
citizens of the Philippine Islands."
Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the
Second Philippine Commission, considered as our first colonial charter of
fundamental law, we were referred to as "people of the Islands," or "inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and not as citizens, much
less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine
Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.3
Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose
or even non-existent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain
rights and privileges, it became a more strict and difficult status to achieve with
the passing of the years.
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be
acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.4
This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
Law of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of
the Philippine Islands" to resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on
April 11, 1899, their children born subsequent thereto, and later, those
naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only later was jus
sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.
Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege
conferred by law directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to
belong to the Philippine Island. Even at the time of its conception in the
Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was conferred did not have
to do anything to acquire full citizenship.5
Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth,
having been born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically
restored to that status when he subsequently reacquired his citizenship after
losing it.
Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced
that the definition of natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the
Constitution refers to the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of the
same Article, to wit:
"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are
only two classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since
respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines
natural-born citizens as " those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship."
Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follow:
"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP
BY RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering
service to, or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same
with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship."
respondent Cruz had perform certain acts before he could again become a
Filipino citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum,
Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenship and had to execute
an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in
the interpretation and constitution of a constitution is to give effect to the
intention of the framers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in
Constitution are used according to their plain, natural, and usual significance
and import and must be understood in the sense most obvious to the common
understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.
The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and
definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what
its plain meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may
call for construction of what the words imply.
In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration,6 this Court held:
"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the
language of the document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be
given their ordinary meaning, except where technical terms are employed, in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution
is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible, should be understood in the sense they have
in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say."
The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to
this petition according to its natural sense.
Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship through any of these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and
legislation under Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in the restoration of previous
status, either as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a simplistic approach
and tends to be misleading.
If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the
citizen concerned can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to
perform certain acts to become a citizen.

As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug7 in the instant case,
concurred in by Justice A.R. Melo:8
"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationally upon the
fulfillment of certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo
the tedious and time consuming process required by the Revised
Naturalization Law (CA 473, s amended), he, nevertheless, would still have to
make an express and unequivocal act of formally rejecting his adopted state
and reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be of section 2, Article IV, of the
1987 Constitution, one should not have to perform any act at all or go through
any process, judicial or administrative, to enable him to reacquire his
citizenship. willoughby opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able to
claim citizenship without any prior declaration on his part of a desire to obtain
such status. Under this view, the term 'natural born' citizens could also cover
those who have been collectively deemed citizens by reason of the Treaty of
Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been accorded by
the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of
alien parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution had been
elected to public office.)"
The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of
the Constitution is so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an
absolute and permanent degree of allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for
membership in Congress, the branch of the government directly involved and
given the dedicate task of legislation."
The dissenting opinion further states:
"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973
Charter, later adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2,
Article IV thereof, is meant to refer to those ' who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship,' and to those ' who elect Philippine citizenship.' Time and again,
the Supreme Court has declared that where the laws speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation – there is only room for application. The phrase 'from birth
indicates that there is a starting point of his citizenship and this citizenship
should be continuous, constant and without interruption."
Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution
requires that a member of the House of Representative must be a "natural-
born citizen of the Philippines."
For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent
citizenship requirement for higher elective offices, including that of the office
of a Congressman. Otherwise, the Constitution should have simply provided
that a candidate for such position can be merely a citizen of the Philippines, as
required of local elective officers.
The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter
framed and ratified by the Filipino (even as the draft had to be approved by
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the United States) guide and governs
the interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more narrow and bounden
concept of being a natural-born citizen.
Under the 1935 costitution,9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was
applicable to the President and Vice Persident.10 A person who had been a
citizen for only five (5) years could be elected to the National Assembly.11
Only in 1940,12 when the first Constitution was amended did natural-born
citizenship become a requirement for Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives.13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still
be appointed Justice of the Supreme court or a Judge of a lower court.14
The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the
requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified
over the years.
Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National
Assembly, Prime Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior
courts, the chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commission and the
majority of members of the cabinet must be natural-born citizens.16 The 1987
Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the members of the
Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens.17
The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and
clear intendment of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier
approach to the meaning and import of natural born citizen and citizenship in
general.
It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no
less that the constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional
definition of a "natural born Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be
accomplished through a constitutional amendment. Clearly respondent HRET
gravely abused its discretion.
Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship
has been restored. He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship
is not mandated. But he cannot be elected to high offices which the
Constitution has reserved only for natural-born Filipino citizens.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND
AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte
issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001
(DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and
( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-
002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been
issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned
as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo
Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over
petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar
(Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano
reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate
of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley
Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces)
filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered
that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations
were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the
court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only
sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's
adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3
Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the
lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006,
OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered
as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December
1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No.
196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5
April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies
at the University of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies
abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner
graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts
where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de
San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who
was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the
wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel
(Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and
Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5
June 2004, respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She
obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with
Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter
Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back
to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition.
17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed
in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral
arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe
blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother,
the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began
preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools
that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester;20
coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods,
furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with
Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their
pet dog into the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job
in the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without
delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25 while her husband
was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to
arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she
and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One
Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.27 The
corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking
slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and
her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age
began attending Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise
the disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings.29 She
travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S.31
The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband
resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May
2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home34 and to this
day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer
Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's name by
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed
with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her
three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July
2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that
she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children
are considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her
three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City
on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine
Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18
March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the
DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said
affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S.
Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire
before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath
as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of
relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the
petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the
Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate
of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6
years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and
was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May
2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-
born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24
May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered
the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of
these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo
(Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was
docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division.59 She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed
material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be
considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-
born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of
reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to
begin with.64 Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born
Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized
American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be
continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner
was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator
wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years
and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that
assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status
under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement
of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from
July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also
on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine
Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile
in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was
actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins
in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement
in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any
allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her
part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of
citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions
of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the
filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that the same
is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-
born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in
the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator
was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to evidence on her
true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the
Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is, should she serve
as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a
Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and
Local Elections, contained material representations which are false. The fallo
of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition
to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby
CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by
petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015
Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S.
Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez
(Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and
raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner
lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is
determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory
construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193
5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore,
the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties
to support her claim that foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad,
international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local
legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed
by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state practice
that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of
the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it
only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was
a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not
comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that
petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she
renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81
Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her
U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat and her
frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner,
docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under
R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83
He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are repatriated
under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert
to their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that
she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and
six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez
rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency
requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras'
petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the
residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should
be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of
residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her
COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the
reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should
be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an
American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration
laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause
of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case
as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89
Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-
born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the
disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto
as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition
for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on
the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that
she is a natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a
nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are
found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be
repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born
status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the
presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the
BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and
the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that
all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started
reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her
children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a
condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home
in Corinthian Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice
in the Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long
as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.100 She
reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign
citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her
COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First
Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to
complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has
been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First
Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for
the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the
COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC
En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the
present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued
by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from
implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the
Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by
petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments
were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division,
in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in
the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding
the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding
the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9
May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should
be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in
the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground
should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into
the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this
case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority.
The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its
provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform
or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition
to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the
provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such
provision for candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v.
Commission on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc
decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15,
1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of
a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution,
cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and
citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility
into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law.
For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings
for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds
specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from
becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a
word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack
of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding
public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility
is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office
does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort
of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer
from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences
of the respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement
that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however,
cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-
Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there
is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether
an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election
offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the
very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided
that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be
voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted;
and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will
not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make,
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending
in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to
the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That
is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty
of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in
their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they
seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the
election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges
of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC
given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in
elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House
of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the
prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as
the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as
reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No.
9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version
of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is
declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to
or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a
Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of
absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court
that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23
are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are
not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification
of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a
prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior
determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a
judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is
suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither
can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds
of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior
authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being
the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of
unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under
Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding
the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule
essentially that since foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of
citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the
COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a
foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at
tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner
possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such
relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the
burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither
unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there
is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private
respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens.
Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because
such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos,
especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that
her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to
the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence
on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in
issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born
in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part,
petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970,
also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners
in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures
were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented
were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528
female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year,
there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970,
there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%.
That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male
aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably,
Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time
petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was
Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the
fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge,
straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing
evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance
that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are
Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as
the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to
the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies
behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every
foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of
being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the
chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be
foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born
in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly
average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino
parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents.
Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born
Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is
15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278.
For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade would
be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers
for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or
not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have
a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their
children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners
abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would
have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical
paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a
foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left
behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just
because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of
these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is
downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense.
Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown
would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable need ...
Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental
political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional Sr. Rafols:
interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines. There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to
be Filipino.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the
1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive Sr. Montinola:
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for
and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need amendment.
to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue,114 this Court held that: Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the one, or the children of unknown parentage."
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the Sr. Briones:
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the parentage.
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.115
Sr. Rafols:
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize
of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended the child, is not unknown.
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is
recorded: President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following
is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not Sr. Rafols:
recognized by the father. I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the
children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their
xxxx parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and
father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as
President: Filipinos.
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment.
The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children? President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
Sr. Rafols: Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents. Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands
Sr. Montinola: of the Legislature?
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes
consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children Sr. Roxas:
of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in
because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the
principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are
citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a
provision on the subject exhaustively.116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there
was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not
citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and
constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign
father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings;
but this amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed
that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation.
Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear
to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and
that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found,
thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the
16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was
declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings
as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying
that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no
more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally
correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on
assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn
existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas
were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more
need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already
impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic
efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to
recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the
1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was
paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it
is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to
create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that
it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against
foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that
foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny
foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the
constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution
really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to
equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of
special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II,
Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1
which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section
3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have
jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a
child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This
Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which
no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject
matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the
personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil
Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural
person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the
Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.120
(Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing
the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on
the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known
as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC
or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the
issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship
which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous.
Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act"
means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process
is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father
and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner
is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122
The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's
adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers
to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence
effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through
a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international
law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.125
International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the
opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of
reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal
systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this
Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our
country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible,
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance
with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child
"to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such
measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of
his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a
name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which
require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines,
are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality
of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the
territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of
parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their
principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the
UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had
not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription
against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless
binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v.
Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted
principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only
sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the
ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out,
the Court was content with the practice of international and regional state
organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the
United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is
Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or
acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was
decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries
of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention.
The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were considered and
yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that
"generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on
international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of
the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination,
which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right against
enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law"
under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and
South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as
its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of
the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the
Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166
out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as
citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis
countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which
the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally
accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children."
In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be
adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even
the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as
Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with
the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show,
that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter
of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a
defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We
cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself
civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's
warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that
those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is
concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It
would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to
deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must
perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only
plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the
matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as
follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in
several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we
described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino
citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which
cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143 where we said that "[t]he repatriation of
the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship.
Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires
his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-
born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural
citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and
remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously
passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship
may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born
citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the
COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be
continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase
"from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time
of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."
Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In
Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of
citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and
that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process
of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category
for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected
as member of the House of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this
Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing
standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of
Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the
condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good
law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon
should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner
committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her
application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive
parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino.
It has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological
parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted.
One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological
parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of
the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an
amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of
the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and
papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department
[of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151
The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her
birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway.
And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was
not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it
cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to
opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not
petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in her COC
that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for
ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years'
residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a
resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to
the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the
day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according
to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May
2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile,
which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:
1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain
there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24
May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-
mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about
28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal
Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of
her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and
for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their
corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of
items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service
confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First
American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27
April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy
where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May
2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on
24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the
condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband
(confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell
the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the
COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez
cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had
been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites,
namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was no
animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the
evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest
date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July
2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In
this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.
COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments,
the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents
contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot
be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires
Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being
insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa)
until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May
2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different
from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented
was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration
that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not
involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from
citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after
reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161
the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only
visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate
was found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She
was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she
offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted
with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove
her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four
cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that
residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa
or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of
petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that
she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house,
taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company,
notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S.,
donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005
(securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property
here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner
returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had
entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No.
6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as
temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a
former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the
opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to
become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country"164 in line with the government's "reintegration program."165
Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help
him reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in
absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free
period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary
formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what
petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying
property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change
in domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the
Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial
precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no
indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the
respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a
situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been
decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of
petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false
because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence
before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In
doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the
2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the
date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-
May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her
husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her
lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of
residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she
submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself
introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not
have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was
vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale
of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence
that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include
her passport and the school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as
a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made
in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period
of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said
that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if
petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May
2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC
and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner
actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false,
but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be
established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July
2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had
returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005.
When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything.
As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with
the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC
pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006
under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in
the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media
on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance.
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the press.
Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that
time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period
of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the
statement were already matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET
petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September
2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six
( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the question and could
have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a
matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for
President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting
to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was
expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an
intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's
pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not
necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for
denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already
discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer
to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should
evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored
a good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to
the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The
veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed
as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn
declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a
declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines
only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this
declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President."
This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it
is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines
residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of
residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that
cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the
candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and
substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what
we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered
by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made
the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a
period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013
Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for
election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It
was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the
declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention
to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made
aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016.
Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a
senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was
mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never
been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband
however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of
their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City.
[Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna
in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning
Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to
school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of
One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived
in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was
completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her
former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
[petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe"
and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise
the disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal
Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He
returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine
company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian
Hills, where they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to
let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider
no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for
her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the
COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with
grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division,
in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division,
in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent;
SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for
the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1
December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The
Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11
December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate
for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC Case Digest (G.R. Nos. 221697 &
221698-700)
POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 221697
& 221698-700
THE PETITION:
The petition is composed of two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for
an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following:
1. DECEMBER 1, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS SECOND DIVISION (Cancelled petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy);
2. DECEMBER 23, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
(Denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration); and
3. DECEMBER 11, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
(Declared that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to
complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has
been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten 10 years and 11 months
as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
September 3, Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
1968 (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar. Custody over petitioner
was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar and his wife.
September 6, Emiliano Militar reported and registered petitioner
1968 as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo).
1973 When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity
spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces)
filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal
Trial Court
(MTC) of San Juan City.
May 13, 1974 The Poe spouses’ petition for adoption was
granted by the trial court and ordered that
petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe."
December 13, Having reached the age of 18, petitioner
1986 registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City.
April 4, 1988 Petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine
Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of
Foreign Affairs
1988-1991 Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a
degree in Development Studies at the University
of the Philippines but opted to continue her
studies abroad and left for the U.S. in 1988.
Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College
in Chestnuts Hill
July 27, 1991 Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and
the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San
Juan City.
July 29, 1991 Desirous of being with her husband who was then
based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S.
April16, 1992 Petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian
Daniel
April 5, 1993 Renewed her Philippines passport.
May 19, 1998 Renewed her Philippines passport.
July 10, 1998 Petitioner gave birth to daughter Hanna
MacKenzie.
October 18, 2001 Petitioner became a naturalized American citizen
April 8, 2004 – Petitioner came back to the Philippines together
July 8, 2004 with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections. It was during
this time that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter Anika.
December 13, Petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon
2004 – February learning of her father's deteriorating medical
3, 2005 condition who died shortly.
2005 Petitioner and husband began preparing for their
resettlement including notification of their
children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools
May 24, 2005 Petitioner came home to the Philippines and
without delay, secured a Tax Identification
Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
March 2006 The petitioner's husband officially informed the
U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
abandonment of their address in the U.S.
petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-
square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City
where they built their family home.
July 7, 2006 Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention
and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
July 18, 2006 The Bureau of Immigration acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is
deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship.
August 31, 2006 Again, petitioner registered as a voter
of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City. She
also secured from the DFA a new Philippine
Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.
October 6, 2010 President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed
petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).
October 20, 2010 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an
"Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the
United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship" before a notary public in
Pasig City.
October 21, 2010 Petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the
Bureau of Immigration and took her oath of office
as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on,
petitioner stopped using her American passport.
July 12, 2011 The petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of
the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation
of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States" and stated that she in the Philippines,
from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from
May 2005 to present.
December 9, The U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a
2011 "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
States" effective 21 October 2010.
October 2, 2012 The petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years
and 6 months" to the question "Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013."
October 15, 2015 Petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the
May 2016 Elections.
In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016
 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005.
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered
the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of
these consolidated cases.
ISSUES:
1. With regard to: a) being a foundling, and b) her repatriation, is the petitioner
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines? YES TO BOTH.
2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as
president? YES.
Did the petitioner commit material misrepresentation in her Certificate of
Candidacy? NO.
RATIONALE:
1. Is petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?
ON BEING A FOUNDLING:
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and
Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has
Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to
the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence
on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in
issue.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown
that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude
the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where
there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in
the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the
fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight
black hair, almond-shaped eyes and an oval face.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by
this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child
"to acquire a nationality:"
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just
because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of
these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is
downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense.
Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is
effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings.
While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is
no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.
 ON PETITIONER’S REPATRIATION
The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born
citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an
act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain
"Philippine citizenship."
According to the Supreme Court, the COMELEC's ruling disregarded
consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, repatriation was explained as
follows:
…Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally
a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-bom Filipino.
Also, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was
already rejected in Bengson vs. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was
clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is
a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."
2. Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as
president?
ON RESIDENCE
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have 10 years residence
in the Philippines before the day of the elections.
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24
May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-
mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about
28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal
Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of
her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and
for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their
corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23
February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of
items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service
confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First
American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27
April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy
where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May
2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on
24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the
condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband
(confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to
sell the family home).
The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual
continuous stay taken together, lead to no other conclusion that when she
came here on May 24 2005, her intention was to permanently abandon the
United States. Petitioner also actually re-established her residence here on 24
May 2005.
ON MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION
The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she
put six ( 6) years and six (6) months as "period of residence before May 13,
2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she
started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the
COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and
the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the
date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012.
Her explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence
before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted
the COC, is strengthened by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced
in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the
day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query
if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012
COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner.
CONCLUSION:
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions
emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9
May 2016 National Elections.
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election
were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2 the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and,
under §40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second
Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of
Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati
City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that
the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of
Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted
that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien
Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen
because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and
is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his
registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is
born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the
position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office
he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo
Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.3 The
motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998,
of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice
mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en
banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining,
the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared
private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the
United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At
the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American
passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with
the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of
registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine
citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an
oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.
Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City,
garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853)
votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred
thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two
thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third
place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In
applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice
than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law
which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs.
Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of
the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as
a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of
Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the
respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-
mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers,
on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice
mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of
the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold
the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that —
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of
majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself
as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-
Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second
Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner
may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified
to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano — whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit
considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification
filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene
granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right
to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying
his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. — Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an
action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to
intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or
proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion,
shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the
matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated
candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for
Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that
time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo
v. COMELEC,6 reiterated in several cases,7 only applies to cases in which the
election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who
placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner,
and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified
"from running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If
Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was
petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had
been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the
candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage
of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear
from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of
1987, which provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in
filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead
decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with
the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive
issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground
of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent
Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from
being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as
"disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with
dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of
Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General,
who sides with him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local
Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states.9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis
is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines
to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if
by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are
clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides:
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the
instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:
10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee
according to which a dual allegiance — and I reiterate a dual allegiance — is
larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is
seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of
the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not
question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional
cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what
happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese
Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the
country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known
is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the
Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently,
sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's Republic of China, they
have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of
Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were
represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their
acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or
Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some
Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were
concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and
especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about
minority claims on our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan,
Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the
great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by
Filipino-Chinese — it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic
capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means
economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship
which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO
CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these
citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double
sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate
thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the
Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which
elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations
exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner
Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those
debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these
naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is
asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the
anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have
detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its
attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and
national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left
to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the
problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will
the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will
prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No.
7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to
"dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin
G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen
of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following
discussion on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41,
page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any
elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a
natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a
natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up
Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging
to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one
of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the
country of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless,
as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a
Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen
of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the
citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he
is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing
he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino
citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law,
Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship
invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts
that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will
probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must
renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be
issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado
v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that
he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality
were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what
our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign
government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It
must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen
encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this
Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the
doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national
both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en
banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American
law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine
elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as
the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37
years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the
age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced
his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A
person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election
in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond
the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However,
by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27,
1998, contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR
"NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A,
BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE
OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL
OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY
THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.
Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this
question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was
really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he
"had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship — long
before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim — when he
abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to
his Filipino citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19,
1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government
when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before
the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore,
it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court,
absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of
allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is
insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation
should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority
since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon
majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last
travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the
filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship.
The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his
American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What
this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private
respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of
both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here
of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of
said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be
no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either
"express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country;
that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear
true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which
he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his
oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was
a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who,
in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First
Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the
Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc
dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel
Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a
consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States
of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his
favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and
perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all
civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best
of my knowledge and belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following
statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders
and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-
generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the
Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April
2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in
the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of
21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring
the respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3)
days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in
default and to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections
where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer,
submitting the following documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela,
Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that
Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his
barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served
as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15
February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying
that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy based on misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division
considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a
resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed
to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First
Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed
with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively
negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado
had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a
blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a
US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court
in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and
nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign
countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not
continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or
to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby
GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for
Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let
the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of
1991 take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En
Banc on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution
and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence
consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which
show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American
citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he
did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance
of his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he
obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out
of time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for
disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the
elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from
jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor
of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the
2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc
a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently,
he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the nullification of
his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the
highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for
Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions
filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has
already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly
lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the
final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of
the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification
even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further
to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution
of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the
petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well
within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010,
which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First
Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following
premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the
respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a
citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent
became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a
dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More
succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what
he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re:
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is
misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after
taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who
are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding
their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case,
respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose
greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to
supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours
with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US
passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only
issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his
Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months
later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact
is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his
passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following dates:
January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31,
2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him
for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent
used whatever is within his control during that time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes
cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for
under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine
citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship
is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes
a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to
continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent
after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have
remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of
clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly
abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The latter’s continued use of
his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his
previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his
declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship.
Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for
the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty
post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office
itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for
office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to
serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of
votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the
qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his
having received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It
has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election
against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after election, his
having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid.
His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est
lex because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the
sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the
Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the
law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring
Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US
passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010
mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his
continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of
the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm
the First Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review
of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that
the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the
vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be
addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification
case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier
made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a
foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s
qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local
Government Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent
Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution
before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the
latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the
second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is
one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the
COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the
petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the
Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under
this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the
COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the
requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the
matter before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner
and respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En
Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the
issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed
by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy
full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office.
He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is
no question that after performing these twin requirements required under
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first,
on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General
of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009
simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the
foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to
travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely
and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy,
thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four
times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute
and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of
all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court
declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial
of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath
as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport
and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after
he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance
and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired
by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado
represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship
is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is
acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct
from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by
law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign
citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required
to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but
also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado
was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American
citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for
a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period
of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first
used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It
must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation
opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that
"Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his
"Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with
the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts
which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office
pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from
running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a
person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that
he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009,
as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3)
months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese
national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the
renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of
an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act
of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this
country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was
in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the
same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the
COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his
Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have
used his US passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct
the fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his
certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the
use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his
subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his
US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes
with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It
likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag
and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded
the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office
are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public
trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the
Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which
is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-
examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-
recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate
cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of
Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio,
and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office.
Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon
the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second
time to the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four
years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory
prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory
cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when
the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The
Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled
to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and
contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former
case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some other
person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board
of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the
court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns
accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election and the
returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who
received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as
to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the
ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that
the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense
of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it
be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the
real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there
is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the
legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal
character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case,
there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In
the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the
opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath
of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality
of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the
Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based
on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the
election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants
has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared
that no one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at
the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question
raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and to hold the
office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the
second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings
that no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the
last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is
rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered
accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even
have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court
comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an
independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate
to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate
to another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter
established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate
who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing
upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful
winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate
in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other
intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon
prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold
himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a
candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public
office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure
to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public
office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires
certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a
person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest
number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise
is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off
our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who
should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse
this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment
only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when
the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic
of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52
where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be
interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be
considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be
disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of
candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy
are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards
election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before
elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the
will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v.
COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-
tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and
unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such
blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively
negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and
fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is
Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local
government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section
74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may
likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to
cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless
if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may
risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an election victory will
cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid
COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay
any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the
electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the
ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the
sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are
disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made
to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral
anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the
election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v.
COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at
all in determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of
the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of
an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the
sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the
qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as
players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory
is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess
any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules
to be eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the
voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules
affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a
prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very
existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary
before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the
first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed
office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive
ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not
only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this
rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his
disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the
elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided
for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect
of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he
has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier
discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed
his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public
office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar
against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating
as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced
any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition
when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character
of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although
made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0
elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is
disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the
Commission on Elections.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I concur in the ponencia. Respondent Rommel Amado (Arnado) is disqualified
from running for any local elective position. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) should be directed to proclaim Petitioner Casan Macode
Maquiling (Maquiling) as the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Arnado received the highest number of votes in the May 2010 elections and
was proclaimed Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nm1e. Respondent Linog G.
Balua (Balua), one of Arnado’s opponents, filed a petition before the
COMELEC against Arnado. Balua's petition to disqualify Amado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy rests on the allegation that Arnado lacks the
residency and citizenship requirements. Balua presented evidence to show
that Arnado used his American passport to enter and depart the Philippines.
Maquiling, on the other hand, was also one of Arnado’s opponents. Maquiling
received the second highest number of votes next to Arnado. Maquiling filed
motions for intervention and for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Bane. Maquiling asserted that he should have been proclaimed as Mayor for
being the legitimate candidate with the highest number of votes.
Arnado is a natural-born Filipino Citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship upon
his naturalization as an American citizen. Arnado applied for repatriation, and
subsequently took two Oaths of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
then renounced his American citizenship. The relevant timeline is as follows:
10 July 2008 - Arnado pledged his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
3 April 2009 - Arnado again pledged his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his American
citizenship.
14 April to 25 June 2009 - Arnado used his United States of America (USA)
Passport No. 057782700 to depart and enter the Philippines.
29 July to 24 November 2009 - Arnado again used his USA Passport No.
057782700 to depart and enter the Philippines.
30 November 2009 - Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
A certification from the Bureau of Immigration showed that Arnado arrived in
the Philippines on 12 January 2010, as well as on 23 March 2010. Both arrival
dates show that Arnado used the same USA passport he used in 2009.
Despite Balua’s petition before the COMELEC, the elections proceeded
without any ruling on Arnado’s qualification. Arnado received the highest
number of votes in the May 2010 elections and was proclaimed Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
The COMELEC First Division issued its ruling on Arnado’s qualification after
his proclamation. The COMELEC First Division treated Balua’s petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy as a petition for
disqualification. The COMELEC First Division granted Balua’s petition and
annulled Arnado’s proclamation. The COMELEC First Division stated that
"Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado
had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office." The COMELEC
First Division decreed that the order of succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code of 19911 should take effect.
Arnado filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
Maquiling intervened, and asserted that although the COMELEC First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the law on succession should not apply. Instead,
Maquiling should have been proclaimed as Mayor for being the legitimate
candidate with the highest number of votes.
The COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the COMELEC
First Division. In granting Arnado’s motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC
En Banc stated that Arnado’s use of his USA passport "does not operate to
revert back [sic] his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is
no law saying such." COMELEC Chair Sixto Brillantes concurred, and stated
that Arnado "after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to
have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the
absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation."
Commissioner Rene Sarmiento dissented, and declared that Arnado failed to
prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the USA and that his loss of the
continuing requirement of citizenship disqualifies him to serve as an elected
official. Moreover, having received the highest number of votes does not
validate Arnado’s election.
The ponencia granted Maquiling’s petition before this Court, and annulled and
set aside the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc. The ponencia declared that
Arnado’s use of his USA passport did not divest him of his Filipino citizenship
but vested back in him the American citizenship he earlier renounced. The
ponencia also directed the COMELEC to proclaim Maquiling as the duly
elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the May 2010 elections for
being the qualified candidate who received the highest number of votes.
On Arnado’s Use of a Non-Philippine Passport
Philippine courts have no power to declare whether a person possesses
citizenship other than that of the Philippines. In Mercado v. Manzano,2
Constitutional Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas was quoted as saying, "Dual
citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the
laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino
mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control."3 In the present case, we have no
authority to declare that Arnado is an American citizen. Only the courts of the
USA, using American law, have the conclusive authority to make an assertion
regarding Arnado’s American citizenship.
Arnado, as a naturalized American citizen and a repatriated Filipino, is required
by law to swear to an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
execute a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before he may seek elective
Philippine public office. The pertinent sections of R.A. No. 9225 read:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;
x x x x.
Arnado’s use of his American passport after his execution of an Affidavit of
Renunciation of his American Citizenship is a retraction of his renunciation.
When Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 30 November 2009, there
was no longer an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. It is as if
he never renounced his American citizenship at all. Arnado, therefore, failed
to comply with the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship as found in Republic Act No.
9225. We previously discussed the distinction between dual citizenship and
dual allegiance, as well as the different acts required of dual citizens, who may
either have involuntary dual citizenship or voluntary dual allegiance, who
desire to be elected to Philippine public office in Cordora v. COMELEC:4
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in
Mercado v. Manzano, Valles v. COMELEC, and AASJS v. Datumanong.
Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the present case.
Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the
circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United
States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian
mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles
stated that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by cause and,
for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is
involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is
enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his
certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active
participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No.
9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is
allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority
of the Republic of the Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an
implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,
was enacted years after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath
found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who reacquire
Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines
shall "meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside
from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings
in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, Velasco v. COMELEC, and Japzon v.
COMELEC, all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became
naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in
the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did
not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the
twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.5
Hence, Arnado’s failure to comply with the twin requirements of R.A. No. 9225
is clearly a failure to qualify as a candidate for Philippine elective public office.
He is still deemed, under Philippine law, holding allegiance to a foreign
country, which disqualifies him from running for an elective public office. Such
failure to comply with the twin requirements of R.A. No. 9225 is included
among the grounds for disqualification in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code: "Disqualifications. – x x x. Any person who is a permanent resident of
or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in election laws."
On the Selection of the Lawful Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Sur
Arnado used his USA passport after his Renunciation of American Citizenship
and before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. This positive act of retraction
of his renunciation before the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy renders
Arnado’s Certificate of Candidacy void ab initio. Therefore, Arnado was never
a candidate at any time, and all the votes for him are stray votes. We reiterate
our ruling in Jalosjos v. COMELEC6 on this matter:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed
winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited
to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at
the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation
of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of
the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then
legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a
candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are
stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never
be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the
elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the
certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more
equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab
initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the
same position.7
It is undisputed that Amado had to comply with the twin requirements of
allegiance and renunciation. However, Arnado’s use of his USA passport after
the execution of his At1idavit of Renunciation constituted a retraction of his
renunciation, and led to his failure to comply with the requirement of
renunciation at the time he tiled his certificate of candidacy. His certificate of
candidacy was thus void ah initio. Garnering the highest number of votes for
an elective position does not cure this defect. Maquiling, the alleged "second
placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Arnado’s ce11iticate of
candidacy was void ah initio. Maquiling is the qualified candidate who actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I dissent from the ponencia’s conclusions that:
(1) respondent Rommel C. Arnado’s (Arnado) use of his US passport in
traveling twice to the US violated his Oath of Renunciation so that he reverted
back to the status of a dual citizen – a distinct ground for disqualification under
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code (LGC) that barred him from
assuming the office of Mayor of Kuswagan, Lanao del Norte; and
(2) the petitioner, Casan Macode Mquiling (Maquiling), the "second placer" in
the 2010 elections, should be rightfully seated as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte.
I base this Dissent on the following grounds:
1) Arnado has performed all acts required by Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
92251 (RA 9225) to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and to qualify and run for
public office;
2) The evidence on record shows that Arnado’s use of his US passport in two
trips to the US after re-acquiring his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 and
renouncing his US citizenship, were mere isolated acts that were sufficiently
justified under the given circumstances that Arnado fully explained;
3) Arnado’s use of his US passport did not amount to an express renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA
63);
4) Under the circumstances of this case, Arnado did not do anything to negate
the oath of renunciation he took;
5) At any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favor of Arnado’s eligibility after
this was confirmed by the mandate of the people of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte by his election as Mayor; and
6) The assailed findings of facts and consequent conclusions of law are based
on evidence on record and are correct applications of law; hence, no basis
exists for this Court to rule that the Comelec en banc committed grave abuse
of discretion in ruling on the case.
The Antecedent Facts
Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, born to
Filipino parents on July 22, 1957 at Iligan City, Lanao del Norte.2 In 1985, he
immigrated to the United States for job purposes.3 He was deemed to have
lost his Filipino citizenship by operation of law4 when he became a naturalized
citizen of the United States of America while in America.
In 2003, Congress declared it the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship upon compliance with the statute Congress passed – RA
9225.5
Arnado, like many other Filipinos before him, at age 51 and after a stay of 23
years in the U.S., opted to re-affirm his Filipino citizenship by filing the required
application and taking his oath before the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, USA. His application was approved by Consul Wilfredo C. Santos,
evidenced by an Order of Approval dated July 10, 2008.6 He took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) on the same day and
was accordingly issued Identification Certificate Number SF-1524-08/2008
declaring him once more purely a citizen of the Republic.7
On April 3, 2009, Arnado took another Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.8
Eleven days later or on April 14, 2009, Arnado left the country for the United
States. According to Bureau of Immigration records, Arnado then used a
passport – US Passport (No. 057782700) – that identified his nationality as
"USA-AMERICAN." The same record also indicated that Arnado used the
same U.S. Passport when he returned to the country on June 25, 2009. This
happened again when he left for the United States on July 29, 2009 and
returned to the country on November 24, 2009.9
The record does not show the exact date when Arnado applied for a Philippine
passport; it shows however that Consulate General of the Philippines in San
Francisco, USA, approved and issued a Philippine Passport (No. XX 3979162)
for Arnado on June 18, 2009.10 He received this passport three (3) months
later.11 Thereafter, he used his Philippine passport in his travels on the
following dates: December 11, 2009 (Departure), January 12, 2010 (Arrival),
January 31, 2010 (Departure), March 31, 2010 (Arrival), April 11, 2010
(Departure) April 16, 2010 (Arrival), May 20, 2010 (Departure) and June 4,
2010 (Arrival).12
On November 30, 2009 or six months after he fully complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for the position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.13
Five months after or on April 28, 2010, respondent mayoralty candidate Linog
C. Balua (Balua) filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC.
Balua contended that Arnado is a foreigner and is not a resident of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Balua attached to his petition a Bureau of
Immigration (BI) certification dated April 23, 2010 indicating Arnado’s
nationality as "USA-American" and certifying that the name Arnado Rommel
Cagoco appears in the Computer Database/Passenger Manifest with the
following pertinent travel records:14
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
(Significantly, Arnado also submitted the photocopy of his Philippine passport
showing that he used his Philippine passport on travels on these dates.)15
Balua also presented a computer generated travel record dated December 3,
2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700
in entering and departing the Philippines. The record showed that Arnado left
the country on April 14, 2009 and returned on June 25, 2009; he departed
again on July 29, 2009 and arrived back in the country on November 24,
2009.16 In these lights, Arnado’s disqualification was a live election issue,
well-known to the Kauswagan electorate, who nevertheless voted Arnado into
office as Mayor.17
The Comelec First Division ordered Arnado to file his Answer (to Balua’s
petition) and a Memorandum. With the petition filed a mere two weeks from
election day, Arnado failed to comply, thus giving Balua the opportunity to
move that Arnado be declared in default. The Comelec, however, failed to act
on the motion as the case was overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections.
Arnado won the election, garnering 5,952 votes over the second placer,
Maquiling, who garnered 5,357 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers
subsequently proclaimed him as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte.18
In the Answer which he filed after his proclamation, Arnado averred that he did
not commit any material misrepresentation in his CoC, and that he was eligible
to run for the office of mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; he had fully
complied with the requirements of RA 9225 by taking the required Oath of
Allegiance and executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.19
To support his allegations, Arnado also submitted the following documentary
evidence:
(1)Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines dated April 3, 2009;
(2) Joint-Affidavit dated May 31, 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela,
Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that
Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
(3) Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte dated June 3, 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his
barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
(4) Certification dated May 31, 2010 from the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served
as Mayor of Kauswagan from January 1964 to June 1974 and from February
15 1979 to April 15, 1986;
(5) Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying
that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since April 3, 2009.20
The Comelec First Division Ruling
The Comelec First Division treated Balua’s petition as a petition for
disqualification instead of a petition for cancellation of CoC based on
misrepresentation. Because Balua failed to present evidence to support his
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States, the First Division
found no basis to conclude that Arnaldo did not meet the one-year residency
requirement under the LGC.
On the issue of citizenship, the First Division held Arnado’s act of using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship on April 3, 2009, effectively
negated his Oath of Renunciation. As basis, the First Division cited the Court’s
ruling in In Re Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,
et al. It concluded that Arnado’s continued use of his US passport was a strong
indication that he had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that
he only executed an Oath of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. The
Division noted in this regard the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s
unexplained use of his US passport and his claim that he had re-acquired
Philippine citizenship and had renounced his US citizenship.
Based on these premises, the Comelec First Division disqualified Arnado,
annulled his proclamation, and ordered that the order of succession to the
mayoralty under Section 44 of the LGC be given effect.21
Maquiling’s Intervention
While Arnado’s motion for reconsideration was pending, Maquiling intervened
and filed a Motion for Reconsideration and an opposition to Arnado’s motion
for reconsideration.
Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the
order of succession under Section 44 is not applicable; he claimed that with
the cancellation of Arnado’s CoC and the nullification of his proclamation, he
should be proclaimed the winner since he was the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes.22
The Comelec en banc Ruling
The Comelec en banc affirmed the First Division’s treatment of the petition as
a petition for disqualification. It also agreed with the disposition of the First
Division to follow the order of succession under Section 44, thus ruling out
second placer Maquiling’s entitlement to the post of Mayor.
The Comelec en banc however, reversed the First Division ruling and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration. It held that by renouncing his US
citizenship, Arnado became a "pure" Philippine citizen again. It ruled that the
use of a US passport does not operate to revert Arnado’s status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation; it does not operate to "un-renounce" what had
earlier been renounced.
The Comelec en banc further ruled that the First Division’s reliance on In Re
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al.,23 was
misplaced as the facts of this cited case are not the same or comparable with
those of the present case. Unlike the present case, the petitioner in Yu was a
naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino citizen,
applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport.
Finally, the Comelec en banc found that Arnado presented a plausible and
believable explanation justifying the use of his US passport. While his
Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, he was not immediately
notified of the issuance so that he failed to actually get it until after three
months later. He thereafter used his Philippine passport in his subsequent
travels abroad.24
The Separate and Dissenting Opinions
Significantly, Comelec Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes issued a Separate Opinion
concurring with the Comelec majority. He opined that the use of a foreign
passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of CA 63
through which Philippine citizenship may be lost. He cites the assimilative
principle of continuity of Philippine citizenship: Arnado is presumed to have
remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of
clear and unequivocal proof of expatriation. In addition, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of Arnado’s retention of citizenship.25
In his Dissenting Opinion, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento emphasized that
Arnado failed to prove that he truly abandoned his allegiance to the United
States; his continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges
of a US citizen ran counter to his declaration that he chose to retain only his
Philippine citizenship. He noted that qualifications for elective office, such as
citizenship, are continuing requirements; once citizenship is lost, title to the
office is deemed forfeited.26
The Issues
The complete issues posed for the Court’s consideration are:
(1) Whether intervention is allowed in a disqualification case;
(2) Whether the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a renunciation made, and whether the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run
for public office;
(3) Assuming Arnado is disqualified, whether the rule on succession in the
LGC is applicable in the present case;27
(4) How should doubt in the present case be resolved in light of Arnado’s
election; and
(5) Whether, based on the facts presented and the applicable law, the
Comelec en banc committed grave abuse of discretion.
The Ponencia
The ponencia grants Maquiling’s petition for certiorari, thus holding that the
Comelec en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in considering the facts
and the law presented. It thus holds that Arnado is a dual citizen disqualified
to run for public office under Section 40(d) of the LGC. On this basis, the
ponencia rules that with Arnado’s disqualification, second placer Maquiling
should be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.
Based on this conclusion, the ponencia resolves all doubts against Arnado and
disregards the democratic decision of the Kauswagan electorate.
As the ponencia reasons it out, the act of using a foreign passport does not
divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship. By representing himself as an
American citizen, however, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his
earlier status as dual citizen. It emphasizes that such reversion is not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an
American citizen by using his US passport.
Thus, by the time Arnado filed his CoC on November 30, 2009, the ponencia
concludes that Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of
Filipino and American citizenship; he was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40 (d) of the LGC, he was not qualified as a
candidate to run for a local elective position.28
With Arnado barred from candidacy, the ponencia further concludes that his
CoC was void from the beginning. The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the CoC
so that he was not a candidate at all in the May 10, 2010 elections. Hence, the
votes cast in his favor should not be counted and Maquiling, as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of vote, should be declared the
duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.29 In this manner, the
ponencia effectively disenfranchised 5,952 or 52.63% of those who voted for
the top two contending candidates for the position of Mayor; it rules for a
minority Mayor.
Refutation of the Ponencia
Arnado performed all acts required by Section 5(2) of RA 9225 to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and run for public office; in fact, he actively followed up
his re-affirmed citizenship by running for public office.
RA 9225 was enacted to allow the re-acquisition and retention of Philippine
citizenship by: 1) natural-born citizens who were deemed to have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity
of the law, became citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are
deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance.30
Section 3 of RA 9225 on these points reads:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Arnado falls under the first category as a natural-born Filipino citizen who was
deemed to have lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an
American citizen.
Under the given facts, Arnado indisputably re-acquired Philippine citizenship
after taking the Oath of Allegiance not only once but twice – on July 10, 2008
and April 3, 2009. Separately from this oath of allegiance, Arnado took an oath
renouncing his American citizenship as additionally required by RA 9225 for
those seeking public office.
Section 5 of RA 9225 on this point provides:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (2) Those seeking
elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,31 we ruled that Section 5(2) of RA
9225 requires the twin requirements of taking an Oath of Allegiance and the
execution of a similarly sworn Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. We said:
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who
reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.32
Thus, the respondent in that case, Jaime Ty - a natural born Filipino citizen
who subsequently became a naturalized American citizen - became a "pure"
Philippine citizen again after taking the Oath of Allegiance and executing an
Oath of Renunciation of his American citizenship. To quote our Decision:
He was born and raised in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in the USA and eventually
became an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine
citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los
Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9225. At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e., American and
Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American
citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine
citizen.33
In the present case, Arnado indisputably complied with the second
requirement of Section 5(2) of RA 9225. On April 3, 2009, he personally
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation an Oath of Allegiance before notary
public Thomas Dean M. Quijano. Therefore, when he filed his CoC for the
position of Mayor of the Municipality of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte on
November 30, 2009, he had already effectively renounced his American
citizenship, solely retaining his Philippine citizenship as the law requires. In
this way, Arnado qualified for the position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and filed a valid CoC.
The evidence on record shows that
Arnado’s use of his US passport after his
compliance with the terms of RA 9225, was
an isolated act that was sufficiently
explained and justified.
The records bear out that Arnado used his US passport in two trips to and from
the US after he had executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on April 3, 2009. He
travelled on the following dates:
Date Destination
April 14, 2009 to the U.S.
June 25, 2009 to the Philippines
July 29, 2009 to the U.S.
November 24, 2009 to the Philippines
Arnado’s Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, but he was not
immediately notified of the issuance so that and he only received his passport
three months after or sometime in September 2009.34 Clearly, when Arnado
travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no
Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States to
attend to the winding up of his business and other affairs in America. A travel
document issued by the proper Philippine government agency (e.g., a
Philippine consulate office in the US) would not suffice because travel
documents could not be used; they are issued only in critical instances, as
determined by the consular officer, and allow the bearer only a direct, one-way
trip to the Philippines.35
Although Arnado received his Philippine passport by the time he returned to
the Philippines on November 24, 2009, he could not use this without risk of
complications with the US immigration authorities for using a travel document
different from what he used in his entry into the US on July 29, 2009. Plain
practicality then demanded that the travel document that he used to enter the
US on July 29, 2009 be the same travel document he should use in leaving
the country on November 24, 2009.
Given these circumstances, Arnado’s use of his US passport in travelling back
to the Philippines on November 24, 2009 was an isolated act that could not,
by itself, be an express renunciation of the Philippine citizenship he adopted
as his sole citizenship under RA 9225.
Arnado’s use of his US passport was not an
express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship under Section 1 of CA 63.
I disagree with the ponencia’s view that by using his US passport and
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado effectively reverted to the
status of a dual citizen. Interestingly, the ponencia failed to cite any law or
controlling jurisprudence to support its conclusion, and thus merely makes a
bare assertion.
The ponencia fails to consider that under RA 9225, natural-born citizens who
were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship because of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country and who subsequently complied
with the requirements of RA 9225, are deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship. RA 9225 cured and negated the presumption made under CA 63.
Hence, as in Japzon, Arnado assumed "pure" Philippine citizenship again after
taking the Oath of Allegiance and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his
American citizenship under RA 9225.
In this light, the proper framing of the main issue in this case should be whether
Arnado’s use of his US passport affected his status as a "pure" Philippine
citizen. In question form – did Arnado’s use of a US passport amount to a
ground under the law for the loss of his Filipino citizenship under CA 63? Or
alternatively, the retention of his dual citizenship status?
I loathe to rule that Arnado’s use of his US passport amounts to an express
renunciation of his Filipino citizenship, when its use was an isolated act that
he sufficiently explained and fully justified. I emphasize that the law requires
express renunciation in order to lose Philippine citizenship. The term means a
renunciation that is made distinctly and explicitly and is not left to inference or
implication; it is a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language,
as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.36
A clear and vivid example, taken from jurisprudence, of what "express
renunction" is not transpired in Aznar v. Comelec37 where the Court ruled that
the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that
he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
In the present case, other than the use of his US passport in two trips to and
from the United States, the record does not bear out any indication, supported
by evidence, of Arnado’s intention to re-acquire US citizenship. To my mind,
in the absence of clear and affirmative acts of re-acquiring US citizenship
either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the re-establishment of
permanent residency in the United States), Arnado’s use of his US passport
cannot but be considered an isolated act that did not undo his renunciation of
his US citizenship. What he might in fact have done was to violate American
law on the use of passports, but this is a matter irrelevant to the present case.
Thus, Arnado remains to be a "pure" Filipino citizen and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of
using his US passport for travel purposes.
Arnado did not violate his oath of renunciation; at any rate, all doubts should
be resolved in favor of Arnado’s eligibility considering that he received the
popular mandate of the people of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte as their duly
elected mayor.
I completely agree with the ponencia that the Oath of Renunciation is not an
empty or formal ceremony that can be perfunctorily professed at any given
day, only to be disregarded on the next. As a mandatory requirement under
Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it allows former natural-born Filipino citizens who
were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country to enjoy full civil and political
rights, foremost among them, the privilege to run for public office.
I disagree however, with the conclusion that Arnado effectively negated his
Oath of Renunciation when he used his US passport for travel to the United
States. To reiterate if only for emphasis, Arnado sufficiently justified the use of
his US passport despite his renunciation of his US citizenship; when he
travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no
Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States to
attend to the business and other affairs that he was leaving. If at all, he could
be faulted for using his US passport by the time he returned to the Philippines
on November 24, 2009 because at that time, he had presumably received his
Philippine passport. However, given the circumstances explained above and
that he consistently used his Philippine passport for travel after November 24,
2009, the true character of his use of his US passport stands out and cannot
but be an isolated and convenient act that did not negate his Oath of
Renunciation.
The People of Kauswagan have spoken and
any doubt should be resolved in favor of
their verdict.
Separately from the issue of Arnado’s isolated act of using his US passport,
we cannot ignore the fact in a community as small as Kauswagan where the
two mayoralty candidates garnered a total of 11,309 votes, Balua’s claim of
Arnado’s foreign citizenship and even the latter’s residency status could not
be avoided but be live election issues. The people of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, therefore, made their own ruling when they elected Arnado as their
mayor despite the "foreigner" label sought to be pinned on him. At this point,
even this Court should heed this verdict by resolving all doubts regarding
Arnado’s eligibility in his favor. This approach, incidentally, is not a novel one38
as in Sinaca v. Mula,39 the Court has already ruled:
When a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly
expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate's
eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people. Above and
beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be
paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, September 6, 2013 of the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec, relying on
in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred. our ruling in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,4 disqualified petitioner
Rommel C. Arnado (Arnado) from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, set
No Basic to Rule that the Comelec aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and
Committed Grave Abuse of declared respondent Florante T. Capitan (Capitan) as the duly elected mayor
Discretion. of said municipality.

As my last point, the Comelec en banc considered and accepted as its factual Factual Antecedents
finding that Arnado’s explanation on the use of his US passport was sufficient
justification to conclude that he did not abandon his Oath of Renunciation. This Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine
finding is undeniably based on evidence on record as the above or incorrect is citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America
not material for as long as it is made on the basis of evidence on record, and (USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in
was made within the contemplation of the applicable law.40 the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No.
92255 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso,
In other words, the Comelec en banc properly exercised its discretion in acting USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July
on the matter; thus, even if it hard erred in its conclusions, any error in reading 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and
the evidence and in applying the law was not sufficiently grave to affect the Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an
exercise of its jurisdiction.41 From these perspectives, this Court has no Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
recourse but to dismiss the present petition for failure to show any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Comelec. On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the
mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national
In these lights, I vote for the dismissal of the petition. and local elections.

ARTURO D. BRION Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition
Associate Justice to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others,
that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US
passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid
Affidavit of Renunciation.

G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015 While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections
proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes for the
mayoralty post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning candidate.
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents.
On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding
that Arnado's continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3,
DECISION 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office
for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec First
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on
succession should be followed.
Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office. Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling
(Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate who garnered the second highest
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed under Rule 64 in relation to number of votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the Comelec First
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Per Curiam Resolution2 dated Division erred in applying the rule on succession.
December 9, 2013 of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) En
Banc in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), which affirmed the Resolution3 dated On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing
the ruling of the Comelec First Division. It held that Arnado's use of his US
passport did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship. The
Comelec En Banc found merit in Arnado's explanation that he continued to use
his US passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a
Philippine passport at the time of the relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En
Banc further noted that, after receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used
the same for his subsequent trips.
Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed as
G.R No. 195649.
While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local
elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On October 1,
2012, Arnado filed his CoC6 for the same position. Respondent Capitan also
filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5,
it annulled and set aside the Comelec En Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution,
disqualified Arnado from running for elective position, and declared Maquiling
as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the May 10, 2010
elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court opined that in
his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively disavowed or
recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that
"Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his
"Affidavit of Renunciation." Tills does not mean that he failed to comply with
the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after
complying with the requirements that he perfonned positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant
to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from
running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a
person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who
subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
x x x x
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.7
The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the
present controversy.
On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling,
Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of
Renunciation Dated April3, 2009."8cralawrednad
The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the
mayoralty post, filed a Petition9 seeking to disqualify him from running for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling
of this Court in Maquiling. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC)
and was raffled to the Comelec's Second Division. The resolution of said
petition was, however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado
garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) while Capitan obtained
1,707 (16% of the total votes cast) votes only.
On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to nullify Arnado's
proclamation. He argued that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this Court
in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Arnado is disqualified from running for any
local elective office. Hence, Arnado's proclamation is void and without any
legal effect.
Ruling of the Comelec Second Division
On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a
Resolution granting the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and disqualify Arnado
from running in the May 13, 2013 elections. Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated
that at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to
comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. While he executed the April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or recalled
when he subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held
in Maquiling.
The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another
Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections. While a
May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation
dated April 3, 2009" was submitted in evidence, the same would not suffice
because it should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on
October 1, 2012.
The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division's Resolution
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted. Restraining Order dated January 14, 2014,16 contending that the acts sought
Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is disqualified from running in the 13 to be restrained by Arnado are already fait accompli. He alleged that the
May 2013 National and Local Elections. Comelec En Banc had already issued a Writ of Execution17 and pursuant
thereto a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers was convened. It proclaimed
SO ORDERED.11 him to be the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he
took his oath of office. Since then, he has assumed and performed the duties
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc and functions of his office.

Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration.12 He argued In a Resolution18 dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered the issuance of
that the Comelec Second Division erred in applying Maquiling claiming that the a Status Quo Ante Order directing the parties to allow Arnado to continue
said case is not on all fours with the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition performing his functions as mayor of Kauswagan pending resolution of this
was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the filing of case.
the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the
sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, Issues
their overwhelming support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the
Comelec Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be reversed and In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following
that he be declared as eligible to run for mayor ofKauswagan. issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the I

Comelec Second Division. It accordingly annulled the proclamation of Arnado
and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan. The
dispositive portion of the Comelec En Banc's Resolution
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is
hereby DISMISSED. The Proclamation of Private Respondent Rommel C.
Arnado as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE T. CAPITAN is hereby DECLARED
the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte inthe May 13, 2013
Elections.
SO ORDERED.13
Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with ancillary
prayer for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo ante. On December
26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order
or Temporary Restraining Order14 in view of the issuance by the Comelec En
Banc of a Writ of Execution to implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND DIVISION VIOLATED
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE PETITIONS OF RESPONDENT
CAPITAN ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND/OR LATE
FILING, ETC.
II
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY ALLOWING COM. ELIAS
YUSOPH TO REVIEW THE DECISION HE WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION.
III
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF THE VOTERS OF
KAUSWAGAN IN THE MAY 2013 ELECTIONS.
IV

On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution15 requiring the WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
respondents to file their respective comments on the petition. In the same DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY
Resolution, this Court granted Arnado's ancillary relief for temporary COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE FILING
restraining order. OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1, 2012.19

Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and
violated his right to procedural due process in not dismissing Capitan's Petition
in SPA No. 13-309 (DC). He avers that Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping
because the latter subsequently filed a similar case docketed as SPC No. 13-
019. In addition, SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day
prescriptive period reckoned from the time of the filing of his CoC on October
1, 2012.
of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other
hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the "capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."22 "Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough; it must be grave."23 Grave abuse of discretion has
likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence.24cralawrednad

Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec is peppered In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing that the
with procedural infirmities. He asserts that the Comelec violated its own rules Comelec En Banc acted capriciously or whimsically in issuing its December 9,
in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to 2013 Resolution. Neither did it act contrary to law or jurisprudence.
consolidate; that SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was not set for trial and no hearing for
the reception of evidence was ever conducted; and, that the Comelec did not Arnado's allegations that Capitan
follow its own rules requiring the issuance of a notice of promulgation of violated the rule against forumshopping
resolutions. and that the latter's petition in
SPA No.13-309(DC) was filed late,
Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only committed grave unsubstantiated and erroneous.
abuse of discretion but also violated his constitutional right to due process
when it allowed Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph (Commissioner Yusoph) to There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded
participate in the review of the Decision he penned for the Second Division. on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the
Furthermore, the Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when other court would make a favorable disposition.25cralawred It exists when the
it disqualified him from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
disenfranchising 84% of the voters of Kauswagan who all voted for him. will amount to res judicata in the other.26 Thus, there is forum-shopping when
in both actions there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial would represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights
register of his former counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, revealed that asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance20 on (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
he is a citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.27cralawrednad
country and, therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May
13, 2013 elections. Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping. He merely
made a general averment that in resolving the petitions of Capitan in SPA No.
Our Ruling 13-309 (OC) and SPC No. 13-019, the Comelec En Banc, as well as its
Second Division, failed to comply with this Court's Revised Circular No. 28-
The Petition is devoid of merit. 91,28without demonstrating how forum-shopping was supposed to be present.
He has not shown that the petitions in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-
Petition for certiorari is limited to the 019 involved the same parties, issues, and reliefs. In fact, Arnado did not even
determination of whether the respondent bother to submit to this Court a copy of the Petition in SPC No. 13-019
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion (annulment of proclamation case). As the party insisting that Capitan
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. committed forum-shopping, Arnado bears the burden of establishing the same.
After all, it is settled that he who alleges has the burden of proving it; mere
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of allegation is not sufficient.29cralawrednad
Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the parties in SPA
in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 are not the same. In the first case, the
interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had parties are only Capitan and Arnado. In the second case, the Municipal Board
committed grave abuse of discretion.21 Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of Canvassers of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is impleaded as respondent.
There is also dissimilitude in the reliefs sought. The former case sought to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC while the latter case prayed for the
annulment of Arnado's proclamation as mayor of Kauswagan.
With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitan's Petition in SPA
No. 13-309 (DC), it appears that Arnado either failed to grasp the import of
Capitan's allegations therein or he made a deliberate partial misrepresentation
in stating that the same is one for cancellation of CoC. A copy30 thereof
annexed to Arnado's herein petition states that it is a petition "to disqualify
and/or cancel the certificate of candidacy" of Arnado. The allegations therein
state in no uncertain terms that it is one for disqualification based on Arnado's
failure to comply with the requisites of RA 9225 and on the ruling of this Court
in Maquiling. Thus, the Comelec Second Division appropriately treated it as a
petition for disqualification with the alternative prayer to cancel Arnado's CoC.
It is elementary that the nature of the action is determined by the allegations
in the petition.31cralawrednad
Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,32 a petition for
disqualification should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates
of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." Here, Arnado was
proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013.33 Thus, the petition in
SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.34cralawrednad
to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny that
same jurisdiction."37cralawrednad
In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,
consolidation is only permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.- When an action or proceeding involves a
question of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of another
action or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or
proceeding bearing the lower docket number.
In Muñoz v. Comelec,38 this Court accentuated "that the term 'may' is indicative
of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that
opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise.
If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions attached
thereto, which in this case require that the cases to be consolidated must
involve similar questions of law and fact."39 In this case, the consolidation of
SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 does not appear to be necessary.
As earlier mentioned, said cases do not even involve the same parties and
reliefs sought. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the
Comelec in not consolidating them.

The other procedural lapses allegedly Arnado's protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules when it decided
committed by the Comelec are likewise SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without setting it for trial likewise deserves scant
unsubstantiated. Assuming the allegations of consideration. The proceedings in a special action for disqualification of
Arnado to be true, the Comelec did not commit candidates under Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure are summary in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or nature where a trial type proceeding may be dispensed with.40 In Diangka v.
excess of jurisdiction. Comelec,41 this Court held that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Arnado's claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should
No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate likewise not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings specially where the law
lacks substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said calls for the proceeding to be summary in character. Pursuant to Section 4,
motion to his petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for
Rule 64 Petition, filed in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being disqualifications are subject to summary hearings. In relation thereto, Section
accompanied by pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent 3, Rule 17 of the said Rules provides that it remains in the sound discretion of
thereto.35 Also, it was Capitan who filed the motion for consolidation. Not being the COMELEC whether clarification questions are to be asked the witnesses-
the movant, Arnado is not in a position to question the alleged inaction of the affiants, and whether the adverse party is to be granted opportunity to cross-
Comelec on said motion. And even assuming that he has, by filing a Verified examine said witnesses affiants. Furthermore, when the COMELEC en banc
Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec En Banc and subsequently reviews and evaluates a party's petition, or as in the case at bar, a party's
appealing to this Court despite the still unresolved motion for consolidation, answer and the supporting papers attached thereto, the same is tantamount
Arnado effectively abandoned said motion for consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon. to a fair "hearing" of his case.42
Lina,36it was held that once a party elevates the case before the appellate
tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned the unresolved motion Arnado's claim that the Comelec En Banc
which remains pending with the tribunal of origin. "[I]t is not right for a party committed grave abuse of discretion and violated
who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter his right to due process in allowing Commissioner
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation of the assailed (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
Comelec En Banc Resolution is likewise bereft of qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
substantiation. existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, public officer authorized to administer an oath;
2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013
Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is not correct. While Commissioner In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the
Yusoph, together with Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite
Tito F. Guia, signed said Resolution, there is nothing therein which would of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on
indicate that Commissioner Yusoph was the writer or the ponente of said Elections,47 his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn
Resolution. The September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at
Division does not state who the ponente is. The same goes true with the the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013
questioned December 9, 2013 Per Curiam Resolution43 of the Comelec En elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The
Banc. As a per curiam resolution, it was arrived at by the Comelec En Banc as Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9,
a whole and without any particular ponente. Hence, we need not belabor 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not
Arnado's claim of denial of due process as his basis therefor lacks factual suffice for having been belatedly executed.
moorings.
The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion,
Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin in upholding the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at Arnado from running for public office. It is worth noting that the reason for
the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013 Arnado's disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections —
elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice. being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections on
Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this
citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it
position. In Mercado v. anzano,44 it was clarified that the phrase "dual departed therefrom.
citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance.''45 Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason opportunity to correct the deficiency in his qualification because at the time this
of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy Court promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on April 16, 2013, the period for
full civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. filing the CoC for local elective office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice Arturo
They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) D. Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent that Arnado was
meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the denied the chance to submit a replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, then
Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn there was an unfair and abusive denial of opportunity equivalent to grave
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer abuse of discretion." Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's April 16,
authorized to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. 2013 ruling in Maquiling or on May 9, 2013, Arnado substantially complied
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary therewith by executing an affidavit affirming his April3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to
existing laws of the Philippines and the following run for public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized
conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was
settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation
x x x x or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel
and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado could not have divined the
possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the Court
in Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting
10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with qualifications for public elective
office must be strictly complied with. Otherwise stated, the Court
in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from
strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to
simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his qualification by submitting
another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that in this case, we
should similarly require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for local
elective office.
The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public
office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for
emphasis, are the same. Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated
his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of
Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his
CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his
qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case
following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which
means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are
established.48 Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has once laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the
same."49 It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation of the
same issue.50cralawrednad
It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a
petition to disqualify him, Arnado has gotten wind that the use of his US
passport might pose a problem to his candidacy. In other words, when Arnado
filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he was not totally unaware that the use of
his US passport after he had executed the Affidavit of Renunciation might have
an impact on his qualification and candidacy. In fact, at that
time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But despite the petitions filed
against him questioning his qualification to run for public office in 2010, Arnado
filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in
his candidacy for the 2013 elections and without executing another Affidavit of
Renunciation. In short, the argument that Arnado should be given the
opportunity to correct the deficiency in his CoC since Maquiling was
promulgated after the lapse of the period for filing a CoC for the 2013 elections,
is totally bereft of merit. Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling,
Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his inaction since he
could have remedied it at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 or even
before that. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible questions about his
qualifications.
The alleged November 30, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any
probative weight.
As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance, the same is highly suspect. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the original or certified true copy thereof
was not presented. In addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to alter the
outcome of the case was never presented before the Comelec much less in
the Maquiling case. Curiously, it only surfaced for the first time in this petition.
In Jacot v. Dal,51 this Court disallowed the belated presentation of similar
evidence on due process considerations. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised
in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-
judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and
due process impel this rule. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to
accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence.
Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the
proceedings before the COMELEC.
Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In
the absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by
analogy or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not
formally presented:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no evidence which has
not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must
be specified.
Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC,
respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this
document would be contrary to due process. Additionally, the piecemeal
presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.52
Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on
January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated
23 April 201 0, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in
the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of
21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel
records:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
DATE OF Arrival :01/12/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :057782700
DATE OF Arrival :03/23/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :05778270053
Despite the existence of such statement in Maquiling, We are puzzled why
Arnado never bothered to correct or refute it. He neither alleged nor presented
evidence in this petition to prove that he did not travel abroad on those dates
using his US passport.
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same
position he had taken in Maquiling that Arnado's use of his US passport in
2009 is an isolated act justified by the circumstances at that time. At any rate,
Arnado started to use his Philippine passport in his travels abroad beginning
December 11, 2009 and thenceforth. This, according to J. Leonen, is borne
out by Arnado's Philippine passport.
With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not
only reviving an issue that had already been settled with finality in
the Maquiling case, but he is also going beyond the issues raised in this
petition. To reiterate for clarity, Arnado's argument in this case-that he is
qualified to run for mayor as he has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of
RA 9225 relative to the May 13, 2013 elections- is premised only on the alleged
newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not
claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an
isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. In Vazquez v. De Borja,54 it was held that
courts do not have jurisdiction over issues neither raised in the pleading nor
tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. They cannot render
judgment based on issues that have never been raised before them. Equally
settled is the rule that "points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not be, and ordinarily will
not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this
rule."55 The same goes true with J. Brion's theory that what was cancelled by
virtue of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation where
Arnado expressly renounced any foreign citizenship; not the July 10, 2008
Oath of Allegiance which carried with it an implied abdication of foreign
citizenship. For J. Brion, "[t]he requirement of an express renunciation x x x
does not negate the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit
renunciation of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the oath of
allegiance." Again, this was never raised in this petition. At any rate, the
execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by Section 356 of RA 9225. For
those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office,
Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time
of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are not useless
or meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires an explicit
renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even
assuming that Arnado's 2008 implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has
also been negated by his use of his US passport in 2009, following the ruling
in Maquiling.
Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied renunciation than to an
express one specifically required by law.
Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that Arnado's use of
his US passport effectively recanted his Affidavit of Renunciation has already
become final and immutable. We can no longer resurrect in this case the
issues that have already been resolved there with fmality.
In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling abroad in
the first quarter of 2010, J. Leonen relies on the copy thereof attached to
the rollo of the Maquiling case. But said copy of Arnado's Philippine
passport57 is a mere "CERTIFIED TRUE COPY FROM THE MACIDNE COPY
ON FILE" as attested to by Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer Ill of the
Comelec.58 This is clearly stamped on aforesaid copy of Arnado's Philippine
passport. A machine copy or photocopy is a mere secondary evidence.59 As
such, it cannot be admitted in evidence until and unless the offeror has proven
the due execution and the subsequent loss or unavailability of the original.60 In
this case, however, Arnado's Philippine passport is not missing. Thus, said
photocopy of Arnado's Philippine passport cannot sway us to depart from the
uncontroverted certification of the Bureau ofimmigration that Arnado used his
US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Consequently, even
assuming that the recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance is true and authentic, Arnado once more
performed positive acts on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010, which
effectively negated the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit resulting in his
disqualification to run for an elective public office.
Landslide election victory cannot
override eligibility requirements.
In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide
majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the
same "cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications."61 In Velasco v. Comelec,62 this Court
pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws
pertaining to elections will become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive
qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that
popular vote cannot override the required qualifications under Section 39,63a
fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy
when it comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 4064 of the same
law. After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the
requirements for election to local public offices. The other half is contained in
the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances that disqualify local
candidates."65cralawrednad
Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec.66 In that
case, petitioner Lopez was also a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his
Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his
candidacy for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in the
synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on
October 29, 2007 without first making a personal and sworn renunciation of
his foreign citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this
Court still affmned the Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a
candidate for a local elective position for his failure to comply with the
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to
discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the
defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate
the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.67
In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Comelec En Banc in sustaining the Resolution of the Comelec Second
Division disqualifying Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections and
in accordingly setting aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said
municipality.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Comelec Resolutions are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by
this Court is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
The present certiorari petition,1 filed under Rule 64 in relation with Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, involves the disqualification of the present petitioner,
Rommel C. Arnado (Arnado), in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections
(May 2013 Elections).
This case traces its roots to the earlier disqualification case [docketed as SPA
No. 10-109 (DC)] filed against Arnado in relation with the May 10, 2010
Elections, that led to the Court's decision in Maquiling v. Comelec disqualifying
Arnado.2 To some extent, the present case is factually linked to the earlier
disqualification case.
As in Maquiling, Arnado and his qualification to run for public office are at the
center of the present petition. Private respondent Florante Capitan seeks to
strengthen the linkage with the earlier Maquilingcase by adopting
the Maquiling positions and considering the present case as a seamless
continuation of Maquiling.
Despite some commonalities, the present disqualification case, however, is
separate and substantively distinct from the Maquiling disqualification case.
The present case involves an election period (2013) separate and distinct from
the election period covered by the Maquiling ruling (2010). The factual
circumstances and consequent legal considerations also vary, as will be
explained below, so that the present case need not necessarily follow the
governing ruling in Maquiling.
Thus, at the outset, I invite the Court: to keep an open mind and remove any
initial impression that the present case is a re-run of Maquiling; to recognize
that at some point, the present case diverges from and must be viewed
independently of Maquiling; and to resolve it from the perspective solely of the
attendant factual and legal considerations specific to it.
The Court must not also forget that this is an election case where the
electorate has its own separate interest to protect. This is an interest that
the Court must not ignore when the issues posed carry the potential of setting
aside the electorate's expressed choice.
Notably, the present controversy involves a candidate whose disqualification
(to run for elective office) has twice been sought based on the same cited facts
and grounds, but who nevertheless has twice been elected by a clear and
overwhelming majority of the voters- in the May 2010 and May 2013
Elections. In 2013, he garnered 84% of the votes of the people of
Kauswagan.
This clear and undeniably overwhelming voice of the electorate, to my mind,
renders it necessary for the Court to consider and apply deeper democratic
principles.3 The circumstances of the present controversy call for this kind of
consideration, particularly when the electorate's already limited democratic
decision making process runs the risk of being negated for no clear and
conclusive reason, as discussed below.
To disregard the electorate's voice once can perhaps be excused by invoking
the rule of law; to ignore the people's voice a second time can only be justified
by clear reasons from this Court that the people can readily understand.
I submit this Dissenting Opinion to object to the ponencia's conclusion
that Arnado is disqualified from running in the May 2013 Elections and
that his proclamation as elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
should now be set aside.
I specifically find the ponencia 's conclusions grossly erroneous and tainted
with grave abuse of discretion based on the following
considerations:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Arnado became a "pure" Philippine citizen on April 3, 2009, after he took
his oath of allegiance and executed his affidavit of renunciation. That he was
subsequently deemed to have recanted his renunciation is unfortunate, but
even the Maquiling ruling recognizes that for some eleven (11) days (i.e., from
April 3 to 14, 2009), he was qualified to run for public office because he was a
"pure" Filipino.
Arnado more than reconfirmed and regained this status and was qualified to
run for public office in the May 2013 Elections based on his persistent
assertions of sole allegiance to the Republic and his repeated renunciation of
his US citizenship.
a. Separately from the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation
that Maquiling said Arnado recanted, Arnado executed on
May 9, 2013, another Affidavit of Renunciation affirming the
terms of his April 3, 2009 Affidavit and thus cured any defect
in his qualification to run in the May 2013 Elections.
(2) The legal consequences of the Maquiling ruling is limited to Arnado's
qualification for public office in the May 2010 elections.
a. The intervening 2010 Maquiling disqualification ruling did not
and could not have invalidated Arnado's status as a "pure"
Philippine citizen who was qualified to run for public office
after having complied with the RA No. 9225 requirements in
the May 2013 Elections.
(3) The Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the May 9, 2013
Confirmation of the Oath of Affirmation was filed out of time.
a. The Comelec grossly failed to consider (i) the circumstances
of the filing of the October 1, 2012 Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC), and (ii) the circumstances and the dynamics between
the 2010 Maquiling case and ruling, and the present 2013
disqualification case, in terms of the retroactive application of
the Maquiling ruling.
b. When Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 (for the 2013
Elections), the prevailing Comelec en banc ruling [in its
February 2, 2011 resolution in SPA No. 10-109 (DC)] was that
he was not disqualified to run for elective public office;
hence, Arnado did not need to execute another affidavit of
renunciation.
c. Based solely on the Maquiling Decision (that pertained to
Arnado's disqualification for the 2010 elections), the
Comelec disqualified Arnado for the May 2013 elections
because his October 1, 2012 CoC was not supported by any
Affidavit of Renunciation (since Maquiling considered his
April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation for the 2010 elections
effectively recanted). This Comelec ruling disregards the
unusual consequences of the April 3, 2009 Affidavit and the
unique circumstances under which the October 1, 2012 CoC
was filed.
d. Since the Comelec did not accept the Affidavit of Renunciation
that Arnado filed on May 9, 2013 (for the 2013 Elections) in
the light of the 2010 Maquiling ruling, he was placed in an
impossible situation of being disqualified in 2013 for a ruling
applicable to the 2010 elections, without being given the
opportunity to submit his compliance for the May 2013
elections.
e. Notably, his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, submitted
to comply with his May 2013 candidacy, was rejected because
it should have been filed on October 1, 2012 (i.e., when he
filed his CoC for the May 2013 elections). If
the Maquilingruling, made on April 16, 2013, was made to
retroactively apply to October 1, 2012, so should the
 opportunity to comply be similarly made retroactive. To the Francisco, USA, had approved and issued in his favor a Philippine Passport
extent he was denied this opportunity is grave abuse of (No. XX 3979162) on June 18, 2009.5 He only received this Philippine
discretion. passport three months later.6cralawrednad

(4) At any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favour of Arnado's qualification: From then on, he used his Philippine passport in his travels on the following
dates: December 11, 2009 (departure); January 12, 2010 (arrival); January 31,
a. Arnado's unequivocal acts and show of allegiance to the 2010 (departure); March 31, 2010 (arrival); April 11, 2010 (departure); April 16,
2010 (arrival); May 20, 2010 (departure); and June 4, 2010
Republic and renunciation of other citizenships, taken
together, should have resolved all doubts in favor of his (arrival).7cralawrednad
qualification;
B. The Maquiling Case and its Incidents
b. the mandate of the people of Kauswagan that twice elected
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of
Arnado as their Mayor should be respected and upheld.
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, for the May 2010 Elections. On the same day,
he executed another Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance.8cralawrednad
I. Roots of the Present Petition
Notably, this Affidavit of Renunciation came after his travel using an American
passport.
A. Factual Background
Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed with the Comelec a petition
For a fuller understanding of the present disqualification case, I reiterate below to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC (2010 Disqualification case) on
the important antecedent facts. the ground that Arnado remained a US citizen: he continued to use his US
passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing the April 3,
Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship after 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Balua's petition was docketed as SPA No. 10-
becoming a naturalized citizen of the United States of America (U.S.) in 1985. 109 (DC).
In 2003, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention Arnado was proclaimed the winning candidate in the May 2010
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003).4cralawrednad Elections.
Arnado opted to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA No. 9225 In a resolution dated February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc ruled [in SPA
and soon filed the required application before the Philippine Consul General in No. 10-109 (DC)] that Arnado's use of his US passport, subsequent to his
San Francisco, U.S.A. On July 10, 2008, Arnado took his Oath of 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, did not have the effect of reverting him to
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; the Approval of his his status as a dual citizen. The Comelec En Banc found believable and
Citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued on the same date. plausible Arnado's explanation that he continued to use his US passport
because he only knew of and received his Philippine passport three months
On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his after it was issued on June 18, 2009. As soon as he received his Philippine
foreign citizenship (interchangeably referred to, from here on, as April 3, 2009 passport, he used it in his subsequent travels abroad.
Affidavit of Renunciation or 2009 express renunciation).
The 2010 disqualification case eventually reached this Court via the petition
On April 14, 2009, Arnado left the country for the US using his US passport - for certiorari filed by Maquiling; the case was. docketed as GR No.
US passport (No. 057782700) - which identified his nationality as "USA- 195649 entitled Maquiling v. Comelec.
American." He returned to the country on June 25, 2009, using the same US
passport. He again left for the US on July 29, 2009, and returned to the country a. The Court's Maquiling Decision.
on November 24, 2009, still using his US passport.
In its April 16, 2013 Decision, the Court annulled and set aside the
Unknown to Arnado, however, the Philippine Consulate General in San
Comelec En Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution; disqualified Arnado from On May 14, 2013, during the pendency of the 2013 Disqualification case
running for the position of Mayor; and declared Maquiling the duly elected before. the Second Division, Arnado was proclaimed the duly elected
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, in the May 2010 Elections. The Court Mayor of Lanao del Norte in the May 2013 Elections.16cralawrednad
ruled that by his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively
disavowed or recanted his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Capitan responded to the proclamation by filing a petition to nullify Arnado's
proclamation, arguing that pursuant to the Maquiling ruling (which declared
In ruling on the case, the Court significantly acknowledged Arnado disqualified from running for any local elective office), Arnado's
that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary proclamation was void and carried no legal effect.

i. The "act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino In a resolution dated July 2, 2013, the Court denied Arnado's motion for
citizenship, which he re-acquired by repatriation. By representing himself as reconsideration of the April 16, 2013 Maquiling Decision.
an American citizen, however, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took II. The Proceedings before the Comelec
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using
his US passport."9cralawrednad
A. Comelec Second Division Ruling
ii. "In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a
period of eleven days, or from April 3, 2009, until 14 April 2009, on which date In its resolution dated September 6, 2013, in SPA No. 13-309(DC), the
he first used his American passport after renouncing his American Comelec Second Division disqualified Arnado from running in the May 2013
citizenship."10 Elections.

C. The Present Disqualification Case The Second Division declared that at the time he filed his CoC on October 1,
2012, Arnado still failed to comply with RA No. 9225's requirement of making
On October 1, 2012, and while the Maquiling case was still pending a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, as his
before this Court (so that the existing standing rule was the Comelec ruling April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation had been deemed withdrawn or recalled
that he was qualified to be a candidate), Arnado filed his CoCII for the same pursuant to Maquiling. His 2013 Affidavit did not rectify this failure as this
mayoralty post for the May 2013 Elections. Thus, Arnado saw no need to subsequent affidavit should have been executed on or before the filing
undertake another Renunciation. of his CoC on October 1, 2012.

Respondent Florante Capitan also filed his CoC12 for the same position. B. The Comelec En Banc Ruling

On April 16, 2013. the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling v. In its December 9, 2013 resolution, the Comelec En Banc fully affirmed the
Comelec, disqualifying Arnado for the May 2010 Elections. Second Division's ruling; annulled Arnado's proclamation; and declared
Capitan the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan.
Apparently in response to the Maquiling ruling, Arnado executed on May 9,
2013, an Oath of Allegiance and Oath of Renunciation affirming the terms III. The Issues
of his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation (herein referred to as 2013
Affidavit).13 Arnado undertook the required acts as soon as he was aware that The issues raised for the Court's consideration
tliey had to be done to perfect his May 2013 candidacy. are:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On May 10, 2013, Capitan filed a petition to disqualify14Arnado from running
for the Kauswagan mayoralty post and/or to cancel his CoC (2013
Disqualification case) based on the Court's Maquiling ruling. The case was
docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and was raffled to the Comelec Second
Division (Second Division).15cralawrednad
A. Whether the Comelec En Banc and the Second Division violated
procedural due process and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to
dismiss the petitions filed by Capitan for forum shopping and/or late filing;
B. Whether the Comelec En Banc violated due process and committed grave
abuse of discretion by allowing Commissioner Elias Yusoph to review the
decision he wrote for the Second Division; The full implication of the effects of RA No. 9225 can fully be appreciated by
considering Section 3 of the law, which reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
C. Whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
disenfranchising 84% ofthe voters ofKauswagan in the May 2013 elections; Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the
and contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
D. Whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
Arnado who had fully complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 before allegiance to the Republic:
the filing ofhis CoC on October 1, 2012. "I ____________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
IV. Refutation of the Ponencia orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
A. Re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
under RA No. 9225; purposes and legal imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
effect of the oath of allegiance and oath purpose of evasion." [emphases supplied]
of renunciation
By its express terms, this oath is one of allegiance that recognizes the
RA No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their "supreme authority" of the Philippines and the obligation to "maintain true
Philippine citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country, to faith and allegiance thereto."
expeditiously re-acquire Philippine citizenship.17 It is a unique mode of re-
acquiring Philippine citizenship and is a far departure from the citizenship re- These terms, while seemingly allowing dual citizenship for natural born Filipino
acquisition procedure under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 63,18 the law in citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
place before RA No. 9225 was enacted. naturalization as citizens in a foreign country,22 carry the implicit effect of
renouncing their foreign citizenship and allegiance because of the
Under CA No. 63, Philippine citizenship may be re-acquired by: (1) renewed allegiance that is accorded to the supreme authority of the
naturalization; (2) repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy, or Air Corps, or Republic.23cralawrednad
of a woman who has lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to an alien after
the termination of her marital status; and (3) direct act of the National In effect, the problem of dual allegiance created by dual citizenship is
Assembly.19cralawrednad transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country. Since the latest oath
that the person takes is one of allegiance to the Republic, whatever treatment
Notably, re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship under the first mode (i.e., by the foreign country may have on his or her status is a matter outside the
naturalization) involves the more stringent procedure laid down in CA No. concern and competence of the Philippine government.24cralawrednad
473.20 The reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the second mode (i.e.,
by repatriation), on the other hand, provides for an easier procedure as it The congressional exchanges on dual citizenship and the potential problem of
requires only the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the dual allegiance (which under the Constitution is inimical to public interest),
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry; it applies, how ver, only attest to this interpretation as these exchanges reconciled the possession
to the specific group of persons enumerated therein. of dual citizenship and the dual allegiance that the Constitution states to
"be inimical to public interest."
Under the procedure currently in place under RA No. 9225, the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance to the x x x x
Republic of the Philippines in a manner similar to the second mode under CA
No. 63. But, RA No. 9225 provides for a deeper effect by declaring it a State Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two
policy that under its terms "all Philippine citizens of another country shall be situations exist - the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship"21 under the conditions Philippine citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships
provided therein. and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual
allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the
creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship
and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a
violation of the Constitution....
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the
constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He
said that the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that in one
sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the
taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is
transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the latest
oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added
that this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and
competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when
dual allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version
of the bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now
requires this oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the
Philippines to the foreign country concerned, he explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not
denounce his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the
foreign government, and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the
Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual citizenship and
dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to address in
Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a Member
of the House.
x x x x
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance
contrary to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that
the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the
Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is
recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created
wherein a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to
another country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces
all allegiance to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign
country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present
measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the last he
utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem
of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the
other foreign country. [emphases supplied]
Jurisprudence confirms this interpretation ofRA No. 9225 in AASJS v. Hon.
Datumanong25cralawred when the Court pointedly
declared:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep.
Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not
made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.26 [emphasis supplied]
The oath of allegiance taken under RA No. 9225 entitles a person to enjoy full
civil and political rights that include the right to participate, directly or indirectly,
in the establishment or administration of the government.27 He or she may now
vote.
To be voted upon to an elective office, however, a natural-born Filipino citizen
who has implicitly renounced foreign allegiance when he or she swears
allegiance to the Republic under RA No. 9225 must still make his or her
previous implicit renunciation "express." In the words of the law, he must
"make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship."
[Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225]
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x
"(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws, and at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath; ....[emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The requirement of an express renunciation, however, does not negate
the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit renunciation o(
citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the oath of allegiance. Thus,
persons availing of RA No. 9225 do not renounce their foreign citizenship for
the first time by executing the Affidavit of renunciation that Section 5(2) of the
law requires; they have implicitly made this renunciation when they swore
allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic.
What the oath of renunciation simply does is to make express what natural-
born. Filipino citizens have already implicitly renounced. The requirement of
express renunciation highlights the implication that it is not the exclusive
means by which natural-born Filipino citizens may renounce their foreign
citizenship. In reality, the oath of renunciation is a requirement simply for
the purpose of running for elective public office, apparently to ensure
that foreign citizenship and mixed loyalties are kept out of the elective
public service.
To paraphrase Japzon v. Comelec,28 the oath of renunciation makes these
natural-born potential candidates for public office "pure" Philippine
citizens29from the perspective of the election laws.
In sum, the oath of allegiance not only allows these natural-born Filipinos to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship; thereby, they also implicitly renounce their
citizenship and allegiance to any and all foreign country as they assert
allegiance to the "supreme authority of the Philippines and x x x maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto". The oath of renunciation, on the other hand,
complements their oath of allegiance through the express manifestation, for
purpose of running for public office, that the candidate is a "pure" Filipino.
B. Arnado's attainment, loss of '"pure"
Filipino citizen status, and subsequent
developments
Based on the above discussions, I find - as the ponencia and the majority
in Maquiling did - that Arnado became a "pure" Philippine citizen when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippines on July 10, 2008, and his oath of
renunciation on April 3, 2009.30 With his oath of renunciation, he became
solely a Filipino citizen with total allegiance to the Republic ofthe Philippines.
He could have, at that point, validly run for public office, except that subsequent
to his renunciation, he travelled using his U.S. passport - a development that
the Maquiling ruling unfortunately characterized as a recantation of his
previous renunciation of American citizenship.
Had the developments that transpired in Arnado's political life simply stopped
with his candidacy in the May 2010 Elections, then the present case and its
complications would have been avoided. But as subsequent developments
showed, a confluence of complicating factors arose.
First, Arnado ran again for the same office in the May 2013 Elections, and
events overlapped. His disqualification case was not resolved with dispatch so
that the period for the filing of the CoC for the May 2013 Elections (in
October 2012) was set while the present case was still pending with this
Court.
Second, at that time, the standing ruling was the Comelec en banc decision
that Arnado was not disqualified and had perfected the required submissions
for his candidacy. No restraining order or any other ruling from this Court
intervened to prevent this Comelec ruling from being the governing rule
in the interim.
As a result, Arnado saw no need to undertake remedial measures addressing
the matters complained about in the 2010 Maquiling disqualification case. But
at that point, he had already filed two oaths of renunciation - on April 3,
2009 and on November 30, 2009 - when he filed his CoC for the May 2010
Elections.
Third, he did not submit any oath of renunciation together with his October 1,
2012 CoC since, to his knowledge, he had complied with the requirements of
RA No. 9225 and the Local Government Code, and had attained "pure" Filipino
citizen status. (That he did attain this status based on the 2008 oath of
allegiance and his 2009 affidavit of renunciation is in fact confirmed
by Maquiling, although his subsequent recantation intervened.)
Arnado's political world was overturned when the Court resolved the May 2010
disqualification case on April 16, 2013, or a few days before the May 2013
elections. But Arnado did not fully dwell on the past. While filing a motion for
reconsideration of the Maquiling ruling, he also acted on his October 1, 2012
CoC by executing and submitting, on May 9, 2013, an Oath of Allegiance
and Oath of Renunciation affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation.
Thus, from the perspective of the laws governing natural-born Filipinos who
have re-acquired Philippine citizenship and who wish to run for public office,
Arnado did not only comply with the twin requirements of RA No. 9225 as of
April 3, 2009; he even exceeded the requirements of the law by asserting
his oath of allegiance to the Republic four times, while also impliedly
renouncing any and all foreign citizenships for the same number of Third, along the same line ofthought, Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
"times, and twice expressly renouncing any and all other Renunciation, submitted to comply with his May 2013 candidacy, was rejected
citizenships (with one express renunciation declared recanted by Maquiling). because it should have been filed on October 1, 2012 (i.e., when he filed his
CoC for the May 2013 elections).
All these are material considerations that should be taken into account in
resolving the present case and are more fully discussed under separate If the Maquiling ruling of April 16, 2013, which addressed the separate 2010
headings below. disqualification case, was made to retroactively apply to October 1, 2012, in
the separate 2013 disqualification case, then a retroactive opportunity should
C. The Comelec gravely abused its also be given in the 2013 disqualification case to comply with what retroactively
discretion in ruling that the May 9, 2013 applied in Maquiling.
Confirmation of Oath of Affirmation
was out of time To the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a replacement
•oath of renunciation in 2013, there was an unfair and abusive denial of
After the promulgation of the Maquiling Decision disqualifying Arnado for the opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.
May 2010 elections and relying solely on its terms, the Comelec disqualified
Arnado for the May 2013 elections because his October 1, 2012 CoC was not D. The Maquiling ruling is limited to Arnado's
supported by any Affidavit of Renunciation (since Maquiling considered his qualification to run for public office and only
April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation for the May 2010 elections effectively for the purpose of the May 2010 elections
recanted).
I submit that the ponencia 's ruling, insofar as it adopts the Maquiling ruling, is
The Comelec ruling and its underlying reasons are, on their face, patently an overreach that runs counter to the policy behind RA No. 9225.
unreasonable since they did not consider at all the surrounding circumstances
of the filing of the October 1, 2012 CoC and the circumstances that led to the I submit that the extent of the legal consequences of the Maquiling ruling
absence of any oath of renunciation after the Maquiling ruling. The Comelec affect solely Arnado's qualification to run for public office and only for
approach is in fact simplistic to the point of grave abuse of discretion. the purpose of the May 2010 elections. These consequences should not
Apparently, it considered that with the oath of renunciation recanted and with be extended to situations outside of and not contemplated by Maquiling.
no oath filed with the October 1, 2012 CoC, then the CoC should be considered
fatally deficient. The ponencia's reasoning also runs this way. The following reasons support my view:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Subject to fuller discussions below, I submit that the Comelec missed out on First, the Maquiling ruling only considered the material facts surrounding the
at least three (3) basic considerations. May 2010 Elections. The critical facts on which the Maquiling case turned
dwelt with the travels of Arnado using his U.S. passport. These facts are not
First, at the time the October 1, 2012 CoC was filed, the prevailing ruling, contested in the present case. Nor am I contesting that for eleven days in April
although then contested before the Court, was the Comelec en banc ruling 2009, Arnado was a "pure" Filipino, until a recantation of his renunciation oath
that did not consider. Arnado disqualified. To reiterate, no intervening took place. These are settled and accepted facts.
restraining order was issued by this Court addressing this Comelec ruling.
Hence, there was no immediate need, at the time of the CoC's filing, for a The Maquiling ruling left out, because these are facts that it did not consider
replacement supporting oath of renunciation. material for its resolution (such as the overlaps in the filing of the October 1,
2012 CoC and the resolution of Maquiling; the effect of Maquiling on the 2013
Second, since the Comelec did not accept Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of disqualification case; the oath of allegiance and renunciation that
Renunciation (for the May 2013 Elections) in the light of the Maquiling ruling accompanied the November 30, 2009 CoC for the May 2010 elections) or
(affecting the May 2010 elections), he was placed in an impossible situation of because they were outside the scope of the relevant facts of
being disqualified in the May 2013 Elections for a ruling applicable only to the Maquiling (such as the prevailing Comelec en banc ruling on October 1, 2012
May 2010 Elections, without being given the opportunity to submit his when Arnado filed his CoC; the facts surrounding the filing of the CoC on
compliance for the May 2013 Elections. October 1, 2012; and the May 9, 2013 filing of the Oath of Allegiance and Oath
of Renunciation affirming his April 3,' 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation). concepts that cannot definitively be affected by a Court ruling in an election
disqualification case, even if the disqualification case touches on the
From these perspectives, how can the 2010 Maquiling case be a seamless citizenship qualification of the candidate. Thus, I submit that Maquiling
continuation of the 2013 disqualification case now before this Court? invalidated Arnado's renunciation oath solely for the purpose of his
qualification for the May 2010 elections.
Second, the implied renunciation of foreign citizenship that Arnado made on
several occasions is different from and has distinct legal implications separate Third, Arnado became a "pure" Philippine citizen as of April 3, 2009, a legal
from the express renunciation he made on April 3, 2009. consequence that Maquilingrecognized and conceded as it declared that "he
in fact did" comply with the "twin requirements under RA No. 9225" for the
The implied renunciation of foreign citizenship proceeds from the oath of purpose of election qualification.
allegiance that natural-born Filipino citizens take to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship. This is patent from the terms of the oath of allegiance and is a What made the Court rule against Arnado's qualification for the May 2010
consequence of the resulting re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship. Elections was the finding of positive, albeit isolated, acts that effectively
"disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section
The express renunciation, in contrast, is an after-the-fact requirement that 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991."
arises only if these natural-born Filipino citizens choose to run for public office.
The requirement of an express renunciation of foreign citizenship arises only Otherwise stated, Arnado, in the Maquiling sense, was indisputably already a
after they have re-acquired Philippine citizenship for the exclusive purpose "pure" Philippine citizen as of April 3, 2009. He reverted to a dual citizen status
of qualifying them for elective public office. (and only from the perspective of the concerned foreign country) only on the
date subsequent to April 3, 2009, and only by virtue of the ruling that
Note in this regard that Maquiling declared as recanted only the express considered his use of his US passport on isolated occasions as a "voluntar[y]
renunciation that Arnado executed on April 3, 2009, not the implied and effective[] [act of] revert[ing] to [the] earlier status [of] a dual citizen."
renunciation that Arnado made on several occasions when he swore
allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic. To quote and highlight the majority's pronouncement on this point: "[such
reversion was not retroactive as it took place the instant Arnado
This Maquiling declaration and the distinction that it signifies are crucial: first, represented himself as an American citizen by using his US
the implied renunciation of foreign allegiance that Arnado made on several passport."31cralawrednad
occasions still stands as valid, as Maquiling affected only his April 3, 2009
express renunciation; second, the implied renunciation must be valid because Thus, even if only for qualification purposes, the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
it did not affect Arnado's reacquisition of Filipino citizenship; and third, Renunciation was a valid and Court-recognized express declaration of
Arnado's express renunciation was declared recanted solely for the purpose Arnado's renunciation of his US citizenship that the Court cannot lightly
of the May 2010 Elections, not for any and all other purposes. disregard in the present disqualification case.

In short, Maquiling did not declare Arnado's renunciation of his US Fourth, even Maquiling did not perpetually and absolutely disqualify Arnado
citizenship invalid for all purposes; it certainly could not have done so as that from running for any elective public office, or from running in any elections as
case involved an election disqualification case that challenged Arnado's they declared that "[h]e is disqualified x x from becoming a candidate in the
candidacy for the mayoralty post by reason of an alleged defect in his May 2010 elections."32 In other words, Maquiling declared Arnado as
qualification,i.e., Arnado's isolated acts that, to the majority, effectively disqualified from running only in the May 2010 Elections; they did not declare
recanted his express renunciation. him as disqualified for any and all other elections, including the May 2013
Elections.
In ruling as it did, Maquiling did not and could not have gone beyond the
confines of the underlying election disqualification case and could not E. Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
have ruled on Arnado's Philippine citizenship per se without exceeding the Renunciation, affirming his April 3, 2009
confines of the Court's jurisdiction. Affidavit, cured any alleged defect in his
qualification to run for public office during
Citizenship and its loss, acquisition, and re-acquisition are much broader the May 2013 Elections

I take exception to the ponencia's ruling that ignores Arnado's May 9, 2013
Affidavit of Renunciation simply because it was executed after Arnado filed his
CoC on October 1, 2012. I submit that Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
Renunciation bears crucial significance to Arnado's qualification to run for the
May 2013 Elections which the Court cannot and should not lightly ignore.
Maquiling unequivocably held that by using an American passport, he
effectively recanted his express renunciation of his US citizenship.
Jurisprudence defines the act of recantation to mean to "withdraw or repudiate
formally and publicly;" "to renounce or withdraw prior statement." To "retract"
means to "take back;" "to retract an offer is to withdraw it before
acceptance."33cralawrednad
That Arnado took back his statement disavowing allegiance to the US
government, however, does not render invalid his status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen; neither does it negate the fact that he had impliedly renounced
his US citizenship, and had subsequently made an express renunciation of his
US citizenship.
Granting that Arnado's use of his US passport amounted to a withdrawal of the
express renunciation he made of his allegiance to the US, this withdrawal does
not erase the fact that he did make an express renunciation ofhis US
citizenship.
To my mind, this express renunciation, even if recanted, may still be re-
affirmed, in the same way a statement already made and subsequently denied,
can be re-confirmed. Thus, Arnado's 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation can
validly re-affirm the 2009 express renunciation that the Court held to have been
recanted in Maquiling.
Note that in the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, Arnado categorically
stated that he renounces his US citizenship, as well as any and all foreign
citizenship; swears allegiance to the Republic; and confirms the
renunciation (of his US citizenship). he had previously made in the
April3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Note, likewise, that as explained above, the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation is a valid and Court-confirmed oath that Arnado had validly
confirmed in his May 9, 2013 Affidavit. To confirm means "to make firm:
strengthen in a resolution, conviction, loyalty, position; to give new assurance
of the truth or validity; to state or imply the truth,"34 and implies a prior
existinact.
Finally, note that the Maquiling ruling was issued after Arnado took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic four times- on July 10, 2008, April 3, 2009 (when he
executed the affidavit of renunciation); November 30, 2009 (when he filed his
CoC for the May 2010 Elections); and October 1, 2012 (when he filed his CoC
for the May 2013 Elections). It was also issued after Arnado renounced his US
citizenship expressly on April 3, 2009, and impliedly on four occasions - on
July 10, 2008; April 3, 2009; November 30, 2009; and October 1, 2012- when
he swore allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic.
In fact, in his October 1, 2012 CoC, Arnado made the following
oath:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey all laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities. I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily, withour mental reservation and purpose
of evasion.
Taken together, all these facts undeniably show that Arnado's May 9, 2013
Affidavit of Renunciation was not entirely new, nor completely different and
independent from the oath of renunciation that Arnado took on April 3,
2009. Rather, it affirmed and revalidated the Court-recognized renunciation
oath that he had earlier taken.
Indisputably, Maquiling found that Arnado's express renunciation had been
validly made. This express renunciation, having been disavowed, can be re-
affirmed by subsequent acts - through his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
Renunciation and through the statement in his October 1, 2012 CoC.
The statement in Arnado's October 1, 2012 CoC, for instance, is substantially
similar to the oath of allegiance required in RA No. 9225. This oath not only
recognizes Arnado's Filipino citizenship, but impliedly renounces his US
citizenship. That he swore sole allegiance to the Philippine Republic in his
October 1, 2012 CoC in effect affirmed his express renunciation of US
citizenship; and thus dispenses with the need for another express
renunciation.
Rather than an oath that should simply be brushed aside as the Comelec did,
the May 9, 2013 Affidavit served: first, to repair his reverted dual citizen status
as declared in Maquiling; and second, to re-assert and emphasize his clear
intent to renounce his US citizenship which he had expressly done once and
impliedly done four times.
In this sense, the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation retroacted to April 3,
2009, and cured any alleged defect in Arnado's October 1, 2012 CoC. More
importantly, it cured any defect that the intervening Maquiling ruling introduced
on Arnado's qualification to run for public office during the May 2013 Elections.
 stood and had not yet been overturned at the time Arnado filed his CoC on
That Arnado executed his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation October 1, 2012 for the May 2013 Elections. Arnado, therefore, had every right
while Maquiling was still under the Court's consideration (it was not confirmed and reason to rely on this Comelec ruling and to believe that he was not
on reconsideration until July 2, 2013) is not without significance. While the May disqualified to run in the May 2013 Elections.
9, 2013 Affidavit was filed for purposes of the present disqualification case, it
could have, had the Court been so inclined, considered as a factor in ruling I concede that, as the events have shown, he should, in retrospect, have
on Maquiling's reconsideration; but apparently it was not at all considered exercised greater care and have taken every. step to secure his qualification
since Arnado's use of his US passport was the focal point of the controversy. to run for public office. His failure, however, should not and cannot affect his
qualification which then stands and is authoritatively affirmed by the Comelec.
F. The intervening Maquiling ruling did
not and could not have invalidated his status Indeed "there is no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of
as a ''pure" Philippine citizen who was qualified Renunciation every election period" as the ponencia puts it. But, note
to run and had filed a valid CoCfor the that there is equally no law that requires him to constantly and
May 2013 Elections consistently assert his renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship. Neither is there any law that expressly or impliedly imposes on
As the legal consequences of the Maquiling ruling on Arnado's renunciation of natural-born Filipino citizens the obligation to constantly assert their allegiance
his US citizenship did not extend beyond his qualification to run for public office to the Republic and perform positive acts to assert this allegiance.
during the May 2010 elections; and that the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
Renunciation cured any alleged defect in Arnado's qualification to run for the In fact, as the law stands, natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their
May 2013 Elections, I submit that the Maquiling ruling on April 16, 2013 did not Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
affect and could not have affected Arnado's qualification to run for public office country need only to take an oath of allegiance to the supreme authority of the
for the purpose of the May 2013 Elections. Republic to re-acquire Philippine citizenship as they are "deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship." Once they re-acquire their Philippine
Under the circumstances, Arnado had effectively become a "pure" natural-born citizenship after complying with these legal steps, they no longer need to
Philippine citizen again on October 1, 2012, when he executed the retroactive perform any positive act to assert Philippine citizenship or to elect
and curative May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, and which status continued citizenship.35cralawrednad
well beyond the May 2013 Elections. In this way, Arnado qualified for the
position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and filed a valid CoC. H. Arnado's persistent assertions of
his allegiance to the Republic and renunciation
G. When Arnado filed his CoC on of his US citizenship more than sufficiently
October 1, 2012, the Comelec En Banc, proved his determined resolve to profess
in its February 2, 2011 Resolution in allegiance only to the Republic; these
SPA No. 10-109(DC), declared him continuing assertions should have resolved
as qualified to run for the elective office; any doubt in favor of his qualification
hence, Arnado did not need to execute
another Affidavit of Renunciation because RA No. 9225 is a relatively new statutory enactment whose provisions have
of this standing Comelec ruling not been exhaustively interpreted and ruled upon by this Court, through an
appropriate case. In this respect, I submit that in situations of doubt where the
I likewise strongly object to the ponencia for faulting Arnado for not executing strict application of the equivocal letter of the law would clearly and
another oath of renunciation at the time of or prior to the filing of his CoC on undoubtedly disregard the legislative intent, the Court must and should tread
October 1, 2012, reasoning out that as "early as 2010 x x x Arnado has gotten lightly as it rules on the relatively uncharted area of application where RA No.
wind that the use of his US passport might pose a problem to his candidacy." 9225 overlaps with our elections laws.

It should be remembered that in the February 2, 2011 Resolution in SPA No. The unique factual situation of this case presents such situation of doubt which
10-109(DC), the ComelecEn Banc declared Arnado as a "pure" Philippine the Court must resolve in the light of the clear legislative intent, rather than
citizen again, qualified to run for elective public office. This Comelec ruling still from the strict application of the equivocal letter of the law. I find that Arnado's
persistent assertion of his allegiance to the Republic and renunciation of his
US citizenship more than sufficiently prove his determined resolve to profess A minor matter, asserted by the ponencia, which should be corrected is the
allegiance only to the Republic and to none other. claim that Arnado "used his US passport on January 12, 2010, and on March
23, 2010, as found by this Court in Maquiling."
I submit that the following considerations should not be missed.
I strongly object to this observation as the ponencia clearly
At the. time Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he had fully satisfied all misread Maquiling.
of the requirements of RA No. 9225 to run for elective public office: he has re-
acquired Philippine citizenship after having filed the Oath of Allegiance and Nowh re in Maquiling did the Court make a finding that Arnado used his US
secured the order of approval on July 10, 2008; he has also met all of the passport again on January 12, 2010, and March 23, 2010- months after he had
qualifications under the Constitution and the law for the local elective office; received his Philippine passport. Rather, the alleged use by Arnado of his US
and he has already executed an Affidavit of Renunciation on April 3, 2009. passport on these dates was a mere assertion of Balua, before the
Comelec First Division in the Maquiling case; interestingly,
Likewise, as of October 1, 2012, Arnado had sworn allegiance to the Republic
four times, i.e., on July 10, 2008; April 3, 2009; November 30, 2009; and Balua was no longer a party when the case reached this Court. In fact, the
October 1, 2012. He had also renounced his US citizenship expressly on April Court in Maquiling, quoting a portion of the Comelec En Banc decision, noted
3, 2009, and impliedly thrice on July 10, 2008, November 30, 2009, and that on January 12, 2010, what Arnado used was his Philippine passport,
October 1, 2012. not his US passport.

Additionally, on October 1, 2012, the Comelec en banc, via the February 2, J. Under the circumstances, the Comelec
2011 resolution in SPA No. 10-109(DC), had ruled in his favour, affirmed the committed grave abuse of discretion
existence and validity of his oath of renunciation, and confirmed his continuing
qualification for the elective post. At that time, the February 2, 2011 Comelec In this Rule 64-Rule 65 petition, the Court's review is limited to the jurisdictional
ruling had not yet been reversed by this Court and stood as the final and most issue of whether the Comelec acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
recent ruling as regards his qualification to run for the local elective post. As it grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
had not yet been reversed, he clearly and rightfully had every reason to rely
on this Comelec ruling when he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012. As a concept, grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the
In these lights, Arnado's allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
and his renunciation of any and all foreign allegiance, including those to the positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
US government, cannot be doubted. From the time he had reacquired "pure" all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
Philippine citizenship under the terms of RA No. 9225, Arnado has persistently despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion
asserted these oaths even while the law does not require him to do so. is not enough; it must be grave.

In this situation, any doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in favor of his full The Court's review power is also limited by the condition, under Section 5, Rule
Filipino citizenship - with his qualification to run for the May 2013 Elections- 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the Comelec, supported by
since the thrust ofRA No. 9225 is to encourage the return to Filipino citizenship substantial evidence, shall be final and nonreviewable. In this respect, the
of natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship through their Court does not ordinarily review the Comelec's appreciation and evaluation of
acquisition of foreign citizenship.36 Note in this regard that Arnado consciously evidence as any misstep by the Comelec in this regard generally involves an
and voluntarily gave up a very much sought after citizenship status in favor of error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
returning to full Filipino citizenship and of participating in Philippine
govemance.37cralawrednad In exceptional situations, however, where the assailed judgment is based on
misapprehension or erroneous apprehension of facts or on the use of
I. Maquiling did not say that Arnado used wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue38 situations that
his US passport again on January 12, 2010, are tainted with grave abuse of discretion the Court is not only obligeq but has
and on March 23, 2010 the constitutional duty to intervene.39 When grave abuse of discretion is
present, the resulting errors mutate from error of judgment to one of approach.40 To reiterate what Sinaca v. Mula41 teaches
jurisdiction. us:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I find that, based on the reasons discussed above, the Comelec's action in this [When] a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and
case as it disqualified Arnado from running for the May 2013 Elections, was clearly expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the
clearly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. candidate1S eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people.
Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when: first, it relied be paramount It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail.
completely and indiscriminately on the Maquiling ruling - the wrong and This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred.
irrelevant, or at the very least, incomplete - consideration in deciding the
underlying disqualification case; and second, it did not make its own finding In the words of another leading case - Frivaldo v. Comelec42- the law and the
of facts and evaluation of the evidence, independent of Maquiling, and courts, including this Court, must give serious consideration to the popular will.
disregarded relevant facts and evidence subsequent to Maquiling - a clear
misapprehension of the facts. Note that the Comelec, both in the September "In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral
6, 2013, and December 9, 2013 resolutions, quoted heavily portions of choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner
the Maquiling ruling and drew its discussions and conclusion largely that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public
from Maquiling. policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the
majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the
For these reasons, and under the circumstances of this case, I submit that the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
assailed Comelec actions must be struck down for grave abuse of discretion antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
K. At any rate, all doubts should be juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
resolved in favor of Arnado's qualification: promote.''43cralawrednad
the mandate of the people of Kauswagan
that twice elected Arnado as their Mayor Under the evidentiary and unique factual situation of this case, the alleged
should be respected and upheld eligibility of Arnado is not antagonistic, patently or otherwise, to constitutional
and legal principles such that giving effect to the sovereign will would create
Independently of all these issues- of Arnado's qualification to run for the May prejudice to our democratic institutions.
2013 Elections and the intervention of the Maquiling ruling the Court cannot
and should not now ignore the undeniable fact that the people of Kauswagan, Notably, the Office of the Sanggunianng Bayan, through Resolution No. 002-
Lanao del Norte, have themselves responded to the situation of doubt 201444 dated January 2, 2014, and the Liga ng Mga Barangay, through
that might have arisen because of the factual link between the present Resolution No. 001-201445 dated January 2, 2014, expressed their continuing
disqualification case and the intervention of the Maquiling ruling. and overwhelming support for Arnado, notwithstanding the Comelec rulings
disqualifying him from the May 2013 Elections, and implores the Court to heed
The people themselves made their own ruling when they elected Arnado the Kauswagan people's voice under the principle vox populi, vox dei.
as their mayor in the two successive elections - the May 2010 and the
May 2013 elections - despite the "foreigner" label his rivals, even the Under the circumstances of this case, the ponencia's action that resolves all
ponencia, sought to continuously pin on him. doubts against Arnado's eligibility undoubtedly defeats the will of the
Kauswagan electorate.46 In ruling as it does, the ponenciaeffectively
Arnado received an overwhelming 8,902 votes as against the meager 1,707 disenfranchises an undoubtedly overwhelming majority of the Kauswagan
votes of his opponent Capitan in the May 2013 Elections; in the May 2010 people as "[t]he rights of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution
Elections, he received the majority 5,952 of the total 11,309 votes cast. At this of the weigh.t of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the
point, "even this Court should heed this verdict by resolving all doubts free exercise of the franchise."47 The Court should respect and uphold the will
regarding Arnado's eligibility in his favor." This is not a novel of the electorate.
For the above reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
Petitioner Rommel C. Amado renounced his foreign citizenship in accordance
with Republic Act No. 9225 no less than three times. After he had filed his
candidacy for the position of Mayor in 2013, this court promulgated its Decision
in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,1 which made it impossible for him to
again renounce or reiterate his renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In the
2013 elections, he won garnering 84% of the votes cast in his municipality.
The majority opinion requires him now, yet again, to renounce his foreign
citizenship.
I concur with the ponencia's finding that petitioner's claim of procedural
infirmities that occurred during the proceedings before the Commission on
Elections is unsubstantiated.
However, I cannot agree with the conclusion that petitioner remained an
American citizen in accordance with this court's ruling in Maquiling. Petitioner
was already a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy
on October 1, 2012. He was qualified to run in the 2013 Elections. The Petition
should be granted.
I allegiance
Petitioner has performed all the acts required by Republic Act No. 92252 in
order to reacquire his Filipino citizenship.
Under Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code,3 a candidate for Mayor
must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident in the
municipality or city where he or she intends to be elected for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of election, and be able to read and write
Filipino or any local language or dialect.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code4 expressly disqualifies those who
possess dual citizenship from running in any local elective position. These
provisions, however, do not disqualify candidates who might have lost their
citizenship but were able to reacquire it before running for public office.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides that "Philippine citizenship
may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law."
Those who lose their Filipino citizenship through naturalization in another
country may reacquire it through the procedure outlined in Republic Act No.
9225. This also applies to naturalized citizens who wish to reacquire their
Filipino citizenship in order to run for public office.
According to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:cralawlawlibrary
"I ___________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and
I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The effect of reacquisition is the restoration of Philippine citizenship to natural-
born Filipino citizens who have been naturalized as citizens in a foreign
country. All that is required to retain their citizenship is to take the oath of
under the law.
In the previous repatriation law, naturalized citizens seeking to reacquire
Philippine citizenship only had to take an oath of allegiance in order to regain
their citizenship, including the right to seek public office.5Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 636 states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Commonwealth of the Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry.
The same requirement is present in the present reacqms1t10n law. Philippine
citizenship is deemed to have been reacquired through the taking of the oath
of allegiance embodied in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. However, unlike
the previous law, the mere act of taking the oath of allegiance is not sufficient
compliance for those seeking to run for public office. The law includes an
additional requisite before they become qualified to run for public office,
thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re- Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish
existing laws of the Philippines and the following an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with
conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines).
This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee
. . . . on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130
held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon.
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal from the renunciation of foreign citizenship:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath[.] (Emphasis supplied) CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office
in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections:7cralawrednad required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
[F]or a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) oath." I think it's very good, ha? No problem?
meet the qualifications for holding such public oftice as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn REP. JAVIER. ... I think it's already covered by the oath.
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.8 CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

The law requires a personal and sworn renunciation of all foreign citizenships REP. JAVIER. Ah... but he has taken his oath already.
before the candidate files a certificate of candidacy.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No...no, renouncing foreign citizenship.
In Jacot v. Dal and Commission on Elections,9 this court disqualified Nestor A.
Jacot from running for Vice Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, after he failed to CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. What's your problem, Boy? Those
make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American seeking elective office in the Philippines.
citizenship:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who that ano...
either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.
public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels naturalborn
Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath
of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute
a personal and sworn renunciationof any and all foreign citizenship before
an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.
REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one
citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have only one.
There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for
Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but
also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections,
Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of
Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn
renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to
emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all
those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the
renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who
have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of
having more than one citizenship.10 (Emphasis in the original)
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 restores full civil and political rights to those
who wish to reacquire their citizenship, including the right to vote and be voted
for. A candidate may have the right to vote and be voted for as long as he or
she has already done all positive acts necessary for the reacquisition of his or
her Philippine citizenship before filing his or her certificate of candidacy.
Residency as a requirement for public office must also be interpreted as a
separate matter from citizenship. Residence is said to be synonymous to
domicile.11 Domicile requires both physical presence and animus revertendi or
intent to retum.12 Citizenship may be presumed from one's domicile,13 but this
presumption is disputable. Further proof other than domicile may be required
to prove citizenship.
A person residing in the Philippines is presumed to be a Filipino citizen.
Domicile, however, does not ipso facto prove his or her citizenship. A Filipino
may reside in the United States but still remain a Filipino citizen. An American
may also reside in the Philippines and still remain an American citizen. The
presumption created by residency is not conclusive of one's citizenship.
Residency also need not be continuous for as long as the total number of
required years have been complied with before the election. Section 39(a) of
the Local Government Code requires residency for "at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election for local elective office." A
candidate for local elective office may be eligible to run for as long as he or
she is proven to have animus revertendi in a certain domicile for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the elections.
The purpose of the residency requirement is "to give candidates the
opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for
growth[,] and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness
for the job they aspire for."14 The length of a candidate's residency depends
on the time necessary to acquire familiarity with the constituency as well as
sensitivity to the welfare of the constituents. The requirement seeks "to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and needs
of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve
that community."15cralawrednad
Continuity does not always guarantee familiarity. A momentary absence from
the country does not negate the purpose of the residency requirement.16 A
candidate who has spent some time abroad may offer a unique perspective as
opposed to a candidate who has never left the country. The former may be in
a better position to observe the changes the country may have undergone
through the years, or may have a stronger intuition as to the level of growth it
still needs. What is important is that the purpose of residency is complied with.
Petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July
10, 2008. On April 3, 2009, he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of his
foreign citizenship. Petitioner alleges that he executed his Affidavit of
Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on November 30, 2009. On May 9, 2013,
he again executed the Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado 's "Affidavit of
Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009."
Petitioner renounced his American citizenship no less than three times before
he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on October 1, 2012. He had performed all
the acts required by Republic Act No. 9225 in order to reacquire his Filipino
citizenship before he ran for public office.
However, the ponencia takes exception to these findings of fact and rules that,
in accordance with this court's findings in Maquiling, petitioner's use of his
American passport after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation negated his
Affidavit. I cannot agree with this conclusion.
II
Petitioner's use of his American passport was an isolated act required by the
circumstances. At that time, he had not yet been issued his Philippine
passport.
In the dissent in Maquiling led by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, it was
pointed out that when Amado traveled back to the United States, "he had no
Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States to
attend to the winding up of his business and other affairs in
America."17cralawrednad
The use of a foreign passport should not by itself cause the immediate nullity
of one's affidavit of renunciation. Its circumstances must also be taken into
account.
 DATE OF Arrival: 01/12/2010
The necessity of the use of his American passport is shown by the timeline of NATIONALITY: USA-AMERICAN
events, thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary PASSPORT: 057782700

Affidavit of Renunciation: April 3, 2009 DATE OF Arrival: 03/23/2010

Date of Issuance of Philippine Passport: June 18, 2009 NATIONALITY: USA-AMERICAN
Receipt of Philippine Passport: September 2009 PASSPORT: 05778270019
Second Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance (alleged by
petitioner): November 30, 2009 This certification is contradicted by petitioner's Philippine pass ort which was
stamped by the Bureau of Immigration also on these dates.20 It was, therefore,
Date of Travels18cralawrednad erroneous for the ponencia to refer to the certification as
"uncontroverted."21cralawrednad

Destination Date of Departure from Date of Arrival in Passport The ponencia unduly gives weight to the Bureau of Immigration's certification
the Philippines the Philippines on the basis that the copy of his Philippine passport was a mere "certified true
USA April 14, 2009 June 25, 2009 American copy from the machine copy on file."22 Maquilingundoubtedly states that
petitioner was issued a Philippine passport and that he used it for his
USA July 29, 2009 November 24, 2009 American
subsequent travels abroad.23 There is a presumption that this piece of
USA December 11, 2009 January 12, 2010 Philippine evidence, like the certification by the Bureau of Immigration, can be relied upon
USA January 31, 2010 March 31, 2010 Philippine since it forms part of the case records. Under the presumption of regularity, his
USA April 11, 2010 April 16, 2010 Philippine passport is presumed to have been stamped by the Bureau of Immigration.
USA May 20, 2010 June 4, 2010 Philippine Until and unless it is alleged and proven that the stamps on his Philippine
passport are fraudulent, it is presumed that the Bureau of Immigration certified
Petitioner could use only his American passport when he traveled on April 14, the use of his Philippine passport and the use of his American passport on the
2009 since the Consulate of the Philippines had not yet issued him a Philippine dates alleged. It is also possible that at the time the certification was issued,
passport. the Bureau of Immigration had not yet updated its database. Therefore, it was
erroneous for the ponencia to conclude that petitioner used his American
When petitioner received his Philippine passport sometime in September passport on January 12, 2010 and on March 23, 2010 based merely on the
2009, he could not immediately use it to exit the United States since he entered certification dated April23, 2010.24cralawrednad
the country using an American passport. If he exited using a Philippine
passport, one presumably without an American visa, immigration authorities of III
both the Philippines and the United States would have questioned his travel
documents. He would have had no choice but to use his American passport to Even if the ponencia applied the ruling in Maquiling, Amado should have
exit the United States. already been qualified to run in the 2013 Elections.

However, petitioner did use his Philippine passport in his subsequent travels.
Hence, his isolated use of his American passport when he did not yet have his
Philippine passport is not sufficient cause to negate his Affidavit of
Renunciation.
The ponencia cites Maquiling, in that Linog C. Balua, petitioner's rival
candidate in the 2010 Elections, presented a certification dated April 23, 2010
from the Bureau of Immigration indicating that as of January 12, 2010 and
March 23, 2010, petitioner's nationality was "USA-American." The Computer
Database/Passenger Manifest states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Maquiling held that petitioner's use of his American passport negated his
Affidavit of Renunciation, thus disqualifYing him to run in the 2010
Elections:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We therefore hold that Amado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took.
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a
candidate in the May 2010 elections.25cralawred
Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that, per Maquiling, petitioner's use
of his Philippine passport signifies his Philippine citizenship.
According to Republic Act No. 8239,26 a passport is "a document issued by the
Philippine government to its citizens and requesting other governments to
allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in case of need to give him/her
all lawful aid and protection."27cralawrednad
By definition, a Philippine passport is a document issued by the government to
its citizens. Clearly, a Philippine passport cannot be issued to an American
citizen.
If this court concludes, as the ponencia has done, that petitioner remained an
American citizen, the facts should show that he continued to use his American
passport before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2013 Elections.
As of June 18, 2009, petitioner was issued a Philippine passport. He has
continually used his Philippine passport from December 11, 2009. He also
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on November
30, 2009. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on October 1, 2012,
he was already the bearer of a Philippine passport.
In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,28 a petition for habeas corpus was filed against
then Commissioner for Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor-
Santiago for the release of Willie Yu (Yu) from detention. This court, confronted
with the issue of Yu's citizenship, found:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese
passport in 1971, valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his
naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981,
petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serias
N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo.
Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July
1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,'' he declared his nationality as
Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
Registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an
express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Gallano,
express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with
full knowledge, and legal capacity, afier having renounced Portuguese
citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he
had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition
of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.29(Emphasis supplied)
Yu's renewal of his Portuguese passport was a renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. This court took into account Yu's application for renewal and his
declaration of his Portuguese nationality in commercial documents.
In contrast, petitioner was forced by his circumstances to use his American
passport at a time when he had not yet been issued a Philippine passport.
Upon the issuance of his Philippine passport, however, petitioner consistently
used this passport for his travels. His consistent use of his Philippine passport
was a positive act that showed his continued allegiance to the country.
Petitioner's continued intent to renounce his American citizenship is clear
when he executed his Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado 's "Affidavit of
Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009" on May 9, 2013.
Republic Act No. 9225 requires a personal and sworn renunciation from
persons who seek to reacquire their Philippine citizenship in order to run for
local office. Petitioner's Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3, 2009, his
continued use of his Philippine passport, his alleged Affidavit of Renunciation
with Oath of Allegiance dated November 30, 2009, and his Affidavit dated May
9, 2013 are more than enough evidence to show his personal and sworn
renunciation of his American citizenship.
IV
Election laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people.
Petitioner garnered an oveiWhelming 8,902 votes, 84% of the total votes
case0 in the 2013 mayoralty elections. If he is disqualified, Florante Capitan,
his opponent who garnered 1,707 votes, a mere 16% of the total votes
cast,31 will become the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
This court will have substituted its discretion over the sovereign will of the
people.
The ponencia erroneously cites Lopez v. Commission on Elections32 as basis
for stating that petitioner's landslide victory could not override eligibility
requirements.
In Lopez, a petition for disqualification was filed against Eusebio Eugenio K.
Lopez (Lopez) to disqualifY him from running for Barangay Chair in the 2007
Barangay Elections. Lopez argued that he was a dual citizen by virtue of
Republic Act No. 9225 and, hence, was qualified to run.
This court disagreed and disqualified Lopez from running in public office since
he failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his American
citizenship. It also ruled that his subsequent victory in the elections could not
cure the defect of his disqualification:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to
discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the
defect ofhis candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate
the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.33
Lopez, however, does not apply since the candidate in that case failed to
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship. In this
case, petitioner made a personal and sworn renunciation of his American
citizenship no less than three times.
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,34 a petition for disqualification was
brought against Jaime S. Ty (Ty), who won as Mayor of MacArthur, Eastern
Samar in the 2007 Elections. Ty was a natural-born Filipino citizen who
migrated to the United States and stayed there for 25 years. He took an Oath
of Allegiance in 2005 and renounced his American citizenship before a notary
public on March 19, 2007. The question before this court, however, was
whether his reacquisition of citizenship has the effect of regaining his domicile,
in compliance with the residency requirements for elections.
In resolving the issue, this court found that Ty substantially complied with the
requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 when he personally
executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public before
filing his Certificate of Candidacy. It also ruled that Ty was able to comply with
the residency requirements:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a
candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears
that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's
right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the
purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voters. To successfully challenge Ty's disqualification, Japzon must clearly
demonstrate that Ty's ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional
and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect
to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to
the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and
laws so zealously protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to
substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.35 (Emphasis supplied)
In Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,36 a similar
citizenship issue was raised against Teodoro C. Cruz (Cruz) on the ground
that he lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
in 1985. This court disagreed, stating that Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
Former Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban's Concurring Opinion is
particularly instructive in stating that this court has a duty to uphold the clear
mandate of the people, thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails
[T]he Court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate
of the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of
Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The people of the District have clearly
spoken. They overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for private respondent
to represent them in the House of Representatives. The votes that Cruz
garnered (80,119) in the last elections were much more than those of all his
opponents combined (66,182). In such instances, all possible doubts should
be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise
would be to defeat the will of the people.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt,
political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Public interest and the sovereign
will should, at all times, be the paramount considerations in election
controversies. For it would be better to err in favor of the people's choice than
to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.
"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to
the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this
Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would
give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause
elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must
clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby
giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."37(Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner has proven over and over again that he has renounced his American
citizenship. He continues to use his Philippine passport for his foreign travels.
His landslide victory in the 2013 Elections represents the trust of his
constituents in him. To disqualify him from public office for the isolated and
reasonable use of his American passport would be to set aside the clear and
unmistakable sovereign will of the people. It will impose an unreasonable
burden over his and the electorate's fundamental right to suffrage.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petition.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation
and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution
mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
election."2 The mischief which this provision — reproduced verbatim from the
1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or
newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and
not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial
Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in
item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven
Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same
position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that
Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations
made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her
Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no.
8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of
the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20,
1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-
009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer,
petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate
of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning
respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted
that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to
register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of
Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a
letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition
with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his
purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious
that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict
of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful,
free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding
private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2)
striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing
with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
"Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be
allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual
and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the
First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood."
In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, to which she always intended to return
whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her
memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by
alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte
since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of
Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that
she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed
when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent
since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this
claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE.
Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin"
which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite
Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought
what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to
believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In
fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in
the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made,
she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of
respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the
"inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or
deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly
conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment
cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The
change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent
seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification
as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To
admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting
minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the
election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow
an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical
accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate
of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A,
Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer
of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that
she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates
of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent
conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from
Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of
August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's
contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as
synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends
to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs.
RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to
the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San
Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila
and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First
District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification
where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in
the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the
time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban
City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected
Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a
registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again
a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa
as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor
of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been
a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident
of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent
wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for
the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may
be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her
claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the
First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make
Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on
several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she
spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such
place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case
of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires
a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon
the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with
animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on
in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter
there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood
and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that
she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence.
Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one
year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what
was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident
of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First
District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the
First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out
that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-
A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months.
This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only
to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a
resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves
nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for
six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the
April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission
RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein
to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the
highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued
a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended
in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was
the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First
District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the
canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of
Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's
Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for
relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions.
The principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995
elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election
Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a
startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and
"Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement
with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or
mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the
House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were,
residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position,
has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and
the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place
of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of
domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." 21
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose
for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose
is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an
individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person
can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs.
Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile
in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile
for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not
by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by
the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our
election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a
case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27
held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession
or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not
constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our
election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated
that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without
the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for
certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when
the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the
place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a
candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted
from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says
that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick
to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence.
30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court
concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the
definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the
same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez
Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of
the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in
petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First
Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied
the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to
his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest
mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which
prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since
childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply
detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit
with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced
that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the
First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then
registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa,
Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of
Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of
the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by
the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks election
thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________
Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual
residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile.
The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual
residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa
obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be
disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in
the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed
Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when
(petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban
City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain
facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place
where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First,
according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the
election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member
of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not,
have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila,"
the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place
for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue
a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in
which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and
domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the
intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his
family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality,
notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in
question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the
saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other
places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is
to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to
return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his
professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he
has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in
national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his
home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be
the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment
or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing
of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment
to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment
for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements
supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election
law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the
fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's
Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established
her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high
school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went
to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his
office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President
Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the
Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President
of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace
and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila.
In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed
her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes
during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to
an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover,
while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the
domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there
and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for
various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the height of the
Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin
by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a
political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of
power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her
influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are
part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our
country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or
the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always
knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not
petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight
years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her
residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her
domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again."
We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father
brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the
same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private
respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince
this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act
of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the
former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction
between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term
"residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area
where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on
this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and
residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in
residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile
or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing
which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile
of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su
residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de
esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais
extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the
aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish
residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence
because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence.
Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el
marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the
husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of
relocating the family to another home or place of actual residence. The article
obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring
from one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may
deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept
of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the
intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that
the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin).
This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by
allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband
and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are
physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple
has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to
stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily
be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to
conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise,
we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while
the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various)
residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with
reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of
some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration
of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are
used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence
of a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place.
The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established
in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence
is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the
wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the
Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our
jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could
not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to
maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously
practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to
opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married
woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband
during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence
or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife
actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either
by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has
held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of
contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that
an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order
can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under
the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the
policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the
instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it,
that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of
contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with
the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized
even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v.
Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice,
expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as
that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to
the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained
by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly,
in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial
Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for
the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the
periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as
we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring
one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife
was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile
to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La.
Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to
article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the
doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other
states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of
contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to
return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so,
to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her
possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the
property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But
it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile
was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be
visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does
not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been
followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in
1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to
follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here
is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which
were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of
these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that
Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her
domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears
to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after
the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To
underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the
Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning
and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary
changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making
the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.
46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing
in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.
What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the
rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only
be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived
from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner
married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new
"domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one
after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This
"choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our)
ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable
for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while
living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have
gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having
been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following
her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or
"actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our
discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either
reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence
of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot
regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive
act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the
marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated
by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by
the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim
of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995,
fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has
jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in
accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a
specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-
compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on
grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American
authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results
to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute
containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered
without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which
may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of
statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of
doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature
or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have
abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus
Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and
other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on
the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed
period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation
to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission
does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case
under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption
of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House
of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction
over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987
Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law
solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established
principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating
power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals,
including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established
principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly
deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the
mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in
the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written
ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must
begin and end with the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred
by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the
Constitutional provision on point states that — "no person shall be a member
of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence
has been understood as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been
validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases1 where significantly the
factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not
effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest
with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different
modalities within which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative
district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which
case a person only has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent
location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his
domicile in which case he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided
of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the
minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for
the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning
his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile
of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his
domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a
candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person
maintains several residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin
continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus
non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for
him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous
limitation that "for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to
be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or
not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile." In other words,
the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations
satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because
of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment
and problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-
year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such
familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set
out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April
1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc) —
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established
her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high
school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952
she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z.
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married
ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter.
When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter
in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro
Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to
Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and
filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident
and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994,
respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila,
requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters
in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On
August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of
Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly
registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends
to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form
No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that
she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex
A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a
resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7
months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social
Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven
Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed
by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains
the decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her
answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the
constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the position of
representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the
constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first
district of Leyte, the next important issue to resolve is whether or not the
Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said
district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of
Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the
rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil.
238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office,
and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or
it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast
for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute
which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if
the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified,
or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral
System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided
that:
. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and
unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above. As the law now stands,
the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final
judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after
the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a
disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated
the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the
petition for disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the
highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend
proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the
law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal
contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer
the winner simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the
law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of
votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being
counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no
reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the
doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will
of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected
representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot
arrive conjointly at the same conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent
which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner
in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the
same are pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the
present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear
to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there
and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then
domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new
domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened
thereafter, her husband having been elected as a Senator and then as
President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in
Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila,
all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those
lofty positions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac,
Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all
elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the
sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually
returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she
claimed to have been merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and
in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered
voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her
registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan,
Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn
Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she
stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas,
San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No.
18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board
of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had
resided in that municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that
she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she
sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item
"8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or
replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy,
petitioner had complied with the residency requirement of one year as
mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation
on the difference between residence and domicile. We have had enough of
that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of
international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile.
That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in
contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial
and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence
is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue
from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its
permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by
operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we
have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or
what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until
abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.1 In
the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as
of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is,
domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The
first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second
is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the
last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is
sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the domicile
of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by
operation of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by
operation of law, not only international or American but of our own enactment,
4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San
Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan,
Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new
domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places
was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his
peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them.
Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the
Philippines were, as she claimed, against her will or only for transient purposes
which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice.5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present
imbroglio over her requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte,
there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of
choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in
Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own submission 6
that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c)
acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition
of a domicile of choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or
substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by
operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her
domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it
is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can
be the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion
of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission
on Elections,7 and advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic,
1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the
time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no
indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin.
Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the
provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her
legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis
supplied).

Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired
a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making
a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find
this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where
petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative
intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own
admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the
majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack
of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied
as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered
likewise in accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the
possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin
after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority
agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the
termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed
by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the
mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the
logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he
thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he
abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original
domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his
intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely
what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy,
unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically
restore his domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority
therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence,
that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could
already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by
operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and obviously
for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes,
advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on one's
freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile
of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against
her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through
her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a
case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With
much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the
termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso
facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this
would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she
was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which
was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's
death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile,9 she nevertheless
retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual
change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the
presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her
husband and will continue after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory
based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance
therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile
is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in
the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile
fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto.
It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal
or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her
husband, and each of her children having gotten married and established their
own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer
called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead,
what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired
or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and
expanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights
and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have
searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either
expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's desired theory of
automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner.
Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern
this issue, there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be
resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the well-turned
phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954
and not having automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot
legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part
continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was,
therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her
amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her
admission in the original certificate that she had actually resided in that
constituency for only seven months prior to the election. These considerations
render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by
petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of
merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice
Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the petitioner's
qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions,
orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs.
COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section
1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction
over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted
with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995
of the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995
discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof.
The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively
discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that
herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied,
miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance
pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for
lack of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin,
which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC,
either by admission or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the
loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not
Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin,
that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was
for only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified
to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional
District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either
Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law
sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later,
President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile
which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or
actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the wife
arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law
then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice
was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article
reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court
may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad
unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a
predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence.
This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife.
For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a
profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix the
family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for
the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons,
however, the wife may be exempted from living in the residence chosen by the
husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses
to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived
for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a
different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence
on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and,
by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife
actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense
that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he
can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48,
37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the
fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of the husband,
but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the
court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not
family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife
may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of
the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V.
SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).

The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the
death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal
effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and
by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife
has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her
husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27). Or,
on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile
is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the
husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45). Note that
what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own
domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that
of her husband at the time of his death — which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since
their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their
residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his
official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was
there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her
sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the
synchronized elections of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a
resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that
place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she
exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte,
through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan,
Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in
Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence"
(photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent
Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement
regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March
1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter
Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E,"
attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8
March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she
solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City
or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for
disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her
"domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such
domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San
Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's
Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this uncertainty is not important insofar as
residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that
forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her
domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished
her power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs.
Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the
principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue
studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does
not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to
any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in
private and public service; educational activities; work in military or naval
reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national
police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in
accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases
and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the
exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of
this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a
circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of
origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly
mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the
petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-
009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban
City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of
origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim
of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code.
Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life
after her marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed
abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo et facto
(KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934],
214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she
"merely committed an honest mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of
candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing
disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did
not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who
asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it
(Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T.
Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted
marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the
legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her
husband. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation
of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage
automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with
Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased
husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own
domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to
acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN
YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Frine' C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for
respondent-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The
Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the
factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against
the Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines
and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon
her failure to do so."
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been
denied, the case was heard on the merits and the parties submitted their
respective evidence.
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor
General are these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the
Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired
to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau
Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted
to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the
date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from
the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in
this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After
repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January 25, 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years
after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either
English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino
name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law,
or sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so
holds, that the instant petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same
reason as set forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the
pertinent portions of which read:
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it
should be held to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses in unmistakable
terms. The clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably
implies that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by
virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because
these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized.
(Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No.
L-11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be
lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such
by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25,
1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under
the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while
claiming not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses
all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted
as a temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she
lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised
Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen
of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not
disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who
herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose
authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, was to
expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January
25, 1962, or just a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is
evident that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or
avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This
cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary
alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that
she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a
visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first
departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al.
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong
Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017, September 16, 1954;
Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only
by the decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but
also on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines
permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must
depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate
Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the
Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this
Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g)
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the
administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613)
and in the performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law
gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial
function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs.
Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that
his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of
discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely
and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she
cannot write either language.
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have
some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of
petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the hearing
..., it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she
does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as
an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said
appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months
after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already
carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo,
thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO
MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15,
REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN
ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY
VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE
POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER
WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR
CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL
CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL
WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF
THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE,
MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH
BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID
OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY PLAINTIFF
LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO
WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE
DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW
A FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE
COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO
LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS
NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN
THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-
41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above
decision upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to
the petition in the court below, viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien
visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will
enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa,
cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first
departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al.
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong
Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9,
last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically
confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and
none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs.
Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution
would necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of
error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with
in appellants' second and fourth assignments of error does not require any
lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor
General's pose that an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a
non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves
appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo
examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of
entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements
of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is
premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino
citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the
court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor
General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto
a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have
held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without
having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9
(g) of the Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines
permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must
depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate
Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the
officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this
Act.
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary
visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship.
Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the
Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside
here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their
bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of
convenient ruses employed by alien to convert their status from temporary
visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed
by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration
Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that he will enter only for a limited time,
and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him
subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without
first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve
him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under
the guise of "change" or "correction", for the law makes no distinctions, and no
officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous
decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien
so permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent
admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our
government to spend time, money and effort to examining and verifying
whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent
residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay
and evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised
to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has
been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a
Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country,
only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing
that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become
incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality
by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon him. Consider for
example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized.
It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could
it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still
have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether
or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and
hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming
unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction. Indeed,
as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice
Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became
also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would
follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such
citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for
section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond
deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be
returned to the depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the
naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the
effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including
that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of
authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because
by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only
for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus
discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are
well taken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial
judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have
the effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does
not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by
the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has
proven that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In
other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been
established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung
possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for
naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a
Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual
proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to
be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et
al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713,1
for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was
promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr.
Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries
a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law
and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that
she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other
applicant for naturalization,2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our
jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still pending
resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second
assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee
Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated
in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty.3
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly
Giok Ha case,4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman
of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay
was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely
departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority
to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9,
1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage
and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage,
demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such
request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do
so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was
filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that
she had no obligation to leave, because she had become Filipina by marriage,
hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court.
In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice,
spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is whether her
marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly
Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In
maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to
a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this
conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage,
she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed
from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No.
613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of
the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be
cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who
marries a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which
petitioners rely, reads:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized."
As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series
of 1950),* this limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as
citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473,
namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their
ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines,
have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States,
whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly
Giok Ha does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law. Moreover,
as the parties who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines
within the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach
thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of political
status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out,
therefore a case against the respondents-appellants.
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in
the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that there was an issue on
whether Ly Giok Ha may "be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first
impression in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity
and justice, the parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce
evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left
in the above decision as regards the following propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a
Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from
the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being
naturalized under Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be
presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner
of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the
Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to
qualifications,5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnotes
several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the
Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15,
Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar
provision in the naturalization law of the United States has been construed as
not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good
character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but
merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v.
Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash.
1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec.
Jose Abad Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the
woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in
cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the
race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised
Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who married a citizen of the
Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been
dissolved, and on the assumption that she possesses none of the
disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
follows the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec.
Jose Abad Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point
of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a
citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the
above provision, means that the woman who is married to a Filipino citizen
must not belong to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of
the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948,
No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within
papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes
mentioned in the law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an
illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the
Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child
follows the citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op.,
Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being
a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the
Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of
Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have
so appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua
v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it
turned out that her passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant
was issued for her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20,
1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the
Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case,
however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with
the deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and
mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the petition. Although this
Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly
Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a
citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of
the Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino
must show, in addition, that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" as a
Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires
proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under
section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino
citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable.
The lower court, therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the
deportation proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites
indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged
validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.)
[Emphasis supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly
gave the parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not
suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of
undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore,
that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of
the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby
becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she
does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization
proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to
qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in
any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean
that such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of
Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this
Court,6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the
most illustrative of which held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen needs only to show that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the
statute, such as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for
naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary. (See: Leonard v.
Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776,
s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R.
No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme Court,
construing the abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that
"marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign
wife," unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation
of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section
4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any
of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that
defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine
citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The
Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his
negative action on the ground that a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is
pending against the petitioner.
We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for
disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law, a
warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become
naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be invoked to negate
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen
under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed
in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition
for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other
things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified
from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition,
which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of Justice Sec.
Jesus G. Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R.
No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the Supreme Court,
construing the above-quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held
that "marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this
limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by
marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other
words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act
is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec.
Jesus G. Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case
is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph I
of Section 15 Of Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does
not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of
Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s.
1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of section 15 excludes from the benefits
of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as
citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473."
(Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above
construction of the law was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay,
supra, in which the facts were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary
stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner
of Immigration asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of
Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be
confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing
order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash
bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike
in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter
an order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be given an
opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability
to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section
15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the
temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary.
Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond is
committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and
conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the
meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were
joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included
Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo
Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does
not relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond. The marriage took
place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of the
undertaking in the bond — failure to depart from the Philippines upon
expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25
March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within
24 hours from receipt of notice — were committed before the marriage.
Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically
confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.*
There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become
a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied
upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of
the statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference
to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them,
Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a
previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the
woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in
cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely that she is of the
race by persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant
modification of the construction of the law, it could be said that there was need
for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for
such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned
by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua,
supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no
immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in issue
now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay,
hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no more than obiter
dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the
Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized," so that the fact of marriage to a citizen,
by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has
previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of
record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua
Suy", without explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly
Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate
concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo
Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-
disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be
departure from the said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the
task of rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No.
L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo
San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a
temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a
Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her
permit, and when she was requested to leave after her authority to stay had
expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage,
and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she
does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization
Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial judge
held for the government that in addition to not having any of the
disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have
also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge
of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the
issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the possession of all the
qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification,
Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on
the basis of the decision laid down in the case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy.
603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary
that the woman "should be a person of the class or race permitted to be
naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out
of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as
qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen." (In explanation of
its conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during the life of the woman or
afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the
party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must
not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the
further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing
laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The
proof of the facts may have existed at the time of the marriage, but years after,
when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white
woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in order to be deemed an
American citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on
residence, moral character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927,
as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of persons who alone
might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were
disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of that law provided:
Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens — Philippine citizenship
may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof
under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United
States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of
the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.
Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following cannot be naturalized
as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists
or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or
incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom
the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.
Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons comprised in subsection (a) of
section one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship,
must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of
their petition.
The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in
addition to being not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the
hearing of the petition, have all and each of the following qualifications:
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less
than five years, except as provided in the next following section;
Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in
their relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in
which they are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some known trade or profession;
and
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.
In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing
and under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith
and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a
native, citizen or subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it
then stood, alien women married to citizens of the Philippines must, in order
to be deemed citizens of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines
who were not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other
Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or
foreigners who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of
that country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set forth in
Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents
and purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act
No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded class or racial
consideration from the qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according
to its proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to
remove the features of the existing naturalization act which discriminated in
favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are
related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity with all nations
[Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the
phrase in question. The result is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" must be understood in the context in which it is now found, in a
setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v.
Grant.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration
is that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under
Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien
woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of
the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid
down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not necessarily
qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats
"qualifications" and "disqualifications" in separate sections. And then it must
not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former law,
it was to be understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under
Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was enough if the
alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in order that
she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case
held was that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely
means that she belongs to the class or race of persons qualified to become
citizens by naturalization — the assumption being always that she is not
otherwise disqualified.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of the
Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she has all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Since there is
no proof in this case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any
way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make
her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way
disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by
the trial court, the same being self-serving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding
administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking
of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision
granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was
contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-
18775, promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact
that the husband became a naturalized citizen does not automatically make
the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself
possesses all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become
a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-
wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that
a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband is
no assurance that he (the husband) would become a citizen, as to make a
basis for the extension of her temporary stay.
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27,
1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing
particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok
Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking
oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan
on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here
only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence
in the Philippines required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under
discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy
King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy
King Tee's husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959
and took the oath on January 31 of the same year. Choy King Tee first came
to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong
since then, her last visa before the case being due to expire on February 14,
1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of
Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's,
for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as
to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing
anew the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only
reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further
that the ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective
admission to Philippine citizenship.7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June
22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of
the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the
Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting
she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only
an affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did
Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No.
L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took
occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with
examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of
disqualifications, without taking into account the other affirmative requirements
of the law."9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966,
10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed
during the dependency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in
order that she may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from
proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she
possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the
decision to such effect discussed above, 11 even as he impliedly reversed pro
tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2
SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the
assumption that the point now under discussion is settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same
issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473,
providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any
woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in
the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the
naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen,
and a foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority,
unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in
which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of
age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent,
shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year after reaching
the age of majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the
American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the
necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is
married to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino
citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications
enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications required
by said law? if nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty,
as recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative
answer to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the
present case was actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet,
shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and
even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other
circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the
Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the
membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court
already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro
concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because (they
wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are
concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with
copious relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the
memorandum of the amici curae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken
lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner,
not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative
practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of
alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered
themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially or
otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status
as such by the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by
the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an
opportunity to consider the views of the five justices who took no part in Go Im
Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine
the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San
Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not
categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by
the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to light during the
deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later
cases can still bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We
are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been
taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more
accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American
provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of
doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine
Legislature under American sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No.
2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship
laws were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act
of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of
1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted
by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on
the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the
Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws
on said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our own; everything
was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their
children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United
States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress
of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives
of other insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United
States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided
for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws
regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien
woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles
17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it
was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the
husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of
naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the
marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had
become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided
thus: .
SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. —
In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his
widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision
rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are
concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the
life of the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending
Act 2977, that the following provisions were added to the above Section 13:
SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between
sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and
Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under
this law, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of the
naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be
considered citizens thereof.
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be
considered citizens thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on
June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already
been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a)
abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of
this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And
it could not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our
naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of this Court from
the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok
Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become
herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding
because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage,
provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section
4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not
the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only
in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically
required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala
reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications provided by the law
should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to
become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was
briefly as follows: That "like the law in the United States, our Naturalization
Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even
as it provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act
473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section providing
who might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination
in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only logical deduction ... is
that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified
to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the
view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the
class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization
Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready
reference may be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number
of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove that she has all the
qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed
a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo
San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v.
Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted
the question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling
in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in the United States after which
Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of
the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the
U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an
amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which
was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition
of Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of
the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular
possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or
foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become citizens of
the latter country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to
foreigners who may become American Citizens is restrictive in character, for
only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In other
words, in so far as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a
similarity between the naturalization laws of the two countries and hence there
was reason to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the
United States to the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien
women marrying American citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the
enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act No. 473)
on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but
the provision found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to
presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provision — that to be
deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is no longer to the class or
race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial,
but to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated
in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage,
contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided
is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to
Philippine citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who
are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis
alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of
moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals,
customs and traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for
naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of the disqualifications, she is
not entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen.
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of
the same conclusion thus:
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has
been residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of at least (10) years
(p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation
(p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the
principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words
emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization Law requires that an alien
woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being disqualified under any of the
eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in
order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court
below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is
that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the
question at issue could be regarded as not conclusively settled, there being
only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-
11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer
Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly
established the rule that the requirement of section 15 of Commonwealth Act
473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should
be one who "might herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free
from the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who
possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act
473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of
Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27,
1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang,
L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30,
1965).
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under
section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications enumerated in its
section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that
the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well
be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the policy
of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not
previously convicted by a competent court would not be thereby disqualified;
still, it is certain that the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a
citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship
"must be of good moral character."
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy,
in government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote exclusively by
certain "herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as
long as she is not "opposed to organized government," nor affiliated to groups
"upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor
"defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault
or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas." Et sic de
caeteris.
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying
exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the
other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the
appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was
derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994) and should be given the
same territorial and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court
has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30,
1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations,
but a closer study thereof cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations
which adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus
rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act
2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of
Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the
racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino
nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians
only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with,
that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927
which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine citizenship
may be acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof
under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United
States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of
the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there
any mention of race or color of the persons who were then eligible for
Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it
reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-
Commonwealth American regime to the understandable stations flowing from
our staffs as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In
fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express
authority without which it could not have been done, granted by an amendment
to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United
States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the
Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been footed
earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship
matters under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was
eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination
contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally
wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American
legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was
one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference
in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become
American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain
specified races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of
the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine
the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons
therein mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the United States and,
corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under her laws. The words
used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular
race or color and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all the
disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the laws of the
United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our
Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States already
provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June
29, 1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized
government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any organization
entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized
government, or who advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of
the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific
individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or
of any other organized government, because of his or their official character,
or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United
States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine
citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be
Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which
was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and
to provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United
States" contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese,
the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly repealed by this law,
hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section
1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it
were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912
already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the rationalization in
the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1
of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than
the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear
factual basis. 17
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason
why the construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not
prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as
amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy,
deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States
as it stood before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite
unmistakable construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States
that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered,
as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our
legislators enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the
United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute,
they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the
construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General
of the United States and all administrative authorities, charged with the
implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo
Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32
[1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756
[19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938];
Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct.
423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American
courts and administrative authorities is contained in United States of America
ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt.,
295 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d
ed. p. 117) provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of
February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its second section
provided "that any woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws, married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall
be deemed and taken to be a citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British
Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which provided that "any woman
married, or who shall be married, to a natural-born subject or person
naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all
the rights and privileges of a natural born subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411,
Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An Act
Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2,
provides "that any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after the
passage of this Act, ... shall not become a citizen of the United States by
reason of such marriage ..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are
repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship
acquired or retained under either of such sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So
that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the
present case, as the marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage.
This case, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the
Revised Statutes.
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283,
284, construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as follows: "The term,
"who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the
application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act,
existing at the time, only required that the person applying for its benefits
should be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged
to the class or race which might be lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to
any of the other provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral
character, or to any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the
exclusion or deportation of aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also
construed the Act of 1855, declaring that "any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and might herself be
lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." He held that "upon the
authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the case," the statute must
be construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or
race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who marries
a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary
that it should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications
at the time of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.

In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit
court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a subject of
Prussia came to the United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr.
Justice Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her
marriage she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as fully as if she
had complied with all of the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of
naturalization. He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19
L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who might be lawfully
naturalized.
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman
came to the United States from France and entered the country contrary to the
immigration laws. The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port
of New York, with the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under
a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she married
a naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth Circuit
held, affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be discharged from
custody. The court declared: "The rule is well settled that her marriage to a
naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The
status of the wife follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage
her husband's domicil became her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165.
Fed. 980, had before it the application of a husband for his final decree of
naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration
authorities at New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous
and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the
husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view
of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the husband's
application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was determined
whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the
express ground that the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her.
At the same time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization
would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become
lawfully naturalized. "Her own capacity (to become naturalized)," the court
stated "is a prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that
capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was
actually decided in that case, and the views expressed therein are really
nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something more
than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge, unable
to accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge
Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the Turkish Empire, who
married an American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United
States, could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a
disease which under the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground
for her exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case was
brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A.
464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators married, they
might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: "Even if we assume the
contention of the district attorney to be correct that marriage will not make a
citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does
not affect these relators."
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was
also said to be inconsistent with the policy of our law that the husband should
be a citizen and the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the
one now before the court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place
before any order of exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was
celebrated after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere
administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a court, and
works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances
that existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances
change prior to the order being carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For
example, if an order of exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien
was at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made
satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely
recovered from the disease, we think it plain that the order could not be carried
into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the order of exclusion and
while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries an
American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she
thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the Revised
Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon, the
immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction
applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained
the right of the officials to deport a woman under the following circumstances:
She entered this country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in
Turkey. She was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the
following September, and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued.
Pending hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody
of her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was that she was
afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her entry. One
of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married
a citizen of the United States pending the proceedings for her deportation.
Judge Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such
circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts
shown." He held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or
override the immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country
of the wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an
alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law from admission to
the United States does not come within the provisions of that section. The court
relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other
authorities were cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed
1994 and held that where, pending proceedings to deport an alien native of
France as an alien prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States,
she thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her
citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as
was contended, her marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for
the purpose of evading the immigration laws and preventing her deportation,
such fact should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an action
commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was
dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of
the statute by the Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney General Williams,
14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that
residence within the United States for the period required by the naturalization
laws was riot necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she
having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never
resided in the United States, she and her husband having continued to reside
abroad after the marriage.
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907,
in an opinion rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It appeared an
unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived
in New York and went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to
reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was taken before a United
States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the Immigration
Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d
ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered this country
for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of
prostitution and practicing the same within three years after landing. It
appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United States
commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of
Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the United States.
The woman professed at the time of her marriage an intention to abandon her
previous mode of life and to remove with her husband to his home in
Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had been, but professed to
believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport
her, the claim being advance that by her marriage she bad become an
American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney General
ruled against the right to deport her as she had become an American citizen.
He held that the words, "who might herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a
class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the
other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen.
507.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our
observation that Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of 1917, so as to
provide, in 19, "that the marriage to an American citizen of a female of the
sexually immoral classes ... shall not invest such female with United States
citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall be solemnized after her
arrest or after the commission of acts which make her liable to deportation
under this act."
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the
immoral class avoiding deportation through the device of marrying an
American citizen.
(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an
alien woman of any other of the excluded classes, either before or after her
detention, should not confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling
her to enter the country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19
would not have been confined solely to women of the immoral class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject
and We have found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was
meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and
other treaties and other writings on the subject would seem to give such
impression. The case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most
cited among the first of the decisions 19 simply held:
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women
married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the class of persons for
whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms
"married" or "who shall be married," do not refer in our judgment, to the time
when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They
mean that, whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized,
is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the
passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she
becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists,
confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The construction which would
restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are
citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think,
the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to
follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application for
naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the
restriction suggested.
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only
limit the application of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization
Act, existing at the time only required that the person applying for its benefits
should be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th,
1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New
York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives the widest
extension to its provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be
naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application to free white women"
20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time,
... required that the person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free
white person" (but also) ... not an alien enemy." This is simply because under
the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was decided,
the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of
July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof anon. In
other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was
mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial requirement or
no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is demonstrated by
the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous
naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is
impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression
used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be
naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free
white women, must be interpreted in the application to the special facts and to
the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether
or not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not
only on her race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there
were other disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage
or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second
Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the evidence that because Section 1 of Act 2927
was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said
eliminated section particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether
or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is
not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must
also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age,
residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the
Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or
ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and
one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain schools,
etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely
intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration
of the proper premises, We have come, to the conclusion that such inference
is not sufficiently justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already
explained above of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown
to indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is
definite is that Section 15 is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of
Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by American courts
and administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American
decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that in the construction of the
identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States,
(Section 1994, which was taken, from the Act of February 10, 1855) all
authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications
of residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not
supposed to be considered, and that the only eligibility to be taken into account
is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope
of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case of Leonard v. Grant,
supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such
posture of the American authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was
in the Act of 1855, supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen" while it
may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen
by ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent
court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such
person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed"
is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore, whatever an act
of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing,
must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established
concerning "such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly.
When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the
contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of
Congress, or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction
that in a situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an American
statute word for word, it is understood that the construction already given to
such statute before its being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems
to be no reason how We can give a different connotation or meaning to the
provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining
the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in accurate factual premises
related to the real legislative background of the framing of our naturalization
law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act
2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question
that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same
as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed
already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
473. If it were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section
13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial
requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of
Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of
shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American
jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was
approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had
their counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to
be taken into account and that what should be considered only are the
requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully
naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended to convey a meaning
different than that given to it by the American courts and administrative
authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from
which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that,
time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer
in force because it had been repealed expressly the Act of September 22, 1922
which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of American
citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization
proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In
other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as
already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the
Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical
compulsion for alien wives to be natural judicially. Simple logic would seem to
dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had
two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled
construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of
requiring judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the first,
We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or
previous American Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473
was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then
from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old
American law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act
of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the
language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that the
legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was
eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans
had amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the
construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently,
had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the
American courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those
given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a
construction here different from that of the Americans, but as things stand, the
fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a
settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators
even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining
the old phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would be in defiance of
reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has
a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed
independently of the previous American posture because of the difference of
circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in
the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or
perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view seems to indicate
otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize
that in reality and in effect, the so called racial requirements, whether under
the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as
qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927
and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have
always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did
not possess them were the ones who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just
as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section 2 of
Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which,
incidentally, are practically identical to those in the former law, except those in
paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression
anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions
quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-
602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and
Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of the secretary of Justice. 23
Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always
treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications
under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a
subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such
elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as
irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the
import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section
15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section
13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination
of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind
making the phrase in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no
longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification under Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two
groups of persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under
Section 1 and those falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one
group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by any process
of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the
disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by
what alchemy of logic such elimination could have convicted qualifications into
disqualifications specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are
disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from
qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence,
qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining
"who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute
governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the
matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal
provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the United States, there
are practical considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As
aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee
dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications" —
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a
construction that Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of a Filipino
must affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications prescribed
under Section 2, before she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if
imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance
therewith manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is
shown by the following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization
under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant "must have resided in the
Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years." If this
requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means
that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship
of her husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law
declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses her
citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could mean that
for a period of ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even after having
acquired continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no
guarantee that her petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she
would remain stateless for an indefinite period of time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization
that he "must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation." Considering the constitutional
prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of
hereditary succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to
acquire the citizenship of her husband must have to prove that she has a
lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The
income requirement has been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself
must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct.
27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v.
Republic, L-20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove
that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than her husband's
trade, profession or calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have gainful
occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the dependence
of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting
the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it
is an accepted concept that when a woman marries, her primary duty is to be
a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty,
how can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for
citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have
enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines,
where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed as
part of the school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization
as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has minor children by a previous
marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor
children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her period of
residence in the country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under the
interpretation of this Court. The reason behind the requirement that children
should be enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they follow the
citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954;
Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668
[1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v.
Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children by her
first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for
such requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis
cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence
prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced to five years for any
petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman." It is absurd that an alien male
married to a Filipino wife should be required to reside only for five years in the
Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a
Filipino husband must reside for ten years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien
wife related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such citizen, than for a
foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the
general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord
to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not
similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment
of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law),
there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They
were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation
that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the
observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the
nationality of the husband; but the Department of State of the United States on
October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino
citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v.
Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code
being political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States. Accordingly, the stated taken by the Attorney-General
prior to the envictment of Act No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to
Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this counting. (Op. Atty.
Gen., March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928
adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that "any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this
Court did, in such a way as to require that the alien wife must prove the
qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives
would become illusory. It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary
to the manifested object of the statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the
language is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out and the
other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction. (In
re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S.
338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v.
Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910).
... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and
the court will, if possible, place on the statute a construction which will not
result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a
construction which will result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will
also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or
construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which
will result in absurd consequences.
So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an
apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been determined by the
judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion
not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should adopt that
construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly
shown to have been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which
would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague is to be
avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an
illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on
the need for aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of
selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked,
is it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature
contemplated to make it more difficult if not practically impossible in some
instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than
any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been demonstrated
above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was
intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino
irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and
all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse."
Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and
benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but
must the minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the
construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a
Filipino family the alien woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the
customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live
and associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even before
marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the extension of
citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the
husband. Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy
rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite
persuasive:
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the
question. The avowed policy of "selectives admission" more particularly refers
to a case where citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding
for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national
policy of selecting only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here
a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this
policy finds no application in cases where citizenship is conferred by operation
of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the
individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings
that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise
than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who
is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the
Philippines, "irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and
identification with Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions." A minor child of a
person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove the fact of his birth in
the Philippines, is likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative
income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien
wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself
be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the disqualified persons
enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status
as a fact.
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in
this regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously deliberate choice of words.
It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship
to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to
maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v.
Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and Commentary."
UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399,
pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by allowing
the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively through the husband. This is
particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has placed the
husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern
the life of the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the
unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation
of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it
has been said that by tradition in our country, there is a theoretic identity of
person and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature of the
relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See De la Viña v. Villareal, 41
Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of
husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband
should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the law
upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65
C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The status of the wife follows that of the
husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile became her
domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law being that the property
relations of husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership
(Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and
identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it
cannot be that the husband's interests in property and business activities
reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and
be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but
for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit
that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where
the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best
interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given
effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase
"who may be lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from which it
was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and
administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in the view that Philippine
statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with
particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity
in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot"
of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country
whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly, the writer of
this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our
jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American
authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be
regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close
our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny
has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily
from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence
of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on
the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the
opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that
direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of
Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans
cannot be citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization
proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of
August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of
1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood
as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso
facto, without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding and without
having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral
character, adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided
they show they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in
the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous
decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section
15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born
or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to
be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an
alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows
the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless
there will be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take
advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages
or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because
of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise
than as dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal,
juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering such
undesirable practice and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling
of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization
proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or
deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already noted, was submitted for
decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the
foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court
could have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage
to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any
naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that she is
not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the
Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a
Filipina without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question
must necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision
in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a
motion for its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of
serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons
expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any
other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires
to be a citizen of this country must apply therefore by filing a petition for
citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section
2 and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance
where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing
of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official,
administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of
justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also
a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words
of law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of
the petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and
to prove afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised
Naturalization law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as
one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the
Philippines."
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a
Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she
possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of
the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these,
she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization apparently
from declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina.
In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to
her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the
national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and
if she desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the
same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the
required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or
Spanish and one of the principle local languages, make her children study in
Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation of
her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of intention and
after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two
credible witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc.,
etc., until a decision is ordered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo
the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as
citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial
declaration.
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the
other hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision, in question, that the law
intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and
children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the
language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect
beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner
to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling,
if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked any relevant
consideration warranting a conclusion different from that complained therein.
It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its
consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein
made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that
Our decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not
contemplated either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to endorse.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number
and standing in the Bar and well known for their reputation for intellectual
integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in
research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum they have submitted
in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present
case -- that an alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen not only does not
ipso facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only
through ordinary naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization
Law, and that all administrative actions "certifying or declaring such woman to
be a Philippine citizen are null and void" — has consequences that reach far
beyond the confines of the present case. Considerably more people are
affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The newspapers
report that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are
affected by this decision of the Court. These are women of many and diverse
nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian,
Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the community,
some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades, have
all exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They
will have acquired, separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen
husbands, real property, and they will have sold and transferred such property.
Many of these women may be in professions membership in which is limited
to citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in
companies engaged in business activities for which a certain percentage of
Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married women are now
faced with possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and
privileges exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a reading of the
law that has been accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very
agencies of government charged with the administration of that law. We must
respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such
comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of
Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan
Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 — when
Chief Justice Concepcion observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases
— although referring to situations the equities of which are not identical to
those obtaining in the case at bar — may have contributed materially to the
irregularities committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced the
parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure
followed was valid under the law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration,
the Solicitor General was required, not only, to comment thereon, but, also, to
state "how many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of
naturalization have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for
naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the
periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic
was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was decided)
"and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the decision in the
present case was rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's
motion for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the Government, as well
as of the data contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid
down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates
of naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had
to expressly enjoin the prospective application of its construction of the law
made in a previous decision, 24 which had already become final, to serve the
ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far.
As already observed, the decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while
the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that
followed them have at the most become the law of the case only for the parties
thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do now is to
reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in
the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of
naturalization of the parents, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen,
and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the
parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his
minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a
minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after
becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent,
shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching
the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the
American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the
necessary oath of allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the
Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to
establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of
citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out such a procedure, remarkable
for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility
of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but
categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an alien
undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of his immediate
family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it
ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines
shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside
the Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall
automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines and
not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also redeemed
citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer
their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all
such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization,
shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves
by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the
country where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d)
as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point
that the minor children, falling within the conditions of place and time of birth
and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine
citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the
need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed,
the language of the provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But
it is claimed that the same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting
of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase
requiring that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
implies that such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone the
whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to
become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section
15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor children,
the same section deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for
the ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional
authority of the Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status
by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898];
See, 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In
fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates,
27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons
under general conditions applicable to all of the members of such class or
group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized.
The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature hag done so
in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr.
Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political law in the
Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of
naturalization is often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus
in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso
facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who may apply for
naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499
[10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the
1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the
provision of the United States statutes from which our law has been copied,
28a the American courts have held that the alien wife does not acquire
American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the Revised
Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect of this statute is that
every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United States becomes
perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless
of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v.
Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299,
60 L ed. 297.) .
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first
enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927
by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was
copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction among
the courts and administrative authorities in that country holding that under such
provision an alien woman who married a citizen became, upon such marriage,
likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage itself
without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that, it
could be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to
be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We
already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this
decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be reiterated for
emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the American
Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of
such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring
all such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization albeit under more liberal
terms than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the
Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a
requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim
the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating
its preference to adopt the latter law and its settled construction rather than the
reform introduced by the Act of 1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may
feel that as the United States herself has evidently found it to be an
improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to
discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without
passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used
to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial
mentality, that as a developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy,
unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature has enacted our laws
on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said
law along the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do
so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not institutionally
permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going precisely
against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is
quite clearly implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the
Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization
who dies during the proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another
naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings
involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. —
In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has been rendered, his
widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision
rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are
concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the
life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this
Court held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1)
that under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are allowed to continue
the same proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2)
that the qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not
those of the widow and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies
whether the petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before
the judgment becomes executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence
of said Section 16 contemplate the fact that the qualifications of the original
petitioner remains the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that
"The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor
children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been
rendered during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the
intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the deceased as the
theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary
to consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor
children.
xxx xxx xxx
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead
person can not be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of allegiance,
because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be
allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the deceased. In the case at bar,
petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath of
allegiance and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization
proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been completed, not on
behalf of the deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients
of the benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner
proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue
of the legal provision that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married
to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons
naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The
decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do
not show that the petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized,
at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children
were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee
Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI,
Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua Chian
case is, therefore, premature.

Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow
of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings,
is not required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and
there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them
differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the
motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with
the following views of counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be
considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed
that Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under
which foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring
citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed.
890 [1898] ; see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152
[1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who
are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine
Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only
those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the
acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative
naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of
an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an
alien woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172;
Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil
Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14
of the Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to confer
citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law
(Revised Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that
upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of
the United States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the
statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S.
Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 4021, July
20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op.
2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S.
Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604,
Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizens" while it may
imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by
the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent
court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such
person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed"
is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act
of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing
must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established
concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed" an American citizen, the effect when the
contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an Act of
Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne, Citizenship of
the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted
the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law is shown
by a textual analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15
reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically
become" as used in the above provision, are undoubtedly synonymous. The
leading idea or purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by
operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their
relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the
Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in
the provision concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to whom they
are related, the effect is for said persons to become ipso facto citizens of the
Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and
all minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship,
necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory
requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for
naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is
that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to
a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines
the point of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the
second paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under
the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the
Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of
citizenship of his parent, and the time when the child became a citizen does
not depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the
Philippines. The child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his
father that he was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be
"considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine
citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a
Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her marriage
(perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship
status became in question), that she is one who might herself be lawfully
naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine
citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine
citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very
phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien
wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that
she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain
terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting
or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary
to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established
and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely
replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman
"had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force.
(Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283
[1869). That she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter
the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire
the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself
may be lawfully naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the
"acquisition" of citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her
qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is not a citizen unless and until she
proves that she may herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words
of the law that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by
Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited by
this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the alien wife
becomes a citizen only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship.
What those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those cases failed to
prove their qualifications and therefore they failed to establish their claim to
citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was
remanded to the lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose
claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by the Government,
"might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the purpose of " proving her alleged
change of political status from alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101
Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was a
Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was
no proof that she was not disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on record, the
claim of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her
marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that in these
decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives "might
(themselves) be lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did not
become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the
decisions merely held was that these wives failed to establish their claim to
that status as a proven fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time
when citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when
citizenship status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any
proceeding would be required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen
of the Philippines in order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His
citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto
is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman
who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the
time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to
establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory
declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his
father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes a
citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she has established her status as a
proven fact. But neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become
a citizen of the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any
legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status as a
fact. In such a case, the presumption of law should be that she is what she
claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527
[1955]). There is a presumption that a representation shown to have been
made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A.
369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing
views is, what substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to enable the
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship
settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it
everytime she has to perform an act or enter in to a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question
is that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today,
there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship
under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same
situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship
of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as
We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate
proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and
judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort
easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the
antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting
point and so that the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in
order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then
Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most
appropriate initial step by the interested parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed
in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition
for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other
things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified
from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition,
which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as
an alien, there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino
citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and
vigor of the opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed
upon was not touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case,
the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo
dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the
Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is
permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the
confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared
to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-
appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on
January 25, 1962. No costs.
Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL,
respondents.
Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.
Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective;
the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the local elections of January
18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent
resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated
January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3)
petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No.
87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of
Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for
review of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a
rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also
to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card
issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a
permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card
for convenience in order that he may freely enter the United States for his
periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he
is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous
elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the
exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the
ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.
On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently
indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having
voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets
the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective
local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code,
there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
(p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign
country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card holder, it is
incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove
that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be
qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo,
G.R. No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito
Miguel, respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated
June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C.
Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied Miguel's motion to
dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by Caasi. The Court of Appeals
ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding
in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the
qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the COMELEC
has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship
and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no
legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the
Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No.
88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is
proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2)
whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of
or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who
seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident
of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public
officials in the present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are
holders of green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to
hold elective public office in the Philippines is a question that excites much
interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the
"Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No.
230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and
submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United
States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his
"Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,
"Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the
respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT
ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is
printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.

Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the
United States." (Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in
1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children
or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the intention to have
there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a
visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of his, he was issued by
the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there
permanently.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating
the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of
permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however, statutes sometimes give a
broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to
the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the
protection given to him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in
general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of person
and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to
remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to their
rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus
resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no state shall deprive
"any person" of life liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person the equal protection of the law, and the protection of this
amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary
occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of
the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-
530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public
officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status
of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law"
is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of
the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure"
as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881), which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting
himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local
elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United
States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires
that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as
a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of
filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of
itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of
the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some
act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective
office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for
any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves
that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the
records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as
such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18,
1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for
that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at
least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42,
Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that
qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and
he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after
his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of
that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent
residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has
laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office
those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law
has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our
country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption
is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such
entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye
on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under
the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status
as permanent residents thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent
residence in the United States, he never really intended to live there
permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come
and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court believe
that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this
time he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the
Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party
to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of
both worlds so to speak.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S.
and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits
to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as
indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an
irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the
appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local
elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to
run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of
Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel
as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against
the said respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and
DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G.
Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed decision
directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte,
Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10,
2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the
presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case,
except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue.
The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's
Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American
Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-
President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations,
with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch
25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a
Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives
and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other
hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing
business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit
facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants (herein
respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may
be served with summons and other court processes at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor
of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to
his daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter
used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States
some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo
used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo,
Japan while he was there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend
the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they
resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's
account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000.
Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of
account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in June
2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were
canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded
feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political
and professional standing as a result of respondents' acts which were
committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him,
jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the
complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of
action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid
because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that
respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding
the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident
thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was
presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention,
respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in
Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case
for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of
Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or
Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any
allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and
unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof
at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take judicial
notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident
of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the
Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he
has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said
city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's
residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative
defenses interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. The court a quo
likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly
laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was
and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte
with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any
and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking government
official of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As
such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or
place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v.
Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action,
is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home, the
place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in the sense that they
disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have
but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence.
(Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied
the same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate
court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September
10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a bond,
the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order
which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting
respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid.
It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September
10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from
further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against
respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said
rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may
be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,
or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election
of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court,
because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically,
it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate
court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency.4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of
Appeals5 where the Court distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile"
in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with
the term residence, for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that
domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while
residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this
distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary
Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving
stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the
same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any
means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, the appellate court referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated
in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, which
was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax
certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against
respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the
community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is
located.8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also
representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing
circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions
of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer required
proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent
congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be
taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had yet
been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern
Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was
actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the
court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It
opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or
Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option
of petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not
left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon
him by the Rules of Court.9 Further, fundamental in the law governing venue
of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by
the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by
taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both
plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due
course to respondents' affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid
any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his complaint with the
court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to
wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful
and influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance could be
regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors Finance
Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action
before the court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering
that plaintiff therein was an influential person in the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the
appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders
must be, as they hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent
judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to
desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary
restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of preliminary
injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners [herein respondents], within
five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the amount of Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private
respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such
injunction should the Court finally decide that petitioners are not entitled
thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the
Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the
appellate court, in the Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion
for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for review with the Court
alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-
mentioned Decision and Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a
way probably not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed
fact that herein petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of
Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence (sic) of said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of
improper venue due to the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court; and1avvphil.net
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the
rules on venue, and even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the
complaint in Maasin City was only to vex the respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the
appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was
improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one of
the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the
court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4
of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to
plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the
Rules of Court.14 The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed
to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and
evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding.15 The option of
plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where
defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If
plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint
with the court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his
complaint that he was a member of the House of Representatives and a
resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency
requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding
that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the
filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner
Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law
office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as negating
petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo
was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint,
and consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In
Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento,17 the Court had the occasion
to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue,
thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed
in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance
means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or
the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by
the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by
taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of
justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly
synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an
established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively
more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary
stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well
emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily
supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October,
1954, reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval
v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that -
'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and
the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any
means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule
4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may
be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.'
(Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully
convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after
the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an
action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of
no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually resided
or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to comply
substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on
venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of
the Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al.
(G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670),
decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases,
stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean?
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of
his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex
vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.'
This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules - Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence'
and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other
words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary."18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the
representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his
complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact as it
states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels
to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower
house."19
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly
deemed by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said
position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district which he was
representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law,
the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The
term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of
election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile."
Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the term
"residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular
place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where
a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks
of residence for the purposes of election law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of
"residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the
district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term
is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have
had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put
in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was
also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is
because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced.
Contrary to its holding,26 the facts of the present case are not similar to the
facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of
Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff
therein had not established that he was actually a resident therein at the time
of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile
therein because although he manifested the intent to go back there after
retirement, the element of personal presence in that place was lacking. To
reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, imports
"not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent
any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for
the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the
definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo
not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal
presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The latter
element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was
sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes
of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino).
Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can
exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that,
once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to
stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have
his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in
the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his business in the
City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places (Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990
Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual,
personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he stays there
with intention to stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of
exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political
purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then
he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then be
preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as
congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by
law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at
Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be
considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a
residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one
domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone
district of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted
as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as
such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the
representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be
faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.
functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
Constitution. dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial
has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-
community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known 3172 are REINSTATED.
to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though
usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the SO ORDERED.
country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the
local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner
Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time
could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a
matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits.

Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be

properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that,
under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or
representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the
district in which he shall be elected.

In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot
be characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part
because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.

Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly
verified by petitioner Saludo deserves scant consideration.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or

rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on

"information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states

that he has "read the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same