Oxford Scholarship Online: Faces On The Ballot: The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe

Conclusion
University Press Scholarship Online

Oxford Scholarship Online
Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of

Electoral Systems in Europe
Alan Renwick and Jean-Benoit Pilet
Print publication date: 2016

Print ISBN-13: 9780199685042
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2016
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685042.001.0001
Conclusion
Alan Renwick
Jean-Benoit Pilet
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685042.003.0011
Abstract and Keywords
Chapter 11 presents the principal findings of the book,

summing up the key themes of the book, the lessons learnt,
the implications of the findings, and the avenues for further
future research. In particular, it confirms that a trend towards
more personalized electoral systems may be observed in
Europe, especially since the 1990s. And it shows how such
reforms have often been linked with the greater concerns
about the growing gap between citizens and politics. It also
discusses the main implications of these findings. In
particular, it elaborates on the broader literature on electoral
systems and on the personalization of politics, as well as on
the link between institutional change and citizens’ growing
dissatisfaction with politics.
Keywords: electoral system, institutional change, personalization, satisfaction

with politics, Europe
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Conclusion
In this concluding chapter, we sum up the key themes of the

book, the lessons learnt, the implications of the findings, and
the avenues for further future research.
11.1 What We Have Done

The starting point for this book was a set of three observations
regarding the recent evolution of contemporary democracies.
The first observation concerns the dealignment of citizens
from political parties that has been widely documented for at
least thirty years. The signs of citizens’ detachment from
parties are manifold. One of the most visible is the steady
decline in the number of citizens with strong party identities
(Fiorina 2002). Party loyalties have also been in decline in the
polling booths. Across Europe, electoral volatility has been on
the rise since the late 1960s. And today, the share of voters
who vote for the same party at every election and every level
of power is shrinking (Dassonneville et al. 2015). Another sign
of the decline of parties within society is the decline in party
membership. Real mass parties are becoming the exception in
Europe (van Biezen, Mair, and Poguntke 2011). Finally, anti-
party sentiment, or at least reticence towards political parties,
has gained ground among the public in most established
democracies (Webb 2002; Dalton and Weldon 2005).
More broadly—and this is our second observation—the

transformation of citizens’ relations with political parties has
paralleled a gradual decline in public satisfaction with the
functioning of politics. Support for representative institutions
has been falling in many—though not all—countries (Dalton
2004; Marien 2011). The idea of a general democratic malaise
has gained attention. And debates about democratic renewal
and institutional reforms have flourished (Geissel and Newton
2012). The assumption is that growing numbers of citizens—
though not all (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002)—would
support reforms giving them more opportunities to participate
in decision-making (Cain et al. 2003; Webb 2013).
(p.266) Third, since the 1990s, and even more over the last
decade, literature has developed on the growing weight of
individual politicians in politics at the expense of collective
actors such as parties. This evolution has generally been
Page 2 of 13
Conclusion
analysed under the title of the personalization of politics

(Karvonen 2010)—a multifaceted concept covering the
growing role of individual politicians in political parties, in
media coverage of politics, and, perhaps most importantly, in
elections.
Stemming from these three observations, the thinking that led

to this book was that these changes should prompt reforms of
electoral institutions, and, specifically, the personalization of
electoral systems. Electoral systems, we posited, should
become more candidate-centred. And such reforms should be
driven by the personalization of the functioning of politics, by
the decline of political parties, and by the growing demands
among citizens for democratic renewal. From this starting
point, the book has offered a systematic empirical
investigation into the idea of a personalization of electoral
systems in Europe.
That investigation has been structured in three stages. First,

we looked at whether there is indeed a trend towards more
personalized electoral system in Europe and where such
changes occur. Second, we sought to isolate the main factors
associated with adoption of more personalized electoral rules.
In particular, we analysed the role in this process of the
growing scepticism among the public towards the working of
contemporary political systems in general, and the central role
of political parties in particular. Finally, Part III of the book,
we examined the impact of personalizing reforms. We first
observed whether such reforms change election outcomes in
themselves—by leading voters to make more use of candidate
voting or by changing the allocation of seats within parties.
Then we considered whether personalizing reforms have any
power to restore the link between citizens and politics,
focusing on electoral turnout and public satisfaction with
democracy and politics.
Our analysis of these points is based on the most systematic

attempt ever made to catalogue changes to the intra-party
dimension of electoral systems. This book is the main output of
our project Electoral System Change in Europe (ESCE),
initiated in 2010. This project collated all electoral laws used
for the lower chamber of parliament in thirty-one European
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Conclusion
countries (the EU28 plus Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland)

since 1945 (or since the first democratic elections), allowing
us to identify all relevant changes. This book is thus, we
believe, the most far-reaching study of what Colomer (2011)
has described as the most neglected dimension of electoral
systems.
11.2 What We Have Found

Our first main finding is that there is a clear trend towards
more candidate-centred electoral systems in Europe. We
began the book by proposing a (p.267) revised version of
Carey and Shugart’s classic typology of electoral system
personalization (Carey and Shugart 1995). First, we adopted
the perspective of voters rather than candidates, leading to
certain changes of classification. Second, and more
importantly, our approach is more detailed, and, in particular,
pays more attention to the variety of rules within the family of
flexible- (or semi-open-)list systems. These systems give both
parties and voters some influence over candidate ranking and
vary widely in where the balance between these groups lies.
We opted for a more detailed classification partly because
such variations can have important effects, and partly because
we expected most personalizing reforms to happen gradually.
We know from the electoral systems literature that parties and
established politicians are reluctant to change the rules that
elected them (Katz 2005). Many reforms are therefore likely to
involve changes within rather than across electoral system
families.
Applying this classification to electoral system changes in the

thirty-one European countries covered in the book gives clear
results. There is indeed a marked trend towards more
personalized electoral systems, and this trend has emerged
over the last quarter century, since the beginning of the
1990s. In particular, what is rising is the weight of intra-party
votes in the allocation of seats within lists. Twenty-one
reforms increased voters’ influence at the expense of party
control between 1990 and 2009. These include changes in a
wide range of old democracies—Austria, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Iceland, and Sweden—as well as newer
democracies, including most of the post-1989 democracies.
Page 4 of 13
Conclusion
Overall, thirteen countries (out of thirty-one) have an electoral

system that was more personalized in 2010 than twenty years
earlier. Only three countries moved in the opposite direction—
two of which have themselves restored greater personalization
in the years since the end of our study period. These findings
are markedly different from those produced by Karvonen
(2010) in the only previous attempt we are aware of to
evaluate the existence of a trend towards more candidate-
centred electoral systems. Karvonen found roughly as many
cases of reduced as of increased personalization. Our own
findings confirm the idea that the trend is neither universal
nor irresistible—fifteen countries have experienced no change
in the personalization of their electoral system, and, as we
have seen, three reduced personalization, at least for a period.
Yet the remaining thirteen cases indicate that electoral system
personalization is now a significant trend in European
democracies. The discrepancies between our findings and
Karvonen’s may come, first, from our wider set of cases
(thirty-one v. six) and second, from our more fine-grained
classification of the intra-party dimension. Indeed, the vast
majority of the personalizing cases involve changes within the
flexible-list family, whereas there are rather fewer cases of
change from closed to flexible lists, or from flexible to fully
open lists. These patterns confirm, first, the reality of the
personalization of electoral systems in Europe, and, second,
(p.268) the incremental nature of this trend. It also
contradicts Shugart’s hypothesis of a natural convergence of
electoral systems towards more mixed rules (Shugart 2001b).
The most ‘extreme’ systems on the intra-party dimension are
the fully closed- and fully open-list systems (as well as non-list
systems). And it is in countries using these systems that we
see fewer reforms.
Having confirmed that there is indeed a trend towards more

personalized electoral systems, our next step was to identify
what factors could explain this evolution. Our main goal was to
verify whether a link could be made with the growing public
discontent with the way our political systems function and the
central role of political parties in them. Part II of the book
comprises five chapters that seek to answer these questions.
The five chapters combine a large-n quantitative approach
Page 5 of 13
Conclusion
(Chapter 4) with detailed historical analysis of the

circumstances under which choices regarding the intra-party
dimension of the electoral system have been made (Chapters 5
to 8).
In Chapter 4, we examine the factors that appear to increase

statistically the likelihood of personalizing reform. We find
support for the idea that such changes could be linked to the
so-called democratic malaise. Lack of systematic data for a
long period of time meant we could not assess statistically the
impact of voters’ long-term disengagement from traditional
party politics. But we found clear support for the proposition
that reform is associated with lower satisfaction with
democracy: it is where levels of satisfaction are lowest that
personalization of the electoral system is most likely to
happen. This can be illustrated by the personalizing reforms
passed since the 1990s in many Central and Eastern European
countries, but also by reforms in older democracies such as
Belgium, Austria, and Italy.
We also tested for other factors, such as the composition of

government and the ideology of the parties in power. In fact,
the only other factors that had a statistically significant impact
on the probability of personalizing reforms in any of our
models were the age of democracy and the degree of
personalization of the electoral system in use. First, older
democracies are less likely to experience personalization.
Second, the quantitative analysis hinted that personalizing
reforms are more likely in countries using flexible-list systems.
The significance of neither of these relationships was
consistent, however, across all our models.
Our quantitative analysis thus gave some support to our core

hypothesis about the association between growing public
dissatisfaction with politics and the personalization of
electoral systems. To pursue this matter further, we opted for
in-depth qualitative accounts of the history of electoral
systems in the thirty-one countries covered in the study. By
way of background, we began in Chapter 5 by examining the
circumstances of the first choice of a democratic electoral
system in each country during four periods: from the turn of
the twentieth century to the 1930s; after the Second World
Page 6 of 13
Conclusion
War; after the collapse of the Spanish and Portuguese

dictatorships in the 1970s; and (p.269) following the fall of
communism. Then, in Chapter 6, we looked at reforms in
existing democracies between 1945 and 1989, before the start
of the personalization era. Finally, in Chapters 7 and 8, we
investigated processes of reform and non-reform since 1989.
The core proposition that we examined in these chapters was

that growing public disengagement from traditional party
politics has precipitated a shift in the character of electoral
reform debates and processes, leading in turn to the growth of
electoral system personalization. The qualitative approach
allowed us to look not just at dissatisfaction with politics, as in
our quantitative analysis, but also at the impact of anti-party
sentiment and behaviour. It further permitted examination of
the interplay between the political elite and the public in
debates about electoral reform.
We did indeed find a marked shift in the character of electoral

reform debates and processes, with the change first becoming
manifest in 1989. The turning point is not the fall of the Berlin
Wall in November 1989, but rather the passage of an
amendment to the electoral law in the Netherlands six weeks
earlier. Before then, electoral reforms occurred with almost no
reference to public opinion. Even where reforms affected the
intra-party dimension, the debates around them focused
overwhelmingly on inter-party effects. Where the intra-party
dimension was mentioned, calls to reduce voters’ influence
were heard as often as arguments that it should be increased.
Parties with more popular individual politicians tended to
support more candidate-centred rules, hoping they would give
them an electoral boost. Power battles also took place within
parties, between individual (often locally anchored) politicians
and central party organizations. When the latter were strong
enough, the choice was often for rather closed systems that
gave parties the capacity to control access to parliament.
Citizens were not involved; nor were their preferences
mentioned.
Since 1989, by contrast, references to public attitudes towards

the state of politics and to the need to foster greater public
participation in politics have been near-universal features of
Page 7 of 13
Conclusion
electoral reform debates. Politicians at least appear to be

concerned about the growing gap between themselves and
ordinary citizens. They feel urged to react, and personalization
of the electoral system often looks like a good response.
Perceived public support for reducing the centrality of parties
in the electoral process has become central to reform debates,
accepted by both supporters and opponents of greater
personalization.
Our qualitative accounts analysed a number of additional

propositions, but found only patchy support for them. We
posited that support for personalization should be stronger
among parties on the right that favour a strong role for the
individual, especially liberal parties, and weaker among
parties of the left, whose vision of society and of democracy
emphasizes collective organization and identity. We found
evidence of this in recent debates in some (p.270) countries,
including Belgium, Norway, and Sweden, but not in others—
including the former communist countries, as well as Cyprus,
Iceland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Regarding the impact of
the existing electoral system, we found a striking lack of
pressure for depersonalization in countries whose electoral
rules already give voters substantial voice over individual
candidates. We also observed some evidence that
personalization is harder in countries using fully closed- rather
than flexible-list systems, though our conclusions here were
tentative.
Following these analyses of the trend towards more

personalized electoral systems across Europe and the drivers
underlying this evolution, the third and final part of the book
examined the impact of these reforms. In doing so, we
considered three possibilities: that the reforms have been too
insignificant to have any effect, whether mechanical (on which
candidates enter parliament) or psychological (on voting
behaviour and attitudes to politics); that they have been
sufficiently meaningful to exert a mechanical influence and
perhaps also shape voters’ usage specifically of candidate
voting opportunities, but not to alter politics more broadly; or
that they have been major reforms that have had deeper
effects on citizens’ engagement with and perceptions of
politics. We found that, while some reforms belong to the first
Page 8 of 13
Conclusion
category and none to the third, a number also clearly fit within
the second. Meaningful change to Europe’s electoral systems
has therefore taken place, but we should not exaggerate its
depth.
Chapter 9 began this process by analysing whether voters

react to personalization by making more use of candidate
voting and whether personalizing reforms lead to the election
of more candidates on the basis of voters’ choice. Our
conclusions here were mixed. On the one hand, personalizing
reforms have clearly influenced who gets elected: in most
cases of reform, there is an increase—sometimes, though not
always, a substantial one—in the share of seats won by
candidates who would not have been elected had lists been
fully closed. Political parties have thus lost some real capacity
to control the electoral process because of personalizing
reforms. On the other hand, we find no clear and general
impact of personalizing reforms on voting behaviour. Even in
those cases where candidate voting has risen following
reform, it is generally not possible to distinguish this from pre-
existing trends. Overall, it appears that personalizing reforms
are meaningful, in that they reduce the control of parties on
who enters parliament, but voters are not so enthusiastic
about or impressed by these changes as to change how they
vote on a large scale in response.
The limited impact of personalizing reforms on voters is

confirmed in Chapter 10, where we examine whether changes
towards more candidate-centred systems have affected
citizens’ broader relations with politics. Having seen in Part II
of the book that arguments about democratic renewal have
been central to the adoption of many personalizing reforms,
we asked whether (p.271) such reforms have indeed had
positive effects on citizens’ engagement with and attitudes
towards politics. Limited data meant our answers were only
tentative. Nevertheless, two key indicators—electoral turnout
and satisfaction with democracy—gave no evidence that
personalizing reforms have any effect. That is, we found no
statistically significant and positive effect of personalizing
reform on the proportion of registered voters casting a ballot
or on expressed levels of satisfaction with democracy. We
Page 9 of 13
Conclusion
looked also at the impact of personalizing reforms on the

openness of the political system to newcomers by analysing
the share of women elected to parliament before and after
personalizing reforms. Again, reforms appear to make no real
difference.
Overall, the findings of Chapter 10—though we recognize their

limits—are rather disappointing for those who believed that
changing the electoral system by making it more candidate-
centred and less party-centred could renew the relationship
between citizens and politics. There is, we believe, clear
evidence that the political elite has tried to be responsive to
public demands for democratic renewal. But personalizing
electoral systems, or at least the cases of personalization
passed so far, have not cured the democratic malaise.
11.3 What This Tells Us

This book, we believe, adds significantly to the academic
literature in multiple respects. First, it contributes directly to
the study of electoral systems and their evolution. In
particular, it sheds light on an aspect of electoral systems that
is too often ignored: the intra-party dimension. The vast
majority of studies focus on the rules affecting allocation of
seats between parties, whereas systematic and detailed
accounts of the rules organizing the allocation of seats within
parties remain scarce. The most detailed attempt, by Carey
and Shugart, is now twenty years old (Carey and Shugart
1995). With this book and the associated data we make
available to the community of scholars,1 we not only update
knowledge of the intra-party dimension of electoral systems,
but also give a much more detailed account, in particular
regarding the variety of list systems that—as recognized by
Shugart himself (Shugart et al. 2005)—are too often grouped
together in the vague category of flexible-list systems.
Second, this book enriches the growing literature on the

personalization of politics. Over the last twenty years, many
studies have been written on various facets of this evolution.
The personalization of media coverage of politics, of political
parties, and of elections has been discussed and analysed (see
(p.272) Karvonen 2010 for a review). We go one step further
Page 10 of 13
Conclusion
and show that personalization is affecting not only the

functioning of politics, but also the institutional architecture
itself. The heart of the representative process—the electoral
system—is being reshaped in many European countries,
reducing the role of political parties and increasing voters’
capacity to select the candidates who will enter parliament.
Given that institutions are rather stable, these reforms are
likely to leave a lasting footprint in European political systems.
Third, the book’s findings have important implications for the

broader debate about institutional choice and democratic
renewal—most particularly, by showing that public opinion
can have a real impact in processes of institutional change.
The dominant view about the politics of electoral reform has
been that it is elite-driven (see Boix 1999; Benoit 2004; Rahat
2008; Leyenaar and Hazan 2011). More recently, some
authors have underlined the role of citizens in these processes
(Reed and Thies 2001; Renwick 2010; Jacobs 2011). Here we
have provided the most detailed and systematic test of this
idea to date. We have shown that reforms are significantly
more likely to happen in contexts of very low satisfaction with
democracy. We have also provided striking evidence in
support of Dalton’s proposition that the politics of institutional
reform has changed. Until the late 1980s, it was dominated by
politicians who pursued their power interests with almost no
expectation that their actions would affect public opinion.
Since then, elite responses to public disengagement from
traditional party politics and disillusionment with politics more
generally have become a central component of most reform
debates. Politicians see—with varying degrees of sincerity—
that they have to do something to bridge the gap between
citizens and politics. Giving voters more influence over the
choice of representatives and therefore constraining the role
of political parties in the process, often appears as a way to
address these concerns.
These findings are important beyond the case of personalizing

reforms. First, they provide strong support for a more
systematic account of the role of citizens in processes of
electoral and institutional change. Reusing a concept that one
of us introduced in previous research (Renwick 2010), elite–
mass interaction should gain more scholarly attention in the
Page 11 of 13
Conclusion
study of electoral reforms. Second, the findings expand

academic reflection about the so-called crisis of democracy
experienced in all established democracies. Weak trust in
politics, widespread dissatisfaction with democracy,
disengagement of citizens from parties, and high levels of
electoral abstention are very well documented. But so far,
most of the academic literature has linked these signs of a
democratic malaise with democratic innovations in the
direction of participatory or deliberative democracy (Barber
1984; Fishkin 2009; Pateman 2012). Less research have
explored how they affect electoral institutions (though see
Cain et al. 2003). And none has looked specifically at the
personalization of (p.273) electoral systems. With this book,
we show that concerns about the relationship between citizens
and democracy also affect institutions at the core of
representative democracy.
Nevertheless, what also emerges is that such changes to the

electoral system are generating no clear shift in how citizens
relate to politics. The personalizing reforms have not been
purely symbolic. They have modified election outcomes,
leading to the election of more candidates as a result of voters’
preferences. Yet voters appear unimpressed. They have not
massively reoriented their voting behaviour to make more use
of candidate voting. Turnout has not increased significantly,
nor has declared satisfaction with democracy.
Different interpretations can be given to these observations.

One could be that citizens are disappointed by the scale of
reform. Perhaps they would be more impressed by more
radical personalization or by more innovative democratic
reforms such as the introduction of participatory or
deliberative devices. Their disillusionment may only
strengthen if the claims made for reforms at the time of
enactment subsequently go unfulfilled. On the other hand,
another possibility is that voters are just not interested enough
in politics to notice changes to institutions of which they have
little understanding. Disillusionment and disengagement may
lead to distrust of any solutions offered by politicians.
Summing up, however, our book gives evidence against both

the most cynical and the most optimistic interpretations of the
Page 12 of 13
Conclusion
reforms that have taken place. At least in some cases,

politicians have given away genuine power. Furthermore, in
multiple cases—Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden,
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania—there have been
several rounds of reform, as politicians, recognizing that initial
changes have not gone far enough, have sought to push
further. On the other hand, nowhere has reform been enough
deeply to revitalize the political system. Much more is yet to
be learnt about the potential effects of electoral system
personalization on electoral campaigns and the behaviour of
politicians—and whether, under some circumstances,
personalization can therefore strengthen democracy over the
longer term. This opens up a wide agenda for valuable future
research. (p.274)
Notes:
(1) <http://www.electoralsystemchanges.eu/>.
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Conclusion

University Press Scholarship Online

Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of

Print publication date: 2016

Abstract and Keywords

Chapter 11 presents the principal findings of the book,

Keywords: electoral system, institutional change, personalization, satisfaction

In this concluding chapter, we sum up the key themes of the

11.1 What We Have Done

More broadly—and this is our second observation—the

analysed under the title of the personalization of politics

Stemming from these three observations, the thinking that led

That investigation has been structured in three stages. First,

Our analysis of these points is based on the most systematic

countries (the EU28 plus Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland)

11.2 What We Have Found

Applying this classification to electoral system changes in the

Overall, thirteen countries (out of thirty-one) have an electoral

Having confirmed that there is indeed a trend towards more

(Chapter 4) with detailed historical analysis of the

In Chapter 4, we examine the factors that appear to increase

We also tested for other factors, such as the composition of

Our quantitative analysis thus gave some support to our core

War; after the collapse of the Spanish and Portuguese

The core proposition that we examined in these chapters was

We did indeed find a marked shift in the character of electoral

Since 1989, by contrast, references to public attitudes towards

electoral reform debates. Politicians at least appear to be

Our qualitative accounts analysed a number of additional

Following these analyses of the trend towards more

Chapter 9 began this process by analysing whether voters

The limited impact of personalizing reforms on voters is

looked also at the impact of personalizing reforms on the

Overall, the findings of Chapter 10—though we recognize their

11.3 What This Tells Us

Second, this book enriches the growing literature on the

and show that personalization is affecting not only the

Third, the book’s findings have important implications for the

These findings are important beyond the case of personalizing

study of electoral reforms. Second, the findings expand

Nevertheless, what also emerges is that such changes to the

Different interpretations can be given to these observations.

Summing up, however, our book gives evidence against both

reforms that have taken place. At least in some cases,

Access brought to you by: University of Colorado at Boulder

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