RENATO L. CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, GR No.

100113, 1991-09-03
Facts:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been... candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does... not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%.
He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his... professional license fees as a lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father.
During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of... an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered
services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986)
and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, Monsod's,... work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accredition hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal... knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a guasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990)
and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia-Munoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.
Issues:
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod... as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Ruling:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined
that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of
such an acknowledged... power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court... interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance... of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Principles:
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences
as a... lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor - verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement - that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least... ten years.
2

Ventura vs. Atty. Samson, A.C. No. 9608 – Case Digest

 Post published:November 27, 2012

 Reading time:4 mins read

FACTS

Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint for Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson for “grossly
immoral conduct.” Ventura alleged that sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, she was sleeping in the
maid’s room at Atty. Samson’s house when Samson entered and went on top of her. Atty. Samson then kissed her
lips, sucked her breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and found bloodstain in
her panty. She stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at Samson’s poultry farm in Alegria, San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Atty. Samson asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to an old shanty where
he sexually abused her. Thereafter, Atty. Samson gave her five hundred pesos and warned her not to tell anyone
what had happened, or he would kill her and her mother.

Atty. Samson in his answer alleged that the sexual intercourse with Ventura was consensual and he did not violate
any immoral conduct for having sex with Ventura with just compensation once does not amount to immoral conduct.

Then after, Ventura and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor and executed their respective Affidavits of
Desistance. Ventura stated that what happened between Atty. Samson and her in March 2002 was based on mutual
understanding. Thus, she was withdrawing the complaint she filed against Samson before the RTC as well as the one
she filed before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against Atty. Samson was
dismissed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the act of Atty. Samson constitutes a grossly immoral act.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that that act of Atty. Samson constitutes a grossly immoral act and is in violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 6, Rule 6.0 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court further stated that
the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. Consequently, any errant
behavior on the part of a lawyer may be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer
deficient in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Samson himself, we find that
Samson’s act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral
conduct that warrants sanction. Atty. Samson not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with Ventura but also
showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he
even gave her money.
Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect for the laws on the
sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a very
young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the dignity of the human person and
the ethics of his profession. Atty. Samson has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by Ventura, then a
13-year-old minor, who for a time was under his care. Whether the sexual encounter between Samson and Ventura
was or was not with the latter’s consent is of no moment. Atty. Samson clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly
immoral, and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of morality required of the
legal profession and should be disciplined accordingly.
Due to the seriousness of the offense, the Court is compelled to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED.
3

FERDINAND A. CRUZ v ALBERTO MINA

G.R. No. 154207. April 27, 2007
FACTS

Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner), a third-year law student, filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano
Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court and set the case for continuation of trial.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MeTC and RTC) seeking to reverse the Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law
Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the
source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner
cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior
courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
The petitioner directly filed to the Supreme Court the petition and contended that the court[s] are clearly ignoring the law when
they patently refused to heed to the clear mandate of the Laput, Cantimbuhan and Bulacan cases, as well as bar matter no. 730,
providing for the appearance of non-lawyers before the lower courts (MTC’s).

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant

HELD

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the
petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case
without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an
inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal
capacity without the supervision of a lawyer: Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may
conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the
bar.There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance of a
non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law
student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner
for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that
appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly
clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

DECISION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the
public prosecutor.

Bansig vs. Celera

FACTS: In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into
a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.

However, notwithstanding respondent’s marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with
a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and
in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or
rendered void by any lawful authority. Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is
still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue
his membership in the Bar.

ISSUE: won the certified xerox copy of the marriage certificate is sufficient.

HELD: Yes. The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as
the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. — When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof.

Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also clearly indicate that
respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent.
The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this
disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to
prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar.

Tomas P. Tan, Jr., complainant vs Atty. Haide V. Gumba, respondent

[A.C. No. 9000.October 5, 2011] [Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.] Facts:  Tomas Tan Jr., a self-made businessman with a tailoring
shop in Naga City, filed a verified Complaint against Atty. Gumba before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines  That respondent
borrowed ₱350,000.00 from the complainant. Respondent assured him that she would pay the principal plus 12% interest per
annum after one year. She likewise offered by way of security a 105-square-meter parcel of land located in Naga City registered in
her father’s name.  Respondent showed complainant a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by respondents parents, and
verbally assured complainant that she was authorized to sell or encumber the entire property.  Complainant consulted one Atty.
Raquel Payte and was assured that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus, complainant agreed to lend money
to respondent.  Respondent, however, defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite complainants
repeated demands.  Complainant manifested that he had lent money before to other people albeit for insignificant amounts, but
this was the first time that he extended a loan to a lawyer and it bore disastrous results. He submitted that respondent committed
fraud and deceit or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Issue: WON a lawyer may be subject under disciplinary action for deception
when she acted in her private capacity and not as a lawyer. Held: Yes  Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.  Lawyers are similarly required, under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code, not to engage in any
unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.  Here, respondent’s actions clearly show that she deceived complainant
into lending money to her through the use of documents and false representations and taking advantage of her education and
complainant’s ignorance in legal matters. By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainant’s perception of the legal
profession but the public’s perception as well. Her actions constitute gross misconduct for which she may be disciplined. 
However, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent. It is worth stressing that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution. Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Considering the
circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a suspension of six months is sufficient. After all, suspension is not primarily
intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession

A.C. No. 10783, January 31, 2018

ATTY. BENIGNO BARTOLOME, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTOPHER A. BASILIO, Respondent.

FACTS: On October 14, 2015, the Court suspended Basilio from the practice of law for one (1) year, revoked his incumbent
commission as a notary public, and prohibited him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective
immediately, after finding him guilty of violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Decision was circulated to all courts for the information and implementation of the order of
suspension. Basilio, thru his counsel, Atty. Edward L. Robea, claimed to have received a copy of the Decision on December 2,
20I5, hence, his suspension from the practice of law, as well as the revocation of his notarial commission and prohibition from
being commissioned as a notary public should have all effectively commenced on the same date.

However, on 2016, Atty. Rambayon inquired from the Court about the status of Basilio's suspension, alleging that the latter still
appeared before Judge Ovejera of the MTC of Paniqui, Tarlac on April 26, 20I6. The OBC informed Rambayon that the Decision
had already been circulated to all courts for implementation, and that Basilio's motion for reconsideration had been denied with
finality by the Court. In another letter, Rambayon informed the Court that in the schedule of cases before Judge Fajardo of the
RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac that there were five (5) cases where the litigants were supposedly represented by Basilio.

Complying with the show cause order, Basilio explained that he did not immediately comply with the suspension order because he
believed that his suspension was held in abeyance pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration of the Decision, following
the guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios, wherein it was stated that "unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately
executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has fifteen (15) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory." On this score, he maintained that what was immediately
executory was only the revocation of his notarial commission and the two (2)-year prohibition of being commissioned as a notary
public.

The OBC recommended that Basilio be meted with an additional penalty of a fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for his failure to
immediately comply with the Court's order of suspension from the practice of law. Likewise, it recommended that the lifting of the
order of suspension from the practice of law be held in abeyance pending his payment of the fine.

ISSUE: Whether or not he should be fined for his failure to immediately comply with the order of the Court

HELD: Irrefragably, the clause "effective immediately" was placed at the end of the enumerated series of penalties to indicate that
the same pertained to and therefore, qualified all three (3) penalties, which clearly include his suspension from the practice of law.
The immediate effectivity of the order of suspension - not just of the revocation and prohibition against his notarial practice -
logically proceeds from the fact that all three (3) penalties were imposed on Basilio as a result of the Court's finding that he failed
to comply with his duties as a notary public, in violation of the provisions of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, and his sworn
duties as a lawyer, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, with the Decision's explicit
wording that the same was "effective immediately", there is no gainsaying that Basilio's compliance therewith should have
commenced immediately from his receipt of the Decision on December 2, 2015. On this score, Basilio cannot rely on the Maniago
ruling as above-claimed since it was, in fact, held therein that a decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof if the
decision so indicates, as in this case. All told, for his failure to immediately serve the penalties in the Decision against him upon
receipt, Basilio acted contumaciously, and thus should be meted with a fine in the amount of P10,000.00, as recommended by the
OBC. Pending his payment of the fine and presentation of proof thereof, the lifting of the order of suspension from the practice of
law is perforce held in abeyance.

Festin v. Zubiri

Facts:
 Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in the May 2013
elections. His opponent, Villarosa, filed an election protest against him before the RTC. After deciding in favor of Villarosa,
the RTC issued an Order (First Order) granting his motion for execution pending appeal.

 Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari before the COMELEC, seeking a TRO against the issuance of the
writ of execution pending appeal. COMELEC issued a TRO (COMELEC TRO), directing the RTC judge, in her official
capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, to cease and desist from enforcing the Order. Accordingly, the RTC issued
another Order (Second Order), pertinent portion of which reads:
o In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is directed NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution in accordance with the
[January 15, 2014] Order until further notice. Despite the TRO and the RTC's Third Order, respondent, as counsel
of Villarosa, filed five (5) manifestations addressed to the COC insisting on the writ's issuance. Notably, he did not
serve copies of these manifestations to the other party.
 In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC's First Order on January 18, 2014, and
counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended on February 12, 2014. Since the COMELEC only issued the
Second Order on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer had any effect. Respondent further asserted that the TRO was
addressed only to the RTC Judge, and not to the COC; therefore, the COC is not bound by the TRO. For these reasons,
respondent insisted that the COC could legally issue the writ of execution pending appeal.
  The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal addressed to the sheriff. However, complainant only
found out about respondent's manifestations when the sheriff attempted to serve the writ on him. Soon thereafter,
complainant filed the disbarment complaint.
 In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties when he misled and induced the COC to
defy lawful orders - particularly, the COMELEC's TRO and the RTC's Second Order. As a result, respondent allegedly
violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.
 In his answer, respondent claimed that, first, since the case records had been transmitted to the COMELEC, the RTC was
divested of jurisdiction over the case; therefore, it had no more power to issue the Second Order. Respondent put forward
the same reason for filing the five manifestations with the COC instead of the RTC Judge. Second, the manifestations
contained no misleading statements or factual deviations. He merely stated in his manifestations his honest belief that the
twenty-day period had already lapsed when the COMELEC issued its TRO; hence, it no longer had any binding effect. He
explained that the filing of manifestations to highlight his position did not violate any rule. Third, he allegedly filed those
manifestations pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of the CPR to represent his client with competence and diligence.

Issue: W/N respondent should be held administratively liable? YES

Held:
 After a judicious review of the case records, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held administratively
liable for his violations of the CPR. However, the Court finds it proper to impose a lower penalty.
 Contrary to the CPR, respondent improperly filed the five (5) motions as "manifestations" to sidestep the requirement of
notice of hearing for motions. In effect, he violated his professional obligations to respect and observe procedural rules,
not to misuse the rules to cause injustice, and to exhibit fairness towards his professional colleagues.

 The difference between a manifestation and a motion is essential in determining respondent's administrative liability.
 A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise indicated. In a manifestation, the
manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court, rather than to contest or argue. In contrast, a motion is an
application for relief from the court other than by a pleading and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of
service to the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. Settled is the rule that a
motion without notice of hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it and
the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party to agree or
object to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due process.
 In the present case, respondent filed five (5) manifestations before the COC praying for affirmative reliefs. The Court
agrees with the IBP that these "manifestations" were in fact motions, since reliefs were prayed for from the court -
particularly, the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. By labelling them as manifestations, respondent craftily
sidestepped the requirement of a notice of hearing and deprived the other party of an opportunity to oppose his
arguments. Moreover, the fact that he submitted these manifestations directly to COC, instead of properly filing them
before the RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit fairness towards the other party by keeping the latter completely unaware
of his manifestations. Undoubtedly, respondent violated his professional obligations under the CPR.
 He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely represented his client with competence and diligence. However,
respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is ethically bound not only to serve his client but also the court, his
colleagues, and society. His obligation to represent his client is not without limits, but must be "within the bounds of the
law" pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR. Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only fair and honest means to attain
their clients' objectives.
 Respondent further argues that his filing of the manifestations with the COC is justified considering that the RTC had
already lost jurisdiction over the case and the COC had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution. His argument
fails to persuade. The Court has ruled that a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the judge
directs its issuance. In this case, however, the RTC Judge had issued the second explicitly directing the COC "NOT TO
ISSUE a Writ of Execution." Therefore, the COC in this case did not have a ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution.
 8
HENRY SAMONTE, petitioner, vs. ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, respondent. A.C. No. 3452. June 23, 2014. Facts: Complainant
filed an administrative complaint against respondent for falsification of documents, dereliction of duty, gross negligence and
tardiness in attending scheduled hearings and dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by
complainant. Respondent denied the charge of falsification of documents, clarifying that the filing of the complaint could be made
but complainant had not given enough money to cover the filing fee. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was
baseless. He countered that it was Samonte who had been dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at
least P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in addition to the
filing fees. Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the lawyer’s oath “I will do no falsehood. . . . “ Held: The IBP CBD found
respondent negligent in handling certain aspects of his clients’ cause. Resorting to falsehood and being late in submitting formal
offer of exhibits for Samonte. Although his negligence did not necessarily prejudice his client’s case, his lack of honesty and
trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to falsehood and deceitful practices were a different matter. It has to be noted that
he had twice resorted to falsehood, the first being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on June 10,
1988 despite the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and the second being
when he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the reply by producing a document bearing a rubber stamp
marking distinctively different from the trial court. Every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy.
These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar,
for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a
bona fide member of the Law Profession. By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but
also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.

11

ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE v. ATTY. RIZAL P. BALBIN, AC. No. 7088, 2018-12-04
Facts:
Complainant alleged that he was the plaintiff's counsel in a case entitled FELMAILEM, Inc. v. Felma Mailem
Shortly after securing a favorable judgment for his client,... herein respondent-as counsel for the defendant, and on appeal-started
intimidating, harassing, blackmailing, and maliciously threatening complainant into withdrawing the case filed by his client.
According to complainant, respondent would make various telephone calls and send text messages and e-mails not just to him,
but also to his friends and other clients, threatening to file disbarment and/or criminal suits against him.
Further, and in view of complainant's "high profile" stature, respondent also threatened to publicize such suits in order to besmirch
and/or destroy complainant's name and reputation.
Initially, respondent moved for an extension of time to file his comment,... which was granted by the Court.
However, respondent failed to file his comment despite multiple notices, prompting the Court to repeatedly fine him and even
order his arrest.
Eventually, the Court dispensed with respondent's comment and forwarded e records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for its investigation, report, and recommendation.
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar infractions in the future shall
merit more severe sanctions.
The Investigating Commissioner found that instead of availing of the procedural remedies to assail the adverse MeTC ruling in
order to further his client's cause, respondent resorted to crudely underhanded tactics directed at the opposing litigant's counsel...
by personally attacking the latter through various modes of harassment and intimidation.
IBP Board of Governors adopted the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation in toto.
Issues:
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be administratively sanctioned for the acts complained of.
Ruling:
Membership in the Bar imposes upon them certain obligations.
To this end, Canon 8 of the CPR commands, to wit:CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Case law instructs that "[l]awyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity[,] and civility.
A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren.
Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.
Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations[,] and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal
profession, but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action."
In this case, respondent's underhanded tactics against complainant were in violation of Canon 8 of the CPR.
Thus, it appears that respondent's acts of repeatedly intimidating, harassing, and blackmailing complainant with purported
administrative and criminal cases and prejudicial media exposures were performed as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered
by his client.
His actions demonstrated a misuse of the legal processes available to him and his client, specially considering that the aim of
every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.
More significantly, the foregoing showed respondent's lack of respect and despicable behavior towards a colleague in the legal
profession, and constituted conduct unbecoming of a member thereof.
also violated Canon 19 and Rule 19.01 of the CPR.
Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the
adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyer's client.
Court notes that respondent initially moved for an extension of time to tile comment but did not file the same) prompting the Court
to repeatedly fine him and order his arrest.
Such audacity on the part of respondent - which caused undue delay in the resolution of this administrative case - is a violation of
Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, and Rule 12.04 of the CPR
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.x x x xCANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.x x x xRule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.Rule 12.04 - A lawyer
shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
Verily, respondent's acts of seeking for extension of time to file a comment, and thereafter, failing to file the same and ignoring the
numerous directives not only indicated a high degree of irresponsibility, but also constituted utter disrespect to the judicial
institution.
The orders of the Court are not to be construed as a mere request, nor should they be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively; and the obstinate refusal or failure to comply therewith not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in the lawyer's character,
but also underscores his disrespect to the lawful orders of the Court which is only too deserving of reproof.
Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers made personal attacks against an opposing counsel in order to gain
leverage in a case they were involved in, the Court has consistently imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rizal P. Balbin is found guilty of violating Canon 8, Canon 11, Canon 12, Rule 12.03, Rule 12.04,
Canon 19, and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years, effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Principles:

9UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, Complainant vs. ATTY. LAURO G. NOEL, Respondent A.C. No. 3951, June 19, 2018

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client.
However, once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause
with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Respondent's conduct shows inexcusable negligence. He grossly neglected his
duty as counsel to the extreme detriment of his client. He willingly and knowingly allowed the default order to attain finality and he
allowed judgment to be rendered against his client on the basis of ex parte evidence. He also willingly and knowingly allowed said
judgment to become final and executory. He failed to assert any of the defenses and remedies available to his client under the
applicable laws by his failure to file an answer to the complaint and his subsequent failure to file a comment to the application for
preliminary injunction. This constitutes inexcusable negligence warranting an exercise by the Court of its power to discipline him.
FACTS: Complainant retained the legal services of respondent in a case for injunction and damages with writ of preliminary
injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order (LMWD case) filed by Leyte Metro Water District (LMWD) before the
Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte. Respondent, on behalf of complainant, attended the hearing in connection with the LMWD
case. During the said hearing, respondent promised to file a comment on the application for preliminary injunction within ten (10)
days. Respondent failed to file the promised comment. Respondent also failed to file an answer to the complaint. LMWD's
counsel, Atty. Francisco P. Martinez, moved to declare complainant in default. The motion to declare complainant in default was
granted and LMWD was subsequently allowed to present evidence exparte. The decision in the said case was served on
complainant. It referred the said decision to respondent, who assured complainant's Branch Manager in Tacloban, Mr. Francisco
Cupin, Jr., that he need not worry since respondent would take care of everything. A writ of execution was then served on the
manager of complainant's Tacloban Branch. The writ of execution was referred by complainant's Branch Manager to respondent,
who once again reassured him that everything was alright and that he would take care of it. The sheriff enforced the writ of
execution. Complainant was forced to open a savings account in the name of said sheriff to satisfy the judgment. Hence,
complainant filed herein complaint for disbarment against respondent. ISSUE: Whether respondent committed culpable
negligence in failing to file an answer on behalf of complainant in the LMWD case for which reason complainant was declared in
default and judgment rendered against it on the basis of ex parte evidence. (YES) RULING: Canon 17 of the Code provides that
"a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." Canon 18, in
turn, imposes upon a lawyer the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence. Further, Canon 18 expressly states that "a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” It is
axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He
has the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code. However, once he agrees to take up the cause
of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.
Respondent's conduct shows inexcusable negligence. He grossly neglected his duty as counsel to the extreme detriment of his
client. He willingly and knowingly allowed the default order to attain finality and he allowed judgment to be rendered against his
client on the basis of ex parte evidence. He also willingly and knowingly allowed said judgment to become final and executory. He
failed to assert any of the defenses and remedies available to his client under the applicable laws by his failure to file an answer to
the complaint and his subsequent failure to file a comment to the application for preliminary injunction. This constitutes
inexcusable negligence warranting an exercise by the Court of its power to discipline him.
10

TERESITA P. FAJARDO v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, AC. No. 9018, 2016-04-20

Facts:
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent
Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health.[2] He asked for
P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.[3] However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman
nor sign any pleadings.
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the Ombudsman who could help with dismissing
her case for a certain fee.[5] Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and
acquaintances... working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against Teresita dismissed.[6]
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision
recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from service, respectively.[7]
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she gave.[8] Atty. Alvarez promised to return the
amount to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this promise.[9] Teresita sent a demand letter to
Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.
Issues:
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental
Health under the Department of Health, is authorized to engage in the private practice of law;
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.
Ruling:
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit
intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for Mental Health, whose authority was
designated under Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.[58]
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against government in general,
respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the requirement that his practice will not be "in
conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a whole
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of government. The Office of the Ombudsman
is part of government. By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he
swore to serve.
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he communicated
to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help
them get a favorable decision... in complainant's case.
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02[78] prohibit lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.[79] Respondent's act of ensuring that the case... will be dismissed
because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest.
Canon 7[80] of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity... of the legal
profession."
In relation, Canon 13[81] mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that there is... enough proof to
hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.
Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1)... year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is
ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.
Principles:
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their profession.[76] Respondent violated the
oath he took when he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff... in
the Office where the case was pending.