14) South Bell & Co. vs. Natividad (40 Phil.

136)

A writ of mandamus is prayed for by Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.), against Joaquin Natividad,
Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate
of Philippine registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato. The Attorney-General, acting as
counsel for respondent, demurs to the petition on the general ground that it does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. While the facts are thus admitted, and while, moreover,
the pertinent provisions of law are clear and understandable, and interpretative American
jurisprudence is found in abundance, yet the issue submitted is not lightly to be resolved. The
question, flatly presented, is, whether Act. No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid — or,
more directly stated, whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature,
can deny the registry of vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders.

FACTS

Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine
Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel
known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross
The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the
vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused
to issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
were not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the
result.

LAW.

The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, repealing the Shipping Act of April 30, 1906 but
reenacting a portion of section 3 of this Law, and still in force, provides in its section 1:

That until Congress shall have authorized the registry as vessels of the United States of vessels
owned in the Philippine Islands, the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized
to adopt, from time to time, and enforce regulations governing the transportation of merchandise
and passengers between ports or places in the Philippine Archipelago. (35 Stat. at L., 70;
Section 3912, U. S. Comp Stat. [1916]; 7 Pub. Laws, 364.)

The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, still in force,
provides in section 3, (first paragraph, first sentence), 6, 7, 8, 10, and 31, as follows.

SEC. 3. That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws. . . .
SEC. 6. That the laws now in force in the Philippines shall continue in force and effect, except
as altered, amended, or modified herein, until altered, amended, or repealed by the legislative
authority herein provided or by Act of Congress of the United States.

SEC. 7. That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent
with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal,
continued in force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit

This power shall specifically extend with the limitation herein provided as to the tariff to all laws
relating to revenue provided as to the tariff to all laws relating to revenue and taxation in effect in
the Philippines.

SEC. 8. That general legislative power, except as otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted
to the Philippine Legislature, authorized by this Act.

SEC. 10. That while this Act provides that the Philippine government shall have the authority to
enact a tariff law the trade relations between the islands and the United States shall continue to
be governed exclusively by laws of the Congress of the United States: Provided, That tariff acts
or acts amendatory to the tariff of the Philippine Islands shall not become law until they shall
receive the approval of the President of the United States, nor shall any act of the Philippine
Legislature affecting immigration or the currency or coinage laws of the Philippines become a
law until it has been approved by the President of the United States: Provided further, That the
President shall approve or disapprove any act mentioned in the foregoing proviso within six
months from and after its enactment and submission for his approval, and if not disapproved
within such time it shall become a law the same as if it had been specifically approved.

SEC. 31. That all laws or parts of laws applicable to the Philippines not in conflict with any of the
provisions of this Act are hereby continued in force and effect." (39 Stat at L., 546.)

On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761. The first section of this
law amended section 1172 of the Administrative Code to read as follows:
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic
ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued
for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the
certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.

"Domestic ownership," as used in this section, means ownership vested in some one or more of
the following classes of persons: (a) Citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b)
citizens of the United States residing in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company
composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or of both, created
under the laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, or of thereof, or the managing agent
or master of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands

Any vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February eighth, nineteen hundred and
eighteen, had a certificate of Philippine register under existing law, shall likewise be deemed a
vessel of domestic ownership so long as there shall not be any change in the ownership thereof
nor any transfer of stock of the companies or corporations owning such vessel to person not
included under the last preceding paragraph.

Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2761 amended sections 1176 and 1202 of the Administrative Code
to read as follows:

SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of Philippine
register shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the
vessel that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic
ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this
Code.

The collector of customs may at any time inspect a vessel or examine its owner, master, crew,
or passengers in order to ascertain whether the vessel is engaged in legitimate trade and is
entitled to have or retain the certificate of Philippine register.

SEC. 1202. Limiting number of foreign officers and engineers on board vessels. — No
Philippine vessel operating in the coastwise trade or on the high seas shall be permitted to have
on board more than one master or one mate and one engineer who are not citizens of the
United States or of the Philippine Islands, even if they hold licenses under section one thousand
one hundred and ninety-nine hereof. No other person who is not a citizen of the United States or
of the Philippine Islands shall be an officer or a member of the crew of such vessel. Any such
vessel which fails to comply with the terms of this section shall be required to pay an additional
tonnage tax of fifty centavos per net ton per month during the continuance of said failure.

ISSUES.

Predicated on these facts and provisions of law, the issues as above stated recur, namely,
whether Act No 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid in whole or in part — whether the
Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in
its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders .

OPINION.

1. Considered from a positive standpoint, there can exist no measure of doubt as to the power
of the Philippine Legislature to enact Act No. 2761. The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, with
its specific delegation of authority to the Government of the Philippine Islands to regulate the
transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or places therein, the liberal
construction given to the provisions of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, by
the courts, and the grant by the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, of general legislative
power to the Philippine Legislature, are certainly superabundant authority for such a law. While
the Act of the local legislature may in a way be inconsistent with the Act of Congress regulating
the coasting trade of the Continental United States, yet the general rule that only such laws of
the United States have force in the Philippines as are expressly extended thereto, and the
abnegation of power by Congress in favor of the Philippine Islands would leave no starting point
for convincing argument. As a matter of fact, counsel for petitioner does not assail legislative
action from this direction (See U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; Sinnot vs. Davenport [1859] 22
How., 227.)

2. It is from the negative, prohibitory standpoint that counsel argues against the constitutionality
of Act No. 2761. The first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights of the Philippine Bill,
repeated again in the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights as set forth in the Jones
Law, provides "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws." Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the
equal protection of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels,
and because classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their
stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without
due process of law because by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of
every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could
not use .
The guaranties extended by the Congress of the United States to the Philippine Islands have
been used in the same sense as like provisions found in the United States Constitution. While
the "due process of law and equal protection of the laws" clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights is
couched in slightly different words than the corresponding clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, the first should be interpreted and given the same force and
effect as the latter. (Kepner vs. U.S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Sierra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U.
S.,.470; U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7.) The meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
announced in classic decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Even at the expense of
restating what is so well known, these basic principles must again be set down in order to serve
as the basis of this decision.

The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill
of Rights, are universal in their application to all person within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes aliens. (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33.) Private
corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their
property is concerned. (Santa Clara County vs. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. [1886], 118.U. S., 394;
Pembina Mining Co. vs. Pennsylvania [1888],.125 U. S., 181 Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co.
vs. Sandford [1896], 164 U. S., 578.) Classification with the end in view of providing diversity of
treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based upon some reasonable ground
and not be a mere arbitrary selection (Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. Ellis
[1897],.165 U. S., 150.) Examples of laws held unconstitutional because of unlawful
discrimination against aliens could be cited. Generally, these decisions relate to statutes which
had attempted arbitrarily to forbid aliens to engage in ordinary kinds of business to earn their
living. (State vs. Montgomery [1900], 94 Maine, 192, peddling — but see. Commonwealth vs.
Hana [1907], 195 Mass., 262; Templar vs. Board of Examiners of Barbers [1902], 131 Mich.,
254, barbers; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S.,.356, discrimination against Chinese; Truax
vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33; In re Parrott [1880], 1 Fed , 481; Fraser vs. McConway & Torley
Co. [1897], 82 Fed , 257; Juniata Limestone Co. vs. Fagley [1898], 187 Penn., 193, all relating
to the employment of aliens by private corporations.)

A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause the
inevitable deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a
corporation, some of whole members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws. Like all
beneficient propositions, deeper research discloses provisos. Examples of a denial of rights to
aliens notwithstanding the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment could be cited. (Tragesser
vs. Gray [1890], 73 Md., 250, licenses to sell spirituous liquors denied to persons not citizens of
the United States; Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass , 262, excluding aliens from the
right to peddle; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S. , 138, prohibiting
the killing of any wild bird or animal by any unnaturalized foreign-born resident; Ex parte Gilleti
[1915], 70 Fla., 442, discriminating in favor of citizens with reference to the taking for private use
of the common property in fish and oysters found in the public waters of the State; Heim vs.
McCall [1915], 239 U. S.,.175, and Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195, limiting
employment on public works by, or for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the United
States.)

One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence is, that
neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, broad and comprehensive
as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the State,
sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace,
morals, education, and good order of the people, and legislate so as to increase the industries
of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very
necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often
be had in certain districts." (Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27; New Orleans Gas Co. vs.
Lousiana Light Co. [1885], 115 U.S., 650.) This is the same police power which the United
States Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as
to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people." (Bacon vs. Walker [1907], 204 U.S.,
311.) For quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine Organic Law could could
have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its
Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the
sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. (U. S.
vs. Toribio [1910], 15 Phil., 85; Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.) Another notable exception permits of the
regulation or distribution of the public domain or the common property or resources of the
people of the State, so that use may be limited to its citizens. (Ex parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla.,
442; McCready vs. Virginia [1876], 94 U. S., 391; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
[1914], 232U. S., 138.) Still another exception permits of the limitation of employment in the
construction of public works by, or for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States
or of the State. (Atkin vs. Kansas [1903],191 U. S., 207; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U.S., 175;
Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195.) Even as to classification, it is admitted that a State
may classify with reference to the evil to be prevented; the question is a practical one,
dependent upon experience. (Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S.,
138.)

To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain a
certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it
must be done under some one of the exceptions here mentioned This must be done, moreover,
having particularly in mind what is so often of controlling effect in this jurisdiction — our local
experience and our peculiar local conditions.
To recall a few facts in geography, within the confines of Philippine jurisdictional limits are found
more than three thousand islands. Literally, and absolutely, steamship lines are, for an Insular
territory thus situated, the arteries of commerce. If one be severed, the life-blood of the nation is
lost. If on the other hand these arteries are protected, then the security of the country and the
promotion of the general welfare is sustained. Time and again, with such conditions confronting
it, has the executive branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands, always later with the
sanction of the judicial branch, taken a firm stand with reference to the presence of undesirable
foreigners. The Government has thus assumed to act for the all-sufficient and primitive reason
of the benefit and protection of its own citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its
dominion. (In re Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Forbes vs. Chuoco, Tiaco and Crossfield [1910],
16 Phil., 534;.228 U.S., 549; In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41.) Boats owned by
foreigners, particularly by such solid and reputable firms as the instant claimant, might indeed
traverse the waters of the Philippines for ages without doing any particular harm. Again, some
evilminded foreigner might very easily take advantage of such lavish hospitality to chart
Philippine waters, to obtain valuable information for unfriendly foreign powers, to stir up
insurrection, or to prejudice Filipino or American commerce. Moreover, under the Spanish
portion of Philippine law, the waters within the domestic jurisdiction are deemed part of the
national domain, open to public use. (Book II, Tit. IV, Ch. I, Civil Code; Spanish Law of Waters
of August 3, 1866, arts 1, 2, 3.) Common carriers which in the Philippines as in the United
States and other countries are, as Lord Hale said, "affected with a public interest," can only be
permitted to use these public waters as a privilege and under such conditions as to the
representatives of the people may seem wise. (See De Villata vs. Stanley [1915], 32 Phil., 541.)

In Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ([1913], 232 U.S., 138), a case herein before
mentioned, Justice Holmes delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court said:

This statute makes it unlawful for any unnaturalized foreign-born resident to kill any wild bird or
animal except in defense of person or property, and `to that end' makes it unlawful for such
foreign-born person to own or be possessed of a shotgun or rifle; with a penalty of $25 and a
forfeiture of the gun or guns. The plaintiff in error was found guilty and was sentenced to pay the
abovementioned fine. The judgment was affirmed on successive appeals. (231 Pa., 46; 79 Atl.,
928.) He brings the case to this court on the ground that the statute is contrary to the 14th
Amendment and also is in contravention of the treaty between the United States and Italy, to
which latter country the plaintiff in error belongs .

Under the 14th Amendment the objection is twofold; unjustifiably depriving the alien of property,
and discrimination against such aliens as a class. But the former really depends upon the latter,
since it hardly can be disputed that if the lawful object, the protection of wild life (Geer vs.
Connecticut, 161 U.S., 519; 40 L. ed., 793; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 600), warrants the discrimination,
the, means adopted for making it effective also might be adopted. . . .
The discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult question. But we start with reference to
the evil to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated against is or reasonably might be
considered to define those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked
out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one, dependent
upon experience. . . .

The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say that the legislature of
Pennsylvania was not warranted in assuming as its premise for the law that resident
unnaturalized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil that it desired to prevent. (Barrett vs.
Indiana,. 229 U.S., 26, 29; 57 L. ed., 1050, 1052; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 692.)

Obviously the question, so stated, is one of local experience, on which this court ought to be
very slow to declare that the state legislature was wrong in its facts (Adams vs. Milwaukee, 228
U.S., 572, 583; 57 L. ed., 971,.977; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 610.) If we might trust popular speech in
some states it was right; but it is enough that this court has no such knowledge of local
conditions as to be able to say that it was manifestly wrong. . . .

Judgment affirmed.

We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien
stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal
protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the
Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to
register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of
class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions,
notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional
provision.

This opinion might well be brought to a close at this point. It occurs to us, however, that the
legislative history of the United States and the Philippine Islands, and, probably, the legislative
history of other countries, if we were to take the time to search it out, might disclose similar
attempts at restriction on the right to enter the coastwise trade, and might thus furnish valuable
aid by which to ascertain and, if possible, effectuate legislative intention.
3. The power to regulate commerce, expressly delegated to the Congress by the Constitution,
includes the power to nationalize ships built and owned in the United States by registries and
enrollments, and the recording of the muniments of title of American vessels. The Congress
"may encourage or it may entirely prohibit such commerce, and it may regulate in any way it
may see fit between these two extremes." (U.S. vs. Craig [1886], 28 Fed., 795; Gibbons vs.
Ogden [1824], 9 Wheat., 1; The Passenger Cases [1849], 7 How., 283.)

Acting within the purview of such power, the first Congress of the United States had not been
long convened before it enacted on September 1, 1789, "An Act for Registering and Clearing
Vessels, Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes." Section 1 of this law provided
that for any ship or vessel to obtain the benefits of American registry, it must belong wholly to a
citizen or citizens of the United States "and no other." (1 Stat. at L., 55.) That Act was shortly
after repealed, but the same idea was carried into the Acts of Congress of December 31, 1792
and February 18, 1793. (1 Stat. at L., 287, 305.).Section 4 of the Act of 1792 provided that in
order to obtain the registry of any vessel, an oath shall be taken and subscribed by the owner,
or by one of the owners thereof, before the officer authorized to make such registry, declaring,
"that there is no subject or citizen of any foreign prince or state, directly or indirectly, by way of
trust, confidence, or otherwise, interested in such vessel, or in the profits or issues thereof."
Section 32 of the Act of 1793 even went so far as to say "that if any licensed ship or vessel shall
be transferred to any person who is not at the time of such transfer a citizen of and resident
within the United States, ... every such vessel with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the
cargo found on board her, shall be forefeited." In case of alienation to a foreigner, Chief Justice
Marshall said that all the privileges of an American bottom were ipso facto forfeited. (U.S. vs.
Willings and Francis [1807], 4 Cranch, 48.) Even as late as 1873, the Attorney-General of the
United States was of the opinion that under the provisions of the Act of December 31, 1792, no
vessel in which a foreigner is directly or indirectly interested can lawfully be registered as a
vessel of the United. States. (14 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U.S.], 340.)

These laws continued in force without contest, although possibly the Act of March 3, 1825, may
have affected them, until amended by the Act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat. at L., 188) which
extended the privileges of registry from vessels wholly owned by a citizen or citizens of the
United States to corporations created under the laws of any of the states thereof. The law, as
amended, made possible the deduction that a vessel belonging to a domestic corporation was
entitled to registry or enrollment even though some stock of the company be owned by aliens.
The right of ownership of stock in a corporation was thereafter distinct from the right to hold the
property by the corporation (Humphreys vs. McKissock [1890], 140 U.S., 304; Queen vs.
Arnaud [1846], 9 Q. B., 806; 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U.S.],188.)

On American occupation of the Philippines, the new government found a substantive law in
operation in the Islands with a civil law history which it wisely continued in force Article fifteen of
the Spanish Code of Commerce permitted any foreigner to engage in Philippine trade if he had
legal capacity to do so under the laws of his nation. When the Philippine Commission came to
enact the Customs Administrative Act (No. 355) in 1902, it returned to the old American policy of
limiting the protection and flag of the United States to vessels owned by citizens of the United
States or by native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Sec. 117.) Two years later, the same
body reverted to the existing Congressional law by permitting certification to be issued to a
citizen of the United States or to a corporation or company created under the laws of the United
States or of any state thereof or of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 1235, sec. 3.) The two
administration codes repeated the same provisions with the necessary amplification of inclusion
of citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Adm. Code of 1916, sec. 1345; Adm.
Code of 1917, sec. 1172). And now Act No. 2761 has returned to the restrictive idea of the
original Customs Administrative Act which in turn was merely a reflection of the statutory
language of the first American Congress.

Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761, which deny to foreigners the right to a certificate of
Philippine registry, are thus found not to be as radical as a first reading would make them
appear.

Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to
enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage
Philippine ship-building. This, without doubt, has, likewise, been the intention of the United
States Congress in passing navigation or tariff laws on different occasions. The object of such a
law, the United States Supreme Court once said, was to encourage American trade, navigation,
and ship-building by giving American ship-owners exclusive privileges. (Old Dominion
Steamship Co. vs. Virginia [1905], 198 U.S., 299; Kent's Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 139.)

In the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Gibbons vs. Ogden ([1824], 9 Wheat., 1) is
found the following:

Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly
of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage
American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations.
Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade;
and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole
legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American
character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her
enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contradistinguished from foreign;
and to preserve the. Government from fraud by foreigners, in surreptitiously intruding
themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the
trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected.

The United States Congress in assuming its grave responsibility of legislating wisely for a new
country did so imbued with a spirit of Americanism. Domestic navigation and trade, it decreed,
could only be carried on by citizens of the United States. If the representatives of the American
people acted in this patriotic manner to advance the national policy, and if their action was
accepted without protest in the courts, who can say that they did not enact such beneficial laws
under the all-pervading police power, with the prime motive of safeguarding the country and of
promoting its prosperity? Quite similarly, the Philippine Legislature made up entirely of Filipinos,
representing the mandate of the Filipino people and the guardian of their rights, acting under
practically autonomous powers, and imbued with a strong sense of Philippinism, has desired for
these Islands safety from foreign interlopers, the use of the common property exclusively by its
citizens and the citizens of the United States, and protection for the common good of the
people. Who can say, therefore, especially can a court, that with all the facts and circumstances
affecting the Filipino people before it, the Philippine Legislature has erred in the enactment of
Act No. 2761?

Surely, the members of the judiciary are not expected to live apart from active life, in monastic
seclusion amidst dusty tomes and ancient records, but, as keen spectators of passing events
and alive to the dictates of the general — the national — welfare, can incline the scales of their
decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. All the
presumption is in favor of the constitutionally of the law and without good and strong reasons,
courts should not attempt to nullify the action of the Legislature. "In construing a statute enacted
by the Philippine Commission (Legislature), we deem it our duty not to give it a construction
which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly
susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law." (In re Guariña [1913], 24.
Phil., 36; U.S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1.) That is the true construction which will best carry
legislative intention into effect.

With full consciousness of the importance of the question, we nevertheless are clearly of the
opinion that the limitation of domestic ownership for purposes of obtaining a certificate of
Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippine Islands, and to citizens of
the United States, does not violate the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916 No treaty right relied upon Act No. 2761 of the Philippine
Legislature is held valid and constitutional .

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
15) Buck vs. Bell (274 US 200)

16) People vs. Fajardo (104 SCRA 443)

17) Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindanao [39 Phil. 660 (1919)]

18) Torraco vs. Thompson (263 US 197

19) Hurtado vs. California [110]

RELATIVITY OF DUE PROCESS

20) Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (G.R. No. 139466, October 17, 2000)

FACTS:

The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of Foreign Affairs U. S.
Note Verbale No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the United States. The request was forwarded the
following day by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Pending
evaluation of the extradition documents by the DOJ, private respondent requested for copies of
the official extradition request and all pertinent documents and the holding in abeyance of the
proceedings. When his request was denied for being premature, private respondent resorted to
an action for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition. The trial court issued an order maintaining
and enjoining the DOJ from conducting further proceedings, hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Would private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-
Extradition Treaty?

RULUNG:

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law
implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of
notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith.
The observance of our country’s legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution which provides that “[t]he Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policyof peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations.” Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international
law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such
rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p.
12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be
exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal
law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal
law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong
vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine
ofincorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the
principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict
with the constitution (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national
law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted against each
other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void
in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No.
1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the
extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights
ofnotice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto,
the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests
this silence.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an “ex parte technical assessment” of the sufficiency of the extradition
request and the supporting documents.

We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of
the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a
prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no
proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective
extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the
asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35
C.J.S. 410).

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the
two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by
analogy.|||

xxx

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that “the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997];
Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC,276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc.
vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer
vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or
manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils.,
283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional
guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner’s fears that the Requesting State
may have valid objections to the Requested State’s non-performance of its commitments under
the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.

How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four
corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due
process rights of the respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner’s favorable action on the extradition
request and the deprivation of private respondent’s liberty is easily comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Court’s equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as
“justice outside legality,” may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530
[1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the
case at bar does not even call for “justice outside legality,” since private respondent’s due
process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional
guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction
over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
 Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant
and wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies ofthe extradition request
and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment
with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot
and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

21) Morrissey vs. Brewer (408 US 471)

RULE:

The liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified
liberty and its termination inflicts a "grievous loss" on the parolee and often on others. The
liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Its
termination calls for some orderly process, however informal.

FACTS:

Petitioners Morrissey and Booher had been convicted of crimes based upon their guilty pleas.
After serving some time, both were paroled from the Iowa State Penitentiary. Subsequently,
based upon their respective parole officer's report, their paroles were revoked by the Iowa
Board of Parole. Both Morrisseey and Booher filed habeas corpus petitions in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, alleging that they were denied due process
because their paroles were revoked without a hearing. The District Court denied the petitions on
the ground that due process did not require a pre-revocation hearing, which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari review.

ISSUE:

In order to observe the due process of law, should parolees be granted a hearing prior to parole
revocation?

ANSWER:

Yes.

CONCLUSION:

The United States Supreme Court held that one's freedom was valuable and, therefore, its
termination called for some orderly process. According to the Court, the minimum requirements
of due process in revoking paroles include (a) written notice of the claimed parole violations; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross- examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board,
members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the fact
finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. As such, the Court
reversed the decision of the lower court denying the necessity for such a hearing and remanded
both cases for further adjudication.

22) Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union vs. McElroy [367 US 886 (1961)]

RULE:

The control of access to a military base is within the constitutional powers granted to both
Congress and the President. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 gives Congress the power to provide and
maintain a navy; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
to exercise exclusive legislation over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of
the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,
and other needful buildings; and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers. Const. art. I, § 8. Broad power in this same area is
also vested in the President by U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, which makes him the Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.

FACTS:

The individual petitioner was a cook at a cafeteria operated by a private concessionaire on the
premises of the Naval Gun Factory in Washington, D. C., which was engaged in the
development of secret weapons and access to which was limited to persons having badges
issued by the Factory's Security Officer. The contract between the Gun Factory and the
concessionaire forbade the employment on the premises of any person who failed to meet the
security requirements of the Gun Factory, as determined by the Security Officer. On the ground
that the cook had failed to meet the security requirements of the Gun Factory, the Security
Officer required her to turn in her badge and thereafter she was unable to work at the Gun
Factory. After a request for a hearing before officials of the Gun Factory had been denied, the
cook sued in a Federal District Court for restoration of her badge, so that she might be permitted
to enter the Gun Factory and resume her former employment. The District Court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.

ISSUE:

Was the civilian cafeteria employee entitled to be advised of the specific grounds for her
exclusion on a military base, or to a hearing at which she might refute the charges, under the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment?
ANSWER:

No

CONCLUSION:

Affirming, the Supreme Court of the United States held that respondent commanding officer was
authorized to deny civilian petitioner access to the installation under Article 0734 of the Navy
Regulations and in light of the historically unquestioned power of a commanding officer
summarily to exclude civilian tradesmen from the area of the officer's command. The Court also
held that the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. V was not violated. Due process did
not require that the civilian petitioner be advised of the specific grounds for her exclusion and be
accorded a hearing, because government employment, in the absence of legislation, could be
summarily denied.

VOID FOR VAGUENESS/ OVER BREADTH DOCTRINE

23) Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union vs. McElroy [367 US 886 (1961)]

24) David vs. Arroyo (G.R. No. 171390, May 3, 2006)

PROCEDURAL

First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.

I- Moot and Academic Principle

One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of
judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary
simple foundation —

The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all
political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government
consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority
competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and
preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts
exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.22

But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a “self-starting capacity.”23
Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must
be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.24
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our
discussion thereon.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution. It is “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interest;” a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief.25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy,
contending that the present petitions were rendered “moot and academic” by President Arroyo’s
issuance of PP 1021.

Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events,26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.27
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29

The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present
petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital
issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no
protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.”30

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction
over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s
interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly
and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench
and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the
protection given by constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are
capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban’s Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However,
they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s very statement that an otherwise “moot” case
may still be decided “provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to
be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance.” The present case falls right within
this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.

25) Ong vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 126858, September 16, 2005)

26) Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001]

FACTS:

Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.

On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions

3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against
petitioner.

Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,

reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied.

Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a
probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest
of the accused.

Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one offense. Same was denied.

The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law
which states that:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him
directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations

and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to

unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as
provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor
of the State (underscoring supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).

ISSUE:

WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?

HELD:

NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due
process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.

27) Ople vs. Torres [292 SCRA 141 (1998)]

WRIT OF AMPARO

28) Sec. of National Defense vs. Manalo (G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008)

FACTS:

On February 14, 2006, brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from San
Ildefonso, Bulacan were abducted by members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) on suspicion that the brothers were members or supporters of the New Peoples’
Army (NPA). The Manalo brothers were detained in various locations :in Fort Magsaysay,
Nueva Ecija ;in Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan; in Camp Luna, Limay Bataan; in a
house somewhere in Zambales; in a farm in Pangasinan. They were also subjected to various
forms of torture such as chained and blind folded, beaten black and blue indifferent parts of
the body, hit in the stomach with a hard wood, slapped in the forehead by .45 pistol, punched
in the mouth, burned some parts of their bodies with a burning wood, made to witness the
killings of fellow captives; forced to take the pill “alive” which caused them headaches, and
threatened to be executed. After having been detained and tortured for 18 months, the
brothers were able to escape from their captors and torturers on August 13, 2007. On August
23, 2007, the Manalo brothers filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order to stop the military (herein petitioners) from depriving them of their right to
liberty and other basic rights. While the petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo took effect on October24, 2007. On the same day, the Manalo brothers filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition. The next day,
October 25, 2017, the Supreme Court (SC) favorably granted their petitionwhich was treated as
an Amparo Petition. The SC remanded the Amparo petition to the Courtof Appeals (CA) and
ordered the latter to conduct a summary hearing thereon on November 8, 2007.

CA RULING:

On December 26, 2007, the CA granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo to the
Manalo brothers relying on the brothers’ affidavits and testimonies and the medical reports
and testimony of Dr. Molino, a forensic expert, on the scars left by the injuries inflicted on
the brothers. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the AFP Chief of
Staff(petitioners)to furnish the Manalo brothers and the CA within 5 days with all the
official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken, confirm in writing the present
places of Hilario and Caigas –the military personnel identified by the Manalo brothers; to
produce all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed while in detention; and to submit a list of
medical personnel who attended to the brothers while under military custody. In their
Return of the Writ, the military disputed the brothers’ accounts but undertook to exert
efforts in providing results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted relative to
the circumstances of the alleged abduction of the Manalo brothers. The petitioners went to
the Supreme Court seeking the reversal of the CA decision extending the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo to the Manalo brothers.

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the CA erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the
affidavit/testimony of the Manalo brothers.

2.Whether or not the CA erred in granting the reliefs requested in the Amparo Petition –requiring
the petitioners to furnish the Manalo brothers and the CA with all the official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken, confirm in writing the present places of
Hilario and Caigas, to produce all medical reports, records and charts, reports
HELD:

1.Whether or not the CA erred in believing ang giving full faith and credit to the
affidavit/testimony of the Manalo brothers?

No. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1.Petition. -The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile Sections 17 and 18 provide that the quantum of evidence required in petitions for
Writ of Amparo is substantial evidence, to wit:

Sec. 17.Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. -The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.

In affirming the factual findings of the CA, the Supreme Court ruled that Raymond Manalo’s
affidavit and testimony which was corroborated by his brother Reynaldo’s affidavit and
testimony as well as the medical reports and testimony of forensic expert, Dr. Molino, constitute
substantial evidence which is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The SC was convinced by the CA findings that indeed the Manalo brothers were abducted and
detained by the military for 18 months in various locations on suspicion that they were
either members or sympathizers of the NPA. The participation of identified abductors Hilario,
Arman, Ganata, Cabalse, Caigas and the named CAFGU auxiliaries was
established. General Palparan’s participation in the abduction was also established when
he failed to controvert Raymond Manalo’s claim.

The SC also pointed out that the results of the investigation of the Provost Marshall
focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxillaries involved. The SC ruled that there is
a continuing violation of the Manalo brothers’ right to security. Since the brothers’ escape, they
have been under concealment and protection from the military by private citizens because
of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The circumstances of the brothers’ abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat
that they will again be abducted, tortured, and even executed. These constitute threats to
their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a Writ of Amparo.

2.Whether or not the CA erred in granting the particular reliefs requested in the Amparo
Petition?

No. The petitioners argue that the production order of the CA partakes the nature of a
search warrant that necessitates compliance with the Constitutional requisites for the protection
of the right against unreasonable searches. They are wrong.
The amparo production order pertained to a procedure that cannot be identified or confused
with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. Moreover in his affidavit, AFP
Chief of Staff himself undertook to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged abduction of the
Manalo brothers.

Also the disclosure of the present places of assignment of Hilario and Caigas whom the
brothers positively identified as their abductors, is relevant in ensuring the safety of the brothers
and ensuring that Hilario and Caigas will be served with notices and court processes. The
medical reports, on the other hand, will provide the medical history of the brothers while in
detention.

The SC then concluded: In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and
security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ of Amparois a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and
prisoners behind secret walls.