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MAIN CURRENTS
IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN,
BRITISH, AND AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHY
A. Philosophy I 394
1. The Ontological Framework 396
2. The Isomorphism Theory of Sentence Meaning and of
Knowledge 405
3. The Sense of Compound Sentences 415
4. Transcendental Philosophical Outlook 417
B. Philosophy II 423
1. The Abandonment of the Presuppositions of the
T-Philosophy 425
XII MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
APPENDIX 528
BIBLIOGRAPHY 539
Revising a work on philosophy often causes the author more pains than
the preparation of an entirely new manuscript. The reason, of course, is
that one's intellectual standpoint generally changes over the years; and the
more time that has elapsed since the first edition, the more difficult it be-
comes to effect that compromise between one's past and present views
which is simply unavoidable if one is to be able to speak meaningfully
of a second edition.
In philosophy, the difficulties that attend such a compromise are perhaps
greater than in any other field. For a change in philosophical outlook
involves not only the substitution of new hypotheses for old, not only the
abandonment of supposed in sights in favor of other judgments, but
something more radical - a change in one's whole attitude toward the
so-called problems of philosophy. One becomes aware that questions
have new, hitherto unnoticed dimensions. What was thought to be clear
suddenly appears obscure and problematical. The question of just what
in general is and is not philosophically discussable is given a different
answer. All meaning and value accents shift, and with them the concept
of what philosophy itself is.
In the present case, the first edition had in essence been completed when
I was just 24 years old. Since then my philosophical interests and my
philosophical views have both undergone considerable change. As a
consequence, much in the earlier exposition now seems to me unsatisfac-
tory and incomplete. On the other hand, my thinking and style have, I
hope, become somewhat more precise, if also more pedantic and less
intuitive. And I no longer possess the same facuIty I once had for sym-
pathetically understanding modes of thought that are far from mine. I
therefore came to the conclusion that it would not be practical to write
the whole book over again; to do so would have meant losing a great
deal in intuitiveness and immediacy. It has been necessary, however, to
make numerous additions and revisions.
Thus, there have been added to the first edition the following: a chapter
XIV MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
I am, of course, quite aware of the fact that the philosophers who are
now most influential and most widely recognized are not necessarily the
ones who have made the most valuable contributions to philosophy. Here
again a compromise had to be made between what seemed significant to
me and what in fact exercises a great influence, although I myself may not
be as convinced of its worth as others appear to be. I shall be content if
my skepticism regarding certain tendencies in philosophy has not resulted
in a lack of objectivity in presenting them.
The specific thinkers to be dealt with have been selected in accordance
with the following principles: I have omitted all philosophical currents
that strive to continue or renew older doctrines or that have their origins
in the even more remote past (for example, Neo-Kantianism, Neo-Thom-
ism, Lebensphilosophie). Further, I have not considered those philoso-
phers whose teachings do not reflect anything original, but merely attempt
a synthesis of the conceptual themes of as many different philosophical
tendencies as possible. Finally, with the exception of research in the
foundations of logic and mathematics, which is becoming increasingly
important for philosophy as a whole, I have not included efforts to supply
philosophical foundations for the special disciplines (e.g., political phi-
losophy and social philosophy).
At various places - mostly in the assessments - I have made reference
to my other works. This was not done to publicize them, but, wherever
limitations of space prevented a fuller discussion of a particular ques-
tion, to let the reader know how he might obtain more information either
about the substance of the matter or about my views on the particular
question. In contrast with the first edition, I have generally held myself
in the evaluations to a discussion of basic questions. I have purposely
omitted a remark that appears in the foreword to the first edition to the
effect that I would confine myself throughout to an immanent critique.
Today this remark appears to me somewhat incautious; a number of the
critical observations can hardly be subsumed under the heading of im-
manent criticism.
I should like to conclude this foreword with a few observations on what
I do not claim for the book, what I hope for it, and what I fear for it.
I do not claim to have given a complete and adequate picture of all the
philosophical doctrines discussed. Even though the book is limited to ten
movements in philosophy, there are of necessity simplifications and omis-
XVI MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
W.S.
Munich, May 11, 1960
INTRODUCTION:
THE PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
ledge) exhibit at least a partial agreement with the principles of the world
(the categories of being).
The third reaction is likewise polemical, but essentially more radical.
It is manifested in the attitude taken toward Kant's problem by modern
empiricism and analytic philosophy. Up to this point, the Kantians and
their opponents have disagreed only over how to interpret synthetic a
priori knowledge; now the opposition seeks to deny meaning to the
discussion by rejecting the assumption on which the entire controversy
rests: the existence of synthetic judgments a priori. Kant, as well as
metaphysicians of a realist bent, tried by means of various hypotheses to
explain the phenomenon of synthetic judgments a priori. But are there
in fact any such judgments? Schlick, Carnap and the other members of
the Vienna Circle dispute this, as do nearly all the representatives of
analytical philosophy. Sometimes the existence of synthetic a priori
statements is simply denied; but often the rejection takes an essentially
sharper form, the contention being that it is impossible even to give any
clear definition of the concept originated by Kant of synthetic a priori
knowledge of reality.
The importance of this problem of synthetic judgments a priori cannot
be overestimated. For if the negative viewpoint is correct, then there are
no specifically philosophical statements about reality. All synthetic state-
ments are empirical judgments, and their examination must be left to the
empirical sciences. It is no longer possible for philosophy, in competition
with the sciences, to make well-founded, confirmable statements of its
own about reality. Instead, philosophy must withdraw to the domains of
logic, the theory of science, and foundational research.
These few remarks should suffice to indicate how important and pressing
Kant's basic problem is for contemporary philosophy.
intuitive reality extend far back into the past. An illustration is the
doctrine of primary and secondary sense-qualities which, prominent in
British empiricism, was already present in the Greek philosopher
Democritus. According to this doctrine, physical objects possess only
spatio-temporal properties; the secondary qualities, such as colors, sounds,
odors and the like, are purely subjective, being conditioned by the nature
of the perceiver. On this theory, the objectively real world and the
phenomenal world as given to us no longer fully coincide. The two have
become distinct, and spatial and temporal features alone form the
intuitive bond which ties the world of the given to the real world.
From the standpoint of epistemology, the modern physical conception
of the world is characterized above all by the fact that it has broken this
final bond which linked the physically real world to the phenomenal world
of intuition: intuitive space and intuitive time have also succumbed to the
process of subjectivization. Non-intuitive systems of geometry have turned
out, in the theory of relativity, to be better suited than the Euclidean space
of intuition for interpreting physical space, and the relativization of the
concept of simultaneity has deprived physical time of a property that in
classical physics seemed absolutely beyond question. The idea has thus
arisen of a four-dimensional curved world-continuum, which has no
counterpart in the phenomenal world and which admits only of a purely
analytical treatment by means of a complicated mathematical symbolism.
The tendency toward the non-intuitive has been appreciably strengthen-
ed by quantum physics. In the matrix mechanics of Heisenberg, e.g., the
state of a physical system is represented by a vector in a probability space
of infinitely many dimensions, and the changes in that system are repre-
sented by movements of the vector. The only connection with the world
of experience is that the quantities characterizing the state of the system
(the individual state-variables such as energy, momentum and the like)
are associated with certain matrices; and these matrices, in the probability
space, determine coordinate systems whose axes correspond to particular
values of the state-variables. The decompositions (with respect to the
coordinate system) of the vector describing the state of the system indicate
the probabilities that a measurement carried out on the system will yield
one of these particular values.
In view of this situation, the question of how one can acquire any
knowledge at all of a reality entirely removed from intuition assumes an
8 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
unsuspected urgency. For it is only within the intuitive world of the given
that one can gather the empirical data needed to confirm a theory.
These few remarks will perhaps convey a general idea of the wealth of
problems which the development of modern science presents to philosophy
for its consideration. In any case, it appears that the growth of the
empirical sciences has freed epistemology from the narrow choice between
'absolute knowledge' and 'skepticism', which served as a constraint upon
ancient and medieval thought and which often prevailed even into modern
times. Whoever chose not to be a skeptic had to believe in self-evident
essences and eternal truths. The notion of hypothetical-empirical state-
ments, however, introduced something new. Those who denied absolute
metaphysical knowledge were no longer compelled, by that same token,
to deny all knowledge; they could now fall back on the empiricist position
which, denying the existence of absolute knowledge, does accept state-
ments that are confirmed by experience. And conversely, those who
rejected relativism and skepticism were not forced thereby to embrace
metaphysics.
The discussion thus far has been concerned only with the empirical
sciences. But the development of modern mathematics has also produced
an extensive array of epistemological problems, and has led to the demand
for a special philosophy of mathematics. This development, moreover,
has brought about revisions in the basic notions of logic. Particularly
important in this connection have been the rise ofaxiomatics, the at-
tempts to lay a logical foundation for mathematics, the discovery of
logical antinomies and the demand that mathematical operations be
limited to those of a constructivist character. All of these matters will be
discussed in more detail later.
Thus we see that the separate sciences, which in the first flush of
independence sought to draw farther and farther away from philosophy,
have themselves been compelled on internal grounds to engage in philo-
sophical reflections. And in doing so they have at the same time given a
fresh impetus to philosophical research. This is not to say that the
polemics of the sciences against 'unscientific metaphysics' have ceased.
To this day, empirical scientists as well as mathematicians still regard
with deep mistrust all philosophical activity other than logical investi-
gations and the essential inquiry into foundations. Yet it must be counted
a distinct gain that, as a consequence of the problems with respect to
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMS 9
3. Modern Irrationalism
Although, as noted above, interest in metaphysics today has declined,
this holds only for the kind of metaphysics that is formulated in state-
ments and that lays claim to being scientific. In fact, the 'need to engage
in metaphysics', which is the source of questions about the meaning of
the world and of human existence, is particularly strong at present. This
is true whether the questions are posed explicitly or whether, as is more
often the case, they are felt simply as a weight or burden that attends the
ordinary course of life. A tendency is manifested here which runs counter
to the growing immanentist attitude toward existence and which, perhaps,
has arisen from that attitude in the manner of a dialectical 'sudden
change'.
Metaphysics and religious faith have ceased to be accepted as matters
of course by contemporary man. Nor is the world itself any longer some-
thing that he takes for granted. At no time in history has awareness of the
mysterious and problematic character of the world been so pervasive as
today; never before, perhaps, has man been so urgently summoned to
take a clear stand regarding the economic, political, social and cultural
problems of his society. Faith and knowledge no longer provide for our
existential needs. One of the great schisms in contemporary intellectual
life is due to the conflict between a basic skepticism and a felt need for
metaphysics; a second results from the contradiction between the uncertain-
ties of life on the one hand, and the necessity for clear practical decisions
on the other.
This latter problem constitutes the setting for modern irrationalism,
which appears under the name of the philosophy of Existence. Not that
this philosophy either could or would eliminate the schism and replace
it with a harmonious conception of the world; the whole tendency is
much too heavily tinged with pessimism and tragedy, as it depicts the
problems of existence with unprecedented sharpness. Nevertheless, the
philosophy of Existence does seek to show men a road that leads to an
absolute, a way to grasp the ultimate meaning of existence, without being
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMS 11
of the Vienna Circle are to be counted in this group, likewise the repre-
sentatives of contemporary analytic philosophy.
Paralleling this differentiation is a second characteristic process, that
of the mutual estrangement and increasing loss of communication among the
philosophers of the various schools. It is absolutely imperative that this
circumstance be kept clearly in mind, for what it signifies is nothing less
than that the word 'philosophy' has come to have several meanings. A
student of foundations and a Weltanschauung philosopher differ alto-
gether in what they understand by a philosophical work; the same thing
is true of an exponent of an a priori metaphysics of Being and a thinker
who starts from an analysis of phenomena. This process of reciprocal
estrangement may be said to exhibit four phases:
(1) Phase (1) involves scholarly differences of opinion. Here the views
advocated diverge because the individual participants in the discussion
question the validity of the opposing arguments or the correctness of the
opposing statements. In this phase the context of discussion is conserved
despite all the differences. There is still hope for a final agreement, and
the conflict of opinion, as in scientific research generally, is in fact a spur
to progress. It is an incentive to make the concepts more precise, the
statements more correct, and the arguments more cogent.
(2) The situation deteriorates when the points of departure and the
accepted modes of reasoning are different toto genere. A point may then
be reached where no discussion is possible any more. The most that
defenders of opposing views can achieve is a gentlemen's agreement
acknowledging that their arguments and counter-arguments fail to make
contact and that their differing conceptions can no longer be reduced to
a common denominator. At this level, although scholarly analysis or
discussion is of necessity out of the question, a context of communication
is still preserved. Spokesmen for different views can present their positions
to each other and in so doing come to an understanding about the
meaning of their assertions; but they are unable to reach an accord on
how to prove them.
(3) The difficulty is further intensified when two philosophers enjoy no
context of communication because one is unable to attach any meaning to
what the other says. Nonetheless, even here a bond, however loose, may
continue to exist between the thinkers, a bond which may be called a
context of intention. Although one philosopher does not know what the
14 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
other really means, at least he knows that the other, too, is striving for
knowledge and truth.
(4) The gulf between two persons engaged in philosophizing is greatest
when not even a context of intention exists. At this point, not only are the
statements and proofs of the one unintelligible to the other, but the very
concerns and preoccupations of each become a mystery to his fellow. Not
only does the one not know what the other means; he cannot even tell
what sort of activity it is that the other engages in and designates by the
name 'philosophy'. A state is reached here of total absence of communi-
cation.
Phase (1) characterizes what might be called the normal situation
in scholarship. Earlier controversies between individual philosophical
schools - empiricists and rationalists, or Kantians and Aristotelians -
generally remained within this framework. Of course, the present century
too offers examples of philosophical disagreements that belong to the
category of scholarly or scientific conflicts of opinion. The difference in
views, say, between a disciple of Brentano and a follower of Husserl, or
between a phenomenologist and Nicolai Hartmann, is of this kind. More
and more, however, antitheses have come to the fore which can be de-
scribed only in terms of the second, third or fourth phases. Instances of
all three can be cited among the philosophies treated in this book. Thus,
the conflict between the conceptions of Nicolai Hartmann and Heidegger
can be characterized only by phase (2). Even though we may assume that
the latter, in principle, understands what the former meant, a context of
discussion for them is no longer conceivable. A situation of the same sort
can occur even in the modern study of foundations, as is shown by an
example taken from the philosophy of mathematics. Many mathema-
ticians concede (indeed boast) that they do not understand the arguments
advanced by mathematical intuitionism against the traditional forms of
reasoning in mathematics, notwithstanding the fact that it is perfectly
clear just which of these traditional forms intuitionism accepts and which
it rules out.
An encounter between Carnap and someone like Nicolai Hartmann
would illustrate phase (3). And phase (4) serves to characterize the re-
lationship between analytic philosophy and modern empiricism on the
one hand and the philosophies of Jaspers and Heidegger on the other.
It may perhaps sound pessimistic to say that this process of differenti-
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMS 15
ation can no longer be reversed, but it is likely to prove true. The ambiguity
of the term 'philosophy' could be reduced only if entire philosophical
currents were to 'die out' altogether (of which there are no signs), or if
we should simply decide to stop referring to all of the varied things listed
above as 'philosophy' and instead reserve the term for a more or less
sharply defined activity. This latter would be most desirable. Until that
point is reached, however, an introduction to contemporary philosophy
must of necessity be an introduction to a field that is still quite hetero-
geneous.
C. A LOOK AHEAD
logical truths are just those true statements that hold in 'every possible
world'.
Most representatives of modern empiricism and analytic philosophy
deny any synthetic a priori knowledge of reality. In their view, the class
of meaningful statements breaks down into analytic truths on the one
hand and synthetic empirical statements on the other. Thus, in addition
to marking off the domain of the purely logical, the task of the epistemo-
logist consists above all in treating the problems involved in empirical
knowledge of reality. Among these, in particular, is the problem of in-
duction, which Carnap seeks to solve through his system of inductive
logic. Another is the problem of concepts. This problem, indeed, has
recently gained in urgency" since a number of studies have shown that
it is impossible to reduce the more complex concepts of theoretical
empirical science (e.g. theoretical physics) to simpler concepts referring
only to observables.
One curious point should be noted. Modern empiricism and analytic
philosophy are sometimes called 'logical positivism'. The expression
'positivism' goes back to the older immanence-positivism of Ernst Mach
and his followers, according to which the task of science is to obtain the
most exact description possible of the immediately given. Most contempo-
rary empiricists regard the concept of the given as so unclear or so
burdened with unsolved aporias that they discard it as useless. Conse-
quently, the term 'positivism' can no longer be applied significantly to
this tendency. The only philosophical current in which the concept of the
given is still central is phenomenology. It would therefore follow that the
phenomenologists are the only present-day 'positivists'. However, since this
use of the expression would of course be quite misleading, it is best not
to employ it at all.
3. Ethics
In the field of ethics the influence of Kant is likewise unmistakable. Pre-
Kantian ethics either bore traits of eudaimonism, or was an ethics of
goods or ends. According to Scheler, Kant's great service lay in reducing
to an absurdity all such attempts to found an ethics, by revealing the
relativistic consequences to which they necessarily lead. Yet Kant's own
ethics was open to serious objections because of its formal character and
construction. The task thus arose of building an ethics free of these
22 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
the mistakes of earlier ethical theories are due to the fact that ethical
statements have been wrongly interpreted as declarative sentences.
Actually, the statements of ethics do not have the job of communicating
opinions; they have other functions, such as influencing the conduct of
others, and are thus similar to imperative sentences. Hence, the demand
is made that inquiry into the descriptive meanings of expressions be
supplemented by a study of their emotive significance (i.e., their dispo-
sition to evoke emotional reactions). This is coupled with the further
demand for a logic of imperatives, which differs in a number of respects
from the logic based on declarative sentences.
REFERENCE
1 Max Scheler, on the other hand, is not a 'pure case'. Many of his writings belong
at least as much to the first group as they do to the third or fourth.
CHAPTER I
could add arbitrarily many others, until we finally reach those that serve
as the means of individuation. In this fashion we could generate all sorts
of non-existing individuals at particular places and at particular times:
a non-existing fire-spitting dragon in Vienna, a non-existing green dragon
in London, and so forth. Such, in Brentano's view, are the absurdities to
which we are inevitably led if we assume that truth consists in the agree-
ment of a judgment with reality.
(3) According to Brentano, the view that the criterion of truth lies in
the agreement of a judgment with a corresponding real entity can be
disproved by showing that such a view entails an infinite regress. For if
we are to be able to check whether there is agreement between a judgment
and an actual state of affairs, we must first make judgments about both
the original judgment and the corresponding state of affairs with which
it is being compared. But in order to guarantee these judgments and their
correspondence, we should have to make judgments of comparison be-
tween the original judgment and the one that referred to it, between the
second judgment about the state of affairs and the state of affairs itself,
and between the two judgments that occurred in the first state of the
checking process, and this would continue ad infinitum. The same argu-
ment can be put more simply as follows: In order to prove in even a single
case that a judgment is true, it would be necessary to have already had a
judgment, certified as true, about the state of affairs. In other words, we
should have to assume exactly what we were seeking to prove.
This rejection of the doctrine of adaequatio intellectus ad rem, especially
the last argument, is reminiscent of the Kantian solution to the problem
of knowledge. Indeed, Kant's starting-point was precisely the problem of
how a subject can make judgments which, despite this SUbjectivity in their
execution, possess objective and transcendent validity, that is, are valid
for a reality existing in itself beyond the limits of consciousness. Let us
therefore review the Kantian conception of the nature of knowledge and
Brentano's position with respect to it. In so doing, we must make sure
that we describe Kant's theory as Brentano interprets it.
Kant's point of departure was the synthetic judgment a priori. This is
a judgment which (1) does not result merely from an analysis of concepts
and hence is not purely analytic (as is, e.g., the judgment 'All circles are
round'), but rather extends our knowledge and is thus synthetic in
character; yet (2) is universally valid and necessary and is, in short,
30 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
3. Kinds of Judgments
In discussing the problem of truth, we have had occasion to divide
judgments into self-evident and blind; and in considering the classifica-
tion of mental phenomena, we have spoken of judgments as affirmative
or negative. We may also divide judgments with respect to their objects,
as follows:
(1) Perceptual judgments, which in turn may be subdivided into (a)
judgments of inner perception and (b) judgments of external perception;
(2) Memory judgments;
(3) Axioms.
Only axioms and judgments of inner perception are self-evident. These
two sorts of judgments, however, are completely different in nature.
Following Leibniz, who distinguished between truths of reason and truths
of fact, Brentano assumes two sources of knowledge: axioms, or apo-
dictic truths that are evident from concepts (Brentano also calls them
a priori judgments, since they need no further corroboration from experi-
ence), and the immediate self-evidence of inner perception.
FRANZ BRENTANO 33
Thus when I say 'The tree is green', this contains on the one hand the
recognition that the tree exists and on the other the attribution (to it) of
the property green. In contrast, the other two kinds of judgments are
simply linguistic forms. 'If A is, so is B' signifies that the case of A and
not-B is denied (A and not-B, taken together, being the content or matter
of this judgment). The disjunctive judgment 'Either A is or B is' says that
one of the two terms A, B is (the matter of the judgment is difficult to put
into words; it goes something like this: 'A and B, one of them'). We also
note that Brentano worked on a modification of the Aristotelian syllo-
gistic forms, which we shall return to in the evaluation.
Brentano avoids the term 'relation' and speaks only of 'the relative' in
the sense of that-which-behaves-with-respect-to-something. 2 The possi-
bility of a term being suppressed or absent is not peculiar to intentionality;
as Brentano indicates, this can happen whenever we speak of relations in
the usual way. When I make the judgment 'Hans is taller than Peter',
I am not required to acknowledge both Hans and Peter, but only Hans;
with respect to Peter the mere representation suffices, so that the predicate
would still hold good even if Peter were to die.
An additional feature of mental phenomena consists in the fact that
for all their diversity they exhibit themselves as a unity, which is not true
of physical phenomena. But unity, Brentano points out, is not the same
thing as simplicity; consequently, from the unity of consciousness we
cannot draw the immediate conclusion that there exists an underlying,
indestructible soul-substance.
Finally, Brentano believes he can prove that all mental phenomena are
either themselves acts of representation or rest upon such acts. Judging,
willing, abhorring, loving and the like are impossible without a represen-
tation as a basis.
In contrast, the property of extension, which Descartes stressed and
which is supposed to belong to all and only physical things, isin Brentano's
view not definitively established as the distinctive feature of the physical.
For although mental phenomena, of course, are not extended, it is not
equally certain that everything physical is extended.
How a perceiving, knowing, willing subject can have knowledge of his own
mental acts is an old epistemological problem. If we assume that know-
ledge of one's own mental acts requires in turn a mental act, then in order
to ascertain this second act there would have to be a third which addresses
itself to the second, and we would thus be involved in an infinite regress.
According to Brentano, the error here is that in describing the represen-
tations we start from the number and variety of the objects and with each
ofthe objects we associate its own act of representation, e.g., one act with
a sound and another with the hearing of that sound. But the intimate
interweaving of the object of a representation with the representation
itself suggests that what is involved is but a single mental act. The repre-
sentation of a sound and the representation of the representing of the
sound constitute just a single mental phenomenon; and it is only because
of the reference to two objects - a physical one (sound) and a mental one
FRANZ BRENT ANO 37
which is the part modally occupied by and separable from the qualitative
thing. e.g., something colored. Hence it is not self-contradictory to assume
the existence of empty places; indeed, quality is only an accidental ex-
tension of place. We are not given absolute specifications of place any
more than absolute specifications of time. We perceive only the relative
differences of distance and direction between physical things. It follows
that in external perception, too, only that which is universal is given.
Kant's assertion that the understanding apprehends the universal, where-
as the senses perceive the particular is therefore disputed by Brentano.
Even with the senses, we grasp in principle only what is general.
Significance also attaches to Brentano's investigations into the various
kinds of relatives. The most important are intentional relatives (con-
sciousness of something), causal relatives (whatever is caused is caused by
something), relatives in which a whole includes something as part (in
particular, collectives, continua and the modally occupying), and finally
the continuum again, in so far as its parts are relatives distant from each
other. In this connection, we must be very careful in each case to note
where a genuine name is present and where not. For example, 'whole' is
a genuine concept, but 'part' is not; that which is called 'part' can cease
to be a part without itself changing, whereas a whole cannot cease to be
a whole without really changing itself into a part. Likewise, 'that which
is caused' is a concept but not 'that which is causing' (this is why the
causal concept is identified with result (Wirken) and not with ground or
origin (Ursache)). For whether or not one thing causes another by no
means depends on the first thing alone; hence that it causes something
else is not peculiar to that which causes, whereas being caused by some-
thing else is essential to that which is caused.
In concluding this section, we emphasize again that Brentano, in con-
trast, say, to Hume, believes that we are able to point to experiences from
which we abstract the concept of cause. One example relates to the way a
conclusion results from the premisses of an argument, another to the way
the willing of an end brings about the willing of the means. To be sure,
these experiences do not yet contain the general principle of causality,
according to which every coming into being is a bringing into being.
With these few remarks we must close our account of Brentano's most
interesting inquiries into the problem of categories, inquiries which gener-
ally have received much too little attention.
44 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
From ancient times, the problem of knowing what ought to be has been
just as much a preoccupation of the great thinkers as the question of
what is. Brentano's theory of moral knowledge represents in many respects
a clear analogy to his doctrine of truth and can be understood only in
connection with it. Here again he engages in a simultaneous struggle on
two fronts. On the one hand, he opposes the subjectivistic and relativistic
flight from the moral, found mostly among philosophers who try to derive
the process of moral valuation from such psychological uniformities as
the fear of authority, the carry-over of feelings from ends to means 5,
training, the contagious spread of emotion from person to person, and
the like. On the other hand, he rejects any attempt to preserve the absolute
character of morality through recourse to conceptual fictions, such as
Kant's categorical imperative.
A striking kinship exists between the behavior of judging and emotive
behavior in that each exhibits a bipolarity. In judging, there is an oppo-
sition between affirming and denying (acknowledging and rejecting); in
emotive behavior, between loving and hating (approving and disapproving).
This leads us to ask whether or not there is anything in the emotive
domain that corresponds to the fact of self-evident judgments, that is,
judgments with the characteristic of being correct in themselves. As a
matter of fact, Brentano believes that it is possible to identify acts of loving
and hating which are characterized by being right in themselves. And since
love and hate are nothing but general names for positive and negative
evaluations, we thus have the source of our justified value judgments.
All judgments must be either true or false. Similarly, our valuations are
either warranted or unwarranted. From the experience of pain, e.g., we
obtain the concept 'pain', and this concept can motivate in us a rejection
(,hate' in the widest sense of the word) that has the characteristic of being
right. It is from attitudes of this kind, which reveal their own justification,
that we gain our knowledge of values. Such knowledge involves value
judgments of apodictic self-evidence. We said above that, in Brentano's
conception, apodictic judgments are actually negative propositions. So
too here. The judgment 'Pain is a non-value' simply says that it is impossi-
ble for anyone experiencing pain ever to love the pain with a justified love.
As to whether pain and the experience of pain exist at all, the judgment
FRANZ BRENT ANO 45
says nothing, just as the proposition about the sum of the angles of a
triangle does not say anything about the existence of triangles. Here again
it is true that whereas the concepts (e.g., pain) always stem from experi-
ence, the value judgments (value axioms) resting on them are immediately
evident and thus are a priori in character.
From what has been said it also follows that 'good' ('valuable') and
'bad' are not real predicates of any things and are in this respect analogous
to the concepts 'being' and 'not-being'. The statement 'Knowledge is a
good' (or a 'value') means the same as 'No one who loves to know (or,
reformulated, " ... who loves knowledge") loves incorrectly'.
In the case of evaluating, however, we encounter one phenomenon that
has no correlate in the domain of judgments. True and false are contra-
dictory opposites and no transition between them is possible - it does not
make sense to speak of a 'truer' or 'falser' judgment. But in the domain
of value it is perfectly meaningful to talk of 'better' and 'worse'. Indeed,
only when we take into account value-differences of this sort do we enter
the domain of morality in the narrower sense; for there are many kinds
of goods 6 and the real question is which of them ought we to choose in
the given case, that is, which of them is the better?
Just as the concepts 'good' and 'bad' are derived from acts of love and
hate, so the concepts 'better' and 'worse' originate in special acts of
preference, or acts of love involving comparison. These acts correspond to
predicative judgments in the domain of logic 7, whereas acts of simple
love represent an analogue to existential judgments. Acts of preference,
like theoretical judgments and simple acts of love, can be characterized
as either blind or correct. They arise from the comparison of concepts
acquired from experience. For example, it is the comparison between a
blind and a self-evident judgment that constitutes the basis for favoring
the latter over the former with a preference characterized as being right.
Thus the simple axioms of value are associated with axioms of prefer-
ence. The fundamental reason why the latter have no theoretical counter-
part is that while there are degrees of good, there are no degrees of being.
An additional peCUliarity of the domain of value is the presence of value-
neutral situations, which implies that in such cases (e.g., the processes of
inorganic nature) no evaluating attitude is possible.
Only a few of the most general axioms of preference can actually be
set up. Three cases are immediately secured beyond question: we prefer
46 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
D. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
existence from the evidence of design in the world, is false. There are no
such things as 'ends-in-themselves'; we can speak meaningfully of an end
only where a will for that end (ein Zweckwille) exists. Consequently, once
the presence of design or purpose in the world is ascertained, it is then
also established that a will exists directed toward the realization of that
purpose. What must be proved is that the design or fitness found in the
world is not merely an illusion. The proof falls into three parts: first, the
indication that there is in fact the appearance of design; second, the proof
that this appearance can be explained satisfactorily only on the assumption
that an infinite intelligence exists; third, that the ordering activity of this
intelligence must be thought of as a process of creation out of nothing.
The first point is readily verified in the realm of the organic by pointing
to the mutual suitability of cells and organs, to their service in main-
taining the life of the individual and the species, to instinctive capabilities,
and the like. But it is also demonstrated in the inorganic realm if we
consider the identity of substances and the laws regulating the relations
between them.
Attempts to explain this appearance of teleology involve two hypo-
theses: the hypothesis of an intelligence and the hypothesis of chance. The
initial probability of the first hypothesis has the value 1/2 (for there is as
much in favor of it as against it). Also, its explanatory value is finite (for
it is not infinitely probable that this intelligence produces something).
The product of these two values is therefore finite. The explanatory value
of the hypothesis of chance is 1, that is, absolute certainty (for once we
are given the original constellation out of which the world evolved, then
everything else follows necessarily). Its initial probability, however, is
infinitely small, because even a chance collision of bodies in space is
infinitely improbable, not to speak of the chance formation of that
marvelous structure, the organism. Hence the total probability is also
infinitely small. But if the hypothesis that teleology is not a mere illusion
must be regarded as infinitely more probable than the hypothesis of
chance, and if only one of the two can be true, then the former follows
with physical certainty, since a case of infinite improbability can not
occur in actual reality.
The third point follows from the fact that the teleological nature of the
world could not have been the result of an intelligence shaping some
arbitrary pre-existing material. For the elements of the material would
48 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
already have had to exhibit certain traits of order if they were to admit
of being shaped. Therefore the assumption of a mere world-shaper who
imposes order on previously existing material is not satisfactory. To be
able to explain the appearance of teleology in the world, we must pre-
suppose a Creator-God.
The second argument proceeds from the impossibility of motion without
a beginning to the existence of a prime mover. The impossibility of motion
without a beginning may be established as follows: Let a body be in a
uniform rectilinear motion that has no beginning. Since the body moves
with a certain velocity, it will, after traversing a line without a beginning,
be at a certain point N. Had it moved with one-half the velocity, it would
have gone only as far as the earlier point M. Now since with twice the
velocity the body covers twice the distance in the same time, the segment
MN thus corresponds to half the path and would therefore be equal in
length to the beginningless line that extends to M. There would then be
a line between the points M and N equal to a line of infinite length; in
other words, a finite line with a beginning and an end would be equal to
an infinite line that had no beginning. This is self-contradictory. Hence
the assumption of motion without a beginning must be absurd, since
from a permissible assumption nothing absurd may follow.
The contingency argument starts from the impossibility of absolute
chance. An absolutely fortuitous coming into being and ceasing to be is
impossible. For otherwise at each moment an abrupt shift from being to
not-being would be just as likely as a continuation of being or not-being.
The probability of such a shift would be at least 1/2. At the same time,
however, the abrupt alternation would be infinitely less frequent than the
case of the continuation of being or not-being, since alternation takes
place at a certain point in time, and two points in time cannot follow one
another immediately but must be separated by a time interval. It is a
contradiction, however, to suppose that at each point in time the proba-
bility of a shift between being and not-being is 1/2, and yet that of the
total number of time points infinitely more turn up without an abrupt
change than with one. Thus the assumption of a chance coming to be
and ceasing to be leads to a contradiction. The same holds good for the
possibility of a world process that is without a beginning and yet is as a
whole fortuitous.
In our world of experience nothing is immediately necessary. First of
FRANZ BRENT ANO 49
2. The Theodicy
Brentano also addresses himself to the familiar question of how to recon-
cile the evil in the world with the infinite perfection and goodness of its
creator. This question, he believes, can be given an optimistic answer.
Of course, much is obscure, but this is to be expected; in relation to the
Infinite Intelligence our finite understanding must be infinitely inferior.
Nevertheless a positive start may be made toward a solution to the
problem.
FRANZ BRENTANO 51
E. EVALUATION
ontologists, which one might call the 'being-plague' and which induces
philosophers time after time to talk primarily about the 'being of a being'
(Sein des Seiendes). Every young philosopher interested in ontological
questions should be urged first to study Brentano's historical writings on
Aristotle - in particular, his inquiries into the many meanings of being
found in Aristotle - and second, to concern himself with Brentano's
theory of categories, especially his arguments against the assumption that
there is any such thing as the being of a being. After such a study, much
of what is now taken for granted in contemporary writings in philosophy
will perhaps seem questionable.
Of the many elements of the Brentano theory of being that could be
taken as the starting-point for a discussion, we shall single out the
problem of universals. 10 On this question, Brentano took a sharp and
unequivocal anti-Platonist position. Any theory that admits the existence
of abstract objects is, according to him, a false doctrine.
Today the problem of universals is again very much in the foreground.
Above all, a great many specialists in the foundations of mathematics are
taking an active part in the discussion of this question because of the
urgency it has assumed in that area. In the framework of this discussion
- and this speaks well for Brentano - it has turned out to be impossible
to refute the non-Platonist principle on purely logical grounds. All the
arguments of the Platonists - in particular, those of Hussed, who on this
question took a position diametrically opposed to that of Brentano - are
unsound at some point or other. Contrariwise, most of Brentano's mis-
givings about Platonism disappear if that doctrine is taken not in the
comprehensive sense that Brentano had in mind, but in a narrower, say,
a mathematical sense. In the opinion of these 'moderate Platonists', while
there is indeed no 'being', there do exist abstract collections of objects
known as sets or classes. On Brentano's view, the concept of set or class
would also have to be rejected in so far as it does not admit of being
reinterpreted into the concept of a concrete whole. The question is, how-
ever, whether it is possible to do without such a concept. It is at this point
that we encounter a difficulty not yet solved by the non-Platonists.
We use abstract expressions both in ordinary life and in science.
According to Brentano, these serve only to abbreviate speech. For ex-
ample, when we speak of something that possesses an extension (extension
being seemingly an abstract Platonic essence), in reality we are speaking
FRANZ BRENT ANO 53
misgivings previously voiced against it. For when the concept of truth is
introduced in this manner, such expressions as 'agreement', 'state of
affairs' and 'reality' do not appear at all.
Tarski's investigations are of singular philosophical significance for
another reason as well. Within the framework of semantics, which he
founded and which Carnap later developed further, it becomes possible
for the first time to introduce the notion of an analytic judgment (or an
analytic statement) in a form that is both sufficiently general and of the
utmost precision. This notion also plays an exceptionally important role
in Brentano's philosophy, especially in his studies in formal logic.
A few additional remarks should be made about these studies. Bren-
tano's concern was to reform and above all to simplify the Aristote-
lian theory of inference. The simplification rested on a new interpre-
tation, indicated above, of the Aristotelian forms of judgment. For ex-
ample, the proposition 'All A are B' is interpreted as 'There is no A that
is not-B'. On this basis, Brentano succeeds in reducing all the inference
forms of Aristotelian logic to two fundamental forms. The technical
details cannot be set down here 16 ; but some comments should be made
on the conclusions that Brentano drew. Brentano thought that with this
reduction he had proved that the whole of formal logic follows from the
law of contradiction alone; and this viewpoint has been adopted by
various of his followers.
Such a conception, however, is without doubt erroneous. In the first
place, it is incorrect even for the theory of the syllogism; for as a matter
of fact Brentano employed a whole series of additional logical principles
not reducible to the law of contradiction. One such is the law of the ex-
cluded middle - the fact that it is not reducible is shown by the systems
of intuitionistic logic, in which, while the law of contradiction is valid,
the law of the excluded middle is not. Others include the so-called rule
for the elimination of conjunction (by which we may infer' A' alone from
'A and B'), and a further principle analogous to this rule. Besides,
Brentano made use of two forms of inference that are not, as he sup-
posed, reducible to the law of the excluded middle. Finally, he was forced
to apply certain principles of substitution, which generate one valid con-
clusion from another.
Second, as we know today, the theory of the syllogism comprises only
a very small portion of logic. For example, syllogistic logic does not allow
FRANZ BRENT ANO 57
us to infer from the premiss 'All horses are animals' the conclusion 'All
heads of horses are heads of animals'. Such a deduction requires a theory
of relational inferences, and this is lacking in the syllogistic. We become
aware of the deficiencies of Aristotelian logic when we attempt a logical
analysis of mathematical proofs. We are obliged to conclude that most
of the steps in such proofs cannot possibly be justified on the basis of
the syllogistic (cf. Chapter VIII, Section A.l).
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Brentano's revision of
Aristotelian logic remains an important contribution of lasting value. It
is regrettable that Brentano never came into contact with Frege, who was
the first to have had a comprehensive conception of an exact and com-
plete system of 10gic.I ? In any event, it is now known that the law of
contradiction does not in the least suffice for the construction of formal
logic.
A further word on mathematical knowledge. In contrast to Kant,
Brentano believed that the propositions of mathematics, in particular
those of arithmetic, are analytic in character. An equality between
numbers, for example 4 = 2 +2, can be derived purely logically by substi-
tuting the definitions of the numerals. Thus '2' means the same as '1 + 1',
'3' the same as '2+1', and '4' the same as '3+1'. With these definitions,
we obtain the same value on both sides of the equation.
Here, however, the same mistake is made that Frege criticized in
Leibniz. If I make the appropriate substitutions for '4' in the above
equation, I obtain (2+ 1) + 1. If, on the right-hand side of the equation,
I substitute for the second '2' its defined equivalent '1 + 1', I obtain
2 + (l + 1). In order then to be able to prove that (2+ 1)+ 1 =2+(1 + 1),
we need the so-called associative law for addition, according to which
(a+b)+ c=a+(b+c). Either this law must be postulated as an axiom
- in which event the claimed reduction of arithmetical truths to those of
logic is, of course, abandoned - or it must itself be given a logical basis.
The latter course has been taken by the doctrine known as logicism,
which likewise traces its history back to Frege. In this theory, however,
the Platonist concept of set, which Brentano rejects, must again be em-
ployed.ls Thus with respect to a foundation for arithmetic, our only
choice is either to accept some kind of PIa ton ism or to acknowledge the
synthetic character of arithmetic. Both alternatives stand in contradiction
to portions of Brentano's teachings.
58 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
REFERENCES
1 On the fictive nature of the unreal, see the discussion in the next section concerning
Brentano's theory of being.
2 Brentano also rejects the scholastic doctrine of objects immanent in consciousness.
62 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
3 In Brentano's theory, what has being is only the strictly momentary, hence only the
simultaneously existing.
4 One such inconsistency is the following: Either matter is numerically one, in which
case it is impossible to understand how the addition of determinations that do not
individuate can give rise to numerical multiplicity. Or, from the outset, matter is
numerically many, in which case the problem is merely shifted to another level. For
the question then arises as to what splits matter into this multiplicity.
5 An example is the performance of services for the purpose of receiving some return.
Habit is said to foster a desire to serve even where there is no question at all of compen-
sation.
6 It should be noted that we often make use here of abbreviating modes of expression
(in Brentano's sense) which must then be translated back into what was actually meant
- the latter being much more complicated in its linguistic expression.
7 Because here too it is a matter of a relation between two concepts.
8 This freedom has nothing in common with an indeterministic freedom of the will.
Brentano himself was a determinist.
9 In accordance with the Leibnizian principle of the identity of indiscernibles.
10 For a more detailed discussion, see W. Stegmiiller, 'Das Universalienproblem einst
and jetzt', Archiv fur Philosophie 6 (1956) 192-225, esp. pp. 196ff.; 7 (1957) 45-81.
These two articles are republished in the series 'Libelli' by Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft, Darmstadt, Vol. XCIV, Nr. 3322.
11 Modem logicians call expressions like 'all' and 'there are' quantifiers. The domain
mentioned above is the domain of values of the variables bound by the quantifiers.
The conflict between the Platonists and the non-Platonists thus rages over the question
of whether it is sufficient for science to take only domains of concrete objects as the
domains of values of bound variables.
12 Cf. Chapter VIII, Section A.2.
13 See, e.g., B. A. Kastil, Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos, Salzburg 1951, p. 110.
14 For an account ofthe most important of these logical and epistemological questions,
see my Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik, Vienna 1957.
15 Tarski is also one of the leading workers in the field of the foundations of mathe-
matics.
16 A brief and quite readable account of this theory of Brentano may be found in
A. Kastil, op. cit., pp. 201-205.
17 Kastil, in the book cited in note 13, calls the endeavors of modem logic "abstruse
or even fruitless attempts to force logical operations into the schema of mathematical
operations", and defends the Brentano logic against these attempts (pp. 207ff., p. 330).
The only effect of such a standpoint, which isolates itself from any scientific understand-
ing, is that Brentano - even among logicians - fails to receive the recognition due to him.
18 Even within a logicist foundation for arithmetic, great difficulties are encountered
in proving the assertion that arithmetic is an analytic science. For such a foundation
requires the so-called axiom of infinity, which postulates the existence of infinitely many
objects. This axiom, however, cannot simply be accepted, without further consideration,
as a logically valid principle.
19 See W. Stegmiiller, 'Glauben, Wissen und Erkennen', Zeitschrift fur philosophische
Forschung 10 (1956) 505-549. The various opinions on the problem of self-evidence
have been treated in more detail in my book, Metaphysik, Wissenschaft, Skepsis, Vienna
1954. The viewpoint I developed in the book has since been superseded by the paper
mentioned above.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGY:
EDMUND HUSSERL
Husserl was a student of Brentano's. From the latter he took over the
conception of philosophy as an exact science, and in the process he too
made the turn from object to mental act. The ideas of his teacher form
the starting-point for many of Husserl's individual studies, although the
influence of Kant's idealism becomes increasingly evident later on.
The differences between Husserl and Brentano center primarily around
four points. First, Husserl seeks to eliminate the psychologism which he
believes is present in Brentano. Second, he thinks he can prove that
general concepts, which Brentano held to be linguistic fictions, really do
exist and that therefore one must accept the notion of a logical or ideal
existence. Third, he undertakes to perfect, through more subtle differenti-
ations, what he regards as the rough and ambiguous results of Brentano's
analyses of (mental) acts. Finally, he endeavors to provide philosophy
with a productive basis for inquiry in the shape of a new method, the
Wesensschau (the intuiting of essences). We shall begin our account with
Husserl's struggle against psychologism and empiricism in logic, since
everything else is built upon it.
establish the principle that to obtain and augment pleasure is the good
(and hence the norm) can we inquire into the conditions under which we
may derive the greatest possible pleasure from objects. The normative
sciences, in turn, are grounded in theoretical sciences, which make asser-
tions not about what ought to be but about what is. The relationship
between a norm and what it measures is the same as that between a
condition and what it conditions. Thus the normative proposition 'A
ought to be B' presupposes the theoretical proposition 'Only an A that
is B has the property C. Conversely, if a proposition of the latter form
is true and if C is given a positive value, the result is the normative
proposition 'only an A that is B is good', which is identical with the
proposition above 'A ought to be B'. Consider, e.g., the theoretical
proposition 'Knowledge consists exclusively of judgments made with
insight'. Since knowledge appears as logical value, there is immediately
generated the normative proposition 'Judgments ought to be made with
insight (i.e., ought to be self-evident),. Only after this are we in a position
to look into the psychological conditions that must be satisfied if self-
evident judgments are to be possible.
The same thing holds true for logic in general. There must first be a
theoretical discipline through which we obtain the a priori propositions
grounded in the concepts of truth, judgment, definition and the like.
From these propositions we can then derive normative logical principles,
and in due course the appropriate practical rules. The overall system of
theoretical a priori propositions Husserl calls 'pure logic'.
Psychologism, on the other hand, believes there is no reason to acknow-
ledge a normative discipline of this sort. Instead it makes appeal, in its
many variants, to the fact that thinking and knowing are mental activities,
and concludes from this that logic is therefore concerned with psychological
regularities.
Husserl presents a three-fold refutation of psychologism: first, he
indicates some of the inconsistencies to which it gives rise; second, he
shows how it ends up in radical skepticism; third, he exposes certain of
its prejudices and preconceptions.
time. The judgment 'God exists' cannot be true for one species while the
judgment 'God does not exist' is true for another. It makes no sense to
join the preposition 'for' to the concept of truth: what is true is true
absolutely and 'in itself'.
Furthermore, the character of a particular species is a matter of fact
and is thus individually and temporally determined. Hence if truth itself
depends on the character of the species, it too will be a matter of fact,
temporally determined. Truths will then be causes and effects. But while
the act of judgment I perform when I utter the judgment '8 + 6 = 14' is
indeed something that has been caused or brought into being, this is not
the case with regard to the content of the judgment, which expresses a
timelessly valid, ideal relation.
Also, if truth is made to depend on the nature of the human being, then
without this being there is no such thing as truth. But the proposition
'There is no truth' turns out to be self-contradictory, since it is identical
with the proposition 'The truth is that there is no truth'. Consequently,
this assumption that truth is rooted in the specific nature of man is like-
wise self-contradictory.
Finally, a contradiction results from the fact that if truth is relative,
so is the existence of the world. One cannot relativize truth and still
represent its object as existing absolutely. Even the proposition 'I exist'
could be false, namely, if I were so constituted as to be compelled to deny it.
Thus if truth is relative, the nature of the world depends on the nature
of the judgment-making creature. Yet the constitution of the thinking
being is in turn supposed to be a product of world evolution. The result is
the paradox that the world develops out of man while man develops out
of the world, that man creates God and God creates man.
The initially plausible notion - that knowledge, by virtue of the
uniquely human nature of thought, is relative to the species man - is thus
seen to be meaningless. But this idea, whose absurdity becomes evident
as soon as one considers its consequences, is accepted in whole or in part
as one of the presuppositions of psychologism. Hence psychologism itself
is revealed as an obviously inconsistent doctrine.
presupposition in the form ofthe assumption, rejected above, that all laws
of logic are normative. But the proposition 'If every object that has
property A also has property B and if, furthermore, any particular object
has property A, then that object has property B' makes no normative
assertion whatsoever about thinking. The laws of logic refer neither in a
normative way nor in any other way to real events (thought processes); on
the contrary, they refer only to 'ideal contents'. Logic starts from the objec-
tive content of a science, abstracts from the specific nature of that content,
and searches out what belongs to the universal essence of truth in general,
of proof-relationships in general, of propositions as such, and the like.
The objects dealt with by pure logic are not individual, temporal processes
but universal, timelessly ideal relationships of essences.
A second prejudice insists that in logic we are concerned exclusively
with ideas, judgments, inferences and the like, all of which are unquestion-
ably mental phenomena. That this notion cannot possibly be correct is
readily seen when we compare logic and mathematics. Sums, products,
integrals, etc., are clearly the results of specific mental activities-adding,
multiplying, integrating and so forth. But no one would on that account
subsume mathematics under psychology. Why? Because psychology as a
factual science has to do with mental acts taking place in time (including
the act of adding, among others), whereas mathematics concerns itself
with ideal entities. Arithmetic, e.g., considers the numbers 1, 2, 3, etc.,
and the ideal laws and relations based on them, which continue to exist
even if no acts of thought are directed toward them. The same thing is
true of pure logic. When in this discipline reference is made to ideas,
concepts, judgments, and the like, what is intended are not the mental
acts but the contents - contents freed of their accidental, empirical com-
ponents. An inference form, e.g., says nothing about either the laws
governing the course of thought processes or the concrete relations be-
tween individual thought contents, but instead represents an ideal law
expressing a universal, formal relation between possible thought contents.
Similarly, judgments are regarded in logic as ideal units of meaning. A
sharp distinction must accordingly be made between real sciences and
ideal sciences. The objects dealt with by the former are individual, tempo-
rally determined facts (as in biology, history, political economy); those
dealt with by the latter are ideal species or forms (as in logic and mathe-
ma tics). In addition, one must take care, in scientific knowledge, to dis-
68 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
there exists a second sphere of being, that of ideal being (Plato, Nicolai
Hartmann).
(b) Universals in rebus - There are general ideas, but their being is not
independent of the real world; rather, they are interwoven with concrete
facts and processes, and are manifested 'in' them (Aristotle, Scheler).
(2) Conceptualism (the assertion that general concepts exist without
existential correlates in actuality and hence that 'universalia in mente'
exist) :
(a) Universals as general objects of thought - In the real world only
individual objects exist. To designate these objects, however, we have at
our disposal not only proper names such as 'London' or 'the North Star',
which refer to individuals, but also common or general names, such as
'triangle' or 'tree'. We use these general names to refer to objects with
common characteristics. This requires that we abstract or single out
particular characteristics from the complex in which they originally oc-
curred and attach them to various words as the general signification of
these words. Thus, with a little effort we can construct the concept of a
triangle-in-general- one which is neither right-angled nor oblique-angled,
neither equilateral nor scalene, etc., but all of these and none of these at
the same time (Locke).
(b) Universals as abstract concepts - We are able to mean or intend
not only what is particular, but also what is general. However, this latter
process cannot be reduced, as Locke thought, to the abstracting of indi-
vidual characteristics. On the contrary, it portends a fundamentally new
way of looking at things (Husserl!).
(3) Intermediate position between conceptualism and nominalism: While
we do form general concepts, these come into being only through our
thinking of individual concrete things, in a more or less indeterminate
way. At the apex of the conceptual pyramid stands the concept of a
'being' (' Seiendes') or 'thing'. But names that refer to something abstract
are not concepts, as Husserl assumes; they are merely linguistic fictions
(Brentano).
(4) Nominalism (the view that there are no general concepts, simply
verbal signs applied generally, that these latter create the illusion of
general concepts, but that in reality we have at our disposal only indi-
vidual ideas or images):
(a) General meanings as the products of selective acts of attention -
70 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
TABLE I
Classification of eidetic sciences (ontologies)
I. Formal ontology
Substrate
categories
~ 1~ Derivation of th: universal axioms
Syntactic~l ~ ~ H. Materialont%gies
categones ~ 1
1. Various highest genera of being ---- Abstracta b
\ V ( Concreta b
Derivation of the regional axioms }
Generalization
Differentiations dtwn to the lowest
species
We noted above that with his method of reduction, Hussed makes the
turn to transcendental idealism. Phenomenological bracketing leaves as
EDMUND HUSSERL 85
F. EVALUATION
a perspicuous language. This was left for later developers of his ideas,
especially Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. In any case,
what logic specialists teach today clearly bears the birthmarks of Fregean
doctrine, whereas Husserl has remained almost without influence on
contemporary logical theory.
Husserl's conception of logic was oriented toward ideal logical
structures. Modern logic, on the other hand, is oriented primarily toward
language, since it is only through the logical penetration and sharpening
of the language of science that we can obtain the complete system of
precise rules that must be demanded of a fruitful theory of logic. On
closer examination, it turns out that Husserl's reflections are based much
more on grammatical insights than he himself could have guessed. And
for this reason he actually anticipated, if only in a rudimentary way,
certain features of modern epistemology.
This may be illustrated by an example taken from the Logische Unter-
suchungen, which was recently analyzed in more detail by Yehoshua Bar-
Hillel. 7 In Chapter 11 of the second volume Husserl takes up the question
of why certain sequences of words in a language make sense while others
do not. The answer, he claims, lies in a priori laws of meaning connections,
which are manifested more or less clearly in the rules for grammatical
compatibility and incompatibility in a language. According to Husserl,
we apprehend with apodictic self-evidence that certain (combinatorially
possible) connections of meaning are excluded by virtue of the laws
relating to essences. Thus he reduces grammatical incompatibilities to
incompatibilities in the domain of meanings. At the same time, he makes
use here of the notion that the form of a sentence plays a decisive role.
The sentence 'This tree is green' is meaningful, and so is any other
sentence that is obtained from it by substituting for the words 'tree' and
'green', which are equipped with independent meaning, words whose
meanings belong to the same meaning categories respectively as the
meanings of 'tree' and 'green'. In other words, the meaningfulness of the
first sentence carries over to all sentences of the same form. But if we
substitute expressions that belong to other meaning categories, the results
are meaningless, as in 'This frivolous is green'; here it is the lack of
meaning that carries over to all expressions of the same form.
The question we have to ask is: what exactly does Husserl understand
here by meaning categories? Surprisingly, it turns out that these are
92 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
tinction much more sharply and clearly than Husserl, and that the latter
again takes the unnecessary detour through the realm of meanings. The
priority, referred to above, of the first set of rules over the second reduces
today to the almost obvious point that the defining of a consequence
relation for sentences (which is the chief object of the transformation
rules) necessarily rests on a previous definition of sentences (which is the
chief object of the formation rules).
It should be further noted that the demand raised by Husserl for a
pure (a priori) and universal grammar was first satisfied, approximately,
by Carnap's studies. An a priori statement to the effect that all languages
must contain a certain feature (e.g., sentences, expressions that form
compounds, or the like) can be established only if this insight follows
from the very definition of language. Otherwise on principle none but
empirical investigations can determine whether, for instance, all languages
contain nouns, negation signs and so forth. Thus the notion of a pure
grammar cannot be realized unless the ideal grammatical framework
called for by Husserl is derivable from the definition of language itself.
This is precisely the case with Carnap's pure syntax; within it, a priori
statements about language can be obtained that owe their a priori charac-
ter to the fact that they are logical consequences of the definition of the
concept of language.
Husserl's point of view on the problem of universals is of fundamental
importance for his entire philosophy. His position on this question is
diametrically opposed to that of Brentano. The latter used to say on
occasion that Husserl (just as the philosopher Meinong) wears his
(Brentano's) discarded clothing; for at the time when Hussed attended
his lectures, Brentano still believed in the existence of 'entia rationis',
whereas he later came to the conclusion that abstract objects, such as
states of affairs, classes, qualities and the like, represent fictions.
In order to form a judgment on this issue, we must recall what was
said above in the evaluation of Brentano. Husserl too believed, erroneous-
ly, that the problem of universals could be settled in an a priori manner;
but, in contrast to Brentano, he thought that the answer would have to
take a Platonist form. In his critique of the various theories of abstraction,
Husserl had of course revealed many of their errors and unclarities; but
he failed to perceive that this kind of examination can not lead to a
definitive resolution of the question, since the question itself is not one
94 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
that can be decided a priori. 8 No more than Brentano did Husserl recog-
nize that bound variables and these alone - customarily represented in
ordinary language by pronouns - are decisive for the problem of Plato-
nism. His error, to be sure, was much more serious than Brentano's. The
latter had simply overlooked the fact that the non-Platonist too has to
translate all those statements in which the expressions 'all' and 'there are'
refer to a domain of abstract objects into a form acceptable to him, and
that this procedure can run into insurmountable difficulties. Husserl, on
the other hand, thought he could prove definitely, by the example of
general predicates, that nominalism is untenable. But to do this he had
to assume an interpretation of language that the nominalist does not
accept, namely, that all linguistic expressions stand for something and
therefore are to be conceived of as names of what they stand for. On this
assumption, when asked what object a predicate such as 'green' or 'horse'
designates, we can only answer that it is not a concrete object but an
abstract or ideal one - the quality green or the essence horse (the Platonic
'horse-ness'). The nominalist, however, rejects this whole assumption. For
him, expressions can be significant even though they do not name, and
predicates, on the nominalist view, are among such expressions. To under-
stand the meaning of the predicate 'green' we need simply know in which
situation the phrase 'is green' may be used and in which not; such
an understanding, however, does not presuppose the performance of
intentional acts directed to a 'general essence green' rather than to an
individual thing. The fault in Platonism, according to the nominalist,
is precisely that predicates are interpreted on the analogy of proper
names.
This is the reason for the collapse of the logical arguments Husserl
advances in support of his position, in particular his contention that the
likeness of two things means an identity of kind or species (see p. 72).
The Platonist may of course say that the likeness with respect to color
between a red piece of paper and a red flower consists in the fact that
the color quality is identical in the two cases; but he may make this claim
only in so far as he already assumes the correctness of his thesis - that
we may speak of general things the same way we do of concrete, individual
objects. This reasoning, however, as an argument against nominalism, is
a petitio principii. For the nominalist denies that we may speak of 'the
color-quality' as if it were an object and in this manner reduce likeness of
EDMUND HUSSERL 95
color between concrete things to the fact that the same color belongs to
them.
Once we concede that the arguments securing the existence of ideal
essences are not tenable, the presupposition on the basis of which we can
speak at all of an intuiting of essences comes into question. We are
supposedly able to intuit objects of a certain kind; yet the assumption
that these objects exist rests on logically faulty arguments. Obviously, the
Wesensschau itself cannot be offered in turn as the support for the existen-
tial assumption. It would be a patently circular procedure were we to
establish by means of an application of the Wesensschau the existence of
what we must presuppose if we are to speak meaningfully of a Wesens-
schau.
Outside of a rather narrow circle of phenomenologists, there is no
longer any talk of Husserl's epoche in the modern theory of knowledge
and of science. The reason presumably is that Hussed's phenomenological
method is regarded by the critical-minded epistemologist as a two-fold
path into mysticism, or at least into a new kind o/metaphysics, in harmony
neither with the demands of scientific method nor especially with Hussed's
own claim as to the scientific character of his philosophy.
One path proceeds by way of the eidetic reduction. In philosophy, as in
logic, however, the value of a new method must be shown by its fruits,
and these fruits must consist in the fact that the method leads to new
findings in a way that has universal force. But since Husserl's time, what
all has not been proclaimed as knowledge of essences on the basis of his
method! And how much that he himself would never have permitted to
be called by such a high-sounding name! As everyone knows, Husserl
took an extremely critical - and nearly always negative - attitude toward
those who appealed to his phenomenological method. This was the case
especially with regard to Scheler and Heidegger. But does not all of this
indicate that the method lacks just the feature to make it scientific - inter-
subjective testability, the confirmability beyond question of whatever is
asserted on the basis of this method? In any event, the phenomenologists
to this day still owe us proof that their method satisfies this overriding
and indispensable requirement for a scientific method.
The second path into mysticism proceeds via the transcendental re-
duction. Hussed speaks of a 'pure l' or 'pure consciousness' or 'pure
subject' or 'transcendental Ego', which does not depend on anything real
96 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
Janssen have been almost completely ignored. His own philosophy, which
he counterposes to that of Hussed, deserves to be presented here, if only
in outline. Janssen holds that there is no such thing as real sensory elements
'animated' by intentional acts - through which 'animating acts' the world
of objects we encounter in perception is first supposed to be constituted.
Consequently, the Husserlian notion of an "adumbration of things in the
stream of experience" rests on a fiction. When I behold a red surface,
what is given is only the red surface out there, and not additionally some
adumbration of experience.
To avoid any misinterpretation of that which can be exhibited or
pointed to, Janssen prefers to discard the term 'consciousness', which is
burdened with such a variety of associations and misleading constructions,
and to substitute the expression 'being-there' (Dasein). The 'field of
being-there' (Daseinsfeld) is provided with numerous contents and the
being-there of these contents must be granted to be self-evident, prior to
any characterization in terms of judgment. In the center of this field there
is an'!, which at the outset cannot be more closely determined and which,
in respect to the self-evidence of its being-there, enjoys no privileged
status vis~a-vis the other contents of the field of being-there. The book
in front of me, the pen with which I write, the rose in the garden - all
are just as self-evidently there as I am myself. Thus in Janssen's con-
ception 'being-there' is equivalent to what, in the theory of consciousness,
is the 'givenness of a thing for me', after the intentions related to it are
disregarded. The existence of such intentions outside of the areas of
volition and feeling and a few other special cases Janssen denies. Thereby
not only does he attack individual insights of Husserl, but he calls into
question the entire foundation of the Brentano-Husserl doctrine of in-
tentionality. The assumption that every consciousness is a 'consciousness
of something' has its sole origin, according to Janssen, in vague analogies
with spatial events: the process ofperception is conceived of almost as if the
self reached out invisible arms in order to grasp some object and hold it fast.
Actually, however, as in the case of perceiving a red surface, all that can
be established is that this red surface in front of me is 'there', that is, that
it stands in the determinateness of being-there. An additional 'conscious-
ness of this surface' simply cannot be substantiated.
The givenness of the'!, confronts the theory of intentionality with a
difficult problem, and one which has continually given rise to constructions
98 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
of a very odd sort. For it seems not altogether consistent that the '1', as
the subject of all apprehensions, should be given, in turn, to itself. On
Janssen's view, however, the problem has a simple solution: the 'I' itself
simply has the character of being-there, and always as the subject of
assertions, volitional processes and the like; but this 'I' is not given once
again in the sense of a consciousness' of' it 'for' itself.
According to Janssen, within the field of being-there - which is different
for each person - numerous 'ideal' relations appear pointing beyond the
solitariness of the field. Here we can speak of intentions; but in Janssen's
view, we must observe that these emanate not from the'/' but from what
the intentionality theory would regard as the 'object of consciousness'. For
example, when I recall something, this does not mean that a ray, as it
were, goes out from the 'I' back into the past; rather it is the image
hovering before me that causes its pastness to be there as memory. The
past thing is not another something over and above the hovering image;
on the contrary, it is in that image and is self-evidently there, although
not as something intuitive and not with that degree of temporal definition
with which it was present in the past.
If something is represented (imagined) simply as being-there without
actually being there (e.g. the smell of a flower that I am no longer able
to 'reproduce'), then what we have is a self-evident not-being-there. This
leads to conceptual apprehensions, which go beyond the field of being-
there (a simple case is when I 'imagine' the rear or the interior of a house
I am looking at). True, such conceptual apprehensions come about
through voluntary 'staging' on the part of the 'I'; but according to
Janssen, it is incorrect to conceive of them as 'rays of intentionality'
issuing from the 'I'. Rather, this 'swarm' of conceptual understandings
continually ascends from the field of being-there as a whole.
Where in terms of the consciousness theory a 'consciousness of some-
thing' is totally lacking, Janssen speaks of a theoretical not-being-there.
This is the situation when, say, a sound is now neither self-evidently there
(thus I do not 'hear' this sound) nor self-evidently not there (1 also am
not 'thinking' of it in any way). Only later am 1 able to establish the not-
having-been-there, and it is precisely through establishing this that the
not-having-been-there becomes self-evident.
Janssen derives from his theory a number of consequences that stand
in contradiction to various of Hussed's theses. For example, he rejects
EDMUND HUSSERL 99
the Husserlian distinction between meanings and objects meant, and like-
wise the notions of ideal contents of judgments, categorial intuition and
so on. We cannot go into these matters here. It is to be hoped, however,
that lanssen's work will one day receive more attention, if only because
it makes clear, as does scarcely any other German philosophical work of
the last decades, how very often we believe ourselves to be giving plain
descriptions when in reality intuitive metaphors (frequently intuitive
spatial images) have insinuated themselves into our descriptive reports.
Be that as it may, lanssen's observations, whatever details one may wish
to criticize, do serve to remove the aura of obvious truth from the theory
of intentionality, one of the essential ingredients ofHusserlian philosophy.
Husserl's great aspiration was to place philosophy for the first time on
a strictly scientific and absolutely secure foundation. Keeping this goal
in mind, we gain from his later works the impression of an ever-widening
gap between the realization of his program and its first formulation. In
a passage in one of his last works, Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserl
speaks of the Heraclitian world of consciousness. But how totally un-
suited is the image of a Heraclitian flux for indicating what is supposed to
provide an absolutely supportive foundation for philosophy! Today more
than ever we are inclined to regard as a phantom this striving for an
unshakable 'rock bottom' on which all science and philosophy would be
erected. Husserl thought he could approach philosophy without any pre-
suppositions whatsoever. In order to discover just how full of presuppo-
sitions his thought really is, we must do more than pay attention to critical
opinions on concrete individual questions, such as those mentioned above.
We must go over to an entirely different philosophical camp, one with
altogether different intellectual assumptions. One such camp is that of
the philosopher who might be called the English antipodes of HusserI, and
who undoubtedly has influenced contemporary English philosophy in the
same measure that HusserI has influenced German philosophy - the later
Wittgenstein. The sentence 'I possess consciousness' is, according to
Wittgenstein, completely devoid of meaning. Husserl would have con-
sidered such a thesis a monstrosity; but for Wittgenstein, it is a truth
which the philosopher must grasp if he is not to base his ideas on a primi-
tive and erroneous picture of ordinary language.
The claim that Husserl's philosophy has in fact led to a new and
positive foundation for philosophy is sometimes defended by citing in-
100 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
REFERENCES
1 Hussed termed his own doctrine conceptualism. Nevertheless, many passages in his
writings may be construed also in the sense of 1 (b).
2 Hussed attacks only Mill explicitly; but the same argument is valid also against
Brentano's theory.
3 Husserl treats meaning (Bedellfllng) and sense (Sinn) as synonyms.
4 Pure meaning-intensions, without any fulfillment, are found in the case of wholly
non-perceptual thought.
5 In the Logische Untersllchungen, Husser! criticizes Brentano's interpretation of
intentionality as the 'mental in-existing' of an object. Brentano, however, had already
abandoned this doctrine, which goes back to the Scholastics.
6 See W. Stegmiiller, Mefaphysik, Wissenschaff, Skepsis, Ch. IV.
7 Y. Bar-Hillel, 'Husser!'s Conception of a purely Logical Grammar', Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 17 (1956-57) 362-369.
8 Strangely, Husserl never entered into a critical examination of Brentano's later
doctrines.
9 On this, see W. Stegmiiller, 'Der Phiinomenalismus und seine Schwierigkeiten',
Archiv fur Philosophie 8 (1958), No. 1-2, 36-100.
CHAPTER III
Max Scheler was the first to put into actual practice the new method of
philosophical inquiry proclaimed by Husserl. What the latter had secured
as the result of long years of philosophical endeavor Scheler utilized as a
stepping-stone for concrete studies and a technique for creative work. His
tremendous versatility embraced the most varied fields - from biology and
psychology to epistemology, ethics and sociology, and on to the most
exalted realms of the philosophy of religion and the most abstract regions
of metaphysics. Gifted with profound insight, he was able in every area
to reveal what was new or to unite divergent lines of historical research
into magnificent syntheses. He has thus left to posterity an extraordinarily
rich philosophical legacy.
Scheler devoted himself to the age-old complex of metaphysical and
religious problems with the same intensity of spiritual commitment that
characterized his constant interest in the living course of events and in the
historical processes leading to the contemporary intellectual situation.
The philosophical development of the epistemologist and metaphysician
of the past generally took the form of an intellectual grappling with
problems. However, for Scheler, as for the great life-philosophers (Lebens-
philosophen), to philosophize meant to exert the whole of one's spiritual
substance, and problems became philosophical as they took full pos-
session existentially of the person who solved them. Scheler's philo-
sophical evolution was at the same time and in the profoundest sense a
spiritual struggle for existence.
It is not possible to trace in detail the development of Scheler's thought
from his pre-phenomenological phase, through his Catholic period, to the
stage of pantheism. We must therefore make a selection from the rich
materials comprising his philosophy and limit ourselves to his ideas on
knowledge, his theory of value and of the person, his phenomenological
investigations of the feeling of sympathy, his philosophy of religion and
his theory of the stratified structure of life. First, however, we shall briefly
characterize his philosophy as a whole.
102 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
rational; the concord of being and the disunion in the world. We shall
begin our survey with Scheler's reflections on the theory of knowledge.
Scheler's richest works are those devoted to the study of emotional phe-
nomena. In these writings he traces out in a most sensitive way essential
distinctions in the area offeeling, instinct and volition. His analyses are of
special importance methodologically, for they represent the first appli-
cation of the phenomenological method to purely empirical material. As
such they have furnished fruitful examples to Jaspers, Lersch and other
investigators.
Not content with the artificial and distinction-effacing division of
feelings into desire and aversion, Scheler seeks by the analysis of essences
to reveal the kinds of feeling-relations that occur in human intercourse.
In so doing, he distinguishes: imitative feeling (Nachfiihlen), feeling-with-
one-another (Miteinanderfiihlen), empathy (Mitgefiihl), feeling-as-one
110 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
that the absoluteness of morality and its universal validity are identical.
This Scheler challenges categorically. In a given situation, it is entirely
possible for me to do something that is good just for me, but not for
anyone else in the same position. Scheler coins the phrase 'the good-in-
itself-for-me' to describe such a situation. This formula contains neither
a concealed relativism nor a logical contradiction. What it means is that
the relation to particular real individuals is already included in the objec-
tive ordering of values by rank. Hence the absolute character of values
and the irreplaceable, peculiar significance of individual persons do not
cancel each other out; the good-in-itself embraces the unique 'demand of
the moment'. What is true of individual persons holds likewise for com-
munities, especially peoples. They too are obliged, at the point in history
that they occupy, to fulfill their own special task.
The thoughts here expressed in reference to ethics are intended to bring
relativism into harmony with the viewpoint of absolutism. Scheler carries
the same ideas over into the domain of theoretical knowledge by means
of the notion of individually valid world outlooks.
perform or not. The truth is that every human being, whether he wishes
to acknowledge it or not, performs such acts; for their performance is
essentially bound up with the being of all finite spirits as such. This does
not mean, however, that a belief in God is present in every spiritual
creature. The fact is that the higher the type of the spiritual act, the greater
are the dangers of delusion that lie in it. Such dangers are greatest in the
case of religious acts. Here the delusion consists in the circumstance that
some finite good (monetary value, love, knowledge or the like) comes to
be 'deified'. Atheism thus has its ground not in a faulty knowledge of
God stemming from failure to perform a religious act, but in a persistent
delusion as to the object of the religious act. We may therefore lay down
the following universal law of essences: every finite spirit believes either
in God or in an idol.
These are the features that distinguish metaphysical from religious
knowledge of God. In turn the latter, founded on religious acts and on
revelation, divides into the natural and the positive. Natural knowledge
of God is completely non-historical; any finite object or process may form
the point of departure for a natural revelation of God. On the other hand,
positive knowledge of God is always historical; it is tied to the existence of
certain individuals who appear throughout the history of mankind, the
'homines religiosi' or 'saints'. A mere teacher of salvation provides no
more than the theoretical content of a doctrine; in the case of the saint,
on the contrary, it is the Person himself who is decisive. Thus revelation
is anchored also in a peculiar ontic relationship between human beings
and the saintly Person - in having faith in the saint and in following him.
This conceptual characterization of positive knowledge of God is valid
quite independently of whether, where and when such a revelation is
actually realized historically. Natural knowledge of God is completed and
perfected by means of positive knowledge of God; but the acquisition of
natural knowledge does not presuppose positive knowledge. Thus natural
knowledge stands between the rational metaphysical and the positive: it
goes further than the rational metaphysical in that it grasps more of the
essence of God than can be rationally comprehended; but it does not
go so far as to become a positive, historically transmitted religion of
revelation.
Scheler calls his theory of the relationship between metaphysics and
religion a system of conformity. This expression is intended to emphasize
122 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
that the two domains, despite their autonomy and dissimilarity, are bound
together in a higher unity. They differ in regard to object, act and values
known: the religious object cannot be characterized with respect to other
finite objects before it is grasped; the religious act cannot be reduced to
other mental or spiritual activities (representation, judgment, feeling,
volition and the like); the religious value of a saint is fundamentally
different from all merely ethical values. Metaphysical knowledge is a more
spontaneous activity of reason, religious knowledge more a passive re-
ception. Metaphysical knowledge is linked only to a specifically philo-
sophical 'thrust'; religious knowledge is bound up, in addition, with cer-
tain personal and moral conditions (anyone who 'lives by his belly' cannot
attain religious knowledge). Metaphysical knowledge can be presented in
clear concepts and formulated in clear propositions; religious thought is
confined to symbol and metaphor (else it could be translated into the
metaphysical, which, however, is impossible because the two are so
different). As to degree of certainty, metaphysics contains only two propo-
sitions that are absolutely certain - that there is an ens a se and that it is
the prima causa of the world. All other metaphysical findings, however,
remain hypothetical, whereas religious knowledge is self-evident at all
points - there is no 'hypothetical belief' analogous to hypothetical
rational knowledge.
A difference also exists with respect to the final goal. Metaphysics is
primarily an inquiry into ultimately real, or absolute, being. Religious
knowledge, on the other hand, is directed toward the summum bonum,
since the religious way is above all a way of salvation and not a way of
knowledge. Accordingly, there is also a difference in the subjective aspect
of God: the God of religion is a living God, presented through the anthro-
pomorphic traits of anger, love, forgiveness and so forth; the God of
metaphysics is a rigid, supratemporal being, none of whose properties can
be established on the analogy of temporal acts and processes. A final
difference is in the type of Person who provides knowledge of God. The
metaphysician is an investigator; he transmits knowledge by doctrine and
instruction, and the sociological form in which this transmittal takes
place is the school. The corresponding type of Person in the domain of
religion is the saint; the transmittal of knowledge is accomplished through
example and imitation, and the appropriate sociological form is the
church.
MAX SCHELER 123
These differences do not prevent the conformity and in the end the
unity of metaphysics and religion. Such unity is based on insight into the
unity of the human spirit according to which religious and metaphysical
knowledge cannot contradict one another, and further on insight into the
existential identity of the intentional objects of religion and metaphysics.
For it must be taken as a priori true that the salvation or damnation of
all things, man included, depends on the absolutely real, and that, on the
other hand, the absolutely holy is at the same time the absolutely real.
This identity of intentional objects exists along with the dissimilarity of
the paths by which religion and metaphysics arrive at the object. Religion
proceeds from the absolutely holy, which is subsequently shown to be the
absolutely real; metaphysics starts with the absolutely real, and then
shows it to be that which leads man to salvation.
Metaphysics and religion are thus intended to be complementary. To
be sure, even the two together give an inadequate picture of the Divine.
Yet this picture is more complete than would result from a one-sided
absolutization of either of these two forms in which the Divine is
given. The true God is not as empty and rigid as the God of meta-
physics; but He is also not as intimate and alive as the God of simple
faith.
It is Scheler's thought that in this system of conformity metaphysics
and religion should reach out their hands freely, with neither domain
spiritually violating the other. Religion is not just a first step toward true
metaphysical knowledge of God, a mere 'metaphysics of the people' (as
German idealism would have it); nor is metaphysics a preliminary stage
to religion. Scheler rejects even that 'partial identity' assumed in Thomistic
Catholic doctrine, which accords metaphysics and religion a common
foundation. He understands 'conformity' in the sense indicated and not
in that of identity, albeit partial.
Later these theories about God were largely abandoned. Scheler's
metaphysical ens a se absorbed the religious one; the absolute was stripped
of its character as a Personality, and was seen to reveal a tragic, primal
cleavage between a powerful but blind principle of drive or urge (Drang)
and an ordering but impotent spirit. The source of the split was the
conflict-laden world, itself now interpreted as the process of becoming
or realizing God, a process whose difficulties and problems are concen-
trated above all in the 'heart of man'.
124 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
sex partners (but are fertilized through wind and animals) is taken as
proof that, contrary to Nietzsche, the will to power is not the essence of
life.
The feeling-urge in plants is entirely outer-directed, or 'ecstatic', and
there is no reflective turning back of life upon itself. Yet we do encounter
some very primitive forms of expression, that is, certain patterns of in-
ternal states such as being fresh, exhausted, vigorous, poor and the like.
On the other hand, the function of communication is altogether missing.
Like the principle of power, the principle of utility also breaks down.
Indeed, the tremendous multiplicity of colors and shapes points rather to
the presence in the obscure roots of life of a principle that is full offantasy
and play and is only aesthetically regulative. Because of the undifferen-
tiated nature of their vital functions and because they are directly em-
bedded in the whole stream of life, plants, of all living creatures, are least
like machines. But as the organism becomes increasingly hierarchical in
structure and is composed more and more of organic parts and their
functions, the higher types of life begin to approach the structure of a
machine.
The second essential form, which occupies the next level above feeling-
urge, is instinct. By this is meant behavior that is objectively significant
and thus serves the purposes of the individual bearer of life or of other
living beings, that proceeds rhythmically, that is inflexibly fitted to generic
types of situations, that is inborn and inheritable, and hence is not modi-
fiable by trials or experiments but is already perfected in advance. When
it is confronted by new or unusual kinds of situations, however, instinct
fails altogether.
As separate sensations, ideas and drives gradually emerge from the
total complex of rigorously ordered behavior, as the individual is liberated
from the bonds of species, instinct begins to disintegrate. Practical in-
telligence and associative memory develop simultaneously, the former
converting the rigidity of instinct into more mobile and individual-related
forms, the latter mechanizing the automatic process of instinct and trans-
forming it so as to admit of greater, sense-free (Le., non purpose-serving)
possibilities of combination.
Associative memory denotes a slow and steadily more significant shaping
of be havi or where the result is strictly dependent on the number of trials.
It is a necessary precondition that there be a propensity to repeat com-
126 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
objects. However, Scheler still insists that spiritual beings as such are
pure actuality, incapable of being objects.
Here a thought comes into play that is important for the transfor-
mation of Scheler's outlook. In his psychological and especially in his
sociological studies, the idea becomes more and more crystallized that
the spiritual itself is absolutely impotent and helpless, and can exercise
nothing more than a negative, circumscribing, inhibiting and disinhibiting
function with respect to the authentically positive but blind forces of the
level of life. This lower level is the strong one, the lofty and sense-endow-
ing level is the weak one; an absolute spirit would at the same time be a
principle of absolute weakness. Consequently, the stream of world forces
runs from below upward, and not the other way around. Applied to
mankind, this signifies that a specifically spiritual activity, an apprehension
of the essence of beings, is possible only by inhibiting and suppressing the
instincts. It is solely as an 'ascetic in living' that man can attain his peculiar
place in the world.
On this view of the concept of spirit, the assumption of a personal,
transcendent, spiritual yet all-powerful God is no longer tenable. If the
world is dominated by the struggle between instinct and spirit, if the
instinctual is the truly creative factor and the spirit exercises nothing but
a passive, ordering function, then the absolute itself cannot be regarded
as something complete or finished. Instead, we must suppose a split to
exist within absolute being between a blind, primal urge and spirit. These
two in their opposition react upon one another and produce world
history as the outcome of their struggle. In man, spirit is detached from
urge, and primal being finds its way back to itself. Thus, to become man
is at the same time to become God.
In Scheler's final metaphysical phase, we may choose to see either a
fall from the heights of his Christian faith, or a sobering disenchantment
with and liberation from the ideas of religion. Scheler himself, in any
event, did not perceive in this pantheism-of-becoming the dismal pessi-
mism that others found in it. And his ardent affirmation of being could
not be destroyed even by the ultimate tragedy rooted in the circumstance
that God needs man in order that He may come to self-consciousness.
In the struggle for spirit, Scheler saw the supreme fulfillment of meaning,
which can be attained only through active personal commitment, not
through theoretical certainty. To those, however, who are not able to
128 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
of different value ideals each of whom 'does his duty' in accordance with
his ideal. But the idea of ultimate tragedy in the sense of an inner disunion
and absurdity of the world was foreign to him, even though his un-
questioning optimism could scarcely find objective justification in the
content of his final doctrines. The philosophy of existence and existential
ontology both seek to gain this glimpse into the undisguised tragedy in
existing. In doing so, they seek to penetrate a deeper level of man's being,
which lies beneath the conflict between life and spirit, without employing
the resultant new aspects to erect a general world metaphysics reaching
beyond human existence.
REFERENCES
'authentic Existence' is thus an abrupt one, and for that very reason has
nothing to do with differences in ethical valuation. Always at the outset,
and for the most part to the end, man lives in the mode of inauthentic
Existence, or of mere human Being, even when he may justly be assigned
the value predicate 'good'. Authentic Existence demands not a mere
enhancement of the value or the vital quality of life, but a complete
turning away from it, the calling back of one's self from the 'forfeiture'
or 'fallen-ness' (Verfallenheit) characteristic of everyday life.
If what becomes manifest in the basic existential mood is to be ex-
pressed in philosophical terms, we must either alter our entire conceptual
apparatus, or else renounce scientific knowledge altogether, and simply
'appeal' to man to consummate the experience of Existence and avail
himself of the possibility it reveals for authentic self-Being. The first
alternative occurs in the philosophy of Heidegger, the second in that of
Jaspers.
(2) The development of a fundamentally new theme requires an extra-
ordinary method. In Heidegger's case, this need is met by phenomenology,
which, however, must now assume a more radical form corresponding to
the new task. Phenomenology for Husserl consisted in 'bracketing out'
everything contingent by abstaining from existential judgments; Scheler
added a demand for the exclusion of all emotive Being so that a pure
outpouring of spirit might result. Now in Heidegger's hands phenome-
nology becomes a counter-move to the everyday way of thinking as such.
That is to say, this latter mode of thought is nothing more than an ex-
pression of inauthentic, 'forfeiting' human Being, an expression that con-
ceals what really matters. Hence a philosophical knowledge of essences is
necessarily dependent on our tearing ourselves loose from this everyday
attitude. To grasp the truth is to fetch or snatch out of hiding the know-
ledge of Being that is suppressed by the vulgar explanation of the world.
Thus in Heidegger's view, the course of ontological investigation is an
incessant struggle against the 'natural angle of vision', to which those who
philosophize repeatedly succumb. This entails not just the simple elimi-
nation of this attitude, as in Husserl, but a continuing spiritual exertion
constantly menaced by the danger of failure.
(3) In addition to the access by way of mood or frame of mind, there
is also a logical path that leads to the concept of Existence. Scholastic
philosophy drew a distinction between existentia (Dasein) and essentia
136 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
(Sosein). The latter aspect focussed on what a thing is, the former on the
fact that something of this nature really occurs. Here the actuality of
Being remained the contingent element of 'hic et nunc', which is not
involved in the analysis of essences. Husserl, too, clearly held that in
bringing essences into the light we must leave the fact of human Being
(das faktische Dasein) out of consideration as non-essential. But ac-
cording to Heidegger such a bracketing out of human Being is impossible,
and for the precise reason that human Being contains what really matters.
'Existentia' means the same as 'on-hand-ness' ('Vorhandenheit'). It can
therefore be properly ascribed only to an entity that can be treated as a
thing on hand alongside of other things. Man, however, is not this sort
of entity, but a being concerned about his own Being. This 'being con-
cerned about ... ' contains the relationship to himself that precedes all
theoretical reflection. It is in this concern that Existence manifests itself.
As stated above, Existence cannot be fixed by contentual definitions; we
can try to get at it only in terms of its 'how'. But the 'how' of Being is
simply its Being-so (Sosein). It is consequently a fundamental error to
disengage Dasein from Sosein, for the latter is nothing other than the way
in which a being distinguished by Existence is. The traits of Sosein - the
contentual determinations of Being - are potentialities which he who
exists has either made use of or missed. The 'whatness' of man is made up
not of extant properties of an extant thing, but of possible ways to be. It is
not that Socrates is, and moreover 'possesses' certain properties; rather,
he availed himself of certain possibilities, and it was this availing himself
of them that imprinted on him his character, what he was. Hence if
Sosein expresses the 'how' of Being, that is, if Sosein 'flows' to a certain
extent out of Being, then Heidegger can state what from the standpoint
of traditional ontology is the unintelligible proposition: "The essence of
Dasein lies in its Existence". In this context, as always with Heidegger,
'Dasein' is to be understood as 'human Being'. An elucidation of the
essence of man therefore cannot ignore (much less deliberately exclude)
as contingent and non-essential the fact that man is; for the entire em-
phasis of the analysis rests precisely on the 'that' of Being. To illuminate
essences is at the same time and above all to illuminate human Being.
(4) Since the Being of man cannot be got at with the conceptual schema
of traditional ontology, and since it is precisely through that schema that
Being as such is supposed to attain conceptual definition, the concept in
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 137
possible base as well as to work out the contradiction between the pre-
scientific human understanding of Being and the philosophical idea of
Being, the analysis ought to begin exactly at the place where an authentic
comprehension of Being is suppressed; that is, with everyday human
Dasein. Here Heidegger finds the meeting-point of (1) the Aristotelian
problematic (the question of Being), (2) the phenomenological method
(according to which all purely conceptual discussions are invalid unless
a direct showing is made of something given, in this case an instance of
the being 'man'), and (3) the aspect of man stressed by the philosophy of
existence - that he lives for the most part in a state of inauthentic, isolated
and impersonal Dasein. We can also now understand why the explicit
opening up of the question of Being leads to something concrete. For one
thing, the starting-point is to be sought in man; for another, and this is
most important, the illuminating of man's essential structure cannot be
achieved by bracketing out the fact of his Dasein but, as indicated earlier,
must begin precisely with this Dasein. Thus the set of problems posed by
Being is put within the 'here and now'. The greatest question that man
can possibly ask, one that cannot be exceeded in generality, flows directly
into what is most immediate and most concrete.
(7) As already noted, Heidegger calls his investigation 'fundamental
ontology' because it is intended to work out the question of Being and
thus secure the foundation for both material and formal ontologies.
'Philosophical anthropology' might seem an equally or even more ap-
propriate designation, since the inquiry starts with man and, if we leave
aside the governing statement of the problem, does not proceed beyond
man's orbit. But it would be a mistake to disregard this guiding statement;
for the formulation of the problem determines the entire course of the
investigation. Therefore, the subject of the inquiry is not man as man,
as in the case of anthropology2; rather, it is man as a channel through
which to pass to an adequate concept of Being - a process in which,
corresponding to the basic attitude of the philosophy of Existence, the
finitude of man stands in the foreground. The analysis of human Dasein
is thus kept under constant tension by the problem: Is there a road that
leads out of finitude to Being? In the case of Heidegger the theoretical
approach to this matter dominates; for Jaspers, on the other hand, the
question assumes an eminently practical significance with regard to the
actual carrying on of life - something that Heidegger deliberately leaves
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 139
aside as an 'ontic affair 'of the particular Dasein, not to be treated scien-
tifically.
(8) The procedure in analyzing everyday human Dasein is related
historically to Henri Bergson's notion of 'homo faber'. Man in his
ordinary 'in-the-first-instance' and 'for-the-most-part' is not a self-suf-
ficient entity vis-a-vis the world. Nor is he a disinterested subject who
takes in sense impressions and so mirrors the external world in his mind.
On the contrary, active and concerned, he is absorbed in the world with
and around him, where he encounters not things on hand (vorhandene
Dinge) or a stock of things, but 'stuff at hand' ("zuhandenes Zeug").
Thus, purely formally and not dependent on what Existence philosophy
sees as the hostile character of the world, the relation of man to the world
holds a special importance. To be sure, as already pointed out, Existence
must be thought of as devoid of any contentual determination. At the
same time, it is not just some indeterminate thing, which is the constant
companion of Dasein. In existential ontology, there is a much sharper
line drawn between the concepts of Existence and substance than, say,
in Scheler; but since for Heidegger man does not possess the character
of a thing, the concept of Being still becomes generally questionable.
Hence Existence cannot possibly be analyzed by laying down its substan-
tive properties as if it were some 'thing on hand', but by examining the
'how' of its Being, that is, the mode and manner of its relation to the world.
Now this demand for something other than and standing opposite
Existence, which fits Existence into a relationship pointing beyond itself
and which helps condition Existence itself, this necessity for a correlate
to Existence and hence for the inclusion of the world in the analysis of
Existence, becomes so strong in Heidegger that the problem of a self-
subsistent external world loses all force and meaning. The world is every
bit as immediately 'there' as Dasein itself. No longer is man obliged to
break through the bounds of his consciousness or through his '1' in order
to get out in the world; in all that he does, his caring, his knowing, even
his forgetting, he is already, or still, in the world 'outside'. This state of
affairs, which Heidegger calls 'being-in-the-world', is at the same time a
more basic form of the concept of intentionality, and thus establishes a
relation to Brentano and Husserl. In addition, from the standpoint of
epistemology it signifies an interesting attempt to find for the cognitive
relation a point of departure lying beyond the foundation customarily
140 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
toward nothingness. But first some comments are needed on the role
played by moods in the philosophy of Existence.
(14) The first to call attention to the phenomenon of mood in its
philosophical significance was the Danish thinker Kierkegaard, so that
on the whole he is to be looked on as the spiritual father of Existence
philosophy. There was in his case, of course, an extremely close con-
nection with religious matters.4
To the 'abstract thinkers', of whom Hegel in his view was typical,
Kierkegaard counterposed the 'living thinkers'. By the former he meant
those who rely on abstract logical thinking alone, to the exclusion of
their entire personal existence - those who (metaphorically speaking)
build castles in their thoughts but do not themselves reside in them, so
that nothing happens to them if the castle burns down. The living
thinkers, on the other hand, consider knowledge to be neither disinter-
ested contemplation, nor a world-spurning end in itself, nor some aesthetic
amusement running on alongside of life. Instead, their philosophizing
springs from the inmost necessity of their Existence; they place thinking
at the service of living; they enter personally and passionately into the
questions that assail them. Hence for them there is no such thing as a
complete system. They are open without limit to the actual world with
its impenetrable riddles, and this prohibits them from ignoring reality in
the name of some intellectual edifice supposed to solve all problems.
The basic mood of Existence philosophy already comes into play here.
The world in which we live is utterly unintelligible, absurd. How then is
it possible for a life to be authentic and to look the uncanniness (Unheim-
lichkeit) of the world squarely in the eye, instead of denying it away?
Man's insecurity is revealed above all in his moods. Of these, dread
occupies a central position. As distinguished from fear, which is always
directed toward something definite (the danger of being hurt, of failing
in some task, of being punished), dread lacks a specific object of which
to be afraid. Dread is groundless, yet at the same time of an unbroken
totality. For it is not just that one aspect of man or some particular
relationship to the world is threatened; it is that the entire Being of man
together with all of his relations to the world is placed fundamentally in
question. Man loses all hold; all rational knowledge and belief collapse;
the familiar and the intimate are pushed into inconceivable distance. All
that remains is the self in absolute loneliness and despair.
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 145
spirit. In Scheler, spirit is that essential form of mental life which frees us
from bondage to the organic environment, which opens the way for a
candid look at the world as one not relative to the instincts of the per-
ceiving organism, and which makes access possible to the realm of
essences. Heidegger, on the other hand, holds that the specific dis-
tinguishing marks of the spirit are the mood of dread (as distinct from
mere fear, which is also present among the lower organisms), the experi-
ence of guilt, the hearing of the call of conscience, the potentiality-for-
gaining-or-losing-oneself, dying (as opposed to mere living-out-one's-life-
to-the-end), the appropriation of what history has handed down.
The philosophy of Heidegger also differs from Life-Philosophy. The
latter is dominated by the notion, reminiscent of pantheism, that human
Dasein is embedded in the context of the world; that individuality is ab-
sorbed into something impersonal (e.g., in Nietzsche's 'amor fati'); that
our sharply defined concepts are inadequate to deal with the continuous
flux of life; but that in spite of everything it is possible to gain an approxi-
mate grasp of reality and of the creatively developing life-power. In
contrast, Existence philosophy centers around the insecurity and loneli-
ness of the self, the indissolubility of individuality, the absolute unintelli-
gibility of the world, the lack of all that is creative or progressive - for
in the momentary tension of Existence the thought of progress becomes
meaningless.
Existential ontology is likewise sharply delimited from nihilism, as
exemplified in Schopenhauer. Nothingness is not a place of last refuge
which frees life from a meaningless world through the gradual extinction
of the will to be (des Willens zum Dasein). Rather, it is what thrusts man
back into the world and impels him to the most active commitment.
Hence there is no connection here with any romantic conceptions of
death.
By the same token, Existence philosophy has nothing in common with
that form of mysticism dominated by the notions of passively sinking
back into one's own inner state, uniting one's soul with God and thus
enjoying - in direct opposition to the basic mood of Existence philosophy
- a feeling of absolute peace.
This is not to deny, of course, that the most varied relations do exist
with all of these currents of thought; indeed, the preceding remarks were
meant to indicate the manifold connections between Heidegger's existen-
152 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
tial ontology and the works of the Western mind that history has handed
down to us.
(20) We conclude with a further comment on Heidegger's concept of
'nothingness' ('Nichts'), as a preliminary to an overall exposition of his
existential ontology. We may get at this concept by way of Spinoza's
principle that "omnis determinatio est negatio". In order to conceive of
something as being determined in a certain way, we must be in a position
to contrast it with something else. We can grasp the col or 'red' in its
individuality only because we are also acquainted with other colors. If
from birth we had seen everything as red, we would not know what it
means to call something 'red'. This being so, how then do we arrive at the
concept of a being at all? What is the Other from which we mark off
Being? Nothing seems to be left except nothingness. But the latter does
not admit of being thought, since thinking always needs an object to
which it refers. Thus nothingness must be given to us in some other way.
This other way, Heidegger says, is the mood of dread, in which there is
consummated that emptying out of Being which he calls 'annihilation'
('Nichtung'). When we say, after the dread passes, 'It was really nothing',
this is to be taken literally. In dread, man's Being is manifested to him
as a Being-maintained in nothingness (ein Hineingehaltensein in das
Nichts). This is why Heidegger says: "In the Being of a being there takes
place the annihilation of nothingness." In order to comprehend Being as
a positive fulfillment in the sentence 'Something is', it is thus not enough
for Heidegger, as it is for Scheler, simply to have gazed into absolute
nothingness. On the contrary, for the question of Being to become
meaningful, nothingness must have been experienced in dread as a happen-
ing touching the whole of Existence.
These references to the many intellectual motivations of existential
ontology may incline some to believe that a philosophy that effects a
synthesis of Aristotle's problematic of Being, Kierkegaard's idea of Ex-
istence, Rilke's concept of death, the Kantian notion of transcendence,
the phenomenology of Hussed, a concept of understanding that stems
from Dilthey, the Augustinian conception of time, and the like, can only
result in an extremely artificial eclecticism. The following summary ac-
count of Heidegger's philosophy is intended to demonstrate the contrary.
We shall not be able, however, to satisfy the need for a fully rounded
elaboration of the ideas; for while Heidegger is a systematic thinker, he
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 153
the subject is 'They' ('Man'), that is to say, the inauthentic self whose
concern is to keep a distance from others, who suppresses every significant
exception and reduces to a single level all possibilities of Being, who
obscures any primordial access to matters, furtively evades any decision,
removes responsibility from Dasein and thus relieves it of its burden.
Up to this point, we have discussed the correlate that corresponds
generally to Existence in its relation to the Other. The task now is to get
at the Being of Existence itself. It is the essence of Dasein not simply to be,
in general, but to be 'there'. This 'there' is meant to express that man's
own Being is not entirely inaccessible to him, but is originally disclosed
(erschlossen) to him. When we speak of a lumen naturale, we refer meta-
phorically to the fact that to Dasein belongs its own Being-cleared
(Gelichtetsein) or Being-lighted-up, together with - since Dasein is only
as Being-in-the-world - the lighting-up of the world, or what is usually
designated by the rather obfuscating term 'consciousness'.
we split asunder the real unity and construct a world-less subject, which
we then seek in vain to glue back together with the other fragments (the
external world).
The problem of truth is carried to a deeper level by the analysis of dis-
closedness. Knowledge is possible only because Dasein, as Being that is
of understanding-state-of-mind and that is in-the-world, is able to un-
cover being in Dasein itself. The sole criterion of truth consists in the fact
that the being, which was referred to by a judgment, exhibits or identifies
its own self, and this confirms the fact that the judgment was actually an
uncovering. The judgment having been uttered, the uncovering appears
and along with it the relation, as embodied in it, to the uncovered being.
In the case of the theoretical approach, which causes everything to fade
into mere on-handness, assertions themselves become things on hand,
and truth becomes a relation between two things: an assertion and the
asserted being. This is the origin of the theory of adequatio rei et intellectus.
But the truth of a judgment in the sense of uncovering is possible only
because Dasein, and with it the world, is disclosed (lighted up) - that is,
because Dasein is 'in the truth'. Here Heidegger is speaking of ontic truth.
This includes disclosedness (or 'awareness', in the usual terminology),
thrownness (in which Dasein reveals itself as my Dasein in the midst of
other beings), understanding projection, and falling. This last aspect,
however, already expresses the fact that man always exists at the same
time 'in untruth', and this inauthentic way of Being makes possible closing
off, illusion, and error. Hence a deeper analysis shows that the proposition
'The locus of truth is the judgment' becomes its reverse, 'The locus of the
judgment is truth', that is, ontic truth, in which the maker of the judgment
must already stand at all times in order to be able to judge. It follows
further that there can be truth only so long as there is Dasein, which is to
say, so long as men exist; otherwise, beings cannot be uncovered. Also,
from this point of view the necessity to presuppose truth loses its obvious-
ness; for we are required to make this presupposition only because we
must 'presuppose' (i.e., accept simply as being-there) our own selves. But
this 'presupposition' is not 'necessary' so long as we are not asked whether
we wish at all to be or not to be.
6. Being-toward-Death
We obtain the totality of Dasein, which thus far has been broken down
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 161
8. Temporality
The existential and anthropological problematic governing these last
several analyses gains further ontological importance when the meaning-
of-Being of care is set forth as temporality. By meaning here is meant
nothing other than that as which the unity of the care structure can be
understood. It may seem at first that the unity of human Dasein has
become even more questionable as a result of Dasein's being enlarged by
the addition of the phenomena of death, guilt and conscience. Yet, as a
matter of fact, the existential concept of death will now provide the initial
step in expounding the structure of time.
MAR TIN HEIDEGGER 163
to maturity. The more 'futural' Dasein is, the more open it is to the have-
been possibilities of Being. Hence man, and specifically authentically
existing man, is a repeating creature. Repetition is not an empty bringing
back of the past, nor merely a tying back of the present to what has been
outstripped; it is a rejoinder to what has-been-there, which comes out of
the depths of Existence, but which, as a decision of the moment, is at the
same time a decisive disavowal of the mere working out of the past in
the present. Human activity acquires historical meaning not because it is
part of a presumably known, objective, historical context of meaning, but
because it bends back to the individual uniqueness of what has been, and
answering this, pushes forward into the still uncertain obscurity of the
future.
But only the acceptance of thrownness, not the deliverance from it, can
bring about historicality. This boundary cannot be infringed by finite
Existence. All of these aspects are summarized by Heidegger in a sentence
that illustrates both the extraordinary difficulty of his language and its
powerful dynamics: "Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially
futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon
its factical 'there' by shattering itself against death - that is to say, only
an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-
been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take
over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for 'its time'.
Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible
something like ... authentic historicality." 13
Thus, in the overall view of existential ontology, man is pictured as a
nugatory creature thrown unasked into the world, finite, wedged between
the dark poles of birth and death, placed in situations that cannot be
lighted up, filled with dread to the depths of his being - a creature who
comports himself with concern for the world around him, solicitude for
his fellow-men, and care for himself, who for the most part exists lost
in the 'They', and is called upon by conscience to take over Being-guilty
by enduring his own death, and to make use of his historicality by a
repeating or recapitulating appropriation of what has been. But the inner-
most core of man, which for the first time allows all of these structural
aspects to be seen in unity, is temporality. It is the medium, the horizon,
within which a genuine understanding of the Being of human Dasein is
to be obtained.
166 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
The original inquiry, however, was addressed not to man but to the
meaning of Being in general. Man's finite Existence was to constitute
only the transit point toward this goal. Time has been shown to be the
horizon of understanding of human Being. But the question still is
whether time forms the medium for the understanding of Being in general.
This question, which suggests the further one as to whether we can push
on through finitude to Being itself, marks the close of the first part of
Sein und Zeit. 14
C. EVALUATION
tressed when Heidegger states flatly and aggressively that by means of his
analysis of Kant he has 'refuted conclusively' all interpretations that con-
nect Kant's formulations of problems to questions of epistemology. In
support of Heidegger's account, the point may be made that the "problem
of finitude in man" does touch a very important concern of Kant's. This
we can concede. But we ought not to overlook the fact that in Kant's view
there also exist concepts of reason, which are all rooted in the idea of the
unconditioned, and that man as a moral being - that is to say, as a freely
deciding creature - does not remain imprisoned by temporality and fini-
tude, but belongs to the intelligible world. On the basis of his ethics, and
within the framework of his philosophy of religion, Kant was stilI able
to arrive in the end at a metaphysics of the supersensible, although the
latter could not be proved theoretically.
We may regard as the main point of this metaphysics the proposition
that a man lacking revelation - that is, a man who in religious matters
does not rely on revelation - is entitled (but not obliged) to believe in God
and the immortality of the soul. This proposition is demonstrated by
starting from the interests of practical reason: A moral personality has
an interest in belonging to a world that affords it the prospect of un-
limited ethical perfection and, in addition, the prospect of a happiness
corresponding to its ethical value. According to Kant, through a principle
of inference not logically demonstrable, we may, basing ourselves on the
interests of practical reason, move on to a belief in the existence of that
which satisfies these interests - that is, a moral world - from which in
turn we can easily derive the existence of God and the immortality of the
soul.
This aspect of the Kantian philosophy has been given so much promi-
nence because it serves to make clear the great contrast to Heidegger's
thinking. Heidegger is a philosophical 'monist' in the sense that for him
there is nothing beyond the domain of temporal human Dasein, with all
the existential-ontological traits cited above. When he attempts to reduce
the three Kantian cognitive faculties to the transcendental imagination,
he imposes a monism upon Kant, too; for there is left standing, for the
whole interpretation of Kant, only one plane of reference of temporal
human Dasein. But Kant was not a monist, he was a dualist - man as a
moral creature belongs not to the phenomenal world to which our theo-
retical knowledge is restricted, but to the noumenal or intelligible world.
172 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
to have already been achieved. But this is contradicted by the fact that the
examples he gives are quite heterogeneous in character: at times he ap-
pears to take 'Being' (' Sein') in the sense of Existence, but then he intro-
duces 'to be' ('sein') as a copula, as in 'The sky is blue'. More serious,
perhaps, than the failure to distinguish among these various meanings is
the tacitly assumed Platonism involved in employing 'to be' ('sein') as a
substantive, specifically in the expression 'the Being' (' das Sein'). All the
difficulties cited by Brentano arise here. The expression 'the Being' is
supposed to characterize an object (in the wider sense of the term, in
which we call 'object' anything to which we can refer by means of a name
or a description), and thus this object must itself have a Being. Hence
if it is permissible to speak of the Being, we must also grant that this
Being itself has a Being, thus that there is a Being of the Being, and so
forth ad infinitum.
What has been said about Being applies analogously to all predicate
expressions. Let us call such predicates concrete general terms, since they
can be applied to concrete objects; and let us call the names of objects
singular terms. The question that then arises is whether, in addition to
concrete singular terms (names of individuals), there are also abstract
singular terms, which designate non-concrete objects, such as colors or
other qualities, relations and the like. The transition to Platonism consists
in interpreting concrete general terms as being at the same time abstract
singular terms. For instance, the general predicate 'red', predicable of
concrete objects, is conceived of as the name of an object, namely, redness.
Non-Platonists, such as Brentano, would reject this account and ac-
cordingly would recognize the Heidegger expressions 'historicality',
'temporality', 'resoluteness' merely as 'synsemantic'.
These remarks are not intended as a polemic against the Platonism of
Heidegger. We merely want to call attention to the following difficulty.
Undoubtedly, the problem of universals is an ontological problem, and
one that is neutral with respect to interpreting the de terminations of
Being either as 'Existenzialien' or as categories. Now we should expect
that an investigation in fundamental ontology, which is supposed to
precede all special ontologies, would use only such formulations as are
independent of any particular standpoint on the question of universals,
or else that it would raise this problem and proceed toward a solution.
Such an investigation, however, dare not assume that this problem is
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 177
that is both round and square'. Hence in a language freed from the
vaguenesses and especially from the misleading grammar of ordinary
language, the word 'nothing' or an equivalent cannot occur at all, and
therefore a disposition to speak of 'nothingness' can no longer arise.
Perhaps the objection might be made that Heidegger uses the expression
'nothing' in a sense entirely different from that of ordinary language when
he says that nothingness manifests itself in dread and this experience
reveals the fact that Dasein is a Being-maintained in nothingness. But
even apart from the fact that it would still be extremely misleading to
take an expression used both in ordinary life and in science in a quite
definite way and suddenly provide it with an entirely new meaning, this
objection does not hold. Heidegger undertakes his analysis more for the
purpose of investigating the essence of negation. As soon as he comes to
the task of metaphysics, he says: "Metaphysics occupies itself with being
and nothing else (sonst nichts)." And in the very next sentence he asks:
"How do matters stand with this nothingness (dieses Nichts)?" In the
first of the two sentences, the word 'nothing' is used in quite the custom-
ary sense; for this statement is equivalent to 'It is not the case that meta-
physics occupies itself with something other than being'. In the second
sentence the expression 'nothing(ness)' suddenly functions as the desig-
nation for an object, as it does in the various other questions that
Heidegger throws out, such as 'How do we know nothingness?', 'How
do we find nothingness?' and the like. With this, the grammatical sleight-
of-hand is accomplished, and all further speculations rely on it.
We must now bring the discussion of Heidegger to a close. In our view,
the two thinkers to whom Heidegger stands nearest are Dilthey and
Kierkegaard. From the former he has taken over the radical immanentist
standpoint, explaining human Dasein 'in its own terms' without intro-
ducing transcendent entities. The spiritual atmosphere in which Heidegger
thinks and the attitude toward life which nourishes his philosophy are
those of Kierkegaard. We should perhaps add Augustine, whose philo-
sophical reflections about time were fitted into the Heidegger system in
a rather naive form. In addition, Heidegger himself explicitly stresses his
positive relation to Aristotle, one of the greatest logicians of all times,
and to Kant, one of the greatest epistemologists of all times. Neverthe-
less, in the light of the brief discussion above of Heidegger's book on
Kant and of the role that 'Being' and 'nothingness' play within the frame-
MARTIN HEIDEGGER 179
REFERENCES
• The English equivalents used here for Heidegger's unique philosophical vocabulary
are, for the most part, those introduced by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
in their translation of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, entitled Being and Time, New York
1962. These include in particular 'Being' for 'Sein' and 'being' for 'seiend' (but here
also for 'Seiendes'). In addition, two brief passages from Sein und Zeit have been
quoted from the translation. ffranslator's note.]
1 Heidegger understands here by 'meaning' not what comes to mind when we speak
of the 'meaning of the world' or the 'meaning of existence' ('Sinn des Seins'), but
simply the ordinary verbal sense of 'Being'. Nicolai Hartmann's objection that this is
too little for the formulation of metaphysical problems does not hold in the case of
Heidegger. For reasons stated above, Heidegger's question is whether, in understanding
the word 'Being', we have not already fallen victim to a misinterpretation.
2 The word 'anthropology' here is taken in the widest sense conceivable so as to
embrace philosophical studies of man; it is not confined, as is often the custom today,
to the narrower circle of medical and biological problems.
3 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 1927, 1960, p. 136 (translated into English by John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as Being and Time, 1962, p. 175).
4 Kierkegaard referred to himself not as a philosopher but as a religious writer.
5 Cf. F. Heinemann, Neue Wege der Philosophie, 1929, pp. 186ff.
6 Cf. the exceptionally clear account by O. Bollnow, 'Existenz-philosophie', in Syste-
matische philosophie (ed. by N. Hartmann), 1942.
7 It should be recalled that here and in the sequel, in accordance with the Heidegger
terminology, by 'Dasein' is to be understood 'human Dasein'.
8 Cf. the introductory comments in the preceding section (point 12).
9 We should note the connection with ScheIer's concept of spirit. But what in Scheler
is made possible by the introduction of a new principle, is here derived from a changed
attitude toward the world.
10 The same suspension of all world meaning takes place in true boredom. As Heidegger
says in Was 1st Metaphysik?, (1929, 1943): "Deep boredom, moving to and fro in the
abysses of Dasein like a silent mist, draws together all things, men and even oneself
with them, into a strange indifference" (p. 14).
11 Because Dasein as Being-possible includes the not-yet, i.e., because Dasein is Being-
toward-the-potentiaIity-of-Being, Heidegger also speaks of 'Being-ahead-of-oneself'.
180 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
Since the 'not-yet realized' possibilities of man belong to his existential Being, man
always is already ahead of himself. If we designate thrownness by 'Being-already'
(-in-the-world) and falling by 'Being-alongside' (-of-the-world), we obtain Heidegger's
not very graceful expression for care: "being-ahead-of-itself - in-being-already-in ... -
as Being-alongside' ('Sich-vorweg-sein - im-schon-sein-in ... - als Sein-bei'). See M.
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., p. 196.
12 We must omit the temporal interpretations of the individual Existenzialien (under-
standing, state-of-mind and the like), as well as of world transcendence.
13 Sein und Zeit, op. cit., p. 385 (English tr., op. cit., p. 437).
14 The second part has not appeared, although more than 40 years have passed since
publication of Part One.
15 In elucidating this expression, we must limit ourselves to noting that Kant called
transcendental or pure those acts of consciousness that constitute the source of a priori
cognitions. The expression 'imagination' (,Einbildungskraft') is introduced because,
according to Kant, it is through the imagination that "the manifold of intuition is
brought into a single image". The pure imagination divides into pure apprehension
(the a priori component in the combining of simultaneously given contents of the
intuition) and pure reproduction (the a priori component in the combining of present
contents of consciousness with recollections of the past). In Kant's view, such non-
empirical or 'pure' faculties must exist, otherwise the synthetic unity of the contents
of our intuition would be inexplicable. For any such synthetic unity also contains a
synthesis of space and time; but both of these latter are, for Kant, a priori intuitions
and therefore cannot be combined into unities by empirical 'faculties'.
16 Kant-Studien 36 (1931) 17.
17 Op. cit., p. 24.
18 For a more detailed analysis of all these cases, see W. Stegmiiller, 'Sprache und
Logik', Studium Generate 9 (1956) #2, esp. pp. 57-65,74--77.
CHAPTER V
First, since man at the outset is dominated by the belief that the totality
of beings can be understood scientifically, he has to be led to the boundary
of the objectively knowable where he can then be made aware that all
generally valid cognition is relative and of no use for grasping what
really matters. Second, this negative phase of eliminating all alleged
knowledge is followed by the positive philosophical stage. Here man is
summoned to be truly his own self without being offered knowledge of
his own Being and without being relieved of responsibility for his own
Dasein through being presented with universally applicable maxims of
conduct. Yet man himself, no matter how honest he may be or how
intensively he may exert his personality, is not able to find any ultimate
meaning in himself alone. Therefore philosophizing, in a third and final
step, presses on beyond even the inner world of man in order to assure
itself of the absolute, and this in an undogmatic manner that does not
imply definitive rational knowledge. In conformity with these three tasks,
Jaspers divides his first great philosophical work, Philosophie (1932), into
three parts: world-orientation (Weltorientierung), the illumination of
Existence (Existenzerhellung) and metaphysics.
1. World-Orientation
By world-orienting thought, Jaspers means the totality of those processes
of consciousness that are directed toward achieving universally valid
knowledge. It is exclusively through such processes that scientific world-
orientation operates. Philosophical world-orientation, on the other hand,
tries to make us see that thinking in categories suited to objects does not
capture true Being, that what is knowable for us is not Being in itself.
This basic idea coincides with that of Kant's theoretical philosophy. In
carrying it out, however, Jaspers takes other paths than does Kant;
Jaspers, likewise, has a different purpose in bringing man up to the limits
of cognition. Whereas Kant attempted by rational argumentation to
demonstrate his notion of the inapplicability of generally valid knowledge
to the world of things in themselves, Jaspers already moves beyond the
rational in the method he employs. For in his case, as opposed to Kant,
we cannot even know wherein the unknowability of the actual world
consists, since awareness of the basis for this unknowability of beings-in-
themselves would itself constitute cogent knowledge of Being. In place of
a logical demonstration, Jaspers picks out a number of examples from the
KARL JASPERS 183
most varied fields of learning and uses these to exhibit the actual limits
of knowledge. As a rule, he applies a dialectical procedure: he starts with
a particular concept, analyzes it and shows at what point it necessarily
requires supplementation. When the supplement is forthcoming, he then
shows that it has not captured the decisive element, and indeed that this
element lies beyond what can be grasped in these concepts. When I
inquire into Being, e.g., I find that there are many kinds of Being: dead
and living, thing-like and personal, ideal and real, and so forth. All of
these together constitute an object for me, and thus fall under the heading
of Being-an-object. But this Being-an-object does not by any means
exhaust all Being; for whenever I confront an object I do so as that which
is not an object. Even when I attempt to lay hold of myself, I am there
as the 'I' to whom I become an object. The necessary correlate to Being-
an-object is Being-I, or Being-a-subject. Neither of these, however,
captures Being itself. When I try to grasp Being in itself, then, to the
extent that I apprehend it, I convert it into an object for myself and
thereby reduce it to Being-an-object. Thus the three ways of Being inter-
penetrate, although I am not able to set down anyone of them absolutely:
Being-in-itself, which is comprehensible only as a boundary concept;
relative Being-an-object; and Being-I, which is not an object.
This is simply one of many examples from world-orientation. It is
intended to show how Jaspers begins by attempting to introduce us to
that intellectual vortex from which rational knowledge provides no exit.
Here he displays an extraordinary ability to evoke, from continually new
vantage points, an awareness of (impenetrable) boundaries. But his goal
is not, as in the case of Kant, to resolve fundamental problems in the
theory of knowledge; instead, it is to expose the disunion, disharmony
and problematic character of the world - a world in which the lonely
thinker finds himself placed in situations impossible to elucidate, unable
to gain peace in universally valid knowledge. What really matters, namely,
the non-replaceable individual in his personal uniqueness, is suppressed
and eliminated by scientific cognition. The latter is directed not to the
individual as such but to the replaceable I, that is, to that stratum in man's
understanding which he has in common with other men and with regard
to which, therefore, all men are interchangeable. Thus it is only the surface
aspect of man and not his non-replaceable core that can find peace in the
results of the sciences.
184 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
For that reason Jaspers says that Dasein as such is not Existence; man
in Dasein is possible Existence. Here again we encounter the notion of
possibility, which plays such a central role in Heidegger's philosophy.
From Heidegger's novel ontological angle of vision, however, man appears
as such in the light of the constitution of Existence and thus as essentially
characterized by Being-possible. Jaspers, on the other hand, in considering
man scientifically, retains the categorial way of thinking and simply sets
out what Heidegger calls 'authentic Existence' as a possibility in contrast
to objectively comprehensible Dasein. In this respect too, therefore, his
philosophy has a more pronounced irrational flavor than that of
Heidegger. The latter is still able to get a grip on Existence itself by
transforming a conceptual comprehension based on categories (which
define the Being of things-on-hand) into one based on Existenzialien.
Jaspers, on the contrary, renounces any objective comprehension of
Existence and thus for him the question of transforming categories into
Existenzialien does not arise.
If we cannot grasp Existence as such, how then can we speak of it
philosophically at all, and what purpose does such talk serve? Existence-
illumination is not intended to make universally binding statements about
beings (as is done in the world-orienting thinking of the sciences) but to
appeal to the possible Existence in men. Thinking that illuminates Exist-
ence or appeals does not refer to what can be perceived by everyone and
must therefore devise new methods of reflection. This raises a knotty
problem, which Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in their day strove in vain to
master: the problem of communicating Existence. The fulfilled certainty
of authentic Existence does not admit of expression in categories appli-
cable to objects. But we can speak to others only in universal linguistic
symbols and concepts. Hence the spiritual process directed to other men
must fully alter its usual sense. Existence-illuminating thought requires,
so to speak, two wings to fly: one wing is universal comprehensibility,
which belongs to thinking as thinking; the other is the existential con-
sciousness of Being which vibrates in resonance with that thinking. It is
essential that these two aspects coincide; this alone differentiates Exist-
ence-illumination from all kinds of psychology, including the Verstehen-
psychology of the cultural sciences. 1 To express Existence itself is impos-
sible, since realized Existence as such is mute. From the existential stand-
point, talking merely in universal categories is untrue because it fails to
188 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
make perceptible possible Existence as such; instead such talk slides off
into a scientific-psychological mode of comprehension directed not to the
other person in his uniqueness but to the stratum of understanding com-
mon to men, to 'consciousness-as-such', as Jaspers puts it (adopting the
terminology of Kant). This is the reason why Jaspers sets so much store
by linguistic expression. For it is through the type of formulation, the
manner of posing questions and the choice of ideas that the spark of
Being-his-self is to be kindled in man. To this end Jaspers has devised
for his philosophizing a striking language of his own; much easier to
understand than Heidegger's, it possesses an impressive transparency in
saying the inexpressible that becomes manifest only after one has steeped
himself in Jaspers' works.
There are three methods by which we may try, through universal
thinking, to arrive at Existence-illuminating statements. The first re-
sembles that of philosophical world orientation; it consists in moving up
to the boundaries of knowledge, where there is nothing except the absolute
void. It is here that the appeal begins, which is to reach the target of
possible Existence. The second involves speaking in the object-applicable
concepts of psychology, logic and metaphysics, in the course of which the
danger of remaining the captive of universal categories is counteracted
by means of circles, contradictions and paradoxical formulations. The
third consists in employing existential signs, such as 'Existence', 'Being-
one's-self', 'Freedom' and the like. These, however, are not simply to be
accepted as such; for in the sense of universal knowledge there is no such
thing as Existence or freedom or historicality, but only my Existence, my
freedom, my historicality. In order to guard against slipping into the
universal therefore, Jaspers in his Existence-illumination always speaks
in the first person. Nonetheless, the danger of being misunderstood is
naturally much greater in the case of Existence-illuminating statements
than in that of scientific knowledge. In the latter case a misunderstanding
occurs only if concepts are taken in a signification other than the one
defined; in the former it is already present whenever the existential Being
does not attain resonance with the Other.
In the actual carrying out of Existence-illumination, Jaspers differs from
Heidegger in four respects especially. First, Jaspers is not chiefly concerned
with handling a particular metaphysical problem. He proceeds from a much
broader base, introducing the whole gamut of psychical factors in order
KARL JASPERS 189
3. Metaphysics
Just as the philosophical science of the mind must be replaced by Exist-
ence-illumination, so philosophical theology, with its claims to universal
validity, must give way to a philosophical metaphysics which describes
how Existence can rise to the transcendent One, the origin of all Being.
This ascent to the Absolute may be effected in a three-fold manner: by
transcending the contents of the world as grasped in categories of thought;
by the taking in of existential relations to transcendence; and by reading
the ciphers of the Absolute. These types of relations to Divinity, however,
are all so constituted that they can settle nothing conclusively, no final
knowledge is attainable through them, the search for authentic Being can
find no ultimate rest. The struggle for Existence never ends; likewise the
rise to transcendence must always be accomplished anew, since transcen-
dence itself is to be apprehended only as it vanishes. Jaspers rejects both
prophetic metaphysics, in which a single individual believes himself sum-
moned, and scientific metaphysics, which through rational demonstration
would guide us to a Divinity conceived of as underlying all Being. The
KARL JASPERS 193
ness strives for unity and the Absolute. There is, however, a reciprocal
relation between reason and Existence. Reason without the existential
basis would become mere aesthetic play, an empty and irresponsible
movement of the intellect; Existence without reason would mean stub-
bornly barricading oneself against all openness. (See the more detailed
exposition in the following section.)
The path into Being is not a straight line, and leads to no definitive
result. At the end there is always annihilation and the senseless destruction
of what was authentic, positive and of existential magnitude. The remark-
able thing about Jaspers' metaphysics is that the absolute questionability
of the world, which becomes manifest infoundering, itself acts as a cipher
or symbol of transcendence. His view that foundering must be ultimate
rests on the fact that from the existential standpoint duration, continuance
and validity appear as inauthentic and indifferent. The steadfast has no
true height; height may be attributed only to the momentary upswing or
impetus. In order to preserve the point-like character of the height every-
thing essential must disappear at once, that is, move toward foundering.
But because it is in this movement that authentic Being finds its voice,
foundering is at the same time the language of the Absolute. In Heidegger,
the concept of foundering is absent because time itself seems reduced to
the moment. On the other hand Jaspers, who still applies categorial
thinking to the world, understands by time a continuous sequence. If
Existence philosophy's concept of moment is looked at through the
medium of the category 'continuous sequence', then it appears as an
ascent that arises in time and immediately perishes in time, in other words,
as foundering. This is why Jaspers' Metaphysik (the third volume of his
Philosophie) closes with these words: "It is not by luxuriating in perfection
but along the road of suffering, with our gaze fixed on the inexorable
countenance of world-Dasein and in the unconditionality of our Being-
ourselves in communication, that possible Existence can attain that which
is not to be planned and which would become absurd if desired - in
foundering, to experience Being."
features stand out especially. The first is a new concept, that of the
Encompassing (das Umgreifende), which actually becomes the center of
his philosophizing. The second is the significance assigned to reason as
the counter-concept and supplement to the concept of Existence. The
third is the tendency to view all essential formulations of philosophical
problems in the light of the problem of truth and to subordinate them to
this problem.
The idea of the Encompassing has its origin in the experience of the
circumscribed character of knowledge. We experience and come to know
certain objects, but these are not Being itself. We recognize connections
among objects of our world, yet these too are only appearances of Being
and point beyond themselves. We apprehend objects as parts of that
whole in which, as in a horizon of our knowledge, they are enclosed, but
we are forced again and again to break through these supposed wholes
(horizons) because Being itself remains unenclosed for us and extends in
all directions into the unbounded. When we seek Being itself, we learn
from experience that everything that is given us and known by us as an
object is encompassed by something else. This Encompassing is neither
object nor horizon, but that toward which all objects and horizons point
and which makes itself known only in them.
We can, as a first approximation, try to visualize with the aid of Kant's
theory of space and time what Jaspers means by the Encompassing. In
Kant's view, space and time are not perceptual objects; but whatever is
perceivable appears in them. Similarly, for Jaspers the Encompassing is
not an object either of perception or of thought; but all objects present
themselves in it. According to Jaspers, when we philosophize we seek the
Encompassing. But we cannot search for it by disregarding both the
apprehensible and the horizons; for then we would simply fall prey to
empty enthusiasms. We must remain on the clear ground of our know-
ledge. In so far as we philosophize, however, all of the things we know
as objects must become 'transparent' when viewed from the standpoint
of the Encompassing, and must as objects finally disappear, for only in
this way do we become aware of Being. When in philosophizing we think
something non-objective in the objective, we are breaking through the
knowable order to the actual meaningful order. The sense of what is
known as an object is thereby transformed and our own Being and
thinking gain depth.
196 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
which there emerge all the phenomena through which the Being oftheworld
becomes accessible to us". But all efforts to conceive the Being of the
world in its totality are bound to fail: we never encounter anything but
relations and complexes of objects in the world. The world as such is
infinite, whereas only the finite can be the object of human cognition.
The world as Encompassing remains an idea in the Kantian sense. We
become entangled in logical contradictions (the Kantian antinomies) as
soon as we try to transform this idea into a cognitive object.
This insight into the incompletability of our knowledge of the world
is, according to Jaspers, of great positive significance. For, the fact that
we constantly break through every fixed point in supposedly conclusive
knowledge, and thereby place 'in the balance' all knowledge of the world,
generates in us a consciousness of Being that makes us aware of our
freedom. We become free for the world and for ourselves in the world in
that we are no longer engulfed in the finite and the expedient. Above all,
it is in relation to transcendence that we become free for ourselves. For if
I do not absolutize the world, then for me whatever is cognized as an
object becomes transparent for something else that is not the world; and
it is only through this placing-in-the-balance of the world that the basis
of my own Existence shines forth as that which remains certain within
this relativization.
Existence and transcendence are introduced in a manner analogous to
that in Jaspers' first philosophical work. Both can be attained only by a
transcending leap. In fact, in the philosophical representation of Dasein,
consciousness-as-such, spirit and world, there also takes place a trans-
cending, that is, a passing beyond the particular objectivity to an aware-
ness of these Encompassings. Yet even here the objectively knowable still
constitutes the point of departure. Existence and transcendence, however,
exhibit a transcendent Being in a more basic sense than the other modes
of the Encompassing. We do not become aware of them through a gradual
transcending of individual comprehensible objects; rather, we reach them,
if at all, only by leaving entirely behind us all immanent Being, to which
the other modes of the Encompassing belong. These two new realities,
Existence and transcendence, although they sustain everything else, cannot
be grasped as objects at all. In his indirect characterization of the two,
Jaspers strives for a clarity beyond what was said in his three-volume work
Philosophy by counterposing them to the other modes of the Encom-
KARL JASPERS 199
passing. Thus he contrasts them with the other modes, and also discusses
the relations among all modes of the Encompassing. In the course of this
discussion, the relationship between Existence and transcendence again
becomes the central point in his philosophizing.
Existence still designates man's authentic Being-his-self and is realized
only through free decision. Thus Existence basically is not Being but a
potentiality-for-Being. Dasein belongs to man; but it is man as Existence
that first animates Dasein, by taking hold of the Dasein given him with its
properties and transforming it. Here we face an ultimate and inexplicable
mystery: something that is more than Dasein bears a relationship to
Dasein and makes a decision whose origin does not lie in Dasein. Being-
one's-self, as Existence, makes itself known in "man's urge to reach
beyond Dasein to the eternal". This urge must have "some other than
immanent ground". While fortunate hereditary factors and favorable
circumstances may produce a successful man, it would be a fatal de-
ception for him to be proud of his Being-so. For this would mean con-
fusing freedom with what was given to him as Dasein.
Existence stands out in clear contrast not only to Dasein but equally
to consciousness-as-such. The latter is the site of universally valid know-
ledge, and as a knower I am arbitrarily replaceable by others. Existence,
on the other hand, is always the "non-replaceable historicality of the
uniquely occurring origin". The difference between these two Encom-
passings is further clarified by the difference in character of their opposite
poles: the opposite pole to consciousness-as-such is objective Being in the
world; for Existence, the counterposed Other is transcendence, which
exhibits itself only to Existence. The relation between Existence and
transcendence is not one of external counterposition, as in the case of
consciousness-as-such and the world, but is an especially intimate one.
Without Being as Existence there would be no transcendence for men,
and conversely without transcendence there would be no Being-one's-
self as Existence. For part of Being-myself is the knowledge that
transcendence is the power through which alone I am authentically
myself.
Existence is also clearly distinguished from spirit. As a spiritual creature,
man belongs to a transparent and closed totality, and in his behavior
tends to be determined by ideas and universally valid norms. As Existence,
he pierces through any closedness by making exclusionary decisions.
200 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
spond its own truth and its own errors in thought. Hence the word 'truth',
as employed by Jaspers, has a much wider signification than in ordinary
logical and epistemological usage, where what is meant is simply the truth
of a judgment or a statement, or, in Jaspers' terminology, the truth of con-
sciousness-as-such. Everything that has a positive value is subsumed under
the concept of truth, up to and including Being itself - that Being "which
comes to be only through its becoming manifest", i.e., human Existence and
absolute Being in its state of having become manifest for us as Existence.
That truth is one is obvious and immune to any doubt. But the One
itself is never given to us. It breaks down into the modes of the En-
compassing; hence for us the forms of truth grow out of the modes of
the Encompassing. To each of these modes corresponds a unique and dis-
tinctive meaning of truth. According to the correspondence theory of
truth, the essential mark of truth consists in the agreement or corre-
spondence of thought and reality (judgment and state of affairs). For
Jaspers, too, agreement is the factor that characterizes all forms of truth,
a factor which, according to Jaspers, changes slightly depending on the
particular form of truth under consideration. In the domain of conscious-
ness-as-such, truth consists in the agreement between belief and situation
(or, with regard to objective ethical principles, which Jaspers likewise
places in the domain of consciousness-as-such, the agreement between
what one wants to do and what one ought to do). In the domain of Dasein,
truth is the agreement between belief and what is useful for living. On the
other hand, in the domain of spirit and Existence truth cannot be inter-
preted as a relation between two entities comprehended as objects. Of
course, we may say that for the domain of the spirit, e.g., truth consists
in the correspondence between the actual state of affairs and an idea (as
when we speak of a 'true polity', a 'true marriage', a 'true friend'). The
idea itself, however, should never be taken as an object, but only as the
stimulus experienced through participation in that idea. Still less in the
case of Existence can we conceive truth as a relation admitting of objective
characterization; rather, truth here consists in the "agreement between
my realization and my possible Existence", that is, between what I actually
realize in myself and what I as authentic Being-myself can realize in my-
self. In respect to the world, truth consists in the agreement between thing
and archetype. Applied to transcendence, truth lies "in the agreement
between the symbols which have become objects and Being itself". This
204 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
last sense of truth presupposes that the symbols for existential experience
have become appearances of transcendence. When, however, we speak
of the truth of transcendence itself (as, say, in the proposition 'God is
truth'), such truth cannot be captured by the notion of agreement. In this
instance, the notion of agreement becomes an empty idea, for there is
nothing here that has the character of an object.
The notion that there is a universally valid realm of truth has, for
Jaspers, only a relative justification. This thought applies solely in the
domain of the scientific truth of consciousness-as-such. But, as the account
of the various forms of truth has shown, the truth of consciousness-as-such
(conclusive certainty) does not by any means embrace all truth. For us, of
course, all truth becomes clear only in the medium of consciousness-as-
such, which is "the all-encompassing space of all Being-true for us". The
other forms of truth come into contact with conclusive certainty in one
or another fashion, whether by being repelled by this sort of truth or by
assimilating, as a condition, the truth of consciousness-as-such.
Untruth is the reverse side of truth. In every form that is accessible to
us, truth turns out to be fragile; moreover, by reason of our finite and
limited capacity to realize truth, untruth is a constitutive element of
Being-true itself. Philosophical truth in the broad sense embraces all that
is positive in value. Similarly, for Jaspers, untruth includes all that is
negative in value, in particular evil in all of its forms, all kinds of false-
hood, lies, fraud, hypocrisy, and the like.
While the various kinds of truth must be distinguished in accordance
with the modes of the Encompassing, there is the opposing tendency for
the various senses of truth to be reunited in a unity of truth. Just as the
Encompassings do not stand in isolation from one another, but are inter-
related in many ways (even if these ways cannot be grasped as objects),
so too the forms of truth are pointed toward one another, interpenetrate
and supplement each other. And just as the ultimate source of all modes
of the Encompassing and of their relations is the transcendent One, so
in the province of truth the basic certainty for us is that "all particular
truth becomes truth only through the One", although no definitive and
cogent knowledge can be acquired as to whether or not a One exists at all.
But there is an "indicator pointed toward unity" - the fact, especially,
that each mode of truth pushes toward the others and bursts through its
own meaning of truth.
KARL JASPERS 205
C. EVALUATION
upon the ultimate intent of his philosophy and can serve as a most valu-
able stimulus to thinkers who are not prepared to accept the fundamental
approach of Existence philosophy. A particularly outstanding example
is the treatment of the tragic (Von der Wahrheit, pp. 915ff.), with its
analysis of the Oedipus tragedy and of Hamlet, which probably ranks
among the best discussions of these matters ever offered. In addition,
Jaspers' critical observations on culture and the times contain many
important conclusions that are largely independent of his philosophical
position.
A critical appraisal of the actual content of Jaspers' philosophy is
possible only to a very limited extent. Fundamentally, a scientific and
philosophical critique can be addressed only to statements that claim to
express objective knowledge. But Jaspers does not make this claim for
his philosophical statements, at any rate not for those that he deems
crucial. The criterion of truth for such statements is not theoretical in-
sight, but what man may become by understandingly appropriating them.
In other words, the criterion is whether these statements touch man as
possible Existence and open his ears to the language of transcendence.
No theoretically grounded assertions can be made, however, concerning
the ability of Jaspers' philosophy to accomplish this; for such an effect
takes place invisibly and cannot be objectively apprehended.
Nevertheless, we shall try to show that a critique is possible regarding,
first, the presuppositions on which Jaspers' philosophy rests; second, the
substance of his philosophy in so far as this is accessible to rational
scrutiny; and third, the consequences of his philosophy.
The presuppositions include above all the acceptance, in very large part,
of Kant's epistemological position, not only his starting-point but also
the final results of his theory of knowledge - in particular, transcendental
idealism and the doctrine of the unknowability of the things-in-them-
selves. There is even some question as to whether Jaspers did not also
tacitly accept some of the theses of neo-Kantianism. He himself explicitly
stressed his dependence on Kant. This is also evident externally in the
adoption of certain expressions and concepts that are peculiar to
Kantianism. One example is the expression 'consciousness-as-such',
which for Jaspers designates one of the modes of the Encompassing.
Other instances are Jaspers' conception of the world as the objective
correlate of consciousness-as-such, and his version of the concept of
212 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
Jaspers himself saw the danger that Existence philosophy might give
rise to a hysterical type of philosophizing. What at one time appeared as
a danger has in recent years become a reality. The external circumstances
of life may have been a contributing factor. But does this not indicate in
practice that one cannot rest with this kind of philosophizing? Actually
the call to go further is found in the substance of Existence philosophy
itself. For if man is a creature who presses on beyond himself, who can
find ultimate meaning only in his ownmost Being-his-self and who must
be on guard against every dogmatic rigidity, then we must concede the
possibility of some other kind of philosophizing - under pain of Existence
philosophy itself hardening into dogmatism. Nietzsche's principle of
'don't follow me, follow yourself', the meaning of which Existence phi-
losophy seeks to deepen, must in all consistency be applied also to the
substance of Existence philosophy.
While Existence philosophy leads beyond itself, going beyond it ought
not to be confused with falling behind it. The person who honestly engages
in philosophy today will of course seek to assimilate historically such
systems as those of Spinoza or Leibniz or Fichte or ScheIIing. But he is
no longer so naive as to be able to believe in their validity. It is not honest
to operate with outmoded forms of philosophical thought - once real
enough - as if they were philosophies advocated today, when in fact they
represent no more than pallid schemas and empty dogmatisms. Jaspers'
philosophy is suited, as is scarcely any other, for keeping a critical-
existential conscience on guard against any such manoeuvering.
REFERENCES
approach which, despite the differences in point of departure and execution, brings
him into formal proximity to the philosophy of the Middle Ages.
4 A short proof of this assertion for logic will be found in W. Stegmiiller, Unvoll-
stiindigkeit und Unentscheidbarkeit, Vienna (1959), pp. 44-57.
5 On this problem, see the searching discussion by J. Thyssen, Archiv fur Philosophie
5 (1954) 211ff.
CHAPTER VI
CRITICAL REALISM:
NICOLAI HARTMANN
At the same time, he attempts to work out what he calls the irrational
residue or 'metaphysical' element in cognition.
The manner in which he carries out the analysis of phenomena already
contains the later ontological idea that cognition is a relation of Being
between two beings, a knower and a known. According to Hartmann, one-
sided attention to the subject, which is characteristic of psychologism and
in principle also of phenomenology, is just as unsuited to solving the
problem of knowledge as is the mere logical analysis of the object. Both
suppress the problem of transcendence - the problem of the relationship
of the subject of knowledge to something that transcends it. Certainly the
advance into the realm of transcendence can succeed only if, methodo-
logically, it starts from consciousness; for the latter is, to begin with, the
one indubitable given, whereas a transcendent being represents something
that is open to question.
The initial phenomenon is that of grasping or comprehending: in every
cognition a knowing subject faces a known object. The object, however,
does not, by becoming known, gain admission to the domain of the
subject (the sphere of consciousness); it remains transcendent to it. There-
fore the subject must leave (transcend) its own domain in order to 'take
hold of' the object. Yet it must return to its own sphere in order to be
conscious of the object. Hence the grasping of the object can be ac-
complished only by means of an image of it in consciousness. But the
image itself is, at the outset, not known, since cognition is directed wholly
toward the being. What breaks through the immanence of phenomena is
the fact that knowledge, as a phenomenon that breaks through the imma-
nence, is itself among the 'immanent' phenomena of consciousness. For
example, when I think of Mount X, I have a mental image of it in my
consciousness; what I am thinking of, however, is not this image but the
existing Mount X. Hartmann expresses this relation by saying that the
intentional object lives "by the grace of the act (of knowing)", whereas
the existing object is there independently of it. The subject, because of
its total surrender to the thing that has being, is at first not aware that
its representations have the character of images. Such knowledge arises
only when errors or illusions are discovered; here the subject learns from
experience that the being in question is not directly at its disposal.
Two kinds of knowledge may be distinguished at the phenomenal level:
a posteriori knowledge, which proceeds from individual cases, and a
224 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
sciousness that we cannot escape from or make our way out of the stream
of events.
Hartmann's position on the problem of truth diverges in its entirety
from the views of Brentano and Hussed. To be sure, truth for him is also
something absolute; it is present only where the belief or opinion of the
knower is valid. But the consciousness of truth is never absolute; it may
be present even in the case of the grossest errors and illusions. The appeal
to self-evidence, in Hartmann's view, offers no way out. The term 'self-
evidence' is ambiguous: sometimes it means objective self-evidence, i.e.,
a consciousness of certainty that offers a sufficient guarantee for the truth
of an insight; at other times it means subjective self-evidence, i.e., an
absolute conviction on the part of the subject in the truth of his insight
which nevertheless lacks any real guarantee of truth. Subjective self-
evidence is indeed a given, but it may also accompany the crassest super-
stitions and hence does not constitute an objective criterion of truth.
Objective self-evidence would embody such a criterion, but it is not given;
the self-evidence with which we are acquainted is merely a modality of
consciousness and is therefore subjective. Considerations such as these
lead Hartmann to resign himself to the conclusion that we possess only
relative criteria of truth, not absolute ones. These relative criteria consist
in the mutual correspondence of two or more instances of knowledge that
achieve comprehension of one and the same being along two different
paths. In the exact sciences, this process rests on the agreement between
a priori and a posteriori knowledge (e.g., the confirmation of hypotheses
by experience); in the ideal sciences, mathematics in particular, it is based
on an accord between 'stigmatic' knowledge (i.e., knowledge directed at
intuiting specific contents) and 'conspective' knowledge (Le., the intuiting
of more comprehensive interconnections).
Answers may now be found for the problem of formulating problems
and the problem of the progress of knowledge. First, knowledge feels its
way along the relationships of being that hold between the known and the
unknown domain of beings, and thus pushes back the boundary of be-
coming-an-object. The same is true regarding the boundary of know-
ability; here likewise the most diverse relations play across the boundary
and provide us with a concept of the irrational. The boundary of the-
capability-of-becoming-an-object is not to be conceived of as an abrupt
one. What occurs, rather, is a gradual fading away of the rational and a
NICOLAI HAR TMANN 229
Being in strict generality. Being was pulled down from its lofty eminence
and equated to one of its particularizations. The positive lesson to be
gained from these various doctrines is the identity of Being in all that is,
the neutrality of Being with respect to substance and accident, perma-
nence and becoming, unity and multiplicity, and the like.
Although Being does not break down into particularizations, it can
nevertheless be grasped only if we start with the most primordial of
particularizations. And while an irrational residue of Being still remains,
yet a certain approximation to knowledge of Being does result. The primal
particularization of Being, according to Hartmann, occurs in the form of
two pairs of opposites: 'existence (Dasein) - essence (Sosein)" and 'ideal
Being - real Being'. Heidegger criticized the ancient doctrine of existentia
and essentia on the ground that it interprets the concept of existence as
presence or being-on-hand; Hartmann's objection to it is that in the
relationship between the concepts existentia and essentia, these two pairs
of opposites are intermingled in a confused way. Existentia (Dasein) is
identified with reality, essentia (Sosein) with ideal Being. This is incorrect.
For one thing, ideal Being itself - assuming that we have the right to speak
of such a thing - embraces the antithesis of existence and essence. Thus
the existence of aO is a different aspect of this number than the fact that
it is equal to one. The 'that it is' concerns Dasein; but what this being is,
to which existence belongs, concerns Sosein. 2 At the same time, the Sosein
of a real is not something ideal, but a thoroughly real Sosein. For example,
the green color, as the Sosein of a tree, is just as real as the tree itself.
Thus far it would seem that the relationship between existence and
essence has no connection with that between ideal and real Being. The
fact is, however, that there is such a connection. Specifically, Sosein is
neutral with respect to ideality and reality. The roundness of a sphere is
not affected by whether the sphere in question is a material or an ideal
geometrical one. We may therefore speak of a' Sosein as such' or a 'neutral
Sosein'. It follows that the ontic weight of the antithesis between ideal
and real Being must lie entirely on the side of Dasein: there is no neutral
Dasein; it is always either real or ideal.
The relationship between Dasein and Sosein is one of conjunction.
There is no being that possesses only Dasein and exhibits no traits of
Sosein; conversely, every Sosein is bound up with something that exists.
What obtains here is always a 'both-and'. Ideal and real Being, on the
232 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
other hand, form a sharp 'either-or': all beings are either real or ideal.
The relationship between the types of Being is one of disjunction. Thus
we have gained a first determination of 'being qua being'. Being is charac-
terized by two relationships that penetrate it while intersecting with each
other: one is the conjunctive relationship of the two aspects of Being, Dasein
and Sosein; the other is the disjunctive relationship of the two types of
Being, ideal and real. The latter divides being into two spheres of Being,
the former cuts across this division. Hartmann refers to this interweaving
of conjunction and disjunction as the ontic schema in the construction of
the world.
The antithesis between Dasein and Sosein is ontologically relative, not
absolute. For example, the Sosein of a red ball is the Dasein in it of red-
ness. Conversely, any Dasein of something is the Sosein of something else.
Thus the Dasein of a branch is a Sosein of a tree, the Dasein of a tree a
Sosein of a forest, and so forth. Only when a single being is considered
artificially in isolation do Dasein and Sosein fall away from each other. A
universal view, on the other hand, yields the indicated relativity. Not until
we consider the world as a whole does this relativity come to an end: the
Dasein of the world is not the Sosein of a whole that encompasses it.
The two types of Being - ideal and real- are not as easy to define as the
aspects of Being. To begin with, we can say only that the real is that which
is individual, unique, temporal, subject to the process of becoming, where-
as the ideal is that which is universal, timeless, eternal, untouched by
change. The ideal is by no means confined to the subjective and the logical;
it possesses a genuine ontic weight. In proving the existence of ideal Being,
Hartmann first proceeds, as Husserl did, by noting that we mean the
universal as something universal and at the same time quite positively as
something that has being. The decisive argument for him, however, lies
in the relationship between the ideal and the real. It turns out that the real
world is threaded with ideal law-governed regularities, as inorganic nature,
e.g., is permeated by mathematical relationships. Hence the ideal cannot
consist merely in an intellectual creation.
A more precise determination of the distinction between ideal and real
is provided by the analysis of modes of Being. Hartmann's view is that
the two spheres of Being are differentiated from one another by the differ-
ent kinds of relationships that hold in them among possibility, actuality
and necessity.
NICOLAI HARTMANN 233
sorts: two modes may exclude each other (necessity and impossibility);
one may imply the other (necessity and possibility); or they may be neutral
with respect to each other. All intermodal relationships in the sphere of
the real follow from the so-called law of cleavage of real possibility, ac-
cording to which, in the real, the possibility of being and of not-being
mutually exclude one another. If anything is really possible, its not-being
is really not possible; anything whose not-being is really possible is not
really possible. The proof is as follows: real actuality presupposes real
possibility, and real non-actuality presupposes the real possibility of not-
being. Here, to be presupposed signifies to be contained in. But the actual
can contain only the possibility of being, not that of not-being; otherwise,
what is actual could later be made non-actual. An analogous conclusion
holds for non-actuality. Hence, if the really actual contains only the possi-
bility of being, then the possibility of being must exclude the possibility
of not-being, and vice versa.
Hartmann sums up the resulting intermodal relationships of the real
in three basic principles:
(I) No real mode is neutral with respect to any other. All three of the
possible forms of neutrality are absent here - that of actuality with respect
to necessity and contingency, of possibility with respect to actuality and
non-actuality, and of non-actuality with respect to possibility and im-
possibility.
(2) All positive modes of the real(possibility, actuality, necessity) exclude
all negative ones (impossibility, non-actuality, contingency). This principle
gives rise to various 'paradoxical exclusion laws', e.g., that the Being of
what is non-actual is not possible. In this connection, it must be constantly
borne in mind that real possibility is always only a here-and-now possi-
bility.
(3) All positive modes of the real mutually imply each other. From this
follow such 'paradoxical implication laws' as that the really possible is
also really actual and really necessary. When we say that something is
possible, e.g., that the decaying tree we observe might topple over, our
statement is true only in the sense of ideal possibility; for if we had precise
knowledge of all the circumstances, then we would know for certain that
at this moment the tree cannot fall. In order for it to fall, a set of con-
ditions would have to be fulfilled (including, say, a violent burst of wind);
but then the tree does in fact fall, and the event is a really necessary one.
NICOLAI HARTMANN 235
- namely, the species existing side by side in the genus - is never com-
possible. The infinitely many possible worlds of Leibniz, e.g., are ideal
possibilities existing side by side, of which only one can be actualized;
they are not compossible. Hence what rules in the ideal sphere is the law
of the parallel possibility of the non-compossible. With this, contingency
also finds the entry forbidden to it in the real sphere. For only in so far
as species bear the traits of the genus are they governed by essential
necessity. Any additional determinations (specific differences) are essen-
tially contingent.
In conclusion, we should note that besides the two spheres of Being,
Hartmann likewise analyzes the two so-called secondary spheres, those
of logic and cognition, with respect to their modal relationships. His
analysis yields numerous second order intermodal relationships among
the four spheres.
as Hegel says, "bears a contradiction within itself", that is, points beyond
itself and implies other categories.
The categories enumerated above do not by any means exhaust the
system of principles of Being. There are, in addition, specific categories
for the various levels of Being (inorganic, organic, mental, spiritual).
Between these categories there exist law-governed regularities, and these
may be designated as principles ofprinciples. Hartmann summarizes them
in four laws, each of which in turn may be subdivided into four aspects:
(1) The law of validity. This law breaks down into the law of the
principle, which asserts that the Being of categories consists in nothing
but their being principles; the law of the validity of levels, according to
which the determination effected by a category is inviolably fixed for
every concrete entity belonging to the given level of Being; the law of
belonging to a level, which emphasizes the fact that outside of the level
the validity of the category either ceases altogether or continues in a
limited, modified form; and the law of the determination of levels, which
is intended to express the fact that everything basic in the concrete entities
of a level is determined completely as well as inviolably.
(2) The law of categorial coherence (discussed above).
(3) The hierarchical structure of the real world, extending from the
organic to the spiritual, is not the concern of the two laws just mentioned.
The first one presupposes this structure, the second one does not refer
to it at all but to the fact that principles of the same level (e.g., the various
principles of the inorganic realm) are interwoven with one another hori-
zontally. The remaining two laws seek to supply this want. The next law
is that of categorial stratification. Its first sub-law is that of categorial re-
currence, which states that the lower categories recur in the higher levels
as partial aspects of the complex of categories. The organic, e.g., includes
the laws of the inorganic. A limitation on this state of affairs is expressed
in the law of inflection. According to this law, when categorial elements
recur in higher strata, they are modified in many ways. This is due to the
fact that they are incorporated into a new kind of categorial complex
whose peculiar nature colors the individual components. The law of the
novum develops this thought further; the higher complex of categories is
not just a new combination of the lower categorial elements that recur
in it (e.g., the categorial ordering of the principles of the organic is not
merely a new kind of constellation of inorganic laws), it also contains,
NICOLAI HARTMANN 239
The spiritual or cultural level represents the highest level of Being of the
242 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
real. A critical, philosophical study of this area must proceed from the
broadest possible basis in empirical phenomena if it is to avoid the danger
of slipping into metaphysical speculations. The temptation to such specu-
lations is particularly strong here. The idea of an independent spirit hov-
ering over all earthly things is one of the oldest notions entertained by man.
This idea has misled man into assuming either that the spirit is a realm
of timelessly universal ideal entities, or else that, although real, it is the
only real since fundamentally the entire world is spiritual. Arguing against
this, Hartmann maintains that we come upon spirit only within the limits
of our field of experience. And in that context, it turns out first that spirit
is temporally determined and individual, like all other beings in the three
lower levels of the real; and second, that it by no means constitutes the
all-embracing or even sustaining level of Being, but rather rests and
depends on the other levels. Hence every non-speculative analysis of spirit
must have as its background the basic law of stratification according to
which the higher levels of the real world possess freedom with respect to
the lower, yet are the weaker since they are sustained by the lower.
The designation of the spiritual as a distinctive level of the real Iikewise
expresses the fact that this level is not reducible to the world of conscious-
ness. The processes of consciousness are always tied to single individuals,
spiritual contents are not. Even in a simple idea, the thought-act is con-
fined to the private consciousness of the subject who performs the act;
but the thought-content is the spiritual import, which is separable from
the subject and can be transmitted. Consciousness separates men; spirit
unites them.
The essence and structure of spirit can be clarified only by means of
individual, descriptive, cautiously probing analyses. We encounter spirit
in three forms of Being: personal, objective and objectivized. These three
forms do not represent a continuation of the stratified structure of the
world. They are not formed one upon the other (as the organic upon the
inorganic); nor are they built one over the other (as the spiritual over
consciousness). They stand in a mutual relationship of supporting and
being supported; they occupy the same fundamental position in the world
and thus constitute a unified plane of being.
It is personal spirit that presents itself most directly from the naive
point of view. The spiritual units in this case are individual persons. The
chief trait of this form of spirit is eccentricity: the freedom from being
NICOLAI HARTMANN 243
capable of embracing all the science of a period, nor all the artistic contri-
butions, and so forth. In the domain of social life and politics, what results
is a plainly catastrophic situation: the community must be governed, public
business must be disposed of at each moment, disputes must be ironed
out and distress alleviated, and all of this requires continual decisions and
actions. But these can be supplied only by a consciousness. Since the
public spirit lacks consciousness, the individual consciousness must step
into the breach as a surrogate. Individual man, however, can never be
a substitute for the missing collective consciousness. He is fundamentally
unable to cope with the demands of objective spirit; no human under-
standing can encompass the total political situation, as it does the private
situations in personal life. Likewise, in devoting himself to the state or
to public office, no man can lay aside completely his private interests and
sympathies.
Hartmann deems it one of HegeI's basic errors that the latter regards
as true and essential in spiritual life only that which at the time possesses
universal validity. Hegel thereby fails to recognize that aberrations of
objective spirit may also occur. The analysis of the spurious in the life of
spirit ought therefore to form an important component of the philosophy
of spiritual being. Here again it is to be noted that the public spirit
possesses no consciousness, and therefore also has no conscience with
respect to distortions. The role of conscience must be assumed by indi-
vidual men, who may then find themselves in the position of having to
take a stand against objective spirit. The spurious may be found in all
domains of spiritual life - Kitsch (in the arts), mass suggestion (in the
formation of public opinion), the sham morality of the 'good name'
associated with habitual self-deception, superstition (in religion), and the
like. The sole realm of the purely genuine is science. Error, to be sure, does
exist; but there is no such thing as spurious knowledge, since this would
involve the contradictory notion of knowledge that recognizes error and
still holds fast to it. The question naturally arises, whether science might
not function as conscience within objective spirit. On this point, Hartmann
is rather pessimistic; nonetheless he looks to the newly developing sciences
of social and political life to gain an increasing mastery of the situation -
a mastery which may in the future be put to use successfully.
Objectivized spirit, as the third form of Being, comprises the objectivi-
zations 'put out' by spirit from itself: codified law, scientific knowledge
246 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
as fixed in word and writing, works of art and the like. Whereas personal
and objective spirit are living spirit, objectivized spirit is not anything
living. Its basis in reality (the printed page, the stone that has been
worked on) is material rather than spiritual. The spiritual consists in a
non-real stratum of meaning, first brought to life by personal spirit
through the medium of an understanding contemplation and recognition.
Finally, the relationship between the real foreground and the non-real
background is examined more closely using the work of art in aesthetics
as an illustration.
All spirit is historical. The past can tacitly extend into the present, as
is the case with old customs, linguistic forms, moral tendencies, and so
forth, which live on in us without our realizing that they are part of the
past. But what is past may also extend perceptibly into the present, name-
ly, when living spirit knows that it is past. In judging the behavior of
spirit we must pay attention above all to the restraint which objective
spirit exerts upon living spirit. The latter is tied up in these objectivizations,
and they in time become a hindrance to its own life. The result is a con-
stant revolutionary thrust on the part of living spirit directed against
objectivizations that stem from the past. Confronted with so many petri-
fied products of spirit of dubious character, spirit often adopts a certain
light attitude, simply abandoning them; for no living spirit can carefully
sift and weigh all that has been handed down, before it ventures to move
on its own.
D. PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE
1. Ethics
In his treatment of ethics, Hartmann takes as his starting-point Scheler's
ethics of material, or non-formal, values. What Scheler had projected,
Hartmann proceeds to carry through - a searching analysis of the various
values and of the axiological and ontological regularities that hold among
them. The equating of values with Platonic ideas becomes explicit in
Hartmann. Mediation between the real sphere of being and the ideal
sphere of values takes place through the person. It is the essence of the
human person that he be a citizen of two worlds: the real world, which
is bound by an absolute ontological law, and the world of values, to
whose imperatives he is keenly attuned. Values can be realized only
through the commitment of the person.
NICOLAI HARTMANN 247
This realization, however, is not a moral act unless it takes place freely.
We would not apply the predicate 'moral' to an automaton even if it
realized the highest moral value in every situation. 3 Consequently, only
that conduct is morally good which, first, has its origin in freedom, and
second, is guided by the objective rank ordering of values, that is, chooses
the higher value over the lower. Freedom itself, for Hartmann, cannot be
a merely 'negative freedom', or freedom from causation, as it is in the
case of Kant. For one thing, freedom must exist not only with respect to
ontic regularities but also with respect to value claims. (The Kantian
formula of 'freedom under law' is therefore inadequate; there must be
freedom vis-a-vis moral law as well as vis-a-vis natural law.) Thus freedom
cannot have only the negative significance of a freedom from all deter-
minations; it must be something eminently positive, an additional deter-
mination which, in the case of moral freedom, is the self-determination
of the person. This latter freedom, Hartmann concedes, cannot be con-
clusively demonstrated. Yet the arguments against it can be refuted.
Moreover, we can exhibit phenomena pointing in that direction. One of
the most important of these is man's consciousness of freedom.
Considerable importance attaches to the five antinomies involving reli-
gion and ethics, elaborated by Hartmann. The first refers to the contrast
between an orientation to this world and an orientation to the hereafter.
From a pronouncedly religious viewpoint, the ordinary world as such has
no values of its own, but serves merely as preparation for the hereafter;
aspirations that go no farther than the values of this world are evil. This
depreciation of the real world must, from the ethical standpoint, be
rejected completely; ethics is wholly oriented to this world. In the eyes
of ethics, the inclination toward the hereafter is just as subversive of
values as this-worldly desires are from the viewpoint of religion. If it
happens that neither of the two tendencies is advocated outright, this is
only a proof of man's inconsistency.
The second antinomy concerns the relationship between man and God.
While for a religious person God is most important and is the highest
value, man in comparison being of second rank, for ethics man is supreme
and alone important. It is immoral and a betrayal of man that anything
- even God Himself - should surpass man.
The third antinomy relates to the source of morality. According to
religious thought, all moral demands are anchored in God's command-
248 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
ments. Moral values thereby become heteronomous, since they have their
origin in a decree. But for any genuine ethics, moral values are autono-
mous, that is, they are valuable not for the sake of something else but for
their own sake. Accordingly, values are realized not because they are
commanded but because they are evident in themselves.
Still stronger is the antinomy of providence: divine Providence, which
is affirmed by religion, contradicts the freedom of man, which is in turn
the basic presupposition of morality.
The final antinomy is that of salvation. According to religion, man's
sins can be absolved; he can be delivered from them. From the ethical
viewpoint, however, no one can be absolved of guilt for an evil deed; for
since guilt is inseparable from the person, absolution would mean denying
him the capacity to be guilty at all, as in the case of a child or a mentally
ill individual. Hence absolution from guilt, viewed ethically, is worse than
bearing guilt; for in the latter case, man is at least evaluated as a moral
personality, whereas in the former he is not.
The antinomies cannot be resolved. Therefore one of the orientations
- either the ethical or the religious - must be illusionary in character. The
absoluteness of the moral is, for Hartmann, beyond doubt; hence illusion
can lie only on the side of religion. What results, although Hartmann did
not make this explicit, is a postulational atheism, directly opposed to the
course taken by Kant who inferred the existence of God from the existence
of the moral law. The logical consequence of Hartmann's antinomies is
the claim that God does not exist: if there is an absolute morality - and
indeed there is - then there can be no God, since his existence would
destroy the ethical freedom and worth of the human person.
2. Aesthetics
An analysis of beauty must deal with two factors: the aesthetic object, its
structure and types of being; and the act of apprehending or enjoying it.
Since all beauty is sensuous in character, aesthetics begins with the analysis
of perception. A perception does not consist simply in experiencing some-
thing sensuous; the essential thing about any perception is that much
more is meant or intended in it than is given directly. In perceiving, some-
thing unperceived is also present (e.g., the rear and interior of a house).
The sensuously given is merely an accidental aspect, an Abschattung
('projection') in Hussed's sense. Now this relationship of being-present,
NICOLAI HARTMANN 249
The three sub-varieties of beauty - the sublime, the graceful and the
comical - are likewise accounted for by the relationship of levels. In the
case of the sublime, the inner levels preponderate. A non-sensuous back-
ground appears in a sensuously real foreground. This appearance meets
man's need for greatness; here the resistances usually encountered are
easily overcome. At the same time, the presence of the sublime at the
sensuous outer levels is no more than partial; that is why the sublime is
connected with the obscure and the mysterious, the undisclosed depth and
the abyss. In the graceful, on the other hand, the outer levels prevail.
Finally, the comical is characterized by a deception of transparence: the
observer is offered something grand and important, apparently belonging
to a deep inner level, a something which then abruptly dissolves into
insignificance. For Hartmann, as for Kant, comicality consists in the
cancelling out of the deception through this 'dissolution into nothingness'.
Hartmann also discusses the problem of how aesthetic values are given
and how they differ from other values. Aesthetic values, like all others,
are accessible only to a value-feeling (Wertfiihlen). Whereas ethical values
are always founded on the values of goods, aesthetic values need not be
based on any other kinds of values. The value feeling specific to aesthetic
values is aesthetic pleasure. Hartmann, like Kant, characterizes this as dis-
interested satisfaction. What this means is that the extra-aesthetic value
feelings cannot play a role even when other values are presented by the
arts; the extra-aesthetic value feelings are overlaid by the aesthetic. Thus
a doubly high requirement is placed upon the beholder of beauty: he must
have made himself inwardly free from desire for the practical (or other
non-aesthetic) value of the object, and equally free from the value of the
particular state of the subject himself.
At various points aesthetics encounters questions that lead beyond its
bounds. This occurs even in the analysis of artistic creation. The relation-
ship to the theory of spiritual being is established by the fact that the
work of art in its very nature is part of objectivized spirit; for in the work
of art a spiritual content is embedded in objectivity. Furthermore, works
of art also raise a question of truth, which Hartmann answers by differ-
entiating between life's truth (Lebenswahrheit) and essential truth or life's
wisdom (Lebensweisheit). Aesthetics leads into the domain of metaphysics
as well. According to Hartmann, the metaphysicians have continually
made the mistake of endowing the world with a general meaning. But
NICOLAI HARTMANN 251
E. EVALUATION
pirical and hypothetical) theory T'. This concept may then be made
precise, so that the modal concepts of the 'real' become superfluous; to
say that something is possible in the sense of classical mechanics signifies
no more than that it is logically compatible with the theory of classical
mechanics, and to say that something is impossible in the sense of this
theory signifies that it is logically incompatible with it.
With these few references to possible criticisms of certain of Hartmann's
conceptions, we shall conclude our account of his philosophy. There is
much in his thought that points in the direction of modern analytic phi-
losophy: his emphasis on a descriptive, empirical point of departure; his
antipathy to all kinds of rationalistic and speculative tendencies; his
attentiveness to phenomena, which made him the opponent of any arti-
ficial commitment to a particular principle or '-ism'; his conviction that
fruitful philosophical analyses can not come out of nowhere but are
obtainable only on the basis of living contact with research in the special
sciences. On the other hand, much points back into the past: to Plato's
theory of forms, Aristotle's ethics and the medieval doctrine of being.
The future will show whether all these philosophical aspirations are
compatible. For some time it has seemed as if they were not. Modern
empiricism and analytic philosophy, at their inception, engaged in po-
lemics not merely with specific speculative tendencies in traditional phi-
losophy but with the whole of it. Recently old philosophical questions
have suddenly emerged even within the camp of the philosophical ana-
lysts and empiricists (see Chapter VIII), albeit for the most part in a very
much modified form. Should this development continue, as is probable,
the future will confirm one of Hartmann's central beliefs - that a rigorous
logical and analytical method is not incompatible with concern for the
philosophical tradition, but that the two must be seen as interdependent
by any future philosophy that "will be able to come forth as a science".
REFERENCES
beyond its being an object, but in fact does go beyond it, i.e., exists independently of
its being known.
2 In order to have an unambiguous terminology, Hartmann calls existence and essence
'aspects of Being' (,Seinsmomente'); ideal and real Being he calls 'types of Being'
(' Seinsweisen').
3 Hence according to Hartmann, a God whose essence includes goodness cannot be
spoken of as a moral person.
4 See W. Stegmiiller, 'Glauben, Wissen und Erkennen', Zeitschrift fur philosophische
Forschung 10 (1956) 509-549.
5 This is, of course, a gross oversimplification; laws usually referred to as causal must,
in addition to being deterministic, fulfill many other conditions.
6 Hartmann probably would not regard these two propositions as true; but this would
not aft'ect the question of conceptual clarification at issue here.
7 For a more extended treatment, see W. Stegmiiller, 'Sprache und Logik', Studium
Generale 9 (1956) 74ft'., and Metaphysik, Wissenschaft, Skepsis, op. cif., pp. 73ft'.
CHAPTER VII
MODERN EMPIRICISM:
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE
such statements, according to Kant, are in the first place the metaphysical
presuppositions of the empirical sciences, which he termed the principles
of 'pure natural science'. These in their totality constituted for him the
only scientifically tenable metaphysics. Further, he believed that these
synthetic a priori statements form a precondition for the validity of ob-
jective empirical statements. Thus the whole of empirical science rests on
a synthetic a priori foundation.
Now although we may not agree with this conception, we can still
criticize empiricism for failing even to consider the possibility of such
synthetic a priori knowledge. And this objection can be raised even by
those who do not believe in the existence of a priori concepts, but who
hold that empirical criteria must be present for all concepts used in
philosophy or the sciences (with the exception of logical concepts). For,
contrary to Kant's view, the assumption that there is synthetic a priori
knowledge is not dependent on the assumption that there are a priori
concepts.
Whatever our opinion of Kant's theory as a whole, one thing we cannot
deny. Kant formulated the problem of the scientific character of meta-
physics in a classic manner which has never been surpassed: Is there
synthetic a priori knowledge? If there is, on what does its validity rest?
The first of these questions, according to Kant, must be answered un-
equivocally in the affirmative. But that there was such a thing as synthetic
a priori knowledge was for him a fact that demanded explanation. There
is indeed nothing surprising about the existence of either synthetic
judgments a posteriori - empirically confirmed judgments with factual
content - or analytic a priori statements devoid of factual content. The
astonishing thing, however, is that it should be possible to make state-
ments about the real world and to grasp their truth without recourse to
experience. It was this strange fact that governed the theory by means of
which Kant sought to answer the second question; and the transcendental
idealist interpretation of knowledge he presented is plainly traceable to
the circumstance that he saw no other way of explaining the phenomenon
of synthetic judgments a priori. For if our knowledge is to refer to a world
independent of consciousness, it would then be incomprehensible how we
could obtain any knowledge free of experience. A priori knowledge of
reality is intelligible only if there are laws of the thinking faculties -laws
through which a world is constituted in the first place. But this reality
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 265
universal validity. In the first place, it is often not suitable for concepts
of properties; for we can define a Scandinavian as some one who is
either a Swede, a Dane, a Norwegian or an Icelander. This definition is
perfectly correct even though it does not specify either the next higher
genus or the characteristic difference of the species. In the second place,
the rule is not applicable at all to concepts of relations and functions.
Since the quantitative concepts of the natural sciences, such as 'length',
'mass', 'volume', and so forth, are concepts of just this sort, the principle
of definition of the traditional theory of concepts cannot be valid for
scientific concepts. Hence this principle of traditional logic must be
abandoned.
An important variety of nominal definitions are the so-called definitions
in use. They are employed to define not isolated expressions but expres-
sions as components of whole sentences. A major consequence of this is
that such components may be conceived of as incomplete linguistic
symbols, which do not possess independent meaning but are significant
only within a larger context. The definition consists of a general rule of
translation which specifies how statements in which the expression in
question occurs can be translated into statements that do not contain
this expression. These definitions help us avoid recourse to such metaphys-
ical inventions as types of being or spheres of being, and in particular
to the assumption of ideal objects.
For example, suppose we wish to define an expression 'prime number',
which seemingly refers to an ideal object, here the class of prime numbers,
certainly not a concrete object. The apparent reference to the ideal object
may be avoided by conceiving of the expression 'prime number' not as a
designation for the class of prime numbers but as an incomplete linguistic
symbol, which has meaning only within whole sentences. The definition
must then specify how these sentences can be translated into sentences
that do not contain the expression. Manifestly it is not enough to formu-
late a translation rule for the occurrence of the term 'prime number'
within a specific sentence, such as '7 is a prime number'. A procedure of
this sort would leave undetermined what 'prime number' is to mean in
other sentences. In order to be able to state the translation rule as a
general rule, we must start from statement forms, that is, from expressions
that are like sentences but contain a variable in place of the subject term.
An example is 'x is a prime number'. The translation rule must be formu-
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 275
lated for a statement form of this kind; generality is secured by the fact
that specific designations of objects may be substituted for the variable
'x'. In the case of our example these would be the individual numerals.
We thus obtain all the elementary statements in which the expression
being defined occurs. The definition of the concept of prime number would
run somewhat as follows: 'x is a prime number =Df x is a number that
has only x and 1 as divisors'. The sign' = Dr' is the symbol for definition
and should be read 'is to mean the same as'.
The term 'definition in use' or 'contextual definition' is employed here
because the definiendum is defined only as it is used in sentences. The
question whether the object designated by the definiendum exists does not
arise. This question has meaning only if we assume that the definiendum
is an independent name which designates something. But when an expres-
sion is introduced in the fashion described, this assumption is discarded;
the expression is understood as merely an incomplete symbol and hence
not as a name denoting something. In this way, we can avoid having to
populate our ontology with Platonic essences and instead can hold firm
to the principle of Ockham's razor - entia non sunt multiplicanda sine
necessitate.
Characteristic examples of definitions in use are the semantical
definitions of logical connectives by means of truth tables. What are
involved are expressions such as 'and', 'or', 'if... then .. .', ' .. .if and
only if... '. These expressions, together with the quantifiers 'for all x' and
'there is at least one x such that', are termed logical expressions (also
logical particles or form words), and are distinguished from descriptive
expressions, that is, names and predicates. Logical expressions can not be
conceived either as names or as predicates. Even from a Platonist
standpoint it does not make sense to ask what the word 'and' designates.
Although these expressions have no designating function, they play an
extraordinarily important role in logic. The entire structure of formal
logic - the rules for correct proof and for correct logical derivations -
rests on them. Without these logical particles we cannot define the
concept of formal logical truth and mark it off from the concept of
factual truth.
Since logical expressions are not names, they can be introduced in a
precise way into the language of science only by means of definitions
in use. As to the logical connective signs, their role consists in laying
276 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
down the truth value of the compound sentence (constructed with their
help) as a function of the truth values of the component sentences.
Statements that contain no logical connective signs are called atomic
sentences; statements that are formed from atomic sentences by the
application of logical connective signs are referred to as molecular
sentences. To each connective sign there corresponds a particular type of
molecular sentence - conjunctions ('and' -sentences), disjunctions ('or'-
sentences), negations and the like. The meaning of a connective sign is
uniquely determined once we specify which truth value the corresponding
molecular sentence takes for each possible assignment of truth values
to its component atomic sentences. In the case of a binary connective,
there are four possible distributions of truth values to the sentence
components. For each sign of this sort, we can therefore set up what is
called a truth-table, in which, for the sake of generality, we replace the
specific atomic sentences with sentence variables, say 'p' and 'q'. For the
non-exclusive 'or', the truth-table is as follows:
P q pvq
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
Here 'T' stands for 'true' and 'F' for 'false'; 'p v q' is to mean the same
as 'p or q'. The first two columns give the four possible assignments of the
truth values 'true' and 'false' to the two component sentences 'p' and 'q'.
(For example, the second row assigns the value 'true' to 'p' and 'false' to
'q'.) The third column shows for which of these four possible assignments
of truth values to the two components the compound 'or'-sentence is true
and for which false. The definition in use of 'or' provided by the truth-
table may be expressed in words as follows: a sentence constructed by
means of a non-exclusive 'or' is false if and only if both of its component
sentences are false; in all other cases it is true. The truth-table for a con-
junction (an 'and'-sentence) differs from the above table in that the last
column contains 'T' only in the first row, and 'F' in the others; for a
conjunction is true if and only if both of its component sentences are true.
The truth-table method of defining logical connectives was discovered
independently by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein and the
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 277
American logician Emil L. Post. Other studies have shown that all the
signs required to form molecular sentences may be stated in terms of a
single one. Russell and Whitehead, building on the important work of
Frege, have endeavored by means of chains of definitions in use to reduce
all logical and mathematical concepts to a few primitive concepts. Since
then this method has been considerably refined and simplified. Thus the
system of W. V. Quine utilizes, in addition to a single type of variable,
only three primitive logical concepts, by means of which all other
logical and mathematical concepts can be defined. In his constitution
system (which we shall describe shortly), Carnap has attempted to apply
these ideas to empirical concepts, and through chains of definitions in
use to reduce the conceptual apparatus of science to a minimum basis.
basis. Then any infinite sequence of objects, without repetitions, that has
a first element but no last one, and within which every term can be reached
in a finite number of steps beginning with the first term, constitutes a
model of that system; for all sequences of this kind have just the same
structure as the number sequence.
Carnap calls concepts that are defined axiomatically improper concepts.
They differ from proper concepts in one essential respect. In the case of a
proper concept, it must be possible in principle to decide whether or not
an object falls under it, provided the concept has been defined with the
necessary sharpness and the object in question can be investigated with
sufficient exactness. In the case of improper concepts, on the other hand,
it is absolutely impossible to decide this question with respect to individual
objects. For example, it is by no means a priori nonsensical to regard a cer-
tain point on the edge of a table as a natural number. Indeed, one can
in theory select a sequence of points on this edge in such a way that they
constitute a model for the Peano axioms and hence for the number
sequence as axiomatically defined. All that is required is that the sequence
of points have the formal properties mentioned above. But whether we
then have a model of the axiom system for arithmetic can be determined
only for the sequence of points as a whole, not for an individual point.
That an implicitly defined concept is improper is expressed in the fact that
it is impossible to decide for objects considered in isolation whether or
not they come under this concept.
Since concepts that are introduced axiomatically do not have a fixed
meaning, they must be conceived of as variables. Hence the axioms cease
to be propositions; they become mere statement-forms. As such they are
neither true nor false, but are like the statement-form 'x is a man', to
which no specific truth value can be assigned until the variable 'x' is
replaced by some name. This feature carries over to mathematical
theorems, which are also merely statement-forms. What then are the
assertions of mathematics? Clearly they are not categorically formulated
theorems, but compound statements of a conditional or if-then form.
The antecedent of the if-then statement is the whole system of axioms and
the consequent is the particular theorem. Strictly speaking, even the
conditional itself is not a statement but a statement-form, which becomes
a genuine statement only when all the variables that occur in it are uni-
versally quantified. With this the problem of validity in mathematics
282 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
ceases to exist. For the mathematician does not make assertions of the
form 'This is valid'; rather, he limits himself to the logical proof of
conditional propositions ofthe form - 'If such and such axioms hold good,
then this or that theorem also holds good'.
The process ofaxiomatization described here is the first step on the
road toward the complete transformation of a theory into a calculus.
In a calculus all interpretive content is eliminated, whereas in an axiom
system only the characteristic concepts are taken in a strictly formal sense,
such as the concepts 'point', 'straight line' and 'plane' in an axiom
system for geometry, or the concepts 'number' and 'successor' in one
for arithmetic. The remaining expressions, however, are understood in
accordance with their usual content. Examples are the expressions 'two'
and 'there are' in the geometrical axiom 'There are at least two points on
any straight line'. These axiom systems are sometimes referred to as semi-
calculi. We shall say something more about pure calculi later.
Models of formal axiomatic systems may consist either of logico-
mathematical structures or of real objects. In the first case, we speak of
formal models, in the second, of real models. In both cases, the construc-
tion of the model must always take place in such a way that the improper
concepts of the axiom system are replaced by proper concepts. This
procedure of replacement (better, of coordination) has been given the
name 'coordinating definition' ('Zuordnungsdejinition') by Hans Reichen-
bach. We have an instance of a coordinating definition when, in applying
a geometrical axiom system to the world of the physicist, we associate the
concept of straight line with light rays and thus decide to regard these
latter as straight lines. A more exact account of the procedure of coordina-
tion requires the concepts, outlined below, of pure semantics and syntax;
for it is through coordinating definitions that calculi and semi-calculi are
provided with semantical interpretations.
strictly speaking, only statements have meaning, that all other expressions
lack any independent signification. These other expressions are, so to
speak, 'unsaturated signs', to which meanings can be assigned only
derivatively, that is, only to the extent that they contribute to the for-
mation of sentences with independent meaning. Even a predicate such as
'man' is not viewed as an expression with an independent meaning but
as a statement-form, i.e., as the open sentence 'x is a man'. Brentano, we
recall, made a sharp separation between autosemantic expressions (those
with independent meaning) and synsemantic expressions (those without
independent meaning). But according to Carnap linguistic expressions
differ only in degree as regards independence of meaning. The following
expressions are arranged in the order of increasing independence of
meaning: parenthesis signs '(' and 'r; logical signs such as 'or' and
symbols for mathematical operations such as '+'; predicates; proper
names; sentences. This series can, in principle, be extended further, since
a greater independence of meaning can be ascribed to the context in
which a sentence is embedded than to the sentence itself.
The basic outlook of empiricism manifests itself with respect to predi-
cates as well as to statements. We can, of course, reduce some predicates
to others by means of definitions. But the meaning of those predicates that
are not further definable must rest on experience. The only way I can make
another person understand what I mean by a certain word is by giving
an empirical criterion for those objects that are to come under the concept
signified by the word. In the case of the undefined basic expressions, this
can be done only directly, namely, by pointing to something in experience.
In the case of definable expressions, the criterion is specified by means
of a definition; but here too the ultimate source of the meaning is some-
thing that can be exhibited in experience. All definitions lead back eventu-
ally to the undefined basic expressions.
As for propositions, in order that we may regard them as meaningful
it must be possible for us to state under what conditions they are true and
under what conditions false. Initially the formulation of truth conditions
for propositions was identified with the specifying of a method of verifi-
cation. Wittgenstein was supposed to have expressed this thought when
he said: the meaning of a proposition consists in the way in which it is
verified. If we want to know what someone means by a certain statement,
there is generally no use asking him what he means. If the original state-
284 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
ment was unclear, the answer to this question will very likely be just as
unclear. What we should ask instead is how does he verify his statement.
Only if he is in a position to answer this question can we regard his state-
ment as meaningful.
We thus arrive at the first and original wording of the empiricist cri-
terion of meaning: verifiability constitutes a necessary and sufficient con-
ditionfor viewing a statement as empirically meaningful. Now, as Carnap
has shown, this criterion may also be fulfilled by propositions that contain
expressions which refer neither directly not indirectly to what can be
exhibited in experience. Thus the criterion of meaning for propositions
already involves a relaxation of the condition mentioned above for the
significance of words. Suppose we grant that the expression 'Jupiter' does
not refer to any object that can be exhibited in experience and also that
it cannot be defined with the aid of expressions that do have experiential
content. Strictly speaking, the expression would then have to be discarded
as meaningless. Nevertheless, a person can use this expression meaning-
fully in certain propositions if he is able to formulate truth conditions for
these propositions. For example, a proposition of the form 'Jupiter
grumbles at time t at place x' is meaningful if we specify that this propo-
sition shall be true if and only if thunder sounds at place x at time t. A
proposition of this form is supplied with a precise meaning when we give
this method of verification, even though the word 'Jupiter' itself has not
been defined. On the other hand, the proposition 'Jupiter is situated in
this cloud' must be judged meaningless if no observationally determinable
truth conditions are given for this proposition.
Thus only propositions for which we can specify a possibility of verifi-
cation can be accepted as meaningful; all other proposition-like structures
are to be eliminated as pseudo-propositions, even though they have the
outward form of meaningful propositions. The possibility of verification
is to be understood in a logical sense, not an empirical one. If the verifi-
cation of a statement is logically conceivable but impossible on technical
grounds - as in the case, say, of the proposition that higher forms of life
exist on another planet - then in accordance with the criterion of meaning
the statement must be accepted as meaningful.
should serve to make clear that Carnap had undertaken a really extra-
ordinary project: to constitute all empirical concepts, and to do this on
the sole basis of the above-mentioned similarity relation, thus reducing
all empirical concepts to the one concept of remembrance of similarity.
This meant that all scientific statements - regardless of the domain of
objects to which they referred - had to be transformable ultimately into
statements that contain, besides logical expressions, just one single de-
scriptive constant. Although this constitution-system later turned out to
be faulty in many respects - the most telling arguments to this effect, as
in the case of most of the revisions required by his works, came from
Carnap himself - it nevertheless represented an enormous intellectual
achievement which brought about great clarity on many points. This was
particularly true with respect to the fundamental question of the possi-
bilities and difficulties of defining empirical concepts, and the problem of
concrete relations of dependency between various concepts. Ever since the
days of Locke and H ume, empiricist philosophers have repeatedly assured
us that it must be possible to reduce all the concepts of the empirical
sciences to that which is given directly in internal and external perception.
But there the matter rested; the assurances remained an unrealized
program until Carnap set out to convert this program into a reality.
W. V. Quine, one of the most important contemporary American lo-
gicians, has remarked that Carnap has succeeded, in his system, in de-
fining numerous concepts that no one ever dreamed could be defined on
such a slender initial basis. 6
In carrying out his program, Carnap was obliged to make extensive
use of modem logic, especially of the theory of relations. In addition, he
had to employ the calculus of classes, since the method of quasi-analysis
consists in combining into classes elementary experiences, or, more exact-
ly, the similarity ranges mentioned above. With respect to form, the
definitions utilized are definitions in use, which obviate the introduction
of fictitious (e.g. ideal) objects.
It is not possible here to describe the contents of the various levels of
constitution. The following indications will have to suffice. 7 In conformity
with the method of quasi-analysis, Carnap first constitutes quality-classes,
which represent qualities of sensation or feeling. From certain similarity
orderings of the quality-classes he obtains sense-classes (classes of qualities
of one and the same sensory domain). A particular sensory domain may
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 291
thus makes use only of such concepts as have perceivable properties and
relations as their content. The theorist, on the other hand, utilizes a
language with a system of abstract concepts (,electron', 'SchrOdinger
tfJ-function' and the like), a language that refers to the quality-less and
supersensible world of the theoretical physicist, which is altogether
different from the world of perception. But this difference between the two
systems of concepts and languages must be no more than apparent; for
otherwise it would be logically impossible for the statements of the
observer either to support or to upset the statements of the theorist.
Statements of two languages that operate with entirely different conceptual
systems and hence are not inter-translatable cannot sustain any logical
relations, such as that of deducibility or of contradiction. Yet the over-
throw of a theory on the basis of observations can take place only by
reason of the fact that assertions logically deduced from the theory
contradict the statements of the observer.
The Vienna Circle therefore championed with particular vigor the
idea of the unity of science and demanded that a unified language of science
be specified in which every scientific assertion could be expressed. Such
a language would have to satisfy two conditions. First, it must be inter-
subjective, that is, it must be accessible to everyone and its symbols must
possess the same meaning for all. Second, it must be a universal language,
in which any and all facts can be expressed. In the beginning, Neurath
and Carnap defended the view that only the language of physics fulfills
these two requirements, whence the term 'physica/ism'. The physicalistic
language, however, is a purely quantitative one; its statements employ
none but metrical concepts. For this reason, Carnap later on weakened
the physicalist thesis so that it called merely for a 'thing-language' or
language for speaking about the world of things - a language which,
besides quantitative concepts, might also contain qualitative concepts,
provided that these refer to observable properties of things and observable
relations between things. It is this weakened thesis that we shall mean
when we speak of physicalism in what follows. In any event, it should be
noted that physicalism, in both of its forms, asserts no more than that
physical predicates must be the basic predicates of the language of unified
science. It definitely does not combine with this assertion the further de-
mand that all law-like regularities must be reduced to physical laws.
That the thing-language satisfies the condition of intersubjectivity
294 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
needs no more detailed elucidation. Carnap points out that what is in-
volved here is not a logical necessity but simply a fortunate empirical
circumstance. In principle, differences of opinion between various
persons concerning temperatures, lengths, frequencies and the like can,
within the attainable limits of exactitude, be eliminated; the same is true
for non-quantitative statements couched in the thing-language. It is
always possible in principle to obtain agreement between different persons
concerning the states and processes that comprise the physical world.
Indeed, the intersubjectivity of the world of things (or of the statements
referring to that world) is expressed in precisely this fact. In contrast, a
proposition about subjective experiences has meaning only for the person
that utters it and for no one else. Moreover, physical concepts are not
only intersubjective, they are inter-sensuous. The confirmation of any
physical statement may be undertaken within the province of a single
sense. It is possible for physical measuring instruments to be so con-
structed that all pointer readings are obtained visually or, alternately,
with the aid of acoustical or tactual characters alone. An example is the
construction of matching visual, photo, auditory and tactual spectro-
scopes. Thus a person who is completely blind and deaf can set up all the
varied physical observations needed to test physical hypotheses.
It is much more difficult to prove the universality of the physicalistic
language (or of the thing-language). What has to be shown is that the
statements of psychology and of the cultural sciences can all be represented
in that language. This indeed was Carnap's contention. He stressed that
statements about other minds could be translated into statements about
the behavior of other persons, in particular about their dispositions to
react in certain ways to certain stimuli (and, once physiology reaches a
more advanced stage, into statements about processes in their central
nervous systems). The thesis that psychological statements are translatable
into sentences about bodily events presupposes that we have at the outset
two different classes of statements, one psychological and the other
physical, and that the psychological statements originally refer to con-
scious occurrences and only subsequently are translated into the physi-
calistic language. This thesis has for some time been advanced in a more
radical form, namely, that the statements of psychology possess no
meaning except as statements about the bodily processes of the individual
concerned. This point of view resulted from the combination of the radical
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 295
demand for verifiability and the thesis that only statements about bodily
processes are intersubjectively intelligible and testable. The logical import
of a statement about the psychical must then consist of the testable
consequences derivable from that statement and, by virtue of what was
said above, these consequences can consist only of sentences about bodily
properties, relations and processes. The logical import of psychological
statements must of course be strictly separated from the images that
accompany these statements and that relate to the mental experiences of
the other person. Such images are superfluous and form no part of the
content of these statements. The claim that human beings, in addition
to their observable physical processes, also have mental experiences
cannot even be formulated in an intersubjective language of science and
hence represents a meaningless pseudo-proposition. Behaviorism is not
merely one possible way of doing psychology; it is the only logically
possible form of that science.
Similar considerations were adduced to show that all statements in the
social sciences and the humanities can be conceived of as intersubjectively
testable sentences of the thing-language. Even the statements of a person
X concerning his own experience are to be interpreted in this manner;
for X's statements have meaning for another person Y only in so far as
they can be tested. But for Y nothing in X's statements about his own
experiences is testable except that which concerns X's body.
Physicalism seems to be an unavoidable consequence of holding
inflexibly to the demand that all statements of science be intersubjectively
testable. At the same time, the thesis of physicalism, even in its weakened
form, has turned out not to be tenable without repeated, decisive modi-
fications. The chief difficulty lies in the impossibility of achieving a
purely behavioristic definition of the basic concepts of psychology.
Specifically, it is not possible to replace an elementary psychological
sentence (e.g., 'Mr. X is angry now') with a finite conjunction of state-
ments about exactly specifiable physical reactions and other modes of
behavior.8 To form a judgment today concerning physicalism, it would
be necessary especially to take into account Carnap's characterization of
theoretical concepts. Within the recent past, Herbert Feigl has under-
taken a basic study of the various possible ways of formulating psycho-
logical statements and their inter-relationships (see Chapter VIII,
Sections B.3 and C.3).
296 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
which in turn is the equivalent of the original hypothesis, 'All swans are
white'.
The empiricist's demand that hypotheses must be testable by experience
should therefore be taken to mean, according to Popper, that such state-
ments must be falsifiable - the term 'falsifiable', of course, to be under-
stood in the above sense of the logical possibility of falsification. It is their
falsifiability, not their verifiability or their inductive inferability, that
distinguishes empirical statements from the propositions of metaphysics.
But what then constitutes the positive proof of an empirical theory?
Only the fact, says Popper, that the theory has withstood all previous
attempts to falsify it. Thus when we say that a theory is well confirmed
empirically, this means at bottom simply that we ourselves have failed in
all attempts thus far to prove by experience that this theory is a failure. If,
however, a theory contradicts accepted basis sentences, then it is falsified
and must be replaced with another theory. At this point a certain
complication appears in Popper's conception. He regards the contradic-
tion between a theory and the accepted basis sentences as being only a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the falsification of the theory.
For a theory can be viewed as refuted only if it is contradicted by a
repeatable effect.
Popper has also sought to determine the degree of empirical testability
(Le., the degree of falsifiability) of hypotheses by means of certain rules.
Ifwe designate the totality of the logically possible basis sentences that can
falsify a statement as the class of falsification possibilities of this state-
ment, then one such rule would run, e.g., as follows: a sentence A
possesses greater testability (is falsifiable to a higher degree) than a
sentence B if the class of falsification possibilities of B is contained in the
class of falsification possibilities of A.
We note that in spite of Popper's arguments, Carnap later did con-
struct a theory of inductive inference, to be described further on.
degree as the indicated singular sentences, for the 'all' -sentence has infi-
nitely many instances and therefore goes far beyond the content of the
singular sentences. Nonetheless, the 'all'-sentence is confirmed to some
degree by the singular sentences, although as a rule not to the same
degree that the singular sentences themselves are confirmed. In such a
case, we may speak of the incomplete confirmation of an 'all-sentence
by certain singular sentences - or, more exactly, of the direct, incom-
plete confirmation by those sentences, since no intermediate sentences
are used.
Returning to the finite class C of sentences, we shall say that the confir-
mation of any sentence obtained by all-generalization from some or all
of the statements of C is directly incompletely reducible to that of C.
We shall speak of direct reducibility of confirmation when we have
either complete or directly incomplete reducibility of confirmation.
Finally, we shall say quite generally that the confirmation of a sentence
S has been reduced to the confirmation of C if we can specify a finite
sequence of sentences, beginning with the sentences of C, such that (1)
the confirmation of every sentence of this sequence is directly reducible
to the confirmation of preceding sentences in the sequence, and (2) the
last member of this sequence is the sentence S. Thus the steps that lead
from C to the sentence S consist in part of logical deductions and in part
of all-generalizations.
If the confirmation of a sentence is reducible to that of a class C of
sentences, but not directly, we shall speak of indirect reducibility of confir-
mation. And if the reducibility of confirmation is not complete, we shall
speak of incomplete reducibility of confirmation. Hence, incomplete reduci-
bility of confirmation is present in all cases except the first, and indirect
reducibility of confirmation in all cases except the first two (complete
reducibility and direct incomplete reducibility). Indirect reducibility of
confirmation accordingly presupposes that to get from C to the sentence
in question we must perform either at least one step of logical deduction
and one all-generalization or at least two all-generalizations.
To illustrate the concept of indirect reducibility of confirmation, let us
go back to the example given above - the object 0 with property M.
Now let Cl' .•. , cn , d be additional objects and let there be n sentences
which taken together state that d is farther from 0 than any object Cj
(1 ::::;; i::::;; n). We assume that these n sentences result from observations and
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 303
and so forth at the same time become empirically admissible; for in virtue
of what was said above, such statements, no matter how complicated
their structure may be, do not take us beyond the domain of what is
confirmable.
We can now state the empiricist criterion of meaning in definitive form:
In order that a synthetic statement be designated as empirically meaningful,
it is necessary and sufficient that this statement be part of an empiricist
language, that is, a language constructed according to precise rules and
whose statements are all capable of confirmation.
In one respect, the definitions given above remain indeterminate. All
predicates must be reducible to primitive predicates; and where the
requirement of the testability of sentences is adopted, new predicates
have to be introduced by means of test-methods. But exactly what does
this reducibility signify? Although at the time of the Logischer Aujbau
Carnap envisioned a purely definitional reducibility, he later discarded
this assumption in his studies in the testing and confirmation of state-
ments. There he found that dispositional concepts, such as 'water-soluble',
'brittle' and the like, cannot possibly be introduced by definitions. He
was consequently forced to develop a new procedure in order to show
that such predicates are reducible to the observable primitive predicates.
We omit consideration of this point here because subsequent studies have
shown that this new procedure too is not adequate. In the meantime,
Carnap has abandoned the notion of the reducibility - definitional or
otherwise - of all concepts to the observable primitive predicates of an
empiricist language. This reducibility does not exist for what are known
as theoretical concepts, among which are now included dispositional
concepts. This is a matter which will be discussed in more detail in the
next chapter. Here we note simply that one of the consequences is yet
another relaxation of the empiricist criterion of meaning. In the present
chapter, we saw how the broadening of the criterion of meaning resulted
in the admission of arbitrarily complex synthetic statements; but the
reducibility of concepts to what is given in observation was still retained.
In the next chapter, we shall find that concepts will be declared empirically
admissible that are in no way reducible to concepts with observable
content.
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 307
data but that the knowing subject knows these objects only with the help
of sense-data. Each standpoint, according to Carnap, defends a pseudo-
thesis. This becomes evident as soon as we translate statements of this
sort into the formal mode. For instance, the phenomenalist thesis is then
transformed into the statement 'All physical object statements are re-
ducible to (translatable into) sense-data sentences'. The advantage of this
latter formulation is not only that it does away with the fruitless dispute
about the 'true essence' of objects, but also that it makes clear the rela-
tivity or the statement in question to a language. That is, when we assert
that a sentence of a certain kind is translatable into statements of a
different kind, the question immediately arises: For which language does
this translatability hold true? For all languages? For a certain language
already in use (e.g., the language of physics)? Or for a language whose
construction is being proposed for the first time? If this is taken into
account, then seemingly incompatible philosophical standpoints become
mutually consistent assertions. For instance, Mach's thesis that 'in their
essence' all things are nothing but complexes of sense-data (sensations)
seems to be completely incompatible with materialism, which holds that
things are composed of elementary physical particles, such as electrons,
protons and the like. But put in the formal mode his thesis simply states
that all thing-statements can be translated into a sense-data language (a
phenomenalistic language); and the materialist thesis asserts that all
thing-statements can be translated into a physicalistic language of a cer-
tain sort. These two assertions do not at all exclude one another. For one
language can be constructed that fulfills the first thesis regarding trans-
lation, and then a second can be built in which the second translation
thesis is realized.
If studies in logic and the theory of science are based on matters of
language, then the language in question must be precisely specified. Our
everyday language is not suitable for the more exact determination of
concepts; the analysis of ordinary language expressions must therefore
be replaced with the study of artificial languages. In order to obtain a
general view of the various types of such studies and to grasp at the same
time the difference between investigations in logic or in the theory of
science and the analyses of empirical linguistics, we start off with the
following classification. Semiotics embraces all studies of language
systems. It may be divided on the basis of the three factors distinguish-
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 309
able in any language. These are (1) the user of the language; (2) the
(spoken or written) expressions; and (3) that to which the speaker refers,
i.e., the designatum or (possibly different from it) the meaning of these
expressions. Another principle of division yields the distinction between
empirical semiotics and pure semiotics. The former investigates histori-
cally transmitted languages; the latter is given over not to the consider-
ation of existing languages but to the construction of artificial languages
based on precise rules.
Semiotic investigations that take into consideration all three factors -
user, expressions and meaning (or designatum) - belong to the field of
pragmatics. Investigations in pragmatics are always empirical, since the
peculiar character of the speaker can be taken into account only on the
basis of empirical determinations. If we abstract from the speaker and
limit ourselves to the linguistic expressions and their meanings (or desig-
nata), the investigation forms part of semantics. Finally, if abstraction is
made also of designata and meanings and attention is confined to the
structure of expressions and structural relations between expressions, the
study is classified as syntax.
Semantics and syntax can be carried on not only as empirical sciences
but also as pure sciences. Empirical semantics and empirical syntax are
branches of linguistics (e.g., the semantics and grammar of English); pure
semantics and pure syntax are logical disciplines. These latter two are
differentiated by the kind of rules employed to construct the artificial
languages they consider. Often the two disciplines are joined together
under the heading of the 'study of formalized languages'. But this desig-
nation is also frequently restricted to syntactical investigations.
For pure semantics and syntax, the distinction between object language
and metalanguage is of great importance. The object language is the
artificial symbolic language that is to be constructed, and which does not
yet exist at the inception of the investigation. The metalanguage is that
language in which we set forth the rules that are to govern the object
language; and all theoretical findings concerning the object language are
formulated in the metalanguage. Ordinary language usually serves as the
metalanguage. The metalanguage may also in turn be formalized, in
which case the formalization takes place in a metametalanguage. The
expression 'metalanguage' has its origin in the fact that this language is
utilized to talk about the object language. A typical example of a meta-
310 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
is true if and only if things actually are that way. Objections correctly
raised by Brentano and others against earlier versions of this theory are
obviated by formulating the adequacy condition in a logically unassailable
manner. The starting-point is the statement form
(A) X is T if and only if P,
where for 'X' we substitute names of sentences ofthe object language, for
, P' sentences of the metalanguage, and for' T' the truth predicate defined
for the semantical system. Given a semantical system S and a truth defi-
nition for S, the predicate 'true-in-S' will be regarded as adequate if and
only if from the definition of the predicate there follows logically every
sentence that is obtained from the sentence form (A) in the following
manner: For 'X' substitute the name of any sentence of the system S (the
naming, of course, occurs in the metalanguage), for 'P' the translation
of that sentence into the metalanguage, and for' T' the predicate 'True-
in-S'. This form of an adequacy condition that must be satisfied by every
semantical truth concept goes back to the Polish logician, Stanislaw
Lesniewski. But it was the logician Alfred Tarski who above all made use
of this notion, and who first studied in detail the possibilities of intro-
ducing a formally exact and materially adequate concept of truth into
the precise languages of science. Carnap's accounts of semantical systems
rest largely on the prior works of Tarski.
Tarski also called attention to the fact that the strict separation of
object language and metalanguage is of the greatest importance for all
semantical concepts, in particular for the concept of truth. If we neglect
this distinction, we shall find logical paradoxes being generated in con-
nection with all semantical concepts; that is, we shall be in a situation
where we can prove both a statement and its negation at the same time.
Specifically, it will then be possible to reconstruct in modern form the
antinomy of the Liar, known already to the ancient Greeks. This and
other paradoxes arise in ordinary language because that language is
semantically closed; in other words, ordinary language serves as its own
metalanguage. But when, in pure semantics, we introduce the predicate
'true', e.g., we are then dealing with a metalinguistic predicate which
refers to sentences of the object language and therefore cannot at the
same time occur in the object language itself.
What has been said thus far about semantics forms part of the disci-
312 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
3. L-Semantics
A semantical predicate that is applicable to something 'on purely logical
grounds' Carnap marks with the prefix 'L'. The clarification ofL-concepts
entails making a sharp separation between the purely logical and the non-
logical. This is achieved in L-semantics. The most important concepts
here are those of L-truth (truth 'on logical grounds alone') and L-impli-
cation (logical consequence). Carnap's basic idea is that the vague phrase
'on logical grounds alone' should be replaced with the precise definition
'on the grounds of the semantical rules alone'. Thus if no empirical
knowledge is needed to establish the truth of a sentence belonging to a
semantical system S and if this result can be obtained solely by virtue of
the semantical rules according to which system S is constructed, then the
sentence is L-true.
A distinction is also drawn within L-semantics between general and
special semantics, depending on whether the L-concepts are studied in
their general interconnections, which hold for every particular system, or
whether these concepts are studied with respect to quite specific seman-
tical systems.
Here we shall indicate briefly one of the ways of introducing the two
most important L-concepts. Let S be a semantical system. A fully deter-
minate state of affairs that can be expressed with the means available to
S is called an L-state with respect to S. The sentence of S (usually very
complex) that describes the L-state is called a state-description. In general,
a sentence of S will be true for certain L-states and false for others. The
totality of L-states (or of the state-descriptions corresponding to them)
for which a sentence becomes true is called the L-space of that sentence.
To employ an image of Leibniz', we may say that the concept of L-state
is a precise rendering in semantics of the concept of 'possible world',
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 313
G. EVALUATION
first distinguish clearly between two things: first, the positive contribu-
tions to questions of logic and the theory of science made by individual
representatives of this tendency; second, its polemical attitude toward
traditional metaphysics. The two are totally independent of each other.
The failure to grasp this point, as we remarked in the introductory
passages, has often resulted in groundless polemics accusing modern
logic and philosophy of science of being 'positivistic' disciplines. But as a
matter of fact, a Thomist, say, or a modern ontologist can accept the
results of research into the construction of semantical systems, the
confirmability of empirical sentences, the possibilities of rendering more
precise the rules of inductive inference and so forth, without assuming that
metaphysics is meaningless. Indeed, he need not reject even the various
attempts to formulate the empiricist criterion of meaning. He has merely
to interpret them differently - not as rules specifying which statements 'in
themselves' are meaningful and which are not, but as criteria of demar-
cation with the help of which a boundary may be drawn between state-
ments that are and statements that are not admissible into empirical
science, without being committed to the further assertion that all other
statements (except those that contain formal logical truths) are meaning-
less.
There can be no doubt that the studies in logic and the philosophy
of science undertaken by Carnap, by other representatives of the Vienna
Circle and by thinkers close to the Circle have produced a rich harvest
of valuable knowledge. Carnap, in particular, has done very important
pioneering work on many problems. A detailed critical examination of
these results cannot be undertaken here for two reasons: First, we have
been obliged throughout the exposition to confine ourselves to a sketch
of the basic ideas; a critical discussion would have required entering into
concrete details and this was out of the question. Second, we must bear
in mind that in the case of modern empiricism we are not dealing with a
philosophical doctrine in the usual sense, for which it would be meaning-
ful to ask whether we should accept or reject it. Empiricist philosophers
always insist that their work differs fundamentally from that of other
philosophers, since they do not claim to deliver final or definitive truths.
Their efforts are aimed at making concepts more precise, constructing an
exact language for science and creating clarity concerning the procedure
of the individual sciences. Every insight thus obtained will be immediately
316 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
revised or withdrawn in its entirety if the proposed path turns out not to
be practicable.
Philosophical research will then be subject for the first time to the
continuity characteristic of scientific progress. The philosopher who
converts his theory into a world view decked out with articles of faith,
seeks by dint of his eloquence to win the reader or listener to his view,
and feels personally hurt and offended if we resist or oppose his philosophy
- this philosopher has no place in the camp of the empiricists. Carnap is
sometimes 'criticized' because he has so often changed his ideas in so
many respects. To him, however, this attitude cannot but seem the
nonsensical outcome of an unscientific approach to philosophical
questions. Beginning with his Logischer Aufbau der Welt, he has referred
to almost all of his studies and theories as 'first sketches' or 'first attempts'
in a particular direction; he has never claimed that what he was offering
was definitive. On the contrary, each of these attempts was expected to
contain of necessity certain deficiencies, which would become evident
only in the course of further investigations. In contrast to earlier more or
less vague projects, Carnap's writings formulated many things for the
first time in a precise manner - compare, say, the concrete structure of
his constitution system with the affirmation of the older empiricists
that we must be able to "reduce everything to the given". The individual
theses defended by Carnap thus became accessible to and susceptible of a
rigorously logical critique. Consequently, where the critique turned out
to be cogent, Carnap of course has not hesitated to surrender or modify
his former views. It should be recalled that many of the arguments
directed against his earlier positions were advanced by Carnap himself.
For example, through his discovery of the indefinability of dispositional
concepts and the deficiencies in the phenomenalistic language, he has
established that it is impossible to realize the constitution system of
empirical concepts sketched in the Logischer Aufbau. In his first main
work published in the D.S.A., Introduction to Semantics, Carnap added
an appendix containing an extensive list of changes required in various
sections of his Logische Syntax der Sprache. Also in the course of develop-
ing his inductive logic, to be described below, Carnap himself determined
that a number of changes and improvements were needed in the original
version of his theory.
A metaphor used by Carnap helps us understand the viewpoint from
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 317
has two ways open to defend himself successfully. In the first place, he
need not accept the empiricist version of the concept of science. He could
rely on the fact, recognized by Carnap, that because of the vagueness of
the expression 'science' as an explicandum, the explication of the concept
necessarily includes a conventional component, and that for a suitably
broad rendering of this expression even his 'metaphysical' statements
can be subsumed under the sentences of science. A stipulation calling for
a broad application of the concept of science could rest on the historical
fact that over the years subjects have often been called 'sciences' that the
empiricist would not be disposed to acknowledge as such.
In the second place, the metaphysician might conceivably agree that
his activity is not that of a scientist; this would mean that certain princi-
ples of concept formation and oflogical argumentation that are recognized
by scientists possess no validity for his activity. Yet he need not let stand
unchallenged the objection that what he is engaged in is either poetry or
religious prophecy. There is no logically cogent ground for not recogniz-
ing as meaningful - in some other sense than that of the empiricists - an
activity that differs both from science and from art and religion and which
is to be identified with what was represented at least in part by traditional
metaphysics. Further questions, of course, can be raised. For instance, is a
professorial chair the proper place from which to conduct an activity
concededly not scientific? Is this not a deception of the public, which
with greater or lesser understanding assumes that the occupant of a chair
pursues a scholarly, scientific activity? But this is a political and cultural
question, not a problem in the logic of science.
Yet one thing must be admitted. If the metaphysician claims to be
doing science and thereby acknowledges at least certain of the principles
of the logic of science governing concept formation and proof - if not
necessarily all the principles advanced by the empiricist philosopher of
science - then he cannot contradict this by violating these principles in
the course of the specific elaboration of his system. Hence he must
consent to the demand that he explicate newly introduced concepts and
give reasons for his assertions. He must thus as a matter of principle -
like any other scientist or scholar - expose himself to the danger that
unclarities will be found in his concepts and errors in his demonstrations.
At this point the empiricist philosopher may be inclined to say that
we know in advance that the metaphysician is unable to fulfill certain
RUDOLF CARNAP AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 319
1 Carnap was not one of these; some years earlier he had received a call first to Prague
University and later to the University of Chicago.
2 In its first phase, to be sure, empiricism did lay down the requirement of strict
verifiability.
320 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
3 For a critique of the concept ofthe given, see W. Stegmiiller, 'Der Phanomenalismus
und seine Schwierigkeiten', Archiv fiir Philosophie 8 (1958) 63ft'.
4 On what follows, see my article 'Wissenschaftstheorie', in the volume Philosophie
of the Fischer-Lexikon, 1958, pp. 327-353.
5 For a systematic exposition and discussion of the various formulations of the empiri-
cist criterion of meaning, see W. Stegmiiller, Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der
Semantik, Vienna 1957, pp. 262-282.
6 W. V. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, p. 39.
7 For a somewhat more detailed account of the system, see V. Kraft, Der Wiener
Kreis, Vienna 1950, pp. 77-105; English translation 1953,: The Vienna Circle, New York,
pp. 83-114.
8 The difficulties in the physicalistic definition of psychological concepts are in prin-
ciple exactly analogous to those that arise when one attempts to translate statements
about physical things into statements about the given (the phenomena). On this, see
W. Stegmiiller, 'Der Phanomenalismus und seine Schwierigkeiten', op. cit. Also see the
critique contained in V. Kraft, op. cit. (English translation), pp. 168ft'.
9 For a more detailed treatment of questions which here are only touched on, see W.
Stegmiiller, Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der Semantik.
10 There is indeed not just one truth definition but as many as the various semantical
systems we are able to construct. The richer the means of expression possessed by a
system the more complicated will be the truth definition.
11 It is essential to append 'in S' to all semantical concepts, since these can be defined
only in relation to a language system.
12 On this, see also W. Stegmiiller, op. cit., pp. 129-167.
13 This was in fact the case with the empiricist language described earlier, in so far as
confirmability was the chosen criterion of meaning; for the sentences of that language
are all demonstrably capable of confirmation. This coinciding of syntactical admissi-
bility and empirical meaningfulness is no longer present, however, when the criterion
of meaning is extended to the so-called theoretical language, which will be described
in the next chapter, Section B.3.
CHAPTER VIII
1. Mathematical Logic
Mathematical logic is not a product of the past few years. Its origins
date back to Leibniz; its modern development began in the past century,
as a result especially of the work of Boole, Frege and SchrOder. What is
involved is not a new kind of logic, which takes its place alongside of the
traditional Aristotelian form, but a logic in which the attempt is made
to overcome the deficiencies connected with traditional logic. The term
'mathematical logic' has its origin in the fact that symbols are used for
322 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
purposes of abbreviation and the rules of the logic are like the rules for
mathematical calculation, in particular those for algebraic operations.
We shall comment briefly on three of the main factors that led to the
modern development of logic.
The decisive factor was the effort to perfect traditional logic, to fill the
gaps that still remained in it. That Aristotelian logic does not supply an
adequate theory of logical deduction was recognized by several logicians
of the past century when they undertook to analyze mathematical proof
procedures with the means provided by traditional formal logic. Since
mathematical proofs are distinguished by a maximum of rigor, it should
be possible to justify each and every step in a proof with the help of a
logical rule of inference. But astonishingly enough, it turns out that most
steps in a complicated mathematical proof cannot be certified by Aris-
totelian logic. Since no one can assume that all mathematical proofs are
incorrect, it must then follow that Aristotelian logic is inadequate and
embraces only a small portion of the actual operations of logical infer-
ence. It thus becomes necessary to construct a complete system of logic
in which all valid inferences can be justified by means of explicitly formu-
lated rules. In the process, logic has to be mathematized, for otherwise
logical theory would have assumed an endlessly complicated form.
It is not difficult to pick out the main reasons why, in the case of the
more complicated proofs, traditional logic failed. In the first place, this
logic takes into account only statements with a very simple structure. But
with the aid of such expressions as 'and', 'or', 'not', 'if ... then' and the
like we are able to construct statements of any desired complexity. For
example, we can begin by negating a statement, then join this statement
to another to form a conjunction, connect the resulting compound
statement with another to form a disjunction, and in turn take the entire
statement thus obtained as the antecedent of a conditional assertion.
Since statements of this degree of complexity do in fact occur in more
difficult proofs, the rules oflogical deduction must be so formulated as to
allow us to handle compound statements of this kind in derivations and
proofs. Traditional logic fails to satisfy this condition for the very reason
that it recognizes only simple subject-predicate sentences, such as those
of the form 'All S are P', and does not recognize the more complicated
statements.
In the second place, traditional logic considers only predicates denoting
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 323
of class (or set) together with the concepts that occur in sentence logic
and quantifier logic.
It is customary today to construct logic both semantically and axio·
matically (thus syntactically). In the latter case, we also employ the term
logical calculi.
In addition to the two portions mentioned, there are also such special
areas of logic as many-valued logic, where the starting-point is more than
two truth-values; modal logic, which rests on the expressions 'it is possi-
ble that' and 'it is necessary that'; combinatorial logic, and many others.
Research in modern logic has assumed such proportions in the last three
decades that probably no one today is able any longer to survey the whole
field in all its particulars.
(namely itself) that belongs to the first class. But this contradicts the
definition of the set M, which stipulates that M can contain only sets
that belong to the second class. We must therefore conclude that M
belongs not to the first class but to the second class. But in that case M
is a normal set and cannot contain itself as a member. This in turn contra-
dicts the definition of M; for according to this definition, all normal sets
belong to M, and hence M would have to contain itself as an element,
since, as just established, M itself is a normal set.
The modern philosophy of mathematics is characterized by the fact that
various schools have been formed to overcome the difficulties occasioned
by the antinomies. The oldest of these schools is logicism and goes back
to Frege, one of the most significant logicians of all times. His works,
produced toward the end of the past century, have only recently received
the attention they deserve. Even before the discovery of the antinomies,
Frege noticed that in the most elementary of mathematical disciplines,
the arithmetic of natural numbers, we had become accustomed to ac-
cepting a naive view of the problem of infinity. That is to say, we had
simply assumed the natural number sequence as an ultimate given. The
mathematicians had then introduced by definitions the mathematical
operations of addition, multiplication and the like as applied to these
numbers. Extensions of the number concept were obtained by introducing
negative numbers, fractions, irrationals and complex numbers, con-
structed according to specific directions. The natural number sequence,
however, was sti11looked upon as something already at hand. All of this
appeared highly questionable to Frege because it meant assuming the
existence of an infinite totality as something given. That assumption is
problematic, since in the empirical world we encounter only finite totali-
ties and cannot form any mental image of the infinite.
Frege therefore took the position that the presupposition in arithmetic
of the existence of an infinite totality had to be justified, and he sought
to provide a justification by constructing a model satisfying the axioms
of arithmetic. Since no such model is to be found in the world of experi-
ence, he constructed a logical model for arithmetic. He showed first that
the concepts of individual numbers (of 0, of 1, of 2, etc.), the general
concept of natural number, and the concept of the successor ofa number,
as well as the various operations on numbers, can be reduced to purely
logical concepts. He then deduced the propositions of arithmetic from
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 327
can be continued into the transfinite. These two systems, however, have
thus far been presented only in outline and have not yet been constructed
in detail.1
Essentially more radical than Fregean logicism is the position taken by
mathematical intuitionism, a school originated by the mathematician
Brouwer. From Brouwer's standpoint, it is necessary not only to revise
classical mathematics but also to discard certain logical principles. Once
again the concept of infinity is the point of departure. According to
Brouwer, the infinite is never to be regarded as a finished totality ('an
actual infinite'); it must be conceived merely as a possibility of unlimited
progression ('a potential infinite'). The statement that there are infinitely
many numbers, e.g., is not to be thought of as signifying that all the
infinitely many natural numbers exist off to themselves in some domain
of ideal objects. Rather the statement must be interpreted as meaning that
for any natural number we can specify a greater one (say, its successor).
One immediate consequence of this viewpoint is the denial of the uni-
versal validity of the principle of the excluded middle, which traditionally
was reckoned among the basic principles of logic. The principle states
that the assertion 'A or not-A' is true for any A. In the case of infinite
domains this principle can no longer be absolutely valid. Consider, e.g.,
a statement of the form
(1) There is a natural number with the property F.
Since we have learned in everyday speech to use the word 'there is' in
connection with finite and hence completed totalities, the statement (1)
has, to begin with, no clear sense; for in (1) the expression 'there is' has
been applied to an infinite totality and thus to something that cannot be
regarded as existing in completed form. Therefore the statement (1) must
be so interpreted as to maintain that we can actually specify a number
with the property F. Similarly, the negation of (1) cannot be so inter-
preted as to state that the completed totality of all natural numbers con-
tains no number with the property F. Instead, the negation of (1) must
be given the more precise sense that the assumption that we can specify
a number with the property F leads to a contradiction. Now it follows
immediately that in application to (1), the principle of the excluded
middle (in this case, the proposition 'Either there is a natural number
with the property F or there is not such a number') need no longer be
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 329
valid. For this proposition now has the following sense: 'Either we can
specify a natural number with the property F or we can derive a contra-
diction from the assumption that there is such a number.' This last propo-
sition is not necessarily true because it is entirely possible that we may
be unable either to specify a number with the property F or to derive a
contradiction from the assumption that we can specify such a number.
By the same token, according to the intuitionists there can be problems
in mathematics that are in themselves undecidable.
The denial of the principle of the excluded middle entails the rejection
of other logical principles and methods. Thus the principle of double
negation (which allows us to infer 'A' from 'not not-A') is no longer valid;
the same is true of indirect existence proofs, i.e., proofs in which we
establish the existence of some mathematical quantity by showing that
the assumption of its non-existence implies a contradiction. Intuitionism
also discards some other principles that are widely used in classical mathe-
matics. One such is the method of impredicative definition of concepts. By
this is meant the introduction of a set by means of a definition that refers
to a totality to which the set in question itself belongs. Thus the Russell
set M was introduced in this fashion, since its definition presupposes a
division of all sets, one of these being the set M itself. Such methods of
concept formation must be rejected, according to the intuitionists, for the
reason that sets are not ideal objects existing in themselves; they are the
result of mental constructions. Hence on the intuitionist view, it is some-
thing like a vicious circle if we construct a new set by presupposing as
already existing a totality of sets of which the set that is to be constructed
is an element.
The question then arises: How can we avoid destroying mathematics
if we accept the basic constructivist attitude just described? Here the two
mathematicians L. E. J. Brouwer and David Hilbert have taken divergent
paths.
Brouwer sought to construct a special intuitionistic mathematics, in par-
ticular an intuitionistic theory of the continuum, which differs in essential
respects from classical mathematics. What we have presented so far con-
cerning intuitionism has been purely negative - its critique of the basic
presuppositions of the classical theory. The positive counterpart of this
critique may be found in Brouwer's theory of choice sequences. Expressed
in somewhat simplified form, a choice sequence in general is an indefi-
330 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
The totality of statements utilized for this kind of testing is called the
basis of scientific knowledge.
There are widely divergent views concerning the logical nature of the
statements that make up the basis for empirical knowledge. Schlick took
the position that for each person only his own direct observations could
serve as the basis, since they alone possess absolute and indubitable
certainty and only if they are present does 'theory make contact with
reality'. We test a theory by using it to derive predictions. If what is
predicted agrees with our own direct observations, then we experience a
feeling of fulfillment that finds linguistic expression in observation-
sentences. For Schlick, these observation-sentences are temporally pin-
pointed; as soon as they are formulated they disappear, so far as their
previous character is concerned, and are transformed into hypotheses
lacking absolute certainty. Ifat some later date we wish to go back to them,
we find they have lost their character as observation-sentences, since
various sources of error - such as memory illusions, mistakes in writing
down and reading off the findings, and so forth - may by then have
intervened.
A conception quite different from Schlick's had already been advocated
within the Vienna Circle by alto Neurath. He maintained that Schlick's
position still contained metaphysical pseudo-theses, reflected in the
demand for absolute certainty and in the metaphor of the comparison
of a theory with reality. According to Neurath, scientific theories must
be made to agree with the basic protocol sentences. These sentences must
be formulated in intersubjective language and must refer to a specific
person. In formulating protocol sentences we must, if we are to avoid
ambiguities, renounce such expressions as 'I', 'now', 'here', and the like,
and replace them with objective designations for the person compiling
the protocol and with objective specifications of time and place. The
schema of a protocol sentence would then read: 'The person O. N.
perceived such and such at time t and place x.' Absolute certainty is not
demanded of these sentences; rather, they are accepted through a
decision and thus rest on convention.
Popper, too, advocated the view that the sentences we use to test theories
are based on stipulations. But he regarded any reference to the person
compiling the protocol as superfluous, indeed as a psychologistic residue.
According to him, instead of using the phrase 'round table seen by Hans',
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 335
we can speak directly of the round table itself; both statements must be
intersubjectively testable and in this respect the first phrasing offers no
advantage over the second. Popper therefore rejects also the expression
'protocol sentence' and speaks instead of basis sentences. These describe
observable events and are best stated in the form of singular existential
sentences: 'there is such-and-such at this or that space-time location.'
Discussions concerning the problem of basis have centered more and
more around two points. First, are there any absolutely certai'l, indubi-
table basis sentences? Second, do we have any objective assertions here
at all, or are only stipulations involved? Two interesting viewpoints on
these questions remain to be mentioned. The point of departure today
is in general that the statements that make up the basis of empirical
knowledge must be intersubjectively intelligible and intersubjectively
testable. Hence they may not be formulated in a language of private
experience but must be reproduced in a public language understandable
to everyone. Far-reaching consequences seem to follow from this pre-
supposition.
Arthur Pap presents the following argument against the assumption
of indubitable basis sentences. Imagine that someone asserts 'I now have
a sensation of red.' This sentence is supposed to belong to the inter-
subjective language. Then another person can assent to this sentence only
by saying 'Yes, you now have a sensation of red.' If the two persons are
not to talk at cross-purposes, the second sentence, which is a sentence
about other minds, must express the same proposition as that expressed
by the first sentence. But philosophers generally agree that assertions
about other minds can never hold with absolute certainty. Thus the first
sentence cannot be looked upon as fully indubitable, since by assumption
it expresses the very same proposition as the second sentence. If a sequence
of words 'I see such and such' or 'I feel such and such' is a sentence of the
intersubjective language at all and not merely a manifestation of some
experience (like e.g. cries or gestures), then such a sentence may be re-
placed without cha,nge of meaning by a sentence of the form 'X sees
such and such' or 'X feels such and such', and consequently is no longer
absolutely certain.
Carnap has taken the following position on the question of whether the
observation sentences that serve as a basis rest on convention. First, he
criticizes the view according to which instances subsumable under a law
336 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
This inferred conclusion cancels out the first one. In the case of deductive
explanation this sort of thing is impossible; for if a thing possesses a
property F that is connected without exception to G, then the thing
cannot at the same time possess a property H that is connected without
exception to not-G.
As can be shown, this difficulty appears in precisely the same form if we
express the general probabilistic hypothesis with the aid of a precise
version of the concept of statistical probability. The solution to the prob-
lem consists in taking the expression 'almost certain' as referring not to
a property of sentences but to a relation that exists between the premisses
of a statistical argument and its conclusion. If this is done, the seeming
contradiction between the two results (a) and (b) disappears. For 'x is a
G' is almost certain relative to certain premisses and 'x is not a G' is almost
certain relative to other premisses. When this problem is eliminated,
however, a second greater problem makes its appearance, namely, that
in the case of statistical explanations various arguments whose premisses
are all true may lead to contradictory results. That is to say, given suitable
information, mutually incompatible predictions will then, on the basis of
available empirical knowledge, have to be regarded as almost certain.
Practically, this consequence amounts to cancelling out all explanations
and predictions in connection with which statistical hypotheses were used.
Hence a way out of the difficulty must be sought. In a conflict of this sort,
the solution clearly can consist only in accepting as correct just one of the
two arguments.
Hempel finds the basic solution in Carnap's requirement of total
evidence (see also the description of Carnap's inductive logic in Section 4
below). As shown by the above account of the correct interpretation of
'almost certain' in statistical inferences, in the case of such inferences we
are dealing with inductive arguments: the conclusion is not inferred
logically from the premisses, it is only supported or confirmed by them to a
greater or lesser degree. Now Carnap has pointed out that if we are to
apply correctly an inductive approach to given cognitive situations, we
must not use as premisses mere isolated data and laws. We have to make
use of the entire available body of empirical knowledge; and we may ignore
only such knowledge as is irrelevant for the conclusion under discussion
(the concept of irrelevance is made precise in inductive logic). This Car-
napian principle is not a basic tenet of the theory of inductive inference
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 341
but a maxim for the application of inductive inference. The maxim has no
parallel in the case of deduction. If an assertion has been inferred logically
from certain assumptions, then the inference remains correct when further
assumptions are added to the original ones: strengthening the premisses
cannot make a logical inference invalid. Not so in the case of induction.
Here the estimate of probability may change in either direction on the
basis of new data, that is, the inductive probability may grow but it may
also decrease.
The application of Carnap's principle of total evidence to statistical
systematizations provides a solution to the above problem in the following
sense: Observance of the principle leads to the employment in both cases
of exactly the same premisses, namely, all relevant empirical knowledge.
If this knowledge is free of contradiction, then it cannot at one and the
same time give a high probability both to a hypothesis and to its negation;
for the sum of these probabilities must equal 1. Here too, however, a
difficulty arises, but of a wholly different nature from the one mentioned
earlier. It is not a logical problem but a practical one: to this day no
system of inductive probability has been constructed in which it is
possible to formulate scientific hypotheses of an arbitrary degree of
complexity. And even if such a system were available, strict observance of
Carnap's principle would become extremely cumbersome. For in each
correct application of a statistical inference we should have to operate
with an enormous collection of sentences as the premiss-set. Hempel has
therefore attempted to formulate a substitute for this requirement of
total evidence, one which is much easier to handle yet which performs
the same service. The basic idea in Hempel's principle may be expressed
in the following form. Suppose I wish to infer inductively the presence of
G in x from the factual determination 'The object x is an F' and the statis-
ticallaw 'Nearly all Fare G'. Then with respect to the characteristic F,
there must be involved the most detailed among all the descriptions D
of the object x for which there is available a statistical hypothesis of the
form 'Almost all Dare G' (that is, with the same G).
We are not always able to formulate the antecedent conditions and
the laws necessary for the explanation of a phenomenon. Where a com-
plete formulation has not been obtained, Hempel speaks of explanation
sketches. For example, practically all explanations of historical processes
presumably have the character of explanation sketches. What differentiates
342 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
him. It was assumed that for a language of that kind the undefined
primitive predicates designate observable properties and relations and
that all other predicates (concepts) are reducible to these primitive
predicates (primitive concepts). What is to be understood here by reduci-
bility? To begin with, we might have in mind only a definitional reduci-
bility. This is how Carnap himself originally conceived it (e.g., in his
Logischer Aufbau). Later he discovered that the so-called dispositional
predicates are not definable at all. These are such predicates as 'water-
soluble', 'brittle', 'magnetic', 'electrically charged', and the like. Since a
great many scientific concepts are dispositional in character, Carnap's
discovery had an extremely important bearing on the question of how an
empiricist language is to be constructed.
The reason why dispositional predicates are not definable may be
indicated briefly. At the outset, one might suppose that 'x is water-
soluble' can be defined by the condition 'Whenever x is placed in water,
x dissolves'. But since in logic a conditional sentence with a false antece-
dent is taken as true, then by this definition all objects that have never
been placed in water must be designated as water-soluble, which of course
is not the intended sense of this definition. All previous attempts at
different and more complicated definitions for dispositional predicates-
definitions that do not lead to undesired consequences - had met with
failure. Hence Carnap, in his 1936 inquiry into the testability and con-
firmability of statements, had replaced the method of defining dispositional
predicates by another procedure, known as the method of reduction
sentences. Definitional reducibility was abandoned; however, all predi-
cates were still reduced, albeit in other ways, to the primitive predicates
which designate only what is observable. It turned out later that this pro-
cedure too is not without its defects. The point was also made that
the metrical concepts of theoretical physics (length, mass, and the like)
do not fulfill the narrower empiricist thesis of reducibility to what is
observable for the simple reason that they can take as values arbitrary
non-negative real numbers, and it is logically impossible to formulate
observational conditions for all these possibilities. 4 If these and other
doubts are valid against the idea of the reducibility of relatively simple
concepts like 'length', 'temperature', and 'mass', they become even stronger
when we move on to the more abstract concepts of modern physics, such
as 'electron', 'Schrodinger ",-function', and the like.
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 347
theoretical concept of mass is defined only for values that are not very
small and not very large, and even this only to within the limits of the
accuracy of measurement). In the second place, only a few of the theoreti-
cal concepts are connected by such correspondence rules to concepts
expressible in the observation language. Such rules are usually laid down
not for the undefinable primitive concepts of the theoretical language
but for concepts that are introduced by definition within the theory T
and lie closer to the domain of the observable. In modern physics, these
are chiefly the 'macroscopic observables'. The other concepts receive
indirect empirical meaning by virtue of being connected, through the
axioms and theorems of the theory and through chains of definitions,
to the concepts that have been partially interpreted by the correspondence
rules.
In addition, the testability of hypotheses formulated within the theoreti-
cal language is in part a very indirect one. Only those hypotheses are
directly confirmable - in the narrower sense of complete confirmability
or in one of the broader senses described earlier - that contain exclusively
just such concepts as are partially interpretable on the basis of the
correspondence rules. The hypotheses that contain the remaining con-
cepts and which are not directly confirmable empirically also become
testable, if only indirectly, by reason of the logical relationships of
deducibility that hold between them and the directly confirmable hypo-
theses.
Some philosophers are of the opinion that once we admit such theoreti-
cal concepts it is no longer possible to draw a sharp boundary between
theoretical empirical science and speculative metaphysics. For example,
if such a basic concept of theoretical physics as the electron apparently
cannot be reduced to what is observable, how is it different from a
concept of speculative metaphysics, say, the absolute? It seems we must
agree that a continuous line leads from concepts that are closely tied to
the domain of the observable, such as temperature or mass, past abstract
concepts like electron or ljJ-function, to those speculative concepts that
stand in no specifiable relation to observable processes. Carnap does
not share this view. He believes that he can state precisely wherein even
the most abstract theoretical concepts must differ from mere pseudo-
concepts. What this comes to is that an empiricist criterion of meaning
also is offered for the theoretical language. Since the exact formulation
FOUNDA TIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 349
is called the betting quotient. If we assume further that the persons A and
B pool their knowledge, in so far as it is relevant to the hypothesis h, into
the common knowledge e, then the statement 'The degree of confirmation
of hypothesis h on the evidence e is equal to q' can be interpreted to mean
that a wager on h with the betting quotient q is a fair bet for both bettors.
A bet is called fair if it does not favor either partner. This interpretation
also shows why the values of inductive probability must be chosen from
the domain between 0 and 1.
The second interpretation consists in identifying the concept of in-
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 355
quite different value for the degree of confirmation. On this point in-
ductive logic differs markedly in application from deductive logic. A
deductive inference remains valid in its application even when new pre-
misses are added; but an inductive inference is no longer applicable if the
relevant premisses (that is, the relevant evidential data) have changed.
If additional observations, say, have generated a new set of evidential
data elout of the original evidence e and if the two inductive logic
sentences 'c(h, e)=r' and 'c(h, e1)=r 1' hold, then both sentences remain
valid as sentences of inductive logic but only the second is applicable to
the new situation.
Carnap groups inductive inferences according to certain chief types.
The most important of these are the following:
(1) direct inference, or inference from a basic totality to a sample of
that totality;
(2) predictive inference, or inference from one case to another (usually
located in the future) that does not intersect with the first one;
(3) analogical inference, or inference from one individual to another
on the basis of some known similarity between them;
(4) inverse inference, or inference from a sample to the whole;
(5) universal inference, or inference from a sample (a finite class of
individual instances) to some hypothesis having the character of a uni-
versal sentence.
In conformity with what was said earlier, the 'inference' here is to be
understood not as yielding the hypothesis in question h but as supplying
the value of c(h, e) for given hand e. Thus in the first type, where the
evidence e describes the frequency of a property M in the basic totality
and h the frequency of M in a sample of this totality, the question to
be answered is not how to obtain h but what is the value of c(h, e). The
situation is similar in the other cases.
The detailed construction of a system of inductive logic runs into
enormous difficulties. The main problem consists in introducing an ade-
quate c-function, to serve in ascertaining the degree of confirmation of
hypotheses on the basis of the evidence. In other words, the problem lies
in the definition of the function c which must be used in the elementary
statement of inductive logic 'c(h, e)=r.' Carnap was able to show that
there is not just one single inductive method but an entire linear con-
tinuum of such methods. Many of these may be eliminated in advance
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 357
functions are eliminated which, although they satisfy the axioms already
formulated, do not satisfy the next added axiom. The following con-
ventions on adequacy serve as a foundation for these additional axioms:
K 2 • 'c(h, e) shall depend only on the propositions expressed by h
and e.' This requirement reduces to a minimum the dependence of the c-
function on the underlying language system. For example, with K2 we
may establish axioms which provide that the values of c be independ-
ent of the domain of individuals as well as of the number of families of
predicates.
K 3 • 'c(h, e) shall depend only on the logical structure of hand e.' This
requirement makes it possible, through special invariance axioms, to
retain the logically admissible import of the classical principle of indiffer-
ence in a series of axioms.
K4 • 'c(h, e) shall be so defined that it is possible for us to learn from
experience.' This requirement, e.g., leads among other things to the
further requirement that for a sequence of more or less well-confirmed
observation instances the pertinent c-values must increase monotonically.
Ks. 'In calculating c(h, e) only that part of e is to be used that is
relevant to h.'
K 6 • The function c shall be as simple as possible, provided that no
intuitive requirements are thereby violated.
Despite their seeming vagueness, these principles suffice to furnish a
foundation for the axioms of a system of inductive logic. With this, the
problem of justifying induction takes on a wholly new aspect. Carnap
formulates this problem not for one single inductive method, but for an
entire class of credibility functions. His solution consists in justifying the
acceptance of a system of axioms for inductive logic. What such a justifi-
cation must look like we have just indicated. It does not consist of a
logical deduction, and thus a deductive justification of inductive inference
is impossible. Nevertheless, the justification does involve a priori reasons,
since in the reasons offered we utilize neither synthetic assumptions about
the structure of the universe nor what we have learned thus far from
specific experiences.
concept of law. That we have no right to look upon every true universal
statement as a law can be seen from the absurd results to which we are
led if we proceed from such an identification. The most striking examples
are from the areas of scientific explanation and inductive confirmation.
In discussing the concept of scientific explanation, we pointed out that
the explanans for any adequate explanation must contain at least one
statement with the character of a general law (see above, Section B.2).
Suppose B is a basket containing only red apples, and a is one of these
apples. So long as no criterion is set up for a statement being law-like,
nothing prevents us from regarding the sentence
(1) All the apples in the basket are red
as the statement of a law. When we add to it the statement
(2) a is in the basket B,
we may then deduce the sentence
(3) The apple a is red.
If we base ourselves on the schema for scientific explanation outlined
earlier (above, Section B.2), we may take the first two sentences as the
explanans - sentence (1) is the law statement and sentence (2) expresses
an antecedent condition. But this would mean that we are to view the
content of sentence (3) as having been explained by the other two sen-
tences. This of course is absurd; no one would want seriously to assert
that the red color of an apple is adequately explained by the fact that
the apple is found in a basket containing none but red apples.
Ifwe are to avoid having to regard the above deduction as a satisfactory
scientific explanation, there seems to be no other alternative but to deny
that sentence (1) is a law. But we can make this denial in the present case
and in all analogous cases only if we have at our disposal a criterion for
the law likeness of a statement. As Goodman has shown, the problem of
determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for a statement to
designate a law is also of the most immediate urgency within the theory
of the inductive confirmation of statements. The examples adduced by
Goodman indicate at the same time just what the main point is.
Assume that the property green is not a defining characteristic of the
concept of emerald, so that the general statement
362 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
C. PROBLEMS OF REALITY
that Pegasus possesses being as an unrealized possibility (on this, see the
earlier critical comments on N. Hartmann's modal theory).
Quine's solution to the problem consists in generalizing a procedure
developed by Russell. The latter had shown that we can think of singular
descriptions, such as 'the author of Wallenstein', as incomplete symbols,
and we can analyze the sentences in which these expressions occur in such
a way that the expressions disappear without the meaning of the whole
sentence being altered. Accordingly, 'The author of Wallenstein was a
poet' would be translated as 'Someone wrote Wallenstein and was a poet
and no one else wrote Wallenstein'. (The final clause, which begins with
'no one', is necessary in order to render the uniqueness requirement
contained in the use of the definite article.) While in the original statement
the ontological burden lay on the expression 'the author of Wallenstein',
it has now been shifted to 'someone'. Such expressions as 'something' or
'someone', which are employed to form existential generalizations, are
called existential quantifiers and are written '3x' (read as, 'there is an
x such that'). When analyzed, the sentence cited takes the form '3x
(x wrote Wallenstein and x was a poet and no one who is not identical
with x wrote Wallenstein),. The symbol x occurring here is called a bound
variable. The main thing in this connection is the following: The expres-
sion 'someone' or '3x' is not a name. In order for it to be significant,
therefore, it is not necessary to presuppose the existence of specific
objects, in particular the existence of the author of Wallenstein. Affirming
or denying the existence of what such a characterization refers to presents
no more problems once this analysis is carried out. That is, the sentence
'The author of Wallenstein exists' is to be analyzed as 'Someone wrote
Wallenstein and no one else wrote Wallenstein', and the false statement
'The author of Wallenstein does not exist' as 'It is not the case that some-
one exists who composed Wallenstein'.
Since on this basis no further difficulties appear in the case of descrip-
tions, the problems mentioned at the outset in connection with names
will also disappear once we succeed in transforming names into descrip-
tions. Now as a matter of fact, this is always possible. We need only
interpret as predicates those expressions which to begin with are used as
names; the circumstance that each name refers to just one object can be
expressed by prefixing the definite article, that is, by transforming the
whole into a description. In our example, we would introduce the (by
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 367
from the meanings of the predicates occurring in this theory and from the
axioms of the theory. This formulation of the ontological criterion is, of
course, not in accord with Quine's original intention. For he would like
to dispense with intensional concepts (such as 'logical necessity', 'neces-
sary implication', 'analytic', 'synonymous') in all logical and philo-
sophical discussions, since he regards such concepts as unclear and not
explicable.
The attempt to make more precise the difference between Platonism
and nominalism has also run into difficulties. Hao Wang, e.g., has objected
to the characterization outlined above on the ground that it overrates
the syntactical apparatus that a theory employs. For example, there are
set-theoretical systems that use only a single type of variable (and thus
do not distinguish between individual variables and class variables) and
that yet cannot be termed nominalistic theories. Hence the criterion
Hao Wang proposes to use is the difference between finite and infinite
totalities. According to this criterion, Platonistic theories would be those
that assume actual infinite totalities, whereas nominalism would be
equated with a strictfinitism. Goodman, however, has attempted to give
the concept of nominalism a greater precision by means of a modern
form of Ockham's viewpoint. He thus arrives at the position of equating
nominalism with hyperextensionalism, according to which entities that
consist of the same atomic individuals are to be identified with one
another.
Thus far, however, we have only stated the various viewpoints. Which
of these is to be adopted, especially within the context of the modern
theory of science and philosophy of mathematics, remains at present a
subject of lively discussion. Goodman defends the nominalist viewpoint,
and he has adduced some very ingenious arguments against Platonism.
Other logicians, such as Heinrich Scholz and Church, believe that
Platonism is unavoidable even for a proper construction of logic. The
discussion has been additionally complicated by two things. First, what
is called conceptualism (according to which universals exist, but only as
'structures produced by man's mind') also obtains a precise explication
and it too must be taken into account within the confines of the discussion.
Second, Goodman distinguishes between Platonism and so-called realism
(the recognition of qualities, which are conceived of, however, as indi-
viduals). But the discussion has already brought to light several essential
370 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
points: (1) that both nominalism and Platonism are in themselves con-
ceivable standpoints, so that all previous attempts to demonstrate either
of them along a priori lines have inevitably failed; (2) that an 'unbridled'
Platonism is untenable because it leads straight to the set-theoretic anti-
nomies; (3) that radical nominalism is too poor in means of expression
to reproduce the content of present day mathematical and empirical
science.
The modern discussion of the problem of universals also permits us to
view the history of the problem from an entirely new aspect. 9
(2) Due to the fact that experience concepts are not reducible to
behavioral concepts, there must then exist, alongside of behavioral psy-
chology, an introspective psychology in which the private data of experi-
ence are described in a purely phenomenalistic language (Feigl calls it a
'mentalistic' language). Immediate experiences provide the actual 'reali-
ties' to which ultimately the behavioral concepts also indirectly refer.
When a doctor, e.g., asks me whether and where I have a pain, whether
I can read certain letters, etc., he may indeed act purely behavioristically
and test me in a strictly objective manner, which any other observer can
check. But this does not alter the fact that I have the pain or the visual
experience, which I report on the basis of immediate experience and
introspection.
(3) On the other side, one must be extremely careful to fend off all
metaphysical speculations about the mind-body problem. Such speculations
include all the questions to which in principle no scientifically testable
answer can be given either on the foundation of a philosophical analysis
or on the basis of empirical investigations. All meaningful statements
must in principle be testable, this term in Feigl's view, of course, being
taken in its broadest conceivable sense.
(4) Finally, in the case of the questions that make up the mind-body
problem, we must always distinguish most precisely between philosophico-
analytical questions, and the empirical questions whose answer must be
left to the individual sciences. According to Feigl, conceptual confusion in
this area is often attributable to the fact that philosophers wish to decide
in an a priori manner questions that can be settled only by the scientist.
While the mentalistic language is a private language of experience, the
behavioristic characterization of the mental represents a description of it
in a public, intersubjective language. There is still another possible way of
referring to the mental indirectly by way of describing bodily processes,
namely, through neurophysiology or the description of processes in the
central nervous system. This description also takes place in the public
language, since it too has as content that which is intersubjectively ob-
servable. While the behaviorist theory is a macrotheory of behavior, the
neurophysiological one is a microtheory of behavior.
The philosophical mind-body problem thus reduces to the problem of the
logical nature of the relation between the mentalistic, the behavioristic and
the neurophysiological characterization of psychical processes. This prob-
376 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
D. ETHICS
look the fact that every ethically relevant action takes place on the basis
of a certain judgment of the present situation and in the expectation of
future consequences of the action. The agent may err both in his estimate
of the momentary situation and in his judgment of the future consequences
flowing from his actions; furthermore, no one can foresee all the future
consequences of his actions. Hence a contradiction may arise depending
on whether an action is judged from the viewpoint of the agent or from
that of someone affected by the action. If a person affected by an action
'obtains his just due', then the action may be termed materially right
regardless of whether the agent had this as his purpose or not. In the
case where he intended this consequence, the action is called formally
right regardless of whether his activity in fact had the desired result. When
the two cases are in agreement, we have a perfectly right action. The
concept of material rightness is the dominant one; for an act is formally
right only if the agent seeks to bring about that which is materially right
for the person affected by the act. Since, however, there may be incom-
plete or mistaken information about the situation or a deficient intellec-
tual capacity for judging the future consequences issuing from the act, it
is possible that a formally right act may be materially wrong and a
formally indifferent or wrong act materially right. Here we see the ethical
relevance of the agent's factual knowledge and his capacity for under-
standing.
Further complications enter because, in addition to mistakes in logic
and wrong assumptions, the agent is also subject to ethical errors. Let us
assume that a man is raised in a society where the vendetta prevails. He
feels himself duty-bound to kill a member of another family because one
of the ancestors of that family killed a member of his own family. Granted
that this belief in the obligatory character of the vendetta is a moral
error, a successful fulfillment of the intent to kill will result in the follow-
ing situation: the man believes that he has done what he ought to have
done, whereas in fact he has done what he ought not to have done. His
action is both formally and materially wrong, yet subjectively right.
Hence when we speak of a morally right action, we must distinguish
whether we mean a perfectly right action; or aformally right action, which
in the event of inaccurate knowledge of the situation or mistaken logical
thinking results only accidentally in a perfectly right action; or a sub-
jectively right action, which may be present not only in the case of gross
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 383
factual errors but even in the case of the grossest moral errors. A person
may act in conformity with his conscience, but due to ignorance or
stupidity or as a consequence of irrational views about what is morally
right he may nonetheless exhibit behavior that is utterly disastrous for
all affected by it.
As Broad shows, other significant aspects of ethical conduct follow if
we analyze the agent's motives and distinguish the theoretical from the
ethical components of these motives. It turns out that an act may be
morally right in all three of the aspects already mentioned and yet be
morally objectionable. An important problem, from which numerous
other questions follow, concerns the existence of specifically moral
motives: Can a wish to do what in itself is morally right be the sole
determinant of conduct, or must there appear as an additional determi-
nant a belief in the non-moral characteristics of the conduct or of its
consequences?
The epistemological questions of ethics include first of all how we
obtain knowledge of the meaning of specific moral expressions and of the
rightness or wrongness of judgments in which non-moral characteristics
(the telling of an untruth, say) are joined to moral characteristics.
Obviously the answers to such questions depend very much on how we
analyze moral judgments and interpret their sense. The problem of
analyzing moral statements has in recent years become increasingly
prominent. In the terms of Broad's classifications, the theories to be
discussed in the concluding section may be described as standing close
to the emotional reaction theories but as not fully accepting either their
standpoint or that of the objective analysis. The reason is that according
to this final group of theories, language does not serve only either to
communicate some belief (or some knowledge) about something or to
express emotions; beyond these, it has other functions and the latter,
among other things, come into play in the formulation of moral judg-
ments.
vagueness of the expression, and also because the word 'good' has non-
ethical as well as ethical uses, we cannot give a fully adequate analysis of
it, that is, a translation into an equivalent expression that brings into
sharp relief the individual components of meaning. The various 'patterns
of analysis' proposed by Stevenson therefore serve only as preliminary
working models, which are to be refined later in the most diverse ways.
According to the first pattern, 'This is good' says the same thing as 'I
approve of this; do so as well!' What is important in this connection is
the fact that in the analysis of the statement the imperative component 'do
so as well!' appears. This component is in no way equivalent to such an
expression as 'I want you to do so as well'; for this last is no more than an
'introspective report'.
The imperative component is the most important feature of moral
judgments. We use ethical expressions, in particular the expression 'good'
(or its negative correlate 'bad'), to influence the attitude of others, whether
to guide or change their attitude or to strengthen them in it. Why then in
formulating value judgments in ethical discussions do we not confine
ourselves altogether to the imperative form of speech? There are various
reasons for this. First, since imperatives are commands, they have a
tendency to call forth resistance on the part of the hearer, and this is not
the case in the use of the word 'good'. Further, an imperative demands
simple obedience, whereas in using a word like 'good' we leave open the
possibility of further discussion. Lastly, Stevenson does not want to deny
that an ethical judgment possesses a partly descriptive content, which can
be conveyed only by declarative sentences. In the working model cited,
the descriptive component is contained in the first half of the sentence.
Since in many cases this is too scanty an account of the descriptive
content of ethical judgments, Stevenson proposes additional patterns for
the analysis of ethical statements, patterns which give a better account
of the descriptive component.
Stevenson buttresses his theory with a doctrine concerning the emotive
meaning of expressions. Linguistic expressions as a rule have not only a
descriptive meaning, that is, a disposition to arouse in the hearer (or the
reader) such 'theoretical' acts as ideas, assumptions, acts of belief and
the like; they also have the capacity in varying degrees, as the case may
be, to generate emotional reactions, that is, reactions in the domain of
feelings and attitudes. Stevenson calls this disposition of expressions their
386 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
of the sciences moral unanimity will also be attained in the world. This is
due to two circumstances: first, rational methods alone fall far short of
yielding agreement in conceptions or opinions; second, even if they were
sufficient, nevertheless theoretical agreement regarding all of life's
concerns - that is, agreement on those views about things that can be
formulated in declarative sentences - would still presumably run parallel
to a disagreement in attitudes.
Thus when ethical agreement is sought by way of discussions and
argumentation, this is in part a rational process in which we can employ
logical proofs or other scientific arguments that are suited to changing
the belief of other persons, and in part a process of persuasion which
employs persuasive definitions, imperatives, exhortations, and the like.
In any event, we can never say that a certain attitude follows necessarily
from some belief; we cannot assert that if this or that is believed, then
only such and such an attitude is right.
This account of various kinds of ethical controversies and their settle-
ment is itself a descriptive one. It seems plausible to require that an ethical
discussion observe certain principles, e.g., that the attempt at persuasion
must never include a deliberate appeal to the prejudices of the other
person. Such requirements can be set up, but they may not be interpreted
so as to prove that anyone who violated them has committed a mistake
in ethical argument. For requirements of this sort take us beyond the
domain of what is scientifically establishable: we are then moralizing about
the art of moralizing.
According to 'academic ethics', the consideration of means can always
be bracketed out of a discussion of 'ultimate ends'. Stevenson holds this
view to be extremely harmful, since it is based on a series of false as-
sumptions. The realization of an end may under certain circumstances
consist in bringing into being a complex causal process, and this process
itself may be open to different theoretical and ethical judgments. For
instance, an agreement in ultimate ends need not have as its consequence
an agreement on the choice of means, because there may be theoretical
differences of opinion about the suitability of the means. Or, two persons
may agree in their attitude toward an object even though one of them
regards the object only as a means whereas for the other it is an end.
Also, we often observe that what was originally thought of as means
later becomes an end in itself. Or it turns out that the realization of a goal
388 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
serves only a single purpose, namely, "to speak about things". Language
has a great many other functions, and these cannot be squeezed into the
schema of 'speaking about'. The other functions are fulfilled in particular
by imperatives, value judgments (moral and non-moral), and 'ought'-
principles.
In so far as our language serves to construct factual statements and to
communicate them, it is called descriptive language; the statements of this
language are also called indicative sentences. We must distinguish between
it and prescriptive language, which includes imperatives and value judg-
ments. Imperatives may be divided into singular ('Shut the door!') and
universal ('Always tell the truth!'); value judgments comprise the non-
moral ('This is a bad auto') and the moral ('Stealing is bad').
'Ought'-sentences have been repeatedly misinterpreted in philosophy.
Hare mentions two chief types of errors. In one, imperatives are wrongly
construed as descriptive statements. This type embraces all those ethical
theories which hold that 'ought' -sentences serve to express judgments
about obligations. The second includes a crude form of the emotivist
theory to the effect that the function of imperative sentences is to influence
causally the behavior or the emotions of the hearer. What is overlooked
here is that there is a difference between two processes: (1) telling some-
one that he ought to do something, and (2) getting him to do it.
How does an indicative sentence differ from an imperative sentence?
They may, in a certain respect, have a common content. Hence in order
to lay hold of the difference between them it is useful to select as a starting-
point instances of partially overlapping statements belonging to the two
categories, e.g., the two sentences 'You are going to shut the door'll
(indicative sentence) and 'Shut the door!' (imperative sentence). Both say
something about your shutting the door in the immediate future, but they
say something different about it. We can make clear how the two differ
if we restate the indicative sentence by using the following linguistic
expression
(1) Your shutting the door in the future; yes
and replacing the imperative sentence with
(2) Your shutting the door in the future; please.
The first part, which the two sentences have in common, is called the
390 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
cation is given only for this particular situation. However, in the case of
a specifically moral imperative, such as 'You ought to tell him the truth',
we can always require that it be supported by rational grounds. And
these rational grounds consist in subsuming the specific imperative under
general principles. In line with what was said above, these general princi-
ples cannot be formulated with the aid of declarative sentences; for they
themselves represent 'ought'-principles. Thus on the one hand moral
principles are differentiated from assertions of fact, and on the other hand,
because they are purely universal, they are differentiated from ordinary
imperatives. The sentence 'You ought to tell him the truth' may therefore
be analyzed somewhat as follows: 'If you do not tell him the truth, you
are violating a general "ought"-principle to which I hereby subscribe.'
The objection sometimes raised against this type of ethical theory is
that it attributes to moral judgments a function analogous to persuasion,
and that consequently moral judgments can no longer be distinguished
from propaganda. This objection, however, does not apply to Hare's
theory. For him, the chief characteristic of ethics consists in the fact that
a person subordinates himself to one or more universal 'ought'-principles.
And the striving of a person to obtain followers for this principle through
his own personal example can in no wise be termed propaganda.
By advancing universal 'ought'-principles as the only possible means
of justifying specific moral imperatives, Hare's theory moves very close
to the Kantian ethics. There is still another aspect that unites the two,
namely, the Kantian question of the 'autonomy of the will': every man
must make his own decisions with respect to the moral principles to be
assumed. No one can ever take such a decision away from me. If at times
it appears that other people can make decisions for me, then I have over-
looked the fact that I must have decided beforehand to follow the counsel
of these people and to obey their orders.
The justification of a moral decision of necessity includes many com-
ponents. A complete justification would consist in describing exactly all
the effects of the decision (most of which, however, can be known only
with a certain probability), in specifying the universal principles that are
being followed, and finally in describing exactly the consequences that the
general observance of these principles would entail. Can the universal
principles themselves in turn be justified? It is impossible to deduce them
from factual determinations. But, in Hare's view, it is also quite impossi-
392 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
REFERENCES
1 For a brief account of the system projected by Hao Wang, see W. Stegmiiller, 'Das
Universalienproblem einst und jetzt', Archiv fur Philosophie 6, No. 3/4 and 7, No. 1/2,
especially pp. 60ff.
2 See W. Stegmiiller, Metaphysik, Wissenschaft, Skepsis, Chapter Ill, especially
section 9 entitled 'Philosophische Stimmen zum Basisproblem', pp. 279-307.
3 Strictly speaking, these letters designate not the conditions but (to speak in the formal
mode) the statements that have these conditions as their content.
4 The set of real numbers has the power of the continuum, and is thus a non-denumerable
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 393
set. But the number of defining conditions that can be formed by means of a finite, or
at most a denumerably infinite, number of primitive predicates is at most denumerably
infinite, even if we admit a complicated logical apparatus.
5 See Carnap, Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit (ed. by W. Stegmtiller), Vienna
1959. In this book, the philosophical foundation is separated from the technical
structure of the system of inductive logic so that the former can be read independently
of the latter.
6 The semantical relativity to a specific language system has to do with something
else; this kind of relativity attaches to all semantical concepts, in particular to that of
degree of confirmation in so far as it is introduced as a semantical concept.
7 For what follows, see W. Stegmtiller, 'Conditio irrealis, Dispositionen, Natur-
gesetze und Induktion', Kantstudien 50 (1958-59), No. 3, 363-390.
8 See W. Stegmtiller, op. cit., pp. 385-386. In the statement of rule 11 on p. 386 of this
paper, the additional condition should be inserted that the predicate A' must be much
better entrenched than predicate A.
9 A more detailed treatment of this complex of problems, including an historical sketch
written from a modern point of view, may be found in my paper, 'Das Universalien-
problem einst und jetzt', Archiv fur Philosophie 6, No. 3/4 and 7, No. 1/2.
10 For an application of considerations of this kind to questions of economic policy,
see W. Stegmtiller, 'Ethik und Wirtschaftspolitik', Besinnung, Zeitschrift fur Fragen
der Ethik, No. 3 (1955), pp. 1-12.
11 This sentence is to be understood here as making a factual assertion; it is not to be
thought of as a sentence spoken in a threatening tone of command and thus itself an
imperative.
CHAPTER IX
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
A. PHILOSOPHY I
the most general ontological distinction, that between facts and non-facts.
For it is apparent from what they say about being that they understand
by it something belonging to the category of non-facts - whether, like
Wittgenstein, they subsume it under the concept 'thing' or, as in the case
of Heidegger, they shrink from such a subsumption.
Facts are to be distinguished from what Wittgenstein calls states of
affairs. They are not distinct in respect of category, since states of affairs
belong to the category of facts, not to that of individual things and
attributes. But a fact always has to do with something that is actually
the case, whereas a state of affairs represents merely something that is
possibly the case. This distinction is reflected in the difference in content
between true and false propositions. In the two propositions 'Hannibal
lived before Caesar' and 'Caesar lived before Hannibal', something is
asserted to be the case. But the content of the first (true) proposition is
not only asserted; it is also actually the case; it is a fact. The content of the
second (false) proposition, on the other hand, is not a fact. Thus any
arbitrary proposition (except one that is valid purely logically) asserts a
state of affairs. It may be an existing state of affairs or a non-existing one.
If the proposition is true, the state of affairs exists and is then called a
fact. If the proposition is false, the state of affairs does not exist and is
therefore not a fact.
Of great importance for Wittgenstein's ontology is the distinction be-
tween atomic states of affairs and complex states of affairs. In the case
of the latter, he also speaks mostly of' Sachlagen', while atomic states of
affairs he designates simply as 'Sachverhalte'. Similarly, we may dis-
tinguish between atomic and complex facts in so far as existing states of
affairs are concerned. This distinction will be made clearer in the sequel.
Here we merely indicate that an atomic state of affairs is something
'logically simple', which does not itself break down in turn into simpler
states of affairs but is organized into things and attributes.
Wittgenstein says that atomic states of affairs are logically independent
of one another (2.061). What this means is that if A and B are atomic
states of affairs, then there are four conceivable possibilities with respect
to their existence or non-existence, namely, that both exist, both do not
exist, A exists but not B, and B exists but not A. Since this independence
holds regardless of whether either A or B is a fact, Wittgenstein here is
not making a statement about the actual world; he is making a stipulation
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 399
that holds for every possible world. The actual world must be thought of
as embedded in a totality of possible worlds. How then do we arrive at
these possible worlds?
In order to clarify the connection between actual and possible worlds,
Wittgenstein introduces the concept of logical space. As a first approxi-
mation, we can elucidate this concept thus: Suppose we are given the most
detailed possible description of the actual world. From this description
we eliminate all those sentences that depend on other parts of the de-
scription, that is, we have a description that is complete and is such that
its description components are all independent of one another. We embed
the world thus described in a logical space by saying that this space shall
have as many dimensions as there are independent components of the
description of this world, i.e., as many dimensions as there are com-
ponents remaining after we strike out the dependent components.
A simple geometrical model of this procedure is the following: Let the
'world' consist of two rectangles in the Euclidean plane. A complete
description of this world with mutually independent components of
description is a conjunction of four sentences, which give the height and
length of the two rectangles. The description is complete because all
other measurements of the two rectangles (e.g., of the diagonals) are
already determined by it; and it contains mutually independent descrip-
tion components, since the lengths and heights of the rectangles vary
independently of one another. The 'logical space' of our model world
is thus four-dimensional (not two-dimensional!). The remaining possible
worlds are obtained by varying arbitrarily the four determining compo-
nents.
The same holds for the general case. The various possible worlds are
obtained from the factual world by substituting other components for the
individual description components in the world-description sketched
above. In the terminology of logical spaces: a possible world is uniquely
determined by choosing one atomic state of affairs from each dimension of
the logical space. We have a true description of the actual world if, for
each dimension of the logical space, the description contains just one
component that asserts the existence of an atomic state of affairs coming
from that dimension, and this atomic state of affairs is an atomic fact.
Such a description specifies all that is the case, and excludes all that is
not the case.
400 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
in its original form; for then different atomic states of affairs belong to
different dimensions.
It would be too difficult here to go into the conjectural grounds for
Wittgenstein's adoption of a yes-and-no space. Nevertheless, we must
note some of the consequences of this conception. First, it certainly
follows that his concept of the world as a fact is fundamentally more
abstract than we assumed to begin with; for the sentences of everyday
language and the 'simple' states of affairs they describe cannot, according
to him, be 'simple' or 'atomic'. Were they simple, then the underlying
logical space would have to be of the first type, since the states of affairs
that in the usual view seem 'simple' are indeed, as we have seen, not
independent of one another but often logically incompatible. Second, a
different kind of characterization of possible worlds now results. The use
of a logical peripheral space determined a possible world by 'picking out'
one atomic state of affairs for each dimension of the logical space. Now,
however, the atomic states of affairs - assuming their denumerability -
can be ordered in a sequence (S): Sl' S2' S3' ... A complete description of
the actual world is then given when we specify the existing states of affairs
belonging to (S) (i.e., all those that are facts) and when we expressly add
that these are all the atomic states of affairs. We thus eliminate the re-
maining members of (S) as not existing, which means that for each of
these members the other (non-atomic) state of affairs belonging to the
same dimension does exist. Accordingly, while in relation to a logical
space of the first type the class of possible worlds is given by the class of
selections of one member each from every dimension of the logical space,
when we use a logical space of the second type the class ofpossible worlds
is given by the class of all partitions of the sequence (S) into two sets that
are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive: the set of existing and the
set of non-existing states of affairs in (S).
In 4.463 Wittgenstein says that logical space is infinite. This is in-
structive for the relationship of atomic states of affairs to time. What he
means is that the number of dimensions of logical space is infinite. This
thesis cannot be justified by the preceding considerations; rather, it is a
consequence of Wittgenstein's acceptance of Hume's notion that there is
no necessary connection between what takes place at one point in time and
what takes place at another. Expressed in the language of T, this means
that the atomic states of affairs belonging to different points of time are
402 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
independent of one another and hence different from one another, regard-
less of whether they are the same in all other respects. The consequence
is that a subspace of logical space is assigned to every point of time. Thus
quite independently of whether these individual subspaces as such are
infinite, the total logical space must be infinite, since the number of points
of time is infinite. Of course, we must not think of logical space as some-
thing 'in which' the processes of the world run their course (as in physical
space) nor as something that moves through the world in time (like a
moving coordinate system). On the contrary, logical space is nothing
other than the abstract totality of all the logical subspaces belonging to
the various points of time.
Included in Wittgenstein's ideas about logical space are some that later
found a place in semantics, e.g., those that Carnap made more precise in
the theory of logical range. According to Wittgenstein, every meaningful
sentence determines a complete decomposition of the class of all possible
worlds into two sub-classes: those in which the sentence is true (those
that are compatible with the sentence) and those in which it is false (those
that are incompatible with it). The first class of possible worlds he calls
the logical position of the sentence, or "the range that the sentence leaves
open to the facts" (4.463).2 For logically true statements, the logical
range coincides with the entire logical space, while for logical false state-
ments it is empty. In particular, logically true sentences, since they are
compatible with all possible states of affairs, have no descriptive content.
It is therefore true to say that "All the sentences of logic say the same
thing, namely, nothing" (5.43).
Among the expressions of T that are most easily misunderstood are the
words 'thing' ('Ding') or 'object' ('Gegenstand'), and 'substance' ('Suh-
stanz'). According to 2.01, a state of affairs is a combination of things or
objects. Since a union of individual things cannot possibly constitute a
state of affairs - because an attribute must be a part of each state of
affairs - Wittgenstein cannot mean by 'thing' what we call individual
things. His concept of thing serves rather to characterize everything that
does not belong to the category of facts. Thus the basic categorial dis-
tinction is carried out linguistically in T in such a way that the category
offacts is distinguished from the category of things. Attributes - proper-
ties and relations - then constitute certain special categories of things,
and individual things form another such category.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 403
ble worlds, thus contradicting our assumption. This would seem to pro-
vide an explanation for the second half of 2.021.
On this basis we can perhaps also interpret in a plausible way some of
the sentences in T that are not only obscure but sound downright absurd,
e.g., 2.0232: "Objects are colorless." We have seen that only by equating
logical space with a logical peripheral space can we identify everyday or
simple scientific facts with atomic facts; this is not possible with respect
to logical fundamental space. Hence the seemingly simple things of
everyday life or of science cannot be atomic things in Wittgenstein's
sense. If the fact that a certain patch in the visual field is red is not an
atomic fact, then neither this patch nor the color red is a (logically atomic)
thing. It is quite possible that in this sentence Wittgenstein merely wanted
to indicate that his 'objects' are not empirical objects, just as his 'states
of affairs' do not represent what we call states of affairs.
The fact that substance is common to all possible worlds should not
be taken to mean that the atomic individuals that appear in them re-
present something 'temporally eternal'. This would entail the clear contra-
diction that the atomic states of affairs belonging to various points in
time are different from one another. Rather, atomic individuals are to be
thought of as 'instantaneous objects', a notion that does not contradict
the assumption that these instantaneous individuals in all possible worlds
are identical.
One of the various possible ways of isolating a subspace out of the
logical space represented by the sequence (S) is to select those atomic
states of affairs in which a particular 'thing' appears. This subspace consti-
tutes the essence or nature of the thing in question, or as Wittgenstein also
calls it, the (logical) form of the thing. If we know this subspace, then we
also know all the possible ways for this thing to appear in atomic states
of affairs. This form determines in particular whether the thing is an
individual, a two-place attribute, or a many-place attribute. Thus the
concept of logical space also serves to fix the categorial differences within
the domain of non-facts.
If we sum up the logical form of all atomic individuals and attributes,
we arrive at the 'form of substance'. If we know this, then we also know
how many individuals and how many attributes of one or more places
there are in the world. The substance of the world thus outlines the scope
of what is possibly the case; it forms a kind of 'internal structure of the
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 405
world'. The external structure is different from this; it is first given with
that which in fact is the case. In order to know the external structure, we
must also know, for each atomic state of affairs appearing in the sequence
(S), whether it or its complementary state of affairs exists.
This then is a sketch of the basic ideas in the ontological portion of T.
We have had to omit consideration of various complications and special
cases that arise primarily in relation to the 'form of the substance'. Our
description has gone forward on the presupposition that the sequence
(S) of atomic states of affairs and the 'substance of the world' are fixed
once and for all. This presupposition, however, does not appear to be
cogent: just as a perceptual field can be broken down in various ways
into 'individual facts' and these again into 'individuals' and 'attributes',
so too the world as a fact could conceivably be analyzed in various ways
into individual facts and ultimate elements. Indeed, radical changes in the
scientific picture of the world may perhaps best be interpreted as just such
transformations in organization. A conception of this sort would result
in a relativization of all the fundamental concepts in Wittgenstein's on-
tology. Atomic states of affairs, things, logical space, the substance of the
world - all these are what they are only relative to a certain kind ofanalysis
of the world as a fact. What did Wittgenstein himself think about all this?
Most of the sentences of T speak for an 'absolute' interpretation; yet
there are some passages in T that are compatible with taking the basic
concepts in a relative sense. In his Philosophical Investigations, at any rate,
Wittgenstein rejected the tendency, clearly dominant in T, to give these
concepts an absolute sense. He also rejected the consequences that follow
from this absolute interpretation for the idea of a logically correct analy-
sis of sentences and a logically ideal language (see PI, 46-64: these para-
graphs, however, contain numerous other reflections typical of PI and
inseparably interwoven with a critique of the basic notions of T).
istic' sense. And when philosophical readers encounter the word, they
inevitably think of the various forms of 'naive' or 'critical' realism that
develop a picture theory of knowledge according to which our thinking
coincides with reality wholly or partly in so far as it is true. We must,
however, free ourselves from all these notions. 4
In the first place, Wittgenstein is not thinking of naturalistic pictures,
but of a complex abstract relation that corresponds more to what the
mathematicians call a 'mapping' ('Abbi/dung'). As we shall see later, this
relation is such that prototype and picture must be of the same category.
In the second place, since 2.1 speaks of 'pictures of facts', it follows that
what Wittgenstein calls a 'picture' can never be a thing but must itself
belong to the category offacts.
In elucidating the concept of picture it is enough if we take as a basis
the relative sense of 'fact', 'atomic state of affairs', etc. Consider some
easily grasped complex fact analyzed into simple states of affairs. Let the
participating 'things 'be three persons, a, b, and c; the relation of father-
of, F; and the property of being musically gifted, M. (This is a somewhat
simplified example as compared to the one used by Stenius.) Let the
complex fact be composed of three individual facts: a is the father of
b, a is also the father of c, and b is musically gifted. The 'external structure'
of this complex is thereby determined. On the other hand, the internal
structure of the fact is already given when we specify the number and
category of the participating elements: three individuals, one one-place
attribute, and one two-place attribute. Now what is required to represent
this complex fact by means of a 'picture', e.g., by a diagram? A minimal
requirement is that the desired picture must possess the same internal
structure as the fact that is to be mapped. The first step therefore is to
make sure that elements of the same number and category are available:
three individuals, one two-place relation, and one property.
Suppose for the moment that we can select as elements of the picture
the three letters 'a', 'b', and 'c' to represent the three persons, an arrow
to represent the relation of father-of and a circle to represent the property
of being musically gifted. (The circle is to enclose the letter designating
the musically gifted person.) The equality of the internal structure as
between prototype and picture is a conditio sine qua non for obtaining any
'picture' at all of a fact; this equality makes possible a one-one corre-
spondence between the two domains. It does not, however, determine the
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 407
two attributes. Only now does our diagram become an isomorphic picture
of the prototype fact. Thus this diagram is not a figure consisting of 5
individual objects - three letters, an arrow, and a circle - but is itself a
fact consisting of the three letters as the sole individual objects and the
two attributes just cited. Only because the diagram itself constitutes a fact
can it be used by us as a picture of the prototype fact.
Suppose we call our illustrative fact G and our diagram D. Now it is
not the case that we are 'given' both G and D, and can then ascertain the
isomorphy between these two complex facts by inspection. Rather, G
itself is not given at all and we experience something about it by way of
what alone is given, the diagram D and the interpretation rule connected
with it and known to us for the three individuals and two attributes in D.
It is this that distinguishes the purely mathematical concept of a mapping
- under which D and G are completely equivalent so that we can arbi-
trarily designate D as the picture of G or G as the picture of D - from the
philosophical concept which Wittgenstein utilizes in his theory of sentence
meaning.
It should be clear from these considerations why Wittgenstein starting
from the statement "We picture facts to ourselves" comes to the necessary
conclusion: "A picture is a fact" (2.141). Wittgenstein calls a complex
fact a 'picture' if it stands in such a relation to another fact that condition
(1) above is fulfilled, without condition (2) having also to be fulfilled. In
order for something to be a picture of something else, there must then be
equality of internal structure or categorial equality between picture and
prototype; but there need not be an isomorphy between them. If, how-
ever, there is an isomorphism, so that condition (2) is also fulfilled, then
Wittgenstein speaks of a 'true picture', otherwise of a 'false picture'. In
this connection, the interpretation rule, which Wittgenstein calls a 'repre-
senting relation' ('abbildende Beziehung'), is conceived of as a component
of the picture (2.1513). The equality of internal or categorial structure
between picture and prototype Wittgenstein calls, somewhat unfortunate-
ly, the "form of the representation" (2.17). The important epistemological
function of the picture consists in the fact that it depicts the objects of the
prototype as being combined with one another in the same way as is
shown by the prototype's own external structure.
Naturally this does not guarantee that this kind of combination actually
exists in the prototype, even if we know that condition (1) is fulfilled and
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 409
the picture possesses the same categorial structure as the prototype: "It
is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false"
(2.224). This statement contains in nuce Wittgenstein's rejection of the
doctrine of the synthetic a priori. The mistake made by this doctrine is
that it concludes fallaciously from the equality of the internal structure
of picture and prototype to the equality of their external structure. Such
an inference is impermissible. Hence, "There are no pictures that are true
a priori" (2.225). Underlying this criticism is the idea (voiced especially
clearly in 3.001) that all thinking is aimed at isomorphic mapping or
representation.
We add two supplementary comments on Wittgenstein's concept of
picture. First, it was said above that the expression 'picture' is not to be
taken in a naturalistic sense. We can now explain this further. Our ex-
ample would be changed, at least in part, into a naturalistic picture if the
three persons in the 'picture' D were represented not by three letters but
by three photographs. In general, we call a picture naturalistic in the
sense defined earlier if we assume that the elements - individuals and
attributes - of the prototype are in content of the same nature as, or of
a nature similar to, the corresponding elements of the picture. But
Wittgenstein presupposes instead only a one-one correspondence between
equal categorial elements, which as far as content is concerned need not
resemble one another in the least. It is in this sense that his concept of
picture is 'abstract'.
Second, what one might most easily take exception to in the onto-
logical portion of his philosophy is the fact that he speaks about "possible
states of affairs". Does this not imply a hyper-realistic theory in which
unrealized possibilities are incorporated into a Platonic heaven? The
answer to this question is contained in the concept of picture. A true
picture depicts a fact, a false picture depicts not a fact but a possible state
of affairs (something that could be a fact). That a possible state of affairs
is involved is shown by the external structure of the picture. Hence the
concept of the mere possibility of a state of affairs has nothing mysterious
about it: one may say that the mode of being of a merely possible state of
affairs consists in the possibility of its being depicted by a picture.
It would be equally unfair, moreover, to accuse the author of T of
interpreting properties and relations platonistically because he treats them
as 'things'. His formulations would seem without loss of consistency to
410 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
the signs',' and ' 1\ ' and there is nothing corresponding to them in the
picture D that is isomorphic to G. For instance, nothing in reality corre-
sponds to negation. Its function is better explained as follows: the simple
sentence 'Ma' is a picture in the earlier sense, namely, a picture of the
possible state of affairs that a is musically gifted. But this state of affairs
is not an existing one; hence the sentence is a false picture. The negation
sign, which stands before 'Ma' in the compound sentence, calls attention
to the fact that what is involved here is a false picture.
Thus a compound sentence may be regarded only in an indirect sense
as a picture of the state of affairs it describes. The indirect sense consists
in the fact that a compound sentence may be transformed into a picture in
the strict sense of the term, and exact rules can be laid down for this
transformation. In our case, the point would be to transform the state-
ment 'aFb 1\ aFc 1\ ,bFc 1\'" 1\ ,Ma 1\ Mb 1\ ,Mc'into diagram D. This
requires four things: (1) In the desired picture the multiple occurrences
of 'a' and the other letters are to be replaced by single occurrences. (2)
Parts of the picture must correspond to the non-negated 1\ -members or
conjuncts (e.g., the fact that 'a' stands in the F-relation to Ob'); e.g., that
part of the diagram D in which 'a' is connected to ob' by the arrow-
relation corresponds to the sentence 'aFb'. (3) No parts of the picture
correspond to the negated 1\ -members; e.g., since the portion 'bFc' of the
sentence is furnished with a negation sign, in the picture Ob' may not be
connected with 'c' by the arrow-relation. (4) The sign' 1\' has no counter-
part of its own in the picture; the conjunction of the non-negated members
of our compound statement is given in the picture through D's being a
complex fact whose structure is determined by the circumstance that it
breaks down into those simple facts consisting of just the picture-
correlates of the non-negated members of the sentence. 5
The procedure sketched above may in principle be carried over to
statements that contain arbitrarily many logical constants, such as 'not',
'and' and the like. This result can only be indicated here, since its proof
requires a theorem from mathematical logic. It can be shown that any
such statement can be put into an equivalent 'disjunctive normal form'.
This means that it can be written as a sentence the components of which
are connected by 'or', and each component has the form of the compound
sentence cited just above (i.e., each 'or'-component consists of a conjunc-
tion of negated or non-negated elementary sentences). Since to each of
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 417
picture, on the basis of its external structure, depict the prototype. Why
then can a sentence not showi what it describes, that is, what it shows.?
The answer is that every description already presupposes that the compo-
nents of the described state of affairs possess the same categorial or
internal structure as the sentence that undertakes the description. Thus
a sentence can never showi what it says.
It now becomes clear why it is so difficult to understand and explain
the categorial differentiation into 'things' and 'facts' which constitutes
the point of departure for Wittgenstein's philosophy. This difference
touches the internal structure of reality and therefore cannot be said at all,
but only shown (in the sense of shown;). One must learn to 'see' this
difference, and one can do so because language exhibits it although
unable to express it as a descriptive content of sentences. And so it is
with respect to all ontological statements, that is, all statements about the
form or internal structure of reality. All of them without exception are
meaningless, since they purport to say something that cannot be said, only
shown. Although the author of T seems to share with positivistic writers
- e.g., those of the Vienna Circle - the thesis of the meaninglessness of
metaphysics, there is nonetheless a vast difference both in the motivation
and in the character of the thesis. In logical positivism the thesis is a
consequence of an empiricist criterion of meaning, and is therefore a
relative thesis. Depending on whether this criterion is stated more narrow-
ly or more broadly, certain statements turn out to be meaningless or
meaningful. And as we have seen in Chapter VIII, the original version of
the criterion has had to to be increasingly modified in order to obtain
harmony between what is meaningful according to scientific practice and
what is meaningful in conformity with this criterion. The analogous thesis
of Wittgenstein's, however, is an absolute thesis. It does not rest on any
empiricist criterion of meaning and hence there is no alternative to it and
no weakened form of it. It rests on the difference between what a picture
depicts on the basis of its internal structure and what feature common
to picture and prototype must already be present in order for the picture
to be able to function as a picture.
For Wittgenstein, as for Kant, the goal of transcendental philosophy
is to exhibit the limits of meaningful theorizing, or the 'limits of theoretical
reason'. But the limits are marked out differently. In Kant's view, not
everything that is logically possible is theoretically possible. Only that is
420 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
was fully aware of all this and drew the necessary conclusion that all of his
sentences in T are meaningless. He arrived at this result not through the
subsequent application to his sentences of a positivistic criterion of
meaning, but by way of the version of the Kantian transcendental philoso-
phy just described.
The meaninglessness of philosophical sentences does not signify that they
are worthless. If philosophy is conceived of not as a kind of science
whose aim is to prove propositions with true descriptive content, but
as an activity, then meaningless sentences may have an important
elucidatory function. And it is such a function that Wittgenstein at the end
ascribes to the sentences of T: "My sentences serve as elucidations in the
following way: Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them
as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond
them. (He must, so to speak, throwaway the ladder after he has climbed
up it.) He must transcend these sentences, then he will see the world
aright" (6.54). But for philosophy as theory or doctrine there is no place.
Transcendentallingualism ends in a self-transcendence of all philosophical
theory, itself included: With respect to philosophical questions, we are
condemned to silence. It is to this final consequence that the concluding
sentence in T refers, a sentence which seemingly expresses a triviality but,
according to what Wittgenstein himself says in the foreword, contains the
quintessence of his whole philosophy: "Whereof one cannot speak,
thereof must one be silent" (7).
No meaningful statements can be made about the mysteries of life
and of reality. They do not even constitute a subject for meaningful
questioning. Even if all meaningful questions were answered, our life
problems would still remain untouched (6.52). Wittgenstein's remarks
about the mystical do indeed show that his philosophy could have taken
a turn that it did not take: it would have been understandable if he had
subordinated "philosophizing as an activity" to the achieving of a
mystical vision or at least to some non-theoretical end, as in the case of
Jaspers' 'existence-illumination'. Although the 'unsayable' is constantly
present from the first sentence of T, yet Wittgenstein had no inclination
to employ philosophy as a means of attaining irrational experiences. The
practical lesson he drew from the philosophical outlook of T was to
cease interesting himself in philosophical questions and to turn to a
non-philosophical life.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 423
and atomism contained in T. The absolutism resides in the thesis that the
world as a fact is analyzable into simpler facts in one and only one way;
the atomism consists in the assertion that this analysis leads to the
simplest facts (the atomic or elementary facts) in the constitution of which
there participate atomic things, i.e., individuals and attributes that are not
further analyzable. Both of these doctrines are now abandoned (see, in
particular, PI, 46ff.). There is not just one way of analyzing something
complex or composite (Zusammengesetztes), be it a thing or a state of
affairs, into something simpler. And this for the fundamental reason that
the expressions 'simple' and 'composite' themselves do not possess any
absolute or context-invariant meaning. What we mean by these expres-
sions depends on the context in which they are employed, and which
determines what kind of compositeness is intended. Even in the seemingly
unequivocal limiting case of a chess board, we are not confined to the
statement that it is composed of 32 white and 32 black squares which
constitute its simple elements; a different way of looking at the matter
would yield a breakdown into three elements - the color white, the color
black, and the schema of the network of squares. We shall surely not go
wrong if we assert that Wittgenstein in his late phase recognized as a
metaphysical fiction and abandoned the notion of states of affairs existing
independent of language. The world is not 'in itself' organized in such
and such a way, and then in its organization described truly or falsely
by language; on the contrary, the possibilities of its organization first arise
through linguistic articulation. As many ways as there are of describing the
world, just so many ways are there of analyzing it into individual states of
affairs.
The emphasis on the context-dependency of the concepts of analysis,
of complex, and of simple, not only leads to replacing absolutism with
a relativistic conception; in addition, it entails the giving up of atomism.
For then there is simply no sense in continuing to speak of something
'absolutely simple'. To a philosophical question such as whether one or
another thing (e.g., a certain visual field) is simple or composite, we can
respond only with the utterance 'That depends on what you mean by
"composite".' And this linguistic response does not answer the question;
it refers it back to the questioner. But if there is no unambiguous analysis
of states of affairs leading to atomic elements, then there is also no
definitive analysis of propositions into elementary sentences.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 427
Now Wittgenstein does not deny that under certain circumstances and in
particular contexts deliberations that we might call 'analysis' have an
important function: philosophical misunderstandings having to do with
the use of words can at times be cleared away by substituting certain
forms of expression for others. Because the process is similar to that of
taking something apart, this sort of thing can be called 'analysis'. Many
of the remarks in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which contain methods
of therapy for philosophical disorders, are in this special sense 'analyses'.
But they are not analyses in the sense that they claim to have discovered
the true sense of forms of expression hitherto ignored by other philo-
sophical currents. Controversy of this sort neither can nor may go on in a
sensible philosophy. One of the concerns of Wittgenstein's later philo-
sophy is to make us aware of why this is so.
conception, words are 'arbitrary signs' and occur joined to mental acts
only on the basis of a convention itself always subject to change. It
should therefore be possible, say, for us to resolve to attach to the
sequence of letters 'a b cd e' exactly the same sense that we otherwise
associate with the words 'It will probably rain tomorrow'. But when I
try to do something like this, I fail. Nor am I able to interchange that
which is meant by familiar words; e.g., I cannot say 'It is very warm
here' and mean thereby 'It is very cold here'. Or, suppose I say 'Mr. Scot
is not a Scot.' I mean the first occurrence of'Scot' as a proper name and the
second as a common name. If meaning is a mental activity, then I must
also be able to mean the first 'Scot' as a common name and the second as
a proper name. But when I try to do this, says Wittgenstein, "I blink
with the effort" (PI, p. 176). That all these attempts, which could easily
be carried out were the criticized theory correct, do in fact fail is a clear
indication that the theory is based on a fundamental error.
A more basic consideration still is that, according to this theory, acts
of meaning not only can be associated with any other arbitrary words as
symbols but also must be performable in complete independence oflanguage.
For instance, I must be able to mean the sense of the sentence 'It is to be
hoped that the sun will shine for the celebration to be held day after
tomorrow', without saying anything at all (not even in internal speech to
myself). Here the very description of the imaginary experiment takes on
an air of absurdity.
Another, perhaps less persuasive, argument is that the conception in
question collides with the correct use of the word 'mean', as is shown by
considering simple question-and-answer games. For example, if some one
makes an assertion A and another person asks him what was going on
in him while he uttered A, the correct answer is not 'I was meaning ... ',
although if the conception under criticism were correct this would have
had to be the right answer.
Furthermore, difficulties also arise when we ask about the point in time
when these mental acts take place or about their exact content. For
instance, if I say 'Heinz has just called me', when do I mean by 'Heinz'
the man Heinz MUller? Only at the moment when I pronounce this word,
or during the entire time it takes me to utter this sentence? And if the
latter is the case, how do the acts of meaning become superimposed one
upon the other; for now I must mean various things simultaneously, that
432 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
is, I must also mean the meanings of the other words that occur in the
sentence, such as 'just', 'me', etc.? As to the content of the act, it appears
in the case of a proper name, e.g., to consist of a mental image. But
regardless of how accurate a mental image of Heinz MUller may be, it
also fits numerous other men that look like him. How then can I mean
him and him alone with this image?
Wittgenstein concludes that nothing would be more preposterous than to
call meaning a mental activity. To do so, he suggests, is like speaking
about the activity of butter when it increases in price. This rather queer
way of speaking is harmless enough so long as no problems are bound
up with it (and none are likely to be in this particular case). But when
we come to meaning, a similar way of speaking does lead to problems and
to attendant philosophical confusion.
Thus the view that meaning is a mental activity, which appears plausible
at first, is on closer inspection quite untenable and in fact leads to absurdi-
ties. It must be replaced by the idea, in brief, that we operate with linguistic
expressions, that we 'calculate' with them. And it is also a part of this
calculating that we translate these expressions sometimes into one picture
and sometimes into another. But that we always connect quite definite
mental images or acts of meaning with the expressions is an unnecessary
assumption. Whoever embraces such an idea and tries to hold on to it
in practice behaves as foolishly as the man who has received a written
order for a cow and who believes that so long as he has the paper in his
possession he must continue to imagine the cow, since otherwise the order
might lose its meaning and its validity. (The examples cited and the argu-
ments can be found, for the most part, in PI, 449, 508-10, 661, 675, 691-
693; PI n, p. 176.)
word belonging to our everyday language and like other words has more
than just one use. But for a large class of cases the meaning of a word can
be identified with its use in the language (PI, 43) and the sense of a sentence
with its employment (PI, 20, 421). This is not a thesis to be substantiated
merely by giving a simple answer to the question 'Why, according to
Wittgenstein, is tillS so?'. On the contrary, its substantiation involves
nothing less than his entire later philosophy. Hence we can gain an under-
standing of his reasons for the thesis only gradually and to the measure
that we penetrate his new philosophy.
Thus far we have obtained only the first beginnings of such an under-
standing - negatively through criticism of the traditional theory of the
meaning of the word, a criticism that sought to make clear what meanings
are not; positively through some remarks about sentence radicals and
their employment. In the present section, we shall continue the process
by giving an account of the new picture of language that Wittgenstein
reached in PI. We shall try in the sections that follow to achieve a deeper
understanding by considering Wittgenstein's ideas about the essence of
a thing and about the mental acts accompanying speech.
We begin by surveying Wittgenstein's most important reasons for re-
peatedly and emphatically urging us to attend to the use of expressions.
We shall not have attained full clarity as to the significance ofthis appeal
until we reach the end of his discussion.
First, we must mention again the negative fact that the alternatives
proposed by other theories of meaning do not stand up under criticism.
As was shown by the criticism of the theory of meaning in T, the meaning
of a proper name is not its designatum. We shall see later that the meaning
of an expression is also not a mental content generated by 'meaning-
endowing' psychical acts; a fortiori, it is not some supposed ideal essence,
which is apprehended by means of such acts. If all these alternatives have
failed, it seems plausible to make an about face and, instead of letting
ourselves be guided by these theories of meaning, to study the actual use
of expressions. Should it turn out that we learn all we would want to know
in the course of this study, then why ask about anything other than use?
As a matter of fact, use provides all that those sense-enlivening acts are
supposed to furnish: "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?
In use it is alive" (PI, 432). The natural question to which Wittgenstein
immediately addresses himself is then the following: 'Is life breathed into
436 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
it there, or is the use its life?' The first alternative is ruled out by the
criticism just indicated: The-life-breathed-into-it, which the sign has 'in
itself', is Wittgenstein's way of referring to those conceptions according
to which a sign is 'brought to life' by special mental acts of meaning and
understanding. In his view, the assumption that such acts exist springs
from a mythological picture of language; acts of this sort are nothing
more than linguistic fictions (see below, Section BA). Thus only the other
alternative remains, that it is the use itself that gives the sign 'life'.
Second, this conclusion is supported by means of an analogy. The
analogy is with non-linguistic signs - not those which (like black clouds
portending a storm) are natural indications of something, but those which
become signs only as a result ofa convention, such as an arrow or sign-post
that points in a certain direction (PI, 454). Here too we may speak of the
meaning of a sign; but it is easier than in the case of linguistic expressions
to recognize that this meaning is not some mental content - not a mys-
terious something that is connected to the sign, that sets up a magical
relation between the sign and the object to which it points and that we
must draw on to explain, if asked, how it comes about that the arrow >-+
'points to the right'. Certainly we can say that if we are to understand the
meaning of the arrow, then something 'psychical' or 'mental' must play
a role in the sense that there must be a creature capable of learning who
has been taught how to deal with the arrow. The imparting of the meaning
consists in training or drill - to look to the right if one sees the figure of
an arrow, or to guide one's steps in the direction of the arrow's head,
and the like. This training could have been different, in fact quite the
opposite, so that people would turn left when they saw such an arrow.
For us, the arrow has the one meaning and not the other, or any others,
because we have learned to respond to the perception of the particular
figure with certain actions. The kind of reaction was fixed by convention.
Learning the meaning of the arrow can therefore be identified with learn-
ing certain rules for dealing with things of a given kind. If we have learned
the rules, then we understand the meaning of the figure. We can put this
as follows: The meaning of the arrow consists in its use.
Third, further support for Wittgenstein's view is provided when we
replace 'what-is'-questions by questions of a quite different sort. Here we
have to anticipate part of Wittgenstein's criticism of essentialism. Ac-
cording to this criticism, one of the roots from which philosophical errors
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 437
time is, is not yet settled. And as for what one tells the time for - that
doesn't come in here" (PI, 363).
As the fourth and final point we cite something special. It does not
involve anything basically new, only an important application of some-
thing already said. Moreover, it cannot be adduced as a foundation for
Wittgenstein's position, since the foundation in that case would be circu-
lar. But for an understanding of Wittgenstein it is crucial. In the pre-
ceding point, we explained the ban on questions of the form 'What is
time?', or, which comes to the same thing, 'What is the meaning of
"time"?'. Now let us consider those philosophical activities that are them-
selves concerned with meaning. Is not the expression 'meaning', at least,
unambiguous - somewhat vague to begin with, perhaps, but still sus-
ceptible of being made more precise? Are we not thus justified at any rate
in posing the question 'What is the meaning of "meaning"?'? We see at
once that Wittgenstein's response cannot be different here from that in
other cases. For if we were to answer the question of the essence of
meaning positively, then questions about the meaning of specific ex-
pressions would also be justified and philosophically answerable. For
them to be unanswerable implies that the question about the meaning of
'meaning' is unanswerable. Hence this latter question too, like other
questions about essences, must be transformed into one or more questions
of another sort. This Wittgenstein also saw clearly. The context of prime
importance here is the phrase "explaining the meaning of an expression"
(PI, 560). 'Meaning' itself is a word from ordinary language, and we can
become clear about it only when we see how it is used. To that end, we
must observe how what we call 'explaining a meaning' proceeds. When
we do so, we establish that learning the meaning of an expression consists
in the learner being trained to employ the expression correctly (that is, in
the desired manner). Teaching the meaning of an expression is always
teaching the use of something.
The matters just considered thus also serve to bring home the identifi-
cation of meaning with use. But we must add at once a qualification (as is
almost always the case if we want to make general assertions about
Wittgenstein's later philosophy). Often Wittgenstein finds it not appropri-
ate simply to identify the two with one another. Rather, the thrust of his
summons is that we stop thinking about meaning and instead ask about
use. A hint to this effect appears in PI as early as toward the conclusion
440 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
this deep level too "we still in some way have to do with language".
Hereafter we shall put quotation marks around these expressions of
Wittgenstein wherever there is any danger of a misunderstanding.
We had a first look at depth grammar in Sub-section B.2.b above.
There we encountered for the first time differences in the employment of
linguistic expressions - in that case, differences in the ways sentences are
employed. These were the different moods in which sentences occur. One
and the same sentence radical can be involved in various moods or speech
acts and thus have different modal employments. The modal differences,
of course, are reflected partially in ordinary grammar, so that at this
point at least 'surface grammar' and 'depth grammar' are in contact.
But even here a divergence is in part revealed, which shows in what sense
surface grammar can be misleading: there are many more modal differences
than those shown by ordinary grammar. In this regard, we must also
correct retroactively the comments in Sub-section B.2.b. While ordinary
grammar leads us to draw only some rough distinctions, such as those
among declarative sentences, questions and imperatives, from the philo-
sophical standpoint we need to make much finer differentiations. Now
we have reached the point where Wittgenstein puts up a danger sign:
don't let the 'surface grammar' deceive you into accepting an over-
simplified picture of language.
In PI, 24, Wittgenstein points out how extremely diverse are the things
we call 'descriptions'. We describe a picture; we describe the course of an
athletic contest; we describe the location of a body by giving the coordi-
nates of its position; we describe what a person at a particular moment
experiences haptically (or acoustically or visually); we describe a frame of
mind. The same holds for what we call questions. A question can be a
request for confirmation of one's own memory (,What was the name of
the man who ... ?'); it can take the form of a problem posed for the
intellectually curious; it can be an expression of sympathy ('Are you
feeling better?'); in many contexts it may even contain a reproach ('How
can you think that of him?').
In Sub-section B.2.b we pointed out in what respect Wittgenstein's
picture of language was different, and we cited three categories of lan-
guage games. The remarks we have just made show that this was still a
very rough classification and that Wittgenstein's new picture of language
is significantly more differentiated and complex. In fact, it may be said
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 443
with which the other person (the hearer or speech partner) responds or
will respond, the dependence of word use and sentence employment on
the concrete dialogue-situation; (4) the extra-linguistic actions of the other
person; (5) the 'perceptible' circumstances of the present or of an earlier
situation.
The 'mastery ofa language' is thus an extremely far-reaching competence,
made up of many capabilities and skills and often resting on a very
complicated interrelationship between linguistic and extra-linguistic
social actions. This is why Wittgenstein says that speaking a language is
part of aform of life (PI, 19,23). In order to make clear on the one hand
how complicated and difficult it can be to fathom even relatively simple
language games and to show on the other how the rules governing such
games are conventional rules, Wittgenstein furnishes one example after
another of imaginary primitive language games or entirely different
conceivable forms of life. These latter especially often produce a vivid
background for an insight into the fact that how men actually do speak and
think is relative (see the example toward the end of Section B.5). Thus,
when Wittgenstein observes that if animals spoke we could not understand
them (see his comment about the lion, PI, p. 223), he uses another picture
intended to bring to our consciousness, as in a flash, how intimately the
whole 'field of social activity' as form of life is interwoven with language
acquisition. His picture tacitly assumes two things: first, that the animals
have correctly mastered our language in conformity with the 'surface
grammar' (that the lion, e.g., speaks perfect English); second, that the
animals do not otherwise behave like human beings (that the lion does
not become a man 'in lion's form', but outside of his linguistic utterances
acts like a lion). We would then not be able to bring the behavior of
the animals into harmony with their words and hence could also not
understand their words. It would be of no use to us to discover that
speech in lions is accompanied by the same psychical processes as in our
own case.
We shall now indicate briefly, almost in caption form, some additional
differences between a language game and the game of chess:
(A) The rules of a game like chess are codified or at least codifiable at
any time; the rules of a language game (in contrast to those for a calculus)
are not codified. The question of how we can track down the rules of the
'depth grammar' is thus something we shall still have to go into.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 447
in a language game' are not invariant with respect to history. The 'rules for
the use of a word' must therefore have been so formulated that among
other things the preceding dialogue is taken into account. Remarkably
enough, as we shall see, what happens is that even the future finds entry
into the present meaning of a word.
(F) Finally we must take note of the 'dynamic' aspect. Unlike the
rules for chess, the rules for correct language use are not rigid, but are
always in flux. New language games arise, old ones die away or change
their character (see the analogy with the city in PI, 18, an analogy
which can easily be 'dynamicized' into one with a city that is changing).
These differences, to which others may be added, should make clear
that the game analogy must not be stretched too far. At the same time,
they show that in the case of language the situation is for the most part
more complicated than in the case of an artificial game. Hence we cannot
expect a priori that we shall be able to grasp and formulate in abstraction
the 'rules for the use' (i.e., the rules of the 'depth grammar'). Instead,
what we can and should do is to imagine for ourselves pragmatic situations
within the various language games. By making clear to ourselves how a
particular expression or a particular phrase is to be used in a situation
(or in what kind of situation its employment is permissible), we obtain
at least a partial look into the 'rules for its use' and thus into its meaning.
This method of gaining successive insights into meanings, synonymies
and differences of meaning is tedious and laborious. In addition, as we
follow the method we must suppress an inner disinclination to adhere to
it. For we think at the outset that the process must actually be much
simpler, that by sharply concentrating our attention we can focus it on the
meaning of an expression. The meaning would then stand revealed to
us all at once. But it matters little what the various associations are that
are awakened in our imagination when we repeat a word over and over
to ourselves; the point is how does the word function: "One cannot
guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from
that" (PI, 349). And Wittgenstein adds: "But the difficulty is to remove
the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid
prejudice."
It may be helpful to clarify these considerations with a concrete
example, which we take not from Wittgenstein's philosophy but from
analytic philosophy. The example is also intended to exhibit the impor-
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 449
deavored to clarify the question of how our language is "related to the real
world". If Wittgenstein could have addressed himself to these objections,
he would no doubt have found them a good occasion for the sort of
sarcastic reply that he sometimes made to the objections he invented to
his own lines of reasoning. For it can be seen from the way these ob-
jections are formulated that those who make them are captives of the
very same philosophical modes of thought that Wittgenstein seeks to
overcome through his reflections on language. First, a picture is formed
of the 'real world' or of 'reality'; next, a second picture, "here is the
language and there is the real world"; and to the latter the question is
then appended, 'What is the relationship between the two?'. Wittgenstein
would say: Don't make yourself metaphysical pictures of the 'real world'
and of its 'relationship' to language! Look at how language functions and
how in particular the expressions 'real' and 'reality' are used! For these
expressions are only words, and the Wittgenstein program is to be ap-
plied to them as to all other words. Here as before, the point is to "bring
the words back again from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI,
116). A painstaking comparison of the contexts in which these expressions
are used can turn up some surprises for the opponents of this view and
teach them one thing above all- how inapt it is to propose philosophical
objections in the form of metaphorical phrases.
It is not necessarily a criticism of Wittgenstein to say that it would be
desirable for future research if the philosophical study of ordinary lan-
guage, advocated by him, were conducted more systematically. According
to Wittgenstein, we do not comprehend the 'depth grammar' of our ex-
pressions. The task of recognizing this 'depth grammar' ought not be left
to the private inspiration of some philosopher; systematic methods should
be developed for that purpose. English and American philosophers of the
younger generation are convinced that this is possible. It would be grati-
fying if this supposition were borne out. Otherwise, anyone who is not
gifted with Wittgenstein's linguistic inspiration would from the outset be
fighting a losing battle.
We have not traced Wittgenstein's concept of language game in all
possible directions, nor exhaustively in anyone direction. There is one
gap especially left open, as is suggested by the following possible ob-
jection. No matter how far the investigations of speech activities and the
rules that govern them are carried, nor how differentiated the consider-
452 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
In T(6.5), Wittgenstein said: "The riddle does not exist." But according
to PI, all philosophizing begins with riddles. Wittgenstein's method does
not consist in denying the existence of puzzles and exposing them simply
as pseudo-problems. Quite the contrary! Pitcher (op. cif., p.118) compares
Wittgenstein's procedure to that of Socrates, who used to open his philo-
sophical deliberations by creating perplexity and conceptual confusion
in his dialogue partner (see PI, 123). In his note on Wittgenstein's lec-
tures for 1934-37, John Wisdom (Mind, 61, 1952,259) emphasizes that
Wittgenstein's continuing concern was to make his audience sharply
conscious of the riddle, and that he was dissatisfied if it seemed to him
that he had not succeeded.
Participants in Wittgenstein's sessions nearly always had the feeling at
first that they were in the presence of a totally destructive mind. Many of
them probably never lost that impression. Wittgenstein was aware ofthis,
and, as Norman Malcolm reports, was often shocked to find that he
exerted so purely disintegrative an influence on students. This effect of
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 453
his teaching was presumably not due to just one reason. No doubt the
way he lectured was responsible in some part. He never treated a topic
systematically. He would enter the classroom without any notes and begin
to 'think out loud' on one question or another. Remarks and objections
by his audience formed a crucial element in the conduct of his lectures.
And although supporters and opponents were always extremely impressed
by the enormous concentration of his exposition as well as by the fact
that he always appeared to have thought the problem through in all its
dimensions - as his quick-witted and convincing replies to all kinds of
questions and challenges proved - yet with this style of lecture it is not
surprising that there should have been at the conclusion the widespread
impression of 'being left with nothing positive'.
In larger measure the feeling about him was probably evoked by the
at once extremely difficult and extremely radical conceptions that he
presented. Anyone who breaks with fond and familiar notions - especially
those buried as deep, say, as certain firmly rooted views about conscious-
ness and mind, about essence and meaning, or about mathematical truth
- will almost inevitably be branded a destructive mind. Further, the
listener was obliged first to extricate Wittgenstein's conceptions from their
dialogue context. Even today, when all the works are available in printed
form, it is still a laborious matter to discover 'just what he is actually
getting at', or indeed whether we can extract unambiguously any philo-
sophical views at all from his later works.
But the really decisive element in creating the impression of a de-
structive mind was very likely his 'Socratic method' aimed at bringing to
light the innumerable difficulties that lie hidden behind even the most
banal and ordinary ideas. Also the way he applied the method reflected
his radical and basic approach. His concern was not merely to 'exhibit
problems' or 'point out open questions' in the manner, say, of the aporetic
method, but to push ideas ruthlessly even to their most absurd conse-
quences: "My aim is to teach you to pass from disguised nonsense to
something that is patent nonsense" (PI, 464).
As a matter of fact, there is scarcely a philosophical problem that does
not admit of being sharpened to a kind of paradox. Whether we address
ourselves to the problem of insight or self-evidence, of the knowledge of
reality or the truth of statements, to the question of the validity of logical
and mathematical sentences, to the problem of universals, the question
454 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
of free will and determinism, the problem of natural laws and the in-
ductive confirmation of statements, the difficulties to which we are led by
the concept of perception or the concept of time - in all cases we are
immediately entangled in a network of unfathomable difficulties and anti-
nomies. This is naturally not the place to bring up all these complexes
of questions. Nor is the view that philosophical problems have this
character of paradox characteristic of Wittgenstein's philosophy alone.
From Zeno to Augustine to Kant to Nelson Goodman, keen minds have
expounded philosophical problems in the form of paradoxes and anti-
nomies. What distinguishes Wittgenstein's philosophy from others is the
way he reacts to these paradoxes. The usual philosophical reactions, ac-
cording to Wittgenstein, are intellectual blind alleys, and the point is to
find a way out of them. What are these 'usual reactions'?
They may be divided into three types. The first can be characterized
by the words 'abiding in a state of confusion'. Thinkers who react in this
way remain forever occupied with the problems that stir them without
their having found a way to solve them. These thinkers include some of
the most honest minds, but also some whose concern with the problems,
while entirely serious, has turned into a sophistic game of spinning out
questions and devising paradoxes.
The second type of reaction is found among the theorists and systematic
thinkers, the philosophers who claim to have discovered solutions to the
problems. Philosophers in this group outline theories and seek to establish
them - the theory of self-evidence or the transcendental idealist theory
of knowledge, the Platonistic theory of the medieval realists (or of some
modern logicians), the phenomenalistic theory of objects of perception,
the materialistic and spiritualistic theories of reality, the varied forms of
determinism denying the freedom of the will, and the like. These philoso-
phers nearly always arrive at conceptions that contradict ordinary com-
mon sense and that are incompatible with what the philosophers actually
believe in their own practical lives. We would probably not be mistaken
if we assumed that Wittgenstein regarded these ways of 'overcoming'
problems as the worst of all philosophical evils. For the results can only
be pseudo-solutions; yet, according to him, pseudo-solutions can lead to
subjective satisfaction as well as genuine ones can. Thus the danger arises
that the philosophical awareness of problems may itself be fully satisfied
and the theorists remain forever in a blind alley. This explains Wittgen-
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 455
another (PI,449). The pictures are not to blame; they may indeed be
quite fruitful, provided we are clear about their being pictures, as well as
about how to apply them and where their limits lie. Wittgenstein knew
from ample personal experience the kind of hypnotic compulsion that
pictures can exert on a philosopher's thinking. His picture theory of sentence
meaning in T presumably came as a sudden inspiration while he was
looking at a photograph. And in his later philosophy he is in constant
danger of being overpowered by pictures despite his clear awareness of
the danger. We have already noted, e.g., that he overdoes the analogy
between everyday language and its rules on the one hand, and chess and
its rules on the other. A complicated game like chess more closely re-
sembles a calculus than it does a natural language. The very fact that
Wittgenstein repeatedly mentions the rules of the language is enough in
itself to show that even in his later philosophy he worked with the model
of a formal language. Yet, as we have seen, he was in many respects clear
about the limits of this analogy as a picture of language.
For the most part, however, philosophers are not conscious of the
limits of their pictures. Frequently, they are not even aware that what
they are dealing with are not 'the things themselves' but only certain
pictures that may in crucial respects be false. If we single out any of the
well-known important philosophical terms such as 'knowledge', 'truth',
'world', 'reality', or 'time', inevitably certain images or pictures are called
up; and it is tempting, because easy, to believe that they supply us with
the meanings of these expressions or at least important indications of the
meanings. It is difficult to disengage ourselves from these pictures and to
absorb the idea that they may bar our path to the substance of the matter.
A clear example of mistaken orientation can be found in N. Hartmann's
'phenomena analysis' of knowledge (Chapter VI, Section A), where the
phenomenon of knowledge and the relationship between 'knowledge' and
'reality' is seen entirely in the light of spatial analogies which are then
erroneously taken to be the 'knowledge phenomenon'.
Because language has the capacity to produce false pictures in us,
philosophy is for Wittgenstein a struggle against the bewitchment of our
intelligence by means of language (PI, 109). We must say a few words
more about the concept of picture, which thus far we have employed
more or less uncritically. At times we have cited Wittgenstein's own
utterances about this concept - e.g., his remark that pictures have held
458 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
dictions, and occasions analogies that are faulty in that they lead to un-
tenable consequences. Here are some examples:
(A) The levelling out of differences. The auxiliary verb 'is' occurs in '2
times 2 is 4' and 'The rose is red'. The use of the same word in both cases
is sanctioned by the rules of grammar. We are thereby given the im-
pression that the auxiliary verb has the same function in both sentences.
That this is not so, that the meanings are different, is shown by the fact,
e.g., that in the first case 'is' may be replaced by the equality sign whereas
in the second it may not (PI, 558).
(B) The generating ofpseudo-problems and contradictions. Here we take
an example that we encountered before in Carnap. Many philosophers
speak of the Nothing (das Nichts) as if it were an entity of a certain kind.
Wittgenstein would have described the situation by saying that this word
'nothing', which occurs in ordinary language, has led the thinkers in
question to a picture of Nothing. By what has been said above, this does
not mean that they have to produce in their minds a mental image
(whether intuitively clear or not) of some entity they name 'Nothing'.
It is sufficient if they make statements about it as about other things,
attribute or deny properties to this entity, and the like. The pseudo-
problems that then arise look like this: Does Nothing exist or not? If it
does, what kind of object is it? What kind of properties does it have, or
'what does it do'? No matter how we answer these questions, an incon-
sistent theory will be the result. That we really are dealing here with a
picture called forth by the grammar of ordinary language is shown by the
fact that the expression 'nothing', according to this grammar, can occupy
the subject position in a sentence. Thus in
(1) Nothing is round and square,
'nothing' occupies the same position as the word 'Hans' in
(2) Hans is stupid and lazy.
This picture, however, is deceptive; 'nothing' is not a name. This is not
only demonstrated indirectly by the pseudo-problems and contradictions.
It can be exhibited directly as in (A) by citing operations that we can
perform with proper names but not with the expression 'nothing'. In (2),
e.g., the word 'Hans' can be repeated and jumped over the 'and' without
changing the import of the sentence:
460 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
(3) and (4). Of course I can believe or even know something because I
have received an 'authentic communication', but I cannot recognize
'simply on authority'; only I myself can recognize something. The third
difference between my recognizing something and my believing or knowing
has already been mentioned: the cases of 'recognizing' are limited further
by the fact that a surrounding total situation is necessary for the meaning-
ful application of this expression. Believing and knowing can extend to
the past and the future; but I can speak of recognizing only with reference
to the present, unless I use the word in some metaphysical sense rather
than in an everyday one.
We shall merely indicate two additional dimensions of question and
answer games, which are important in elucidating the meanings of the
three expressions. One of these dimensions is reached if my opponent
has recourse to the concept of reality and expresses doubt, say, that the
Y involved is real. Here again, instead of going into metaphysical specula-
tions about 'knowledge' and 'reality' and operating with a nebulous,
general concept of reality, we must examine more closely the contexts in
which the predicate 'real' is employed. In the present instance, this means
statements in which we seek to rule out certain possibilities, such as
errors, sensory and other illusions, or hallucinations. Depending on the
context, there are varied 'possible dangers'. Thus we want to make sure
that the oasis is real and not a lata morgana, that the bird is real and
not a stuffed one, that the man is real and not a wax puppet, and so on.
A question about the 'reality' of what we thought we recognized can be
raised only if there is a concrete and specific element of suspicion that
justifies the question.
The other dimension may be indicated by the caption 'Knowledge and
Certainty'. 'To know that' cannot be equated with 'to be certain that' in
either the first or the third person. On the other hand, it cannot be con-
cluded from my saying 'I know that S' that I know that S. The natural
assumption that such a conclusion can be drawn at least when I rightly
say 'I know that .. .' is likewise untenable. This sort of thing could be said
only of a Divinity. In the case of a human being there is always the
possibility that I might say 'I know that ... ' although I did not know that ...
- even when I said it 'rightly'. This last comment is intended merely to
suggest that presumably we form a false picture also of the language
games of 'saying something rightly'.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 467
for the difference between the empirical and the mathematical; for in the
mathematical domain we are able to introduce concepts in such a way
as to avoid this openness, while in the empirical domain we cannot.
The best way to explain the openness of concepts is to go back to
Wittgenstein's thesis that (for the most part) meaning consists in correct
use, and to consider that what (for the most part) we call 'concepts' are
meanings of expressions. Now in certain practical situations we can
sharpen the rules for use and thus eliminate ambiguities and narrow the
range of vagueness. There is, however, a limit. But the point is not that
just as there is a limit to the exactness of observation, so too there is one
to the 'exactness of definition' (which would not be anything new).
Rather, the openness of concepts rests on the fact that it is impossible
to fix rules for all conceivable sorts of situations. That is why even an
expression that de facto is sharply defined always has within it the
possibility of vagueness. This holds for the expressions employed in the
natural sciences, as well as for everyday words (PI, 80). No matter how
we may define an empirical concept, in our definitional demarcations we
constantly think only of normal cases and do not reckon with wholly
unexpected but logically possible cases. David Hume two centuries ago
considered what the consequences would be if the world in the future
were to run a different course from that of the past. He used this thought
in order to help understand the problem presented by inductive inference
and to reveal the impossibility of inferring the future from the past.
Wittgenstein employs the same notion to make clear that were the world
in the future to depart sufficiently from its past course, the result would
be the breakdown of our language and of our conceptual world. For instance,
when we think of words like 'house' and 'lion' as being equipped with
a sharply defined meaning, we presumably do not have in mind that a
thing that looks like a house might 'inexplicably' disappear and then re-
appear time after time (not only for me, but for everyone else, and even
when tested by instruments); or that an animal that looks like a lion and
at the outset behaves like one might suddenly expand to gigantic propor-
tions and then shrivel up, meanwhile transforming itself into an eagle,
seeming to die, being restored to life again, etc. Such 'absurd trains of
thought' teach us that the above-mentioned possibility of vagueness can-
not be eliminated and that every non-mathematical concept, though not
vague hitherto, can suddenly become vague. The resulting situation could
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 469
then be described only in the words' we would no longer know what we ought
to say about that'. Not only is the idea of perfect knowledge a meta-
physical illusion, but so is the notion of a perfect conceptual system.
As Wittgenstein's observations about the name 'Moses' shows (PI, 79),
peculiar situations such as the ones above may even be found, surprisingly
enough, in the case of expressions having a purely historical content.
It would be interesting to explore how far Wittgenstein himself falls
short in his attempt to free himself from the mistakes he criticizes. That
he tended to press the analogy between language and game too far has
already been noted. Nor is he altogether free from the 'essentialist in-
fection'. It is certainly not entirely wrong to say that in his description of
language games as well as in his critique of different conceptions,
Wittgenstein was dominated throughout by the conviction that he had
gained a deeper insight than other philosophers into the essence of
language.
A more serious criticism, which would at the same time be a criticism
of Wittgenstein's philosophical method, could be pressed by analytical
philosophy. We pointed out above that certain portions of his critique
of the philosophy of essence can also be construed as a criticism of ana-
lytical philosophy. We also noted in Sub-section B.I that, as far as
Wittgenstein was concerned, the very concept of analysis became problem-
atic in his later philosophy. Now, however, we must consider that what
stands in the foreground for the advocates of the tendencies treated in
Chapters VII and VIII is not the concept of analysis but the concept of
the explication of concepts or reconstruction (see Chapter VII, Section C.2).
Reconstruction may also turn out to be necessary in the domain of phi-
losophy. But this type of philosophical activity, contrary to Wittgenstein's
thesis, does not 'leave everything as it is'; it leads to something new. And
this something new, so it is claimed, contributes to clarification. An ex-
ample of how such a reconstruction may become a necessity in
"Wittgenstein's very own domain", so to speak, is afforded by Goodman's
studies of the problem of what a sentence is about.13 These studies are at
the same time a good illustration in practice of the limitations of the
Wittgenstein method. We are certainly not through when we have de-
scribed the actual use of language and given an account and comparison
of language games. And this for the simple reason that the ordinary use
of language turns out to be inconsistent on the point in question. It would
470 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
among other things makes a statement about the 31st of May, 1965. Thus
if the statement is made on May 30, 1965, it is a statement about the
future. Now we introduce the new predicate '+2-raining' which we ex-
plain as follows: 'It is raining+2 at time t' is to mean 'It is raining two
days after t'. Sentence (1) is logically equivalent to the following state-
ment.
(2) It is raining+2 on May 29, 1965 in Munich.
But this seems to be a statement about May 29, 1965. If it is uttered on
May 30, 1965, it is a statement about the past, even though it has the
same import as (1). Obviously we would be inclined to say that statement
(2) uttered on May 30, 1965 asserts something about the future. But on
the basis of what criterion can we assert this? To point to the fact that
the new predicate was defined by means of 'raining' would naturally be
no solution; for we could just as well take' +2-raining' as the basic predi-
cate and with its help define 'raining'.
The difficulty can be formulated in more general terms. The sentence
'Norway has many fjords' certainly makes a statement about Norway.
And it seems as if we are speaking about Norway when we refer to some-
thing of which Norway is a part (e.g., Scandinavia) or that is a part of
Norway (e.g., Oslo). But if every statement about something contained
in A is a statement about A (Principle I) and at the same time every
statement about something that contains A as a part is a statement about
A (Principle 11), then we obtain the absurd consequence that every state-
ment about anything (e.g., B) is simultaneously a statement about any
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 471
arbitrarily chosen object Y. To see this, we need only pick a C (e.g. the
universe) that includes both Band Yas parts. According to Principle I
a statement about B is at the same time a statement about C and by
Principle II a statement about C is at the same time a statement about Y;
thus a statement about B is at the same time a statement about Y.
It is pointless to claim that a given sentence makes a statement about
something definite if at the same time this statement is about anything
else you please. But, as this discussion shows, when we ask how we can
avoid consequences such as this, our linguistic intuitions leave us in the
lurch.
If we wish to obtain a serviceable criterion for what a sentence is about,
we have no recourse but to depart from the ordinary use of language. As
Goodman shows, to acquire such a criterion is not simple. To begin with,
we might suppose that the following proposal would suffice: 'A sentence
S is (or says something) about A if a sentence W that mentions A follows
logically from S (where a sentence is said to mention some thing if a name
of that thing occurs in the sentence).' But even if we exclude logically true
consequences, this proposal is inadequate. For from
(1) Germany is larger than Austria
it follows logically that
(2) Norway or Germany is larger than Austria.
And since (2) mentions Norway, we would have to maintain that (1) is
a statement about Norway, which it certainly is not. To improve the
proposed criterion, we have to make use of the idea that a statement about
A must be 'selective with respect to A', in the sense that it may not say
the same thing about every other X. Thus in our example, (l) does not
say something 'selectively' with respect to Norway, since not only does
(2) follow from (1) but so does every other statement that comes from (2)
by substituting another name for 'Norway'.
We may seek in this manner to arrive successively at better criteria. But
in so doing, we leave behind the mere 'study of language games'. The
situation is similar when we wish to learn how laws differ from non-laws,
or when it is a question of clarifying such concepts as that of probability
or of logical consequence. Even when Wittgenstein points out that ap-
proximate specification oftime is sufficient for ordinary purposes, he does
472 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
not deny that more exact measurements are necessary for the purposes of
physics. Why then should we not also be allowed, for specific purposes,
to obtain more exact determinations in philosophy? But if that is the case,
there is no apparent reason why the Wittgenstein method should not be
combined with analytical philosophy. It is only when we 'absolutize' the
Wittgenstein philosophy that a seemingly irreconcilable opposition arises.
The word 'mind' ('Geist') is not employed here in the sense found e.g. in
N. Hartmann, but in the sense of those acts of consciousness (Bewusst-
seinsakte) that we also call acts of mind (geistige Akte). We thus restrict
ourselves to those mental phenomena that are bound up with the intelli-
gible articulation and hearing of linguistic structures. In the case of
meaning (Meinen) , we have already seen how Wittgenstein's thoughts
depart from traditional ideas, as well as from his own earlier notions.
But his skepticism about mental acts extends much further.
It is useful to begin with an account of a conception opposed by
Wittgenstein that seems quite natural and unforced and in its general
features may even appear to be a truism not worth discussing. We can
characterize this conception schematically and pictorially as follows:
Written or spoken expressions are nothing more than 'inanimate' physical
things or processes (chalk or ink marks on board or paper, air vibrations).
These lifeless structures do not become meaningful words and meaningful
sentences until 'spirit is breathed into them'. This spirit or mind need not
of course be thought of as an entity existing in its own right and inde-
pendent of the language user. The expressions used in inter-personal com-
nunication become alive-with-meaning by virtue of the fact that speaker
and hearer connect the physical structures produced and perceived
(sounds, written signs) with certain mental acts, such as thinking, assert-
ing, judging affirmatively, meaning, directing one's attention to something,
understanding. Thus the speaker, if he was not simply producing words
'unthinkingly', must have associated certain thoughts with the words. The
content of his thoughts and what kind they are depend on what he has
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 473
that it must be one and the same thing to which we refer when we use the
term 'mean'. And this is precisely what is not the case! On the contrary,
the expression 'to mean' has many diverse uses, and instead of seeking
the common essence 'meaning' we would do better to assemble and com-
pare various kinds of contexts in which the word is used. 14 But from the
knowledge that the expression has many uses we cannot draw the flat
conclusion that it is vague or ambiguous. Rather, meaning is one of those
numerous cases where the concept of family resemblance proves so
fruitful. A family resemblance does exist among the various uses of 'to
mean'. Instances in which we seem most justified in speaking of meaning
as a mental process would be those where we attempt to ward off some
possible doubt about what was said: 'He meant it quite seriously' or 'He
meant what he said'. Now Wittgenstein does not deny that there exists
a characteristic feeling of meaning what one says. And this feeling may
appear where we use one of these phrases or something similar. In the
first place, however, the feeling may be present and yet the utterance be
wrong; one may have the characteristic feeling of meaning what one says
and at the same time tell a lie (see below the discussion of understanding,
where the situation is similar but clearer). Second, in most of the cases
in which we use a phrase of that type correctly there is no trace of such
a feeling.
The expression 'He meant it seriously' often merely states something
superficial, e.g., 'He said it in a serious tone of voice.' But many times
we use the expression to point to something deeper. This 'something
deeper', however, is not some experience that the speaker has had, but
something that forms a part of the circumstances in which he spoke. Here
for the first time we encounter the important concept of surroundings. In
a sense the concept points to a wholly new dimension which we must
penetrate if we want to gain a correct understanding of 'the mental'. At
the same time, it gives us an indication of an additional source of errors
in interpreting linguistic expressions that seem to refer to psychical acts.
When we say 'Mr. N. meant that quite seriously' we think we are referring
to the momentary situation of Mr. N. If we could 'photograph a moment'
of Mr. N. at a given point in time, including also his inner states, then
we could say exactly whether he meant it seriously or not. Yet this as-
sumption too is false; for the very same momentary state of Mr. N. may
or may not signify seriousness, depending on the social as well as linguistic
476 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
context in which the utterance was made, what preceded the time of the
utterance and what will follow it, and thus depending on the concrete life
context in which it was made. We shall meet this concept of surroundings
again later OD.
We frequently come upon utterances in which turns of phrase of some
given sort are altogether unsuitable or are meaningful only under certain
circumstances. For example, the question 'Did he mean it seriously?'
would be quite out of place when a person has said 'Excuse me please!'
This is true generally in cases where the utterance cannot be construed
as an assertion but as the performance of an action (as distinguished from
a description of the performance of an action). To say 'Excuse me please!'
is to excuse oneself, and is not a description of the action of excusing
oneself. Another example would be where someone, say, is asked for the
time and answers: 6 o'clock. Here the question 'Do you mean it seriously?'
seems to make sense only in situations when, e.g., a third person is present
who is sure that it is only 4 o'clock or that the person queried intended
to be somewhere else at 6, etc.
We encounter an entirely different use of 'to mean' when we employ
it in an effort to give a more exact specification or to ward off some error.
This use may relate to non-linguistic matters or to a mixture of linguistic
utterances and gestures. The case is of philosophical interest in that it
illustrates anew a certain way of being led astray by language. Suppose,
e.g., someone points to a picture and makes some comments. Another
person adds in explanation: 'He meant the col or, of course, and not the
shape.' Here we have the kind of situation in which the notion can arise
that to mean something definite signifies (or contains as an essential
component) directing one's attention toward something. Language re-
peatedly leads us astray in the case of this latter phrase because here we
have a much stronger tendency to think of a mental phenomenon, of an
invisible 'mental pointing' (within the person who does the pointing)
which accompanies the externally visible process of physical pointing.
The further course of the discussion is easy to foresee. We say to our-
selves happily 'Aha, I have found in this directing-one's-attention-toward-
something the psychical act that constitutes meaning or that forms an
essential component in all cases of meaning.' Here two mistakes are
superimposed. The first consists in the view, already criticized, that there
must be some occurrence common to all instances of meaning, and this
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 477
common basic feature, or part of it, is the act of attention. The second,
and in the present context more interesting, mistake is the assumption
that 'attention' designates a mental process. As a matter of fact, the
situation with respect to this expression is similar to that of 'meaning'
itself. The phrase 'to direct one's attention toward ... ' has different uses
in different contexts, and only in certain limiting cases does it designate
something that we could call a 'mental occurrence' (PI, 33-36). This
example also makes clear one of the reasons why Wittgenstein's dis-
cussions have the 'unsystematic' character of switching suddenly from one
theme to another. Unless we follow the twists and turns of the expression
'attention' very closely, we shall almost inevitably find ourselves in a
situation where we believe we have discovered in this 'directing one's
attention toward something' the desired psychical experience and so rest
content with this false picture.
We shall take up only one of the remaining possible ways of construing
meaning. Can meaning consist in a mental picture? Instead of examining
Wittgenstein's detailed discussion of this question, we shall try to specify
somewhat abstractly the reasons he gives why the answer must be in the
negative. Afterwards we shall illustrate the abstract schema by means of
an intuitive example.
Suppose there are two persons X and Y, together with an object 0 that
possesses the two characteristics A and B. X asserts that 0 possesses a
particular property and in order to express this utilizes a word W. Y
assents to this assertion and uses the same word W. It makes no differ-
ence whether X and Y have the object intuitively before them or are only
speaking of it without seeing it. Suppose further that in this connection
X has a mental image 0' and Y a mental image 0". Both 0' and 0"
exhibit the two characteristics A and B. Yet X meant the property A
when he used the word W, whereas Y meant the property B when he
used the same word. This shows that introducing the mental image did
not help since it did not lead to the desired differentiation. Now let 0 be
a white tennis ball, say, and W the word 'round'. X meant this shape
when he asserted that 0 was round. The mental image that hovered
before him was that of a white billiard ball. Y mistakenly thought that
'round' signified the same thing as 'white'. When he heard the word,
there appeared before him the image of the round white lantern in front
of his house. This example indicates that the problem is only pushed back:
478 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
among other things by the fact that X will also apply this word in the
future to other round objects regardless of what color they possess,
whereas Y will call white objects 'round' regardless of their shape.
And the situation is exactly the same with images or pictures. Here also
it is true that what is meant (gemeint) by an image (what sort of meaning
(Bedeutung) it has) is fixed by its use. That X and Y mean something
different by the same image is shown by the fact that X applies his image
to something other than Y does. There is an even closer connection with
the use of words. That X will apply his image to round, non-white objects
but not to white, non-round objects is shown above all by the fact that he
will designate objects of the first kind as 'round' and objects of the second
kind as 'non-round'. We have fallen into a vicious circle. The mental
image was supposed to explain what is meant by a word. Yet the result
is that what is meant by a word must explain the meaning of the mental
image. The image of a round object must be meant by X in a certain way,
and how it is meant depends on how X uses the word 'round'. According
to Wittgenstein, this outcome is not suprising: "Meaning it is not a
process which accompanies a word. For no process could have the con-
sequences of meaning" (PI, p. 218; see too PI, 139-141).
We turn now to understanding (Verstehen). Paired with the speaker
who uses a word or a sentence meaningfully is a hearer who understands
these expressions. Again we are immediately tempted by the notion that
'something must go on' in the mind of one who understands, that the
hearer must perform the psychical act of understanding, in order for us
to be able to say truthfully that he has understood. This time the assump-
tion is supported by data from the empirical sciences. It was empirical
psychologists who introduced the concept of the 'aha'-experience, which
is supposed to be the characteristic experience of understanding.
Once more the problem has many ramifications. There is not just
one use of the term 'understanding' but many, all of which must be
investigated. In particular, the word is not used only in relation to
language. We say that we do or do not understand a word, an assertion,
a question, a command; but we also say that we do or do not understand
the actions of a man, or the laws for the formation of a series of numbers.
Wittgenstein takes up in special detail the example of understanding the
principle of a mathematical series. Obviously this kind of understanding
bears a great similarity to being able to do something or knowing how to do
480 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
cation for the assertion that Y understood. But in no case is the test con-
clusive. We have no guarantee that Y understands the matter the same
way X does. This holds also for the general case, although in the instance
of the series it becomes especially clear. The possibility always exists that
beyond a certain point Y may proceed in a manner different from that of X.
This last possibility bears an interesting relationship to the 'absurd'
predicates, such as 'grue', constructed by Goodman (see Chapter VIII,
Section B.5) and used by him to illustrate a problem central to the theory
of induction, that of law-likeness or capability of confirmation. Goodman
begins with the normal use of predicates, such as 'red', 'green', and the
like, and shows that through the correct definitional introduction of
'abnormal' predicates we arrive at seemingly paradoxical results with
respect to what is to be looked on as inductively confirmed. Many of
Wittgenstein's reflections, particularly those connected with learning how
to develop simple series (e.g., PI, 185), can be interpreted in this fashion:
whereas Goodman, in constructing his paradoxes, starts with an ordinary
correct understanding of expressions and then introduces the 'abnormal'
predicates through (formally unobjectionable) definitions, Wittgenstein
has in view cases where a learner already understands rules for using
expressions in an 'abnormal' sense.1 5 Thus the learner follows in the usual
sense the rule for adding + 1 until he reaches 1000, then begins to add 2
up to 2000, after that the number 3, etc., and cannot understand why
anyone should complain that he does not, as required, always do the
'same thing'. Wittgenstein is not concerned, as is Goodman, with the
problem of induction; his aim is to show that there is no guarantee of a
correct understanding, and this neither for the teacher, nor for the learner,
nor for a third person. And this is at the same time an additional argument
against the assumption that understanding is a temporally localizable
inner process.
Here too, as in the case of meaning, the various possibilities noted
above must be pursued further. For again the danger exists that some of
the answers offered will be interpreted in such a fashion as to point toward
the supposed experience of understanding or even to characterize that
experience more closely. For example, when the proper algebraic formula
occurred to Y, was not such an occurrence, at least, an 'act of under-
standing'? Wittgenstein in his reply would again make a differentiation.
In many cases, he would say, 'Y knows how he must proceed' certainly
482 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
means the same as 'The formula F occurred to Y,' as, e.g., when someone
also knows that Y is an experienced mathematician and simply lacked the
formula for the series. But this does not hold in every case. The correct
formula may occur to Y without his noticing that it is the correct one,
or it may occur to him without his knowing how to apply it, and the like.
In such cases, we would not say that Y has understood or knows how he
must proceed. But even in the first case, the occurring to him of the for-
mula is not necessarily a mental process. If the mathematician has worked
with pencil and paper and scribbled the formula down without its having
'hovered before him', then the written formula can perform exactly the
same services as the 'mental' formula did in the other situation.
At this point it may seem appropriate to raise a question that some
readers surely have already asked themselves. Is not the position that
Wittgenstein advocates merely a particularly extreme form of behaviorism
and are not the arguments and examples simply attempts to sustain a
behavioristic philosophy? Wittgenstein posed this question himself
(PI, 307). Instead of repeating the very brief answer he gave, let us follow
his own example and introduce some differentiations.
First of all, we must distinguish between metaphysical behaviorism,
which denies the existence of psychical occurrences, and methodological
behaviorism, which either leaves open the question of the existence of
psychical phenomena or, while expressly acknowledging that they exist,
restricts itself to supplying behavioral criteria for all that is psychical.
Clearly, Wittgenstein does not advocate a metaphysical behaviorism.
He does not deny the existence of experiences that may accompany
meaning, understanding, and the like. In his view, however, these are no
more than concomitant processes which are not to be regarded at all as
belonging to the 'essence' of the phenomena.
With respect to methodological behaviorism, there are these distinc-
tions to be made:
(1) A behavioristically formulated psychological theory uses behavioral
criteria so as to be able to test the truth of statements about persons; but
it does not claim to explicate the sense of everyday expressions that relate
to the use and understanding of words (and sentences) such as 'mean' and
'understand'. Hence Wittgenstein's conception might best be termed
'sense-behaviorism' . Yet this term would be quite misleading because of
the other associations bound up with the word 'behaviorism'.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 483
but we can pose analogous questions in both cases and perform the same
kind of grammatical transformations. For instance, we can ask 'Whom
was Mr. N. thinking of?' ('Which document did Mr. N. tear up?'), 'When
was he thinking ... ?' ('When did he tear up ... ?'), 'Where was he when he
was thinking of... ?' (,Where was he when he tore up ... ?'). We can
incorporate both statements in similar contexts, such as 'Mr. N. tried to
think of.. .' ('Mr. N. tried to tear up the document'). Like parallels may be
set up in the other cases, among them expressions that appear to contain
a 'logical activity' such as 'infer', 'prove', 'draw a conclusion'. The reader
can easily reflect further on this point with the aid of other examples. The
situation is no different where we seem in both instances to describe states
('He is furious', 'He is surprised') or processes ('He became sadder and
sadder', 'He grew fatter and fatter'). But in case (1), and in the other ana-
logous cases, we do not see any action. We do not perceive how Mr. N.
thinks about X (e.g., how he constructs or tries to construct a logical
proof), whereas we do see how he tears up the paper or tries to tear it up.
Thus the actions involved in thinking cannot be of exactly the same kind
as the physical doings; at most they are analogous to them but differ in the
one essential respect that in contrast to physical activities they do not take
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 485
'to think' and 'to understand'. For since in the physical case we usually
refer to activities and processes with the help of verbs, we would be
tempted in this instance to speak of an activity of 'not-ing', which,
lacking perceptibility, would have to be located in some invisible ghost
world.
In the preceding section we talked only of those mental acts that, ac-
cording to the usual view, accompany the use and understanding of
linguistic expressions. The explanation of these supposed processes as
'linguistic fictions' still says nothing about the innumerable phenomena
that make up our world of experience: sensation, feelings, intentions,
perceptions. In the present section, we shall describe Wittgenstein's re-
flections about the relationship of language to inner experience. Although
the reader may be somewhat prepared for what follows by the previous
exposition, we must still emphasize that here we are dealing with one of
the most difficult phases of his philosophy. More than elsewhere in his
later philosophy, Wittgenstein seems to be doing battle against obvious
truths, and faced with Wittgenstein's pronouncements the reader will find
time and again that his mind becomes paralyzed.
Wittgenstein was a virtuoso of subtlety. Important details that matter
very much will escape us if we treat our problem in too general a manner.
It will be a bit more difficult for them to escape us if we give the problem
a concrete form and look at the situation more closely. In Wittgenstein,
we do not find the kind of questions we would expect in other philoso-
phers, such as 'How do we arrive at concepts of sensations and feelings?'
or 'How do we come to know other minds?'. Instead, the problems are
discussed with the aid of concrete experiences, in particular the ever re-
curring example of pain. We shall present first the usual view and then
contrast it with what Wittgenstein has to say. We speak again of a 'usual
view' because what are at issue here are some very general assumptions
shared by most philosophers and psychologists independently of how
they differ in their epistemological standpoint and what particular hypo-
theses they defend.
488 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
In brief, the customary view is that the experiences of each person are
his own private affair. No one else can get into my consciousness and
have my experiences. Only in my own case can I experience what pain is.
The pain that I myself suffer constitutes the sole experimental foundation
for abstracting the general concept of pain. Hence the word 'pain' is a
meaningful expression for me only because I myself have been in pain.
It is in an indirect way that I at first come to carry over the concept of
pain to another person. In this connection, it is inessential whether or not
the theory is correct that we obtain knowledge of someone else's pain
indirectly, since that theory is the result of an argument by analogy - a
thesis already disputed by Scheler. Rather, the point is that the desig-
nation of the experiences of others as pain is indirect in a particular sense.
For due to the fact that the pain of someone else is not given to me
directly, the application of the word 'pain' to the experience of others
must be supported by physical signs. And after the transfer from one's
own case to that of another has been effected and the word 'pain' has
thus become a generally intelligible component of the public language,
one's own case is still distinguished by two features. First, after being em-
bedded in the public language, the expression 'pain' remains meaningful
for each person only because he attaches to it the private ideas that rest
on his personal experiences of pain. Second, I always know only with
respect to my own self whether or not I am in pain (the self-evidence of
inner perception), whereas I can at most believe or hypothetically assume
pain in others. For in their case, it is not the pain itself that is given but
only the pain-utterances, and that is why I am constantly exposed here
to the danger of error or deception.
Wittgenstein does not accept any of these usual conceptions. According
to him, they rest in part on mistaken ideas about the functioning of
language as such and in part on incorrect notions about the use of
sensation words. These errors are fostered to a great extent by images
that arise in and dominate us when we begin to philosophize about
psychical phenomena. Here we shall try to reconstruct Wittgenstein's
exposition by dividing it into three parts: (1) a critique ofthe assumption
that one's experiences constitute the only source for the concept of pain;
(2) a critique of the claim that the application of this concept to the case
of other minds is merely indirect and fundamentally problematic; (3) a
critique of the assumption that the incorporating of the word 'pain' into
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 489
The phrase "that is none too easy a thing to do" is meant ironically.
That is, what Wittgenstein's reflections come to is that under the specified
conditions it would be impossible to imagine the pain of another person.
I would remain 'solipsistically' encapsulated in the domain of my own
consciousness. For if I could learn the meaning of 'pain' only by per-
ceiving my own pain, then 'pain' would be synonymous with 'pain ex-
perienced by me'. At most I could go so far as to have felt a pain at a
place outside of my own body; but it would be nonsense to speak of
someone else's pain. The assumption that 'pain' designates a class of
private sensations would thus lead to the absurdity that I could never
understand what it would mean for someone else to be in pain.
It is important that we be clear about what Wittgenstein is not saying.
Thus he is not saying that if we assume the criticized theory to be correct
we could never arrive at the knowledge that a certain person is in pain
(no matter whether that knowledge has come about through the argument
by analogy or by some other means). He is advocating a stronger thesis,
namely, that under such an assumption it would be meaningless for me
to speak of the pain of another person. This thesis is the stronger, be-
cause unless we know what 'someone else's pain' means, we cannot
even formulate the question 'How do I know that someone else has a
pain?'.
Here too one might be tempted to seek a way out through the concept
of sameness. The earlier attempt was to impart a clear sense to the rules
of a private language by characterizing as the same, or not the same,
experiences that appear at various times to one and the same person, to
wit, the hypothetical inventor P of the private language. This time same-
ness is intended to bridge the gap between one's own experience and those
of another person: "'But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I
am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had'"
(PI, 350). The answer Wittgenstein offers to this is typical of his utter-
ances. Its striking force is heightened by the indirect reference to the
relativity of simultaneity contained in the simile he employs: "It is as if
I were to say : 'You surely know what "It is 5 o'clock here" means; so
you also know what "It's 5 o'clock on the sun" means. It means simply
that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock'. - The
explanation by means of identity does not work here. For I know well
enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 5 o'clock there "the same
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 495
time", but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak of its being
the same time here and there. In exactly the same way it is no explanation
to say: the supposition that he has a pain is simply the supposition that
he has the same as 1. For that part of the grammar is quite clear to me:
that is, that one will say that the stove has the same experience as I, if
one says: it is in pain and I am in pain" (PI, 350).
Operating with sameness was supposed to make it possible this time
to break out of the solus ipse. Wittgenstein's reply seeks to make it
evident that this attempted escape must fail: If I know that x has a
property A and that y possesses property A - which presupposes that the
application of A to both x and y is already explained - then I can subse-
quently say that x and y have the same property. If, however, 'property
A' by definition is synonymous with 'property A had by x' (where x is
a quite definite individual), then I cannot impart sense to the expression
'y has property A' by saying that this is the same property that x has.
This again is one of those examples in which Wittgenstein suddenly gives
an ironic twist to a line of argument; for it is of course not a meaningful
statement to say that the stove is in pain. To anyone who learned the
meaning of 'pain' from his own case, the statement that someone else is
in pain would be at least as nonsensical as an analogous statement about
the stove. That we do not immediately perceive the sentence about the
stove to be nonsense is due to the fact that the phrase 'the stove is in pain'
can evoke in us all kinds of (useless) pictures. In the case of the words
'It is exactly 5 o'clock on the sun', we can also picture something to
ourselves, e.g., a grandfather clock pointing to 5.
Let us now go on to point (3). Again we leave aside the preceding
difficulties, that is, we assume that the word 'pain' has become meaningful
to me by my conceiving of it as a name for a concept I obtained 'through
abstraction from my own pain experiences'; and further that I have
succeeded through some kind of argument by analogy in also applying
this concept to other people. Would this suffice to make us understand
how the word 'pain' can become a component of human linguistic com-
munication? Not at all. Originally this word formed part of the private
language. The fact that I have been able in thought to transfer the ex-
pression from my own case to other cases still does not provide a sufficient
explanation of how the private language comes to be embedded in the
public language. On the contrary, new and insurmountable difficulties
496 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
arise here, which have often been noticed by philosophers but never
thought through to their ultimate consequences.
It may seem at first glance that no further problems of this sort exist.
Different people use the word 'pain' and for each of them the word is
meaningful in that by it each refers directly to his own pain-experiences,
that is, he ties to it images of his own pain-experiences. But could it not
be the case that another person has an experience of a wholly different kind
from mine when he speaks of pain? One might of course think that while
it is a regrettable fact that 1 cannot 'enter' the consciousness of someone
else to test whether his experiences are qualitatively similar to mine,
nevertheless this does not rule out a common language in which to talk
about the mental. For it would still suffice if everyone, each for himself,
consistently used the word 'pain' for the same sensation! 18 But how do
matters stand with the word 'sensation'? Here too 1 know what this word
means only from my own case! It could be that what I call 'sensation' is
something different from what another person designates by the term.19
It would do no good to say (to this): 'It may well be that what 1 call
"sensation" is not the same as what someone else calls by that name, but
in any event I have something and he too has something.' For 'I have
something' would likewise possess only a private meaning, which may be
different from that of the other person. "So in the end when one is doing
philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an
inarticulate sound" (PI, 261). But the matter would not rest even there;
for this sound "is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language
game, which should now be described" (ibid.).
These reflections are intended to show that even if the concept of a
private language is self-consistent, the idea of a subsequent embedding
of a private language in a public one cannot be thought through to the
end. The 'infinite' gulf between the private sphere of consciousness and the
public sphere can never be bridged. The entire question was wrongly
formulated, and we must make a 180 0 turn. Only if general experience-
words, such as 'feeling', 'sensation', etc., as well as specific expressions
like 'pain', are from the very beginning a part of the public language
can sensations be spoken of in this language intelligible to everyone.
Wittgenstein's position regarding the picture "here the bodies of men
accessible to general perception, and there the private worlds of conscious-
ness inaccessible to other subjects" has been expressed most strikingly
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 497
in his simile of the beetle and the beetle-box. This simile is interesting
also because it contains an important hint as to the solution to the puzzle.
Assume that everyone has a box containing something we call a 'beetle'.
No one is able to look into the box belonging to any other person and each
one therefore asserts that only from looking into his own box does he
know what a beetle is. It might then be the case that each one has a
different thing in his box, and furthermore that this thing is constantly
changing! If nonetheless the word 'beetle' had a certain use in the language
of these people, this use would not be as the name of a thing; for "the
thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a
something: for the box might even be empty. - No, one can 'divide
through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is" (PI, 293).
In this simile, the boxes represent the bodies of men, and the beetles the
pains, as these latter are viewed by the theory Wittgenstein opposes. There
is a further assumption that can be carried over from the simile to the real
case; for the expression 'pain' actually does have an intersubjective use
here. If the situation were as that theory claims it to be, then we could
'divide through by pain'.
It is very difficult to free ourselves from these pictures about the
worlds of other minds. Why is this so? One reason is our tendency to
base our interpretation of what happens in the 'world of consciousness'
on the model of things and processes in the physical world. Another is
once again the oversimplified notion of how language works: 'If language
serves to "talk about things", then it is all the same whether what we talk
about are horses, colors, pains or good and evil.' That is why, in connec-
tion with the above simile, Wittgenstein makes the statement: "If we
construe the grammar of sensation on the model of 'object and designa-
tion', then the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant" (PI,293).
At this point, Wittgenstein draws another striking analogy between
the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of mind. When a
mathematician says 'Either there is a natural number with a certain
property P or there is not, and there is no third possibility', he pictures
to himself an infinite mind that commands a view of the entire infinite
sequence of natural numbers and thus either discovers a number with the
property in question or determines that the sequence contains no such
number. Similarly, when we say that someone else either has or does not
have a particular sensation, again a picture occurs to us "that by itself
498 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
seems to make the sense of the statement unmistakable" (PI, 352). But in
neither the one case nor the other is this the real situation. For in both
cases our mode of expression is "designed for a god who knows what we
cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those infinite series and he
sees into human consciousness" (PI,426).
The opponent can bring a final gun into play and say that there is in
any event an essential difference between one's own case and that of
another, namely, a difference in the degree of knowledge. For I alone
know whether I really have a pain; someone else can at most surmise it.
Wittgenstein counters by turning the argument against the opponent: the
first half of the opponent's assertion is nonsense, the second half is false.
Let us take the latter first. Then there is this to be said: "If we are using
the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?),
then other people very often know when I am in pain" (PI, 246). Here
Wittgenstein is not attacking a false epistemological position but is
merely establishing that anyone who makes the above claim has an in-
correct image of how the term 'to know' is used. The counterobjection to
this is that the other person still cannot know I am in pain with the same
certainty that I myself know it! Whereupon Wittgenstein replies: "It
can't be said of me at all (expect perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in
pain. What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain"
(ibid.).
It might be useful to examine more closely the logical structure of
Wittgenstein's rejoinder. The starting-point for the opponent's argument
is the idea that the expression 'pain' (and likewise more specific expressions,
such as 'headache', 'stomachache', 'toothache') is a name for a certain
kind of private state or occurrence in his consciousness to which no one
except himself has access. Hence when a person A says that he is in pain
(or has a headache, etc.), then he is describing this specific kind of private
occurrence, and when he asserts that someone else B also has these pains,
A thereby asserts that B is experiencing in the private world of B's
consciousness the same kind of occurrences that A himself does when A
applies this name to his own experiences. The first case has to do with
something immediately given, and therefore an item of knowledge. In the
second case, however, since we have no direct access to someone else's
consciousness, we can have at most a (more or less well-confirmed)
conjecture. Thus from the assumption that pains are certain kinds of
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 499
objects and 'pain' a name for them, a certain conclusion has followed
with regard to what we can know about pains and what we can only
surmise.
Wittgenstein does not deny this interrelationship; in fact, he affirms it.
Were the starting-point correct, we would indeed be obliged to say that
we can know only about our own pains, and can merely entertain a belief
about those of someone else. But Wittgenstein insists that we consider
how the expression 'to know' is actually used in these situations. The
result then is that the abovementioned conclusion turns out to be partly
nonsensical and partly false. Consequently the starting-point has become
untenable. As expressed in Wittgenstein's terminology, a picture of pain
(or of other conscious experiences) has of necessity led to a picture of
knowledge and belief with respect to pain. Brief reflection upon certain
language games, in which the expressions 'pain' and 'knowledge' occur,
destroys the latter picture and thus also destroys the first picture. The
opponent's argument has been turned into an objection to his own
position.
The foregoing considerations have all been of a purely critical nature.
Even if the reader has understood Wittgenstein's critique of his oppo-
nent's initially quite plausible theses, he will at the end - as so often -
again feel quite lost, and will ask, at first vainly, what Wittgenstein has
to offer in a positive way. As at various earlier points, it is important to
be clear about what we ought not to expect of Wittgenstein. Obviously,
we cannot expect any assertions about the essence of pain. At the same
time, however, we must also suppress an inclination to ask 'What
actually is Wittgenstein's own theory, which is supposed to replace the
rejected ones?' Wittgenstein himself would have turned back such a
question; for, "if one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would
never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them"
(PI, 128). The very presupposition on which the question is based is
incorrect, namely, that what have been rejected are theories. Pictures and
conceptions that have their roots in linguistic confusions should not be
called theories. This time the confusion consists in a fundamental mis-
understanding of the functioning of those expressions, sentences, and
contexts in which the talk is of sensations and feelings. Wittgenstein's
critique serves once again the philosophical "battle against the bewitch-
ment of our intelligence by means of language" (PI, 109). We must not
500 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
contrary, there are intermediate cases (see PI, pp. 187-189). One such
would be if the speaker wished to express with the words 'I am in pain'
a request that he be left in peace. A relatively 'pure' descriptive case would
be that of a man who, when asked by a physician, describes the bodily
location, diffusion and character of the pain. Of course, Wittgenstein
would immediately warn us not to overlook the differences among the
language games that we call 'descriptions' (PI, 290, 291). The fact is that
such a 'description of a mental state' cannot be regarded as a description
of things, states and processes in the private world of consciousness of
the speaker.
Here we encounter an aporia that seems to have been overlooked thus
far by commentators on Wittgenstein. Even if we take into account all
that has been indicated in the preceding paragraphs, there is still the
problem of how a descriptive pain-utterance can be reconciled with the
thesis that 'pain' is never a name. Wittgenstein would surely have acknow-
ledged that a sentence speaks about something only if names occur in it.
But does it make sense to call a sentence a description if at the same time
we are compelled to deny that this sentence speaks about something?
It is an evasion rather than a solution if, instead of answering this ques-
tion, we go into a discussion of the functions and purposes of such a descrip-
tion. A solution would presumably have to look like this: in the descrip-
tive case, even in first person sentences, 'pain' is to be construed as a
name, although not as the name of a private experience of a certain kind.
In addition, we should have to agree that the utterance indeed speaks
about someone. The problem could then be formulated thus: 'About
whom does a "descriptive" utterance of the form "I am in pain" say
something, and what does it say about him?'
Third person pain-utterances are always descriptive. Hence the question
analogous to the one just formulated always makes sense in this context.
'Mr. N. is in pain' is of course never a linguistic substitute for an outcry.
Yet here too the question arises as to what 'pain' refers to this time. We
know that the answer 'certain private experiences of Mr. N.' is excluded.
Once again we must refer to pain-behavior in order to deduce from
Wittgenstein's statements the sort of answer he would make; yet the
answer must be so constituted as not to represent a 'pain-behaviorism'.
Furthermore, the concept of a criterion must be taken seriously here.
In fact, it has to be applied at two places. When I say 'Mr. N. is in pain',
504 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
that basically the sentences in FM fall into two classes: illustrations for
his fundamental philosophical notions, and statements, for the most part
incorrect, about difficult mathematical concepts and results in modern
foundational research in mathematics. Were that the case, then it would
be a superfluous undertaking to occupy ourselves with these ideas of
Wittgenstein; for the utterances belonging to the first class would com-
municate nothing new, while those of the second class had better be
passed over unnoticed. As a matter of fact, however, Wittgenstein's
statements contain philosophical thoughts about logic and mathematics
that go beyond what could be called an application or exemplification of
the ideas developed in PI and that at the same time are wholly independent
of his partly mistaken views about mathematical and metamathematical
conceptions. For these philosophical ideas of his, including his reflections
on the nature of proof, are of great importance, as are his many analyses
of elementary numerical and calculating operations. The point, however,
is not that Wittgenstein devotes a great deal of attention to these oper-
ations, after they had been rather neglected so long in the philosophy of
mathematics, in order to bring a certain specific problem into our view.
Instead, the examples of numerical and calculating operations introduced
by him should be looked on as analogous to the examples of simple
language games cited in PI. Just as the language games served there as
models to obtain information about the way in which language functions,
so here cases drawn from elementary mathematics are used as especially
simple models from which to gain information about the nature of the
most general logical and mathematical concepts, such as the concept of
proof.
It would be useful perhaps as a first approximation to characterize
Wittgenstein's position in terms of its relationship to the two dominant
interpretations of mathematics, the classical and the intuitionistic (on
this, see Chapter VIII, Section A.2). According to the classical conception,
every meaningful mathematical statement is either true or false, even if
(up to now or perhaps forever) there is no possibility of our deciding
which of the two is the case; mathematical states of affairs exist inde-
pendently of whether they are or are not known by us. The progress of
mathematical knowledge consists basically in the fact that, for an in-
creasingly large class of statements, it is determined that these statements
are true, that is, they correspond to the independently existing mathe-
510 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
either (1) or its negation must be true. The objection that possibly we may
never be able to decide whether sentence (1) or the sentence
(3) No odd number is perfect
is true will not be accepted as valid by a supporter of the classical view;
for he defends the conception that the question is not whether we possess
an effective decision procedure for statement (1) but how things are in
themselves. Hence statement (1) must in any case be true or false, and
in the latter event statement (3) is correct.
To this the intuitionist will answer that the classicist is compelled to
have recourse to a metaphysical assumption to justify his thesis. If things
necessarily are either as (1) asserts they are or as expressed in (3), obvious-
ly this can only mean that the series of natural numbers exists as a finished
totality in a kind of Platonic heaven, and that it is therefore determined,
for every element of this totality, whether it has the property of being
perfect or not. This example plainly shows that the hyperrealism of
classical mathematics and logic is directly bound up with the assumption
of actually infinite totalities. If these are rejected as fictitious, then the
whole argument that makes (2) a logically valid statement collapses.
The intuitionist might further indicate his criticism by the following
'Wittgensteinian' type of consideration. We have acquired a knowledge
of the meaning of expressions such as 'there is (are)', 'some', 'all', and
'none' in the course of practically acquiring knowledge of our language.
However, our talk has always been of finitely many things ('I have no
money', 'Have you used up all of it?', 'There is a man who is 140 years
old', and so forth). Hence when we suddenly begin to use 'there is', 'all',
and 'none' to refer to the infinite totality of numbers, these expressions
have at the outset no meaning at all. Meaning is still to be given them.
If in imparting meaning to them, we stay as close as possible to ordinary
usage without recourse to Platonistic fictions, then as the interpretation
for 'There is a number with property P' we must choose the expression
'A number with property P is specifiable'. Similarly, 'none' is to be inter-
preted as 'sharpened' negation (see Chapter VIII, Section A.2). Once this
is done, there can be no further talk of the logical validity of sentence (2).
This account of the situation is of course somewhat misleading. For the
objection could be made that while considerations of this sort may show
that (2) is not a logically valid statement, the principle of the excluded
512 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
that are valid in classical logic and mathematics. They hold fast, however,
to the objectivity of logico-mathematical proofs. Wittgenstein reaches
results in part similar to those of the intuitionists; but this is only because
he rejects belief in the objectivity of mathematical truth on the radical
ground that not even the belief in the objectivity of mathematical proofs
possesses validity for him. It is therefore to be expected that his position
would lead to a sharpening of the conception advocated by the intuition-
ists. Yet, as we have remarked already, Wittgenstein's more radical view
opens the way in his case to an attitude that in many respects is more
conciliatory toward mathematical activity than the attitude found among
the intuitionists. If a person engaged in philosophical reflections about
mathematics appeals to the tertium non datur, Wittgenstein joins with the
intuitionists in rejecting such a consideration; for what lies behind it,
as a tacit assumption, is the theory of truth-conditions with its Platonistic
ontology. Wittgenstein, however, does not object if a mathematician
makes use of the tertium non datur in carrying out a proof, since the
mathematician does have the right, on the strength of a decision, to regard
this statement form as necessarily valid. Acceptance of a proof amounts
to accepting a new rule of language. A proof I come upon is intended to
cause me to acknowledge something as a truth not open to criticism, to
grant necessity to the theorem proved and to deposit it in the archives,
that is, not to permit anything to contradict it any longer but, on the
contrary, to use it as a standard for testing other results. Thus in accepting
the proof we have won through to a new decision (FM, Il, 27), and we
acknowledge the theorem "by turning our back on it" (FM, Ill, 35). But
once such a decision is taken, then new logical relations are established by
the sentence recognized as necessary and thus our concepts too become
different after we have accepted the proof This will become more clear
later on.
We are apt to think that Wittgenstein's views about proofs, logical
necessities and unassailable truths represent only a particular consequence
of what he has said about meanings, the explanation of a meaning,
'following a rule', and the like - things that as such have nothing whatever
to do with mathematics. Ideas of this sort might find support in Wittgen-
stein's likely objection to the argument that we surely have no free choice
in accepting a step in a proof if the axioms and rules are formulated with
absolute precision, e.g., in a completely formalized system of mathematical
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 521
employ the word 'can' they refer to what is theoretically possible, whereas
in Wittgenstein the emphasis is on practical-technical possibility. Thus
Wittgenstein questions our right to say that it is 'in principle' decidable
whether a very large number (e.g., 1437 raised to the power of a nine-
digit number) possesses a certain property P, so long as we have only
primitive procedures by means of which to decide. Yet this description
of his ideas contains a very great oversimplification. Since a proof is
regarded as something definitive and unassailable and as a standard for
testing other results, it must, according to Wittgenstein, be such that it
can be taken in at a glance - it must be perspicuous and reproducible
(FM, n, 1). It is this quality that distinguishes a proof from an experi-
ment, for in the case of the latter we do not have any guaranty that its
repetition will bring about the same result. Here is the key to under-
standing many of Wittgenstein's thoughts.
In the first place, it is clear that the ever-recurring question in FM of
how a proof differs from an experiment is not intended as a discussion of
an empiricist interpretation of mathematics. Rather, it serves to show us
that what may look like a proof is in truth an experiment, a circumstance
we conceal from ourselves by means of the picture of 'fundamental
theoretical possibilities'. For example, a person who has spent two decades
determining whether some extraordinarily large odd number is perfect
or not has not furnished a proof of anything no matter what his results
may look like. Since his procedure can no longer be taken in at a glance
nor easily reproduced, what he has undertaken is an experiment, not a
proof.
Second, we may now describe more exactly a recent sharpening of the
intuitionist conception mentioned above. Let us consider again the
example we began with:
(1) There are perfect odd numbers.
The classical logician, with his thesis of the truth-definiteness of all
meaningful statements, must designate this statement as true or false.
The intuitionist, for reasons already described, discards the presupposi-
tion of truth-definiteness. But he too will regard statement (1) as meaning-
ful, although he replaces truth-definiteness by proof-definiteness. For we
do indeed know what a proof of the statement would look like. All we
need do is supply an odd number that is equal to the sum of its proper
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 523
divisors. But what would this mean? Since such a number has not yet
been found, if there is one it must be gigantically large. Hence the standard
procedure for checking whether or not it is perfect would break down,
since the calculations required for a magnitude of this order would no
longer be such as could be taken in at a glance. Thus we cannot assert that
we possess methods by which to determine for arbitrary numbers whether
they are perfect or not. A proof that would exhibit the perfectness of such
a giant number would have to employ entirely new methods. And it is these
methods that would first lay down, for numbers of this order of magni-
tude, what is meant by the predicate 'perfect'. The sharper thesis advanced
by Wittgenstein might then be characterized by saying that for him (1)
is not even a sense-definite statement.
Third, the discussion brings out a new aspect of Wittgenstein's conten-
tion that the discovery of a proof alters our concepts. This took place, in
example (1), with respect to the concept of a perfect number.
There is another connection in which the question of the relationship
between conformity-to-mathematical-laws and experience plays a crucial
role in Wittgenstein's thinking. To go back to the example of the urn,
we who can add and who accept the results of the addition as 'unassail-
able' regard the simultaneous obtaining of the three results - 3 black, 4
white and 8 balls total- as a sign of having miscounted and thus as a sign
that when we recheck the situation empirically we shall discover a mistake.
According to Wittgenstein, as we have seen, a decision on the matter
may fail to take place. Must we then abandon the arithmetical sentence
3 + 4 = 7, as we discard an hypothesis in natural science when the predic-
tions derived from it conflict with the factual observations? Not at all.
We use mathematical sentences in an altogether different way from
synthetic hypotheses about nature. Mathematical sentences do not assert
that certain regularities prevail in nature; hence we cannot confront
such sentences with experience. Nevertheless, experience may lie behind
a mathematical statement "as a condition, so to speak, of the possibility
of applying the statement appropriately". In the case of the balls in the
urn, if the calculation results and experiences described above were fre-
quently repeated, we would stop saying that we are calculating. Thus while
a general mathematical statement does not express an empirical law-like
regularity, it is still entirely conceivable that quite new regularities in
nature's course might lead to our no longer designating as calculations
524 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
REFERENCES
3 The interpretation outlined here of the concepts 'thing' and 'substance' was presented
very convincingly by Stenius, loco cit., pp. 6{)ff.
4 It was the studies of Stenius, in my opinion, that first achieved basic clarity regarding
Wittgenstein's concept of picture.
5 Wittgenstein himself did not formulate explicitly the rules for taking compound
sentences into pictures. For further details on this rather difficult theory, see Stenius,
loco cit., p. 150.
6 page uumbers for Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics are cited from the original editions in German and English, published in
1953 and 1956 respectively (Basil Blackwell, Oxford).
7 'Empty names' play an important role, e.g., in the theory of the Polish logician
Stanislaw Lesniewski.
8 Stenius has pointed out the importance of this illustration.
9 These two expressions I first used in my Das Wahrheitsproblem und die Idee der
Semantik, Vienna 1957.
10 In chess too one might of course counterpose a 'depth level' of rules to the 'surface
level' of the usual rules. The former would then include, e.g., rules for various winning
strategies.
11 It is characteristic of Wittgenstein's procedure to employ the same thing as an
illustration for different points. Thus as we have seen, complicated games served him
as models to clarify the 'functioning of language'; now the concept of game constitutes
the chief example illustrating concept-families.
12 For a more detailed treatment of this example, see J. L. Austin, 'Other Minds', in
Logic and Language, First Series, Oxford 1953, and W. Stegmiiller, 'Glauben, Wissen
und Erkennen', Zeitschrift filr philosophischen Forschung 10 (1956) 509-549.
13 N. Goodman, 'About', Mind, 1961, Iff.
14 On this, see Pitcher, op. cit., pp. 258ff.
15 We can of course turn the matter around. As Goodman's discussions show, what
Wittgenstein assumes as a possibility of thought can always be obtained by appropriate
definitions if we presuppose persons who possess the 'normal' understanding of words.
16 The method and style in which Wittgenstein presents the conception he criticizes is
often so strongly reminiscent of Brentano that it is impossible to resist the impression
that Wittgenstein acquired his own ideas, at least partly, in the course of a critical
examination of Brentano's philosophy. There seem to be no historical data, however,
to confirm this point.
17 See C. A. Van Peursen, 'Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein', Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 20 (1959) 181-197.
18 It should be recalled that these observations are being made under the unreal
assumption that the difficulties mentioned under (1) do not arise or have been overcome.
19 A remark similar to that in the preceding note applies here with reference to the
difficulties cited in (2).
20 Speaking technically, what is involved is the application of the so-called axiom of
comprehension of naive set theory.
21 To characterize the game-theoretic method completely, we would also have to
specify exactly the conditions for attack and defense, as well as the number of admissible
attack- and defense-repetitions. By varying these rules, we can obtain classical logic
again. On this, see Kuno Lorenz, Arithmetik und Logik als Spieie, Dissertation, Kiel
1961. A brief exposition, including technical details, and discussion of Lorenzen's
method will be found in W. Stegmiiller, 'Remarks on the Completeness of Logical
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN 527
Systems relative to the Validity Concepts of P. Lorenzen and K. Lorenz', NoIre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic 5 (1964) 81-112.
22 Michael Dummett has given a similar explanation ofWittgenstein's idea in 'Wittgen-
stein's Philosophy of Mathematics', Philosophical Review 68 (1959) 324ft'.
23 See M. Dummett, loc. cif., p. 335.
APPENDIX
Einstein. And even such a genius could do so only after long years of
effort as an adult who is already master of a number of languages and
possesses many insights into the theoretically possible range of grammat-
icallanguage structures.
But what ground is there for assuming that the cases of learning
Chinese and learning the Mars language are radically different? The
answer is that man probably lacks the inborn structures necessary if he is to
learn the Mars language whereas he has those needed to learn any of the
languages of earth.
This brings us to our central theme. Chomsky cites numerous empirical
facts to show that learning an ordinary language cannot take place in a
purely empirical manner. These facts naturally carry a stronger force of
conviction when seen against the background of his own theory of
language, which we shall now outline.
In the case of the child who has not yet learned a language, we can
present schematically the model for a physical system C whose internal
structure is to begin with unknown, and which constitutes an abstract
device for learning a language L. The model is constructed as an input-
output system. The input consists of relevant empirical data, namely, a
sufficiently large and representative set of utterances of the language L
(Italian, Chinese, English, etc.), which have been produced by the
language environment. The output consists in the mastery of L, in partic-
ular the mastery of its phonetic and grammatical rules. For simplicity's
sake, let us abstract from the phonetic component and direct our atten-
tion exclusively to the grammatical aspects. Further, let us anticipate
Chomsky's finding that the linguistic abilities of a mature speaker can be
characterized by means of a formalized grammar of the language in
question. We can then specify the output by using the abbreviating
caption 'formalized grammar of L'. Now the task of determining how the
language acquisition device operates can be described as that of gaining
an insight into the nature of the function that maps the observed empirical
data (utterances ofan adult speaker of L) into the formalized grammar of L.
Since, in general, we can improve and extend our information about an
input-output relation by varying the input conditions, in the case of
language acquisition we shall likewise seek the greatest possible variety
of input conditions, say, by selecting the empirical data from many
different languages. Since language learning is one of the most important
532 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
and that many children learn to speak without talking. Above all we
should cite the creative aspect of language use, which consists in the ca-
pacity to produce and interpret new sentences (independently of external
stimuli or identifiable internal states).
These and other empirical data alone should lead one to suspect that
the 'language acquisition device' C is equipped with a kind of specific
capacity whose innate component largely predominates. This surmise is
strengthened by systematic studies of what constitutes linguistic compe-
tence in adult speakers.
At this point it becomes necessary to describe briefly Chomsky's
systematic investigations in the theory of language. We should at the
same time emphasize that this area is actually the domain of his own
research. From what has been said above, the reader may have received
the impression that Chomsky is interested primarily in the study of
language acquisition. But this is not at all the case. We must make a sharp
distinction between two things: the systematic theory of language itself
and the theory of (ordinary) language acquisition. In terms of Chomsky's
work, the relationship between these two domains can be briefly char-
acterized in the following manner. His own interest attaches to the first
domain. Basing himself on the results he obtains there as well as on the
available empirical data, he arrives at conclusions that pertain to the
second domain. He does not claim that these conclusions constitute a
'theory oflanguage acquisition' ; they simply trace out the framework and
point a direction for such a theory, exhibiting in particular the limitations
of all empiricistic speculations.
Chomsky's conception of how difficult it is to arrive at a theory of
grammar can perhaps best be conveyed if we paraphrase a famous saying
of Kant's: "To write the theory of the grammar of an ordinary language
is surely the most difficult of all scientific undertakings. Thus far no such
theory of grammar has been set forth."
For what we really have in the way of so-called theories of grammar is
an enormous mass of factual material, furnished with numerous more or
less artificial ad hoc rules which afford us no view of the inner structure
and operation of language. That is to say, these rules, in the best of cases,
report only the surface structure of a grammar and not its deep structure.
These words immediately call to mind Wittgenstein's distinction between
surface grammar and depth grammar. And Chomsky consciously selects
534 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
surface grammar may differ while the grammatical deep structures are the
same.
A general theory of grammar, as distinguished from the above case
which has to do only with the grammatical theory of a specific language,
would according to Chomsky have the task of providing the following:
(1) a recursive enumeration of all potential grammars, G 1 , G2 , ••• ;
(2) an enumeration of all potential sentences Si' S2' ... (in phonetic
transcription) ;
(3) a constructive definition of the concept of structural description
and the effective specification of a 2-place function f that assigns to an
arbitrary element Si of sequence (2), with respect to an arbitrary grammar
Gj from (1), the structural description F(i, j). (Here f is thought of as a
partial recursive function. It is partial recursive because it is undefined for
certain pairs of arguments, namely, where Si is not produced by Gj ; ob-
viously not every sentence is produced by every grammar.)
We return now to the question of what consequences for the theory of
learning follow from these abstract considerations. Again the point of
departure is a schematic analogy model from the theory of automata:
utterances of language L (input)-+ system C-+ formalized grammar of L
(output).
Let N be the class of grammars of languages possessing all the structural
features that are common to human languages. These structural features
are Chomsky's linguistic universals. Whereas the natural languages on our
planet differ enormously from one another in their surface grammatical
structures, it turns out that languages with linguistic universals are quite
similar with regard to their deep grammatical structure. The class N is
by no means identical with the class of potential grammars referred to in
(1). In the somewhat mechanical-sounding idiom of automata theory,
Chomsky's first thesis can be formulated as follows: The human brain
('the brain of system C') at birth is programmed for certain structural
features of natural language 3 , specifically of just those languages whose
grammars belong to N. Man can learn only languages that have this
grammatical structure. This is the first innate component.
What role is played by the empirical data or input, that is, the speech
utterances of the environment? Whatever that role, it is not the positive
one ascribed to them by empiricistic-behaviorist theories. Rather these
data, to begin with, have a purely negative function. A swift elimination
APPENDIX: NOAM CHOMSKY 537
procedure separates out of N those grammars that are not relevant to the
data in the sense that the sentences uttered by the linguistic environment
can not be produced by such grammars. The remaining grammars are then
evaluated with respect to the empirical data in a certain manner.
At this juncture, a second innate component comes into play. Expressed
once more in terms of a model from automata theory, from the beginning
(in the case of man, at birth) there must be built into the language acqui-
sition device C an evaluation function that selects, from among the gram-
mars remaining after the above-mentioned inductive elimination, those
grammars that have the greatest value on the basis of the empirical data.
An additional empirical-heuristic procedure then leads to the rapid selec-
tion of that function (see (3) above) which assigns to a given sentence the
corresponding structural description relative to the grammar chosen.
Thus Chomsky obviously does not deny that experience plays a large
role in the learning of an ordinary language. What he holds is that
empiricistic philosophers, psychologists and linguists indulge in much too
primitive speculations about language learning. These speculations are
essentially primitive in that the only way they can be improved upon is not
by refining the conceptual and theoretical apparatus but by recognizing
in addition to the empirical data the efficacy of innate factors. Only by
gaining a deeper insight into the complicated interplay of empirical and
innate factors will we arrive at a better understanding of the unique and still
quite mysterious phenomenon of human language and how it is learned.
Thus we see that by no means does Chomsky proclaim some kind of
return to Cartesian and Leibnizian theories of innate concepts. And there
is a further important difference which should be stressed. Descartes and
Leibniz sought to provide a priori demonstrations for their theories.
On the other hand, Chomsky's hypothesis is an empirical one, which like any
other hypothesis in empirical science is subject to the criteria of empirical
testability.
At the Boston symposium referred to earlier, Putnam tried to reduce
Chomsky's ideas to five simple theses, which he then discussed critically.
It is most doubtful whether he thereby really did justice to Chomsky. Of
particular interest, perhaps, was the analogy Putman drew with the 'proof'
offered by Karl Marx in support of his labor theory of value in Volume III
of Capital. There Marx argues in essence as follows: What else could
explain the fact that commodities have different values except the fact that
538 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
REFERENCES
1 Lest I be accused of putting in Chomsky's mouth words that he never uttered, let me
expressly state that nowhere does he describe Wittgenstein as a dilettante. Yet the
formulation given above does seem useful in a brief account of the essential part of
Chomsky's ideas.
2 Chomsky does not utilize the notion of a derivation tree. It seems to me, however, that
his exposition gains in clarity and intelligibility if systematic use is made of this concept.
3 This expression is from Putnam, not Chomsky.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The philosophers treated in this volume have in general published a very large number
of books, monographs and articles. It has therefore not been possible here to include
more than the chief larger works and the most important papers. Similarly, space
limitations have permitted mention of only a small selection from the extraordinarily
abundant secondary literature (almost 1000 books and articles have appeared thus
far on Heidegger alone). What have been included are in the main the most recent
items.
GENERAL WORKS ON CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
Bochenski, J. M., Europiiische Philosophie der Gegenwart, 2nd ed., Berne 1951.
Fischl, J., Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. V: Idealismus, Realismus und Existentialis-
mus der Gegenwart, Vienna 1954.
Heinemann, F., Neue Wege der Philosophie, Geist I Leben I Existenz, Leipzig 1929.
Hiibscher, A., Denker unserer Zeit, Munich 1956.
Landgrebe, L., Philosophie der Gegenwart, Bonn 1952.
Ruggiero, G. de, Philosophische Stromungen des 20. Jahrhunderts, Cologne 1949.
Meyer, H., Die Weltanschauung der Gegenwart, Wiirzburg 1949.
Sawicki, F., Lebensanschauungen moderner Denker, vol. 11: Die Philosophie der Gegen-
wart, Paderborn 1952.
Stegmiiller, W., Hauptstromungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Vienna 1952.
Wamock, G. J., English Philosophy since 1900, London 1958.
Spiegelberg, H., The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction, The
Hague 1960. 2nd ed. 1965.
Urmson, J. O. (ed.), The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers,
New York 1960.
Winn, R. B., A Concise Dictionary of Existentialism, New York 1960.
Brunner, c., Die Deutsche Philosophie nach 1945, Berlin 1961.
BRENTANO, F.
Chief works:
Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, Freiburg i. Br. 1862.
Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, Mainz 1867.
Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr augenblicklicher Stand, Stuttgart 1895.
Aristoteles und seine Weitanschauung, Leipzig 1911.
Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (ed. by O. Kraus), 2nd ed., Leipzig 1934.
Die Lehre Jesu und ihre bleibende Bedeutung (ed. by A. Kastil), Leipzig 1922.
Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (ed. by O. Kraus), Leipzig, vol. I, 1924; vol.
11,1925; vol. Ill: Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewusstsein, 1928.
Versuch iiber die Erkenntnis (ed. by A. Kastil), Leipzig 1925.
540 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
HUSSERL, E.
Chief Works:
Philosophie der Arithmetik, Halle 1891.
'Folgerungskalkiil und Inhaltslogik', Vierteljahresschrift f wiss. Philosophie 15 (1891).
Logische Untersuchllngen, 3 vols., 4th ed., Halle 1928.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 541
SCHELER,M.
Chief Works:
Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode, Leipzig 1900.
Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, 2nd ed., Halle 1921; 4th ed.,
Berne 1954.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 543
Vom Umsturz der Werte, 2 vols., Leipzig 1919; 4th ed., Berne 1955.
Vom Ewigen im Menschen, Leipzig 1921; 4th ed., Berne 1954.
Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Halle 1923; 5th ed., Frankfurt/M. 1948.
Sehri/ten zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre, 3 vols., Leipzig 1924.
Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Leipzig 1926.
Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, Darmstadt 1928; Munich 1947.
Mensch und Geschichte, ZUrich 1929.
Phi/osophische Weltanschauung, Bonn 1929.
Nachgelassene Sehriften, vo!. I: Zur Ethik und Erkenntnistheorie, Berlin 1933; 2nd ed.
in: Gesammelte Werke (ed. by Maria Scheler), vo!. X, Berne 1957.
Other Literature:
Przywara, E., Religionsbegriindung. Max Seheler - J. H. Newman, Freiburg 1923.
Heber, J., Das Problem der Erkenntnis Gottes in der Religionsphi/osophie Max Schelers,
Hamburg 1931.
Kraenzlin, G., Max Sehelers phiinomenologische Systematik, Leipzig 1934.
Altmann, A., Die Grundlage der Wertethik, Berlin 1935.
Temuralp, T., Ober die Grenzen der Erkennbarkeit bei Husserl und Seheler, Berlin 1937.
Koehle, E., Personality. A Study According to the Philosophy of Value and Spirit of
M. Seheler and N. Hartmann, Newton, N.J., 1941.
Hessen, S., Max Seheler, Essen 1948.
Kransack, T., Max Seheler, Berlin 1949.
MUller, Ph., De la psychologie d /'anthropologie. A travers /'(J!Uvre de Max Seheler,
Boudry 1946.
LUtzeler, H., Der Philosoph Max Seheler, Bonn 1947.
Scheler, M., 'Bericht Uber die Arbeit am phi!. Nachlass M. Schelers', Ztschr. f.
Phi/os. Forschung 2 (1947).
Besgen, A., Religion und Phi/osophie bei Max Seheler, Bonn 1949.
Blessing, E., Das Ewige im Menschen. Die Grundkonzeption der Religionsphi/osophie
M. Sehelers, Stuttgart 1954.
Hartmann, W., Die Philosophie M. Schelers und ihre Beziehungen zu Ed. v. Hartmann,
DUsseldorf 1956.
Lorscheid, B., 'Max Schelers Phanomenologie des Psychischen', Abhandlungen zur
Philosophie, Psychologie und Piidagogik 11 (1957).
Klausen, S., Grundgedanken der materialen Wertethik (N. Hartmann, M. Scheler) in
ihrem Verhiiltnis zur Kantischen, Oslo 1958.
Lorscheid, B., Das Leibphiinomen. Schelers Wesensontologie des Leiblichen, Bonn 1962.
Schutz, A., Collected Papers. I: The Problem of Social Reality (ed. by M. Natanson),
The Hague 1962.
Sweeney, R. D., Material Value in Max Seheler's Ethics: An Exposition and Critique
Diss. Fordham Univ. 1962.
Bassenge, F., 'Drang und Geist. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Schelers Anthropologie',
Ztschr.f, Phi/os. Forschung 17 (1963).
HEIDEGGER, M.
Chief Works:
Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Seotus, TUbingen 1916.
544 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
'Sein und Zeit. Erste Hiilfte', in Jahrb. f Phi!. u. phiinamenalag. Farschung, Halle, 8
(1927).
'Vom Wesen des Grundes', in Ergiinzungsband zum Jahrb. f Phi!. und phanamenolag.
Farschung. Festschr. E. Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet, Halle 1929.
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Bonn 1929.
Was ist Metaphysik?, Bonn 1929 (Inaugural lecture, Freiburg i. B. 24 June 1929).
'HOlderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung', in Das Innere Reich, vo!. Ill, Munich
1936/37.
Hoiderlins Hymne: 'Wie wenn am Feiertage', Halle 1941.
'Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit', in Geistige Oberlieferung, vo!. 11, Berlin 1942.
Vam Wesen der Wahrheit, Frankfurt/M. 1943.
Was ist Metaphysik? (4th ed., enlarged with a Postscript), Frankfurt/M. 1943.
'Brief iiber den "Humanismus"', in M. Heidegger, Platans Lehre van der Wahrheit.
Mit einem Briefuber den 'Humanismus', Berne 1947.
Was ist Metaphysik? (4th ed., enlarged with an Introduction), Frankfurt/M. 1949.
Vam Wesen der Wahrheit (2nd ed., with an enlarged Summary), Frankfurt/M. 1949.
Vam Wesen des Grundes (3rd ed., enlarged with a Preface), Frankfurt/M. 1949.
Halzwege, Frankfurt/M. 1950.
Erlauterungen zu Hoiderlins Dichtung, Frankfurt/M. 1951.
Was heisst Denken?, in Merkur, Munich, 6 (1952).
Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, Tiibingen 1953.
'Die Frage nach der Technik', in Die Kunste im Technischen Zeitalter. Dritte Falge des
Jahrb. Gestalt und Gedanke, Munich 1954.
'Anmerkungen iiber die Metaphysik. (Aus den Jahren 1936-1946)" in Im Umkreis
der Kunst. Eine Festschrift fur Emi! Pretarius, Wiesbaden 1954.
Vortrage und Aufsiitze, Pfullingen 1954.
Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, Pfullingen 1954.
Ober "Die Linie", Festschr./ur Ernst lunger, Frankfurt/M. 1955.
Gelassenheit, Pfullingen 1959.
Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pfullingen 1959.
Vam Wesen und Begri./f der Physis: Aristoteles Physik, Bk. I, Milan 1960.
Nietzsche, 2 vols., Pfullingen 1961.
Kants These uber das Sein, Frankfurt/M. 1962.
Die Frage nach dem Ding, Tiibingen 1962.
Other Literature:
Cassirer, E., 'Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (zu Heideggers Kant-Inter-
pretation)', Kantstudien 36 (1931).
Janssen, 0., Das erlebende Ich und sein Dasein, Berlin and Leipzig 1932, pp. 199-218:
'Die Verirrungen des Seinproblems in der "Hermeneutik" des "Daseins"'.
Kraft, J., Van Husserl zu Heidegger. Kritik der phanomenalagischen Philasaphie, Leip-
zig 1932; 2nd ed., Frankfurt/M. 1957.
Sternberger, A., Der verstandene Tod. Eine Untersuchung zu M. Heideggers Existential-
ontalagie, Leipzig 1934.
Bollnow, 0., 'Existenzphilosophie und Geschichte', Blatter f deutsche Philasophie 11
(1938).
Das Wesen der Stimmungen, Frankfurt/M. 1941.
'Existenzphilosophie', in Systematische Philasaphie (ed. by N. Hartmann), Stuttgart 1942.
Marcel, G., 'Autour de Heidegger', in Dieu vivant, vo!. I, Paris 1945.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 545
JASPERS, K.
Chief Works:
Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, Berlin 1919.
Die Idee der Universitiit, Berlin 1923.
Die geistige Situation der Zeit, Berlin 1931.
Philosophie, 3 vols.; vol. I: Philosophische Weltorientierung, vol. 11: Existenzerhellung,
vol. Ill: Metaphysik, Berlin 1932.
Vernunft und Existenz, funf Vorlesungen, Groningue 1935.
Nietzsche, Einfuhrung in das Verstiindnis seines Philosophierens, Berlin 1936.
Descartes und die Philosophie, Berlin 1937; 2nd ed., Berlin 1956.
Existenzphilosophie, drei Vorlesungen, Berlin 1938; 2nd ed., 1956.
Philosophische Logik, vol. I: Von der Wahrheit, Munich 1947.
Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, Munich 1950.
Einfuhrung in die Philosophie, Munich 1953.
Der philosophische Glaube, Munich 1955.
Die grossen Philosophen, vol. I, Munich 1957.
'Philosophical Autobiography' and 'Reply to my Critics', in The philosophy of Karl
Jaspers (ed. by P. A. Schilpp), New York 1957; German ed.: Stuttgart 1957.
Die Atombombe und die Zukunft des Menschen, Munich 1958.
with Portmann, A., Wahrheit und Wissenschaft, Basle 1960.
Vernunft und Existenz, Munich 1960.
Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung, Munich 1960.
with Rossmann, K., Die Idee der Universitiit, Heidelberg 1961.
Drei Grunder des Philosophierens: Platon, Augustin, Kant, Munich 1961.
Der Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Ojfenbarung, 2nd ed., Munich 1962; 1964.
with Zahrnt, H., Philosophie und Ojfenbarungsglaube, Hamburg 1963.
Other Literature:
Wahl, J., 'Le probleme du choix, l'existence et la transcendence dans la philosophie
de Jaspers', Revue de metaphysique et de morale 41 (1934).
Dufrenne, M. and Ricoeur, P., K. Jaspers et la philosophie de i'existence, Paris
1947.
Wahl, J., La tMorie de la verite dans la philosophie de Jaspers, Les Cours de Sorbonne,
Paris 1953.
Ojfener Horizont, Festschrift fur Kart Jaspers, Munich 1953.
Lichtigfeld, A., Jaspers' Metaphysics, London 1954.
Knauss, G., Gegenstand und Umgrei/endes, Basle 1954.
Paumen, J., Raison et existence chez Karl Jaspers, Brussels 1958.
'24 weitere Abhandlungen', in The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers (ed. by P. Schillp), New
York 1957, German ed.: Stuttgart 1957.
Bentz, H. W., Karl Jaspers in Obersetzungen, eine Bibliographie, Frankfurt/M. 1961.
Phillips, R. M., Time, Freedom, and Self-Consciousness in the Philosophies of K. J. and
Nicholas Berdyaev, Diss. Bryn Mawr College, Pa. (U.S.A.) 1961.
Reinitz, E., Kant and the Beginnings of German Existentialism: A Study in the Early
Philosophy of K. J., Diss. Johns Hopkins Univ., 1961.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 547
HAR TMANN, N.
Chief Works:
Platos Logik des Seins, Giessen 1909.
'Uber die Erkennbarkeit des Apriorischen', Logos 5 (1915).
'Die Frage der Beweisbarkeit des Kausalgesetzes', Kantstudien 24 (1919).
'Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus', Kantstudien 29 (1924).
Grundziige einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, Berlin 1925; 4th ed., 1949.
Ethik, Berlin 1926; 3rd ed., 1949.
Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. I, Berlin 1923; vol. 11, Berlin
1929.
Aristoteles und Hegel, Erfurt 1933.
Das Problem des geistigen Seins, Berlin 1933; 2nd ed., 1949.
Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, Berlin 1935; 3rd ed., 1949.
Moglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, Berlin 1938; 2nd ed., 1949.
Der Aufbau der realen Welt, Berlin 1940; 2nd ed., 1949.
'Neue Wege der Ontologie', Systematische Philosophie, Stuttgart 1942.
Philosophie der Natur, Abriss der speziellen Kategorienlehre, Berlin 1950.
Teleologisches Denken, Berlin 1951.
A'sthetik (ed. by F. Hartmann), Berlin 1953.
Philosophische Gespriiche, Gottingen 1955.
Kleinere Schri/ten (ed. by F. Hartmann), vol. I: Abhandlungen zur systematischen
Philosophie, Berlin 1955. - Vol. 11: Abhandlungen zur Philosophiegeschichte, Berlin
1957. - Vol. Ill: Vom Neukantianismus zur Ontologie, Berlin 1958.
Other Literature:
Aster, E. von, 'Zur Kritik der materialen Wertethik', Kantstudien 32 (1928).
Gurvitch, Georges, Les tendances actuelles de la philosophie allemande. E. Husserl,
M. Scheler, E. Lask, N. Hartmann, M. Heidegger, Preface de Leon Brunschvicg,
Paris 1930.
Plessner, H., 'Geistiges Sein', Kantstudien 37 (1933).
Guggenberger, Alois, 'Das Weltbild N. Hartmanns. Die erkenntnistheoretische Grund-
these', Stimmen der Zeit 136 (1939).
Vanni-Rovighi, Sofia, 'L'ontologia di Nicolai Hartmann', Rivista di ftlos. neoscol. 31
(1939).
Guggenberger, A., Der Menschengeist und das Sein. Eine Begegnung mit Nicolai Hart-
mann, KraiIIing 1942.
Kempski, J. v., 'N. Hartmann', Cahiers franc-allemands, Dtsch.-/ranz. Monatshefte,
Karlsruhe, 9 (1942).
Landmann, M., 'N. Hartmann and Phenomenology', Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 3 (1942/43).
Breton, St., 'La theorie de la modalite dans l'ontologie de N. Hartmann', Rassegna di
scienze ftlosoftche 1 (1948).
Konig, J., 'Uber einen neuen ontologischen Beweis des Satzes von der Notwendigkeit
aIIes Geschehens', Arch.f Phil. 2 (1948).
Hartmann, M., 'Das Mechanismus-Vitalismus-Problem vom Standpunkt der kritischen
Ontologie N. Hartmanns', Ztschr.f Philos. Forschung 3 (1948).
Klein, I., Das Sein und das Seiende. Das Grundproblem der Ontologie N. Hartmanns
und M. Heideggers, Cologne 1949.
548 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
Trost, A., Das Sein der Werte. Eine Untersuchung zur Ontologie der Werte bei Max
Scheler und N. Hartmann, o. O. 1969.
Meyer, H., Die Weltanschauung der Gegenwart, Paderbom-Wiirzburg 1949.
Hafert, H. J., 'N. Hartmanns Ontologie und die Naturphilosophie', Phi/osophia
naturaUs 1 (1950).
Hennemann, G., 'Welt und Menschen in der Sicht N. Hartmanns', Ztschr. f Phi/os.
Forschung 4 (1950).
Hiibler, M., 'WerthOhe und Wertstarke in der Ethik von N. Hartmann', Phi/. Stud.
1 (1950).
Beth, E. W., 'N. Hartmanns Natuurphilosophie', Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor
Wijsbegeerte en Psycho!. 43 (1951).
Kropp, G., Naturphi/osophie als Kategorialanalyse. Zum Gedenken an N. Hartmann,
Schlehdorf/Obb. 1951.
Schilling, K., 'Bemerkungen zu N. Hartmanns Ontologie', Arch. f Rechts- u. Sozial-
phi/. 39 (1951).
Leisegang, H., 'N. Hartmann zum Gedachtnis', Ztschr. f Phi/os. Forschung 5 (1951).
Mayer, E., Die Objektiviit der Werterkenntnis bei N. Hartmann, Meisenheim/Glan
1952.
Heimsoeth, H., N. Hartmann. Der Denker und sein Werk (with 15 new articles on
N. Hartmann), Gattingen 1952.
BaIIauf, Th., 'N. Hartmanns Philosophie der Natur. Zu ihren Voraussetzungen und
Grenzen', Phi/osophia naturalis 2 (1952/53).
Wahl, J., La tMorie des categories fondamentales dans N. Hartmann, Paris 1954.
Baumann, W., Das Problem der Finalitiit im Organischen bei N. Hartmann, Meisen-
heim/Glan 1955.
Hiilsmann, H., Die Methode in der Philosophie N. Hartmamls, Diisseldorf 1959.
Schmitz, J., Displlt iiber das teleologische Denken. Eine Gegeniiberstellllng von N. H .•
Aristoteles und Thomas v. Aqllin, Mainz 1960.
Beck, H., Moglichkeit und Notwendigkeit zur Modalitiitenlehre N. Hs., PuIIach 1961.
Molitor, A., 'Bemerkungen zum Realismusproblem bei N. H.', Ztschr. f Phi/os. For-
schung 15 (1961).
Baumgartner, H. M., Die Unbedingtheit des Sittlichen. Eine AlIseinandersetzllng mit
N. H., Munich 1962.
Breton, S., L'etre spiritllel. Recherches sur la philosophie de N. H., Lyon/Paris 1962.
Kanthack, K., N. H. lInd das Ende der Ontologie, Berlin 1962.
Herrigel, H., 'Was heisst Ontologie bei N. H.?', Ztschr,f Phi/os. Forschllng 17 (1963).
Schmiicker, F. G., 'N. Hs. Erkenntnismetaphysik in phanomenologischer Sicht',
Ztschr. f Phi/os. Forschung 17 (1963).
Maslang, A., Finalitiit. Ihre Problematik in der Phi/osophie N. Hs., Fribourg 1964.
Scheinprobleme der Philosophie, Berlin 1928. 2nd ed. (together in one volume, with
a new preface by the author), Hamburg 1961.
Abriss der Logistik, Vienna 1929.
'Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft', Erkenntnis 2 (1932).
'Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache', Erkenntnis 3 (1932).
'Uber Protokollsatze', Erkenntnis 3 (1932).
Die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftslogik, Vienna 1934.
Logische Syntax der Sprache, Vienna 1934 (Engl. translation with additions, 2nd ed.,
London 1949).
'Testability and Meaning', Philosophy of Science 3 (1936); and 4 (1937) (new printing
New Haven 1950).
'Foundations of Logic and Mathematics', Internat. Encycl. of Unified Science, 1939.
Introduction to Semantics, Cambridge, Mass., 3rd ed., 1948.
Formalization of Logic, Cambridge, Mass., 1943.
'On Inductive Logic', Philosophy of Science (1945).
'Modalities and Quantification', Journal of Symbolic Logic (1946).
'Remarks on Induction and Truth', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 6
(1946).
Meaning and Necessity; a Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, Chicago 1947.
For later works, see the literature listed under Foundational Studies and Analytic
Philosophy, especially P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudo/f Carnap, LaSalle,
Ill. and London 1963.
Kraft, V.:
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Neurath,O.:
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'Protokollsatze', Erkenntnis 3 (1932).
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Schlick, M.:
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'Positivismus und Realismus', Erkenntnis 3 (1932).
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Gesammelte Aufsiitze 1926-1936 (ed. by F. Waismann), Vienna 1938.
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Feigl, H., Scriven, M., and Maxwell, G. (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, vol. Il, Minneapolis 1958.
Bergmann, G., Philosophy of Science, Madison 1958.
Carnap, R., 'Beobachtungssprache und theoretische Sprache', Dialectica 12 (1958).
Stegmiiller, W., 'Wissenschaftstheorie', in Fischer-Lexikon, vol. Il: Philosophy, Frank-
furt 1958.
'Der Phanomenalismus und seine Schwierigkeiten', Archiv,f Phil. 8 (1958).
Braithwaite, R. B., Scientific Explanation, Cambridge 1959.
Hempel, C. G., 'The Logic of Functional Analysis', in Gross, L. (ed.), Symposion on
Sociological Theory, New York 1959.
Goodman, N., 'Recent Developments in the Theory of Simplicity', Philosophy and
Phenomenologicai Research 19 (1959).
Popper, K., The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London 1959.
Feigl, H. and MaxwelI, G. (eds.), Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, New
York 1961.
Nagel, E., The Structure of Science, New York 1961.
Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G. (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol.
Ill, MinneapoIis, Minn., 1962.
Nagel, E., Suppes, P., and Tarski, A. (eds.), Logic, Methodology, and the Philosophy
of Science, Stanford 1962.
Pap, A., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, New York 1962.
Baumrin, B. (ed.), Philosophy of Science, vols. I, 11, New York/London/Sydney 1963.
Kim, J., 'On the Logical Conditions of Deductive Explanation', Philosophy of Science
30 (1963).
Popper, K. R., Conjectures and Refutations, London 1963.
Rescher, N., 'Discrete State Systems, Markov Chains and Problems in the Theory of
Scientific Explanation and Prediction', Philosophy of Science 30 (1963).
Schemer, I., The Anatomy of inquiry, New York 1963.
Suppes, P. and Zinnes, J. L., 'Basic Measurement Theory', in Handbook of Mathe-
matical Psychology (ed. by R. D. Luce et al.), New York/London 1963.
Schilpp, P. A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudo/f Carnap, LaSalle m./London 1963.
Mandelbaum, M., Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception, Baltimore 1964.
3. Problems of Reality
Bernays, P., Sur le platonisme dans les mathematiques, Paris 1935.
Goodman, N., The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge, Mass., 1951.
Quine, W. V., 'Logic and the Reification of Universals', in Quine, W. V., From a
Logical Point of View, Cambridge, Mass., 1953.
Wang, Hao, 'What is an Individual?', The Philosophical Review 62 (1953).
Cartwright, R. L., 'Ontology and the Theory of Meaning', Philosophy of Science 21
(1954).
Bochenski, J. M., Church, A., and Goodman, N., The Problem of Universals, a Sym-
posium, Notre Dame, Ind., 1956.
Stegmiiller, W., 'Ontologie und Analytizitiit', Studia Philosophica, Switzerland, 16
(1956).
Feigl, H., 'The "Mental" and the "Physical"', in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, vol. II, Minneapolis 1958.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 553
WITTGENSTEIN, L.
Chief Works:
Diaries 1914-1916, in volume I of the Suhrkamp edition of the Schriften; in German
and English (transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe), ed. by G. H. von Wright and G. E. M.
Anscombe, Oxford 1961. Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, published under the title
Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung in Ostwald's Annalen der Naturphilosophie, 1921;
in Volume I of the Suhrkamp edition of the Schriften; in German and English, London
1922, 1960. 'Letter to the Editor' of Mind (1933). 'A Lecture on Ethics', The Philo-
sophical Review (1965), 3-12. 'Lectures in 1930 to 1933', edited with a commentary
by G. E. Moore, Mind 63 (1954), 1-15,289-316; Mind 64 (1955), 1-27,264. Lectures:
'Is Mathematics Based on Logic?' (manuscript), Oxford 1939. Philosophische Bemer-
kungen, Suhrkamp edition of Schriften, volume n, ed. by R. Rhees, Frankfurt/M.
and Oxford, 1964. Philosophical Investigations; in vol. I of the Suhrkamp edition of
the Schriften; in German and English (transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe), ed. by G. E. M.
Anscombe and R. Rhees, Oxford, 1st ed., 1953, 2nd ed., 1958. The Blue and Brown
Books, Oxford 1958. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, in German and
English (transl. by G. E. M. Anscombe), ed. by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and
G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford 1956.
Other Literature:
Malcolm, N., 'Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations', The Philosophical Review 63
(1954),530-559 (reprinted in Knowledge and Certainty, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963).
Rhees, R., Can There be a Private Language? (Symposium Ayer-Rhees), Aristotelian
Society, Suppl. vol. XXVIII, 1954, pp. 77-94.
Strawson, P. E., 'Philosophical Investigations. By Ludwig Wittgenstein', Mind 63
(1954), 70-99.
Von Wright, G. H., 'Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Biographical Sketch', The Philosophical
Review 64 (1955), 527-545. German in 'Beiheft' to vol. I of the Wittgenstein-edition
of Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1960.
Feyerabend, P., 'Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations', The Philosophical Review
64 (1955), 449-483.
Stegmiiller, W., 'Glauben, Wissen und Erkennen', Ztschr. f Philos. Forschung 10
(1956),509-549 (printed in StegmiiIler, W., Special publication of the Wissenschaftl.
BuchgeseIlsch. Darmstadt, 1965; Reihe 'LibelIi', vol. XCIV).
Anderson, A. R., 'Mathematics and the "language game"', Review of Metaphysics 11
(1957/58), 446-458.
Copi, I. M., 'Objects, Properties, and Relations in the Tractatus', Mind 67 (1958),
145-165.
Feibleman, J. K., Inside the Great Mirror: a Critical Examination of the Philosophy of
Russell, Wittgenstein and Their Followers, The Hague/London 1958.
MaIcolm, N., Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir, With a Biographical Sketch by G. H.
von Wright, London/New York/Oxford 1958; German: Munich/Vienna 1961.
Pole, D., The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein, London 1958.
Kreisel, G., 'Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics', The British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (1958/59), 135-158.
Anscombe, G. E. M., An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus', London 1959.
Bernays, P., Betrachtungen zu Ludwig Wittgensteins "Bemerkungen iiber die Grund-
lagen der Mathematik''', Ratio (1959), 1-18.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 555
CHOMSKY, N.
Chief Works:
'Explanatory Models in Linguistics', in Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of
Science (ed. by E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski), Stanford 1962, pp. 528-550.
'A Transformational Approach to Syntax', in The Structure of Language. Readings in
the Philosophy of Language (ed. by J. A. Fodor and J. J. Katz), London 1964, pp.
211-245.
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, Mass., 1965.
556 MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY
Aristotle 2, 18, 33, 41, 52, 69, 179, 222, Gentzen, G. 333
255,350 GOdel, K. 258, 333, 508
Augustine 148, 437, 454 Goodman, N. 360--5, 369, 370--2, 454,
Austin, John L. 444, 526 469, 470, 481, 528, 538
Avenarius, R. 269 Gorgias 266
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