US Democracy Promotion and Popular Revolutions in the Middle East: Challenges and

Opportunities
Author(s): Muhammad Ijaz Latif and Hussain Abbas
Source: Pakistan Horizon , July 2011, Vol. 64, No. 3, THE ARAB UPRISING (July 2011),
pp. 25-42
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24711154

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US Democracy Promotion and Popular Revolutions in
the Middle East: Challenges and Opportunities
Muhammad Ijaz Latif arid Hussain Abbas

The Middle East is experiencing a process of change through popular

uprisings partly as a result of worldwide political awakening. Events in
the Middle East, since the last few months, have surprised observers as
well as policymakers throughout the world. These issues are matters of
concern and opportunities for many international actors, including the
United States. A popular backlash has started against American
supported dictatorships and repressive regimes throughout the Middle
East and North Africa. The popular uprisings have significant aspects of
dynamic change in the region and are likely to impact the major
international players in the Middle East, especially the US and its policy
of democracy promotion. It is, typically, a challenge for US foreign policy
which has supported dictators to realize its strategic interests in the
region. The US has pursued a dual agenda in the Middle East for
decades. On the one hand, it has adopted the policy of democracy
promotion, even by use of force, in the Arab world and, on the other hand,
categorically supported dictators and repressive regimes.

Support for internal reforms in Arab countries has become an integral

part of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Prior to the invasion of Iraq,
American foreign policymakers emphasized the broader benefits likely to
result from the removal of Saddam Hussein's authoritarian regime and
the cultivation of a democratic regime in its place.1 It was envisioned by
US policymakers that the success of democracy would further enhance
democratization and greater economic prosperity in the Middle East, a
region characterized, historically, by authoritarian regimes which
arguably have contributed in reinforcing chronic political instability,
conflict and economic problems.

Muhammad Ijaz Latif is Head, Department of International Relations, The

Islamia University of Bahawalpur.

Hussain Abbas is Lecturer, Department of International Relations, The Islamia

University of Bahawalpur.

1 'The national strategy for victory in Iraq',

http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf,
accessed 25 March 2011.

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26 PAKISTAN HORIZON

For decades US policy has been to maintain stability in the region, by

all means available, to ensure the even flow of oil supplies. For this
purpose, the US has very often supported monarchs and dictators. But
with the start of 2011, a series of popular uprisings has started to replace
the centuries old authoritative rule in the Middle East with that of the
governance of the people. This wave of change, also dubbed as the 'fourth
wave of democratization' by various scholars, has succeeded in Tunisia
and Egypt and is now enveloping almost all the Middle East and North
Africa. While it poses many challenges to the decades long US policy in
the Middle East, it has also opened a new democratic chapter in the
history of the Middle East, which was long-awaited by the West and
especially by the US.

The much-nuanced 'Arab Spring' has opened a window of opportunity

for the US to revise its policy of supporting dictators for the sake of
stability, towards a policy to support the Middle Eastern public for a
sustainable democratic change, which is in the long-term interest both of
the US and peace, stability and prosperity in the region. The revision of
US policy from support for dictators to support for the people is full of
challenges for US policy and its objectives. This paper analyzes the course
of the US policy of democracy promotion in the Middle East and
especially towards the recent popular uprisings. It also analyzes the
challenges and opportunities for US policy and its ability to help the local
population to transform the Middle East into a democratic and stable
region of the world.

Democracy promotion: A cornerstone of US foreign policy

The US is a country most closely associated with the concept of

democracy promotion and its practice as a foreign policy objective.
Following Wilson's agenda of'World Safe for Democracy', especially after
the Second World War, a variety of strategic policy initiatives, such as the
Atlantic Charter, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift and the 1961
Foreign Assistance Act, continued building US tradition for democracy
support.2 The reason for this support was rooted in America's national
interests and in democratic ideals closely associated with its self-image.
Like all great powers with a wide-ranging set of interests and an even
greater set of geopolitical challenges, the US also often prioritized its own
strategic interests at the expense of local democratic movements.3 There
had clearly been a growing trend in US foreign policy towards democracy

2 Balint Molnar, 'Promoting Democracy-Trends, Policies, and Challenges',

http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00005290/01/discwp-2008-06-molnar.pdf, accessed 5
March 2011.
3 Ibid.

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US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 27

support, characterized by increased attention to human rights issues

under President Carter. Subsequently, under President Reagan, there
was an ever more explicit commitment to democracy promotion and the
push for the creation of an institutional framework specifically
supporting this goal.4

In parallel with the emergence of a publicly funded non-governmental

institutional framework, the role played by various government agencies
in US democracy promotion abroad was also transformed. President
George W. Bush further expanded support for democratic development by
adding it to the portfolio of the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). During the late 1990s, under the Clinton
administration, democracy promotion became one of the three pillars of
US development strategy. Under George W. Bush, democracy promotion
received unprecedented profile in US foreign policy, including a highly
ambitious agenda for fostering democratic change in the Middle East.
Today, both democracy promotion and 'democratic bureaucracy' are
highly dispersed groups of government agencies, multinational bodies
and private organizations in the US.5

US government agencies central to democracy promotion

programming include USAID, the State Department, as well as the
Departments of Defence, Justice, and Labour. USAID and the State
Department are more generalist in their programming of democracy
assistance and preservation of human rights.6 The US has supported
civil society activists who, through their opposition to autocratic rulers,
were seen as the key movers of indigenous democratic change in the
Middle East.7 In this sense, the US has been considered as the supporter
and promoter of democratic change in a 'bottom-up' fashion.

US democracy assistance took multiple forms including support to free

and fair elections, help in developing effective political institutions,
parties, constitutions, courts, legislatures and local governments
promotion of nongovernmental civic and community groups like fraternal
organizations, religiously affiliated associations, rights groups, trade
unions, professional societies and the media. Such assistance has often

4 Ibid.
5 Thomas 0 Melia, 'The Democracy Bureaucracy', The American Interest, vol. I,
no. 4, Summer, 1 June 2006, p.9.
6 bid.
7 Jeffery Kopstein, 'The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion', The
Washington Quarterly, 29:2, Spring 2006, pp.88-89.

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28 PAKISTAN HORIZON

been coordinated with diplomatic, economic and even military tools and
measures.8

US democracy promotion in the Middle East

Democratic waves around the world have brought about significant

changes and resulted in the promotion of prosperity and stability. The
first wave in the post-Second World War period introduced democratic
reforms in Japan, Germany and Italy. Under the second wave, Portugal,
Spain and some other countries introduced democratic governments. The
last democratic wave was linked with the process of the disintegration of
the USSR at the end of the Cold War. This is considered the potential
wave that converted the anti-democratic system into a democratic one. Its
greatest manifestation was the collapse of the Berlin Wall that led to the
flourishing of democracies in Eastern and Central Europe. At the end of
the Cold War, the Arabs desired to be part of the democratic wave looking
up to the West, especially towards the US, hoping for support to change
their authoritarian political systems. However, their hopes were in vain
as the Arab regimes resisted change, cracked down on democratic forces,
and tightened their grip on power as never before.9

The democratic West showed no sympathy, commitment to, or

support of democratic forces in the region. On the contrary, western
democracies such as France, Britain and the US have been major obstacle
in the process of transition to democracy in the Arab world. The US policy
of supporting dictators, especially the regime of Mubarak in Egypt and
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, just to buy reliable strategic partners,
and its tolerance of their repressive policies had undermined the
objectives of democracy promotion. For decades, the US has been
committed to serve its strategic and economic interests at the expense of
democracy and freedom in the region.

On policy levels, as a former US ambassador put it, 'the United States

government had for so long practiced 'democratic exceptionalism,'10 and
other western democracies never deviated from this norm. In the region,
the US acted on the assumption that its interests were best served under
authoritarian rule rather than democratic governments. This was in

8 Thomas O Melia, op.cit., 'The Democracy Bureaucracy', p.9.

9 Muhammad Olimat, 'The Fourth Wave: Revolution and Democratization in the
Arab Middle East', Journal of International Women's Studies, vol. 12, no. 3,
Spring 2011, p.l.
10 John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, 'Battle for Muslims' hearts and minds:
the road not (yet) taken', Middle East Policy, vol. XIV, no.l, Spring 2007,
pp.27-41.

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US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 29

addition to the misconception that Arabs and Muslims cannot establish

democratic governments and societies because of the incompatibility of
their political culture with modern norms of democracy.11

Although the US promoted democracy in the Middle East in one way

or other in different historical periods, the last decade brought a number
of important additions to the policy architecture of US democracy
promotion. After 9/11, when it was considered that tyranny and
authoritarianism breed terrorism, the Bush administration reversed
'democratic exceptionalism' and strongly advocated democratization of
the Middle East even through use of force. Thus, under the Bush
administration, democracy promotion became the fundamental aspect of
foreign and security policy. In 2003, President Bush launched a policy for
advancing democracy and freedom in the Middle East, putting US allies
and adversaries on notice about the new emphasis. He declared that,
'sixty years of western nations' excusing and accommodating lack of
freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe because in the
long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty'.12

The Bush administration's focus on the Middle East in the context of

the democracy promotion agenda was considered a welcome shift in
geographical priorities13 but regime change in Iraq in the name of
democracy promotion made this policy more controversial at the
international level. The long shadow of the Iraq invasion and the
subsequent dressing up of the invasion to remove Saddam Hussein as a
democratizing mission, made any hopes for successful pro-democracy
engagement in most countries of the Arab world a mirage. It was partly
also a result of a simplified concept aimed at linking the 'war on terror'
with democratization, arguing that pushing forcefully for a democratic
opening in repressive Arab states would reduce the risk that these
countries would continue to be breeding grounds for extremism and
terrorism.14

With its long history of intervention in the region and cordial relations
with many Arab authoritarian regimes, the US had generally opposed
participation of Islamist opposition groups in the democratic process for
fear that they would gain control of their respective governments.

11 Muhammad Olimat, op.cit., 'The Fourth Wave: Revolution and Democratization

in the Arab Middle East', p. 2.
12 Robert McMahon, 'The Brave New World of Democracy Promotion', Foreign
Service Journal, 12 January 2009, p. 34.
13 Balint Molnar, op.cit.,'Promoting Democracy-Trends, Policies, and Challenges',
p. 11.
14 Ibid.

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30 PAKISTAN HORIZON

Apparent US concern behind this rejection was that Islamists were

thought to threaten US interests in the region. The US still opposes the
integration of the Islamists in the democratic process as a large number
of Islamist organizations remain included on the State Department's list
of'terrorist' groups.

The role of Islamist groups in the recent uprising in the Middle East
and North Africa has proved that it is a mistake for American
policymakers to assume that every Islamist group is inherently violent or
al Qaeda-oriented. In the wake of the 'Arab Spring', there is a growing
realization in US policymaking circles that true democratization in the
Arab world cannot materialize without the participation of Islamist
political groups. In this respect, the US has started to engage the Muslim
Brotherhood in the political process of Egypt. However, this realization
has not been fully translated into concrete policies.

Despite the rhetoric and increase in funding, US democracy promotion

policy during the Bush administration and last year was in a worse shape
than it was at the time of its formation. The US rejection of Islamists
added to the negative perception of its policies in Arab countries and
elsewhere, and discouraged any possibility of forging true democratic
processes in a region that has long suffered from autocracy and the
absence of basic freedoms. Democracy promotion, as part of foreign policy,
became the story of the abuse of democracy promotion for the pursuit of
strategic interests and establishment of US hegemony in the Middle
East.

With the election of the first Afro-American president, committed to

change, the policy of democracy promotion gained new direction.
Although President Obama is committed to the goals of democracy
promotion, the strategy to pursue that goal has changed altogether from
democracy imposition to democracy support in the Middle East.

Popular revolutions in the Middle East and US policy

Linking the 'war on terror' with democratization by the US brought

negative responses from opposition groups and human right activists in
the autocratic regimes of the Middle East. Repression by authoritarian
regimes in the name of 'war on terror' and the local population's mistrust
of US policies frustrated those who were dreaming of freedom and
democracy in their respective countries. The Arab population had hoped
that the US agenda would provide an opportunity to transform the
repressive political structures of the Arab world into democratic systems
but the rhetoric of democracy promotion could not match the ground
realities. Consequently, that ambitious agenda could not attain its

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US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 31

objectives, primarily because of the US dual approach towards democracy

promotion in the region.

The negative impact of US policies and repression by the Arab regimes

forced the population to show street power to change their political
system. The Arab public believed that the strategic alliance between
authoritarian elites and US interests damage the people's will for true
democratic reforms in the Middle East. This consciousness convinced the
people that no one would get freedom for them until they took charge of
change themselves. This perception led to popular uprisings and started a
course of events that ultimately toppled the regimes of the Tunisian and
Egyptian presidents and provided an opportunity for major powers to
take action against Libyan President Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.

Democratic transition in Tunisia and US response

Since December 2010, Tunisia has undergone a dramatic wave of political

and social unrest which led to the ousting of President Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali in January 2011. The 'Tunisian Revolution' has been
characterized by unprecedented pro-democracy protests and a campaign
of civil resistance which has seen a series of street demonstrations.
Sparked by the self-immolation of a young 26-year old unemployed
Tunisian man, the series of pro-democracy demonstrations were later
violently suppressed by the security forces, resulting in many injuries
and deaths.15

President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January

2011, following weeks of mounting anti-government protests. Tunisia's
popular uprising, also known as the 'Jasmine Revolution', appears to
have inspired reforms and opposition movements in Egypt, Libya, Yemen,
Jordan, Algeria and other Middle East and North African countries.16
The pro-democracy movement has been internationally heralded, but the
wave of protests across the Middle East has also raised international
concerns over the stability in the region which was associated previously
with secure, autocratic, pro-western regimes.17

15 Daniel Novotny, Abdessemad Belhaj, Marek Cejka, Alice Savovovâ and Jan
Kuzvart, 'The Changing Security Situation In the Maghreb', Research Paper
3/2011, April 2011, http://www.anatem.info/articles/securite_maghreb.pdf,
accessed 26 March 2011.
16 Alexis Arieff, 'Political Transition in Tunisia,' CRS Report for Congress,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21666.pdf, accessed 10 May 2011.
17 Ibid.

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32 PAKISTAN HORIZON

Overall, US and Tunisian relations during Ben Ali's presidency

largely emphasized security cooperation. Tunisia cooperates with NATO's
Operation Active Endeavor, which provides counter-terrorism
surveillance in the Mediterranean. However, Tunisia did not support the
1991 Gulf War and the 2003 war in Iraq which President Ben Ali feared
might destabilize the Middle East.18 Generally, it can be argued that the
relations between the two countries remained uncontested as their
interests converged on the matter of suppression of Islamist groups in
Tunisia, which were considered a threat to US interests and a formidable
opposition to the Ben Ali regime.

The US considered President Ben Ali to be a close ally, a moderate

Arab ruler, and a partner in international counter-terrorism efforts.19
Under cover of counter-terrorism measures and with US strategic
support, President Ben Ali emphasized the threat of Islamist extremism
in order to justify his authoritarian rule.20 His repressive measures were
tolerated by US administrations due to the conviction that Islamist
extremism in Tunisia was a threat to the US and, if Islamists took over
part of the Tunisian government, they would pose a severe threat to the
US interests in the region. 21

Despite the generally positive bilateral ties with the Ben Ali regime,
US officials occasionally expressed deliberate criticism of Tunisia's record
on political rights and freedoms of expression.22 The State Department
was critical of the 200423 and 2009 elections, by arguing that the US
would continue to press for political reforms. Furthermore, in July 2010,
the State Department also showed deep concern over the decline in
political freedoms, notably severe restrictions on freedom of expression in
Tunisia, particularly with regard to sentencing of an independent
journalist to four years in prison.24 While the State Department reports
included details of corruption and abuses by the Ben Ali regime, they
stressed that would not affect the strategic relationship between the US
and Tunisia. This policy showed that the US preferred the strategic
relationship with an authoritarian regime at the expense of freedom and
liberty.

18 Tunis Infortunisie, 'Ben Ali Expresses 'Deep Regret' at the Start of War Against
Iraq', CRS Report for Congress, 20 March 2003.
19 Alexis Arieff, op. cit., 'Political Transition in Tunisia'.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tunisia, released by US
State Department on 28 February 2005.
23 Ibid.
24 US State Department's daily press briefing, 9 July 2010.

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US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 33

Numerous international and regional news reports and analyses have

referenced internal communications among US diplomats who were
reportedly highly critical of political repression and corruption among
Ben Ali's inner circle and in his family. Some analysts have speculated
that reports of such communications may have played a role in sparking
anti-government protests.25

While watching protests in Tunisia quietly for some days without any
response, the US started perceiving that there was an opportunity to
advance its agenda of democracy promotion, with new zeal, in the regions
of the Middle East and North Africa. After Ben Ali's departure on 14
January 2011, President Obama stated, 'I condemn and deplore the use of
violence against citizens peacefully voicing their opinion in Tunisia, and I
applaud the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people.'26 He also called
on the Tunisian government to hold 'free and fair elections in the near
future that reflect the true will and aspirations of the Tunisian people.'27
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton echoed his call for elections and
encouraged the Tunisian government to 'build a stronger foundation for
Tunisia's future with economic, social and political reform,' adding that
'the United States stands ready to help.'28This is considered a clear shift
in US policy from Ben Ali's support to the people's support but, again, is
motivated by long-term US strategic interests which are now associated
with siding with pro-democracy protesters.

Although the Obama administration has focused on policy measures to

help the Tunisian people in political and social reforms, it is a shared
perception of civil society activists, opposition groups and human right
activists that human rights abuses committed in the name of 'counter
terrorism' have increased under the Obama administration. This
perception shows concerns about the future relationship of Tunisia with
the US and can undermine the Obama administration's capacity to build
Tunisia as a democracy favourable to US strategic interests in the region.

Uprising in Egypt and the US role

The rapid fall of the dictator in Tunisia encouraged the Egyptians to

think that, suddenly, the impossible was possible and it became a factor

25 Christopher Alexander, 'Tunisia's protest wave: where it comes from and what
it mean', Foreign Policy, 3 January 2011.
26 Statement by the President on Events in Tunisia, The White House, 14
January 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press
ofïïce/2011/01/14/statement-president-events-tunisia
27 Ibid.
28 US State Department, 'Recent Events in Tunisia', 14 January 2011.

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34 PAKISTAN HORIZON

to motivate the people to join in the protests in Egypt.29 On 25 January

2011, a week after the flight of Ben Ali, Egyptians took to the streets,
protesting against President Hosni Mubarak. Outrage was sparked by a
number of circumstances, including the regime's brutal murder of rights
activist Khaled Said, widely publicized on Facebook, the stolen elections
of November 2010, when opposition forces were denied any credible
representation and the mid-winter spike in the price of basic food
commodities, that harmed Egypt's poor community.30

The uprising in Egypt was surprising. Among the various Arab

countries, Egypt had been for years seeking reformation. After the fateful
17 days, President Mubarak stepped down from power in favour of a
military council which promised rapid political reforms. This
extraordinary storm of events posed serious challenges to the Obama
administration, which was confronted by a delicate balancing act between
demonstrating its commitment to a long-standing ally, managing an
inevitable transition in order to protect core US interests, and acting in
accordance with its sympathy with the peaceful protesters.31

Although the US had been calling for reforms in Egypt for over a
decade, the Bush administration had eased its pressure for reforms
following the strong showing of the Muslim Brotherhood in
parliamentary elections in late 2005.32 The Muslim Brotherhood is one of
the oldest political opposition groups in Egypt and the US had always
shown concern about its ascendancy. Mainstream Islamist parties in
Egypt were viewed with suspicion by the US, not because of their
disengagement with liberal values but because of the challenge they pose
to long-standing US geopolitical interests in the Middle East.33

The US tolerated various repressive policies of the Mubarak regime

just to contain extended engagement of the Muslim Brotherhood in the
political structure of Egypt. The government cracked down on the party,
arrested its members, banned its political activities but the US response
to such moves was relatively muted. The US administration has, for
many years, preferred to support friendly regimes in Egypt rather than

29 Eva Bellin, 'Lessons from the Jasmine and Nile Revolutions: Possibilities of
Political Transformation in Middle East?', Middle East Brief, no. 50, May 2011.
30 Ibid.
31 Marc Lynch, 'America and Egypt After the Uprisings', Survival, vol.53, no. 2,
April-May 2011, pp. 31-42.
32 Robert McMahon, op.cit., 'The Brave New World of Democracy Promotion,' p.
32.
33 Andrew Lee Butters, 'How the Egyptian Uprisings is Changing the Muslim
Brotherhood', http://www.time,com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046725,00.html,
accessed 20 July 2011.

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US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 35

elections that might bring up new leaders who challenge its interests in
the region.

The Obama administration's response to the uprising in Egypt was

more prudent as, when protests gained strength, it quickly concluded
that Mubarak could not survive and its policy must be designed to broker
a post-Mubarak outcome amenable to core American strategic interests.34
It focused on efforts to restrain the Egyptian military from using violence
against the protesters, demanding respect for universal rights, insisting
that only the Egyptian people could choose their leaders and push for
long-term and meaningful reforms.35 The Obama administration has been
successful in preventing the uprising from becoming violent through
constant, private pressure on the Egyptian military.36

Because of the Obama administration's efforts, the military decided to

focus on protecting government buildings rather than acting against the
demonstrators. 37 On 31 January 2011, a military spokesman explicitly
declared on the state television that 'the military understood the
legitimacy of the protesters' demand and that the armed forces will not
resort to force against our great people.'38 This was mainly attributed to
military professionalism and American abandonment of President
Mubarak. Although this move was seen with suspicion by many in and
outside the Mubarak regime, it played a significant role in managing the
situation in favour of the local public.

The turning point seemed to come on 2 February 2011, when plain

clothed thugs swarmed into Tahrir Square and brutally tortured the
protesters. The violence backfired and the Obama administration, which
had publicly warned against civilian protesters, quickly exerted its
pressure on the Egyptian military to begin an immediate transition.39 It
also repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with various reforms offered
by Mubarak.

When Mubarak refused to surrender power even in the face of popular

outrage and stern statement from Washington, the military stepped in,

34 Ibid.
35 'Remarks of President Obama on Egypt Situation', http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/01remarks-president-situation-egypt,
accessed 25 May 2011.
36 Marc Lynch, op.cit., 'America and Egypt After the Uprisings, p.32.
37 David Kirkpatrick, 'Mubarak's Grip on Power is Shaken', The New York Times,
31 January 2011.
38Ibid.
39 Marc Lynch, op.cit., 'America and Egypt After the Uprisings, p.34.

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36 PAKISTAN HORIZON

removed Mubarak from power and promised to return Egypt to

democratic rule. For the Obama administration to side with the
protesters against Mubarak, who was considered in Washington as a
reliable partner and enthusiastic supporter of the American moderate
camp against the radical camp in the Middle East, was not an easy task.
It had realized that siding with the Egyptian people and brokering a deal
for the people's power in Egypt would enhance the US international
image and build trust between the two sides. Also, the hardliners of
American foreign policymakers realized that Mubarak had lost his
popularity and control and would not recover from the uprising.
Therefore, it had become important for America to cater for broad-based
and long-term US strategic interests in the changing context.40

Contrary to the Bush administration, President Obama became

involved in concrete efforts to achieve an orderly transition and
consistently put the Egyptian people, rather than America, at the centre
of the demonstrations.41 Moreover, the members of the Obama
government worked to engage with a variety of actors, government and
opposition and preferred calculated measure to broker a change in Egypt.
While it is difficult to know what the Egyptian military might have done
on its own, the Obama administration spent a great deal of time and
effort in communicating with it at all levels. At least six phone calls were
made by Secretary of Defence Robert Gates to the top Egyptian military
leadership, and ongoing communication with junior and senior officers
took place at all levels to manage the situation amicably according to the
wishes of the Egyptian people.42

In this way, the US played a facilitative role in brokering change,

supported through back channels, avoiding public announcements. It
emphasized that its future relationship with Egypt depended on its
respect for the universal rights of its people and repeatedly warned
against any attempt to avoid genuine reforms. There is also a growing
realization in US policymaking circles that true democratization cannot
be achieved in Egypt without positive engagement with Islamist
opposition groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, but this approach
has yet to take shape in concrete policy.

40 Ibid.
41 Obama's statement on 11 February 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
press-office/2011/02/11/remarks-president-egypt, accessed 15 March 2011.
42 Josh Rogin, 'Gates and Mullen in Close Contact With Egyptian Military',
Foreign Policy, 11 February 2011, at
http://www.thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/1 lgates-and-mullen-in
close-contact-with-egyptian-military, accessed 5 May 2011.

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US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 37

Intervention in Libya and US policy measures

Popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt have significantly shaped the

course of action in Libya. These organized events deliberately challenged
the repressive and despotic acts of their rulers for the first time in 42
years in such a massive way. For protesting against 42 years of
oppression endured under Qadhafi's regime, the Libyan people were
attacked with helicopter gunships and subjected to extrajudicial killing
by the Libyan military forces.43 The crisis reached a flashpoint in
February 2011. When the military attempted to suppress protests, the
uprising turned violent and sparked open rebellion against the Qadhafi
regime.44

By mid-March 2011, the rebellion was on the brink of defeat and the
UN was asked to establish a 'no fly zone' over Libya to prevent the
slaughter of innocent civilians caught in the middle of the civil war. In
accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1973, the US, Britain,
France, Qatar, UAE and several other NATO partners began Operation
Odyssey Dawn to enforce a 'no fly zone' over Libyan airspace.45 Rebel
groups, with the help of the intervening major powers and their allies,
declared a new regime in areas under their control as the Libyan
National Transitional Council. This regime has been gaining
international recognition as the sole legitimate authority of Libya while
the armed conflict continues to end Qadhafi's 42-year rule and establish a
democratic government in Libya.46

The US, along with other western countries, has been calling for an
end to Qadhafi's regime. US drones and CIA assistance hold the potential
to help the Libyan rebels to organize and renew their momentum in what
appears to be a stalemate.47 It has also started giving political support
and financial assistance to the Transitional National Council while
establishing a foundation for future business deals to secure the
permanent US energy interests in Libya.

Historically, the US had supported Libya's independence, but

relations between the two countries deteriorated after Qadhafi's first
three-year rule. By the end of 1979, the US broke diplomatic relations

43 Matthew Gannon, 'Opportunities for the United States in the Libyan Crisis of
2011 and Beyond', http://www.iwp.edu/docLib/20110521_YVMERD.pdf,
accessed 5 May 2011.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.

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38 PAKISTAN HORIZON

with Libya because it was considered that employment of different

terrorist groups by the Libyan government was an intrinsic feature of its
foreign policy.48 That led to a proxy war between the intelligence agencies
of both countries and a kind of Cold War started between the two states.
In the recent scenario, US relations with Qadhafi irrevocably soured with
his brutalities against the Libyan people. The international community,
with the leading voice of the US demanded his surrender as US,
sponsored and trained rebels fought for their independence. The US-led
Operation Odyssey Dawn, was the first defining action of what was
considered 'the Obama doctrine', characterized by cooperation with
international partners and the use of military force to secure
'humanitarian interests'.49

Challenges to the US policy of democracy promotion

In the current situation, sustained mass protest and the flight of

autocrats are not a finished deal in the Middle East and North Africa.50
The important question remains that, even if all autocrats were to leave,
would that necessarily lead to democratic transition in the region?
Scholars of democratization have long been arguing that transition from
authoritarianism to democracy is a two-step process.51 First, the
authoritarian regime must be brought down; second, democratic
foundations must be built. These are independent processes, and success
in one does not necessarily result in success in the other.52 Bringing down
an authoritarian regime does not mean that a democratic regime will
necessarily take its place. In fact, the more common scenario historically
has been for one authoritarian regime to be replaced by another
authoritarian regime.53 These possibilities in post-revolutionary Tunisia
and Egypt pose a grave concern for the US to avert which it has to take
up the challenge of assisting both countries in establishing democratic
regimes.

48 'Christopher Boucek, 'Libya State-Sponsored Terrorism: A Historical

Perspective, Terrorism Monitor', vol.3, issue.6,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=l&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=305,
accessed 20 March 2011.
49 Nikolas Gvosdev, 'The Realist Prism: Reconciling the New Obama Doctrine
With the Old', World Politics Review, 29 April 2011,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8683/the-realist-prism-reconciling
the-new-obama-doctrine-with-the-old, accessed 14 May 2011.
50 Eva Bellin, op.cit., 'Lessons from the Jasmine and Nile Revolutions:
Possibilities of Political Transformation in Middle East?', p.6.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.

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US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 39

Building democracy on the ruins of authoritarianism is a daunting

task. The story of the Egyptian change is far from complete. The military
rulers of the new Egypt may try to fulfil their promises of rapid return to
civilian rule, but they may also follow the pattern of past Arab coup
leaders and endeavour to retain power.54 As the US kept in touch with
the military throughout the crisis, encouraged it to take power and even
brokered change in Egypt, it has to maintain continuous pressure on the
Egyptian military to fulfil their promise of a smooth transition to
democracy in Egypt as soon as possible, according to the wishes of the
Egyptian people.55 Solving problems and maintaining stability would be
the future task of the new leadership but the real challenge would be the
massive economic and social problems that fuelled the uprising. These
issues can only be tackled with the commitment of existing regimes and
assistance from the US.

Political inclusion of various Islamist parties is the best way to steer

them in a more moderate direction, and it will need more pragmatic
efforts on the part of the Obama administration to engage them in
mainstream political activities.56 However, it is to be noted that their role
is likely to push Egyptian politics in a more conservative direction, both
in domestic and foreign policies.57

The transformation of Egypt has transnational implications and the

most affected country seems to be Israel, which has seen its most trusted
Arab partner overthrown and the security of its southern border, long
taken for granted, thrown into question.58 It seems unlikely that the
Camp David accord will be overturned by the new Egypt but popular
hostility to the blockade of Gaza, and ultimate opening of the Gaza
border, mean that it is unlikely that the new regime will continue to
enforce it with the same spirit as Mubarak.59 Another Israeli war with
Gaza or Lebanon may well lead to a dramatic deterioration in Egypt's
relationship with Tel Aviv,60 and will undermine the security and
stability of Israel which is the main pillar of the US Middle East policy.

The revolutionary wave in the Arab world has opened a Pandora's box.
Therefore, events should not be seen only as a thirst for freedom or

54 Ibid.
m ibid.
56 Marc Lynch, op.cit., 'America and Egypt After the Uprisings', p. 38.
57 Ibid.
ss Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.

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40 PAKISTAN HORIZON

democracy.61 The desire for democracy is not necessarily accompanied by

a desire to become western, either conceptually or culturally.62 Moreover,
on the contrary, some of the elements promoting the popular protests in
the Arab world today are fundamentally hostile to the West in gener
and the US and its strategic partner, Israel, in particular.63

Almost every state in the Middle East where proper elections took
place in the last two decades, saw significant successes reaped b
Islamist forces, as in Algeria, the Palestinian Authority and Turkey.
These elements do not have sympathy for the democratic idea in its
western context but emphasize their own. This was further complicate
by the Bush administration's double standards regarding democrac
promotion in the Middle East. The Bush administration's democrac
promotion by force in Iraq and neglect of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, ev
tolerating their repressive policies, raised doubts about the real
intentions of the democracy promotion policy of the US. This fear an
doubt still prevail in the minds of the Middle East population.

Overall, the US is now viewed as a hollow reed for its allies and
toothless vis-a- vis its enemies, further weakening its status in the
Middle East.64 This perception of the US role in the Middle East is most
likely to undermine its ability to assist democratic movements, and will
ultimately put its role into confusion. Therefore, the US has to adopt a
pragmatic policy that can reshape its image to pursue its agenda of
supporting democratic reforms in the Middle East and North Africa.

US policy and opportunities for democratic change

The approach of the US administration towards regional upheavals is

deeply rooted in the American world view to support popular struggles for
freedom and a deterministic belief in the victory of democracy in every
area of the world. It is also possible that its moves are imbued with the
hope that this would help to restore the US image in the Middle East,
which has traditionally been negative. Some in the US even claimed that
the seeds of the current wave of revolutions were planted with the demise
of Saddam Hussein's regime. Hussein's media-covered capture propelled
gradual defusing of fear of the Arab people to confront their regimes, a

61 Michael Milstein, 'A New-Old Middle East: Current Developments and Their
Implications for Israel', Strategic Assessment, vol. 14, no. 1, April 2011, p.5.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.

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US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION 41

process that has peaked in recent months and has provided an

opportunity to change the region into a democratic one.65

Another positive sign for US policy is the scant anti-Americanism

observed during these protests.66 With the positive response from leading
revolutionaries for US support for a democratic transition, it is argued
that it will be good for the region and for US credibility. US support for
democracy in the region will also deflect anti-Americanism and provide
more credibility when it deals with the new regimes that will come to
power.67

The Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings constitute important milestones

in Arab politics, and their success at democratization may provide
important precedents. Political analysts have long acknowledged the
importance of the so-called 'demonstration' effect in spreading democracy
and the urge to emulate among other countries is most powerful when
the 'demonstrator' country or countries are both geographically proximate
and culturally and historically similar.68 For the first time in the Middle
East, 'people's power' has brought down dictatorships and, perhaps, in
the long run these two uprising will mark the first step towards the
process of institutionalizing people's power throughout the Arab world.69

Although primarily motivated by economic and commercial interests, US

action in Libya sends a positive message to those struggling against
oppression in the Middle East. It also conveys that those seeking to effect
democratic change can count on some form of support from the US. Other
uprisings in the Middle East can consider the US as a valuable potential
partner for establishing new governments and developing commercial
ties.70

Obama's careful efforts to build a strong international consensus

against the Qadhafi regime, after it unleashed brutal violence against the
Libyan protesters, also demonstrated the US struggle to develop a
coherent, consistent approach to regional upheavals.71 What is happening

65 'Interview with Fouad Ajami taken by Natasha Mozgovaga', Haaretz, 25

February 2011.
66 Dr. Uma Purushothaman, 'USA and Revolutions in the Arab World,' ORF
ISSUE BRIEF, no.27, April 2011.
67 Ibid.
68 Eva Bellin, op.cit., 'Lessons from the Jasmine and Nile Revolutions:
Possibilities of Political Transformation in Middle East?', pp.6-7.
69 Ibid.
70 Matthew Gannon, op.cit., 'Opportunities for the United States in the Libyan
Crisis of 2011 and Beyond'.
71 Marc Lynch, op.cit., 'America and Egypt After the Uprisings', p. 40.

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42 PAKISTAN HORIZON

in the Arab world is, therefore, a chance for Obama to deliver his promise
and infuse American foreign policy with more idealism and more
practical help.72

The Arab uprisings present an unprecedented opportunity for the US

to do away with its policy of supporting dictators in the name of
realpolitik73 During the transition process, the US support for pro
democracy movements will upgrade its image and taking sides or
supporting one party against the other will have negative results. It could
also bolster support to civil society in these countries through technical
and economic aid.74 This way, the US can strengthen its positive soft
image and establish credibility for its policy of democracy promotion to
transform the Middle East into a region of peace, stability and democratic
governance.75

Conclusion

The crisis in the Middle East is unfolding and it is too early to early to
make a long-term strategic assessment. The state survives, but in most
cases its nature is changing. In homogeneous states like Egypt and
Tunisia, the uprisings have been relatively less violent but in a
heterogeneous state like Libya, they have become violent. The current
regional wave of protests can be considered as the basis of future
revolutions. They have posed some challenges to the existing order
dominated by the US, but have also provided it with an opportunity to
transform its role in the Middle East.

Obama's administration has an opportunity to revise the US policy of

democracy imposition in the Middle East to democratic support, as he
had promised. Contrary to his predecessor, Obama responded to the
uprisings more pragmatically. Despite initial support for dictators like
Mubarak, the US has now adopted a realist policy in support of peaceful
democratic change with regard to Arab upheavals. It has also adopted a
country-specific strategy to deal with the protests instead of a strategy for
the entire region. In Tunisia and Egypt, where it was obvious that the
regimes had thoroughly alienated their people and were bound to
collapse, it supported democracy movements. In Libya, it decided on
airstrikes to protect civilians with the backing of the UNSC resolution,
instead of going alone, moved by humanitarian impulses and also by
Libya's oil riches.

72 Uma Purushothaman, op.cit., 'USA and Revolutions in the Arab World,' p. 15.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.

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