Proceeding Paper
How GPT Realizes Leibniz’s Dream and Passes the Turing Test
without Being Conscious †
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic 1,2
Citation: Dodig-Crnkovic, G. How
GPT Realizes Leibniz’s Dream and
Passes the Turing Test without Being
Conscious. Comput. Sci. Math. Forum
2023, 8, 66. https://doi.org/10.3390/
cmsf2023008066
Academic Editors: Zhongzhi Shi and
Wolfgang Hofkirchner
Published: 11 August 2023
Copyright: © 2023 by the author.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
Comput. Sci. Math. Forum 2023, 8, 66. https://doi.org/10.3390/cmsf2023008066
1 Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology,
412 96 Gothenburg, Sweden; dodig@chalmers.se
2 School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Mälardalen University, 721 23 Västerås, Sweden
† Presented at the Workshop on AI and People, IS4SI Summit 2023, Beijing, China, 14–16 August 2023.
Abstract: This article addresses the background and nature of the recent success of Large Language
Models (LLMs), tracing the history of their fundamental concepts from Leibniz and his calculus
ratiocinator to Turing’s computational models of learning, and ultimately to the current development
of GPTs. As Kahneman’s “System 1”-type processes, GPTs lack mechanisms that would render
them conscious, but they nonetheless demonstrate a certain level of intelligence and the capacity to
represent and process knowledge. This is achieved by processing vast corpora of human-created
knowledge, which, for its initial production, required human consciousness, but can now be collected,
compressed, and processed automatically.
Keywords: LLM; GPT; Leibniz’s calculus ratiocinator; Turing Machine; Turing Test; consciousness
1. Introduction
The latest technological advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs), such
as ChatGPT and other Generative Pretrained Transformer platforms (GPTs), have pro-
vided evidence supporting Turing’s theory on the possibility of machine-based intelli-
gence/Artificial Intelligence (AI). Not only does ChatGPT deliver believable replies in
dialogues with humans and effectively pass the Turing Test, it has also succeeded in
impressing some humans to the point where they ascribe personality to it.
Originally referred to as “the imitation game”, the Turing Test was designed to assess
a machine’s ability to exhibit intelligent verbal behavior comparable to that of a human.
Turing proposed that a human evaluator would engage in natural language conversations
with both a human and a machine, and if the evaluator could not distinguish between
them, the machine would demonstrate its capacity for faithfully imitating human verbal
behavior. Observe that Turing did not mention consciousness, only the ability to imitate.
However, there are reported examples of individuals who believe that ChatGPT is
conscious. As reported by The New York Times on 23 July 2022 (accessed on 23 July
2022), Google fired engineer Blake Lemoine for claiming that Google’s Language Model for
Dialogue Applications (LaMDA) was sentient, (i.e., experiencing sensations, perceptions,
and other subjective experiences). While Lemoine’s views were extreme, he was not the
only one attributing sentience and even consciousness to new LLM platforms. More
cautious interpretations suggest that LLMs might, in principle, possess some degree of
consciousness, but currently, we have no way to ascertain this.
The advances of LLMs are rooted in principles that have been a part of AI research
since the inception of deep neural networks, but what sets them apart is how they are
currently being implemented. Modern advancements are built upon extensive neural
networks, which are trained on vast datasets using thousands of high-speed graphical
processing units (GPUs) in large computer clusters. This training process is supported by
an efficient infrastructure, Transformer architectures, and neural network optimization
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techniques. The crucial final steps involve applying reinforcement learning with the human
feedback (RLHF) [1]. Human AI trainers create a reward model that ranks responses,
training the AI to determine the most appropriate responses for a given human interaction.
The effectiveness of this method and the ability of LLMs to generate intelligent re-
sponses in natural language were unexpected by the majority, who believed that more
complex approaches would be required to pass the Turing Test. However, it appears that
performing comprehensive computations over human-structured data, information, and
knowledge may be sufficient to demonstrate a surprising level of imitation of human
language abilities.
The training of GPT-3.5 involved a wide range of resources, including Wikipedia
articles, social media posts, news articles, books, and other documents published before
2021. The next step in the development of the current methodology involves enhancing
ChatGPT prompts with web search capabilities using WebChatGPT.
Data compression (Kolmogorov–Chaitin compression) plays a central role in the entire
process of utilizing the collected human knowledge. As formulated by Greg Chaitin in 2006,
“A useful theory is a compression of the data; compression is comprehension” [2]. In 2018,
inspired by the work of Greg Chaitin, Hector Zenil wrote an article titled “Compression is
Comprehension and the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Digital Computation in the Natural
World” (https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.10258v3, accessed on 23 July 2022). Gerry Wolff, in his
article “Intelligence Via Compression of Information” (tinyurl.com/2p8d5f4z, accessed on
23 July 2022), published in the IEEE Computer Society Tech News, Community Voices, on
1 February 2023, explains the mechanism of data compression in a cognitive system as a
process of intelligence. Phil Maguire, Philippe Moser, and Rebecca Maguire take it a step
further by arguing that consciousness can be understood as data compression [3].
On the other end of the spectrum regarding the acknowledgment of LLM capabilities
is Luciano Floridi, who views LLMs as “agency without intelligence” [4]. This alludes to
“their ‘brittleness’ (susceptibility to catastrophic failure), ‘unreliability’ (false or fabricated
information), and occasional inability to make basic logical inferences or handle simple
mathematics”. Floridi’s article concludes that at the current stage of development, LLMs
exhibit no intelligence. In this context, “intelligence” refers to an idealized human capacity
for rational reasoning. However, it is worth noting that recent developments in cognitive
science indicate a development toward a different, more inclusive understanding of intelli-
gence, wherein not only humans but every living organism possesses a level of cognition
(basal cognition) and intelligence [5].
To make a connection to human abilities, it is helpful to examine Large Language
Models (LLMs) not only in terms of their implemented mechanisms of data/information
processes and architectures but also in comparison to human cognition. According to
Daniel Kahneman, humans possess two complementary cognitive systems: “System 1”,
which involves rapid, intuitive, automatic, and non-conscious information processing;
and “System 2”, which encompasses slower, reflective, conscious reasoning and decision-
making [6,7]. By solely recognizing “System 2” symbolic information processing (as seen
in traditional AI approaches such as GOFAI), the symbol grounding problem remains
unsolved. In contrast, “System 1” neural networks, as sub-symbolic data processing
mechanisms, provide a means for symbol grounding in deep learning.
The fast neural network computation performed by LLMs, resulting in convincing dia-
logues, aligns with the fast thinking associated with “System 1”. According to Kahneman’s
description, being on the “System 1” level means that LLMs lack consciousness, which, in
this context, is characteristic of “System 2”.
Researchers such as Joshua Bengio are exploring ways to incorporate “System 2” and
merge neural networks with symbolic computing. Proposed hybrid models [8,9] would
combine symbolic and sub-symbolic elements, enabling the modeling of a blend of reactive
(fast, non-conscious/sub-conscious) and deliberative (slow, conscious) cognitive behaviors
typical of human cognition. It should be noted that the interpretations of “System 1”
and “System 2” by Bengio and Kahneman are not identical. This was evident from the
Comput. Sci. Math. Forum 2023, 8, 66 3 of 6

discussion at the AAAI-2020 conference during the Fireside Chat with Lecun, Hinton,
Bengio, and Kahneman [10]. However, the specifics of their differences are not essential for
our present exposition.
The fast, automatic “System 1” can be understood, as stated in [11], through physical
correlations explained by Carlo Rovelli [12], which aligns with Shannon’s relative informa-
tion theory. These physical correlations can also accommodate some reflexive emotional
elements [13] in embodied (physical) agents. On the other hand, the slow “System 2”
introduces an element of choice and indeterminism [14], primarily due to the presence of
synonyms in the symbol system. This topic has been further explored in other research that
also discusses parallel concurrent computation, which is typical of biological systems but is
inadequately represented by the Turing Machine model [15].

2. Historical Notes, from Leibniz via Turing to GPT

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s work on universal language, “Characteristica Uni-versalis”,
and calculus of reasoning, “Calculus Ratiocinator”, provide a theoretical framework for
universal logical calculations that have greatly influenced modern computer science and AI.
In many ways, ChatGPT can be seen as the realization of Leibniz’s vision of “characteristica
universalis” and a method for generating new knowledge from existing information.
This article traces the evolution of the computational approach to knowledge gen-
eration from its roots in Leibniz’s concept of a universal language to Turing’s ideas of
morphogenesis and, further, to modern AI models such as ChatGPT. Turing’s contributions
laid the ground for a computational approach to learning and knowledge generation, with
the invention of the Turing Machine for symbol processing, the concept of an “unorganized
machine” (neural network model), and the Turing Test for Artificial Intelligence [16].
This article explores the possibility that knowledge generation and learning can be
achieved computationally, aligning with Leibniz’s original beliefs. It also highlights how
the success of ChatGPT and other Large Language Models can be viewed in the context of
Leibniz’s intellectual legacy.
Importantly, neither Leibniz, Turing, nor ChatGPT presupposes consciousness as a
requirement for the computational process of generating knowledge from existing informa-
tion and knowledge.

3. Penrose’s Criticism of Classical Computationalism and the Absence of

Consciousness in ChatGPT
Roger Penrose has expressed criticism of computationalism in two of his books and
proposed alternative perspectives on the nature of consciousness and human cognition. In
his first book, Penrose [17] examines the limitations of Artificial Intelligence and computa-
tional models in explaining human consciousness and understanding. He discusses Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems, the nature of consciousness, the role of quantum mechanics in
the brain, and the constraints of algorithmic reasoning. In his second book, Penrose [18]
continues his exploration of consciousness and its relationship to computation. He expands
his previous arguments and addresses criticisms and responses received following the pub-
lication of the first book. In this book, Penrose suggests that quantum processes underlie
consciousness.
In his more recent work from 2012, the foreword to A Computable Universe: Under-
standing Computation & Exploring Nature As Computation [19], which is Penrose’s latest
text on computationalism, he explicitly acknowledges having changed his position on the
question of computationalism (the belief that the mind can be modeled computationally)
multiple times. In the foreword, Penrose discusses different versions of computational-
ism and various possible interpretations. He expresses his criticism, based on the Turing
Machine Model of computation, assuming that computation = Turing Machine = algorithm.
When Penrose argues that consciousness is incomputable, he means that it is not
algorithmic in the sense of the Turing Machine. This position is well-established, even
Comput. Sci. Math. Forum 2023, 8, 66 4 of 6

within modern computational approaches which suggest that distributed, asynchronous,

and concurrent models of computation are necessary.
It is thus crucial to differentiate between new computational models of intrinsic
information processes in nature, such as natural computing/morphological computing, and
the old computationalism based on the computer metaphor of the Turing machine, which
describes symbol processing. This traditional model has been criticized as inadequate for
modeling human cognition (Miłkowski [20,21]; Scheutz [22]), and it is considered irrelevant
for AI by researchers such as Sloman [15].

4. Concluding Remarks. Passing the Turing Test Does Not Imply Consciousness but
Demonstrates a Useful Level of Intelligence
When Turing discussed the possibility of constructing artificially intelligent agents
based on computations performed by electronic machines, he was met with skepticism by
many. Even to this day, human intelligence and especially consciousness are often consid-
ered impossible to implement in machines due to their supposed substantial differences
in nature.
Recent technological advances in the development of Large Language Models (LLMs),
such as ChatGPT and other GPT (Generative Pretrained Transformer) programs, have
finally provided justification for Turing’s belief in the possibility of realizing intelligence
in machines, also known as Artificial Intelligence (AI). These advancements are based on
remarkably simple principles that have been known within the AI field for several decades,
particularly since the advent of deep neural networks.
The current developments primarily differ in the following respects: the use of large
neural networks trained on vast amounts of data; the utilization of thousands of fast GPUs
in huge computer clusters that run for several weeks; the implementation of elaborate
infrastructure; the optimization of neural networks; and the adoption of architectures such
as Transformers.
The final step in this progression was achieving a better interface for human users,
which was accomplished through reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF). In
this process, human AI trainers created a reward model in which responses were ranked
by humans, enabling the AI to learn which response was the most effective.
The method is surprisingly simple yet effective: predicting the next word based on
immense compressed data that contains human knowledge on a given topic collected from a
vast array of available Internet sources. Thus far, LLMs have employed large networks with
a substantial number of parameters, building extensive datasets, and designing algorithms
to pass the Turing Test.
Symbolic computing has not yet been involved. Researchers such as Joshua Bengio [23]
believe in the power of hybrid computing models that involve both neural networks (NNs)
and symbolic computing. This perceived necessity of two complementary systems is
motivated by the findings of Kahneman [6] and Tjøstheim et al. [24] on two basic cognitive
systems in humans: a “System 1” that involves reflexive, unconscious, automatic, and
intuitive information processing; and a slow “System 2” that involves reflective, conscious,
reasoning, and decision-making processes.
Computation in LLMs corresponds to Kahneman’s fast, intuitive “System 1”and
provides a foundation for the slower, symbolic processing of “System 2”. Current devel-
opments in AI are continuing toward the modeling “System 2” symbolic reasoning, as
presented by Russin, O’Reilly, and Bengio [23]. In a recent interview with Wired maga-
zine, Sam Altman from OpenAI said that the age of giant AI models is over and that new
development strategies will be needed in the future [25].
It is important to observe that the Turing Test which GPT programs can pass is not
a test of human consciousness but one which shows the ability of a machine to produce
sufficiently believable human-like dialogue.
The question of generating new knowledge de novo, i.e., not from a vast corpus
of existing human knowledge, is a different inquiry. Language models (LLMs) serve as
Comput. Sci. Math. Forum 2023, 8, 66 5 of 6

computational models for knowledge generation, producing new knowledge based on

existing knowledge. This is why GPT programs are trained on huge amounts of human-
produced text which required consciousness or physical presence in the world when it was
produced by humans.
This situation is similar to synthetic biology, which can construct a living cell by
assembling components from disassembled cells. However, it is still unable to generate
a living cell de novo from a container containing organic molecules that constitute a
living cell.
Using Kahneman’s terminology, LLMs operate on the ‘”System 1” level, with rapid
and unconscious processing. The success of LLMs relies on human knowledge being
compressed and reused. Humans employed consciousness during the generation of that
knowledge, but once it existed, an automated procedure could use it to generate addi-
tional knowledge.

Funding: This research was funded by Chalmers University of Technology AI Research Centre CHAIR.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: No new data were created.
Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Chalmers AI Research Centre CHAIR for
supporting the organization of the workshop “AI for People” at IS4SI summit 2023, to which this
article was submitted.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest. The funders had no role in the design
of the study; in the collection, analyses, or interpretation of data; in the writing of the manuscript; or
in the decision to publish the results.

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