Article 37.

Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family
relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special
laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (n)

a. Capacity to acts vs Juridical Capacity

b. Bambalan vs Maramba - Olairez

G.R. No. L-27710

ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO Vs. GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, G.R. No. L-27710, January 30, 1928

DOCTRINE:

Minority

FACTS:

Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro
Bambalan y Colcotura.

The defendants affirm that the plaintiff did sell the land and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July 17, 1922.

The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva
Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment.
 ISSUE:

Whether the plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants.

RULING:

No, the plaintiff did not sell the land in question to the defendants.

The document was vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor, which is clearly
shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in question.

Even supposing that the document in question embodies all of the requisites prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of section 50 of
Act No. 496, bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the register of deeds to make the proper registration, inasmuch
as it is the registration that gives validity to the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if
it is taken into consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.

As regards minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting
the contract executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the
purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document.

c. Suan Chian vs Alcantara - Parana

G.R. No. L-1720 March 4, 1950

Facts:
On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon
Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon
Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara
executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon Alcantara received from
Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same. On August 8, 1940, an action was
instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of land covered by
certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio, Azores, Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the
latter two being, respectively, the brother and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of Appealed which reversed the decision of the trial court, on the ground that the
 deed of sale is not binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution, and accordingly sentenced Sia Suan to pay to Ramon Alcantara the sum
of P1,750, with legal interest from December 17, 1931, in lieu of his share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved from the complaint), and to reconvey to Ramon
Alcantara an undivided one-fourth interest in the lot originally covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the cost of the suit. From this judgment Sia Suan and Gaw
Chiao have come to us on appeal by certiorari. On August 3, 1931, showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of legal age. The Court of Appeals
remarked that "The fact that when informed of appellant's minority, the appellees too no steps for nine years to protect their interest beyond requiring the appellant to execute a
ratification of the sale while still a minor, strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was executed." But the feeble insinuation is sufficiently
negative by the following positive pronouncements of the Court of Appeals as well in said resolution as in the decision. The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on
the ground that the appellants did not actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated
that the consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino Alcantara.

Issue:
Whether Ramon Alacantara’s execution of the deed of sale is valid despite being a minor at the time of its execution.

Ruling:
Yes, the deed of sale is valid.
The Supreme Court argued that the respondent being a minor at the time of the sale was of no significance. The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the
ground that the appellants did not actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not suffer any detriment by reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that
the consideration therefore was a pre-existing indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred. In the first place, in the
case cited, the consideration for sale consisted in greater part of pre-existing obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of
legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration.
The circumstance that, about one month after the date of conveyance, Alcantara informed the appellants of his minority is of no moment, because Alcatara’s previous
misinterpretation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the inference that the appellants in fact did not know that the
appellee was a minor on the date of contract, and somewhat emphasizes Alcantara’s BF’s, when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he given said information than he ratified
he’s DO’s.

As such, the respondent was stopped from annulling the deed of sale. The Supreme Court reversed all previous decisions, absolving the petitioners and incurring costs to the
respondent.

d. Braganza vs Villa-Abrielle - POKAIS

G.R. No. L-12471

ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners, vs.FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
DOCTRINES:
Contracts; Incapacity of Parties; Minority; When can be made as a basis of deceit-The failure of the minor to disclose his minority when making a contract does not per se
constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. In order to hold a minor liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive.
Liability of Minor under the Contract- Although the written contract is unenforceable because of non-age, however, the minor shall make restitution to the extent that he may
have profited by the thing he received.
Annulment; 4-year period; when NOT applicable- Where minority is set up only as a defense to an act on, without the minor asking for any positive relief from the contract,
the four-year period fixed by Art. 1301 of the Civil Code must NOT be applied.
FACTS:
This case is about a petition for review filed by Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo of the Court of Appeal's decision whereby they were required
solidarily to pay Fernando F. de Villa Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from October 30, 1944.
On October 30, 1944, the above petitioners received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay
him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines",
plus 2% per annum. But in March 1949, NO payment had been made thus, Villa Abrille sued them before the Manila Court of First Instance. The defendants (yung mga
petitioners above), in their answer, claimed that they have received only P40,000 — instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They further averred that Guillermo and Rodolfo
were minors when they signed the promissory note.
After hearing the parties and their evidence, the court of first instance rendered judgment, which the appellate court (RTC) affirmed, in the terms described. “There can
be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because the minority of her consigners note release her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the
minors. However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such minors may be responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that at the
time of signing of the promissory note, Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively.
The Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:

1. These two appellants did not make it appear in the promissory note that they were not yet of legal age.
2. If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information relative to their age, parted with his
money, then he should be content with the consequence of his act.

But, that was not the case. Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much needed money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing the
legal impediment with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minors, like in the instant case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact they were not, they will not later on
be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215.)
ISSUE:

1. Whether the minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo, are bound by the promissory note pertaining to the contract of loan that they have signed?
2. Whether the minority as a defense is still valid because the 4-year period has lapsed.

RULING- 1st issue:

NO, the minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo, are not bound by the promissory note pertaining to the contract of loan that they have signed.
 Article 38 states that Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do
not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
Article 39 provides that “The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship.” The Supreme Court further held that the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the same
promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter to assert it due to the fact that they had no juridical duty to disclose
their inability. In fact, according to Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;
“In order to hold infants liable, however, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to
age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit.” The mere failure of the infant to disclose his age is not sufficient.
In the present case, the promissory note signed by the minors contained no such statement specifying that the signatories were of age. In other words, there was no
active misrepresentation; whereas in this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation.
Hence, the SC held, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally bound by their signatures in the promissory note signed.
Additional information lang here sa issue na to as to the status of a contract incase of misrepresentation of age:

 If ACTIVE MISREPRESENTATION- then the contract is VALID. Why VALID? Generally, voidable talaga siya since a minor is a party however, the minor can no
longer annul the contract later on. The right to annul is already lost thus, parang VALID na ang contract since it can’t be annulled. Active Misrepresentation is when the
minor expressly declared or in the document that he signed stated that he is of majority age.
 If CONSTRUCTIVE/ PASSIVE MISREPRESENTATION- VOIDABLE. So the minor is still allowed to annul it later on upon reaching the age of majority. There is
passive misrepresentation when no document was signed, he is silent about his age, or no express declaration that he is of majority age.

RULING- 2ND ISSUE - though mas importante ang first issue

Yes, the minority as a defense is still valid.
Article 1301 CC provides that "an action to annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached majority age. Furthermore,
there is reason to doubt the pertinence of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code where a minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors
asking for any positive relief from the contract.
In the case at bar, the parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth but it is undenied, however, that in 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such datum, it
should be held that in October 1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this defense was interposed in June 1951, four years had
not yet completely elapsed from October 1947. Further, they have not filed in this case an action for annulment. They merely interposed an excuse from liability.
Upon the other hand, The Supreme Court held that these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In accordance with the provisions of Civil Code,
even if their written contact is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money they received. (Art.
1340) There is testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used for their support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold
that they had profited to the extent of the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944,
P40.00 Japanese notes were equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should now return P1,166.67. Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency as stated in
the promissory note can not be enforced, as already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is presently declared without
regard of said promissory note, but solely in pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.
 Accordingly, the appealed decision should was modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e P3,333.33 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and
Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed. No
costs in this instance.

e. US vs Vaquilar - Sepulchre

G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.

Facts:
Evaristo Vaquilar killed his wife and daughter and have wounded other persons with a bolo. He did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying that
the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to the commission of the crimes. They also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and
stomach prior to the killing. Martin Agustin, witness for the prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise, and that he went to the house and saw the
appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was cut by the appellant; that there "were seven, including the small boys and girls who were cut by him;" that he did not know of any
disagreement between the appellant and the two deceased; that on the morning before she was killed that the appellant had 'felt pains in his head and stomach." The witness
further stated that the appellant's "eyes were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as
he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family — his wife and child."
Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that he helped Martin Agustin capture the appellant; that the appellant "himself used to say before that time he had felt pains in
the head and the stomach;" that at the moment he was cutting those people " he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying any
attention to who it was."
Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that her brother had headache and stomach trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that "he looked very
sad at the time, but I saw him run downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that "he must have been crazy because he cut me."
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant, testified that he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his head
is not all right;" that "oftentimes since he came to the jail he was that quiet and sometime shouts "What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you are beasts."
The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found that the appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other
wounds on her hands; and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to the other." The witness stated that he made a slight examination of the
defendant in the jail and did not notice whether defendant was suffering from any mental derangement or not.
RTC decision: Wala pong decision ng RTC and minention sa case
CA decision: CA charged Vaquikl with two separate information with parricide, one for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs in each case.
From this judgment he appealed.
Issue:
Whether Vaquilar is an insane person and can escape criminal liability.

Ruling:
No, Vaquilar is not an insane person and cannot escape from criminal liability.
In a usual condition, there is a presumption that a person is sane which certainly affords proof of fact. If the killing and nothing more appears, this presumption, without other
proof upon the point of sanity, is sufficiently to support a conviction and as the State must prove every element of the crime charged "beyond a reasonable doubt," it follows that
this presumption affords such proof. Insane must be differentiated from a person who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good
judgment in what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman.
The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos
mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic."
In the case at bar, the acts of Vaquilar is an act of a crazy person. This was supported by the testimony of witnesses that the acts if Vaquilar is a conception of the word “crazy”
because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family. That witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily
rational person would not think of doing. Vaquilar’s sister also states the “He is crazy because if he is not crazy, he wouldn’t have cut me”. Courts states that this is an illustration
of the popular conception of the word "crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. Vaquilar is not proven as insane. The conduct of
the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and remorse which would follow
the commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant might be sufficient to cause the person to cry out, "What kind of people are you to me; what are you doing to
me; you are beast," and yet such conduct could not be sufficient to show that the person was insane at the time the deeds were committed. The appellant's conduct, as appears
from the record, being consistent with the acts of an enlarged criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he committed the
crimes, and the facts charged in each information having been proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance with the law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed,
with costs against the appellant.

Also, in order to order to make such defense of insanity, sufficient proof must be shown to overcome the presumption of sanity. In the absence of proof that a person had lost his
reason or became demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is improper to conclude
that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proven. It is now
well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral system, where the
person is mentally sense, does not exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence. Care must be taken to distinguish between mere moral insanity or
mental depravity and irresistable impulse resulting from disease of the mind. Possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or revenge, which
way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot nevertheless be shield from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only
excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the direct consequences of
his insanity.

Therefore, Vaquilar is not insane and cannot escape from criminal liability.
f. People vs Rafanan - Tulio
G.R. No. L-54135

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.

Facts:

On February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya, who was fourteen (14) years old at the time, was hired as a house helper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan. The
accused Policarpio Rafanan was a married man and had two children, and was living with his mother in the same house in Pangasinan.

On March 16, 1976, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help in their store. Attending the Store at the time was the accused Policarpio, who asked for help
to close the door of the store which Estelita complied. After due compliance of such head for help, Estelita was pulled inside the store by the accused asking her to have carnal
knowledge with her with the latter replied “I do not like” and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused used a bolo and threatened Estelita if she should resist to the
accused’ call for flesh. Due to her fear of being killed, she then submitted to the sexual desires of the accused and was cautioned by the latter that if she reports such matter, she
will be killed. Because of fear, Estelita did not immediately report the matter and only left the house a day after the incident.

Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel
ensued. The next day after coming home, Estelita reported the incident to her mother. Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, Alejandra Ronaya, accompanied by
Patrolman Mairina, reported the incident to the police headquarters.

Policarpio was convicted by the trial court and thus, an instant appealed anchored on the ground that “the lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged
rape was suffering from insanity”, relying on Art. 12 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that an insane person must be exempted from criminal liability. The principal
submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a mental aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted violent intentions upon Estellita. Moreover, the
appellant contends that at the time of the incident, as shown by the medical reports, he was already suffering from schizophrenia for 2 years and that hallucinations and failure to
distinguish reality from fantasy triggered such acts.

Cross-examinations was conducted with Dr. Jovellano who conducted the medical treatment and medical reports of the accused. The doctor was asked if a person under the
condition of being schizophrenic, is conscious, despite being uncontrollable, during the commission of the crime.

Issue:
Whether the accused should be exempted of the crime due to him being schizophrenic.

Ruling:

No. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. In order that the exempting
circumstance of insanity be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of
reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern; or that there be a
total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, impairment must be so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts and mere
abnormality of his mental faculties during the commission of the act does not exclude imputability.

In this case, the affirmative answer of Dr. Jovellano that the accused is conscious despite having no control of his acts during the commission of the crime, negates complete
destruction of intelligence which is required or critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. Furthermore, the fact that the appellant threatened Estelita with death should
she reveal the acts of the former to the latter, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. It is complete loss of
intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found and not mere abnormality of his mental faculties during the commission of the act does
not exclude him from imputability.

Although schizophrenic reactions cannot be exempted because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, it may be considered as a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(9) of the RPC, which provides that “as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender’s willpower without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts”. Appellant must be credited with the previously stated mitigating circumstance, although it would not affect the penalty imposable upon him in
accordance with Art. 63 of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.

Note:

Art. 38 of the New Civil Code. “…, insanity,… are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter
arise from his acts,…”. (cleaned up)

Art. 39 of the New Civil Code. “The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act:.., insanity, …”. “The consequences of these circumstances are
governed in the Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws…”. (cleaned up)

Although appreciated by the diminishment of his willpower, but not total deprivation of consciousness, due to the claim of insanity, the appellant cannot be subject to exemption
from his civil obligation of damages as well as when the latter arise from his acts.
g. Standard Oil vs Arenas - Yamashita
Gr L-5921

The Standard Oil Company of New York v. Juana Codina Arenas and Others (defendants) ; Vicente Sixto Villanueva (appellant)

Facts:
Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay,
jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months from date, with interest at P1 per month.

The Standard Oil Sued the five debtors for the payment of the said amount. The defendants were then summoned but Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared in
default and were so notified.
The Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced all the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the interest
thereon at 1 per cent per month from December 15, 1908, until complete payment should have been made of the principal, and to pay the costs.

While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that Vicente was declare insane by the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila and that she was appointed as his guardian by the same court to institute legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her
husband while in a state of insanity, among them is the present case. She, the guardian was not aware of the proceedings and was only by chance informed of. She said that
when Vicente gave the bond, he was already permanently insane therefore not being able to appear in court and defend himself in the said obligation. She petitioned the court to
relieve the said defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated judgment and reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf of the defendant with respect to
his capacity at the time of the execution of the bond in question which the court granted and the trial was reopened for introduction of evidence. Mr. Villanueva suffered from
“monomania of great wealth” which means that a person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality.

Issue:
Whether suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity to act.

Ruling:
No. Villanueva still have the capacity to act. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is
presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this
court, has not been proved in this case. A person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not necessarily a positive proof of insanity or
incapacity to bind himself in a contract.
Granting that he was a monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he executed the bond now under discussion. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of
incapacity, to wit, lunacy or insanity, it is a rule of constant application that is not enough that there be more or less probability that a person was in a state of dementia at a given
time, if there is not direct proof that, at the date of the performance of the act which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the part of the executor, the latter was
insane or demented, in other words, that he could not, in the performance of that act, give his conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent.
The witness who as physicians testified as to extravagancies observed in Villanueva's conduct, referred, two of them, to a time prior to 1903, and another of them to the year
1908, but none to December 15, 1908, the date of the execution of the bond sought to be invalidated. the testimony of one of these witnesses shows that when Villanueva's wife
endeavored, in 1908, to have her husband confined in the Hospicio de San Jose and cared for therein, objection was made by the director of the institution who advised her that
if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward for old men, as soon as he shouted and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be locked up in the insane ward; to which
Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not exactly insane enough to be placed among the insane."
Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant, and it is very evident that it cannot be concluded therefrom that when Villanueva subscribed the
obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
 CHAPTER 2
Natural Persons
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)
Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one
to the other. (33)

a. Geluz vs CA - Balatong
b. Quimiguing vs ICAO - Ridulfa
c. De Jesus vs Syquia – Minimo

d. Continental Steel vs Montaño - Galuten

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to ART. X and ART XVIII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died
during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.

Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits.

It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must
have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits.
Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements
for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel contended that only one
with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life
of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

According to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that
a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Hence, Atty. Montaño, the appointment Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator issued a Resolution ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

The Office declares that for entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under ART. X, SEC. 2 of CBA three (3) indispensable
elements must be present: (1) there is death ; (2) such death must be of employee’s dependent; (3) such dependent must be legitimate

On the other hand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under ART. XVIII, SEC. 4 of the CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (1) there is death ; (2) such death must be of employee’s dependent; (3) such dependent must be legitimate; and (4) proper legal documents must be presented.

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus has the right to be supported by the parents from the
very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone
else, specifically his/ her mother.

The CA affirmed Atty. Montaños Resolution. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are
meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn
child.
CA denied Motion for Reconsideration of Continental Steel.

ISSUE:
Whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4 of the CBA.
RULING :

YES.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced.

Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born.
Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case. The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. Death has
been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life.

No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another to support; one not able
to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else. By these definitions, even an unborn child is s dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have
reached 38-39 weeks of of its gestational life without depending upon his mother. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be a parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent. Without such
qualification, then child is understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

We emphasize that the bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and is family
who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who in this case had gestational life of
38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Where conflicting interests of labor and capital to be weighed on the scales os social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED

The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño,... which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
e. Limjoco vs Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante - Napicog
G.R. No. L-770

ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,

vs.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.

FACTS:

On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience for an Ice Plant to Pedro Pio Fragante to operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, who
had passed away, through its special or legal administrator.

The Commission determined that the application satisfied the requirements for a certificate of public convenience, including promoting the public interest, Pedro O. Fragante
being a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death, and his estate's financial capability to maintain the proposed ice plant.

The Public Service Commission, in its decision, noted that Fragante had invested P35,000 in the ice plant. Fragante's other business activities, including a transportation
business, were also mentioned, indicating his financial capability to operate the ice plant effectively.

The commission found that Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino citizen at the time of his death. This citizenship status was a crucial factor in determining his eligibility to obtain the
certificate of public convenience.

The Public Service Commission granted the application after Fragante's death, allowing his estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.

The petitioner raised several objections, including the commission's decision not being in accordance with the law, the alleged departure from the commission's policy, and the
substitution of the legal representative for the deceased applicant.

In the case of Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, the parties had the following contentions regarding the issues raised in the case:

Petitioner's Contentions:

The petitioner argued that the Public Service Commission's decision to grant a certificate of public convenience to Pedro Pio Fragante's estate was not in accordance with the
law. They contended that the commission should not have allowed the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant after Fragante's death.
The petitioner also raised concerns about the alleged departure from the commission's policy. They argued that the commission's decision in this case departed from its usual
practices and policies, which should have been followed.

The substitution of the legal representative for the deceased applicant was another contention raised by the petitioner. They questioned whether Fragante's estate, represented
by a legal administrator, should be allowed to step into Fragante's shoes and continue with the application.

Respondent's Contentions:

The respondent, representing the Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, argued that Fragante's estate should be considered a legal entity. They contended that if Fragante had lived,
he would have been granted the certificate of public convenience, and the situation remained the same except for his death. Therefore, his estate had the same economic
capacity to properly operate and maintain the ice plant, as it inherited this capability from him.

They asserted that the term "person" encompasses artificial persons, including the estates of deceased individuals. Therefore, within the constitutional framework, Pedro O.
Fragante's estate should be recognized as an artificial or legal entity for the purpose of settling and distributing his estate, which includes pursuing the rights and fulfilling the
obligations that continue after his death, such as the pending application before the Public Service Commission.

The respondent argued that failing to consider Pedro O. Fragante's estate as a legal entity would result in an unjust outcome, potentially leading to the loss of the $35,000
investment made by Fragante in the ice plant, which would affect the estate, creditors, and heirs solely because of the individual's death.

The court ultimately ruled in favor of the respondent, recognizing Pedro Fragante's estate as a legal entity and allowing it to maintain and operate the ice plant. This decision was
based on the principle that the estate of a deceased individual can continue to have a legal personality even after their death, primarily for the purpose of settling debts and
fulfilling obligations.

ISSUE: Is Pedro Fragante's estate considered a legal entity?

RULING:

Yes, the court decided that Pedro Fragante's estate should be considered a legal entity.

If Fragante had lived, he would have obtained the certificate, and the situation remained the same except for his death. His estate had the same economic capacity to properly
operate and maintain the ice plant, as it inherited this capability from him.

The term "person" encompasses artificial persons, including the estates of deceased individuals. Therefore, within the constitutional framework, Pedro O. Fragante's estate
should be recognized as an artificial or legal entity for the purpose of settling and distributing his estate, which includes pursuing the rights and fulfilling the obligations that
continue after his death. This includes his pending application before the Public Service Commission in this case.
Failing to consider Pedro O. Fragante's estate as a legal entity would result in an unjust outcome.

Notes: CA 146, Section 15, mandates that no public service can operate in the Philippines without a valid certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as a "certificate
of public convenience" or "certificate of public convenience and necessity." This certificate ensures that the operation of the service and the authorization to conduct business will
serve the public interest adequately.

Relevance: The case highlights that the estate of a deceased individual can continue to have a legal personality even after their death, primarily for the purpose of settling debts.
In this situation, recognizing the estate as a legal entity is crucial to prevent the unjust loss of a $35,000 investment made by the deceased in an ice plant, which would otherwise
affect the estate, creditors, and heirs solely because of the individual's death.

NCC 42 states that civil personality ceases upon death, and the impact of death on the rights and responsibilities of the deceased is determined by law, agreements, and wills.

Article 40 of a legal code appears to address the legal concept of when a person's personality is established in the context of birth and the rights of a conceived child.

Elements of this article:

1. Birth as the Determinant of Personality: The article begins by stating that a person's personality, or legal identity, is established or determined by their birth. This means
that, in the eyes of the law, a person's existence as a legal entity begins when they are born.

2. Conceived Child: The article recognizes the existence of a "conceived child." This term refers to a fetus or embryo that has been conceived but has not yet been born. In
legal terms, this child is not yet considered a person with legal rights.

3. Consideration for Conceived Child: The article introduces an important principle. It states that, even though a conceived child is not yet born and does not have legal
personality, there are situations where the law will treat it as if it were already born.

4. Conditions Specified in the Following Article: To understand the full scope of when a conceived child is considered as born for legal purposes, one needs to refer to the next
article in the legal code. Article 40 acts as a preamble or introduction to the conditions outlined in the subsequent article.

In summary, Article 40 establishes the fundamental principle that a person's legal personality is determined by their birth. However, it also recognizes that in certain situations, a
conceived child can be considered as born for legal purposes, but the specific conditions under which this occurs are provided in the following article. This legal concept
acknowledges that some legal rights and protections may be extended to a conceived child in situations that are favorable to the child, even before their actual birth, provided
they meet the conditions outlined in the subsequent article.
f. Dumlao vs Quality Plastics - Baruel

g. Marcos vs Manglapus - Martinez

G.R. NO. 88211

MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS G.R. NO. 88211 (OCTOBER 27, 1989)

Based on the separate opinion of Justice Padilla: The right of a Filipino to be buried in his country is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is
finally laid to rest in his country.

FACTS: In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C.
Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power". This did not,
however, stop bloody challenges to the government. Armed threats to the government were not only found among the followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist
insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos.

The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years
after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has
remained elusive.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a
time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar
the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The Petition

 This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and
social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.

 This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family
and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law."
Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any
authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside
here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that such return will endanger national security and public safety. Thus, banning the return of Marcos in the
Philippines.

ISSUES: Whether the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his family returning to the Philippines is correct.

RULING: YES. That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature. The President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest.

The country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses, while the Government has barely
scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total
economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the
country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees petitioners invoke are neither absolute
nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the
President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it
is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at
153].

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining
that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:

 Justice Cruz opined that Marcos' return was not at all a threat to national security and would not plunge the nation into paroxysms of grief.

 Justice Paras argued that the former President, although already dead, was still entitled to certain rights. The issue as to whether or not former President Ferdinand
Marcos should be allowed to return to the Philippines may be resolved by answering two simple questions: Does he have the right to return to his own country and should
national safety and security deny him this right?

There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen and both under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines, he has the right to return to his own country except only if prevented by the demands of national safety and national security. Our Armed Forces have failed to
prove this danger.

 Justice Padilla contended that the former President was a Filipino and, as such, entitled to return to, die and be buried in this country. Philippine democracy is built on the
fundamental assumption that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply to all Filipinos, whatever he is as long as he is a Filipino. The right of a Filipino to be buried
in his country is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and ends only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his country. Mr. Marcos is a Filipino and, as
such, entitled to return to die and be buried in this country.

 Justice Sarmiento voted to grant reconsideration and pointed out that the President has no power to deny requests of Marcos relatives to bury the former President in his
homeland as the President’s supposed “residual” power to forbid citizens from entering the Philippines can not be found on the Constitution, neither by direct grant or by
implication. The threats to the government which may be caused by the return of the Marcoses is a mere conjecture and speculation.