BARNES' 'THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE'

Started: 19/08/23
Completed:

Categories
1
- When things have only a name in common and the definition of being
which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. (3)
- When things have both the name and definition of being which
corresponds to the name in common they are called synonymous. (3)
- When things get their name from something, with a difference in
ending, they are called paronymous. (3)
2
- Of things that are said, some involve combination and others do not.
(3)
- Of things that are: a) some are said of a subject but are not in any
subject; b) some are in a subject but are not said of any subject (by in a subject
is meant what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what
it is in); c) some are both said of a subject and in a subject; d) some are neither
in a subject nor said of a subject. Things that are individual and numerically one
are, without exception, not said of any subject, but there is nothing to prevent
some of them from being in a subject. (3)
3
- Whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all
things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also. (4)
- The differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate
one to the other are themselves different in kind. There is nothing to prevent
genera one to the other from having the same differentiae. For the higher are
predicated of the genera below them, so that all differentiae of the predicated
genus will be differentiae of the subject also. (4)
4
- Of things said without any combination, each signifies either
substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-
a-position or having or doing or being-affected. None of the above is said just by
itself in any affirmation, but by the combination of these with one another an
affirmation is produced. For every affirmation is either true or false; but of
things said without any combination none is either true or false. (4)
5
- That which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most
of all is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the
individual man or the individual horse. (4)
- The species in which things primarily called substances are, are
called secondary substance, as also are the genera of these species. (4)
- If something is said of a subject both its name and its definition
are necessarily predicated of the subject. But as for things which are in a
subject, in most cases neither the name nor the definition is predicated of the
subject. In some cases there is nothing stopping the name from being predicated of
the subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be predicated. (4, 5)
- All the other categories are either said of the primary substances as
subjects or in them as subjects. (5)
- If the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for
any of the other categories to exist. (5)
- No substance is in a subject; this is not peculiar to substances only
however, for the differentia also are not in a subject. For footed is said of man
but not in man. (6)
- The defintiion of the differentia is predicated of that of which the
differentia is said. (6)
 - We need not worry that we may be forced to say that the parts of a
substance, being in a subject (the whole substance), are not substances. For when
we spoke of things in a subject we did not mean things belonging to something as
parts. (6)
- It is a characteristic of substances and differentiae that all things
called from them are so called synonymously. (6)
- From a primary substance there is no predicate, for a primary
substance is not said of any subject. (6)
- Every substance seems to signify a certain "this." As regards the
primary substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signify a certain
"this"; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one. (6)
- The secondary substance does not signify a "this," but rather a
certain qualification; however, it does not signify simply a certain qualification,
like white does. White signifies nothing but a qualification, whereas the species
and genus mark off the qualification of substance - they signify substance of a
certain qualification. (6)
- Another characteristic of substance is that there is nothing contrary
to them, both primary and secondary substances. This is not unique to substance,
for there is also nothing contrary to any definite quantity. (7)
- Substance does not admit of a more and a less. (7)
- It seems distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and
the same is able to receive contraries. (7)
6
- Of quantities, some are discrete whilst others are continuous. Some
are composed of parts which have a position in relation to one another, others are
not composed of parts which have position. (8)
- Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces,
bodies, and also, besides these, time and place. (8)
- Nothing seems to admit contraries at the same time. (10)
- It turns out that things (primary substances) are their own
contraries (for example, this large thing and that small things). For if large (in
itself) is contrary to small (in itself), and the same thing (substance) is at
thesame time large and small (for it may be large in relation to one thing and
small in relation to another), a thing (substance) would be its own contrary. But
is is impossible for a thing to be its own contrary. Therefore, large (in itself)
is not contrary to small (in itself), nor many to few. So that even if someone says
that these belong not to relatives but to quantity, it will still have no contrary.
(10)
- A quantity does not seem to admit of a more or a less. (10)
- Most distinctive of a quantity is its being called both equal and
unequal. (10)
7
- We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they
are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else.
(10)
- State, condition, perception, knowledge, and position are all
examples of relatives. State of something, knowledge of something, etc. (10)
- Lying, standing and sitting are particular positions; position is a
relative. To-be-lying, to-be-standing, etc., are not positions, but they get their
names paronymously from the aforesaid positions. (11)
- There is contrariety in relatives, e.g. virtue is contrary to vice,
and knowledge to ignorance. But there is not a contrary to every realtive; there is
no contrary to double or treble or anything like that. (11)
- Relatives seem to admit of a more and a less. But not all admit of a
more and a less, for what is double is not more double or less double. (11)
- All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that
reciprocate. For example, double of a half and vice versa. (11)
- At least some relatives seem to be simultaneous by nature, for if
there is a double there is a half, if there is a slave there is a master; and each
carries the other to destruction. (12)
- Some relatives seem not to be simultaneous by nature, for the
knowable would seem to be prior to knowledge. Likewise, one does not carry the
other to its destruction, necessarily: for if there is not knowledge that does not
prevent there being a knowable; but, on the other hand, if there is not a knowable
there is no knowledge. (12)
- The perceptible seems to be prior to perception. (12)
- Substances are not relatives; for a relative to be a relative, one
must know definitely what it is relative to. (14)
8
- By a quality I mean that in virtue of which things are said to be
qualified somehow. But quality is one of those things which is spoken of in a
number of ways. (14)
- One kind of quality let us call states and conditions. A state
differs from a condition in being more stable and lasting longer. States are also
conditions but conditions are not necessarily states. (14)
- Another quality is that in virtue of which we call people boxers or
runners or healthy or sickly - anything, in short, which they are claled in virtue
of a natural capacity or incapacity. (14)
- A third kind of quality consists of affective qualities and
affections. Such include sweetness, bitterness, and the like, as well as hotness
and coldness and paleness and darkness. (15)
- Affections differ from affective qualities in that the former easily
disperses and quickly gives way, whereas the latter is more permanent, contrast a
man who reddens from shame to a man who is ruddy. (15)
- There are affective qualities and affections of the soul just as
there are of the body. (15, 16)
- A fourth kind of quality is shape and the external form of each
thing, and in addition straightness and curvedness and anything else of the like.
(16)
- Things called paronymously because of qualities or called in some
other way from them are qualified. (16)
- There is contrariety with regard to some qualities, but not to
others. (16)
- Qualifications admit of a more and a less. (17)
- It is in virtue of qualities only, and hence distinctive of
qualities, that things are called similar and dissimilar. (17)
- We should not be disturbed lest someone may say that though we
proposed to discuss quality we are counting in many relatives (since states and
conditions are relatives). For in pretty well all such cases the genera are spoken
of in relation to something else, but none of the particular cases is. For
knowledge, a genus, is called just what it is, of something else (it is called
knowledge of something); but none of the particular cases is called just what it
is, of something else. Grammar (a species of knowledge) is not called grammar of
something, etc. If at all, it is in virtue of the genus that these are spoken of in
relation of something, it is in virtue of the genus knowledge that grammar is said
to be the knowledge of something. Thus the particular cases are not relatives. But
it is with the particular cases that we are said to be qualified, for it is these
which we possess, e.g. we possess particular knowledge. Hence these - the
particular cases, in cirtue of which we are on occasion said to be qualified -
would indeed be qualities; and these are not relatives. (17)
- Moreover, if the same thing really is a qualification and a relative
there is nothing absurd in its being counted in both the genera. (17)
9
- Doing and being-affected admit of contrariety and of a more and a
less. (18)
10
- Things are said to be opposed in four ways: as relatives or as
contraries or as privation and possession or as affirmation and negation. (18)
 - Things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their
opposites or in some other way in relation to them. (18)
- Things opposed as contraries are never called just what they are, in
relation to one another, though they are called contraries of one another. (18)
- For contraries, if it is necessary for the one or the other to
belong, then there is no intermediate between them; however, if it is not necessary
for the one or the other to belong, then there is something intermediate between
them. (19)
- Privation and possession are spoken of in connection with the same
thing, for example, sight and blindness in connection with the eye. To generalise,
each of them is spoken of in relation to whatever the possession naturally occurs
in. (19)
- Both deprived and possessing are not privation and possession. For
sight is a possession and blindness a privation, but having sight is not sight nor
is being blind blindness. For blindness is a particular privation but being blind
is being deprived, not a privation. If blindness and blind were the same thing they
would be predicated in the same way, but man is not called both blind and
blindness. (19)
- Possession and privation are not opposed in the same way that
relatives or contraries are. (20)
- For things opposed as affirmation and negation it is necessary always
for one to be true and the other false; this is not the case for any of the other
opposites. Nothing that is said without combination is either true or false, and
all the opposites aside from affirmation and negation are said without combination.
(21)
- Either the affirmation or negation will be true even if the subject
does not exist. (21)
11
- What is contrary to a good thing is necessarily bad; but what is
contrary to a bad thing is sometimes bad also. (21)
- With contraries it is not necessary if one exists for the other to
exist to. (21)
- It is clearly the nature of contraries to belong to the same thing
(either the species or genus). (21, 22)
- All contraries must either be in the same genus or in contrary
genera, or be themselves genera. (22)
12
- One thing is called prior to another in four ways. (22)
- First and most strictly, in respect of time. (22)
- Secondly, what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence.
(22)
- Thirdly a thing is called prior in respect of some order, as with
sciences and speeches, for the introduction is said to be prior to the exposition.
(22)
- Finally, what is better and more values is thought to be prior by
nature; people say those they love the most have "priority," this way is perhaps
the least proper. (22)
- There is in fact a fifth way, a true statement is said to be
posterior to the thing the true statement is based on, as the true thing is in some
sense the cause of the statement's being true, and the cause of another's existence
might reasonably be called prior by nature. (22)
13
- Those things are called simultaneous without qualification and most
strictly which come into being at the same time. These are called simultaneous with
respect to time. (22)
- Those things are called simultaneous by nature which reciprocate as
to implication of existence, e.g. the double and the half. (22)
- Coordinate species of a genus are called simultaneous by nature. But
genera are prior to species since they do not reciprocate as to implication of
existence. (23)
14
- There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase,
diminution, alteration, change of place. (23)
- Change in general is contrary to staying the same. Destruction is
contrary to generation; increase to diminution; change of place seems most opposed
to staying in the same place, or perhaps to change in the contrary place; for
alteration there seems nothing to which it is contrary, except perhaps staying the
same in qualification or change towards the contrary qualification, for alteration
is change in qualification. (23)
- A thing alters through the occurence of change towards contrary
qualifications. (24)
15
- Having is spoken of in a number of ways: having as a state and
condition or some other quality; or as things on a body; or as a part; or as in a
container; or as a possession. This list is perhaps not exhaustive but is a pretty
complete enumeration. (24)

De Interpretatione
1
- Names and verbs by themselves signify nothing true or false, but may
do so only when they are combined. Written and spoken language differ among men,
yet the things to which the language points to are the same for all men. (25)
2
- A name is a spoken sound significant by convention, "by convention"
because no name is a name naturally. (25)
- "Not man" is not a name nor a phrase or a negation, let us call such
things indefinite names. (25)
3
- A verb is what additionally signifies time, no part of it being
significant separately; and it is a sign of things said of something else. The verb
"recover" additionally signifies something's holding now, in the present, whereas
the name "recovery" does not signify time. (26)
- "Does not recover" is an indefinite verb, because they hold
indifferently of anything whether existent or non-existent. "Recovered" and "will-
recover" are not verbs but inflexions of verbs. (26)
4
- A sentence is a significant spoken sound some part of which is
significant in separation - as an expression, not as an affirmation. (26)
- Not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but only those in
which there is truth or falsity. (26)
- Sentences other than statement-making sentences belong to the other
sciences such as rhetoric or poetry. (26)
5
- The first single statement-making sentence is the affirmation, next
is the negation. (26)
- Every statement-making sentence must contain a verb or an inflexion
of a verb. (26)
- A single statement-making sentence is either one that reveals a
single thing or one that is single in virtue of a connective. There are more than
one if more things than one are revealed or if connectives are lacking. (26)
- Let us call a name or a verb simply an expression. (27)
6
- For every affirmation there is an opposite negation; and vice versa.
Let us call an affirmation and a negation which are opposite a contradiction. I
speak of statements as opposites when they affirm and deny the same thing of the
same thing. (27)
7
 - Of actual things some are universal and others particular. I call
universal that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things, and
particular that which is not. (27)
- It is sometimes of a universal that someone states that something
does or does not hold, and sometimes of a particular. (27)
- If someone states universally of a universal that something holds or
does not, there will be contrary statements. (27)
- When someone states something of a universal non-universally the
statements are not contrary. (27)
- "Every" or "no" does not signify a universal but a universal is being
taken universally. (27)
- It is not true to predicate a universal universally of a subject, for
instance, every man is every animal. (27)
- I call an affirmation and a negation contradictory opposites when
what one signifies universally the other signifies not universally. I call the
universal affirmation and the universal negation contrary opposites, for these
cannot be true together, but yet it is possible that neither holds true. (27)
- Of contradictory statements about a universal taken universally it is
necessary for one or the other to be true or false; similarly if they are about
particulars. (28)
8
- A single affirmation or negation is one which signifies one thing
about one thing (whether about a universal taken universally or not), assuming that
the subject has just one meaning, and means that one meaning. (28)
9
- With regard to what is and what has been it is necessary for the
affirmation or negation to be true or false. (28)
- What is as chance has it is no more thus than not thus, either
possibility may actualise. (29)
- Aristotle seems to think that because we see things that have their
origin in deliberation or in action, there are clear examples of things happening
that did not happen by necessity. (30)
- What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is
not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is; and not everything
that is not, necessarily is not. (30)
- It is not necessary that every affirmation and opposite negation one
should be true and the other false. For what holds for things that are does not
hold for things that are not but may possibly be or not be. (30)
10
- Every affirmation will contain either a name and a verb or a
indefinite name and a verb. Without a verb there will be no affirmation or
negation. (30)
- When "is" is predicated additionally as a third thing, there are two
ways of expressing opposition. Because of this there will be four cases: "is" will
be added to the predicate and the not-predicate, and likewise the negation, "is
not." (31)
- Prior Analytics is mentioned. (31)
- If the same name and verb are transposed the same affirmation and
negation are produced. (32)
11
- A dialectical question is such that it offers as an answer one or the
other side of a contradiction. (33)
- Topics is mentioned. (33)
- Of things predicated, and things they get predicated of, those which
are said accidentally, either of the same thing or of one another, will not be one
(made one compound). (33)
12
- The negation of "possible to be" is "not possible to be." (34)
- The negation of "admissable to be" is "not admissable to be";
similarly with "necessary" and "impossible." (34)
- Universally one must treat "to be" and "not to be" as the subjects,
and these others (possible, admissable, necessary, and impossible) must be joined
on to "to be" and "not to be" to make affirmations and negations. (34, 35)
13
- From "possible to be" follows "admissable to be" and from "not
impossible to be" follows "not necessary to be." (35)
- Some capabilities are homonymous. For the capable is spoken of in
more than one way: either because it is true as being actualised, or because it
might be actualised. This latter capability applies to changeable things only, the
former to unchangeable things as well. Thus it is not true to assert the second
kind of capability of that which is without qualification necessary, but it is true
to assert of the other. So, since the universal follows from the particular, from
being of necessity there follows capability of being - though not of every sort.
Perhaps the necessary and not necessary are first principles of everything's either
being or not being. What is of necessity is in actuality; so that, if things which
are eternal are prior, then also actuality is prior to capability. Some things are
actualities without capability (like the primary substances), others with
capability (and these are prior by nature but posterior in time to the capability);
and others are never actualities but only capabilities. (36, 37)
14
- The more true belief about anything is the one about what it is in
itself. (37)

Prior Analytics
Book One
1
- A proposition is a statement affirming or denying something of
something; and this is either universal or particular or indefinite. By universal I
mean a statement that something belongs to all or none of something; by particular
that it belongs to some or not to some or not at all; by indefinite that it does or
does not belong, without any mark of being universal or particular, e.g.
"contraries are subjects of the same science," or "pleasure is not good." (39)
- A demonstrative proposition differs from a dialectical one,
because a demonstrative proposition is the assumption of one or two contradictory
statements (the demonstrator lays his premise down), whereas a dialectical
proposition choice between two contradictories. But this will make no difference to
the production of a deduction in either case. (39)
- A deductive proposition without qualification will be an
affirmation or denial of something concerning something; it will be demonstrative,
if it is true and assumed on the basis of the first principles of its science; it
will be dialectical if it asks for a choice between two contradictories or if it
assumes what is apparent and reputable, as we said in the Topics. (39)
- I call a term that into which the proposition is resolved, i.e.
both the predicate and that which it is predicated, "is" or "is not" being added.
(40)
- A deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being
stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being
so. (40)
- I call perfect a deduction which needs nothing other than what
has been stated to make the necessity evident; a deduction is imperfect if it needs
either one or more things, which are indeed the necessary consequences of the terms
set down, but have not been assumed in the propositions. (40)
- That one term should be in another as in a whole is the same as
for the other to be predicated of all of the first. We say that one term is
predicated of all of another, whenever nothing can be found of which the other term
cannot be asserted. (40)
4
- A demonstration is a sort of deduction, but not every deduction
is a demonstration. (41)
- If A is predicated of every B, and B of every C, A must be
predicated of every C; similarly, if A is predicated of no B, and B of every C, it
is necessary that A will belong to no C. This is perfect deduction. (41)
- I call that term major in which the middle is contained and
that term the minor which comes under the middle. (42)
- If A belongs to every B and B to some C, then A belongs to some
C; If A belongs to no B, and B to some C, then A does not belong to some C. This is
perfect deduction. (42)
- All the deductions in this figure are perfect and all
conclusions are proved by this figure, viz. universal and particular, affirmative
and negative. Such a figure I call the first. (43)
30
- Dialectical deductions must start from plausible propositions.
(73)
Book Two
23
- Every belief comes either through deduction or from induction.
(109)
- Induction, or rather the deduction which springs out of
induction, consists in deducing a relation between one extreme and the middle by
means of the other extreme, e.g. if B is the middle term between A and C, it
consists in proving through C that A belongs to B. For this is the manner in which
we make inductions. (109)
- Where there is a middle term the deduction proceeds through the
middle term; when there is no middle term, through induction. And in a way
induction is opposed to deduction; for the latter proves the extreme to belong to
the third term by means of the middle, the former proves the extreme to belong to
the middle by means of the third. In thje order of nature, deduction through the
middle term is prior and more familiar, but deduction through induction is clearer
to us. (110)

Posterior Analytics
Book One
1
- All teaching and intellectual learning come about from already
existing knowledge. Both deductive and inductive arguments proceed in this way; for
both produce their teaching through what we are already aware of, the former
getting their premises as from men who grasp them, the latter proving the universal
through the particular's being clear. Rhetorical arguments too persuade in the same
way; for they do so either through examples, which is induction, or through
enthymemes, which is deduction. (114)
- It is necessary to be already aware of things in two ways: of
some things it is necessary to believe already that they are, of some one must
grasp what the thing said is, and of other both. (114)
- Before the induction, or the deduction, you should perhaps be
said to understand in a way (universally) and not in another (simpliciter). (114)
2
- We think we understand a thing simpliciter whenever we think we
are aware both that the explanation because of which the object is is its
explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise. (115)
- Things are prior and more familiar in two ways; for it is not
the same to be prior by nature and prior in relation to us, nor to be more familiar
and more familiar to us. I call prior and more familiar to us what is nearer to
perception, prior and more familiar simpliciter what is further away. What is most
universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest; and these are opposite
to each other. (115, 116)
- A principle of a demonstration is an immediate proposition, and
an immediate propositon is one to which there is no other prior. (116)
 - A proposition is one part of a contradiction, one thing said of
one; it is dialectical if it assumes indifferently either part, demonstrative if it
determinately assumes the one that is true. A contradiction is an opposition of
which of itself excludes any intermediate; and the part of a contradiction saying
something of something is an affirmation, the one saying something from something
is a denial. (116)
- An immediate deductive principle I call a posit if one cannot
prove it but it is not necessary for anyone who is to learn anything to grasp it;
and one which it is necessary for anyone who is going to learn anything whatever to
grasp, I call an axiom. (116)
- A posit which assumes either part of a contradiction I call a
supposition; one without this, a definition. For a definition is a posit but not a
supposition. (116)
3
- Some think that because one must understand the primitives
there is no understand at all; others think that there are demonstrations for
everything; neither view is true or necessary. (117)
- Demonstration is just one kind of understanding; they are not
co-extensive. (117)
- In the case of the immediates understanding is non-
demonstrable. (117)
- We say that there is not only understanding but also some
principle of understanding by which we become familiar with the definitions. (117)
4
- It is impossible for that of which there is understanding
simpliciter to be otherwise. (118)
- Demonstration is deduction from what is necessary. (118)
- I say that something holds of every case if it does not hold in
some case and not others, nor at some times and not others. If animal holds of
every man, then if this is a man, it is true to call him an animal too. (118)
- One thing belongs to another in itself both if it belongs to it
in what it is - e.g. line to triangle and point to line (for their substance
depends on these and they belong in the account which says what they are) - and
also if the things it belongs to themselves belong in the account which makes clear
what it is - e.g. straight belongs to line and so does curved, and odd and even to
number and prime and composite; and for all these there belongs in the account
which says what they are in the one case line, and in the others number. That which
belongs in neither way I call accidental. (118)
- Things which are not said of some underlying subject I call
things in themselves, and those which are said of some underlying subject I call
accidentals. (118)
- What belongs to something because of itself belong to it in
itself, and what does not belong because of itself I call accidental. (118)
- In the case of what is understandable simpliciter, is said to
belong to things in themselves in the sense of inhering in the predicates or of
being inhered in, holds oth because of themselves and from necessity. (119)
- The contrary is either in privation or a contradiction in the
same genus. (119)
- I call universal whatever belongs to something both of every
case and in itself and as such. It is evident, therefore, that whatever is
universal belongs from necessity to its objects. To belong in itself and as such
are the same thing. (119)
5
- The demonstration holds universally when the predicate
predicated of the subject is shown to hold of the subject abstracted away from all
things accidental, in all cases, and hence universally. (120)
6
- From truths one can deduce without demonstration, but from
necessities one cannot deduce without demonstration; for this is precisely the mark
of demonstration. (120)
- It is not what is reputable or not that is a principle, but
what is primitive in the genus about which the proof is; and not every truth is
appropriate. (121)
- To understand why is to understand through the explanation.
(122)
- The middle term must belong to the third, and the first to the
middle, because of itself, in order to have a demonstration from necessities. (122)
7
- One cannot prove anything by crossing from another genus. (122)
- There are three things in demonstrations: one, what is being
demonstrated, the conclusion (this is what belongs to some genus in itself);
second, the axioms (axioms are the things on which the demonstration depends);
third, the underlying genus of which the demonstration makes clear the attributes
and what is accidental to it in itself. (122)
- If the demonstration is going to cross genera and still be
valid, the genera must be the same in some respect. For it is necessary for the
middle terms and the extremes to come from the same genus. For if they do not
belong in themselves, they will be accidentals. (122)
8
- If the propositions on which the deduction depends are
universal, it is necessary for the conclusion of such a demonstration and of a
demonstration simpliciter to be eternal too. There is therefore no demonstration of
perishable things, nor understanding of them simpliciter but only accidentally,
because it does not hold of it universally, but at some time and in some way. (122)
9
- One cannot demonstrate the proper principles of anything; for
those will be the principles of everything, and understanding of them will be
sovereign over everything. (123)
10
- I call principles of each genus those which it is not possible
to prove to be. (124)
- For every demonstrative science has to do with three things:
what it posits to be (these form the genus of what it considers the attributes that
belong to it in itself); and what are called the common axioms, the primitives from
which it demonstrate, and thirdly the attributes, of which it assumes what each
signifies. (124)
- There are by nature these three things in scientific
demonstration, that about which the science proves, what it proves, and the things
from which it proves. (124)
- Whatever a man assumes without proving it to himself although
it is provable, he supposes it, not simpliciter but only in relation to himself as
a learner; but if he assumes the same thing when there is either no opinion present
in the learner or actually a contrary one present, he postulates it. (124, 125)
22
- There is predicating simpliciter and predicating accidentally;
and it is in the former way that demonstrations demonstrate. (135)
- One cannot define that of which indefinitely many things are
predicated. (136)
- There are a definite number of predications; for if there were
to be an indefinite number of predications, there would be an indefinite number of
demonstrations, and the indefinite number of demonstrations cannot be known by man
in entirety since one can only think one demonstration at a time, and therefore no
principles would exist nor be knowable and all would be supposition. (137, 138)
Book Two
8
- It is not possible to become familiar with the reason why
before the fact. (153)
- Aristotle says the soul is "something moving itself." (153)
 - When it becomes clear that A belongs to C, then to seek why it
belongs is to seek what B is. (154)
9
- Of some things there is something else that is their
explanation, of others there is not. Hence it is clear that in some cases what a
thing is is immediate and a principle. (154)
10
- One definition of definition is said to be an account of what a
thing is. Another definition of definition is an account which makes clear why a
thing is. The former type of definition signifies but does not prove; the latter
will be a sort of demonstration of what a thing is. (154, 155)
- The definition of immediates is an undemonstrable positing of
what they are. (155)
19
- We must have some capacity for coming to know the immediates.
Knowledge of these immediates comes to us through repeated perceptions. We come to
know the primitives by induction. (165, 166)

Topics
Book One
1
- The object of this treatise is to grasp dialectical deduction;
in order to do this, we must say what a deduction is, and what its varieties are.
(167)
- A deduction is an argument through which, certain things being
laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (167)
- It is a demonstration when the premises from which the
deduction starts are true and primitive, or such that our knowledge of them has
originally come through the premises which are primitive and true. (167)
- It is a dialectical deduction if it reasons from reputable
opinions. (167)
- Things are true and primitive if they are convincing in and of
themselves; for the first principles of a science it is improper to ask for the why
and wherefore of them. (167)
- Contentious deductions are such if they derive from opinions
that appear reputable but are not really so. (167)
- The above then, is a rough outline of the species of deduction.
(168)
2
- This treatise is useful for three purposes - intellectual
training, casual encounters, and philosophical sciences. (168)
- Dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to
the principles of all inquiries. (168)
3
- We must not omit any of the methods at our disposal in order to
have an adequate grasp of this science. (168)
4
- The materials with which arguments start are equal in number,
and are identical, with the subjects on which deductions take place. For arguments
start with propositions, which the subjects on which deductions take place are
problems. (169)
- Every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or
a property or an accident - for the differentia too, being generic, should be
ranked together with the genera. (169)
- Let us say that that which identifies an essence is a
definition, whilst that which identifies only a part thereof is a property. (169)
- The elements turn out to be four - either property or
definition (essence) or genus or accident. It is from these that problems and
propositions are formed. (169)
 - Problems and propositions are equal in number, for for every
proposition you will also make a problem if you change the turn of phrase. (169)
5
- A definition is a phrase signifing a thing's essence. (169)
- We may call definitory anything that falls under the same
branch of inquiry as definitions. (169)
- A property is something which does not indicate the essence of
a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it.
(170)
- A genus is what is predicated in what a thing is of a number of
things exhibiting differences of kind. (170)
- An accident is something which, though it is none of the
foregoing, yet belongs to the thing. (170)
- An accident can become both a relative and temporary property,
but an absolute property it will never be. (170)
9
- Each predicate will fall into one of the ten categories. (172)

Physics
Book One
1
- We do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted
with its primary causes or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far
as its elements. (315)
- The natural way to determine the principles of the science of
nature is to start from the things which are more knowable and clear to us and
proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature. Thus we must
advance from universals to particulars; for it is a whole that is more knowable to
sense perception, and a universal is a kind of whole, comprehending many things
within it, like parts. (315)
2
- We must take for granted that the things that exist by nature
are, either all or some of them, in motion - which is indeed made clear by
induction. (316)
- One is bound to refute every kind of difficulty that may be
raised from the principles of the science in question; but are not bound to refute
every kind of difficulty, without qualification (residing outside of the science in
question). (316)
- The impossible may be identical with the absurd. (316)
- Both "one" and "is" are used in many ways. (317)
- The continuous is divisible ad infinitum. (317)
- Though the limit is indivisible (such as a point), the limited
is not (such as a line). (317)
- There is no difficulty in the same thing being both one and
many, provided that these are not opposites; for what is one may be either
potentially one or actually one. (317)
- Melissus' sense of the one is as the "indivisible"; Aristotle
proceeds to show that it is impossible for all to be one as the indivisible is one
(i.e., Melisuss' sense of the one is not the only sense, rather, there are three
definitions/senses of "one," as Aristotle says). (317)
3
- Melissus thinks that "what has not come into being has no
beginning" follows from "what has come into being always has a beginning" which in
fact does not follow. (318)
- What is cannot be one in form, although it may be in what is is
made of (as some of the physicists hold); for example, man and horse both are and
yet have different forms. (318)
- Parmenides believes "is" is used in only one way, whereas it is
instead used in several different ways. (318)
 - An attribute is either that which may or may not belong to the
subject or that in whose definition the subject of which it is an attribute is
involved. Sitting is an example of the former and snubness of the latter, for to
define snubness would be to introduce the definition of "nose." (319)
4
- Plato treats his "Great and Small" as matter, and the one as
form; others treat the one which underlies as matter and the contraries as
differentiae, i.e. forms. (319)
- The infinite qua infinite is unknowable, so that what is
infinite in multitude or size is unknowable in quantity, and what is infinite in
variety of kind is unknowable by quality. (320)
- No part of animal, plant, or any other whole can be indefinite
in size in the direction of the greater or the less. (320)
- Flesh is quantitatively definite with respect to greatness and
smallness. (321)
- First principles must not be derived from one another nor from
anything else, while everything has to be derived from them. But these conditions
are fulfilled by the primary contraries, which are not derived from anything else
because they are primary, nor from each other because they are contraries. (321)
- To justify the above one must first accept the presupposition
that in nature nothing acts on, or is acted on by, any other thing at random, nor
may anything come from anything else, unless we mean that is does so accidentally.
(321)
- The white comes from the not-white, but not just anything not-
white, like the musical, but rather from black or some intermediate. (322)
- Everything that comes to be or passes away comes from, or
passes into, its contrary or intermediate state. But the intermediates are derived
from their contraries, as colour is from black and white. Everything, therefore,
comes to be by a natural process is either a contrary or a product of contraries.
(322)
- The universal is knowable in the order of explanation, the
particular in the order of sense; for explanation has to do with the universal,
sense with the particular. (322)
6
- The principles of (the science of) nature cannot be one; for
there cannot be one contrary. Nor can they be innumerable, because, if so, what is
will not be knowable; and in any one genus there is only one contrarietym and
substance is one genus. (323)
- Some contraries are prior to others, and some arise from
others. (323)
- We do not find the contraries to constitute the substance of
any thing. But what is the first principle ought not to be predicated of any
subject. The subject is a principle, and prior presumably to what is predicated of
it. (323)
- Substance is not contrary to another substance. How then can
substance be derived from what are not substances? Or how can non-substance be
prior to substance? (323)
- The doctrine that the One and the excess and the defect are the
principles of things would appear to be of old standing, though in different forms:
for the early thinkers made the two the active and the one the passive principle,
whereas some of the more more recent maintain the reverse. (323)
- It is impossible that there should be more than one primary
contrariety. For substance is a single genus of being, so that the principles can
differ only as prior and posterior, not in genus; for in a single genus there is
always a single contrariety, all the other contrarieties in it being held to be
reducible to one. (323)
- It is clear than the number of elements is neither one nor more
than two or three. (324)
7
 - One thing comes to be from another thing, and something from
something different, in the case both of simple and of complex things. In the case
of the simple, the not-musical becomes musical; in the case of the complex, the
not-musical man becomes a musical man. (324)
- When a simple thing is said to become something,in one case it
survives through the process, the man remains a man when he comes musical; in the
other case it does not survive, the not musical or unmusical does not survive.
(324)
- Only substances are said to come to be without qualification.
(325)
- Substance alone is not predicated of any other subject. (325)
- But substances too, and anything that can be said to be without
qualificaiton, come to be from some underlying thing, will appear on examination.
For we find in every case something that underlies from which proceeds that which
comes to be, for example, animals and plants from seed. (325)
- Whatever comes to be is always complex. There is something
which comes to be, and again something which becomes that - the latter in two
senses, either the subject or the opposite. (325)
- Everything comes to be from subject (man, for example) and form
(musical, for example). (325)
- The subject is one numerically, though it is two in form. For
there is the man, the gold, or in general, the countable matter; for it is more of
the nature of a "this," and what comes to be does not come from it accidentally;
the privation, on the other hand, and the contrariety are accidental. And the form
is one - the order, the art of music, or any similar predicate. (325)
- The principles are not more in number than the contraries, but
as it were two; nor yet precisely two, since there is a difference of being, but
three. (326)
- The underlying nature can be known by analogy. For as the
bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before
receiving form to anything which has form, so is the underlying nature to
substance, i.e. the "this" or existent. (326)
- Whether the form or what underlies is the substance is not yet
clear. But that the principles are three, and in what sense, and the way in which
each is a principle, is clear. (326)
8
- Comes to be so-and-so from what is not means "qua what is not."
(327)
- We maintain that nothing comes to be from what is, and that
what is does not come to be except accidentally. (327)
- We do not subvert the principle that everything either is or is
not. (327)
- Another way of solving the difficulty of things coming to be
from what is not is to speak in terms of potentiality and actuality, but this has
been done elsewhere, notably the Metaphysics. (327)
9
- We distinguish matter and privation, and hold that one of
these, namely the matter, accidentally is not, while the privation in its own
nature is not; and that the matter is nearly, in a sense is, substance, while the
privation in no sense is. (328
- For admitting that there is something divine, good, and
desirable, we hold that there are two other principles, the one contrary to it, the
other such as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it. The truth is that what
desires the form is matter, as the female desires the male and the ugly the
beautiful - only the ugly or the female not in itself but accidentally. (328)
- My definition of matter is just this - the primary substratum
of each thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists in the result, not
accidentally. (328)
- The accurate determination of the first principle in respect of
form, whether it is one or many and what it is or what they are, is the province of
first philosophy; so these questions may stand over till then. (328)
- The natural forms are the perishable. (328)
- The three principles are form, privation, and matter. (328)
Book Two
1
- Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other
causes. By nature we mean animals and their parts exist, and the plants and simple
bodies (earth, fire, air, and water). Each of these things has within itself a
principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth or
decrease, or by way of alteration). (329)
- A bed and a coat or anything else of this sort, insofar as they
are productions of art, have no innate impulse to change. But insofar as they
happen to be composed of stone or of earth or a mixture of the two, they do have
such an impulse; this seems to indicate that nature is a principle or cause of
being m oved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue
of itself and not accidentally. (329)
- In the case of artificial products, none of them has in itself
the principle of its own production. (329)
- Things have a nature which have a principle of this kind (a
principle of change); each of them is a substance; for it is a subject, and nature
is always in a subject. (329)
- The term "according to nature" is applied to all these things
and also to the attributes which belong to them in virtue of what they are. The
property of fire to be carried upwards is not a nature in itself nor does it have a
nature in itself but is rather by nature or according to nature. (329)
- Antiphon's account of nature is that it is the primary
underlying matter of things which have in themselves the principle of motion or
change. (330)
- Another account of nature is the shape or form which is
specified in the definition of the thing. (330)
- What is potentially flesh or bone has not yet its own nature,
and does not exist by nature, until it receives the form specified in the
definition, which we name in defining what flesh or bone is. Thus on the second
account of nature, it would be shape or form (not separable exist in statement) of
things which have in themselves a principle of motion. (330)
- The form indeed is nature rather than the matter; for a thing
is more properly said to be what it is when it exists in actuality than when it
exists potentially. (330)
- The shape then is nature; shape and nature are used in two
ways, for the privation too is in a way form. (330)
2
- The two sorts of things we call nature are form and matter.
(331)
- That for the sake of which, or the end, belongs to the same
department of knowledge as the means. But the nature is the end or that for the
sake of which. For if a thing undergoes a continuous change toward some end, that
last stage is actually that for the sake of which. (331)
- "That for the sake of which" can be taken in two ways, as we
said in our work On Philosophy. (332)
- The arts which govern matter and have knowledge are two, namely
the art which uses the product and the art which directs the production of it. That
is why the using art also is in a sense directive; but it differs in that it knows
the form, whereas the art which is directive as being concerned with production
knows the matter. (332)
- In productions of art we make the material with a view to the
function, whereas in the products of nature the matter is there all along. (332)
- Matter is a relative thing, for different forms there is
different matter. (332)
 - Form and essence are used interchangeably. (332)
- The student of nature is concerned only with things whose forms
are separable indeed, but do not exist apart from matter; the mode of existence and
essence of the separable is the business of first philosophy to define. (332)
3
- We must proceed to consider causes, their character and their
number. (332)
- In one way, then, that out of which a thing comes to be and
which persists, is called a cause. (332)
- In another way, the form or the archetype, i.e. the definition
of the essence, and its genera, are called causes. (332)
- The primary source of the change or rest, generally what makes
of what is made and what changes of what is changed is another cause. (332)
- In the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is
done is another cause. (332)
- Of the four causes one pair are causes in the sense of what
underlies (material and efficient), the other pair are causes in the sense of the
end or the good of the rest (formal and final). (333)
- All causes, both proper and accidental (in the sense that a
pale man may be said to be the cause of a statue, which is in one sense true
however it is not qua pale or qua man that he is the cause of the statue, but qua
scupltor), may be spoken of either as potential or as actual; e.g. the cause of a
house being built is either a house-builder or a house-builder building. (333)
- All the various usages of causes come to six in number: it is
either what is particular or genus, or an accidental attribute or a genus of that,
and these as a complex or each by itself; and all either as actual or potential.
(334)
- The difference is this much, that causes which are actually at
work and particular exist simultaneously with their effect; but this is not always
true of potential causes - the house and the housebuilder do not pass away
simultaneously. (334)
- Powers are relative to possible effects, actually operating
causes to things which are actually being effected. (334)
4
- It would seem that the wise men of old did not believe in
anything happening by chance. (334)
5
- Some things come to pass in the same way, others for the most
part; there is a third class of event besides these two - events which all say are
by chance - it is plain that there is such a thing as chance or spontaneity. (335)
- Of things that come to be, some are for the sake of something,
others are not. Some in the former class are in the accordance with intention,
others not. Things for the sake of something include whatever may be done as a
result of thought or of nature. Things of this kind then, when they come to pass
accidentally are said to be by chance. For just as a thing is something either in
virtue or itself or accidentally, so may it be a cause. (335)
- That which is per se cause is determinate, but the accidental
cause are indeterminable; for the possible attributes of an individual are
innumerable. (336)
- It is clear that chance is an accidental cause in the sphere of
those actions for the sake of something which involve choice. Thought, then, and
chance are in the same sphere, for choice implies thought. (336)
- It is necessary that the causes of what comes to pass by chance
be indefinite; and that is why chance is supposed to belonmg to the class of the
indefinite and inscrutable to man, and why it might be thought, in a way, nothing
occurs by chance, for they occur accidentally and chance is an accidental cause.
But it is not the cause without qualification, like the housebuilder is to the
house. (336)
- To say that chance is unaccountable is correct. (336)
 - Some accidental causes are more relevant to the effect than
others. (336)
- Both chance and spontaneity are accidental causes. (337)
6
- Spontaneity is wider than chance; every result of chance is
from what is spontaneous, but not everything that is from what is spontaneous is
from chance. (337)
- Eents which belong to the general class of things that may come
to pass for the sake something, when they come to pass not for the sake of what
actually results, and have an external cause, may be described by the phrase "from
spontaneity." Thjese spontaneous events are said to be from chance if they have the
further characteristics of being the objects of choice and happening to agents
capable of choice. (337)
- Nothing which is accidental is prior to what is per se, and it
is clear that no accidental cause can be prior to a cause per se. Spontaneity and
chance, therefore, are posterior to intelligence and nature. (338)
- However true is may be that the heavens are due to spontaneity,
it will still be true that intelligence and nature will be prior causes of this
universe and many things in it besides. (338)
7
- There are three branches of study, one of things which are
incapable of motion, the second of things in motion, but indestructable, the third
of destructible things. (338)
- There are two causes of motion, of which one is not natural, as
it has no principle of motion in itself. Of this kind is whatever causes movement,
not being itself moved, such as that which is completely unchangeable, the primary
reality, and the essence of a thing, i.e. the form; for this is the end or that for
the sake of which. (338, 339)
- Since nature is for the sake of something, we must know this
cause also. (339)
8
- We must explain first why nature belongs to the class of causes
which act for the sake of something. (339)
- If it is agreed that things are either the result of
coincidence or foir the sake of something, and natural things cannot be for the
result of coincidence or spontaneity, it follows that they must be for the sake of
something; therefore action for an end is present in things which come to be and
are by nature. (339)
- Where there is an end, all the preceding steps are for the sake
of that. Surely in action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action,
if nothing interferes. Action is for the sake of an end, therefore the naure of
things also is so. If artificial products are for the sakle of an end, so clearly
also are natural products. (340)
- Nature is a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose. (341)
9
- Necessity is in the matter, while that for the sake of which is
in the definition. (341)
- The necessary in nature, then, is plainly what we call by the
name of matter, and the changes in it. Both causes must be stated by the student of
nature, but especially the end; for that is the cause of the matter, not vice
versa; and the end is that for the sake of which, and the principle starts from the
definition or essence. In some cases in the definition too there are some parts
that stand as matter. (342)
Book Three
1
- Nature is a principle of motion and change; we must understand
what motion; for if it were unknown, nature too would be unknown. (342)
- Motion is supposed to belong to the class of things which are
continuous; and the infinite (indefinite) presents itself first in the continuous -
that is how it comes about that the account of the infinite is often used in
definitions of the continuous; for what is infinitely divisible is continuous.
(342)
- Motion is spoken of only in relation to the categories, either
subtance, quantity, quality, place, etc. (342)
- There are as many types of motion or change as there are of
being (i.e. categories). (343)
- The fulfilment of what is potentially, as such, is motion. (343
- The same thing can be both potential and fulfilled, not indeed
at the same time or not in the same respect, but e.g. potentially hot but actually
cold. (343)
- What effects motion as a natural agent can be moved: when a
thing of this kind causes motion, it is itself also moved. This, indeed, has led
some people to suppose that every mover is moved. However, Aristotle says it is
possible for a thing to cause motion, though it is itself incapable of being moved:
a set of arguments will be provided for this statement later. (343)
- Motion occurs just when the fulfilment itself occurs, and
neither before nor after; it is the fulfilling of a potentially that is motion.
(343)
2
- Motion is a sort of actuality, hard to grasp, but not incapable
of existing. (344)
3
- Motion is in the movalble. It is the fulfilment of this
potentiality by the action of that which has the power of causing motion; and the
actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is not other than the
actuality of the movable; for it must be the fulfilment of both. A thing is capable
of causing motion because it can do this, it is a mover because it acutally does
it. But it is on the movable that is it capable of acting. Hence there is a single
actuality of both alike, just as one to two and two to one are the same interval,
and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one - for these are one and the
same, although their definitions are not one. So it is with the mover and the
moved. (344)
- Perhaps it is necessary that there should be an actuality of
the agent and of the patient. The one is agency and the other patiency; and the
outcome and end of the one is an action, that of the other a passion. (344)
- Teaching is not the same as learning, or agency as patiency, in
the full sense, though they belong to the same subject, the motion; for the
actualisation ofthis in that and the actualisation of that through the action of
this differ in definition. (345)
Book Four
10
- The "now" is not a part of time (i.e., it is a single moment,
and a single moment is like a cross-section/slice of time, not having a duration of
it's own). Time is not made up of "nows." What are considered parts of time, namely
the past and the future, either were and are no longer, or are not yet, and so it
would appear that no part of time is. (370)
- One "now" cannot be next to another, any more than a point to a
point. (370)
- The "now" is a termination, and it is possible to cut off a
determinate time. (370)
- It is difficult to say whether there is one and the same now,
or if each now is different from the others. (370)
- Time is most usually supposed to be motion and a kind of
change; yet there are differences between time and change/motion: the change or
movement of each thing is only in the thing which changes or where the thing itself
which moves or change may chance to be. But time is present equally everywhere and
with all things. Again, change is always faster or slower, whereas time is not; for
the fast and slow are defined by time - fast is what moves much in a short time,
slow what moves little in a long time; but time is not defined by time, by being
either a certain amount or a certain kind of it. Clearly then it is not movement.
(370, 371)
11
- Time does not exist without change (neither is it change); when
the state of our minds does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing,
we do not think that time has elapsed, any more than those who are fabled to sleep
among the heroes of Sardinia do when they are awakened; for they connect the
earlier "now" with the later and make them one, cutting out the interval because of
their failure to notice it. (371)
- The non-realisation of the existence of time happens to us when
we do not distinguish any change, but the mind seems to stay in one indivisible
state, and when we perceive and distinguish we say time has elapsed, evidently time
is not independent of movement and change. (371)
- What is bounded by the "now" is thought to be time. (372)
- For time is just this - number of motion in respect of "before"
and "after." (372)
- Time is not movement, but only movement insofar as it admits of
enumeration. (372)
- Number is used in two ways: both of what is counted or
countable and also of that with which we count; time is what is counted, and is
therefore a kind of number. (372)
- The "now" is the same in substratum - though its being is
different - and the "now" determines time, insofar as time involves the before and
after. (372)
- The "now" is no part of time anymore than the points are parts
of the line - for it is two lines that are parts of one line. (373)
- Time is number of movement in respect of the before and after,
and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous. (373)
- The smallest number in the strictest sense is two. But of
number as concrete, sometimes there is a minimum, sometimes not: e.g. of a line,
the smallest in respect of multiplicity is two (or, if you like, one), but in
respect of size there is no minimum; for every line is divided ad infinitum. Hence
it is so with time. (373)
- Time is a measure of motion and of being moved. (374)
- Things which are always are not, as such, in time; for they are
not contained by time, nor is their being measured by time. (375)
- Since time is the measure of motion, it will be the measure of
rest too. (375)
- Those non-existents whose opposites always are, as the
incommensurability of the diagonal always is, will not be in time. Nor will the
commensurability, therefore; hence this eternally is not, because it is contrary to
what eternally is. A thing whose contrary is not eternal can be and not be, and it
is of such things that there is coming to be and passing away. (375)
13
- The "now" is the link of time, as has been said (for it
connects past and future time), and it is a limit of time (for it is the beginning
of the one and the end of the other). But this is not obvious as it is with the
point, which is fixed. It divides potentially, and in so far as it is dividing the
"now" is always different, but insofar as it connects it is always the same, as it
is with mathematical lines. For the intellect it is not always one and the same
point, since it is other and other when one divides the line; but insofar as it is
one, it is the same in every respect. (375)
- The "now" is in one way a potential dividing of time, in
another the termination of both parts, and their unity. (375, 376)
- Time will not fail if motion always exists; it would appear
that Aristotle does not believe that the same time can recur, therefore the same
events cannot recur either, for if they were truly the same events, they would
occur at the same time and therefore be one. (376)
 - In time all things come into being and pass away; for this
reason some called it the wisest of all things, but the Pythagorean Paron called it
the most stupid, because in it we also forget; and his was the truer view. (376)
- In itself, time is a cause of destruction rather than a coming
into being (for change, in itself, makes things depart from their former
condition), and only accidentally of coming into being, and of being. A sufficient
evidence of this is that nothing comes into being without itself moving somehow and
acting, but a thing can be destroyed even if it does not move at all. (376)
14
- It would seem that there would be no time if there were no
soul, for there would be nothing countable if nothing could count; the before and
after are attributes of movement, and time is these qua countable. (377)
Book Six
1
- Things are continuous if their extremities are one, in contact
if their extremities are together, and in succession if there is nothing of their
own kind intermediate between them. (390)
- Nothing that is continuous can be composed of indivisibles; the
line cannot be composed of points. (390, 391)
- Intermediate between points there is always a line and
intermediate between nows there is always a period of time. (391)
- Time is composed of (or embraces) indivisible "nows." (392)
Book Eight
1
- Anaxagoras says that all things were together and at rest for
an infinite amount of time, and that then Mind introduced motion and separated
them. (418)
- Empedocles says the universe is alternately in motion and at
rest - in motion, when Love is making the one out of many, or Strife is making many
out of one, and at rest in the intermediate periods of time. (418, 419)
- Motion is the actuality of the movable insofar as it is
movable. (419)
- There must be something capable of being burned before there
can be a process of being burned, and something capable of burning before there can
be a process of burning. (419)
- There cannot be a before and after without the existence of
time; and there can be no time without the existence of motion; if there is always
time, there is always motion; motion must also be eternal; Democritus shows that
all things cannot have had a becomingm, for time, he says, is uncreated; Plato
alone asserts the creation of time, saying that it is simultaneous with the world,
and that the world came into being; time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from
the now, and the now is a kind of middle-point, uniting itself both to a beginning
and an end, a beginning of future time and an end of past time, it follows that
there must always be time; therefore, since the now is both a beginning and an end,
there must always be time on either side of it; but if this is true of time, it is
evident that it must also be true of motion, tinme being a kind of affection of
motion. (420)
- It is clear that motion is eternal and cannot have existed at
one time and not at: in fact, such a view can hardly be described as anything else
than fantastic. (420)
- That which holds by nature and is natural can never be anything
disorderly; for nature is everywhere the cause of order. (421)
- There is no relation of the infinite to the infinite (or
indefinite to the indefinite), whereas order always means ratio. (421)
- Principles are external and have no ulterior cause, unlike, for
example, a triangle which always has its angles equal to two right angles, but
there is nevertheless an ulterior cause of the eternity. (421)
2
- Objections are raised regarding the above and are then refuted.
(421, 422, 423)
3
- Aristotle maintains that in the world, some things are always
in motion, some things are always at rest, and others are capable of both being at
rest and being in motion. (423)
- It is a hypothesis that nature is a principle of motion. (423)
4
- Of things that cause motion or suffer motion, some do so
accidentally, others in their own right - accidentally if they merely belong to or
contain a part athing that causes motion or suffers motion, in their own right if
they cause motion or suffer motion not merely by belonging to such a thing or
containing it as a part. (425)
- Of things which move in their own right, some derive their
motion from themselves, others from something else: and in some cases their motion
is natural, in others violent and unnatural. (425)
- All things that are moved unnaturally and violently are moved
by something other than themselves. (427)
5
- Aristotle establishes that there must be a first mover
(logically, not temporally). (428, 429, 430)
- The two kinds of mover are that which moves itself and that
which is moved by something else. (430)
- That which primarily imparts motion is unmoved. (432)
6
- Since there must always be motion without intermission, there
must necessarily be something eternal, that first imparts motion, and this first
mover must be unmoved. (432)
- The first unmoved mover is the ultimate cause of the fact that
some things are and others are not and of the continuous process of change. (432)
- The unmoved mover remains simple and unvarying and in the same
state, and will therefore cause motion that is one and simple. (434)
7
- Of the three kinds of motion that there are - motion in respect
of magnitude, motion in respect of affection, and motion is respect of place - it
is this last, which we call locomotion, that must be primary. (435)
- The word "primary" may be used in several ways. A thing is said
to be prior to other things when, if it does not exist, the others will not exist,
whereas it can exist without the others; and there is also priority in time and
priority in being. (435)
- In general, that which is becoming appears as something
imperfect and proceeding to a principle; and so what is posterior in the order of
becoming is prior in the order of nature (being). (436)
8
- The motion of everything that is in locomotion is either
rotatory or rectilinear or a compound of the two. (437)
- There cannot be a continuous rectilinear motion that is
eternal. (439)
- The circle is a perfect motion because it's beginning and end
coincide. (442)
- Neither alteration nor increase admits of continuity. (442)
9
- Rotatory motion has no limit unlike rectilinear motion, such as
that of a straight line, for the straight line has limits, i.e. its extremities,
whilst rotatory motion has none. (443)
- Motion in the strictest sense is motion in respect of
locomotion. (444)
10
- Aristotle asserts that the first mover is without parts and
without magnitude. (444)
 - It is impossible for the finite to cause motion during an
infinite time. (444)
- It is impossible for an infinite force to reside in a finite
magnitude or for a finite force to reside in an infinite magnitude. (445)

On Generation and Corruption

Book One
1
- The question must be raised whether alteration has the same
nature as coming-to-be, or whether to these different names there correspond two
separate processes with distinct names. (512)
- A single matter must always be assumed as underlying the
contraries in any change - whether change of place, or growth and diminution, or
alteration. (513)
2
- It is absurd that a magnitude should consist of things which
are not magnitudes, viz. points (instead one might say that a magnitude embraces an
indefinite number of points, but is made up of smaller magnitudes). (516)
- Aristotle refutes atomist theory. (516, 517, 518)
3
- Qualified coming-to-be is a process out of qualified not-being.
(518)
- "Unqualified" means either the primary within each category, or
the universal, i.e. the all-comprehensive. (518)
- Something that is not a substance or a "this" clearly cannot
possess predicates drawn from any of the other categories, otherwise properties
would admit of existences separate from substances. (518)
- In one sense things come-to-be out of that which has no being
without qualification; yet in another sense they come-to-be always out of what is.
For there must pre-exist something which potentially is, but actually is not; and
this is spoken of both as being and as not-being. (518)
- It is due to matter that passing-away and coming-to-be never
fail to occur in nature. (519)
- If some one of the things which are is constantly disappearing,
why has not the universe been used up long ago and vanished away - assuming of
course that the material of all the several comings-to-be was finite? For
presumably, the unfailing continuity of coming-to-be cannot be attributed to the
infinity of the material. That is impossible; for nothing is actually infinite, and
potentially things are infinite by way of division; so that we should have to
suppose there is only one kind of coming-to-be, viz. one which never fails, such
that what comes-to-be is on each successive occasion smaller than before. But in
fact this is not what occurs. (519, 520)
- The passage into what without qualification is not is
unqualifed passing-away, while the passage into what is without qualification is
unqualified coming-to-be. Hence, however they are characterised, as Fire and Earth
(as Parmenides had it) or as some other couple - the one of them will be a being
and the other a not-being. (520)
- There is unqualified coming-to-be (though it is a passing away-
of-something) and unqualified passing-away (though it is a coming-to-be of
something). For this distinction depends upon a difference in the material -
whether the material is or is not a substance, or upon whether it is more or less
substantial, or upon whether the material out of which and into which the change
occurs is more or less perceptible. (521)
- Every coming-to-be is a passing-away of something else and
every passing-away is a coming-to-be of something else. (521)
- Those categories which are not substance are only said to come-
to-be so-and-so, and not to come-to-be without qualification. (521)
- The substratum is the material cause of the continuous
occurrence of coming-to-be, because it is such as to change from contrary to
contrary and because, in substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a
passing-away and vice versa. (521)
- For just as people speak of a passing-away without
qualification when a thing has passed into what is imperceptible and what is not,
so also they speak of a coming-to-be out of a not-being when a thing emerges from
an imperceptible. Whether, therefore, the substratum is or is not something, what
comes-to-be emerges out of a not-being; so that a thing comes-to-be out of a not-
being just as much as passes-way into what is not. Hence it is reasonable enough
that coming-to-be should never fail. For coming-to-be is a passing-away of what is
not and passing-away is a coming-to-be of what is not. (521, 522)
4
- We maintain that coming-to-be and alteration are distinct
changes. (522)
- There is alteration when the substratum is perceptible and
persists, but changes in its own properties, whether these are contraries or
intermediates. The body is now healthy and now ill. (522)
- When nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a
substratum, and the thing changes as a whole (the seed into the plant), such an
occurrence is a coming-to-be of one substance and a passing-away of the other -
especially if the change proceeds from an imperceptible something to something
perceptible. (522)
5
- Matter, in the most proper sense of the term, is to be
identified with the substratum which is receptive to coming-to-be and passing-away;
but the substratum of the remaining kinds of change is also, in a certain sense,
matter, because a;; tjese substrata are receptive of contrarieties of some kind.
(523)
- We must not regard the matter of the body as points of lines.
The matter is that of which points and lines are limits, and it is something that
can never exist without quality and without form. (524)
- The efficient cause of one things coming-to-be is either an
actual thing (either specifically or generally), or an actuality. Since there is
also a matter out of which corporeal substance itself comes-to-be (corporeal
substance, however, already characterised as such-and-such a determinate body, for
there is no such thing as body in general), this same matter is also the matter of
magnitude and quality - being separable from these matters in definition, but not
separable in place. (524)
- Growth is not a change out of something which, though
potentially a magnitude, actually possesses no magnitude. For if it were, the void
would exist in separation, and we have explained that this is impossible in Physics
Book 4. (524)
- Growth must not be regarded as a process from a matter without
magnitude to an actuality with magnitude; for this would be a body's coming-to-be
rather than its growth. (524)
Book Two
1
- Aristotle appears to criticise Plato's Timaeus in which Plato
asserts a separable matter: Aristotle on the contrary says that matter is
inseparable from that which it underlies. (538, 539)
2
- We are looking for the principles of perceptible body; and
since perceptible is equivalent to tangible, and tangible is that of which the
perception is touch, it is clear that not all the contrarieties constitute forms
and principles of body, but only those which correspond to touch. For it is in
accordance with a contrariety - a contrariety of tangle qualities - that the
primary bodies are differentiated. (539)
- Vision is prior to touch, so thats its object also is prior.
(539)
- The elements according to Aristotle are four: these are hot,
cold, dry, and moist. (540)
3
- The elements are four, and whilst any four terms can be
combined in six couples, the contraries cannot be coupled, and hence we will have
only four couples. These then are the apparently simple bodies (Fire, Air, Water,
and Earth). Fire is hot and dry. Air is hot and moist. Water is cold and moist.
Earth is cold and dry. (540)
- Each of the bodies mentioned, fire, air, water, and earth, are
not in fact simple, but are combined. The simple bodies are indeed similar in
nature to them, but not identical with them. Thus the simple body corresponding to
fire is fire-like, nor fire; that which corresponds with air is air-like, and so
on. (541)
- Fire and Air are forms of the body moving towards the limit.
Earth and Water are forms of the body that moves towards the center. (541)
4
- It is evident that the coming-to-be of the simple bodies will
be cyclical; and that this method of transformation is the easiest, because the
consecutive elements tally. (542)
- Flame is par excellence of Fire; but flame is burning smoke,
and smoke consists of Air and Earth. (542)
5
- One of two contraries is a privation. (543)
- Matter is the mean between the two contraries, and is
imperceptible and inseparable. (544)
10
- Motion is prior to coming-to-be, for that which is being moved
is, but that which is coming-to-be is not. (550)
- Coming-to-be and passing-away happen to things continuously.
(550, 551)
- Motion causes coming-to-be. (551)
- God is mentioned. (551)
- Coming-to-be perpetually is the closest approximation to
eternal being. (552)
- If movement is to be continuous and there must always be
movement, what initiates it must be single, unmoved, ungenerated, and incapable of
alteration. If the circular movements are more than one, then despite their
plurality, they must all of them be subordinated to a single principle. (552)
- Time is a number of some continuous movement. (552)
11
- It is clear that some comings-to-be are not necessary. (553)
- If a things coming-to-be is necessary, it must be always in its
coming-to-be. For what is necessary coincides with what is eternal/always. It
follows that the coming-to-be of anything, if it is absolutely necessary, must be
cyclical - i.e. must return upon itself. (553, 554)

Parts of Animals
Book One
1
- That cause is first that we call that for the sake of which.
(995)
- There is absolute necessity, manifested in eternal phenomena;
and there is hypothetical necessity, manifested in everything that is generated as
in everything that is produced by art. (995)
- Generation is for the sake of the substance and not this for
the sake of generation. (996)
- It would seem to be the case that the form of the living being
is the soul, given that when the soul departs at the point of death what remains is
no longer an animal except in configuration. (997)
- Nature is spoken of - and is - twofold, as matter and as
substance; nature as substance including both the motor cause and the final cause.
Now it is in the latter of these two senses that either the whole soul or some part
of it constitutes the nature of an animal; and inasmuch as it is the presence of
the soul that enables matter to constitute the animal nature, much more than it is
the presence of matter which so enables the soul. (997, 998)
- In none but man is their intellect. (998)
- It is not the whole soul that constitutes nature, but only some
part or parts of it. (998)

Metaphysics
Book One (A)
1
- All men by nature desire to know. (1552)
- Experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals;
actions and productions are all concerned w/ the individual. (1552)
- We think that knowledge and understanding belong to art rather
than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than men of experience; this
because the former know the cause, but the latter do not. For men of experience
know that the thing is, but do not know why, while the others know the "why" and
the cause. (1553)
- The master-workers in each craft are thought to be more
honourable and wiser than the manual workers, because they know the causes of the
things are done (we think the manual works are like certain lifeless things which
act indeed, but act without knowing what they do, like fire burns). (1553)
- It is a sign of the man who knows that he can teach, for
artists can teach, and men of mere experience cannot. (1553)
- We do not regard any of the senses as wisdom; yet surely these
give the most authoritative knowledge of particulars. (1553)
- Once all the sciences aimed at providing the necessities were
discovered, the sciences not aimed towards utility were discovered, this is why the
mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed
to be at leisure. (1553)
- Wisdom is knowledge about certain causes and principles. (1553)
2
- The most universal knowledge is hardest for man to know for it
is furthest from the senses. (1554)
- The people who teach are those who tell the causes of each
thing. (1554)
- The first principles and causes are the most knowable; for by
reason of these, and from these, all other things are known, but these are not
known by means of the things subordinate to them. (1554)
- The good, i.e. that for the sake of which, is one of the
causes. (1554)
- The possession of the science of first principles and causes
may justly be regarded as beyond human power; it is the only free science, and
exists for itself; this science would be most met for God to have as it is a divine
science; God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first
principle, and such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others.
(1555)
3
- Causes are spoken of in four senses: in one of these we mean
the substance, i.e. the essence (for the "why" is referred finally to the
definitory formula, and the ultimate "why" is a cause and principle); in another
the matter or substratum, in a third the source of the change, and in a fourth the
cause opposed to this, that for the sake of which adn the good (for this is the end
of all generation and change). (1555)
4
- The earlier philosophers seemed to recognise a material cause,
and then realising the insufficiency of only one cause, also introduced a cause of
change, i.e. an efficient cause. (1558, 1559)
5
- The Pythagoreans thought that everything could be expressed in
number. (1559, 1560)
6
- Plato used only two causes, that of the essence and the
material cause (for the Forms are the cause of the essence of all other things, and
the One is the cause of the essence of the Forms); and the dyad, the great and the
small, is the matter. (1562)
7
- Aristotle seems to say that essence is the substance (ousia) of
things. (1562)
8
- The Pythagoreans' discussions and investigations are all about
nature. (1564)
9
- In general, if we search for the elements of existing things
without distinguishing the many senses in which things are said to exist, we cannot
succeed. (1568)
10
- All men seem to seek the causes laid out in the Physics, and we
cannot seem to name any causes other than these. (1569)
Book Two (a)
1
- For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the
reason in our soul to the things which are by their nature most evident of all.
(1570)
- The end of theoretical knowledge is truth; the end of practical
knowledge is action. (1570)
- That which causes derivative truths to be true is most true of
all. (1570)
Book Three (B)
1
- Aristotle recounts all of the subjects that must be discussed
in order to arrive at the science (first philosophy) we are seeking. (1572, 1573,
1574)
Book Four (Γ)
1
- There is a science which investigates being as being and the
attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. It is of being as
being that we also must grasp the first causes. (1584)
2
- There are many senses in which a thing may be said to "be," but
they are all related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not
homonymous. It is of substance that the philosopher may grasp the principles and
the causes. (1584, 1585)
- Being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense
that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are, not in the sense
that they are explained by the same formula: for one man, a man, an existent man,
and one existent man are all the same thing. (1585)
- There are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of
substance. (1585)
- In the list of contraries one of the two columns are privative,
and all contraries are referred to being and nonbeing, and to unity and plurality,
as for instance rest belongs to unity and movement to plurality. (1586)
3
- Nature is only one particular genus of being. (1587)
- The most certain principle of all is the principle of non-
contradiction. (1588)
 4
- It is impossible to enumerate the accidents of a thing, which
are indefinite in number. (1590)
- Denoting the substance of a thing means that the essence of the
thing is nothing else. (1590)
- That which exists potentially and not actually is the
indeterminate, which is non-being. (1591)
5
- If a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which
it comes to be and a something by which it is generated, and this process cannot be
ad infinitum. (1595)
- It is in respect of form that we know each thing. (1595)
6
- Privation is the denial of a predicate to a determinate genus.
(1597)
Book Five (Δ)
1
- A list of the meanings of the term "origin" is enumerated.
(1599)
2
- Some causes are causes as substratum (e.g. the parts, and the
matter), others as essence (the whole, the synthesis, and the form). (1600)
3
- We call an element that which is the primary component immanent
in a thing, and indivisible in kind into other kinds. (1601)
4
- We call nature 1) the genesis of growing things; 2) the primary
immanent element in a thing, from which its growth proceeds; 3) the source from
which the primary movement in each natural object is present in it in virtue of its
own essence; 4) nature is the primary matter out of which any non-natural object
consists or out of which it is made, which cannot be modified or changed by its own
potency, as the bronze is said to be the nature of the statue; 5) nature is the
substance of natural objects, as with those who say the nature is the primary mode
of composition. (1602)
5
- A list of the meanings of the term "necessity" is enumerated.
(1603)
6
- A list of the meanings of the term "one" is enumerated. (1603,
1604, 1605, 1606)
7
- Things are said to be in 1) an accidental sense and 2) by their
nature. (1606)
8
- We call substances 1) the simple bodies because they are not
predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them; 2) that which,
being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of
their being, as the soul is of the being of animals; 3) the parts which are present
in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose
destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane;
4) the essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance
of each thing. (1606, 1607)
- Substance has two senses, a) the ultimate substratum, which is
no longer predicated of anything else, and b) that which is a "this" and separable
- and of this nature is the shape or form of each thing. (1607)
9
- A list of the meanings of the terms "same," "different," and
"like" are enumerated. (1607)
10
 - A list of the meanings of the term "contrary" is enumerated.
(1608)
11
- A list of the meanings of the terms "prior" and "posterior" are
enumerated. (1608, 1609)
12
- A list of the meanings of the terms "capacity" and "incapacity"
are enumerated. (1609, 1610)
13
- A list of the meanings of the term "quantity" is enumerated.
Because space is continuous it is called a quantity, and because that is a quantity
movement is also a quantity, and because this is a quantity time is so. (1608)
14
- A list of the meanings of the term "quality" is enumerated.
(1611)
15
- A list of the meanings of the term "relative" is enumerated.
(1612, 1613)
16
- A list of the meanings of the term "complete" is enumerated.
Excellence is a completetion; for each thing is complete and every substance is
complete, when in respect of its proper kind of excellence it lacks no part of its
natural magnitude. (1613)
17
- A list of the meanings of the term "limit" is enumerated.
(1614)
18
- A list of the meanings of the term "that in virtue of which" is
enumerated. (1614)
19
- A list of the meanings of the term "disposition" is enumerated.
(1614)
20
- A list of the meanings of the term "having" is enumerated.
(1614)
21
- A list of the meanings of the term "affection" is enumerated.
(1615)
22
- A list of the meanings of the term "privation" is enumerated.
(1615)
23
- A list of the meanings of the term "to have" is enumerated.
(1615)
24
- A list of the meanings of the term "to come from something" is
enumerated. (1616)
25
- A list of the meanings of the term "part" is enumerated. (1616)
26
- A list of the meanings of the term "whole" is enumerated.
(1616, 1617)
27
- A list of the meanings of the term "mutilation" is enumerated.
(1617)
28
- A list of the meanings of the term "kind" is enumerated. (1617,
1618)
29
 - A list of the meanings of the term "false" is enumerated.
(1618)
30
- A list of the meanings of the term "accident" is enumerated.
(1614)
Book Six (E)
1
- Natural science deals with movable thing; the student of
natural science must study the soul to some degree: to the degree that the soul is
not independent from matter. (1619, 1620)
- There are three theoretical philosophies: mathematics, natural
science, and theology (first philosophy). (1620)
- All causes must be eternal. (1620)
2
- The unqualified term "being" has several meaning: one of which
is the true (non-being being the false), one of which is the accidental, and
besides these there are the figures of predication (quality, quantity, etc.).
(1620)
- That which is neither always not for the most part we call
accidental. This is also why there is no science that deals with the accidental,
for science deals with things that happen always or for the most part. (1621, 1622)
3
- That there are principles and causes which are generable and
destructible without ever being in course of being generated or destroyed is
obvious, for otherwise all things will be of necessity. (1622)
4
- It seems that falsity resides in the mind's concept of things
rather than in the things themselves. (1622, 1623)
Book Seven (Z)
1
- There are several meanings of "being"; for in one sense it
means what a thing is or a "this," and in another sense it means that a thing is of
a certain quality, or quantity, or some such predicate of it; it is obvious that
the primary meaning of being is the "what," which indicates the substance of the
thing. Therefore that which is primarily and is simply (not is something) must be
substance. (1623)
- There are several senses in which a thing is said to be
primary, but substance is primary in all of them: in formula, in order of
knowledge, in time. (1623)
- Substance is the only category that exists independently; the
question "what is being?" is the same as the question "what is substance?" (1624)
2
- Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; so we
say animals and plants and their parts are substances, and so are the natural
bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and the heavens
and the parts of the heavens, i.e. stars and moon and sun. We must inquire into
whether the common statements regarding substance are right, and what things are
substances, and whether there are or not any besides sensible substances. (1624)
3
- The word "substance" is applied to at least four main objects:
for both the essence and the universal and the genus are thought to be the
substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. (1624)
- The substratum is that of which other things are predicated,
while it is itself not predicated of anything else; we must first determine the
nature of this, for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the
truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is thought to be of the nature
of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third sense, the compound of these.
(1624)
- The predicates other than substance are predicated of
substance, while substance is predicated of matter. (1625)
- It is impossible for matter to be substance, for both
separability and individuality are thought to belong chiefly to substance. And so
form (which presumably individuates/separates) and the compound of form and matter
would be thought to be substance, rather than matter. But that the substance is the
compound of matter and form may be dismissed, because the compound is posterior.
(1625)
4
- The essence of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of
itself. (1625, 1626)
- The formula in which the term itself is not present but its
meaning is expressed, this is the formula of the essence of each thing. (1626)
- There is an essence only of those things whose formula is a
definition. (1626)
- We have a definition not where we have a word and a formula
identical in meaning but where there is a formula of something primary; and primary
things are those which do not involve one thing's being said of another. Nothing,
then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence - only species will
have it. (1626)
- Essence will belong, just as the "what" does, primarily and in
the simple sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories also,
- not essence simply, but the essence of a quality or of a quantity. (1627)
- Definition and essence in the primary and simple sense belong
to substances. Still they belong to other things as well in a similar way, but not
primarily. (1627)
5
- Definition is the formula of the seence, and essence must
belong to substances alone or cheifly and primarily and in the unqualified sense.
(1628)
6
- To know a thing is to know its essence; the good must be one
with the essence of good, and the beatiful with the essence of beauty, and so with
all things which do not depend on something else but are self-subsistent and
primary. (1629)
- Each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same with
its essence. (1629)
7
- Things come to be by nature, art, or spontaneously. (1629)
- Everything that comes to be comes to be something, and that
which it comes to be may be found in any category: it may come to be a "this" or a
quantity or a quality or some other category. (1629)
- Things that come to be by nature or by art have matter; for
each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the
matter in each. (1630)
- All productions other than natural productions are called
makings; all makings proceed either from art or from a capacity or from thought.
(1630)
- From art proceed the things of which the form is in the soul
(by form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance). (1630)
- I call the essence substance without matter. (1630)
- When by a thing's form we mean figure, figure is the proximate
genus in which the thing is placed. (1631)
8
- The "form" means the "such" and is not a "this" - a definite
thing; but the artist makes, or the father generates, a "such" out of a "this"; and
when it has been generated, it is a "this such." (1632)
- Callias and Socrates are different in virtue of their matter,
but the same in form; for their form is indivisible. Therefore it is matter which
individuates/differentiates. (1632)
 9
- Substance is the starting-point of all production, as of
deduction. (1633)
- The natural things which can be produced spontaneously are
those whose matter can be be moved even by itself. (1633)
10
- The parts of the formula, into which the formula is divided,
are prior to it, either all or some of them. (1635)
- The parts which are of the nature of matter and into which as
its matter a thing is divided, are posterior; but those which are parts of the
formula, and of the substance according to its formula, are prior, either all or
some of them. (1635)
- The soul is the substance of living beings, and is their
substance, i.e. their form and essence of a body of a certain kind, therefore the
parts of the soul are prior, either all or some of them, to the concrete animal,
and similarly in each case of a concrete whole; and the body and its parts are
posterior to this as substance, and it is not the substance but the concrete thing
that is divided into these parts as its matter. (1635)
- Only parts of the form are parts of the formula, and the
formula is of the universal. (1635)
- Individual, concrete things have no definition, but they are
known by the aid of thought or perception; and when they go out of actual
consciousness it is not clear whether they exist or not; but they are always stated
and cognised by means of the universal formula. But matter is unknowable in itself.
And some matter is sensible and some intelligible. (1635)
11
- Definition is of the universal and of the form, not of the
concrete thing. (1636)
- There is some matter in everything which is not an essence and
a bare form but a "this." (1637)
- It is clear that the soul is the primary substance and the body
is matter, and man or animal is a compound of both taken universally. (1637)
- The essence and the individual thing are in some cases the
same, i.e. in the case of primary substances, e.g. curvature and the essence of
curvature, if this is primary. (1638)
- By a primary substance I mean one which does not imply the
presence of something in something else, i.e. in a substrate which acts as matter.
(1638)
12
- If the genus does not exist apart from the species then the
genus could be considered matter. (1638)
13
- As the substrate and the essence and the compound of these are
called substance, so also is the universal. (1639)
- Man is the substance of the individual man in whom it is
present. (1640)
- It seems in one sense that there cannot be a definition of
anything, but in another sense there can be, and what we say will become plainer in
what follows. (1640)
14
- Clearly there are not Forms of sensible things in the sense in
which some maintain their existence. (1641)
15
- Substance is of two kinds: the concrete thing and the formula
(I mean that one kind of substance is the formula taken with the matter, while
another kind is the formula in its generality); therefore there is a destructible
kind of substance and an indestructible kind of substance. (1641)
- There is neither definition nor demonstration of sensible
individual substances, because they have matter whose nature is such that they are
capable of both being and not being; for which reason all the individual instances
of them are destructible. (1641)
16
- Parts of a whole must exist only potentially. (1643)
- Neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, just as
being an element or a principle cannot be the substance. Being and unity are more
substantial than principle or element or cause, but not even the former are
substance, since in general nothing that is common is substance; for substance does
not belong to anything but to itself and to that which has it, of which it is the
substance. (1643)
- That which is one cannot be in many things at the same time,
but that which is common is present in many things at the same time; so that
clearly no universal exists apart from the individuals. (1643)
- No doubt some eternal substances must exist. (1643)
- No universal term is the name of a substance, and no substance
is composed of substances. (1643)
17
- Substance is a principle and a cause. (1643)
- The efficient cause is sought in the case of genesis and
destruction; the final cause is sought in the case of being. (1644)
- The substance of each thing is that which makes a whole out of
parts, i.e. that which makes a syllable out of letters or flesh out of fire and
earth. This is the primary cause of its being, which is not an element but a
principle. An element is that into which a thing is divided and which is present in
it as matter, e.g. a and b are the elements of the syllable. (1644)
Book Eight (H)
1
- Matter is potentially a "this." (1645)
2
- The difference between becoming in the unqualifed sense and
becoming in the qualified sense has been stated in the Physics. (1645)
- The actuality or the formula is different when the matter is
different. (1646)
- The formula that gives the differentiae seems to be an account
of the form and the actuality, while that which gives the components is rather an
account of the matter. (1646)
- It is obvious then, what sensible substance is and how it
exists - one kind of it is matter, another as form or actuality; while the third
kind is that which is composed of these two. (1647)
Book Nine (Θ)
1
- Potentiality and actuality extend further than the mere sphere
of motion. (1651)
- The word "potential" and "can" have several senses as pointed
out in Book V, 12. But all potentialites that conform to the same type are starting
points, and are called potentialities in reference to one primary kind, which is a
starting-point of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. (1651)
- One kind of potentiality is being acted on, i.e. the principle
in the very thing acted on, which makes it capable of being changed and acted on by
itself regarded as other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change
for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other,
i.e. by a principle of change. (1651)
- The thing being acted on contains a certain motive principle,
and even because the matter is a motive principle. (1652)
2
- Since some such [motive] principles are present in soulless
thing, and others in things possessed of soul, and in soul and in the rational part
of soul, clearly some potentialities will be non-rational and some will be
accompanied by reason. This is why all arts, i.e. all productive forms of
knowledge, are potentialities; they are principles of change in another thing or in
the artist himself considered as other. (1652)
3
- That which is deprived of potentiality is incapable. (1653)
- The word "actuality" we have connected to fulfillment;
actuality in the strict sense is identified with movement, yet it has been extended
to other things besides movement. (1653)
4
- It is not true to say "this is capable of being but will not
be," - a view that leads to the conclusion that there is nothing incapable of
being. (1654)
5
- All potentialities are either innate, like the senses, or come
by practice, like the power of playing the flute, or by learning, like that of the
arts. (1654)
- The non-rational potentialities are productive of one effect
each, but the rational potentialities produce contrary effects.
6
- Actuality means the existence of the thing; yet all things are
not said in the same sense to exist actually. (1655)
- The infinite and the void and all similar things are said to
exist potentially and actually in a different sense from that in which many other
things are said so to exist. (1655)
- The infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it
will ever actually have separate existence; its separateness is only in knowledge.
For the fact that division never ceases to be possible gives the result that this
actuality exists potentially, but not that it exists separately. (1655, 1656)
7
- The seed of man is not alone sufficient to be said to be
potentially a man, but only when it enters another principle, called a foreign
medium. (1656)
- It seems that when we call a thing not something but "of" that
something, as a casket is of wood, we can proceed to find some first thing which no
longer is called after something else, and said to be of it, and this then is prime
matter, not being a "this." (1657)
- The substratum of accidents is an individual such s a man, i.e.
body and soul, while the accident is something like white or musical. Wherever this
is so the ultimate subject is a subtance; but when this is not so but the predicate
is a form or a "this," the ultimate subject is matter and material substance. And
it is only right that the "of" something locution should be used with reference
both to the matter and to the accidents; for both are indeterminates. (1657)
8
- It is clear that actuality is prior to potentiality. (1657)
- Actuality is prior to potentiality in formula; for that which
is in the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible for it to
become actual. (1657)
- Actuality is prior to potentiality in time in one sense, but
not in another; it is prior in that potential things are made actual by actual
thing, but posterior in the sense that a thing is potential before it becomes
actual. (1657, 1658)
- Actuality is prior to potentiality in substance; firstly,
because the things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form and in
substance; secondly, because everything that comes to be moves to a principle, i.e.
an end. For that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the
becoming is for the sake of the end; and the actuality is the end, and it is for
the sake of this that the potentiality is acquired. (1658)
- Matter exists in a potential state, just because it may attain
to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its form. (1658)
- The action is the end, and the actuality is the action.
Therefore even the word "actuality" is derived from "action," and points to the
fulfillment. (1658)
- Substance or form is actuality. From this argument it is
obvious that actuality is prior in substance to potentiality; and as we have said,
one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the
eternal prime mover. (1659)
- Actuality is prior in a higher sense also; for eternal things
are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal thing exists
potentially. (1659)
- Nothing that is without qualification imperishable is without
qualification potentially. Imperishable things, then, exist actually. (1659)
- Nor can anything which is of necessity be potential; yet these
things are primary. (1659)
- Actuality is prior to potentiality and any principle of change.
(1660)
9
- The good actuality is better and more valuable than the good
potentiality. (1660)
- The bad does not exist apart from bad things; for the bad is in
its nature posterior to the potentiality. And therefore we may also say that in the
things which are from the beginning, i.e. in eternal things, there is nothing bad,
nothing defective, nothing perverted (for perversion is something bad). (1660)
- The potentially existing relations are discovered by being
brought to actuality (the reason being that thinking is the actuality of thought);
so that potentiality is discovered from actuality (and therefore it is by an act of
construction that people acquire the knowledge), though the single actuality is
later in generation. (1660)
10
- Being and non-being are in their strictest sense truth and
falsity. (1660)
Book Twelve (Λ)
6
7
8
9
10