Candu Nuclear Power Systems

CANDU Nuclear
Power System
.muary 1981
• UNRESTRICTED TDS1-10S
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* CANDU NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM
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I ATOMIC ENERGY OF CANADA LIMITED
ENGINEERING COMPANY
SHERIDAN PARK RESEARCH COMMUNITY
1 MISSISSAUGA, ONTARIO L5K 1B2
1901 JANUARY
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™ UNRESTRICTED TDS1 -105
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| CANDU NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM
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• ABSTRACT
I This report provides a comprehensive summary of the
many components that make up a CANDU reactor. Major

emphasis is placed on the CANDU 600 MW(e) design. The
I reasons for CANDU's superior performance and the
inherent safety of the system are also discussed.
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I TABLE OF CONTENTS
I 1.
1.1
INTRODUCTION
Introduction to AECL
I 1.2
1.3
History and Performance of CANDU
Layout and Component Parts of CANDU
I 2.
2.1
POWER SYSTEMS
Reactor Core
I 2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
Heat Transport Systems
Overall Plant Control
Core Control
Reactivity Control Devices
I 2.6
2.7
2.8
Fuel
Startup, Operation and Shutdown Sequences
Secondary Side Systems
I 3. MODERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS
I 3.1
3.2
3.3
Main Moderator System
Moderator Auxiliary Systems
Heavy Water Management
I 4.
4.1
SAFETY SYSTEMS
Inherent Safety Features of CANDU
I 4.2
4.3
Safety Design Philosophy
Safety Systems Description
I 5.
5.1
5.2
REFUELLING SYSTEM
Fuelling Machines
Fuel Transfer
I 5.3
6.
Fuel Storage
SUMMARY
I 6.1
6.2
Advantages of CANDU
Conclusion
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I 1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO AECL
I AECL is a crown corporation of the Canadian government charged with the

mandate to develop nuclear power and associated industries in Canada.
I AECL commenced operation in 1945 with the construction of elaborate

nuclear laboratories and research reactors in Chalk River, Ontario.
Today, AECL is a large multi-faceted company with over 7,500 employees.
I The various activities of the company are illustrated in Figure 1.1-1, and
the structure of the company as it is presently constituted, is shown in
Figure 1.1-2.
I The company's major facilities in Canada (Figure 1.1-3), are:
. The Head Office, located in Ottawa, Ontario
I . Nuclear laboratories at Chalk River, Ontario and Pinawa, Manitoba -
I . Douglas Point and Gentilly-1 nuclear generating stations, located in

Ontario and Quebec respectively
I . The Glace Bay and Port Hawkesbury heavy water plants in Nova Scotia, and
the partially completed La Prade heavy water plant in Quebec
. The Radiochemical Company, located in Ottawa, markets radioisotopes and
I designs, manufactures and markets radiation equipment
r . The Chemical Company, located in Ottawa, responsible for heavy

production
water
. The Engineering Company, located in Mississauga with a subsidiary office

in Montreal, responsible for the engineering of nuclear power reactors
» AECL International located at Mississauga and elsewhere is responsible

for overseas projects and international marketing
AECL today has world-wide experience in design, project management and

construction of large nuclear generating stations and research reactors.
AECL is also experienced in transferring CANDD expertise from Canada to
participating countries through the establishment of local manufacturing
programs. AECL has a genuine interest in this transfer of technology and
in the generation of local employment in participating countries.
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AECL *
OPERATES LABORATORIES. I
PROVIDES NUCLEAR CONSULTING SERVICES.
DESIGNS CANDU NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS. |
BUILDS AND MARKETS NUCLEAR PLANTS.
BUILDS AND OPERATES HEAVY WATER PUNTS. }
PRODUCES AND MARKETS RADIOISOTOPES.
LIAISES WITH INDUSTRY AND UNIVERSITIES. I
COOPERATES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND AGENCIES.
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FIGURE 1.1-1
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I ATOMIC ENERGY OF CANADA LIMITED
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CORPORATE OFFICE
Directs and administers the Company's activities.
• Markets CANDU nuclear reactors, components and technology.
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Effects scientific and technological exchange agreements with counterpart agencies in
other countries.
Makes available its special facilities and expertise to assist Utilities n the practical use
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of nuclear energy, and other Government agencies In their operation and services.
I RESEARCH COMPANY
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ENGINEERING COMPANY
Designs nuclear generating stations, in co-

• Operates laboratories for fundamental and
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operation with electric utlities and private
applied research and engineering development
industry.
in the nuclear field.
• Provides nuclear power plant consulting ser-
• Enters into co-operative research and develop- vices and undertakes development work In
ment contracts with industry and universities. support ot the CANDU nuclear power plant.
I • Makes available its special facilities and ex-

pertise to assist universities in nuc ear studies
and techniques.
* Provides nuclear steam plant equipment and
makes available its special facilities and ex-
pertise to assist in developing manufacturing
capability to nuclear specifications.
I CHEMICAL COMPANY RADIOCHEMICAL COMPANY
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Constructs and operates Heavy Water Produc-
tion Plants.
Provides heavy water for nuclear reactor re-

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Produces and markets radioisotopes.
Designs, manufactures, and markets equip-
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quirements.
Coordinates the development of Heavy Water

technology.
ment for the utilization of radioisotopes and
radiation.
I AECL INTERNATIONAL
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Identifies offshore sales opportunities.
Formulates marketing strategies in order to
develop new reactor and associated
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technology sales overseas.
Promotes CANDU export sales to these newly
defined markets, and to existing markets (in
cooperation with the organization of CANDU
industries O.C.I.)
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Represents the Chemical Company and the
Research Company in offshore sales.
Constructs nuclear generating stations n
cooperation with international electrlca
I utilities and local industries.
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r FIGURE 1.1-2 ATOMIC ENERGY OF CANADA LIMITED ORGANIZATION/RESPONSIBILITIES
1 Whitnnall Nuclear R t M a r c h
Establishment
2 Bme* Nuclear Power Development
Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station
3 AECL Engineering Company
AECL International
4 Picturing Nuclear Generating Station 9 AECL Engineering Company-Montreal ;
5 DarUngton Nuclear Generating Station 10 Gentilly-1 Nuclear Generating Station :
Gentilly-2 Nuclear Generating Station •
6 Nuclear Power Demonstration (NPD)
La Prade Heavy Water Plant :
7 Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories
11 Point Lepreau Nuclear Generating Station :
S AECL Corporate Office
12 Port Hawkesbury Heavy Water Plant :
AECL International Head Office AECL Research Company
AECL Radiochemical Company AECL Chemical Company 13 Glace Bay Heavy Water Plant ;
FIGURE 1.1-3 NUCLEAR ENERGY ESTABLISHMENTS IN CANADA
f^^'vr*1^ (--^Frt-ii -IJ i

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I 1.2 HISTOK? AND PERFORMANCE OF CANDU
The history of CANDU is illustrated in Figure 1.2-1, and shows the
I genealogy of the CANDU reactor from its inception to the current state of
the art. Figure 1.2-2 summarizes this graph in tabular form.
I The Pickering "A" nuclear generating station (Figure 1.2-3) consists of

four units of 515 MW(e) electric each, for a total net output of 2060
MW(e). It is situated on the outskirts of, and provides power to, the
city of Toronto, Ontario.
I These units came into service during the years 1971 to 1973. Adjacent to
the Pickering "A" station is the Pickering "B" station, again comprising
I four units, which will deliver 2060 HW(e) when completed during the years
1981 to 1983. The Bruce "A" nuclear generating station (Figure 1.2-4) is
located approximately 160 miles north-west of Toronto, and consists of
I four units of 746 MW(e) each, for a total station output of 2984 MW(e)
electric, plus enough steam to feed the Bruce heavy water plants. These
units came into service during the years 1977 to 1979 and hence form the
newest additions to the Canadian nuclear grid. On the same site, the
I Bruce "B" nuclear generating station is under construction with its four
units of 769 MW(e) electric each, due in service during the years 1984 to
1987.
I Ontario Hydro has also commenced construction of a four unit nuclear

generating station of 850 HW(e) per unit at the Darlington site
I approximately 60 miles east of Toronto.
Currently, more than 31% of the electrical demand in the Province of

Ontario is generated by nuclear power.
I The Gentilly-2 (G-2) nuclear generating station (Figure 1.2-5) is a 638
MW(e) net single unit station under construction adjacent to the
I Gentilly-1 nuclear generating station, the only CANDU station with boiling
light water coolant.
I The Point Lepreau generating station is under construction in the Province

of New Brunswick. It is very similar to the Gentilly-2 station and will
produce 633 MW(e) net.
I CANDU stations are also operating or under construction in other

countries. Three of these are shown in Figures 1.2-6, 7 and 8.
I CANDU stations are the world leaders in availability. These facts are
illustrated in Figures 1.2-9 and 1.2-10 which show extracts from 'Nuclear
Engineering International1 comparing the CANDU system against other
I competing reactor types.
1 1.1-2
800
Length and location of rectangles denotes

700 • construction and commissioning period.
Arrows denote flow of information.
600
POWERS 500
REACTORS
MW(e)
RESEARCH
REACTORS
MW(Ih)
General research, development

and design information.
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
YEARS
FIGURE 1.2-1 GENEALOGY OF CANDU REACTORS
POWER DATE OF
MWe NUCLEAR FIRST
NAME LOCATION TYPE NET DESIGNER POWER
NPD ONTARIO PHW 22 AECL & CGE 1962

DOUGLAS POINT ONTARIO PHW 206 AECL 1967
PICKERING A ONTARIO PHW 515x4 AECL 1971/73
GENTIuLY 1 QUEBEC BLW 266 AECL 1971
KANUPP PAKISTAN PHW 125 CGE 1971
RAPP1 INDIA PHW 203 AECL 1972
RAPP2 INDIA PHW 203 AECL —
BRUCE A ONTARIO PHW 740x4 AECL 1976/79
GENTILLY 2 QUEBEC PHW 640 AECL —
POINT LEPREAU NEW BRUNSWICK PHW 635 AECL —
CORDOBA ARGENTINA PHW 600 AECL —
PICKERING B ONTARIO PHW 516x4 AECL —
WOLSUNG 1 KOREA PHW 600 AECL —
BRUCE B ONTARIO PHW 756x4 AECL —
DARLINGTON ONTARIO PHW 850x4 AECL —
CERNAVODA ROMANIA PHW 600 AECL _
TOTAL 18,208 MWe
FIGURE 1.2-2 CANDU POWER REACTORS

FIGURE 1.2-3 PICKERING 'A' AND 'B' 8 x 515 MW{a)
FIGURE 1.2-4 BRUCE 'A' 4 X 700 MW(e> START OF PROJECT 1970
FIGURE 1.2-5 GENTILLY-2 600MW(e)
FIGURE 1.2-6 ARGENTINA — CORDOBA CANDU 600 MW(#)
FIGURE 1.2-7 REPUBLIC OF KOREA - WOLSUNG CANDU 600 MW(e)
C
FIGURE 1.2-8 ROMANIA - CERNAVODA 4 x 600 MW(e)

20
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
(Courtesy of Nuclaar Engineering lnternational,1980 December)
FIGURE 1.2-9 COMPARISON OF THE PERFORMANCE OF FOUR TYPES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

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I Station Cumulative Load Type
Factor %
I Bruce-3 82.0 CANDU
I Stade-1
Pickering-2
Pickering-1
81.2
80.9
80.3
PWR
CANDU
CANDU
I Point Beach-2
Pickering-4
Pickering-3
77.4
77.3
75.4
PWR
CANDU
CANDU
I Prairie lsland-2
Calvert Cliffs-2
Connecticut Yankee
75.2
74.7
74.6
PWR
PWR
PWR
I Bruce-4
Bruce-1
73.5
73.0
CANDU
CANDU
I Ref: Nuclear Engineering International Vol. 25 No. 307,1980
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I FIGURE 1.2-10 CUMULATIVE LOAD FACTORS FOR REACTORS OVER 500 MW(e)
I TO END OF SEPTEMBER 1960

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1.3 LAYOUT AND COMPONENT PARTS OF CANDO |
The terminology used in describing CANDU is shown in Figure 1.3-1. This _

terminology is most convenient in referring to delineations in scope of I
supply. "
Figure 1.3-2 shows the Nuclear Steam Plant and Balance of Plant portions. I
Figure 1.3-3 illustrates containment, which consists solely of the reactor 1
building. Figure 1.3-4 shows the CANDU Nuclear Steam Supply System inside
containment and Figure 1.3-5 shows pictorially the layout inside "t
containment* Figure 1.3-6 illustrates the control room which is in the J
service building outside of containment.
The site layout for.G-2 (Figure 1.3-7) shows water intake and discharge |
facilities and the pumphouse in addition to the Nuclear- Steam Plant and *
Balance of Plant facilities. Figure 1.3-8 shows a twin 600 MW(e) Nuclear
Generating Station which is a feature of the plant. The reactor building .1
layout is identical in both units and the service building layout is 1
adjusted to accommodate the dual unit configuration.
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1.1-3
CANDU 900 NUCLEAR
GENERATING STATION (NGS)
NUCLEAR STEAM BALANCE OF

PLANT (NSP) PLANT (BOP)
, TURBINE GENERATOR
AND AUXILIARIES
NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY BALANCE OF NUCLEAR ELECTRIC POWER

SYSTEM (NSSS) STEAM PLANT (BNSP) SYSTEMS (BOP)
, COMMON PROCESSES
I - REACTOR BUILDING AND SERVICES (BOP)
I - SERVICE BUILDING
*~ SPENT FUEL BAY(SFB) , BUILDINGS AND
STRUCTURES
NUCLEAR CORE STEAM GENERATING BALANCE OF NUCLEAR

SYSTEM (NCS) SYSTEM (SOS) STEAM SUPPLY
SYSTEM (BNSSS)
PRIMARY HEAT I - HEAVY WATER MANAGEMENT

TRANSPORT SYSTEM I - ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS (NSSS)
STEAM AND WATER *- COMMON PROCESSES AND SERVICES (NSSS)
BALANCE OF SYSTEMS (NSP) & SPENT FUEL BAY PROCESS SYSTEMS
NUCLEAR
NUCLEAR CORE
CORE(NC)
SYSTEM (BNCS)
• REACTOR
• FUEL HANDLING
•CONTROL CENTRE (NC) t MODERATOR SYSTEM
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS
EWS, EPS
FIGURE 1.3-1 COMPONENT PARTS OF THE PLANT

1 REACTOR 7 SPENT FUEL INSPECTION AND STORAGE
2 FUELLING MACHINE 8 MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION
3 STEAM GENERATOR 9 CONTROL CENTRE
4 DOUSING SYSTEM 10 MECHANICAL WORKSHOP
5 NEW FUEL HANDLING 11 WATER TREATMENT
6 SPENT FUEL HANDLING 12 TURBINE AND GENERATOR
FIGURE 1.3-2 600 MW(e) NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

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I SEPARATION MEMBRANE
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FIGURE 1.3-3 REACTOR BUILDING SECTION
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1 MAIN STEAM SUPPLY PIPING
2 STEAM GENERATORS
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3 MAIN PRIMARY SYSTEM PUMPS
4 FEEDERS
5 CALANDRIA ASSEMBLY
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6 FUEL CHANNEL ASSEMBLY
7 FUELLING MACHINE BRIDGE
8 MODERATOR CIRCULATION SYSTEM
FIGURE 1.3-4 NUCLEAR CORE SYSTEM AND STEAM GENERATING PLANT

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I DOUSING WATER TANK
DOUSING WATER VALVES
MODERATOR PUMP
MODERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER
FUELLING MACHINE CARRIAGE
FUELLING MACHINE CATENARY
FUELLING MACHINE MAINTENANCE LOCK
1 FEEDER CABINETS
REACTOR FACE
REACTOR
REACTIVITY MECHANISM
FUELLING MACHINE MAINTENANCE LOCK DOOR
END SHIELD COOLING WATER DELAY TANK
VAULT COOLER
PRESSURIZER
9 HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM PUMP 18 STEAM GENERATOR
10 FUELLING MACHINE BRIDGE 19 STEAM GENERATOR ROOM CRANE
FIGURE 1.3-5 600 MW(e) REACTOR BUILDING CUTAWAY

EMERGENCY
CONTAINMENT CORE MODERATOR AND
MISCELLANEOUS
COOLING REACTOR MISCELLANEOUS PRIMARY HEAT
AUXILIARY
SYSTEMS TRANSPORT SYSTEM
FUELLING MACHINE SYSTEMS
ANNUNCIATION ELECTRICAL
AND FUEL HANDLING AND DIGITAL STEAM GENERATOR DISTRIBUTION
CONTROL CONSOLE SYSTEM TURBINE GENERATOR SWITCHYARD SYSTEMS
CONTROL
COMPUTERS
/ / / I /I
PL14 PL15 PL16 PL17 PL18 PL19 PL20
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FIGURE 1.3-6 CONTROL CENTRE
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= UJ g
u § 3 s <S
o 5g
5L5
» - (NJ CO * ID <
F/M MAINTENANCE
F/M DECONTAMINATION
DECONTAMINATION
CENTRE .
ERADIATION
PROTECTION
FIGURE 1.3-8 SERVICE BUILDING PLAN EL. 100 (GRADE)

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I 2.0 POWER SYSTEMS
2.1 REACTOR CORE

I 2.1.0 General
I This section of the CfiNDU Nuclear Power System presentation introduces the
principal features of the Reactor Core and its location arrangements.
Particulars of the related process and control systems are covered in
I subsequent sections.
The CANDU 600 MW(e) Reactor is the sixth in a series of Pressurized Heavy
Water Reactor (PHWR) designs developed in Canada for the production of
I electric power from natural uranium fuel.
Like preceding CANDU reactors, this design incorporates a standardized,

I geometrical arrangement of horizontal pressure tubes which contain fuel
and circulating heavy water coolant at high pressure.
I These fuel channels are mounted within a cylindrical calandria, which

contains heavy water moderator in a separate low pressure system.
The CANDU 600 MW(e) Reactor Core is located at the heart of the Reactor
I Containment building within biological shielding.
2.1.1 Reactor Assembly

I The Reactor Assembly is mounted inside a steel-lined light water filled
concrete vault (Figure 2.1-2) and comprises:
I . A cylindrical low-pressure calandria vessel of stainless steel

construction.
I . Two integral end shields (also of stainless steel construction with

carbon steel shielding balls) easjh horizontally penetrated by 380
lattice tubes.
I . 380 Zircaloy-2 calandria tubes joining the lattice tubes at each
position in the lattice.
. 3S0 fuel channel assemblies mounted within these lattice sites.
. Vertical and horizontal reactivity control devices which penetrate the

I vault shielding to provide power sensing, control and shut-down
features.
r . Connections for the heat removal recirculation of the heavy water

moderator.
E 2.1-1
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3.
4.
5.
CALANORIA
CALANDRIA - SIDE TUBESHEET
CALANDRIA TUBES
EMBEDMENT RING
FUELLING MACHINE - SIDE TUBESHEET
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
EARTHQUAKE RESTRAINT
CALANDRI A VAULT WALL
MODERATOR EXPANSION TO HEAD TANK
CURTAIN SHIELDING SLABS
PRESSURE RELIEF PIPES
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7.
S.
9.
10.
ENO SHIELD LATTICE TUBES
END SHIELD COOLING PIPES
INLET-OUTLET STRAINER
STEEL BALL SHIELDING
END FITTINGS
21.
22.
23.
24.
2S.
RUPTURE DISC
REACTIVITY CONTROL UNIT NOZZLES
VIEWING PORT
SHUTOFF UNIT
ADJUSTER UNIT
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11. FEEDER PIPES 26. CONTROL ABSORBER UNIT
12. MODERATOR OUTLET 27. ZONE CONTROL UNIT
13. MODERATOR INLET 2B. VERTICAL FLUX OETECTOR UNIT
14. HORIZONTAL FLUX DETECTOR UNIT 29. LIQUID INJECTION SHUTDOWN NOZZLE
IS. ION CHAMBER 30. BALL FILLING PIPE
FIGURE 2.1-1 REACTOR ASSEMBLY

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I . Cooling connections for the water within the end shields and calandria
vault•
I The transverse reactivity devices (Figure 2.1-2) are:
I 1)
2)
Six externally mounted ion chamber assemblies, 3 each side, which
sense low levels of neutron flux,
Seven Horizontal Flux Detector Assemblies which sense flux levels in
I 3)
regions of the reactor core,
Six Poison Injector Nozzle Assemblies which provide rapid injection
I of neutron-absorbing gadolinium nitrate solution into the moderator

when trip sensors in Eihutdown System No. 2_ (SDS2) are actuated.
I Vertical penetrations from the reactor deck (Figure 2.1-3) provide access,
through thimbles, to the calandria, for positioning the other reactivity
control devices.
I The vertical reactivity devices (Figure 2.1-4) are:
26 Vertical Flux Detector Units
I These embody flux sensors which provide inputs to:
I 1)
2)
The Reactor Regulating System which controls power levels in various
regions of the reactor,
The Reactor Protective System to actuate Shutdown System No. J. (SDS1)
I 3)
in the event of excessive power indications.
The Flux Mapping System which is used to record local power levels to
I identify zones where refuelling would be most appropriate.
6 Liquid Zone Control Units which provide a total of 14 compartments in
I which light water levels are varied in response to control requirements of

the Reactor Regulating System.
r 21 Adjuster Units which serve the dual functions of:
1) Flux flattening during normal operation through neutron-absorption in

inserted absorbers,
2) Xenon override following power reduction or shutdown, through

absorber withdrawal.
r 28 Shut-off Units which drop neutron absorbing rods into the reactor core
to shut down the reactor when a trip is actuated in the Reactor Protective
System's S D S L
2.1-2
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IC3 ON FAR SIDE
ONLY
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(SIDE'C')
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1•
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ION CHAMBER HOUSING
(3 EACH SIDE)
( • J HORIZONTAL FLUX DETECTOR (7) I
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POISON INJECTOR NOZZLES (6)
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FIGURE 2.1.2 TRANSVERSELY MOUNTED REACTIVITY CONTROL DEVICES
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STEAM GENERATOR
MOUNTING POST
ROOM FLOOR LEVEL
ADJUSTER UNIT.
SHUTOFF UNIT
TREADPLATE
FLUX
DETECTOR
UNIT
MOUNTING
POST
o 1
HELIUM COVER VIEWING
GAS LINES PORT
LIQUID ZONE
VERTICAL
CONTROL UNIT /
FLUX
DETECTOR
UNIT CONTROL &
POWER CABLES
1
SHIELDING • CABLE
r TRAYS
COLLAR \ H
'' *• 1
|THIOKOLP-STYROFOAM
SEALANT!
CALANDRIA t • .
CALANDRIA
VAULT WALL'i VAULT
NITROGEN GROUT
SHIMS -SEAL PLATE .
VAULT WATER
' DOUBLER PLATE
FIGURE 2.1.3 REACTIVITY MECHANISM DECK - SCHEMATIC SECTIONAL VIEW

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O FUEL CHANNEL
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VERTICAL FLUX DETECTOR (26) LIQUID ZONE CONTROL (6)
5
ADJUSTER (21)
SHUTOFF UNIT (28)
^
©
SOLID CONTROL ABSORBER (4)
VIEW PORT (2) I
OVERFLOW « HELIUM BALANCE
FIGURE 2.1-4 PLAN - VERTICALLY MOUNTED REACTIVITY CONTROL DEVICES

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I These vertical reactivity control devices are positioned in the calandria
in guide tubes which pass through the thimbles and the calandria tube
lattice^ and are secured at the bottom of the calandria shell.
I 2.1.2 Fuel Channel Assemblies
I The fuel channel assemblies (Figure 2.1-5) consist of:
1) Zirconium-niobium alloy Pressure Tubes (6.3 m long x 105 nun nominal
I bore x 4.16 mm minimum wall thickness) to house fuel and pressurized

D 2 O,
I 2) AISI type 403 Stainless Steel End Fittings, with type 410 stainless
steel liners, to provide shielding extensions to pressure tubes,
3) Positioning assemblies for each end fitting, one of Which is locked.

I to locate its end fitting at the required position on its bearings in
the end shield,
I 4) Garter spring Tube Spacers to support each pressure tube within its
calandria tube,
I 5) Bellows Assemblies to seal the annular space between each pressure

tube and its calandria tube (and between the end fittings and end
shield lattice tubes),
I 6) Shield Plugs for every end fitting to minimize neutron leakage from
the fuel channel and (in the case of the downstream shield plug) to
provide axial support to the column of 12 fuel bundles - (see Section
I 7)
2.6),
Removable Closure Plugs (Figure 2.1-6) to seal each end of the fuel
I 8)
channels and to enable access for refuelling by the fuelling machine,
Feeder Connections to the Heat Transport System for the supply and
removal of D2O coolant for each fuel channel.
I Fuel channels are installed at the reactor site by a highly trained crew
in a closely controlled production operation.
I Subsequently the feeders are installed to connect fuel channels to the

Heat Transport circuit, described in the next section.
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FIXED END OF CHANNEL
1 CHANNEL CLOSURE
2 CLOSURE SEAL INSERT
3 FEEDER COUPLING
4 LINER TUBE
5 END FITTING BODY
6 END FITTING BEARING
7 TUBE SPACER
8 FUEL BUNDLE
9 PRESSURE TUBE
10 CALANDRIA TUBE
11 CALANDRIA SIDE TUBE SHEET
12 END SHIELD LATTICE TUBE
13 SHIELD PLUG
14 END SHIELD SHIELDING BALLS
15 FUELLING MACHINE SIDE TUBE SHEET
16 CHANNEL ANNULUS BELLOWS
17 CHANNEL POSITIONING ASSEMBLY
FIGURE 2.1-5 FUEL CHANNEL ASSEMBLY

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I 1 FRONT HOUSING
2 REAR HOUSING
I 3
4
5
SPRING
PLUNGER
STEM END
6 JAW
I 7
8
9
TOGGLE
CAP SCREW
SEAL DISC PIN
10 SAFETY LATCH SPRING
I 11
12
13
SAFETY LATCH
SEAL DISC
SPIDER
14 STEM
I
I
I SAFETY LATCH LOCKED SAFETY LATCH UNLOCKED
I VIEW 2 VIEW 3
I
I
1 SECTION SHOWING THE JAWS AND SPIDER 2 SECTION SHOWING THE SAFETY MECHANISM
1 SPRINGS. THE RAM ASSEMBLY HAS JUST CON-

TACTED THE REAR HOUSING, ADVANCING THE
SEAL DISC 0.9 mm.
AND THE CAP SCREWS. THE SAFETY LATCHES
ARE IN THEIR LOCKED POSITION PREVENTING
THE ACCIDENTAL DEPRESSION OF THE STEM.
I
I
I
I 3 HERE THE LATCH RAM HAS ADVANCED 12.7 mm
TO UNLOCK THE SAFETY MECHANISM BY
4 THE LATCH RAM AND 'C RAM HAVE BOTH
MOVED A FURTHER 21 mm TO COMPLETELY
PUSHING THE FOUR SAFETY LATCHES INWARD. RETRACT THE FOUR JAWS.
I
r
FIGURE 2.1-6 FUEL CHANNEL CLOSURE PLUG
I
1
2.1.3 Summary g
In summary, the CANDU-600 MW(e) Reactor Core comprises an assombly of 380 _

fuel channels in a calandria assembly which also includes vertical and I
transverse reactivity control devices. The latter are described in *
greater detail in Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
2.2 HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEMS

1
2.2.1 Fundamentals of the CANDU Nuclear Steam Supply System J
The CANDU reactor is contained within a low pressure tank called the -*
calandria (Figure 2.2-1). The fuel channel assemblies run through the !
calandria and contain the bundles of natural uranium fuel. The calandria
is filled with heavy water (DjO) which moderates or slows the fast
neutrons, making a chain reaction possible. The heat of fissicn generated X
within the fuel is removed by the pressurized heavy water coolant which is II
pumped through the fuel channels. This hot coolant is passed through the
steam generator where heat is transferred to light water to generate IB
steam. j|
The pressure tube forms the pressure boundary of the heat transport system <«.
(Figure 2.2-2); the heavy water coolant passes through and around the I
bundles of natural uranium fuel located within the pressure tube. The
calandria tube is in contact with the moderator. The annular space
between the pressure tube and the calandria tube provides thermal I
insulation between the hot heat transport system coolant and the cool I
moderator.
I
The portions of the fuel channel assemblies external to the calandria |
(Figure 2.2-3) are known as the end fittings; the end fittings have
connections to the feeders which feed coolant into and out of the fuel •
channels. I
The following sections provide further detail on the principle process
systems of the CANDU nuclear power system (Figure 2.2-4). 1
2.2.2 Heat Transport System
2.2.2.1 Arrangement !
The CANDU 600 MW(e) reactor has 380 fuel channels arranged in a square ~f
array within the calandria. The heat transport system is arranged into {
two circuits, one to each side of the vertical centre line of the reactor *~
core, with 190 fuel channels in each circuit.
2.1-4
I
I STEAM LINES
I
I Jc:
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I FUEL CHANNEL
ASSEMBLIES
I LIGHT WATER STEAM

NATURAL URANIUM FUEL
I LIGHT WATER CONDENSATE
HEAVY WATER COOLANT
I HEAVY WATER MODERATOR
I MODERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER
FIGURE 2.2.1 CANDU NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM

1
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FIELD WELD
END SHIELD
TUBE SHEET
CALANDRIA TUBE
GAS ANNULUS
(Between Lines)
SPACER FUEL BUNDLES
T
PRESSURE TUBE
(Inner)
A
SHIELD PLUG
CALANDRIA
FIGURE 2.2-3 REACTOR CORE SCHEMATIC

SAFETY VALVES ££ TO SUPPRESSION TANKS
37170O0kgft 260"C _ _ _ ^ 4690KN;m2 IAI 2S
2 MOlSTUilt SFPAHATOR HEHEAHRS
.P. I
TURBINE L.P TURBINE
CiENtRATCin
PRESSURIZER
187"c
266°C 27.U5O.OOO k3/!,

310°C '
9990 KN/m2(AI !I.Z30KN/m 2 (A(
Q n
nOstfa
HtAVY WATER MODERATOR
FUELLING
MACHINE
HEAVY WATER COOLANT
STEAM
CONDENSATE
H1VFH VVATLR
MODERATOR
HEAT EXCHANGEB
FIGURE 2.2-4 CANDU NUCLEAR POWER SYSTEM
*r4 r-r™-E»«
I
I
I The circuits are shown in Figure 2.2-5; each circuit contains 2 pumps, 2
steam generators, 2 inlet headers and 2 outlet headers in a 'figure-of-
eight' arrangement. Feeders connect the inlet and outlet of the fuel
I channels to the inlet and outlet headers respectively.
The flow through the fuel channels is bidirectional (i.e. opposite
I directions in adjacent channels). The fee<":>:s are sized such that the
coolant flow to each channel is proportional to channel power. The
enthalpy increase of the coolant is therefore the same for each fuel
channel assembly.
I One of the advantages of this 'figure-of-eight' arrangement is that in the

event of a heat transport pump failure, the coolant flow in the circuit is
I maintained at approximately 70% of the normal value, thereby permitting

continued reactor operation at reduced power.
I The arrangement of the heat transport system within the reactor building
is illustrated in Figures 2.2-6 and 2.2-7. The steam generators, HTS
pumps and headers are located above the reactor; this permits the heat
transport 3ystem coolant to be drained to the header elevation for
I maintenance of the HTS pumps and.steam generators, and also facilitates

thermosyphoning (natural circulation) when the HTS pumps are unavailable.
I 2.2.?..?. Heat Transport System Conditions
Heavy water (D 2 O) is utilized as the reactor coolant; the principle
I advantage of heavy water is its low neutron absorption. The variation of

saturation temperature with pressure for D ? O is shown in (Figure
2.2-8). The heat transport system operating pressure is one of the key
elements in optimizing the CANDU cycle; high primary pressure permits high
1 secondary pressures and increased unit efficiency. They also, however,

require thicker walled pressure tubes, and hence incur a burnup penalty.
The operating pressure of the 600 MW(e) reactor (outlet header) is 10 MPa.
1 In order to maximize unit efficiency, boiling in the core at high power is

utilized, leading to an outlet header quality of up to approximately 4% at
full power. Figures 2.2-9 and 2.2-10 illustrate a typical steam generator
and its heat load diagram respectively. The feedwater enters the
I preheater section of the steam generator secondary side, is warmed to

saturation temperature, and is then evaporated to produce steam. The
heavy water coolant enters the steam generator U-tubes opposite the
I preheater section; the heavy water vapour is condensed, and the liquid
D 2 O progressively cooled, until it leaves the U-bend near the
preheater section entrance. The small amount of vapour in the heavy water
coolant entering the steam generator increases the Log Mean Temperature
1 Differences (LMTD) across the s t e m generator, and improves steam

generator perfomance.
i
2.1-5
r
1
:"\
i
»
i
i
i
I
STEAM GENERATOR
PUMF
STEAM GENERATOR
1>UMP n
u T 1
W \m
Lr OU1rLET HEADER
-
INLET HEADER INLET HEADER OUTLET HEA[)ER "
"1 r
1 r-
LOOP
—|
L,
1I >
REACTOR
OUTLET LOOP OUTLET
y S—-s
STEAM
GEh ERATOR
INLET
HEADER
LJ
L|
INLET
HEADER
-
GENEFIATOF
PUMP PUMP 1 1
1 j
1 1
1 1
i i
FIGURE 2.2-5 A HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I 1 STEAM GENERATORS
2 HTS PUMPS
3 REACTOR
1 FIGURE 2.2-6 LOCATION OF HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM EQUIPMENT
i
I
1
1
OUTLET HEADER
INLET HEADER
FEEDERS
STEAM GENERATORS
END FITTINGS
HEAT TRANSPORT PUMPS
INSULATION CABINET
FIGURE 2.2-7 FEEDER AND HEADER ARRANGEMENT

I
I
I
I
I
I PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE — D2O
I 12
OPERATING POINT
I REACTOR OUTLET -
HEADER
I
I
I I
200 300 400
I TEMPERATURE C O
1
I
I
1
1
I FIGURE 248 VARIATION OF SATURATION PRESSURE WITH TEMPERATURE FOR HEAVY WATER
r
STEAM OUTLET
I
1
STEAM SEPARATION
SCREEN
1
STEAM DRUM
1
1
HIGH CAPACITY
CYCLONES 1
U-TUBES I
1
SHROUD
I
TUBE SUPPORT PLATES
I
1
PHEHEATER SECTION
I
I
FEEDWATER INLET
I
I
D2OOUT
D2OIN
I
I
FIGURE 2.2-9 TYPICAL STEAM GENERATOR
O
266
111
Q_
100
PERCENTAGE HEAT TRANSFERRED
Data presented Is tor AECL 600 MW(e) reactor
FIGURE 2.2-10 STEAM GENERATOR HEAT LOAD DIAGRAM

I
A simplified Heat Transport System flowsheet is shown in Figure 2.2-11. I
HTS parameters are summarized in Figure 2.2-12. This figure also presents •
data for Douglas Point, Pickering and Bruce/ and illustrates the
evaluation of the CANDU system. 1
2.2.2c3 Heat Transport System Major Components -|
Each vertical centrifugal type HT pump (Figure 2.2-13) has a single

suction and double discharge. The rotational inertia of the pump-motor _
assemblies is sufficient to extend pump rundown so that coolant flow |
matches the reactor power decrease following a loss of power to the pump •
motors.
The pump 3eal package (Figure 2.2-14) consists of three carbon seals in I
series. The seals are provided with a cool, clean flow of D2O during
normal operation via the gland seal system (Figure 2.2-15). Cooling water ~l
is also provided to the pump gland jacket. £
The steam generators (Figure 2.2-16) feature integral preheaters and steam r.
drums. The heavy water coolant passes through the U-tube bundle. The I
feedwater enters the preheater section of the steam generator, which
encompasses the lower portion of the cold leg of the tube bundle. The two
phase light water flow rising from the U-tube region of the steam F
generator is passed through cyclone separators and secondary scrubbers to -t
assure that the moisture content of steam leaving the steam generator is
less than 0.25%. The liquid removed from the steam is returned to the T
tube sheet region of the steam generator via the annular downcomer. The X
circulation ratio for CANDU steam generators is approximately 5 to 1.
Steam generators in caNDCJ nuclear steam supply system, have an excellent I

operating history. The tube defect rate for CANDU systems is 0.001% per
year from 1971 to 1977, compared to a world average failure rate of 0.4%
per year. I
Figure 2.2-17 shows a typical header: the nozzles on the header which
connect to the feeders are cold drawn from the parent header material. T
i
Figure 2.2-18 is a photograph of an actual installation and shows the
feeder and end fitting arrangement. -r
2.2.3 Pressure and Inventory Control System
The inventory of the Heat Transport System (HTS) (Figure 2.2-19) is

controlled by 'feeding' D2O into, or 'bleeding' D2O out of, the
HTS system. At power, the HTS pressure is controlled by a pressurizer \
connected to the two HTS circuits. Heat is added to the pressurizer via I
electric heaters to increase pressure and is removed via steam bleed to
2,1-6
1
STEAM FLOW
(TYPICAL)
STEAM GENERATOR
/
FEEDWATER FLOW
(TYPICAL)
r
FIGURE 2.2-11 HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM FLOWSHEET

DOUGLAS
REACTOR POINT PICKERING BRUCE GENTILLY-2
NUMBER OF ELEMENTS PER BUNDLE 19 28 37 37
OPERATING CONDITIONS
COOLANT D2O D2O D2O D2O
NOMINAL INLET PRESSURE MN/m z 9.8 9.8 9.3 11.09
PRESSURE DROP/CHANNEL (CRUD FREE) kNlmd 738 565 738 758
BUNDLES/CHANNEL 10 12 13 12
MAXIMUM CHANNEL POWER MW 2.743 5.125 5.74 6.5
INLET TEMPERATURE °C 249 249 252/256* 266.4
OUTLET TEMPERATURE °C 293 293 298.9 312.3
EXIT STEAM QUALITY % 0/3.5* 2.9
MAX. MASS FLOW/CHANNEL kg/s 12.6 23.8 23.8 23.94
* INNER ZONE/OUTER ZONE
FIGURE 2.2-12 HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM PARAMETERS

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I 1
2
3
UPPER OIL POT COVER
THRUST BEARING OIL POT
RUNNER
17
18
19
MOTOR FLYWHEEL
STATORCORE
ROTOR ASSEMBLY
I 4
5
6
7
THRUST BEARNG ASSEMBLY
DOWN THRUST BEARING
UP THRUST BEARING
THRUST BEARING COOLING COILS
20
21
22
23
LOWER GUIDE BEARING
THRUST DISC
SPACER COUPLING
MOTOR STAND
I 8
9
10
11
BRAKE RING
MOTOR SHAFT
OIL LEVEL CONTROL
BEARING COOLING WATER PIPES
24
25
26
27
PUMP SHAFT
VAPOUR CONTAINMENT SEAL
SECONDARY MECHANICAL SEAL
PRIMARY MECHANICAL SEAL
I 12
13
14
15
AIR COOLER WATER PIPES
SURGE CABINET
AIR SHIELD
AIR SHIELD
28
29
30
31
PUMP BEARING
PUMP CASE
CASE WEAR RING
PUMP DISCHARGE
32 SUCTION PIPE
I 16 BLOWER RINGS
1
FIGURE 2.2-13 HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM PUMP
1
1
1
DRAIN TO LEAKAGE
COLLECTION
VENT TO LEAKAGE
1
SEGMENTED COLLECTION
CARBON
BACK-UP SEAL
1
I
1
I
1
A TO LEAKAGE
A COLLECTION
1
1
RESTRICTION
BUSHING
1
PUMP SHAFT
PUMP END
I
1
FIGURE Z2-14 HEAT TRANSPORT PUMP GLAND SEAL
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I PUMP
3
GLAND
PUMP
4
GLAND
I CLASS 3
I
I
I D2O
' SAMPLING
L
DISCHARGE
t D2O
SAMPLING
D2O SAMPLING
OF D2O
FEED PUMPS
I
I FIGURE 2.2-15 HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM PUMP GLAND SEAL COOLING SYSTEM
1
STEAM OUTLET NOZZLE
SECONDARY STEAM CYCLONES
1
PRIMARY STEAM CYCLONES
CHEMICAL FEED NOZZLE AND HEADER
DOWNCOMER ANNULUS
I
REHEATER DRAINS RETURN AND
EMERGENCY WATER SUPPLY NOZZLE
U-BEND SUPPORTS
I'
TUBE BUNDLE
TUBE SUPPORT PLATE
BACK-UP SUPPORTS
OBSERVATION PORT
I
BLOWDOWN NOZZLE
DIVIDER PLATE 1
I
1
1
1
1
14
15
D2O INLET NOZZLE
BASE SUPPORT
I
16 D2O OUTLET NOZZLE
18
BAFFLE PLATE
PREHEATER
1
19 LATERAL SUPPORTS
20 WATER LEVEL
CONTROL TAPS
MANWAY
1'
FEEDWATER NOZZLE
I
I
I
FIGURE 2.2-16 600 MW STEAM GENERATOR
FIGURE 2.2-17 TYPICAL HEADER
FIGURE 2.2-18 FEEDER END FITTING ARRANGEMENT
PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVES (2)
DEQASSER CONDENSER
' PRESSURIZER STEAM BLEED VALVES (2)
RELIEF VALVES (2)
STEAM GENERATOR
STEAM GENERATOR
-CA>-^, T HEADERS I
^ k INLET OUTLET A
h^ r
FROM D 2 O STORAGE TANK
AND DEGASSER CONDENSER
FIGURE 2.2-19 HEAT TRANSPORT PRESSURE AND INVENTORY CONTROL SYSTEM

1
I
reduce pressure. The inventory control system can also provide pressure •
control at low power (less that 5%) when the pressurizer may be isolated.
The pressurizer also serves to limit the magnitude of HTS pressure
transients by receiving coolant from the heat transport system when I
pressure is increasing, and by supplying coolant to the heat transport •
system when pressure is decreasing. Three typical heat transport system
transients are shown in Figure 2.2-20. I
Valves that discharge D 2 O from the heat transport system (HT relief
valves, pressurizer steam bleed valves and relief valves) connect to the i*
degasser condenser (Figure 2.2-19). The relief devices of the degasser If
condenser are set above the normal HTS operative pressure, thereby
limiting the discharge of D2O from the HTS in the event that any of _
these discharge valves fail open. It
2.2.4 Shutdown Cooling System
The shutdown cooling system (Figure 2.2.-21) can be utilized to remove IJ

decay power following a reactor shutdown. Two independent shutdown
cooling system circuits are provided, one at each end of the reactor core. ••
D 2 O is taken from the outlet header, passed through a pump and heat J|
exchanger, and returned to the inlet header. Since there are no valves in
the heat transport system circuits, a portion of the shutdown cooling _
system flow passes from the outlet header to the inlet header via the I
steam generators. The shutdown cooling system can also be operated *
utilizing the heat transport system pumps; in this mode of operation, the
shutdown cooling system flow bypasses the shutdown cooling system pimps. "1
This system is also effective with the heat transport system depressurized
and the D 2 O level lowered to the elevation of the headers; this
facilitates maintenance of the steam generators and HTS pumps.
1
2.2.5 Heat Transport System Purification •
The accumulation of active materials in the CANDU heat transport system is

inherently very low. This is primarily due to restrictions placed on "1
materials used in the HT system (for example, very low cobalt levels are 1
permitted), and the absence of failed fuel during reactor operation (in
the event fuel failures do occur, they are detected and removed). ••
To further minimize the accumulation of active deposits within the HT

system, the coolant is continuously filtered and purified. The head of
one heat transport system pump in each circuit is utilized to provide a T
flow of heat transport system coolant through the purification system -I
(Figure 2.2-22). An intercooler is utilized to minimize heat losses.
Flow through the filters and ion exchange columns is cold and
pressurized. 1
2.1-7
1
• I I I | i | | i i 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 -
, LOSS OF CLASS IV POWER

11 -
10 -
z
111
a.
9
\ . 7
\ ^ LOSS OF ONE PUMP
^--^^
^w STEPBACK TO 70% POWER
8 "
REACTOR TRIP ^"^^s^^ /

FROM FULL POWER ^%«%>>>^ y
7 -
• I l l I I I I I I i i i i i i
12 16 20 24 28 32
TIME-SECONDS
FIGURE 2.2-20 HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM TRANSIENTS

STEAM GENERATOR I.STEAM GENERATOR
HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM
SHUTDOWN
SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM
COOLING HEAT
ISOLATION VALVE (TYPICAL)
EXCHANGER
SHUTDOWN
COOLING
PUMP
FEEDERS (TYPI
CIRCUIT 1
FIGURE 2.2-21 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

STEAM GENERATOR STEAM GENERATOR
HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM
COOLER
FILTER
FEEOERS (TYP)
REACTOR
ION EXCHANGE
FIGURE 2.2-22 HEAT TRANSPORT PURIFICATION SYSTEM

I
1
2.3
2.3.1
OVERALL PLANT CONTROL
Introduction
I
The term "Overall Plant Control" is used to describe the controls that
coordinate the turbine-generator output with the power output of the
I
reactor. These controls are described in this section, but the section
also describes other features of the controls and instrumentation which
are unique to CANDU nuclear power plants. The CANDU plants use direct
digital control for all major control functions. The control computers
I
-r
are a highly reliable dual computer system. A second feature of CANDU |
control is the advanced control room concept which uses computer driven
displays, alarms, messages, and logs to replace much of the more
conventional instrumentation used in other plants. In addition to the f
main control room, CANDU plants incorporate a Secondary Control Area from -
which important variables can be monitored and controlled and from where
the plant can be shutdown. The Secondary Control Area and its equipment ~j
is seisfflically qualified and protected against other external events. {
2.3.2 Main Control Centre I
All CANDU reactors built since the mid 1960's have used centralized direct
digital computer controls. However the control room designs of the T
earlier plants were quite conventional. In more recent plants the control L
room design has been modified to make better use of the more flexible
display and message capability. Pickering 'A' which came in service in
the early 1970's uses conventional instruments supplemented by a few
computer-driven CRT's (Cathode Ray Tubes) to display messages and alarms.
I
Bruce 'A', which was about 5 years later in design, replaces much of the •»
conventional instrumentation with monochrome CRT's capable of displaying I
plant information in a variety of formats - graphs, bar charts, printed
messages, etc.. Plants designed since Bruce 'A' have carried this concept
further by using colour CRT's in place of the monochrome CRT's (see Figure I
2.3-1). I
Most of the wiring between the plant and the control room equipment T
(including the computer) is routed through a Control Distribution Frame [
(CDF). This arrangement gives greater flexibility and allows field
terminations of wiring to be completed independently of connection to the -..
control panels and computers. !
2.3.3 Electrical Power

f-
Power in the plant is divided into four classes depending on the .1
requiranents of the equipment being supplied. The power supply buses are
further subdivided and separated to help meet equipment reliability 7
2.1-8
EMERGENCY
CONTAINMENT COKE MODERATOR AMD
MISCELLANEOUS
COOLING REACTOR MISCELLANEOUS PRIMARYHEAT AUXILIARY
SYSTEMS TRANSPORT SYSTEM
FUELLING MACHINE SHUTDOWN ELECTRICAL
A M FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM AMGENERATOR DISTRIKITION
CONTROL CONNIE i „ , , \ SHUTDOWN \ REACTOR SYSTEM ITCHYARD SYSTEMS
SWITCHYARD SYSTEM I 1
\\ REGULATING CONTROL E GENERATOR
\ ""v \ SYSTEM
SYSTEM COMPUTERS
f - . „
\ \ N 1
\ °- PL4
» \
PL5
I
PLB PL7 H.V) PL11 PH2 PLI3 I /I l\
TIT I I T I
PL fL3 PL4 P
\ \ \ \ \
\
LINE PRINTERS
V V
FIGURE 2.3.1 TYPICAL ARRANGEMENT OF CRT DISPUYS ON MAIN CONTROL PANELS

1
1
requirements. Most of the control equipment is supplied by Class II J
power. This is uninterruptable power and separate buses are used to
redundant instrumentation. _
2.3.4 Dual Computer System

1
•
High reliability of control functions is assured through the use of two •
identical independent digital computers (DCCX and DCCY). Each computer is
capable of complete station control and can transfer control automatically m
to the other computer on detection of a fault. Faults in either software II
or hardware are detected by a combination of internal hardware and
software self checking facilities plus an external "watchdog timer" or _,
operations monitor. Fault detection may result in automatic reloading of II
core memory from the disc and computer restart, or transfer of control to '*
the other computer. The computers also verify the incoming data using
redundant information and rationality checks. Messages to the operator [I
identify out-of-range data. Both computers are normally running but the II
outputs to the plant are only connected to one computer. Switching of
outputs is automatic when required. •
2.3.5 Plant Controls
In a nuclear power plant there are a large number of variables to be

controlled. Examples are:
. Moderator temperature
. Deaerator level
I
. Heat transport system pressure 1
. Pressurizer level
. Reactor power
1
. Steam generator pressure
. Steam generator level

1
In order to control the plant electrical output to the desired value,
I
these variables and others must b e controlled in a co-ordinated way. Some _
of the variables can be controlled quite independently, and in some cases fj
have their own controllers. Most of the variables are controlled by ^
interacting programs in the plant computers. In controlling the
turbine-generator output, it is also necessary to control the reactor fT
power. Steam generator pressure is also closely related to this control [£
2.1-9 ff
I
I
I problem as is the steam generator level. These three control loops share
common filaments and can be considered together. Within the logic diagram,
I Figure 2.3-2, can be seen separate control loops for reactor power, steam
generator pressure, and steam generator level, all controlled from the
main computer system. The overall plant control scheme is similar to that
used in non-nuclear plants. It operates in two modes:
I a) Normal Mode (Reactor follows plant loads)
I The turbine generator load is set by the operator, and the turbine
governor valves open to supply the necessary steam. The steam generator
pressure control program senses pressure changes due to governor valve
I motion and requests variations in reactor power to maintain drum pressure

constant. For example a frequency drop due to increased grid loading
would cause the turbine governor valves to open further. The resulting
drop in steam drum pressure would cause the pressure control program to
I request an increase in reactor power. This would occur unless there were
limits on reactor power available. The reactor control system is
discussed separately in Section 2.4.
I b) Alternate Mode (Turbine follows reactor)
I Reactor power is controlled to a setpoint supplied by an operator. The

steam generator pressure control program manipulates plant loads to keep
steam drum pressure constant. This mode is used:
I 1) At low power when the steam drum pressure is insensitive to reactor

power;
I 2) During upset conditions where it may not be desirable to maneuver

reactor power.
In addition to adjusting the turbine load to accept the steam output from
the reactor, the pressure control program also has access to steam
discharge valves so that excess steam can be dumped directly to the
condenser or to atmosphere. The Condenser Steam Discharge Valves (CSDV)
I typically can carry 70% or more of the steam production if necessary while
the Atmospheric Steam Discharge Valves (ASDV) are limited to about 10%.
If the turbine becomes temporarily unavailable, the reactor can continue
1 to operate by dumping most of its steam to the condenser. The atmospheric

steam discharge valves are used during startup when the condenser may be
unavailable and temporarily during other transients.
n 2.1-10
ATMOSPHERIC
STEAM DISCHARGE
GENERATOR
STEAM
REACTOR GENERATORS
FLUX POWER
AND RATE
r REACTOR
POWER
REACTOR STEAM
GENERATOR
FLUX
PRESSURE
CONTROL
CONTROL
REACTOR
POWER
SETPOINT TURBINE LOAD CONTROL
OR UNIT POWER
I
REGULATOR (UPR)
DEMANDED REACTOR POWER

ELECTRICAL OUTPUT
(ALTERNATE MODE ONLY)
SETPOINT
(NORMAL MODE)
FIGURE 2.3-2 OVERALL PLANT CONTROL — BLOCK DIAGRAM
i.. •..Jin}
I
I
I 2.4
2.4.1
CORE CONTROL
Introduction
I Reactor control was mentioned as one of the sub-loops in the Overall Plant
Control System. The reactor control system is one of the most important
I control systems. It combines hierarchies of measurement instruments and

control devices with complex computer logic to meet a number of
requi rements.
I The system is required to:
1) Monitor and control reactor power to satisfy station load demands.
I 2) Monitor and control the three-dimensional power distibution in the

reactor so that individual fuel bundles and fuel channels operate at
I 3)
powers within their design specifications.
Monitor important plant variables and reduce reactor power at

appropriate rates to keep the variables within specified limits.
I The reactor control system can be more easily understood by examining the
measuring instruments, the reactivity control devices, the logic that '
I relates the device operation to the measurements, the requirements of the

system, and the disturbances it is subjected to.
I 2.4.2 Reactor Power Measurement
I Power from the reactor is measured with combinations of:
1) Startup counters
I 2)
3)
Ion chambers
Self-powered in-core flux detectors
1 4) Thermal power measurements.
t 2.4.2.1
Startup counters are used only during the first criticality or for
1 starting after a very long shutdown. They are used along with manual
controls to raise power above a range (7 decades below full power) where
the ion chambers give useful readings to the computers. Following high
1 power operation, heavy water reactors retain a source term which keeps the
ion chambers on scale even after extensive shutdowns. Startup counters
2.1-11
1
1
are therefore not normally required and are removed after startup. I
2.4.2.2
Three ion chambers mounted in the side of the reactor give neutron flux
measurements in the range from 10"' to 1.5 times full power. The
signals are provided to the computers through logarithmic amplifiers. -m
Shielding in the ion chamber housings provides good discrimination against I
gamma rays. The signal response is essentially prompt except at the
lowest powers. Automatic startup and shutdown of the reactor can be —
accomplished over the full range of ion chamber signals. Figures 2.4-1 I
and 2.4-2 show the locations of ion chambers and some of the other reactor *
control devices.
2.4.2.3
1
Self-powered in-core flux detectors are generally used above a few percent I
of full power for flux measurements. Unlike ion chambersf they can give
information about the spatial distribution of neutron flux and their _
response is essentially unaffected by dissolved poisons in the moderator. I
The prime source of flux measurements is 28 prompt responding detectors at ~
14 locations in the core. These detectors use platinum, inconel, or
platinum coated inconel emitters. While their response is partially "i
neutron sensitive, they also have some gamma sensitivity. The information .1
from these detectors is supplemented by 102 additional vanadium emitter
type detectors. Their response is entirely due to neutrons but is not "J
prompt. The detectors are usually coiled onto vertical assemblies. More |
recent designs have used shorter straight detectors which are individually
inserted into well-tubes. In both designs, detectors are strategically _
located throughout the core. Flux detectors (and ion chambers) are also I
used to provide signals to the special safety systems - shutdown system. •
However entirely separate instruments are used for those systems.
2.4.2.4
I
The neutron flux measurements are calibrated against measurements of I
reactor total thermal power. At high power this comes from redundant
measurements of steam flow, steam pressure, steam temperature, feedwater «_
flow and feedwater temperature. At low power the steam flow measurement I
is not sufficiently precise, and reactor power is calculated from -1
temperature rise measurements across the reactor.
I
I
2.1-12
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I CALANDRIA
CALANDRIA- SIDE TUBESHEET
CALANDRIA TUBES
EMBEDMENT RING
"*"" 16
17
18
19
EARTHQUAKE RESTRAINT
CALANDRIA VAULT WALL
MODERATOR EXPANSION TO HEADTANK
CURTAIN SHIELDING.SLABS
1 5
G
7
B
9
FUELLING MACHINE-SIDE TUBESHEET
END SHIELD LATTICE TUBES
END SHIELD COOLING PIPES
INLET-OUTLET STRAINER
STEEL BALL SHIELDING
20
21
22
23
24
PRESSURE RELIEF PIPES
RUPTURE DISC
REACTIVITY CONTROL UNIT NOZZLES
VIEWING PORT
SHUTOFF UNIT
10 END FITTINGS 25 ADJUSTER UNIT
11 FEEDER PIPES 26 CONTROL ABSORBE.fi UNIT
12 MODERATOR OUTLET 27 ZONE CONTROL UNIT
13 MODERATOR INLET 28 VERTICAL FLUX DETECTOR UNIT
14 HORIZONTAL FLUX DETECTOR UNIT 29 LIQUID INJECTION SHUTDOWN NOZZLE
15 ION CHAMBER 30 BALL FILLING PIPE
FIGURE 2.4.1 REACTOR ASSEMBLY

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 112 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 I
VERTICAL FLUX DETECTOR (26)
ADJUSTER (21)
SOLID CONTROL ABSORBER (4)
LIQUID ZONE CONTROLLER (6) I
SHUTOFF ROD (28) HORIZONTAL FLUX
DETECTOR (7)
I
I
I
I
I
ZONE CONTROL
E
ABSORBERS
•
ZONE CONTROL
DETECTORS
I
VIEW OF REACTOR FACE
FIGURE 2.4-2 REACTIVITY MECHANISM LAYOUT

I!
I
I
I 2.4.3 Control Devices
The regulating system (Figure 2.4-3) controls the neutron flux in the
I reactor (level and distribution) by adjusting a hierarchy of devices -
light water control absorbers, mechanical control absorbers/ adjusters,
moderator poison, and fuel.
I 2.4.3.1
I There are 14 light water zone control absorber compartments distributed

throughout the reactor. These compartments are partially filled with
light water - a neutron absorber in a heavy water reactor. There is a
I constant outflow of water from the compartments and a controlled inflow
which allows the computer to raise or lower water levels in unison or
differentially. These absorbers are the primary reactivity control
I devices used for both bulk and spatial control of neutron flux in the
reactor. A compartment can be completely emptied or filled in a minimum
time of one minute giving a reactivity change per compartment of
I 0.5 mk (i.e. ^ = 0.0005).
I 2.4.3.2
The four mechanical control absorbers are normally out of the core but can
I be driven in at variable speeds or dropped to supplement the negative

reactivity from the light water absorbers. They are mechanically the same
as shutoff rods but are functionally and physically separate and under the
I control of the computer system. They provide up to 6 mk of negative

reactivity when inserted for a power reduction.
I 2.4.3.3
The 21 adjuster rods are normally fully inserted in interlattice positions
I where they contribute to flux flattening. They are not used for dynamic
control of the flux distribution but may be withdrawn in symmetrical banks
and at variable speeds to provide additional reactivity. This would be
I required to compensate for xenon following a large power reduction or

shutdown followed by a restart. A total reactivity worth of 15 mk is •
available in the adjusters and each bank can be withdrawn in a minimum
time of 1 minute.
I
I
2.1-13
I
I
. TOO MANY ADJUSTER

INPUTS EVICES
D
LOW BOILER j OIGITAL COMPUTER CONTROLLER
I
• TRIP SYSTEMS SET

LEVEL
HIGH POWER
DRIVING OUT
ERROR
HIGH HT
PRESSURE
HT PUMP 4CONTROL
I
FAILURE ABSORBERS
I
STEP-BACK
REACTOR TRIP
TURBINE TRIP
ROUTINE
TT CLUTCHES
ONLY
LOSS OF LINE t t
LOSS OF STATOR
COOLING
REGULATING
PROGRAM
REACTIVITY
ADJUSTER
DRIVE
INTERLOCKS
21 ADJUSTERS
VARIABLE
SPEED DRIVE
I
OPERATOR
DEMAND
DEMAND POWER
CONTROL
14 ZONE
CONTROL
I
ROUTINE VALVES
BOILER
PRESSURE
CONTROLLER
M j
28 SHUT-OFF
I
RODS
ZONE
CONTROLLER
FAILURE
TRIP SYSTEMS SET
t
OUT DRIVE
I
FLUX TILT CONTROL 4 CONTROL
PROBLEMS
HIGH LOCAL
FLUX
ABSORBER
DRIVE
INTERLOCKS
ABSORBERS
VARIABLE
SPEED DRIVE
I
SET BACK
HIGH BOILER
PRESSURE
LOW BOILER I \
MODERATOR
POISON
I
ADDITION
I
LEVEL
HIGH SURGE
TANK LEVEL
MANUAL
VANADIUM
IN CORE
DETECTOR
FLUX
MAPPING
I
POWER ROUTINE
ION CHAMBER
POWER : - . . • ' : • • (
f:
I
INCORE
DETECTOR
POWER
POWER
MEASUREMENT
AND
CALIBRATION
*
ALARMS I
BOILER
SECONDARY
SIDE
MEASUREMENTS I
f
OPERATOR
DISPLAY
SELECTOR
DISPLAY
PROGRAM
C.R.T.
DISPLAYS I
FIGURE £4.3 REACTOR REGULATING SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
I!
7
I
I
I 2.4.3.4
Boron or gadolinium salts can be dissolved in, or removed from, the
I moderator as an additional reactivity shin. This is normally an operator

function, but under exceptional circumstances the control computer can
intervene, "fine reactivity effects are approximately 9 mk/ppm for boron
I and 32 mk/ppm for gadolinum. Only very small concentrations are needed
and the addition and removal rates are slow. Gadolinum burns out at a rate
similar to the buildup rate of xenon.
I 2.4.4 Control Logic
I In each of the 14 zones of the reactor the flux is sensed by a pair of

prompt responding in-core flux detectors. Their response is calibrated
against a flux map derived from the slower vanadium-emitter type of flux
I detectors. The flux map is normalized against thermal measurements. A

setpoint for flux in each zone is calculated by the computer from the
overall plant control requirements or operator demands, and a zone level
setpoint is derived. The valve lift on the input valve to each zone of
I the light water control absorbers is then varied dynamically to drive the
flux and level errors towards zero. If the average power error in the
reactor gets too large or if the average zone level approaches its upper
I or lower limits, the logic then drives adjusters or mechanical control

absorbers to supplement the range of the light water control absorbers.
The logic of this procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.4-4. During normal
I full power operation the adjusters would remain inserted and the
mechanical control absorbers withdrawn. Their positions would only change
during transients such as power level changes.
I 2.4.5 Di sturbances
I Changes in the net reactivity of the core occur because of fuel burn-up,
new fuel addition, or because the power output of the reactor is changed.
These changes are amplified both locally and generally in the reactor by
I the effects of xenon poison. Xenon-135 is a neutron absorbing fission

product which decays naturally with a time constant of several hours.
Because of the nature of the xenon production through the decay of
Iodine-135, there will be an inital increase in xenon when power is
I reduced, although it will eventually return to a slightly lower

equilibrium level. Similarly there will be an initial decrease in xenon
when power is increased. This is both a local and a general effect. Local
I changes in power will cause local changes in xenon. In the absence of

spatial control, spatial xenon induced flux oscillations would also be
possible. The reactor control system must compensate for disturbances
r caused by fuel changes, xenon effects accompanying these changes, and

changes in operating power.
2.1-14
1
(a) 100%
I
I
I
I
-1 0 +1 +5
(b)
POWER ERROR %
100%
I
i
I
u ll i
i
i
Drive Absorbers OUT

70%
Drive Absorbers IN
I
4 Rods 2 Rods 2 Rods 4 Rods
I
-1 0
POWER ERROR %
+1 +2 +4
-I
+5
»-Ep
I
O UJ
•-100% I
5£ 50%
I
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
—I
+5
*-Ep I
POWER ERROR %
I
I
I
Idealized zone reaclivity rate vs. power error
I
I
FIGURE 2.4.4 REACTIVITY LIMIT CONTROL DIAGRAM
I
I
I For small or slow changes in power the xenon effects are small and easily
controlled. For larger changes the xenon effects impose some broad limits
on power manuevering. These are discussed further in Section 2.7.
I 2.4.6 Stepbacks and Setbacks
I The reactor control system in the plant computers

monitor a number of plant variables for operation
limits. Reactor power is promptly reduced if the
limits. These systems are entirely separate from
includes routines which
within acceptable
variables exceed these
the shutdown systc
I and serve to reduce the frequency of operation of

(shutdown) syste
the special safety
I If a very fast power reduction is needed the computer initiates a

"stepback". It opens clutches on the four mechancial control absorbers,
allowing them to drop into the reactor, making it subcritical. The rods
I can be "caught" part way in by re-closing the clutches. The reactor is

then critical at a lower power. If the rods are not caught, the stepback
will take the reactor towards zero power.
I For power reductions which are not as urgent, a "setback" occurs rather
than a stepback. The reactor power setpoint in the computers is taken
downwards at a controlled rate. The power follows through normal action
I of the light water control absorbers and the related devices. The setback
ends either when the variable causing it returns to limits, or when a
predetermined power level is reached. The rate at which reactor power is
I reduced and the power level at which the setback ends may be different for
each variable.
Setbacks and stepbacks override other power demands and are accompanied by
I annunciation defining the out of limits variables.
I 2.5
2.5.1
REACTIVITY CONTROL DEVICES
Liquid Zone Control System
I The liquid zone control absorbers are the primary devices for controlling
reactivity within the reactor during normal operation: Reactivity is
L adjusted by varying the quantity of light water, which acts as a poison,

in each of the zone control compartments (Figure 2.5-1). Fourteen zone
control compartments are contained within 6 assemblies. The location of
each of the zone control assemblies is shown in the reactivity mechanism
I layout. Figure 2.4-2. Details of the liquid zone control assembly are
provided in Figure 2.5-2.
The zone control system is illustrated in Figure 2.5-3. Light water is

circulated through the zone control compartments; level in the
compartments is measured by a helium 'bubbler' system, and is controlled
2.1-15
THREE COMPARTMENTS IN
CENTRAL ASSEMBLIES
TWO COMPARTMENTS
IN OUTER ASSEMBLIES ZONE CONTROL ASSEMBLY
LIGHT WATER (H2O)
MODERATOR
CALANDRIA
FIGURE 2.5-1 LIQUID ZONE CONTROL SYSTEM ARRANQEMENT

I
I
I
I ZONE1
I
I BELLOWS
PENETRATION TUBE
SPLIT SEAL
RING
I BEARING ZONE 2
I
I
I CONCRETE
I
I
I THIMBLE TUBE
NOZZLE
I LOCATOR
I CALANDRIA SHELL
CALANDRIA SHELL
1 WATER
I 2 HELIUM
3 NUT
4 CRUSH WASHER
11 WATER INLET
12 BULKHEAD
13 BAFFLE
14 HELIUM OUTLET
5 TERMINAL BLOCK 15 HELIUM INLET
6 SHIELD PLUG 16 WATER OUTLET
7 ZONE CONTROL TUBE 17 HELIUM BALANCE LINE
8 WATER AND HELIUM TUBES 18 KEY
9 TUBE SUPPORT 19 SPRING
10 TUBE SPRING 20 LOCATOR THREAD
FIGURE 2.5-2 ZONE CONTROL UNIT

I
TO OTHER
I
COMPARTMENTS
I
I
I
GAS BALANCE HEADER
RECOMBINATION
UNIT l-l I
I
LEVEL
TRANSMITTER
HELIUM
BOTTLES
FOR GAS
MAKE UP
I
I
HELIUM GAS
TO OTHER
I
COMPRESSOR „
TYPICAL
ARRANGEMENT
OF ZONE CONTROL
COMPARTMENT
COMPARTMENTS
I
(14 IN ALL)
FROM OTHER
I
COMPARTMENTS
H2O
SUPPLY
HEADER
I
1
I
1
H2O CIRCULATING PUMP (3)
I
FIGURE 2.5-3 LIQUID ZONE CONTROL SYSTEM
I
I
I
I via control valves on the water inlets, based on a signal from the station
computer. The water is forced out of the compartments at a constant rate
by the helium cover gas pressure.
I 2.5.2 Vertical Flux Detector Units
I Like the Zone Control Unit already described, the Vertical Flux Detectors
are mounted beneath the Reactivity Mechanism Deck surface. However, they
may be reached through access plugs in the Deck Plate (Figure 2.5-4).
I Because of their long and slender design, and of their construction of

low-modulus Zircaloy 2 material, these Flux Detector Units are installed
in 27.5 mm guide tubes, which are tensioned to enhance their rigidity.
I Each Unit consists of a carrier and capsule tube assembly with deteccors,
connectors and seal components.
I The detectors themselves are self-powered Hilborn elements oi vanadium or

platinum construction, in which emitter wires are separated from their
I sheathing by mineral oxide insulation.
These detectors provide signals which are directly proportional to fission

rates in the reactor, with varying response and sensitivity according to
I their material or exposure duration.
I 2.5.3 adjuster Units (Figure 2.5-5)
The requirements for normal insertion and controlled removal of the
r absorber elements, for Xenon override, demand mechanical features foe

hoisting and lowering the elements in response to the regulating system
requirements.
i Adjust Drive Mechanisms mounted above the reactivity deck embody a motor
driven sheave on which absorber cables are wound or unwound for absorber
raising and lowering.
The absorbers consist of stainless steel tubing (of 76 mm diameter) with a

shaped central shim rod.
The adjusters are arranged in seven banks, whose collective withdrawal

would increase reactivity by 15 mk. This increment would provide 30
minutes Xenon override time after shutdown from steady full power
i operation.
Figure 2.5-6 illustrates the positioning of the vertical reactivity
i control devices under normal and actuated conditions.
r 2.1-16
I
TREAD PLATE -
I
I
I
COVER GAS
GLASS
INSULATION
CONNECTION -eg
I
I
I
I
I
I
DETECTOR ASSEMBLY
I
CALANDRIA NOZZLE
I
CALANDRIA SHELL - DETECTOR COIL
I
CALANDRIA TUBES
I
GUIDE TUBE
GUIDE TUBE LOCATOR s

CALANDRIA SHELL
i
II
FIGURE 2 . M VERTICAL FLUX DETECTOR UNIT
B
DRIVE MECHANISM
SHEAVE
INSERT
I GUIDE TUBE
1 EXTENSION
1
I
I H2O
1
FIGURE 2.5-5 ADJUSTER UNIT
1
I
SOLID CONTROL &
SHUT-OFF DRIVE
OPEN FOR SERVICES

1
1
I
I
I
1
]
HORIZONTAL FLUX DETECTORS
LIQUID INJECTORS
ION CHAMBERS 1.2 4 3
1
1
SIDED
1
1
I
I
I
T
FIGURE 2.5.6 SCHEMATIC SECTION SHOWING POSITIONS OF
REACTIVITY CONTROL DEVICES
I
I
I 2.5.4 Mechanical Control Absorber Units and Shut-Off Rods
Mechanical Control Absorber Units and Shut-off Rods (Figure 2.5-7) have
I virtually identical design and capability, but have different missions,

(as outlined in Section 2.1.1) in reactor control and shutdown functions.
I Hence, the Control Absorbers form part of the Regulating System, whereas
shut-off rods are part of the protective Shutdown System N o . 1.
Both units embody a clutch, cable and winch arrangement to hoist, hold or
I release cadmium filled absorber tubes, of 113 mm diameter and of varying

length.
I Rod Ready Indicators sense the presence of the Absorbers in the poised
(fully raised) position.
I Guide tube perforations minimize hydraulic resistance to absorbers' entry

into the calandria.
Spring-assistance provides acceleration in response to a shutoff rod
I clutch de-energization. Normal time for full insertion is about 1.6

seconds.
I Rotary hydraulic dampers, geared to the winch, stop the absorbers'

movement in the calandria at the appropriate level.
I 2.5.5 Horizontal Flux Detector Units (Figure 2.5-8)
The construction of these assemblies is similar to that of the vertical
I flux detector units. However, installation details are quite different

due to their horizontal configuration, to requirements for sealing and
support, and to isolating provisions for replacement, by freezing.
I As noted in 2.1.1 these assemblies form part of the protective jShut Down
JSystem N o . 2_ (SDS2).
I 2.5.6 Liquid Injection Shutdown Units
t SDS2 provides for rapid injection of gadolinium nitrate solution, by

helium displacement, from an external poison tank into the calandria via
injection nozzles, into the moderator.
I Figure 2.5-9 shows the installation, which includes similar features for
sealing, support and replacement as for the horizontal flux detectors.
I
2.1-17
I
I
SPRING TO REWIND
DAMPER
DOG PLATES — LOST MOTION LINK BETWEEN MAIN
AND DAMPER SHAFTS - ALSO ENGAGE POSITION STOPS
MAIN DRIVE MOTOR AND
SHAFT . ^ WORM REDUCTION GEAR
ELECTRO MAGNETIC CLUTCH

BETWEEN IDLER AND MAIN SHAFTS
I
DRIVE MECHANISM
I
POTENTIOMETER
CABLE SHEAVE POSITION INDICATOR
IDLER PULLEY •>
CABLE-
BEVEL REDUCTION GEAR
SHUTOFF HOD AND SPUR REDUCTION GEAR
ON IDLER SHAFT
I
SCHEMATIC SHUTOFF ROD DRIVE MECHANISM
I
I
I
I
I
I
GUIDE TUBE EXTENSION
ACCELERATOR SPRING
(ON SHUTOFF ROD ONLY)
SPIDER ATTACHING
SUPPORT ROD TO
SHUTOFF ROD I
WATER SHIELD
GUIDE TUBE
I
I
TENSIONING
SPRING
CALANDRIA NOZZLE
II
I
SHUTOFF ROD
CALANDRIA SHELL
I
FIGURE 2.5-7 SHUTOFF AND MECHANICAL CONTROL ABSORBER UNITS
1
MOUNTING BOSS
ADAPTER PLATE
SEAL DETECTOR
SHIELD SLEEVE SEAL CLAMP PRESSURE GAUGE ASSEMBLY
THIMBLE SUPPORT
I FREEZING DoO CONNECTION „„„..,,- DETECTOR

SEAL CLAMP ! JACKET THMBLE cwlf CABLE
ASSEMBLY °°VfcH
GUIDE TUBE
FIGURE 2.5-8 HORIZONTAL FLUX DETECTOR UNIT

SHIELDING WALL
PROTECTIVE COVER
THIMBLE
THIMBLE
SUPPORT
INJECTION NOZZLE
CALANORIA
FIGURE 2.5-9 LIQUID INJECTION SHUTDOWN UNIT

I
I
I 2.5.7 Ion Chamber Assemblies
Six ion chamber units are installed in housings mounted externally on the
I calandria shell, in stainless steel housings (Figure 2.5-10). Lead

shielding provides attenuation of gamma radiation for enhanced
discrimination of neutron flux levels.
I Access tubes enable replacement of defective ion chambers on power, with

suitable suplementary shielding.
I Physical separation of the two groups of ion chambers reduces the

probability of local accidental damage to more than one group.
I The broad sensitivity of these units is exploited by use of logarithmic

amplifiers and applied in monitoring lower power levels and rate of change
in power level.
I 2.6 FUEL
I 2.6.1 Description of Fuel
The 600 MW(e) reactor fuel bundle comprises seven component parts (Figure
I 2.6-1). The elements contain high-density natural UO2 in a thin

Zircaloy-4 cylindrical sheath. A thin graphite layer (CANLUB) on the
inside surface of the sheath reduces the pellet/sheath interaction. End
I caps, resistance welded to the sheath extremities, serve a triple purpose:

(i) to provide a seal for the contents of the element, (ii) to provide
effective element termination for attachment to end plates, and (iii) to
provide the structural component for interfacing with the fuel handling
I system. Thirty-seven elements are held in a close-packed bundle

configuration by welding them to end plates. The desired separations at
the transverse mid-place of the bundle are maintained by split spacers
I brazed to the elements. Bundle separation from the pressure tube is

ensured by bearing pads brazed near the ends and at the middle of the
r
outer elements. The filler metal used for brazing is beryllium.
2.6.2 Design Basis for the Fuel
2.6.2.1 Fuel Elements
The reactor nuclear design requires high neutron economy. The fuel
element in therefore designed for maximum content of fissile material and
l minimum content of neutron absorbing material.
r
2.1-18
CALANDRIA SHELL .
SHIELDING SLEEVES
BEARING
FREEZING COIL
BELLOWS
CARBON STEEL
WATER SHIELD LINER
ION CHAMBER
PENETRATION TUBE (3)
FIGURE 2.5-10 TYPICAL ION CHAMBER ARRANGEMENT

END VIEW INSIDE
PRESSURE TUBE
ZIRCALOY BEARING PADS

ZIRCALOY FUEL SHEATH
ZIRCALOY END CAP
ZIRCALOY END SUPPORT PLATE
URANIUM DIOXIDE PELLETS
CANLUB GRAPHITE INTERLAYER
INTER ELEMENT SPACERS
PRESSURE TUBE
FIGURE 2.6-1 37-ELEMENT FUEL BUNDLE

I
I
The fuel is designed to operate within the power and turnup conditions I
applicable to normal station operation, defined by the nominal bundle '
power envelope (curve A in Figure 2.6-2). Since a limited number of
bundles can exceed this power envelope, the fuel is assessed for operation I
within the reference overpower envelope (curve B in Figure 2.6-2). •
2.6.3
2.6.3.1
Fuel Performance
General
I
_
CANDU fuel performance has been demonstrated by w a n s of out-reactor *

tests, irradiation testing in experimental reactors, and successful
utilization in CANDU power reactors. Nevertheless, performance is M
continually being improved as a result of an ongoing fuel development |
program. Some principal aspects of fuel testing and performance are
discussed below.
2.6.3.2 Out-Reactor Tests

I
_
Out-reactor tests are conducted on prototype and initial production fuel ™

bundles, to ensure the ccmpatiblity of the fuel design with the
requirements stated above. Examples are endurance tests, impact tests and I
pressure drop measurements. I
2.6.3.3 In-Reactor Performance •
Irradiation testing i s mainly performed in t e s t loops at AECL's

experimental reactors. Over the years a significant 1bank of data and •
experience on CANDU fuel behaviour has been built up.
The in-service performance of over 200,000 CANDU fuel bundles irradiated I

t o date has been excellent. Only 0.18% of a l l fuel bundles irradiated I
have been defective, as on September, 1979. The introduction of CANLUB
fuel in the fuel design resulted in a marked improvement of performance. m
Of the approximately 140,000 CANLUB fuel bundles irradiated, only 0*07% I
were defective and none of the defects were due to power boosting, but
were rather latent manufacturing defects, see Figure 2.6-3. It should be _
noted that usually only one defective element i s found in a defective n
bundle. Therefore, i f the defect s t a t i s t i c s are reported on the basis of **
defective elements, as i s customary for other reactor vendors, the defect
s t a t i s t i c s become 0.006% defective elements ( a l l fuel) and 0.002% If
defective elements (CANLUB fuel). If
I
2.1-19
s
1000
900
^ B REFERENC E OVERPOWER ENVELOPE
800
111
700
i A NOM NAL DESIGN

POW ER ENVELOPE
600
500
100 200 300 400
BUNDLE AVERAGE BURN-UP (MWh/kgU)
FIGURE 2.6-2
I
1
ON-POWER FUELLING 1
• Low excess reactivity (± 1 mk) 1
• Short fuel bundles (50 cm)
• On-power removal of defective fuel I
• Constant power shape
1
I
REASONS FOR DEFECTS IN 1
CANDU POWER REACTOR FUEL
NUMBER OF
DEFECTS
Power ramp (previous to CANLUB) 134 (The power ramp
failure rate is zero
for CANLUB fuel)
I
Incomplete end cap welds 12 1
Porous end caps 5
Handling damage 7
Fretting by debris in coolant 6 I
Flew induced fretting 1
Unknown causes 16
I
FIGURE 2.6-3
I
I 2.7 STARTUP, OPERATION AND SHUTDOWN SEQUENCES
I Some of the techniques of operating the plant are considered in -this

section - especially as they relate to the plant control systems.
I 2.7.1 Initial Startup
I In Section 2.4 it was noted that special startup counters are installed
temporarily for first reactor criticality. Using these counters and
manual control the reactor can be made critical and raised in power until
the ion chambers provide signals to the computers. Control is then
I automatic and power can be raised by the operator supplying the required
power and maneuvering rates to the computer. From then on the reactor
remains on automatic control. The ion chambers will continue to measure
I reactor power from the source term for a long period after the reactor is
made subcritical. The automatic controls therefore operate even while the
reactor is subcritical. The startup instrumentation and manual starting
would only be needed again following a shutdown of many weeks duration.
I 2.7.2 Eversafe Shutdown
I If major equipment is being maintained, the moderator is heavily poisoned
to ensure that the reactor remains subcritical even following xenon decay
I or removal of reactivity control devices.
2.7.3 Heat Transport System Warmup and Cooldown
The heat transport system normally remains hot and pressurized following
reactor shutdown. However if it becomes necessary to cool down the system
1 or warm it up again, this is done under the control of the steam generator
pressure control program in the computer system and at predetermined rates
of temperature change. The system can be pressurized using heat from the
I rates.
pumps alone, but reactor heat is also available to help achieve design
I 2.7.4 Turbine Runup
There is a program available in the plant computers to run the turbine up

I to speed automatically and synchronize it to the grid.
I 2.7.5 Sudden Shutdown or Trip
If the reactor trips or steps back to zero power, recovery to power is

automatic once the operator resets the trip and gives a power setpoint to
II 2.1-20
1
the system. Resetting a trip of Shutdown System Number One causes the
shut-off rods to withdraw. This is followed by withdrawal of mechanical
control absorbers and lowering of light water control absorber levels
until the reactor is critical. Adjusters may also withdraw in response to
xenon increases to allow the reactor to become critical. Power is held at
a low value until the operator requests a power increase. The request for
a power increase must come within about 20 minutes of the sudden shutdown
from full power to avoid "poisoning out". If the reactor poisons out the
xenon builds up to a level that the reactor control system cannot
immediately compensate for. The xenon will decay away allowing a restart
after about 36 hours. If the reactor is restarted within the 20 minute
"decision and action" time the xenon will burn out as reactor power is
raised. However there will be some spatial assymetries in flux
distribution which may not allow power to be raised immediately beyond
about 70% of full power. Power can then be raised over a few hours from
70% to 100%.
2.7.6 Power Maneuvering
Reactor power can be raised at logarithimic rates up to 4% of

instantaneous power per second while power is below 25% of full power. A
maximum linear rate of 1% of full power per second is applied at higher
powers. In general, turbine-generator maximum maneuvering rates will be
more limiting than this - 0.2% of full power per second would be typical.
It is not possible to lower reactor power in a controlled way over a wide
range at rates much faster than 1% per second. However the stepback
function and the use of steam discharge valves allows turbine generator
load to be shed at any required rate. Small step increases (of the order
of 5% of full power) or decreases in load can be handled by the normal
control system. It is thus possible to run the plant at less than full
power in a spinning reserve mode.
Just as a sudden trip of the reactor leads to a transient increase in

xenon, other load reductions have a similar but smaller effect. If the
reactor power is suddenly reduced from 100% to 60%, the ensuing xenon
transient would cause adjusters to withdraw in compensation. The reactor
would not poison out from this size of power decrease and could continue
to operate at 60% power indefinitely. As the xenon transient decays, the
adjusters would gradually re-insert in banks. A return to full power
could begin at any time, but might require several hours if begun while
adjusters were still out and tne flux distribution distorted. The reactor
control system would allow the plant to follow quite closely the typical
daily load changes that occur on most electrical grids. Actual CANDU
operating experience is limited to base load operation.
2.1-21
2.7.7 poison Prevent Operation
It has been noted that a sudden reactor shutdown from full power would
lead to poisoning out of the reactor unless it is brought to high power
again within a short period. However reactor power reductions to
intermediate power levels are accomplished without poisoning out.
Therefore the normal procedure if the turbine trips, is to reduce reactor
power to about 60% of full power. The steam is then bypassed directly to
the condenser through the Condenser Steam Discharge Valves (CSDV). The
plant can be operated indefinitely this way until the turbine is
available. Alternately the power can be gradually lowered from the 60%
level at rates that do no lead to poisoning out.
2.8 SECONDARY SIDE SYSTEMS
2.8.1 Feedwater System
Feedwater to the steam generators is provided by two 100% pumps powered by

independent Class IV buses and by an auxiliary feedwater pump (5%) backed
up by the Class III power supply.
Feedwater is controlled to each of the 4 steam generators independently

(Figure 2.8-1). Each feedwater control valve station consists of two 100%
control valves and one small control valve (15%) for low power operation.
A check valve in each feedwater line prevents loss of steam generator
inventory in the event of a feed line rupture. The reheater drains flow
is returned directly to the steam generators (depending on turbine
supplier). Each steam generator is provided with H2O sampling line to
facilitate secondary side chemistry control, and a continuous blowdown
system, to minimize the accumulation of particulate matter at the
tubesheet.
2.8.2 Steam System
Steam generated within the steam generators is normally directed to the

turbine. In the event that the turbine is unavailable, steam can be
discharged to one or more of the following: the turbine condenser steam
discharge valves, atmospheric steam discharge valves or main steam relief
valves.
2.8.3 Secondary Side Heat Balance
The secondary side flowsheet and heat balance are shown in Figure 2.8-2.
The turbine consists of 1 High Pressure Stage (HP) and 3 Low Pressure
Stages (LP).
The gross electrical ouptut is dependent on local service water

conditions, and on the turbine equipment selected.
2.1-22
ISOLATING VALVES ISOLATING VALVES
En
ATMOSPHERIC STEAM
DISCHARGE VALVE (TYP)
SAFETY VALVES (TYP)
MAIN
STEAM
FLOW
MEASUREMENT
* - STEAM GENERATOR
WATER SAMPLING
FEEDWATER FROM FEEDWATER PUMPS
FIGURE 2.8.1 STEAM AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM

SEPARATOHS REHEATERS
n n n n
J MAI N STfcAM I
INTEHCEF
VALVES
RBHEATER
) DRAIN PUMPS
STEAM
GENERATOR
n
HP TURBINE
CONDENSE
DEAERATOR PRESSURE
•HEATER DRAIN
PUMPS GLAND SEAL
No. G HEATERS Nn5 HEATFRS No 3 HDATfcRS No 2 HRATERS No 1 HfcATERS CONDENSER
FIGURE 2.8-2 SECONDARY SIDE FLOW DIAGRAM

3.0 MODERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS
3.1 MAIN MODERATOR SYSTEM
The moderator system (Figure 3.1-1) removes the neutron heat generated
within the moderator, and the heat transferred to the moderator from the
fuel channels. Heavy water is utilized as a moderator due to its high
moderating ratio (Figure 3.1-2). The heavy water is circulated through
the moderator system for cooling, for purification and for the control of
the concentration of substances used for reactivity adjustment. The
moderator system features two 100% pumps and two 50% heat exchangers. The
piping arrangement permits either pump to operate with either or both of
the heat exchangers. The pumps are provided with pony motors powered by
Class IV and Class III power to provide circulation in the event of a loss
of Class IV power. The location of major equipment within the reactor
building is shown in Figure 3.1-3.
3.2 MODERATOR AUXILIARY SYSTEMS
The moderator auxiliary systems (Figure 3.2-1) include:
a) Moderator Cover Gas System; A helium cover gas is maintained over

the moderator in the calandria. The moderator cover gas system
(Figure 3.2-2) cools the cover gas and recombines the deuterium,
generated by radiolysis within the moderator, with oxygen. The
system consists basically of two 100% compressors and two 100%
recombining units which circulate the cover gas through the calandria
pressure relief ducts.
b) Moderator Purification System: The moderator is circulated through

the moderator purification system to minimize the accumulation of
activity within the system, and to control the concentration of
substances used for reactivity adjustment. Poisons are added to the
moderator in small quantities when the reactor is first started and
when new fuel is added. Large amounts of poison are also added to
the moderator if the second shutdown system is activated.
3.3 HEAVY WATER MANAGEMENT
3.3.1 General
Because of the high cost of heavy water, and to minimize releases of

activity from the station, maximum attention is given to minimizing
D 2 O losses. This is accomplished by lowering the number of mechanical
joints in D 2 O systems, utilizing bellows sealed valves when possible.
3.1-1
TO MODERATOR COVER GAS SYSTEM
FROM MODERATOR COVER GAS SYSTEM
TO D2O SAMPLING SYSTEM
T TO AND FROM D2O

SUPPLY SYSTEM
HEAT EXCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER
FIGURE 3.1-1 MAIN MODERATOR SYSTEM

LIGHT HEAVY GRAPHITE
WATER WATER
SLOWING DOWN
1.35 0.178 0.06
POWER CM-1
MODERATING RATIO 60 2,000 170
PWR CANDU MAGNOX

NEUTRON WASTAGE
PHW
IN MODERATOR, .28 0.16
COOLANT AND .15
CORE STRUCTURES
PER FISSION BWR AGR
(TYPICAL)
.25 0.3
FIGURE 3.1-2 MODERATING EFFICIENCY OF HEAVY WATER

1 MODERATOR HEAT EXCHANGER
2 MODERATOR PUMP
3 REACTOR
FIGURE 3.1-3 LOCATION OF MAIN MODERATOR SYSTEM EQUIPMENT

DEUTERATiON — — RUPTURE DISKS
DE-DEUTERATION
RECOMBINATION
OOOO
OOOOOO
oooooo o o
oooooo o o
ooo ooo o o CALANDRIA
ooo oo o o o
ooooo o
OOOO
D2O LIQUID D2O

SUPPLY POISON COLLECTION
FIGURE 3.2-1 MODERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

f
UM/y \
MANIFOLDS
T T H E L | 1 BOTTLES
FUME
ARRESTER
(TYPICAL) CATALYTIC
RECOMBINATION UNITS
VENT TO REACTIVITY MECHANISMS
CALANDRIA
HEAD TANK
FIGURE 3.2-2 MODERATOR COVER GAS SYSTEM

and by providing a system to collect heavy water from points of
anticipated leakage. Downgrading of heavy water leakages 1* reduced by
locating most H 2 O systems away from D 2 O system areas and by
minimizing mechanical joints in H2O systems within the reactor
building. A typical D 2 0 collection system is shown in Figure 3.3-1.
Sight glasses are provided in individual and common collection lines to
provide a visual indication of liquid flow.
To reduce operating staff exposure, all collected D 2 0 with a high

tritium content is segregated from that with a low tritium content.
3.3.2 D2O Vapour Recovery Systems
Four separate vapour recovery systems are provided, each serving a

separate area in the reactor building:
a) Major areas subject to Heat Transport System leakage which are

accessible only during reactor shutdown.
b) Areas requiring frequent personnel access.
c) The area within moderator equipment enclosures that may have a high
tritium content.
d) The steam generator room which is accessible during reactor

operation.
The vapour recovery equipment is located in the service building, except

for that serving the steam generator area, which is located in the steam
generator area. The recovery units are of the absorption type. Recovery
of absorbed water vapour occurs in the reactivation condensers located
above the dryer vessels; this water is collected in a series of tanks in
the D2O management upgrading area. Recovered water is segregated
according to the degree of downgrading and tritium activity.
3,3.3 D 2 0 Cleanup System
During operation of heavy water systems, small amounts of D 2 0 escape

unintentionally by leakage, and intentionally by deutration* and
dedeuteration of ion exchange resins. The D 2 O cleanup system removes
dissolved, particulate and organic impurities from recovered D 2 0 to
produce a product suitable for the upgraders. Two separate and almost
identical systems are provided; one for low tritium D 2 0 and one for
high tritium D2O.
* Deuteration is the process whereby light water present in new resins

is displaced by heavy water. Dedeuteration is the reverse process.
3.1-2
LEAKAGE INDICATORS
MAIN HEAT TRANSPORT
PUMPS/MOTORS AND DRAINS
22 CONNECTIONS
(TYPICALI
-DRAIN INDICATORS-
TOD2O STORAGE
TANK
- VENT INDICATORS-
B
CONDENSER
1
D2O COLLECTION
TANK
TO D 2 O CLEANUP SYSTEM • * • * • } - (
AND SAMPLING
TC FEED
PUMP SUCTION
FIGURE 3.3-1 D2O COLLECTION SYSTEM

3.3.4 D2O Upgrading System
The D2O upgrading systems separate solutions of D 2 0 and HjO by

distillation. Two upgraders are provided, one for low tritium D2O and
one for high tritium D2O.
The overall D2O management system is illustrated in Figure 3.3-2.
3.1-3
TO
DEUTERATICN VAPOUR LIQUID TO HEAT
& DE-DEUTERATION RECOVERY RECOVERY MODERATOR TRANSPORT
SYSTEMS SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM
L
D2O D2O FRESH
CLEANUP D 2 O SUPPLY
UPGRADING D2O
SYSTEM SYSTEM SYSTEM
f
FROM
HEAT
TRANSPORT
FROM
MODERATOR
SYSTEM
SYSTEM
FIGURE 3.3-2 D2O MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

4.0 SAFETY SYSTEMS
4.1 INHERENT SAFETY FEATURES OF CANDU
The CANDU PHW reactor design with its heavy water moderator, natural
uranium fuel and pressure tube concept has certain inherent safety
characteristics (Figure 4.1-1) that obviate the need for a high strength
pressure vessel. Instead, the pressure boundaries are the pressure tubes
which are considerably simpler to manufacture to the required quality.
Further, experimental evidence indicates that pressure tubes will leak
before they break since their thickness is much less than the critical
crack length. Such leaks can be readily detected by monitoring the
moisture content and the pressure in the gas annulus between the pressure
tube and the calandria tube. This is done on a continuous basis. In
addition, ultrasonic scanning devices are mounted on the fuelling machine
for periodic in-service inspection of the pressure tubes.
The pressure tube design permits the heat transport system to be

subdivided into two separate coolant circuits (loops). In the case of a
hypothetical loss of coolant accident, this design feature restricts the
consequences of the loss of coolant accident to just one of the loops.
This simplifies the design and reduces the burden considerably on the
emergency injection and the contairment system design.
All reactivity devices are located in guide tubes positioned in the low
pressure moderator environment, Figure 4.1-2. Thus, there exists no
mechanism for rapid ejection of any of these reactivity devices, nor can
they drop out of the core. The maximum reactivity rates achievable by
driving all control reactivity devices together in the wrong direction is
about 0.35 mk per second and well within the design capabilities of the
protective systems.
Fuel, coolant and moderator are arranged on a square lattice with a 28.6
cm pitch. This is a near optimum geometry from a reactivity standpoint,
Figure 4.1-3. Even if all fuel channels were either pushed apart or
brought together for whatever reason the net reactivity increase would be
at most, 1 ink; and this only for the ideal case of uniform rearrangement.
This is, of course, physically impossible. For the case where one, or a
few fuel channels are displaced, the net reactivity would at worst not be
affected at all or it would decrease, thereby shutting down the reactor.
Also, since a lattice of natural uranium and light water cannot be made
critical in any concentration, there can be no criticality problems in the
spent fuel bay of CANDU reactors.
The pressure tube design also makes on-power fuelling a possibility.

On-power fuelling results in a reactor with very low reactivity control
requirements. Typically, the reactivity decay rate in 600 MW(e) CANDU PHW
reactors is about 0.4 mk per day. This is compensated by fuelling about
4.1-1
PRESSURE TUBES
Separate moderator from coolant
Cool, low pressure moderator
High pressure coolant
Interstitial reactivity devices
Subdivided PHTS
Tubes leak before break
FIGURE 4.1-1
REACTIVITY DEVICES
In low pressure moderator
NO pressure-driven ejection
Separate devices for control and
for safety
Modest reactivity worth
Maximum combined rate < 0.35 mk/s
FIGURE 4.1-2
REACTOR PHYSICS
Natural UO2 fuel

D2O moderator
Low excess reactivity
Near optimum geometry
Criticality in spent fuel bay not possible
FIGURE 4.1-3
two channels per day. In addition, the pressure tube concept provides an
excellent opportunity for locating fuel defects and the on-power fuelling
permits the removal of defective fuel as soon as it is detected. This
helps to keep the heat transport system essentially free from fission
product activity.
Finally, the separation of the moderator from the high pressure heat
transport coolant allows the moderator to act under certain circumstances
as an additional heat sink for the fuel decay heat/ e.g. where one might
hypothesize a failure or impairment in the emergency core cooling system
following a primary loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
4.2 SAFETY DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
4.2.1 Design Basis Considerations
The basic safety functions to be maintained following any postulated event

are as follows:
a) The ability to shut the reactor down and maintain it in a safe

shutdown condition. ,
b) The. ability to remove residual and decay heat.
c) The ability to limit the release of radioactive material.
d) The ability to perform essential safety related control and

monitoring functions.
The plant design considers both common mode events and randan failures.
Since the nuclear process produces heat for a considerable period after
the reactor is shutdown, the plant design also takes into account other
faults or events which might occur in the post-accident recovery period.
4.2.2 Defense Against Random Failures
The design objective here emphasizes defense in depth and consists

essentially of the following:
a) High level of equipment quality. All systems are designed to

established codes and standards which demand the highest quality in
material and workmanship. This makes equipment failure unlikely to
begin with.
4.1-2
b) Quality Assurance. This involves strict quality control, both during
manufacture and subsequent installation, together with continued
periodic inspection of major components throughout the plant
operation.
c) System redundancy and fail-safe design. The important systems are

designed with redundancy such that the loss of a single component
does not cause the loss of the whole system: the provision of dual
control computers with one of them providing a complete backup for
the other one, two pumps circulating coolant in each of the heat
transport systems, two completely different systems for decay heat
removal (i.e. the shutdown cooling system, or the steam generators)
and finally, redundancy in power supply based on the so-called
odd-even concept. Two completely separate power supply systems are
provided such that one half of the load for any process is supplied
from an odd-bus and the other half from an even-bus.
d) Regulating and Process Systems. These systems are designed to

maintain all operating, parameters within acceptable ranges under
normal operating conditions and when minor accidents occur, e.g.
small leaks from the HT system, single computer failure, etc.,
without resorting to the special safety systems.
e) Special Safety Systems. If important process system parameters

cannot be normally controlled and exceed certain preset values,
special safety systems shutdown the reactor, provide long term
cooling of the fuel, and contain potential releases of
radioactivity.
4.2.3 Protection Against Common Mode Events
The basic defense against common mode events (Figure 4.2-1), is through
the use of superior equipment and separation (by distance and/or barriers)
of reliable systems, structures and components (Figure 4.2-2). The depth
of protection, based on the anticipated rate of occurence of the common
mode events, also guarantees that the common mode events under
consideration cannot disable the systems required to shutdown the reactor
and to remove residual heat, i.e. the basic safety functions have to be
maintained. Some of the common mode events considered are: man induced
events such as fires and missiles, natural phenomena such as earthquakes
and floods, human errors arising from design and operation and cascading
of cross-link effects such as effects of pipe whip, environment produced
by postulated events, etc. (Figure 4.2-3).
One of the important elements in the defense against common mode events is
the two group separation philosophy (Figure 4.2-4). All safety related
systems in the nuclear plant are divided into two groups. These groups
4.1-3
PROTECTION AGAINST
COMMON MODE EVENTS
• Siting consideration
• High quality design, manufacture,
operation
• Qualification (hardening)
• Duplication + diversity
•
Two group approach
FIGURE 4.2-1
FIGURE 4.2-2 TYPICAL 600 MW(a) PUNT UYOUT
DEFENCE AGAINST
COMMON MODE EVENTS
COMMON MODE EVENTS
• Man induced - fires, missiles ...
• Natural phenomena-earthquakes, flood
• Human error -design, operation ..
• Cascading - pipe whip,
harsh environment
FIGURE 4.2-3
TWO GROUP APPROACH

Essential SAFETY FUNCTIONS
• Shutdown reactor
• Cool the fuel
• Monitor plant
• Design objective to use two groups
• NOT a licensing requirement
FIGURE 4.2-4
are separated so that, within the limits of design, no directional or
localised common mode events can disable more than one group* Inherent in
this philosophy is the premise that the reactor building is by design an
impenetrable barrier to such common mode events. The systems in each
qroup must be able to carry out the basic safety functions.
a) Shutdown the reactor and maintain its shutdown.
b) Remove the decay heat.
c) Supply the necessary information for post-accident monitoring to

permit the operator to assess the state of the nuclear steam supply
system.
In group 1 these functions are performed respectively by shutdown system

# 1 , the normal electrical and water supplies and monitoring from the main
control room. In group 2, the corresponding systems are shutdown system
# 2 , the emergency power and water supplies and monitoring from the
secondary control area (Figure 4.2-5).
Group 1 Safety Support Systems
These systems (the normal electric and water supply systems) support the
operation of one of the special safety systems. Because of the reliance
on these systems for both normal plant operation and continuing operation
of special safety systems, special measures are taken in their design to
assure reliability.
Group 2 Safety Support Systems
As part of group 2, two safety support systems are provided. They are the
emergency water supplies and the emergency power supply systems. They do
not perform any function for normal plant operation but are required to
provide an alternative water supply and electrical power supply during
certain accident conditions. These alternate supplies are located
sufficiently remote from the water and electric power supplies of group 1
to ensure defense against common mode incidents.
Grouping Layout
The functional and physical independence of the two groups ensure that no
common mode incident can disable the required systems of both groups.
There is no unobstructed straightline path between redundant elements of
the two groups above ground. Where there are no suitable obstructions,
one of the elements is embedded in a suitable reinforcement. The group 1
control area is the main control room which is located on the third floor
of the service building. The group 2 control area is a secondary control
area which is located on the side of the reactor building remote from the
4.1-4
TWO GROUP CONCEPT
FUNCTION GROUP 1 GROUP 2
Shutdown SDS1 SDS2

Fuel cooling Normal electrical Emergency power
and water supplies and water supplies
Plant monitoring Main control room Secondary control
area
FIGURE 4.2-5
main control centre. Cables for group 2 exit from the reactor building on
a different side than those for group 1. Control is normally exercised
from the main control centre, but under emergency condition*, control for
shutdown and decay heat removal is also available from the secondary
control area.
The criteria for separation and independence between the special safety
systems belonging to the two groups are as follows:
1) Physical Independence. There must be no sharing of system components

between group 1 and group 2 systems. There must also be no sharing
of routes for the wiring and tubing of systems in different groups.
2) Functional and Conceptual Independence. When two special safety *

systems are designed to perform the same protective function, the two
systems"must have conceptually different senses, instrumentation and
actuators whenever practical. Where possible, similar components of
the two systems must be supplied by different manufacturers. Where a
choice is possible, such components must employ different principles
of operation.
The best known common mode event is, of course, an earthquake. A brief
outline of the design principles used in protecting against earthquakes
will conclude this section on defense against common mode events.
1) Following an earthquake the reactor control system and the reactor

shutdown system must either remain functional or fail safe.
2) Sufficient systems required for core cooling (decay heat removal)

must remain functional.
3) The earthquake should not cause a breach in the heat transport system
pressure boundary.
4) The containment building and associated systems remain functional

during and following an earthquake.
5) Structures and systems not directly required for nuclear safety

reasons are designed so that their failure or dislocation is either
unlikely, (systems are qualified), or do not effect the safe
operation of any safety related systems required during or after the
earthquake.
4.1-5
4.3 SAFETY SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
This section describes those systems which are provided solely to perform
a safety function and have no function in the normal production of
electrical power. As noted earlier, these systems consist of the
containment system, the emergency core cooling system, shutdown system #1,
shutdown system #2, the emergency water supply system and the emergency
power supply system (Figure 4.3-1).
4.3.1 Containment
The containment system (Figure 4.3-2) consists of a prestressed, post-

tensioned concrete containment structure with an epoxy liner, energy sinks
consisting of an automatically initiated dousing system and building air
coolers, a filtered air discharge system, access airlocks and an
automatically initiated containment isolation system.
The dousing tank is located in the dome of the reactor building and holds
water for emergency dousing and emergency core cooling. About 500 cubic
meters of water are reserved for emergency core cooling. The total
capacity of the tank is about 2600 cubic meters. Dousing valves control
the flow'of water to six independent dousing spray header units located
radially below the tank. Each spray unit has two butterfly valves in a
downcomer between the tank and the spray header (Figure 4.3-3). The
design dousing flow rate is about 4500 kg/s and this flowrate can be
provided by any four of the six downcomers. With all six downcotners
operating, the total spray flow is about 6800 kg/s.
4.3.1.1 Operation
Under normal operation conditions, the pressure within containment is

slightly less than atmospheric and the containment ventilation dampers are
all open.
For very small heat transport system leaks, the building coolers in the
containment condense any steam that is discharged, the building pressure
remains at atmospheric pressure and there may be some additional outflow
of dried air through the ventilation system. For larger breaks, the
building pressure rises and at an overpressure of about 3.4 kPa,
containment pressure sensors initiate total containment closure. The
containment will also be automatically isolated in the event of a high
radioactivity signal which may occur following a large loss of coolant
accident. The containment pressure continues to rise and the dousing
system starts to operate automatically at an overpressure of 13.8 kPa
Depending on the break size, there is either continuous or cyclic
operation of the dousing valves, with the valves opening at 13.8 kPa and
4.1-6
SPECIAL SAFETY SYSTEMS
Emergency water supply system
Emergency power supply system
Shutdown system 1
Shutdown system 2
Emergency core cooling system
Containment system
FIGURE 4.3-1
CONTAINMENT SYSTEM
Designed for maximum size LOCA

Small breaks — air coolers
Large breaks — dousing system
Filtered discharge system
Multi-unit station •vacuum building
FIGURE 4.3-2
DOUSING WATER
SUPPLY
DOUSING
SPRAY HEADER
MAIN PRIMARY
SYSTEM PUMPS
FIGURE 4.3-3 SINGLE UNIT CONTAINMENT

closing at 6.9 kPa. When the dousing system overtakes the pressure
transient, the pressure begins to fall, and the building depressurizes to
about atmospheric pressure by condensation on the building walls and
cooling by the air coolers. Initial containment atmosphere cleanup can be
performed by the D2O vapour recovery dryers with long term purging
achieved by discharging air through the dryers and the reactor building
ventilation system filters before release to the atmosphere.
4.3.2 Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) System
The emergency core cooling system (Figure 4.3-4) is composed of three

stages: high pressure, medium pressure, low pressure. The high pressure
stage uses pressurized nitrogen to inject water into the reactor core from
water tanks located outside the reactor building, the medium pressure
stage supplies water from the dousing tank. When this water supply is
depleted, the low pressure stage recovers water that has collected in the
reactor building sump and pumps it back into the reactor core via the
emergency cooling heat exchanger and the emergency cooling recovery
pumps.
The high pressure injection stage consists of one nitrogen gas tank and
two water tanks. The gas tank normally operates at a pressure between 4.1
MPa and 5.5 MPa, whereas the water tanks operate slightly above
atmospheric pressure. The recovery pumps are two 100% pumps. Each pump
is supplied by Class III power and by the emergency power supply system.
The heat exchanger in the recovery pump discharge line is designed to
maintain the emergency cooling flow at about 50°C at entry to the heat
transport system.
Operation. The emergency core cooling system is triggered automatically

when the heat transport pressure reaches 5.5 HPa. The following actions
take place:
a) All gas isolation valves, the high pressure injection valves, and the
D 2 O isolating valves are opened. This will open rupture discs in
the injection lines and permit the flow of high pressure, water from
the injection tanks to all reactor headers of the failed and the
unfailed loops (Figure 4.3-5).
b) The main steam safety valves on the steam generators are opened to
rapidly cool down the boilers and provide an additional heat sink.
This is the main heat sink for small loss of coolant accidents.
c) Valves in all lines interconnecting the two heat transport loops are
closed. This will confine the consequences of the loss of coolant
accident to just the loop containing the hypothesized break.
Sufficient coolant is available during the high pressure injection
phase for at least 2.5 minutes.
4.1-7
EMERGENCY CORE
COOLING SYSTEM
All-points injection
Reactor is low-point in system
Three stage injection
High pressure — external tanks
Intermediate — dousing tank water
Low pressure — building sump
NOT "LAST DEFENCE" FOR LOCA
FIGURE 4.3-4
FROM DOUSING TANK
GAS ISOLATION VALVES
•A
PV81
PV8
PV82 | ^ ^ MP TEST VALVES
MP INJECTION
VALVES
ijl'lj
til
III
ECC
WATER
TANKS KKKHr
OECC GAS TANK

~^^£
ECC
HEAT
EXCHANGER I
| Cxj—-W-
V5 V3
I X}—-W-
V6 V4
ECC
PUMPS
RIH = REACTOR INLET HEADER
ROH = REACTOR OUTLET HEADER LOOP 1 LOOP 2 LOOP 1
MP = MEDIUM PRESSURE
HP = HIGH PRESSURE TO PRIMARY HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM
FSGURE 4.3-5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING HIGH PRESSURE STAGE OPERATION:

2.5 TO 30 MINUTES DURATION. ASSUMED LOSS OF COOLANT IN LOOP 1
The ECC dousing tank suction valves to the ECC recovery pumps will also be
opened automatically on the loss of coolant signal and one of the ECC
pumps will be started when these valves are opened. If this pump fails to
start (as indicated by a low pump discharge pressure), the standby ECC
pump will be started automatically. No operator action is required to
start the recovery pumps or to open the valves to supply dousing tank
water to the pumps for the medium pressure emergency core phase. This
phase will continue to supply water for at least 15 minutes following the
largest break in the heat transport system. It will last longer for
smaller breaks (Figure 4.3-6).
As the dousing tank water depletes, the operator opens valves in the
recovery line from the reactor building sump, then closes the valves in
the line from the dousing tank and opens the cooling water valves to
supply service water to the ECC heat exchanger. The mixture of heat
transport coolant and water from the high pressure and dousing tanks is
pumped from the sump in the reactor building back to the heat transport
system via the heat exchanger (Figure 4.3-7). For large breaks, the ECC
recovery heat exchanger is the main heat sink. For small breaks, the
steam generators continue to be the main heat sink.
4.3.3 Shutdown System #1
The shutdown system #1 (Figure 4.3-8) is the primary method of rapidly

terminating any reactor power increase or reducing reactor power when
certain parameters exceed preset values. This is accomplished by the
release of 28 cadmium rods which fall under gravity from the top of the
reactor. Figure 4.3-9. This gravity drop is accomplished by de-energizing
direct current clutches which normally hold the shutoff rods out of the
core. The shutoff rod units are divided into two banks of fourteen. Each
bank is supplied with dual 90 volt DC power supply for the clutches. Each
clutch coil is held energized by the contact of the separate relay.
The design philosophy is based on triplicating the measurement of each of

the variables that can initiate reactor shutdown. Protective action is
initiated when any two of the three measurements exceed their preset
values. The selection of variables is such that where practicable, there
are at least two different sensing parameters for the specific process
failure being protected against. Examples of trip parameters on shutdown
system #1 are high neutron power, high rate log neutron power, high heat
transport pressure, high reactor building pressure, low steam generator
level, low pressurizer level.
A partial drop test facility is provided to allow the operation of each

shutoff unit to be checked during reactor operation. The shutoff unit
housings are located on the reactivity mechanism deck which permits
regulated, one unit at a time, access to the clutches, motors,
potentiometers, gear boxes, and winches for removal or for maintenance on
power.
4.1-8
FROM DOUSING TANK
GAS ISOLATION VALVES
PV8
MP TEST VALVES
MP INJECTION
VALVES
RIH = REACTOR INLET HEADER LOOP 1 LOOP 2 LOOP 1

ROH = REACTOR OUTLET HEADER
MP = MEDIUM PRESSURE TO PRIMARY HEAT TRANSPORT SYSTEM
HP = HIGH PRESSURE
FIGURE 4.3-6 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING MEDIUM PRESSURE STAGE GENERATION:

13 MINUTES MINIMUM. ASSUMED LOSS OF COOLANT IN LOOP 1
HP INJECTION VALVES
HP TEST VALVES
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM 1
Independent of regulating system

28 Cd shutoff units
Devices inserted from top
Instrumentation on top or vertical
Primary + alternate trip parameter
for each process failure
Independent of SDS2
FIGURE 4.3-8
Separately channelled Class I and Class II power supplies are provided for
each channel of shutdown system #1. The logic is arranged so that any
loss of power to a channel results in a channel trip. The direct current
clutches energized by rectified Class II power will release if power is
disrupted. This will shut down the reactor.
The static negative reactivity worth of the 28 shutoff rods is about 80

ink.
4.3.4 Shutdown System #2
The second method of quickly terminating any reactor power increase or

rapidly reducing reactor power is by the injection of concentrated
gadolinium nitrate poison solution into the moderator through six
horizontal nozzles, Figures 4.3-9 and 4.3-10. A vessel containing high
pressure helium supplies the source of energy for this rapid injection.
This vessel is connected through six quick opening valves to a helium
header which supplies the poison tanks. The quick opening valves are
"air-to-close, spring-to-open" design so that loss of instrument air
initiates automatic poison injection. Each of the poison tanks contains
gadolinium nitrate solution at a concentration of about 8,000 parts per
million. The six zircaloy injection nozzles penetrate the calandria
horizontally and at right angles to the fuel channels. Holes are drilled
into the nozzle along its length to form four rows of jets which
facilitate complete dispersion of the poison into the moderator (Figure
4.3-11).
Each poison tank contains a floating polyethylene ball. When an injection

is initiated the helium driving gas transfers the poison to the calandria
and the ball is driven to the tank bottom. In the bottom position, the
ball seats at the poison tank outlet and prevents the release of a large
volume of helium into the calandria.
as with shutdown system #1 all initiating variables are triplicated and

protective action is initiated by any two of these measurements exceeding
preset values.
The eventual negative reactivity from the poison injection system is in

excess of 300 mk.
4.3.5 Emergency Water Supply System
This system (ref. Figure 4.3-12) is designed to provide an alternate

source of water to cater for:
a) A design basis earthquake.
4.1-9
CALANDRIA
SHUTOFF ROD
GUIDE TUBE
MODERATOR
SHUTOFF ROD
(TYPICAL)
LIQUID POISON
NOZZLE
LIQUID
POISON PIPE
(TYPICAL)
CALANDRIA
TUBE
FIGURE 4.3-9 SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS: SHUTOFF RODS AND LIQUID "POISON" INJECTION
SHUTDOWN SYSTEM 2
Independent of regulating system

6 Gd injection nozzles
Devices located horizontally
Instrumentation on side or horizontal
Primary + aitemate trip parameter
for each process failure
Independent of SDS1
FIGURE 4.3-10
HELIUM VENT LINES
TO EXHAUST
PRESSURE BALANCE LINE
HELIUM COVER GAS
FROM
HELIUM
-----
:--¥i-r-;:--|
GADOLIUM NITRATE
IN HEAVY WATER " "
H.P. HELIUM SUPPLY TANK

-f OOOOOOOOOOOOO
6 NOZZLES
HEAVY WATER MODERATOR CALANDRIA

ISOLATION BALL VALVE y
(NORMALLY OPEN) POISON-MODERATOR INTERFACE
FIGURE 4.3-11 SCHEMATIC OF SECOND SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

CONNECTION FOR
ADDITIONAL PUMP
FOR TWO UNIT 3114-
OPERATION VI TO V4
V9
I I I I FROM
REHEATER
DRAIN
FIGURE 4.3-12 EMERGENCY WATER SUPPLY

b) Loss of Class XV and Class III power
c) Loss of coolant accident followed (24 hours or later) by a site

design earthquake*
Two electrically driven pumps are located remote from the group 1
equipment- and pump house. The pump suction is taken from a sump connected
to a good quality water supply. The emergency water system connects to
the heat transport system, the steam generators and the emergency core
cooling heat exchange. Since the emergency water supply system is not
required immediately following the three events listed above, system
operation consists of manually starting the pumps and then operating the
hand switches to open the appropriate motorized isolating valves to supply
water to the required loads.
4.3.6 Emergency Power Supply System
This system is designed to provide an alternate source of power to cater

for the events already described in the previous paragraph. The emergency
power supply system supplies the necessary power to the emergency water
system pumps and valves, the emergency core cooling pumps and certain
emergency core cooling valves, and power to the group 2 safety and control
systems for operator control of the station from the secondary control
area. This system is qualified to the design basis earthquake.
4.1-10
5.0 REFUELLING SYSTEM
S.0.1 Intr oduct ion
CANDU reactors rely on semi-continuous on-power refuelling to enable close

control of core reactivity and efficient utilization of its natural
uranium fuel.
The operation is carried out by an automated fuel handling system (Figure

5.0-1) which utilizes features and equipment applied in the very
successful Pickering "A" Nuclear Generating Station.
The full power refuelling requirements for CANDU 600 MW(e) reactors
involve replacing about 110 fuel bundles per week. Using the reference
procedure of replacing eight bundles per fuel channel, this entails
refuelling 14 fuel channels per week.
In a.n eight bundle refuelling sequence (Figure 5.0-2), closure plugs are
removed from a channel, and stored within the magazines of the fuelling
machines coupled to each end of the channel.' Four pairs of new fuel
bundles are then inserted from the upstream fuelling machine, displacing
eight spent fuel bundles into the downstream machine. This process is
termed "Flow Assisted Fuelling" (FAF Mode).
The overall refuelling operation of a CANDU 600 HW(e) reactor unit (Figure
5.0-3) comprises:
1) Loading new fuel bundles, in pairs, into a fuelling machine.
2) Coupling this machine onto the upstream end of the channel to be

refuelled and coupling a second machine onto the downstream end of
that channel
3) Displacing spent fuel into the downstream fuelling machine
4) Disengaging the downstream fuelling machine, and moving it to the

spent fuel port
5) Discharging the spent fuel through the spent fuel port into an
elevator, which lowers the bundles into the fuel Discharge Bay to an
underwater conveyor '
6) Transferring the spent fuel from the conveyor to storage trays for
stacking in the Spent Fuel Storage Bays.
This automated fuelling.cycle takes approximately two and a half hours,

which nominally requires system operations for 35 hours per week.
Miscellaneous check out procedures take up to one hour per day.
5.1-1
1 FUELLING MACHINE BRIDGE STRUCTURE
2 FUELLING MACHINE GUIDE COLUMN
3 BRIDGE SUPPORT
A BALL SCREW ASSEMBLIES
5 FUELLING MACHINE HEADS
6 FUELLING MACHINE CARRIAGE TROLLEY
7 ROLLING SHIELD
FIGURE 5.0-1 FUELLING MACHINE USED IN PICKERING

AND CANDU 600 MW(e) PHWR'S
DISCHARGE MACHINE
1B
RAM ® WITHDRAWS CLOSURE PLUG © RAM ©WITHDRAWS CLOSURE PLUG ©
2B
RAM ® CONNECTS TO SHIELD PLUG © RAM ©CONNECTS TO SHIELD PLUG©

AND WITHDRAWS IT TO MAGAZINE
3A 3B
V'EW FUEL BUNDLES ROTATED INTO

CHARGING POSITION. TWO BUNDLES AT A TIME
4A 4B
RAM ©CHARGES NEW

SHIELD PLUG ©WITHDRAWN
ACTIVITIES 3A and 4A REPEATED 4 TIMES
SIDE STOPS (3)COME IN
UNTIL 8 NEW BUNDLES HAVE BEEN INSERTED.
THE FUEL COLUMN IS ADVANCED.
SB
USED FUEL BUNDLES WITHDRAWN TO

MAGAZINE, TWO BUNDLES AT A TIME
SIDE STOPS® HOLD FUEL COLUMN AND ROTATING

MAGAZINE SWINGS USED FUEL BUNDLES OUT OF
THE WAY. ACTIVITIES SB AND SB REPEATED 4 TIMES
NT BUNDLES HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED
R A M ® REPLACES SHIELD PLUG© RAM ® REPLACES SHIELD PLUG @
8A
RAM ©REPLACES CLOSURE PLUG© END SHIELD END SHIELD H A M (©REPLACESCLOSURE PLUG®
* NEW
FIGURE 5.0-2 8-BUNDLE CHANGING SEQUENCE IN A CANDU 600 MW{«) PHWR

NEW FUEL
STORAGE ROOM
NEW FUEL
LOADING AREA
SPENT FUEL
DISCHARGE ROOM
SPENT FUEL
STORAGE BAY
CANNED
FAILED FUEL
STORAGE TRAYS
FIGURE 5.0-3 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM SCHEMATIC

Accordingly, operation on a regular two shift/ five day basis provides
about 100% availability margin for any operational interruptions, checks
or delays.
5.1 FUELLING MACHINES
The major elements of the refuelling system are a pair of identical

unshielded fuelling machines which operate at both ends of the reactor and
bring new fuel from the New Fuel Ports to the reactor, and carry
spent fuel to the Spent Fuel Ports (Figure 5.1-1).
Fuelling machines are mounted in carriages which move from maintenance

area tracks onto bridges, mounted on columns in the fuelling machine
vaults.
These raise and position the fuelling machines at each end of the fuel
channel end fittings, to form a sealed connection before starting the fuel
replacement sequence.
The fuelling machine (Figure 5.1-2), has a 12 station rotating magazine,

snout assembly (which locks onto the channel) and a ram assembly which is
used for removal, storage and replacement of fuel channel plugs, and for
insertion of fuel. The closure plugs are engaged, unlocked and withdrawn
into a storage chamber in the magazine; similar motions are used in
withdrawal of shield plugs.
New fuel is pushed by the upstream ram into the pressure tube, where the
heavy water flow brings it into contact with the installed fuel string.
In central channels the hydraulic forces are sufficient to move the entire
fuel string along the fuel channel to displace pairs of bundles into the
downstream fuelling machine. (FAF Mode).
A FARE tool (Flow Assisting Ram Extension) is inserted to provide

additional hydraulic flow resistance in refuelling outer channels which
have less flow (corresponding to their lower power levels). This is
termed FARE mode refuelling.
As each pair of fuel bundles enter the downstream magazine, separators are
inserted to limit motion of the following bundles, to advance the two
downstream bundles and to enable free rotation of the magazine.
After completion of the refuelling sequence the shield and closure plugs
are reinstalled. The fuelling machine is sealed by installation of a
snout plug, the space between the closures is drained, and the fuelling
machines disengage from the fuel channel.
5.1-2
CATENARIES
NEW FUEL \ EMERGENCY ACCESS PLUGS
. PORT
SPENT FUEL PORT REHEARSAL CHANNEL \ T.V. CAMERA
SERVICE PORTS
S3 J
FIGURE 5.1-1 FUELLING MACHINE VAI,LT AND MAINTENANCE ROOM
1 ANTENNA PLATE 1« FRONT RETAINING PLATE
2 ANTENNA SWITCH 20 WEIR
3 CLAMPING LEVER ARM 21 30" GRAYLOC CLAMP
4 CAM BLOCK 22 GRAYLOC SEAL RING
S WEDGE SEGMENT 23 MAGAZINE HOUSING
« CLAMPING BARREL 24 MAGAZINE DMVE SHAFT
7 SEAL 25 REAR RETAINING PLATE
8 SNOUT PROBE 2S BALANCE SHAFT SEAL
S LOCK RING 27 FERGUSON INDEXING DRIVE
10 SCREW AND GEAR 28 FLOW SHIELD
11 CENTRE SUPPORT 2» RAM HEAD
12 SEPARATOR ASSEMBLY 30 MAGAZINE POSITION
13 FUEL STOPS POTENTIOMETERS
A SNOUT PLUG SHIELD PLUG 14 CLAMPING PISTON 31 MAGAZINE EMERGENCY
B FUEL J ADAPTER 15 RACK DRIVE GEARBOX
C CHANNEL CLOSURE t CHANNEL CLOSURE (SPARE) 16 SNOUT EMERGENCY 32 MAGAZINE DRIVE MOTOR
0 FUEL 1 FUEL LOCK ASSEMBLY 33 10" GRAYLOC CLAMP
E GUOE SLEEVE (INSERTION TOOL I SHIELD PLUG (SPARE) 17 LOCK PISTON 34 RAM HOUSING
F FUEL I FUEL 18 MAGAZINE END COVER 36 EDUCTOR
VKW PROM THE REAR
FIGURE 5.1-2 FUELLING MACHINE HEAD

Subsequently thfi Fuotlinq machines are lowered and driven into the
maintenance area to discharge spent fuel and to load new fuel.
The catenaries and catenary trolleys (Figure 5.1-3} provide electrical,

water and oil hydraulic connections for fuelling machine controls and
cooling, and the drive supplies to the mobile fuelling machines, from the
static control stations.
5.2 FUEL TRANSFER
5.2.1 Mew Fuel Loading
New fuel is received and stored in the Service Building in a New Fuel Room
which can accommodate a complete reactor's inventory of new fuel. This is
equivalent to about nine months' refuelling supply at 80% capacity
factor.
Fuel is transferred by pallet and lift truck to the new fuel loading area.
Two New Fuel Transfer Mechanisms are installed there for inserting fuel
into fuelling machines in either maintenance area (Figure 5.2-1).
Fuel is hoisted from its pallet, inspected and loaded into a loading
trough. Pairs of fuel bundles are pushed into the fuel loading magazine
under semi-automatic control. Subsequently they are transferred, by a
motor driven ram under fully automatic control, into vacant magazine
positions in the waiting fuelling machine.
An airlock gate valve in the transfer port minimizes the transfer of any
contamination from the fuelling machine or maintenance room.
At all times except during fuel loading the new fuel port houses a shield
plug to reduce any radiation into the fuel loading room.
r
;.2.2 Spent Fuel Discharge
One spent fuel port is mounted in each maintenance room for transfer of
spent fuel to the fuel storage bays (Figure 5.2-2).
As these ports constitute physical penetrations of the Reactor Containment

Building, they each embody pairs of isolating valves. Drains, sprays and
pressure relief devices are also provided for containment protection.
After the fuelling machine has been positioned and coupled to the
spent fuel port, its heavy water level is lowered and its snout plug
removed and stored. Its magazine is then rotated for dry transfer of one
pair of fuel bundles, through the port, onto the transfer mechanism for
lowering into the fuel transfer canal.
5.1-3
FUELLING MACHINE
CARRIAGE
TROLLEY TRACK
FUELLING MACHINE
MAINTENANCE LOCK TRACK
HOSE AND CABLE

CARIER
CATENARY TROLLEY
- MOTION
CATENARY LOOP
FUELLING MACHINE
HEAD
TROLLEY DRIVE
UNIT
HOSE AND CABLE

CARRIER TRACK
CATENARY LOOP
NORTH ('A') ASSEMBLY SHOWN
FIGURE 5.1-3 FUELLING MACHINE SUPPORT AND CATENARY SYSTEMS

NORTH CA1) NEW FUEL TRANSFER MECHANISM
SOUTH CC1) NEW FUEL TRANSFER MECHANISM
NEW FUEL PORTS
CONTROL PANELS
BUNDLE INSPECTION TABLE
BUNDLE LOADING TROUGHS
1/4 TON JIB CRANE AND AIR HOIST
2-TON JIB CRANES AND ELECTRIC HOISTS
REMOVABLE PLATFORM
NEW FUEL PALLETS
FUELLING MACHINE MAINTENANCE LOCK CRANE RAIL
SERVICE PORT ENCLOSURES
IRRADIATED FUEL HANDLING SOUTH LADLE DRIVE
FUELLING MACHINE TRANSPORT CART GUIDES
LIQUID INJECTION SHUTDOWN SYSTEM ENCLOSURE
15-TON CRANE
FIGURE 5.2-1 600 MW(e) NEW FUEL TRANSFER EQUIPMENT

1 END FITTING
o BALL VALVES
3 ELEVATING LADLE HOISTS
4 ELEVATING LADLE DRIVE (IN NEW FUEL ROOM)
5 ELEVATING LADLES
6 MAIN ELEVATOR RAILS
7 GUIDE RAILS
8 FUEL POSITIONING ASSEMBLIES
9 LOWER RAIL SUPPORT
10 AUXILIARIES
11 SPRAY HEADERS
12 REMOVABLE PLATFORMS
13 FUEL TRANSFER EQUIPMENT
14 DEFECTED FUEL CANNING EQUIPMENT
FIGURE 5.2-2 600 MW(>) IRRAOIATEO FUEL DISCHARGE EQUIPMENT

5.3 FUEL STORAGE
Fuel is routinely transported by underwater conveyor to the reception bay

for loading onto trays and for subsequent storage (Figure 5.3-1).
If there should be an indication of a defective fuel bundle, the suspect

bundle is transferred to a carousel which collects any fission gas bubbles
released. After a suitable period of cooling the defective fuel is
canned, then transferred to temporary storage.
The fuel storage bay capacity is sufficient to accommodate at least ten

year's output of spent fuel under normal conditions.
5.1-4
6 CONVEYOR DRIVES
7 RECEPTION BAY
8 TRANSFER RACK
9 TRANSFER RACK HANDLING TOOL
10 RACK HANDLING TOOL
STORAGE BRACKET
11 2-TON RECEPTION BAY CRANE
12 SINGLE RACK STAND-OFF
13 EMPTY RACKS ON TRIPLE RACK
STAND-OFF
14 STORAGE TRAY STAND
15 PARTIALLY FILLED TRAY ON STAND
16 BUNDLE LIFTING TOOL
17 FULL STORAGE TRAYS
18 STORAGE TRAY CONVEYOR
19 CONVEYOR DRIVE
20 STORAGE TRA.V LIFTING TOOL
21 SPENT FUEL STORAGE BAY
1 SPENT FUEL DISCHARGE EQUIPMENT 22 EMPTY STORAGE TRAYS
(REF. ONLY) 23 DEFECTED FUEL TRANSFER EQUIPMENT
2 TRANSFER RACK DETECTION (REF. ONLY)
SWITCH LEVER 24 DEFECTED FUEL STORAGE BAY
3 DISCHARGE BAY CONVEYOR 25 DEFECTED FUEL BAY ISOLATION
4 TRANSFER CANAL CONVEYOR VALVE (REF. ONLY)
5 TRANSFER CART 26 ISOLATION VALVE DRIVE (REF. ONLY)
FIGURE 5.3-1 600 MW(«) FUEL STORAGE BAY EQUIPMENT

6.0 SUMMARY
6.1 ADVANTAGES OF CANDU
. CANDU is a proven technical product, a product that has put Canada ahead
of all the countries of the Western World when the achievements of all
thermal reactors are considered (Figure 6-1).
. CANDU is a conserver of uranium supplies, its once through fuel cycle

uses 15% less natural uranium than light water reactor (LWR) fuel
cycles. This fuel savings increases to 38% if 1.2% enriched uranium
fuel is used.
. CANDU is a flexible system, it can be adapted to advanced fuel cycles

employing other fissile or fertile materials: thorium and plutonium.
. From a safety point of view the containment of the core environment in

many small diameter pressure tubes is preferable to one very large and
heavy pressure vessel. The pressure tubes have been proven to exhibit
the "leak before break" characteristic that is so important in safety
considerations. The presence of heavy water is readily detectable and
serves notice of any leak in the system. As pointed out previously the
CANDU system uses a defence in depth approach with redundant safety
systems.
. On-power refuelling, a unique feature of the CANDU, permits the

immediate correction of low reactivity areas in the reactor core.
Another advantage of this feature is its ability to quickly remove any
failed fuel from the core while the reactor continues to operate.
Shutdowns are only required for reactor maintenance.
. CANDU energy costs are competitive. The difference between coal

(representative of fossil fuels) and nuclear costs in the Province of
Ontario in 1979 is shown in Figure 6.2. These numbers have been brought
to a common base for direct comparison and .clearly show the CANDU
advantage.
6.2 CONCLUSION
This presentation provides a technical summary of the many systems that

together make up a CANDU reactor, and at the same time outlines the
reasons for CANDU 1 s superior position among the power reactors of the
world today.
While focusing primarily on the CANDU 600 MW(e), AECL is able to offer
customers larger reactor units (up to 950 MW(e)), if required.
6.1-1
WORLD POWER REACTOR LIFETIME PERFORMANCE
1 CANADA Pickering-2 542 MW 84.5%

2 W. GERMANY Stade-1 662 MW 83.5%
4 CANADA Bruce 4 791 MW 78.5%
5 CANADA Bruce 3 791 MW 78.2%
8 USA Point Beach 2 524 MW 77.4%
9 USA Connecticut Yankee 602 MW 75.4%
10 SWEDEN Barsebaeck2 600 MW 74.5%
CUMULATIVE LOAD FACTORS FOR REACTORS OVER 500 MW(e)

TO END OF SEPTEMBER 1980
Station Cumulative Load Type

Factor %
Bruce-3 82.0 CANDU

Stacto-1 81.2 PWR
Picfcerlnjj-2 80.9 CANDU
Pickwing-1 80.3 CANDU
Point BMCh-2 77.4 PWR
Picker! nc-4 77.3 CANDU
Pick»ring-3 75.4 CANDU
Prairie ltland-2 75.2 PWR
CaKwrt CllfU-2 74.7 PWR
Connecticut Yankee 74.6 PWR
Bruce-4 73.5 CANDU
Bruce-1 73.0 CANDU
REF: NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INTERNATIONAL VOL 25, NO. 307, 1980
Country Annual load Number and size Cumulative load Number and size
factor% of reactors factor % of reactors
Canada 70.11 10 (5818 MWe) 64.90 10 (5818 MWe)

Europe 56.35 53 (38500.3 MWe) 56.48 57 (42284.3 MWe)
USA 56.76 68 (54684 MWe) 54.74 68 (54658 MWe)
Japan 48.41 20 (13852 MWe) 52.40 22 (15117 MWe)
UK 51.77 22 (7949.3 MWe) 53.24 22 (7949.3 MWe)
France 56.63 10 (6429 MWe) 51.87 12 (8343 MWe)
W. Germany 50.49 10 (14299 MWe) 54.95 11 (15199 MWe)
Source: Nuclear Engineering International (March 1980)
FIGURE 6-1
COAL
FUEL
17.06
NUCLEAR
FUEL
1.7
CAPITAL COST,
OPERATION,
MAINTENANCE
AND HEAVY
WATER UPKEEP
CAPITAL COST,
OPERATION AND 12.8
MAINTENANCE
10.19
27 .27 COSTftnfcWh 14.S
1979 BREAKDOWN OF UNIT ENERGY COSTS (ONTARIO HYDRO FIGURES)
FIGURE 6-2 COMPARISON OF COSTS — COAL AND NUCLEAR

Candu Nuclear Power Systems

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Candu Nuclear Power Systems

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CANDU Nuclear

I This report provides a comprehensive summary of the

many components that make up a CANDU reactor. Major

I reasons for CANDU's superior performance and the

inherent safety of the system are also discussed.

I 3. MODERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

Inherent Safety Features of CANDU

1.1 INTRODUCTION TO AECL

I AECL is a crown corporation of the Canadian government charged with the

I AECL commenced operation in 1945 with the construction of elaborate

I The company's major facilities in Canada (Figure 1.1-3), are:

. The Head Office, located in Ottawa, Ontario

I . Nuclear laboratories at Chalk River, Ontario and Pinawa, Manitoba -

I . Douglas Point and Gentilly-1 nuclear generating stations, located in

. The Radiochemical Company, located in Ottawa, markets radioisotopes and

I designs, manufactures and markets radiation equipment

r . The Chemical Company, located in Ottawa, responsible for heavy

. The Engineering Company, located in Mississauga with a subsidiary office

» AECL International located at Mississauga and elsewhere is responsible

AECL today has world-wide experience in design, project management and

• Markets CANDU nuclear reactors, components and technology.

Designs nuclear generating stations, in co-

I • Makes available its special facilities and ex-

I CHEMICAL COMPANY RADIOCHEMICAL COMPANY

Provides heavy water for nuclear reactor re-

Designs, manufactures, and markets equip-

Coordinates the development of Heavy Water

I utilities and local industries.

FIGURE 1.1-3 NUCLEAR ENERGY ESTABLISHMENTS IN CANADA

f^^'vr*1^ (--^Frt-ii -IJ i

The history of CANDU is illustrated in Figure 1.2-1, and shows the

I The Pickering "A" nuclear generating station (Figure 1.2-3) consists of

I Ontario Hydro has also commenced construction of a four unit nuclear

I approximately 60 miles east of Toronto.

Currently, more than 31% of the electrical demand in the Province of

I The Point Lepreau generating station is under construction in the Province

I CANDU stations are also operating or under construction in other

I competing reactor types.

Length and location of rectangles denotes

General research, development

NPD ONTARIO PHW 22 AECL & CGE 1962

FIGURE 1.2-2 CANDU POWER REACTORS

FIGURE 1.2-8 ROMANIA - CERNAVODA 4 x 600 MW(e)

(Courtesy of Nuclaar Engineering lnternational,1980 December)

FIGURE 1.2-9 COMPARISON OF THE PERFORMANCE OF FOUR TYPES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS

I Ref: Nuclear Engineering International Vol. 25 No. 307,1980

I TO END OF SEPTEMBER 1960

The terminology used in describing CANDU is shown in Figure 1.3-1. This _

NUCLEAR STEAM BALANCE OF

NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY BALANCE OF NUCLEAR ELECTRIC POWER

NUCLEAR CORE STEAM GENERATING BALANCE OF NUCLEAR

PRIMARY HEAT I - HEAVY WATER MANAGEMENT

FIGURE 1.3-1 COMPONENT PARTS OF THE PLANT

FIGURE 1.3-2 600 MW(e) NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

FIGURE 1.3-4 NUCLEAR CORE SYSTEM AND STEAM GENERATING PLANT

FIGURE 1.3-5 600 MW(e) REACTOR BUILDING CUTAWAY

FIGURE 1.3-6 CONTROL CENTRE

FIGURE 1.3-8 SERVICE BUILDING PLAN EL. 100 (GRADE)

2.1 REACTOR CORE

Like preceding CANDU reactors, this design incorporates a standardized,

I These fuel channels are mounted within a cylindrical calandria, which

2.1.1 Reactor Assembly

I . A cylindrical low-pressure calandria vessel of stainless steel