6

Barriers Surrounding Taiwan’s

Parliamentary Diplomacy

This chapter discusses factors that have an impact on the capacity of members
of the Legislative Yuan to act internationally and in this way contribute to
parliamentary diplomacy of Taiwan. A great deal of the analysis in this section
is based on 73 interviews conducted with 62 interviewees. For various reasons,
mostly associated with the political sensitivity of the topic and related research,
the position they occupied and/​or the (political) status they had at the time of
conducting interviews, the interviewees agreed to talk to us if our discussion
was off the record. We honour their trust in the following way. When we refer
directly to an interviewee, we do so by providing general information about
his or her position at the time of the interview. We also provide information
about the place and date of the interview. All interviews have been done
in the period 2016–​2020. The majority of them have been conducted in
Taipei, others have taken place by using telecommunication applications
or by email. We have opted for semi-​structured interviews to allow our
respondents to reflect on the topic, and also broadly about challenges and
opportunities for Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. The interviewees have
been informed about the background and the aim of the research. We have
told them that the focus of our research is the period since the early 1990s
when parliamentary diplomacy was introduced to Taiwan’s foreign policy.
We have explained to them that we aimed to understand better the potential
of parliamentarians to help Taiwan pursue its foreign policy. The maximum
time devoted to an interview was between 30 minutes and 90 minutes, and
the average time spent in an interview roughly 60 minutes.
Our group of interviewees is diverse. We have met no less than 18
parliamentarians who were members of the Legislative Yuan at that time.
Four of them were from the KMT, and 14 from the DPP. We have been
fortunate to include several prominent KMT and DPP parliamentarians
among our interviewees. On the executive branch side, we have interviewed

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eight officials. At the time of conducting those interviews, all of them

were employees of the MOFA, some of whom were directly involved in
coordinating parliamentary visits. From the administrative and research
support side, we have interviewed seven individuals, including a high-​ranking
official in the Legislative Yuan and a person with experience in coordinating
activities in the parliament. We have also included in this group five assistants
to members of the Legislative Yuan. Four of them were assistants to legislators
from the DPP and one to a legislator from the KMT.
Furthermore, we have spoken to 15 domestic experts. They combine
expertise, first-​hand knowledge and experience as academics, former
diplomats, members of governments and politicians, some of them serving
in the past as LY members. Seven of them are closer to KMT positions and
three to DPPs. We evaluate other experts in this group as politically neutral.
Among those close to the KMT’s position, three interviewees are high profile
political figures who also served in the Legislative Yuan. Their views benefit
the research because all of them have provided a valuable reflection on the
time when the KMT was dominating the Taiwanese political scene. Their
insights complement the perspective we have been given by parliamentarians
and others sympathizing with the DPP, the party that currently dominates
in Taiwan. Interviewees from abroad include former parliamentarians who
visited Taiwan as well as senior officials with first-​hand experience working
with the Legislative Yuan (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Breakdown of interviewees by categories

Legislators Legislators Executive Staff Staff Domestic Foreign Foreign

–​ KMT –​ DPP (MOFA) (LY) (other) experts officials experts
(legislators,
staff)
4 14 8 7 3 15 6 5

Total interviewees: 62

So, what have we found out? At international level, there is no doubt that
the PRC’s One China principle and the insistence on the 1992 Consensus
are the biggest hurdles LY members face as they try to participate in
international (parliamentary) relations. From the perspective of the PRC,
the tightness of the grip on Taiwan depends on whether Taipei accepts that
the unification with Taiwan is the only option acceptable for the PRC.
Everything is negotiable, Beijing says, if Taipei takes the road to unification.

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On the other hand, as long as the government in Taipei does not accept
that and is unwilling to talk to the PRC, Bejing says, everything is possible,
even taking Taiwan by force.1
This ominous communication from Beijing, which has intensified at the
time of writing this study, is just one of the many manifestations of the ‘China
factor’. Take, for example, an official invitation from the Legislative Yuan
or the government given to a prominent parliamentarian from overseas to
visit Taiwan. In normal circumstances, this would have been a high-​profile
visit. Instead, such invitations turn into complex projects with uncertain
outcomes. The MOFA and the Legislative Yuan face considerable obstacles
when they try to invite senior parliamentarians from countries abroad.
Bar a few exceptions, these politicians are afraid that their countries might
have difficulties with the PRC when they return home. The dilemma of
whether or not to travel to Taiwan becomes even bigger if their party is in
power because such visits might have tangible negative consequences for
the business this country does with the PRC.2 A similar dilemma occurs if
parliamentarians from Taiwan visit their peers abroad, except that in order
not to “inconvenience our hosts”, LY members are willing to meet them
in “secret places”.3 Such incidents, at times going to extremes, for example
when a parliamentarian from Taiwan kindly asks a minister from a foreign
country for permission to take a picture with him or her, are considered as
humiliating by members of the Legislative Yuan.4
The influence of the PRC goes beyond inter-​governmental cooperation.
IPAs would seem a possible forum for LY members to participate in
international relations, but, as one of the interviewees said, “even on the
inter-parliamentary level we face many obstacles”,5 such as that members of
the APPU, the only IPA of which Taiwan is a member, prefer to channel
funding to other IPAs in the region where the PRC is a member.6 In
addition to that, as we know by now, Taiwan has no access to prominent
IPAs such as the IPU and the PGA. Most of our interviewees believe that
this has important ramifications for the mobility of LY members and their
ability to network with peers from all over the world.
Not everything is bad news for members of the Legislative Yuan, because
some options for inter-​parliamentary cooperation remain open and/​or are
(partly) outside the PRC’s control. For example, according to several interviewed
parliamentarians, cooperation with parliamentarians from Japan and the US is
very well organized. The same can be said for the cooperation between the
Legislative Yuan and the British Parliament. The support of the European
Parliament for Taiwan is becoming increasingly important. A new trend in
creating friendship groups seems to be taking place. Parliamentarians create
friendship groups focusing on businesses and scientific cooperation. In addition
to that, LY members can network via PAs to which the PRC has no access.

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The network via friendship groups seems limited to some extent, given
the lack of balance between the number of friendship groups LY members
have created and the number of those created in foreign parliaments. In
addition, by parliamentarians’ own admission, not all friendship groups are
equally active, which represents a problem for Taiwan. As one of the LY
members has said, the very act of creating a friendship group must be based
not on the notion that it is important to establish a friendship group but
on a plan –​what should such a group accomplish? It has been suggested
that international activities of friendship groups should be strictly issue-​
oriented and only those parliamentarians with keen interest, willingness to
produce results and knowledge about the topic should participate. Some
members of the Legislative Yuan have been applying this theory in practice,
as explained by one of our interviewees who is a member of the LY. When
he would take his fellow parliamentarians on a foreign visit, he assumed that
everyone in the group was highly motivated to meet and talk to his or her
colleagues abroad. Hence, he insisted on a clear agenda, and “no sightseeing,
no shopping, just work and staying focused”. That kind of approach, he
said, made his friendship groups “less popular” among parliamentarians in
the Legislative Yuan.7
This anecdote demonstrates the importance of personal motivation,
which brings us to LY members as the units of analysis. Some of our
interviewees complained that there is no systemic push in the Taiwanese
political system that would encourage parliamentarians to be motivated to
engage internationally. If there is a ‘system’, as illustrated by an interviewee,
it is such that “you can’t blame them or hold them accountable for doing
nothing”.8 In addition to that, parliamentarians in Taiwan are up against
the public image of parliamentary diplomacy being a PR of individual
parliamentarians or their parties, or that parliamentary diplomacy is (ab)used
by parliamentarians as a means for travel and pleasure. The challenge for the
LY is how to address these negativities and make use of parliamentarians
willing to spend their time and effort to contribute to Taiwan’s presence
in international relations. The challenge is considerable, for there is no
parliamentary diplomacy without motivated parliamentarians.
But being motivated is not enough. Every parliamentarian with interest
in international (parliamentary) relations should have a good idea about
where to contribute through inter-​parliamentary activities. Being so isolated,
Taiwan would welcome good initiatives. One interviewee, a former member
of the Legislative Yuan, has argued that trade relations should be at the centre
of these initiatives. Diversification of the economy is as strategic and as vital
a goal for Taiwan as security. Taiwan needs to become as independent as
possible in running economic affairs, and using inter-​parliamentary channels
may be a part of activities aiming towards that goal.9 Meetings with companies

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and fellow parliamentarians from other countries are important for an

exchange of ideas and considering business opportunities for Taiwan. Given
that Taiwan is not a widely recognized state and relations between Taiwan
and governments around the world are restricted, parliamentarians might
be able to open more doors than members of Taiwan’s representative offices
(de facto embassies) can. In some countries, members of the cabinet may
be elected parliamentarians at the same time, which is yet another stimulus
for parliamentarians from Taiwan to travel abroad, seek contacts and put
forward Taiwan’s business and other interests.10
One interviewee listed five characteristics an LY member should have
to take part in Taiwan’s effort not to remain isolated from international
relations and contribute to Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. Besides his
or her interest and motivation, the other four are communication skills,
networking ability, willingness to do work beyond protocol obligations and
innovativeness in finding ways and means to help Taiwan. In his view, such
parliamentarians are hard to find in the Legislative Yuan.11 We would add
expertise and competencies to this list. Almost all our interlocutors agree
with this view. Not many parliamentarians speak English, the lingua franca
of international communications today. Only a few parliamentarians have
broader knowledge about international relations, and most of them have no
interest in foreign policy at all.12 Some of these findings apply to Speakers
of the Legislative Yuan, too. For example, Wang Jin-​pyng, the LY speaker
from 1999 to 2​ 016, was known during his tenure as a cosmopolitan and
conciliatory person able to communicate with both parties (Chan, 2013).
He received hundreds of foreign delegations, yet his English was considered
to be rather weak.13 According to one estimate for the ninth term of the
Legislative Yuan (2016–​2020), only about three to five members of the
LY from the DPP and only three to five of them from the KMT could be
described as ‘internationalists’, that is, those who combine good education,
interest in international relations and the ability to speak fluent English.14 For
the rest of the LY membership, their priorities are ‘down-​to-​earth topics’
such as agriculture and trade, in short, whatever brings votes. This is not
what an interest in foreign policy does.15 Some interviewees believe that
ignoring foreign policy matters in this way is in contrast with international
ambitions of Taiwan, and indeed, of LY members themselves. The case
in point is the number of friendship groups: as we know, 71 have been
created for the 2016–​2020 LY. It is difficult to expect that members of the
Legislative Yuan participating in so many friendship groups could serve the
group properly without the relevant knowledge and skills.16 Because of such
‘reality’, visits of Taiwanese parliamentarians risk ending up as stories about
lost opportunities for Taiwan. One former parliamentarian has illustrated this
by providing an example of when a parliamentary delegation from Taiwan

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went to visit the US to inquire about the purchase of weapons. The group
was bipartisan, but in that delegation, half of them did not speak English or
did not have enough knowledge on the subject.17 As we indicated earlier
by introducing views from the US Congress about parliamentary visits from
Taipei, such structuring of parliamentary visits does not benefit Taiwan.
To put this into another perspective, said one expert, one should take into
account that about 50 per cent of the entire inter-​parliamentary activity in
Taiwan is focused on relations with the US.18 This alone is a good reason for
visits to be paid to parliamentarians from strategically important countries,
not by Taiwanese parliamentarians generally interested in (visiting) these
countries, but by those currently sitting in the Legislative Yuan who have
knowledge, expertise, experience and skills to be able to converse with their
hosts on substantive issues fluently and competently. In inter-​parliamentary
relations and parliamentary diplomacy, quality takes preference over quantity.
Knowledge is an important asset for a parliament that wishes to expand
its international presence, but some of our interviewees have warned that
this fact must be put in to context, which concerns the way LY members
are elected. Taiwan’s election system includes first-​past-​the-​post and
proportional representation. This creates two types of parliamentarians, those
directly elected (district) and those nominated (at-​large). District legislators
feel less pressure about the need to speak foreign languages or to have a
broader understanding of international relations. Their primary concerns are
domestic issues and voters’ preferences –​their job is to win the next election.
On the other hand, it is expected that more members of the Legislative
Yuan from the party list (at-​large legislators) should be able to converse
in foreign languages and to have a better understanding of international
affairs. From the perspective of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy, the most
important advantage at-​large legislators have over district legislators is they
do not need to serve constituents, so they can focus entirely on particular
projects of importance to their political party. That being said, to choose
the right ‘team’ of at-​large legislators is anything but an easy task (Hsieh,
2019) and not even a perfect representative of Taiwan abroad, a diplomat or
a parliamentarian, can do much without strong domestic support. Political
parties in Taiwan carry a big responsibility to find ways to agree on platforms
that they could represent internationally. It would seem that it is not always
easy to deal with this challenge.
The current political system in Taiwan –​a democracy –​is, of course, far
different from the dictatorship in the past. Free speech is the norm, and
elections are immensely competitive. In such circumstances, finding an
agreement between parties on issues of national concern is difficult. One
way to describe the impact the democratization process has had on Taiwan’s
foreign policy-​making is to call the era of democracy an era of lack of

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consensus; there is no consensus in Taiwan on the ‘1992 Consensus’. We

have seen that on some occasions, such as the exclusion of Taiwan from
the WHO, the main political parties in Taiwan speak to the world with
one voice. Yet, the differences between the KMT and the DPP about the
vision for the future of Taiwan should not be ignored. So how much do
these differences affect the design, the content and the implementation of
Taiwanese parliamentary diplomacy? Some argued that they do a lot of
damage to Taiwan. The domestic discussion about whether Taiwan should
lean more towards independence or more towards a kind of relationship if
not unification with China does not only limit parliamentarians’ scope of
activities in the international community, it also cripples the country from
inside.19 Avoiding partisanship in the Taiwanese domestic arena20 is important
for the MOFA as well. A Taiwanese expert on international politics, with
experience working for the MOFA, has underlined that the support of
two main parties for Taiwan’s foreign policy and diplomacy is the only way
forward for Taipei. Otherwise, Taiwan risks being weakened in dealing with
the One China principle promoted by the PRC. If differences between the
parties on foreign policy issues are substantial, the hands of the MOFA are
tied. Namely, the foreign ministry cannot push for only one agenda –​it
has to find a compromise between the preferences of both parties. Doing
otherwise would create confusion among international partners and would
not help Taiwan.21
Our interviewees acknowledge that differences between the KMT and
the DPP burden Taiwan and they list several reasons why this is so. Events
such as the meeting between former president Ma and Xi Jinping in 2015
to endorse the 1992 Consensus (Ma, 2015), and the 2016 visit of the new
leader of the KMT to Beijing after the party’s defeat in the 2016 elections
(Chung, 2016), sowed the seeds of discontent on the other side of the aisle.
The recent convention of the KMT has confirmed that the 1992 Consensus
remains the bone of contention, for the KMT sticks by it (Hsiao, 2020a).
Some of the interviewed DPP members seem concerned about the KMT’s
‘contribution’ to the disintegration of Taiwanese society from inside, to make
it more vulnerable to the PRC propaganda. Others are unhappy with the
practice of ‘double representation’, in the form of creating rival friendship
groups in the Legislative Yuan.22 Those that belong to the KMT camp believe
that the role the KMT plays in strained Taiwan–​PRC relations should have
been better appreciated. Namely, some KMT members of the Legislative
Yuan pursue a different kind of parliamentary diplomacy: they seek, often
on their own initiative, to keep up some kind of communication with the
PRC.23 The motivation for doing so is to make sure that strained relations
between Beijing and Taipei have as few consequences as possible for other
ways of cooperation between the island and the mainland; in particular,

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the door for doing business in Taiwan and the PRC must be kept open.
In this respect, the argument goes, their efforts are useful for Taiwan.24
Unfortunately, said another interviewee, because of the lack of domestic
support, the room for KMT members of the Legislative Yuan to play some
kind of mediating role between the PRC and Taiwan is extremely narrow.25
The discord between the two parties on key (foreign) policy issues becomes
particularly problematic if the two parties seek to influence politicians in the
United States, Taiwan’s key ally. Taiwan has been dealing with this problem
since the DPP became the KMT’s main competitor. The DPP wanted its
voice to be heard in Washington, hoping that policy-​and lawmakers there
would understand the role the DPP was to play in Taiwanese politics. The
KMT, once valued in Washington as the pillar of anti-​Communism in East
Asia, was becoming ever more PRC-​friendly and the DPP was there to fill
the void. To advocate its positions, the DPP first relied on the Formosan
Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), a lobby group established in 1982
to promote democracy in Taiwan and to separate it from the PRC. The
FAPA has proven not only to be a successful lobbyist for Taiwan in the US
Congress,26 but also a diplomatic channel for the DPP to assure members
of Congress that the DPP is a party that would keep the anti-​PRC position
and bring Taiwan on to the path of democratization.
The KMT countered such narratives and practices. For example, it would
‘invite US members of Congress and staff to visit Taiwan and inform them
that the DPP and the opposition movement were fronts for communists’
(Lin, 2006: 153). In Washington, various tactics were employed by the KMT,
including protests with members of Congress who supported resolutions
that seemed to favour Taiwan’s interests –​but not in the way the KMT
would have wanted them to do so. An example is a resolution introduced
in September 1991 by Dennis Hertel, a Democrat in the US House of
Representatives, which sought representation for Taiwan in the United
Nations.27 The KMT lobbied against that resolution claiming that the
Taiwanese government supported UN membership ‘in principle but only
if Taiwan could take over the seat of the PRC in the UN Security Council
with veto-​r ight’ (Lin, 2006: 153).
As long as the KMT was in power, Taiwan had one of the most powerful
lobbies in Washington (Sciolino, 1996). Things began to change after the
DPP’s candidate Chen Shui-​bian won the presidential election in 2000.
Following that historic win, the competition for the attention of the US
administration and members of the US Congress intensified, and some
kind of party diplomacy rather than parliamentary diplomacy ensued. The
DPP, now the ruling party, did not trust the TECRO, which it considered
KMT-​controlled. The KMT, on the other hand, was convinced that the
new administration did not properly represent Taiwan’s interests (Dumbaugh,

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2006: 17–​18). Parliamentarians from the Legislative Yuan kept coming to

Washington. Some of those delegations were not bipartisan, but in the
light of fierce competition between the two parties both inside and outside
Taiwan, this was not necessarily such a bad thing at that time.28 Keeping
up a permanent presence in the US capital was high on the agenda of both
parties. As long as it controlled Taiwan’s de facto embassy, the KMT did not
see the need to have a special representative office. Four years after the defeat
in 2000, a KMT–​PFP representative office was opened in Washington. It
was closed down after the KMT returned to power in 2008 and resumed
its activities from the TECRO (Chung, 2020), but it has not reopened
after the DPP came back to power in 2016. The DPP, meanwhile, had its
representatives in Washington from the 1990s, and it strengthened its presence
further in 2013 by opening a new office. The DPP explained the motivation
for establishing the new office by stating that it should ‘foster close relations
with the US and explain the party’s policies and strategies toward China’
(Lowther, 2013). Some observers translate this statement as a reaction to the
fact that the DPP failed to persuade the Obama administration ‘that it had a
sound and well-​developed strategy for dealing with China. As a result, the
US signaled its support for President Ma Ying-​jeou and in the opinion of
some analysts helped in his victory’ (Lowther, 2013).
The underestimation of the continuing need to keep up contacts in
Washington by the KMT and the better understanding of a long-​term
presence in Washington by the DPP has benefited the latter. Eventually,
the KMT, too, concluded that it needed to work on strengthening ties with
the American administration to ‘counter some of the electoral sway that
the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained from its support in
Washington’ (Chung, 2020b).
The partisanship in the Taiwanese parliamentary presence and activity in
the US might not go away anytime soon. Not so long ago the opposition
party Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) established a rival US friendship
group in the Legislative Yuan, called the Taiwan–​US Legislators Amity
Association. Reflecting on this initiative, a DPP legislator demonstrated
the lack of trust between parties by saying that ‘it is a good thing for
Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy to be diversified rather than being
monopolized by a specific political party, as Washington may only hear
one side of voices within the country’ (Shih, 2012). This returns us to
square one: to the question of whether partisan messages that reach
Washington benefit or weaken Taiwan in its effort to maintain a coherent
foreign policy, including the one concerning the PRC. An answer to
this question is, again, particularly important for the TECRO, which,
according to observers in Washington, continues to be a victim of the

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DPP–​KMT political culture. From the perspective of the US Congress

this is considered unfortunate because the TECRO should be left free
to follow its primary mission when it comes to parliamentary diplomacy,
that is, to cater to all parliamentarians equally, regardless of the political
party they come from.29
Curiously enough, the push factor that helps to bring the two parties
somewhat together and to shape the foreign policy focus in the MOFA/​
TECRO comes from the mainland. The recent increase of tensions in the
Taiwan Strait and threats from the PRC to take Taiwan by force after the
re-​election of president Tsai in 2020 may well have a positive impact on the
positioning of the KMT and the DPP in their competition for the attention
of the US Congress. The current head of the KMT, Johnny Chiang, agreed
that the KMT must be present in Washington, ‘to convey a clear stance on
US–​Taiwan–​Beijing relations to Washington. It needs to emphasize that the
KMT is pro-​America, that it is conciliatory to China instead of pro-​China’
(Chung, 2019). Such a statement does not signal that the KMT radically
changes its position on the PRC, but it might be seen as a way forward to
develop a political platform that would allow for a more bi​partisan presence
of Taiwanese legislators in Washington and more commonly supported
positions that the TECRO could then introduce in the US Congress or
the administration.30
In fact, some of our interviewees already agree that as far as foreign policy
is concerned, primarily relating to the situation in the Taiwan Strait, there
is more cooperation between the DPP and the KMT than there used to be
not so long ago. In their opinion, the current state of play between the two
parties is as follows. Both parties know that declaring the independence of
Taiwan at this point would be imprudent, to say the least.31 Neither party
wants unification, at least not in the short term.32 Neither of them wants to
worsen relations with the PRC. Such positions are shared with the voters,
too.33 But the 1992 Consensus brokered by the KMT remains the bone of
contention. The less chance there is an agreement on the validity of the 1992
Consensus, the less chance there is for cohesion between the two parties at
international level. In this regard, members of the Legislative Yuan emphasize
the importance of their speaker. He or she must be an internationalist by
definition. As the official representative of the legislative branch in Taiwan,
the speaker is expected to keep up the bipartisan support to international
relations of the Legislative Yuan, for example, by ensuring that all political
parties sitting in the parliament are appropriately represented in those
international visits that the speaker undertakes on behalf of the Legislative
Yuan. A senior official in the Legislative Yuan with good knowledge of
the role of its speaker has explained that “as a matter of principle when we

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as parliamentarians go abroad we typically follow the bipartisan line. We

hide our differences and try to represent Taiwanese interests, especially in
terms of trying to ease our isolation”.34 The parliamentarians who we have
interviewed confirm that past speakers Wang Jin-​pyng (the longest-​serving
speaker in Taiwan’s history as a democracy) and Su Jia-​chyuan have followed
that principle.35 The task might be even easier for future speakers, because
the change of generations, especially in the KMT, one interviewee argues,
may further reduce differences between the two parties on key foreign
policy questions.36 If one adds the continuing pressure of the PRC on
Taiwan and the response of the Taiwanese to it, these factors combined –​
the maturity of the political parties accepting that domestic differences ‘stop
at the water’s edge’ and the ‘China factor’ –​might create an even stronger
sense of the importance of bipartisan support to Taiwan’s foreign policy and
parliamentary diplomacy.
Political parties are crucial for the development of substantive and
consistent parliamentary diplomacy, but they are also their weakest link
because of traditionally unpredictable elections in Taiwan. We have looked
at the results of the elections in Taiwan since 2008, after the number of
members in the Legislative Yuan has been reduced to 113, following the
constitutional amendments in 2005 (see Table 6.2).
From the perspective of the presence of LY members in international
(parliamentary) relations, these figures and trends are not encouraging. The
volatile political scene and, consequently, the lower chance of re-​election of
an incumbent member does not help Taiwan’s efforts to break international
isolation with the help of its parliamentarians. The political experience
and influence of a parliamentarian can only come with continuous service
in parliament. The former speaker of the Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-​pyng
earned his reputation among parliamentarians and in the MOFA as “an
important foreign policy figure”.37 In his position as a speaker, he has served
in the Legislative Yuan for more than two decades. Yet, he is the exception
rather than the rule in how the Legislative Yuan is filled every four years.
Parliamentarians in Taiwan are not very successful in their effort to stay
longer in office. In the 2012 distribution of district seats (the KMT won
those elections), 65 per cent of incumbent members were re-​elected, 60
per cent in 2016 (DPP) and 77 per cent in 2020 (DPP).
This brings us to another domestic factor –​the role of constituencies. At
the beginning of this chapter, we have already pointed out some obstacles
LY members encounter if during their term they choose to be more focused
on Taiwan’s international relations rather than on domestic affairs. When
asked the question of what they thought they could contribute to Taiwan’s
parliamentary diplomacy, the majority of directly elected LY members to
whom we spoke have given the same answer to us: nothing, or very little.

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Table 6.2: Parliamentary elections in Taiwan, 2008–​202038

Summary of legislative elections –​total

Re-​elected Newly elected
2008 91 22
2012 64 49
2016 59 54
2020 68 45

Summary of legislative elections –​districts seats

Re-​elected Newly elected
2008 60 13
2012 48 25
2016 44 29
2020 56 17

Summary of legislative elections –​at-​large seats

Re​appointed Newly appointed
2008 26 8
2012 11 23
2016 10 24
2020 7 27

Several reasons have been offered as to why this is so. The most important
ones are culture and tradition. As one member of the Legislative Yuan has
explained, voters expect district legislators to be at their disposal all the
time. Attending weddings and funerals is also on the list of expectations, and
an incumbent may find it difficult to survive through the next elections if
voters complain, “we have never seen you”.39 As one of the interviewees has
illustrated, the chairperson of the Foreign and National Defense Committee
might be just about the only one who could justify the time spent on foreign
affairs. The rest, in his estimation, must devote 90 per cent of their time to the
needs of constituents.40 Another member of the Legislative Yuan explained
her encounter with the new reality after she won the elections in her district.
As a politician who has been educated abroad, with excellent command of
English, ample international experience and a rich network of colleagues
worldwide, she had to dramatically reduce her foreign travel to take care of
her constituents.41 Another parliamentarian explained that as much as he
was aware that international parliamentary activity was important, his time
for international travel was restricted as long as he was a district legislator.

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International relations and foreign policy are among his areas of interest,
but he needed to focus instead on the preferences of his constituents who
only have local concerns. Since he was a directly elected legislator, he said,
he only managed one foreign trip per year.42
In most cases, the decision of district legislators to travel is the result of
some form of cost–​benefit analysis. Because “foreigners do not vote”,43
parliamentarians must have a clear idea about the merits of planned travel
abroad, and how it might affect constituents’ support to him or her in the
next election.44 The decision is even tougher if foreign travel does not receive
much coverage in the media, which is the case in Taiwan. The lack of interest
in foreign affairs is, of course, not typical just to Taiwan, but Taiwan is not
a typical country. Let us remember that Taiwan has very limited access to
the world of recognized states. In its case, at the very least, efforts to reduce
its isolation should not be ignored. Unfortunately, said one legislator, if, for
example, US members of Congress come to visit Taiwan, they are likely to
receive more media attention than those from the Legislative Yuan travelling
overseas, even though, at least in theory, it should be the other way around.
At the end of the day, LY members are the ones who are expected to do
‘something good’ for their country.45
Another problem for LY members is the way political parties in the LY
manage memberships in standing committees. Several interviewees have
emphasized that unlike in most other parliaments, LY members frequently
change membership in those committees, which means that many of them
cannot add experience and expertise in any particular area covered by those
committees.46 A high-​ranking official in the Legislative Yuan has described
the situation thus:

‘In principle, it would be good to have an expert parliamentarian in

a certain committee. But if that committee is obscure –​and currently
[at the time of conducting the interview] the National Defence and
Foreign policy committee does not rank among the most important
ones47 –​then the party would shift its [capable] person somewhere
where he is needed more. In other words, there is no strategic thinking
in the parliament as to how to choose an “appropriate” parliamentarian
for specific tasks, but there are real obstacles that political parties face.
We are aware of that, but nothing much can be done.’48

District legislators may still contribute to parliamentary diplomacy in a

meaningful way. What is required is a vision and some strategic planning,
said one of our interviewees. She proposes what might be called hybrid
parliamentary diplomacy, one that intertwines local and governmental
interests. As a district legislator, representing the DPP, she knows that

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constituents are her priority and that she must pay full attention to them if
she wishes to maintain her seat in the next election. At the same time, she
is a politician, expected to advocate for the interests of Taiwan. She believes
that in the globalized world identifying policies that address local and national
concerns at the same time is not impossible. She gave an example of tourism,
a project in which a summer school would be established for young people
from around the world. The school would focus on teaching mandarin and
stimulating students to connect through joint projects, outdoor activities
and so on. Her win–​win in this proposal is as follows. First, her political
party benefits. This project contributes to its political programme, which is
to diversify trade, especially in tourism, where dependence on the PRC is
considerable. As a directly elected parliamentarian, she benefits because she
communicates with peers and international actors. Her constituency benefits
because the summer school brings business. Taiwan benefits because guests
might develop an ‘emotional fondness’ for Taiwan and, in this way, start
advocating for international support for the country. She is aware that this
approach does not bring results overnight, that it is a long-​term investment
with slow returns. But hybrid parliamentary diplomacy may be an answer
to the district parliamentarians’ dilemma of how to cater to constituents and
be internationally active at the same time.49 There are other international
topics that connect a parliamentarian’s interest in international relations and
local interests that can be offered. “For example, in the territorial disputes
in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, Taiwan’s parliamentarians
focus on interests of Taiwan’s fishermen in the disputed areas”.50
In addition to 73 directly elected parliamentarians, 34 candidates (called
at-​large legislators) are selected according to proportional representation
party votes. Regarding continuity the re-​selection of at-​large legislators to
keep them focused on their respective portfolios is not a matter of course.
After the 2020 election, only seven at-​large legislators have survived the
2016–​2020 term and have been re​appointed. The selection process of at-​large
legislators puts a lot of pressure on political parties, and it may create divisions
and discontent, but it also indicates ‘current ideologies guiding the major
political parties currently represented in the Taiwanese legislature’ (Hioe,
2019). From the perspective of our research, we are primarily interested
in the potential these parliamentarians have for contributing to Taiwan’s
parliamentary diplomacy. Several at-​large legislators explained that they had
more time to spend on international travel to promote topics of interest for
Taiwan, and to connect with their peers abroad with similar portfolios.51
Other LY members argued that at-​large legislators do not represent anyone
but the president, and as such, they are considered ‘junior’ to those directly
elected. They do travel more, but they often do not have as much influence
as directly elected parliamentarians; a junior member of the Legislative Yuan

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is less likely to introduce a policy proposal because he or she does not have
proper standing in his or her party.52 An additional factor to be taken into
consideration is that the two main political parties seem to have different
views about the re​appointment of district legislators. In the DPP, there is
an unwritten rule that a legislator-​at-​large can serve a maximum of two
terms. This is one of the mechanisms of maintaining a balance of interests
in the party. There is no such rule in the KMT. The former speaker of the
Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-​pyng, has been on KMT’s list for four terms.53
Another interviewee with good knowledge of selecting at-​large legislators
has provided a frank opinion that gives a more sobering perspective on
selecting at-​large legislators. She believes that the main selection criteria
are the following: prospects of winning votes for the party, maintaining
balance among factions in the party, attachment to corporate business and,
last but not least, being in or out of favour of the party’s president. As she
put it, “politics, rather than expertise plays a major role in determining the
list of legislators-​at-​large … profession in domestic politics is important but
second to votes and banknotes”.54 Therefore, a lot depends on the strategy
of a given political party, its vision for where it wishes to move Taiwan
and with which politicians, said one of our interlocutors, who agreed that
ideally, one way to be more active in the international arena would be by a
long-​term consecutive selection of at-​large legislators whose knowledge and
expertise could help advance Taiwanese interests with foreign counterparts.
In this regard, he concluded, the two major parties still have enough room
to improve the selection process.55
These insights are important for our analysis of Taiwan’s parliamentary
diplomacy. In theory, it would seem that opportunities to be active
internationally for parliamentarians who come to the Legislative Yuan on
party lists are much better, but in reality they face serious limitations: they
seem to be considered second-​rate politicians because they do not have
a constituency and are not directly accountable to the voters. Also, other
criteria for their selection and the evaluation of their performance apply,
such as how they can benefit the party in terms of gaining votes; whether
they can contribute to Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy is less important.
In this way, Taiwanese parties find themselves in a vicious circle: directly
elected members of the Legislative Yuan do not have sufficient time to deal
with international relations, and appointed parliamentarians lack domestic
legitimacy to participate in international (parliamentary) relations. Let us
add to this the high probability that many incumbents will not survive
the next elections, as well as the large oscillations in the appointment of
at-​large legislators as shown earlier. Local elections that take place two
years after national elections, putting additional pressure on political parties
to win voters’ support, is just another factor that forces parliamentarians

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to be more inward-​oriented.56 Oscillations in the selection of at-​large

legislators also hint at the lack of awareness of how important it is to have
knowledgeable parliamentarians in the Legislative Yuan. For example,
one junior parliamentarian with professional experience who came to the
Legislative Yuan in 2016 on the party list admitted that at the beginning she
was not familiar with the inter-​parliamentary type of cooperation; however,
during her mandate, she became more experienced and knowledgeable of
international affairs. Therefore, she hoped that she might be selected for
the next term (2020–​24), should her party be successful in the elections, to
build upon her experience in inter-​parliamentary relations gained in the first
four years.57 Her party was successful, yet she has remained a single-​term
member of the Legislative Yuan as she was not selected.
All these factors do not help to create a favourable environment for the
development of parliamentary diplomacy in Taiwan. They do not stimulate
the development of a type of politician who does not have to fear re-​election
and can focus on areas of international relations relevant to Taiwan.58 As a
result, a senior former diplomat and member of the cabinet has said he could
not remember a single member of the Legislative Yuan who would be widely
acknowledged for playing a particularly prominent role in pursuing Taiwan’s
foreign policy goals. If most parliamentarians are not interested or do not
find time to get involved in foreign policy then no results can be expected.
The two main political parties must have a clear idea, he continued, what
to do with parliamentary diplomacy. That currently does not seem to be
the case. He contrasted the current situation with the KMT era. At that
time, the party did not need to worry about support from the voters, so it
could do the planning and think strategically. The moment one’s seat in the
parliament is subject to competition, everything, including consistency and
continuity (in foreign policy), becomes uncertain.59
Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy has a special character and is different
from other democracies in yet another dimension: the role of the government.
From Taiwan’s perspective, international parliamentary relations do not
involve only inter-​parliamentary exchanges and communication initiated
and organized by the Legislative Yuan, but also those (inter)parliamentary
activities organized and carried out by the MOFA. Moreover, parliamentary
diplomacy, which is normally in the domain of the legislative branch, has
become one of the tools for the executive branch to implement Taiwan’s
foreign policy interests. In other words, “parliamentary diplomacy in the
language of the Legislative Yuan means a replacement for classic inter-​
governmental diplomacy”.60
The MOFA has been put in charge of coordinating parliamentary
diplomacy since Lee Teng-​hui’s initiative was made public in 1993. In
principle, the two branches should work well together because they share

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the same goal: to break through international isolation. Yet, this relationship
is not always a harmonious one. Several issues concerning the cohabitation
between the two institutions have been raised in our discussions with
parliamentarians, diplomats (present and former) and other experts. The
central one among them is the legacy of the KMT and dissatisfaction
with MOFA’s alleged conservativism. Regarding the KMT legacy, the
interviewees remind us that the diplomatic service had been controlled by
the KMT for most of the time since Chiang Kai-​shek moved his government
to Taiwan in 1949. The DPP is still a ‘newcomer’ in Taiwanese politics, and
its presence in Taiwan’s foreign service is a work in progress. The MOFA is
in a period of transition. The KMT is currently in retreat politically, but the
diplomatic service cannot change overnight, even though politicians from
the rival party, the DPP, are at the helm of the MOFA. Time is needed to
build a pool of quality human resources able to represent modern Taiwan in
the international arena, not just through the prism of interests of one party,
but of Taiwan as a whole. For this ideal goal to be accomplished, all political
parties must contribute. The DPP, as argued by our interlocutors, still needs
to cover some ground before getting there. One of the interviewees said, of
the current generation of DPP politicians, that “they are more nativist and
less cosmopolitan than their KMT counterparts used to be”.61 The DPP is
yet to develop international networks and skilled diplomats that would help
its current government to represent Taiwan internationally, said another.62
The transition period in which the MOFA has found itself raises
expectations and creates tensions at the same time, especially among
parliamentarians from the DPP. Almost every LY member from this party
whom we have interviewed has expressed disappointment with the MOFA.
Some say that career diplomats have yet to accept parliamentarians as a
constituent part of Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy. Parliamentarians can
promote Taiwanese interests, and they see fewer obstacles in doing so than
the MOFA –​they would certainly ‘dare’ more than ordinary diplomats
could afford.63 One parliamentarian mentioned the organization of the visit
of foreign parliamentarians as a case in point. In principle, those meetings
have a template and substantive talks are part of them.64 But, others contend,
the reality does not always match that template. Because it is responsible for
the coordination of parliamentary diplomacy, the MOFA should pay more
attention to substance, to inquire how individual visits benefit Taiwan and
can therefore be considered as proof of active parliamentary diplomacy.
Instead, visits organized by the MOFA, one interviewee said, are associated
with receptions and banquets rather than substance. This is why she believed
many Taiwanese parliamentarians invited to such events do not attend them.65
Another parliamentarian from the DPP explained that officials
implementing the MOFA’s conservative approach were sometimes rather

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discouraging, for example, when they would instruct parliamentarians

who visited countries abroad in an official capacity “not to take pictures of
themselves showing where they travelled, not to give details from a visit on
the web and the like”.66 Another LY member was given similar instructions
ahead of her visit. She said that the main goal of the MOFA is to make
sure “that the PRC is not offended”. In her opinion, the problem of the
MOFA goes even deeper. Namely, she claimed that the influence of the
KMT is visible in the training of diplomats and even “textbooks used there
are pro-​KMT”.67 The lack of flexibility of the MOFA has been illustrated
by another DPP who described MOFA–​organized travels abroad. According
to her experience, “if the MOFA gives an initiative for visit, there is little a
parliamentarian can do: everything is scheduled in advance”. She claims that
visits organized in her capacity are better structured and with follow-​ups.68
Besides parliamentarians, other officials and experts who have talked to
us have been critical about the MOFA’s role in coordinating parliamentary
diplomacy. One sees limits in the MOFA’s ability to contribute to Taiwan’s
parliamentary diplomacy because it is “still a very conservative institution,
which finds it very difficult to adapt to political changes. It is perhaps even
the most rigid of all ministries. The influence of the KMT is still very
much part of it. It will not change very easily”.69 Other experts with deep
knowledge of Taiwanese politics and society concurred. One of them has
said that the conservative cadre still has a big influence in the MOFA. He
argued that this needed not to be so because Taiwanese representative offices
have plenty of possibilities at their disposal to facilitate inter-​parliamentary
relations.70 Another interviewee said that the MOFA does too little for
parliamentary diplomacy, although he saw the source of the problem more
generally, not in the MOFA alone but Taiwanese society as a whole, for the
latter is too internally oriented and not interested in international relations.71
Last but not least, one expert echoed criticism of those parliamentarians
who complained that they had no influence on the agenda of parliamentary
visits but, he added, that one should not ignore the fact that, in his opinion
at least, parliamentary visits serve mostly for sightseeing anyway.72
Some of our interviewees, while critical of the MOFA’s handling of foreign
parliamentary delegations visiting Taiwan, have reflected on suggestions
for the ministry to improve the practising of parliamentary diplomacy. As
has already been said, LY members face the harsh reality of isolation many
times when visiting peers abroad. Their hosts do not dare to invite them
officially to speak in their national parliaments. They meet in a cafeteria or
some ‘secret places’ instead. On the other hand, when parliamentarians from
abroad come to visit Taiwan, they receive a protocol that is appropriate for
an official visit. The trouble is that many of them travel to Taiwan in order
to break from the routine. They do not know much about the country.

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This problem needs to be addressed, one Taiwanese scholar has said; both
visits of parliamentarians from abroad and those of LY members travelling
overseas need to be better structured. Besides, he argued, Taiwan should
prefer visits of smaller delegations, one or two members, and having concrete,
informed talks with their guests, or hosts, with clear objectives.73 A senior
official from the Legislative Yuan agrees. In his view, parliamentary trips
are too loosely organized. There is some time spent on substantive talks,
but a lot of time is spent on leisure, too. Only on some occasions does one
see different strategies in place for the organization of parliamentary visits
from abroad. The same advice applies to the organization of LY members’
trips abroad. The quality of these trips too often depends on the motivation
of committee members74 or on the effort that individual parliamentarians
make in preparing their delegations before and during the visit abroad.75
Officials in the MOFA and those with good knowledge of the work in
the ministry see things differently. They argue that, above all, a lot depends
on the interest and motivation of individual parliamentarians. No system
can push a parliamentarian to work hard and prepare for a visit abroad.76 If a
parliamentarian is proactive, the MOFA can connect personal motivation and
institutional interest. As one parliamentarian with a focus on environmental
protection has told us, his expertise helped him to cooperate closely with
the ministry and its work on environmental issues.77 There should be more
instances of such good practices, he said. In areas that are of particular
importance for Taiwan such as health protection, the cooperation between
the MOFA and members of the Legislative Yuan becomes crucial. In
such instances, the motivation of parliamentarians for being involved in
international relations to help the MOFA and contributing to Taiwan’s
interest in participating in the WHO should not be a question of if but how.
Parliamentarians who know they can count on support from professional
networks from their previous jobs or positions should be particularly
motivated to do so. As one parliamentarian described the ‘sectoral diplomacy’
in the field of health protection, Taiwanese parliamentarians with a medical
background and government officials put their ideological differences aside
(albeit not always successfully78) and work with their colleagues abroad, fellow
physicians and others to contribute to the growing international awareness
that Taiwan should cooperate with the WHO in some capacity.79
However, some of our interviewees warn that when viewed from the
perspective of the executive, an effective participation of LY members in
Taiwan’s parliamentary diplomacy has limits. They explain that working
with parliamentarians is a sensitive issue, politically and strategically. Due
to unpredictable elections and frequent changes in the Legislative Yuan,
the MOFA is reluctant to rely on parliamentarians and give them a more
important role in the conduct of parliamentary diplomacy. It is not always

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easy for the MOFA to develop some kind of cooperation, let alone share
sensitive information, with the LY members coming and going from a
parliament where holding on to two terms in office is already considered
a success.80 As far as foreign travel is concerned, they say, one should not
overlook that, when they are abroad, LY members are perceived as the
official representatives of Taiwan, especially in the eyes of the PRC. This
is the main reason why the MOFA insists that parliamentarians keep a low
profile during a visit if they are to accomplish the objectives of the trip.
The public receives only brief information about planned visits (the
same approach is applied if a parliamentarian from abroad visits Taiwan).
The often-​heard impression that these visits are mostly about leisure and
no substance is wrong, according to officials from the MOFA responsible
for the coordination of parliamentary visits. Substantive discussions are an
essential part of these visits but details are not shared. Reporting about visits
of Taiwanese parliamentarians when they go abroad is classified, because of
the fear of pressure from the PRC. All parliamentarians whose visits abroad
have been coordinated by the MOFA have debriefings with the Ministry
when they return.81
When organizing parliamentary visits from abroad, the officials at the
MOFA say, the ministry takes the potential of parliamentary diplomacy and
its benefits for Taiwan very seriously. Not every foreign parliamentarian is
invited to Taiwan. The MOFA and Taiwan’s heads of representative offices
play a key role is in the process of selecting visiting parliamentarians.82 The
selection is based on a thorough assessment of potential candidates: what their
role is in the domestic politics of the country in question; whether they are
friendly to Taiwan; and what their role might be in helping Taiwan in the
future.83 Representative offices may receive suggestions from LY members as
to who to invite, or they may consult with them on the individuals they are
considering inviting, but the final decision about sponsorship of a proposed
parliamentary visit from abroad rests with the MOFA.
To summarize, the MOFA is not much different from ministries of foreign
affairs around the world. Most of them are seen as conservative institutions,
wary of quick changes. However, each ministry has its specifics, and this
also applies to Taiwan. As we have said many times, the MOFA works in
unenviable conditions, as Taiwan is cut off from the world of recognized
states. Additionally, to understand the MOFA one needs to add another
dimension: history. The role of the MOFA in the development of Taiwan’s
parliamentary diplomacy cannot be studied without reflecting on the
impact of the decades-​long exclusive presence of the KMT and its cadre
in the ministry. Listening to LY members and officials, we have concluded
that the dissatisfaction with the continuously strong presence of the ‘KMT
spirit’ in the MOFA does exist. Yet, one should not disregard the positive

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side of KMT dominance. As the case of Taiwan’s presence in the US has

shown, the representation of Taiwanese interests was more efficient before
democratic changes in Taiwan. This is a challenge for the KMT and the
DPP: how to make sure that their domestic differences do not translate into
an incoherent foreign policy.
Indeed, what matters for Taiwan is the future. Our findings from the
interviews we have carried out suggest that the cooperation between the
Legislative Yuan and the MOFA needs to be constructive. We believe that
this will be the case in the future, for three reasons. First, because it will be
a logical follow-​up in case Taiwan continues to lose diplomatic allies to the
PRC. Second, because as far as foreign affairs are concerned, especially as
regards the One China Policy, the gap in position between the DPP and
the KMT is not as big as it used to be. And third, because Taiwan has no
choice if it wants to play a meaningful role in the international arena; the
gradual gaining of mutual trust and coordinated operation of the Legislative
Yuan and the MOFA is a precondition for, and contributes to, an efficient
implementation of Taiwan’s foreign policy.

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