Militarism in Japan’s Foreign Policy By Kenneri Corecrove 'N_ 1928, Japan in the company of fourteen other states signed the Kel- logg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy in foreign relations. This event occurred within the period of thirteen years when Japan enjoyed a large measure of parliamen- tary government modeled on the British type. The period began with the Hara Cabinet in 1918 and ended with the fall of the Wakatsuki Cabinet in 1931. To the credit of Japan it should be remem- bered that during this short era sincere efforts were made by Japanese statesmen to eliminate war as an instrument of na- tional policy. Japan co-operated in the peace machinery of the League of Na- tions, she supported the International Labor Office and the World Court, and she participated with a fine spirit of sportsmanship in the Washington Con- ference of 1921, the London Naval Con- ference of 1930, and the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Con- ference of 1926-30. Sino-Japanese re- lations almost reached the stage of com- plete conciliation under Baron Shidehara who presided over the Foreign Office for six of the eight years between 1924 and 1931. Indeed, his success in promoting peace with China proved to be one of the reasons that led the militarists to resort to the coup d’état of 1931 which destroyed the parliamentary regime in Japan. ‘The destruction of the author- ity of civil government obviously re- stored war as the chief instrument of foreign policy in Japan. Tue Muuitary Pattern oF Lire Numerous scholars have observed that Chinese culture throughout thirty centuries and more has shown a tend- ency toward the democratic and peace- ful pattern of life, while historic Japan tends toward aristocratic rule and mili- tarism.t Unhappily, this characteriza- tion of Japanese culture is all too true. For centuries previous to the constitu- tion of 1889 the military class held the dominant position in the state. Under Yoritomo, who in 1192 a.p. received the title of sei-i-tai-shogun, or “great bar- barian-subduing general,” even the Em- perors became puppets of the military class. Until the end of the Tokugawa shogunate, Japan was governed from the bakufu, or military camp near the mod- em city of Tokyo, rather than from Kyoto the home of the Emperors. The daimyo, or feudal lords who supported the shogun, ruled by the sword, and their adherents, the samurai, could kill at will, In the opinion of numerous scholars this military tradition still plays a con- spicuous part in modern Japan. In the words of Professor Latourette: ‘The presence of this military class was in many respects to be a distinct advantage of Japan in the new age brought by con- tact with the West. It provided a group of disciplined men accustomed to leader- ship, and whom the nation had been trained to follow. With a few exceptions the lead- ers in the transition from the old to the new Japan were of the military class. The government is still largely dominated by their descendants. In the possession of this special type of military heritage the island empire has had a distinct advantage over China, for there no hereditary nobility with traditions of loyalty and sacrifice is present to lead the nation through the per- ils which beset the period of change, and the nation itself does not seem to have de- 2One of the most recent of these compari- sons is that of Harley Farnsworth MacNair, The Real Conflict between China and Japan (Chicago, 1938)8 Tue ANNALS oF THE AmerIcAN ACADEMY veloped a capacity for discipline and unity as fully as in Japan? The military tradition has also been retained in the religious life of Japan. Emperor worship is one of the essential features of modern Shinto. The three Imperial Ancestors, namely, Chuai ‘Tenno, Empress Jingo, and Ojin Tenno, who constitute the divinities of war, are today worshiped at the Hachiman shrines. In a careful study of this sub- ject, Dr. Holtom offers proof that the Japanese Government widely promotes Hachiman worship. There are twice as many shrines of Ojin Tenno as the com- bined number of all other Emperors. Dr. Holtom concludes: The hero worship aspect of modern Shinto reveals the influence of the martial traditions of the Japanese people. As the teligion of a nation that owes so much to the prowess of its soldiery it is inevitable that Shinto would exalt the military ideal. This it does, not so much by magnifying the worship of the traditional patron divin- ities of war, although this aspect of the situation must be given due attention, as it does by commemorating among the im- mortal kami certain military heroes who have been conspicuous for loyalty to their rulers, Along with these are included the soldiers and sailors who have given their lives in the modern wars of their country.? Thus it may be said that in both the Political and the social zones, the mili- tary tradition still prevails in the mod- ern culture of Japan. Indeed, it would be a miracle if a pattern of national life which has endured for centuries should be revised in such a short space as that occupied by the experiment in parlia- mentary government in Nippon. Tre Peace Poticy or THE PaRLIA- MENTARY GOVERNMENT The parliamentary episode of 1918- ®Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Develop- ment of Japan (New York, 1918), pp. 81-82. ®D. C. Holtom, The National Faith of Ja- ‘pan (London, 1938), p. 176. 31 deserves more than a passing refer ence. It was more than a mere break in the military tradition of Japan. The fall of the Tokugawa shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor in 1867 were accomplished by forces that led to the destruction of feudalism and the mod- ernization of the government. Political control was seized by a few daimyo, or feudal chiefs, and a handful of kuge, or court nobles. This group was aug- mented in a few months by the inclusion of a larger number of samurai, or feudal retainers. At the same time, the lib- eral movement, inspired by admiration for Western ideas, in 1882 compelled this ruling group in the name of the Emperor to initiate the framing of a modern constitution, The constitution of 1889 proved to be a compromise between the four lead- ing clans (Choshu, Satsuma, Tosa, and Hizen), the militarists, the bureaucrats, and the zaibatsu or business houses rep- resented by the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda.* For three dec- ades this combination of interests con- trolled the parliamentary system. By 1918 the balance of this alliance had shifted. The influence of the clans had largely declined, while political parties in the Imperial Diet with the broaden- ing of the suffrage had gained a share in government. Undoubtedly, all the major political parties have been partly controlled by finance capitalism through bribery and other means. But this does not detract from the significance of the fact that for thirteen years, from 1918 to 1931, po- litical parties almost continuously exer- cised the principal contro] over the cab- inets that ruled Japan. In this period, the Cabinets of Hara and Takahashi (1918-22) were composed of members from the Seiyukai (Constitutional Gov- ‘Compare Takeshi Osatake, Dai Nippon Kensei Shi, or Constitutional History of Ja- pan (Tokyo, 1930), pp. 1-6,Mnuranisac 1y Japan’s Foreien Poticy 9 ernment party). The Cabinets of Ad- miral Kato, Admiral Yamamoto, and Viscount Kiyoura (1922-24) constitute the only exception to party ministries. The Cabinets of Taka-akira Kato (1924-26) drew upon the Kenseikai (Constitutional party) and the Seiyu- kai, Wakatsuki succeeded Kato as Pre- mier in the second Kato cabinet, which continued to 1927, The Tanaka Cab- inet (1927-29) was in the hands of the Seiyukai. The Minseito (Democratic party) which developed from the Ken- seikai controlled the Hamaguchi Cab- inet (1929-31) and the Wakatsuki Cab- inet (1931), For forty years the landed interests exercised a large influence in the Seiyu- kai, but in both this party and the Min- seito the impress of the zaibatsu was ex- tensive. With the rise of party cabinets in 1918, bureaucrats and professional soldiers did not disappear from the po- litical arena. It is more correct to say that politicians controlled by financial interests took the lead in the government of Japan. At the same time, the policy of both the politicians and the capital- ists looked toward international peace. No less a political figure than Prince Saionji represented Japan at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and until the collapse of civil government in 1931 Japanese statesmen played loyal roles in the League of Nations. The bureau- crats joined in the peace movement. Baron Shidehara, a career diplomat who presided over the Foreign Office during four ministries and who was closely re- lated to the Mitsubishi, formulated a peace policy that promised complete reconciliation of China with Japan. ‘Tre EMPEROR AND THE MILitaRy Camp ‘The suddenness with which the peace policy of the politicians and the zaibatsw met destruction in 1931 was partly due to a unique constitutional advantage en- joyed by the militarists. In most states, before the rise of totalitarian govern- ment, the military forces had become subordinated to the civil authority. Certainly this was the case in the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Weimar Republic. But never, under the Japanese constitution, has the civil government won control of the army and navy. By tradition as well as constitutional Jaw, the Emperor is the head of the state. Indeed, by official interpretation at the time of the Minobe affair, he is considered not merely an organ of the state but rather the state itself. In most modern constitutional monarchies, the cabinet as a unit will advise the monarch on all questions. In Japan, the Cabinet and the Privy Council give counsel to the Emperor on civil policy, while the war and naval ministers and the chiefs of staff advise him on military affairs, In Japanese law the iaku no gunmu, or supreme command, has always been the prerogative of the Emperor and is so recognized in the constitution of 1889. Article XI recites that “the Em- peror has the supreme command of the army and navy,” while Article XII indi- cates that “the Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the army and navy.” Similar phraseology is found in numerous modern constitu- tions of democratic states in which the head of the government must follow the advice of the cabinet in military as well as civil affairs, But in Japan, the rigid separation of civil and military advice to the Throne tends to place the civil authorities at the mercy of the profes- sional soldiers. Indeed, the gap be- tween the Cabinet and the Imperial camp is responsible for what the Jap- anese call niju seifu, or dual govern- ® Compare statement of the Okada Cabinet in the Tokyo Asahi, Aug. 4, 1935, p. 1.10 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY ment, which in respect to foreign policy becomes niju gwaiko, or dual diplomacy. Tre Mrurtary ADVISERS OF THE EMPEROR The chief military advisers of the Emperor include the Gensui-ju, or Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals, and the Gunji Sangi-in, or Supreme War Coun- cil. The first of these bodies now num- bers only three exalted officers, The Gunji Sangi-in includes the members of the Gensui-fu, the ministers of war and navy, the chiefs of the war and naval general staffs, and other generals and admirals appointed by the Emperor. What the supporters of democracy in Japan have long decried is the iaku joso, or right of direct access to the Emperor enjoyed by professional militarists.° This privilege is based on the eighth article of the Imperial Ordinance on the Organization of the Cabinet in 1889, which provides: With the exception of military affairs of secrecy and grave importance which, hav- ing been reported directly to the Emperor, may have been submitted by the Emperor for the consideration of the Cabinet, the ministers of state and marine shall report to the minister president [prime minister]. This provision means that the min- isters of war and the navy, as well as other exalted military chiefs, have the privilege of advising the Emperor upon all matters pertaining to the defense of the Japanese Empire regardless of the foreign policy of the Cabinet. Technically, neither the civil nor the military advisers give counsel to the ®Sakuzo Yoshino, Niju Seifu to Iaku Joso, or Dual Government and the Supreme Com- mand (Tokyo, 1922), p, 29; Tatsukichi Mi- nobe, Kempo Seigi, or Commentaries on the Constitution (Tokyo, 1931), p. 253. Compare Kenneth Colegrove, Militarism in Japan (Bos- ton, 1936), ch. i, 7Genko Horei Skuran, or Compilation of Laws and Ordinances in Force (Tokyo, 1927), Vol. 1, bk. Emperor without an invitation from the Throne. But as a matter of fact, mili- tary chiefs can, and do, petition for ac- cess to the Emperor in order to offer ad- vice in the same manner as does the Prime Minister. The important ques- tion is: Whose advice does the Emperor follow? Much mystery surrounds the relations of the Emperor and his ad- visers. ‘The present Imperial Majesty, Emperor Hirohito, a man of forty years, is the grandson of Emperor Meiji, but apparently lacks the energy and acumen of his great ancestor. Closely surround- ing the Emperor is the charmed circle of palace officials, the most important of whom are the Vaidaijin (Grand Kee| of the Imperial Seals), the Kunaid (Minister of the Imperial Household), and the Jijucho (Grand Chamberlain). Access to the Emperor can be obtained only through these officials, particularly the Naidaijin. These offices, when in the hands of such liberal-minded states- men as Count Makino, Kurahei Yuasa, Tsuneo Matsudaira, and Admirals Su- zuki and Saito, exerted a powerful tend- ency toward international peace. The attempt of the Young Officers in 1936 to assassinate Count Makino and Ad- mirals Suzuki and Saito was inspired by the belief that these palace officials in- fluenced the Emperor in favor of the advice of the Cabinet rather than that of the militarists. “Reverence for the Emperor is the most conspicuous feature of Japanese polity. But Emperor worship does not necessarily mean that every question of state is resolved by a nod from His Im- perial Majesty. Japanese polity is more complicated than that. Indeed, it is ex- tremely difficult to determine exactly what officers among the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Peers and Representa- tives, the Privy Council, the war and naval chiefs of staff, and the palace offi- cials have the last word in the deter- mination of policy. But one thing isMrurrarisM IN JaPaN’s Foretcn Poticy 11 clear: the Cabinet, whether or not a re- flection of the Diet, competes with other organs and personages in the control of foreign and domestic policy. Mruitary Domination oveR THE CABINET ‘The lack of jurisdiction over military affairs on the part of the Cabinet is emphasized by the long-standing rule that only generals and admirals can hold the portfolios of war and marine.* This rule permits the army and navy to do several astonishing things, including the following: (a) to destroy a cabinet dis- liked by the militarists; (6) to parti pate in the formation of a cabinet; (c) to compel a cabinet to alter a policy dis- liked by the army or the navy; (d) to impair or even thwart a ministerial pol- icy; and (e) to initiate and execute for- eign policies independently of the cab- inet. On well-known occasions the Chuken- gumi, or Army Center, has wrecked cab- inets that displeased the generals. In 1913 when the Cabinet of the renowned Saionji refused to provide two additional divisions of the army for garrison duty in Korea, General Uyehara resigned as Minister of War.* Upon the army’s re- fusal to permit any other general to take his place, the Saionji Cabinet itself was compelled to leave office. In more re- cent times, in 1937, the army forced the resignation of the Hirota Cabinet. On this occasion the army had demanded the dissolution of the House of Repre- sentatives in which criticism of the Chi- * This rule is implied in the fukyo, or at- tached list, of the Imperial Ordinance regard- ing the Organization of the Navy Department, No. 194, May 19, 1900, and the Imperial Ordinance regarding the Organization of the War Department, No. 75, April 15, 1903. See the Genko Horei Shuran’ (Tokyo, 1907), Vol. I, pt. ili, pp. 66, 104-5, ® See the Jiji Shimpo, Dec. 2 and 3, 1913; Yosaburo Takekoshi, Toan Ko, or Prince Toan (Kyoto, 1929), pp. 201-4. nese policy of the army had been ex- pressed. Upon the refusal of the Prime Minister to comply, General Terauchi resigned and thus wrecked the Cab- inet? Still later, in January 1940, the army forced the resignation of the Cab- inet of General Nobuyuki Abe in order to secure a ministry that could more successfully cope with the Diet.** The army and the navy frequently participate in the formation of cabinets. In 1914, when the exposure of naval scandals forced the Cabinet of Admiral Yamamoto to resign and Count Kiyoura received the Imperial command to form a ministry, his efforts were blocked when no admiral would take office under his leadership? The army had a large share in dictating the selection of the Hirota Cabinet formed in 1936 after the February Twenty-Sixth Revolt. Again, in 1937, when General Kazushige Ugaki was summoned to form a ministry, the army feared his peace policy and re- fused to permit a general to take the portfolio of war. Although supported by numerous members of the Diet, by the entire national press, and by thou- sands of letters from private citizens, General Ugaki was compelled to relin- quish the task." Thereupon General Hayashi was summoned to form the ministry. A democratic and antimilitaristic ele- ment in the formation of ministries in the past two decades has been the genro, or elder statesmen, who have always been consulted by the Emperor before the appointment of a prime minister. After 1924, Prince Saionji was the only existing genro, His democratic and 2°Compare Tokyo Asahi, Jan. 24 and 25, 1937. See also the Kwampo gogai, or Im- perial Gazette (appendix), Jan, 24, 1937. 2. Compare Tokyo Asahi, Jan. 15, 1940, p. 1; Osaka Mainichi, Jan, 15, 1940, p. 1. 12 Takeshige Kudo, Taisho Kensei Shi, or Constitutional History of the Taisho ‘Era (Tokyo, 1927), pp. 93-94. 48 Tokyo Asahi, Jan, 29, 1937, p. 1.12 Tue Annats or THE AMERICAN ACADEMY peace-loving attitude generally opposed the militarists; but the exigencies of the national emergency after 1931 com- pelled his selection of prime ministers acceptable to the army and navy. His death in 1940 removed one of the bar- tiers to complete military domination. The army and the navy have repeat- edly succeeded in compelling cabinets to alter policies which were not acceptable to the militarists. In 1938 the army was partly responsible for the resigna- tion of the liberal General Ugaki as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Konoye Cabinet when he sought to block the army’s plan for creating a special China Affairs Board to control the government of the occupied parts of China.* Thereupon Prince Konoye himself took the portfolio and carried out the army’s policy in removing the Foreign Office from control of the pup- pet regimes in occupied China. Duat Drrromacy Of significance is the capacity of the army to impair and even thwart a min- isterial policy. A conspicuous example of this power was the violent destruc- tion of the conciliation program of Baron Shidehara in 1931. In the sum- mer of 1931 Baron Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Wakatsuki Cabinet, had nearly completed negotia- tions for the liquidation of all disputes between China and Japan. The sai- batsu and the press almost unanimously favored this policy. Moreover, the Wakatsuki Cabinet had the support of the Minseito, which commanded an overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, the army was able to reverse the foreign policy of the Cabinet and to launch an invasion of Manchuria. There exists considerable proof to the effect that the army, fearing that the 14 Compare the Tokyo Asahi, Sept. 30 and Oct. 1, 1938, peace-making policy of the Wakatsuki Cabinet would curtail the military estab- lishment of Japan, deliberately provoked the invasion of Manchuria in order to insure the retention of all of the armed forces. Excuse for the invasion was found in the explosion on the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden on the night of September 18, 1931. The Japanese version of this epi- sode says that Chinese troops blew up the tracks, The Chinese version claims that the Japanese blew up their own tracks with the intention of creating an incident. Of the two claims, the evi- dence in the case seems to favor the Chinese."* Regardless of the guilt of either party, an incident was indeed created, and the Japanese militarists took full advantage of it, In the face of the crisis the Cabinet in Tokyo remained calm, de- termined to maintain the Shidehara pro- gram, The army demanded the dis- patch of reinforcements to Manchuria. On September 21 the Cabinet debated for seven hours the question of sending troops. The Prime Minister, the Min- isters of Foreign Affairs and Finance, and five other ministers were opposed. The decision was to be taken on the following day, and the militarists had reason to fear that the vote would be in the negative. Accordingly, before the Cabinet met for the final decision the army moved forward, with the result that General Minami, the Minister of War, was able to inform the Premier that a brigade of four thousand men had already entered Manchuria by orders of the commander of the Korean garri- son."* Thus the Cabinet was out- maneuvered by resort to the supreme 18 League of Nations: Appeat by the Chi- nese Government: Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Geneva, 1932), p. 71. 18 Tokyo Asahi, Sept. 22 and 23, 1931. See also Shinnosuke Yanagizawa, “Diplomacy of the Manchurian Crisis,” Gaiko Jiko, No. 645 (Oct. 18, 1931), pp. 72-83.Mutrrarism IN JAPAN’s ForEIGN Portcy 13 command. This spectacular affront to parliamentary government not only marked the end of conciliation with China but also the end of the supremacy of civil government in Japan. ‘The capacity of the army and navy to initiate and execute foreign policies in- dependently of the Cabinet gives rise to the oft criticized miju gwaiko, or dual diplomacy. The rapid prosecution of the conquest of Manchuria while the Foreign Office continued to assure the Council of the League of Nations re- garding the peaceful intentions of Japan is a case in point. There is grave suspi- cion that the attack on the American gunboat “Panay” in 1937 was the de- liberate act of an army officer who had no sympathy with the attempts of the Tokyo government to retain the friend- ship of the United States. Indeed, the records of the invasion of Manchuria, of the withdrawal from the League of Na- tions, and of the China Incident are re- plete with occasions of dual diplomacy. In many of these episodes the sincere efforts of the Foreign Office to maintain friendly relations with foreign powers were blocked by the independent action of the army and navy. And more than this, even the War Office in Tokyo has been occasionally ignored by the army in the field. The creation of the China Affairs Board in 1938 culminated a pro- tracted effort of the army to oust the Foreign Office from interference with its dictation in China.’ The board con- sists of the Prime Minister as president, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, War, and Marine as vice-presidents, which means that the board is directed by the Prime Minister who in recent years is more readily controlled by the militarists than the Minister of Foreign Affairs. ‘Tre Ansty ty A TorALrrartan JAPAN The army, and to less extent the 11 Kwampo, Dec. 16, 1938, p. 513. navy, has contributed to the emergence of Japan as a totalitarian state. In 1934, when the influence of the Young Officers was strong, the War Office ini- tiated a series of “army pamphlets” which were published in editions of sev- eral hundred thousand, designed to in- fluence the press, the schools, and the citizenry. The refrain of this propa- ganda ran as follows: (a) Japan lacks natural resources; (4) the United States, Great Britain, and France dis- criminate against Japan; (c) Japan re- quires self-sufficiency in order to sur vive; (d) Japan has a divine destiny as the leader of Asiatic countries which must expel Western intervention; (¢) Japanese citizens must be prepared to make great sacrifices for national de- fense; (f) social reforms in Japan must be achieved in order to bring a greater degree of national unity; and (g) the army and navy must be augmented.’* ‘The army and navy pamphlets forecast not only the New Order for East Asia announced by Prince Konoye in 1938 and 1940, but also the New Political and Economic Structures of 1940. The philosophy of the army pamphlets was preached by General Sadao Araki when he presided over the War Office in 1932- 34, and it was also propagated by his successors. Later, as Minister of Edu- cation, General Araki had opportunity to push this program in the public schools. In the economic field, finance capi- talism contributed to the totalitarian state. German cartels have long been admired in Japan, with the result that 39 Among the more effective of the army and navy pamphlets were the Kokubo no Hongi to Sono Kyokwa no Teisho, or Princi- ples of National Defense and Proposals for its Augmentation, issued on October 10, 1934 by the Information Section of the War Of- fice, and the Kaiyokoku Nippon to Sono Hat- ten, or Sea-Gitt Empire of Japan and Its De- velopment, issued in February 1936 under the auspices of the navy.14 Tue ANNALS OF THE AmERICAN ACADEMY even in the parliamentary period sangyo gorika, or rationalization of industry, re- ceived the support of industrialists, bankers, bureaucrats, and politicians.? In 1925 the Diet passed the Law for Regulating Associations Manufacturing Exportable Goods in Important Indus- tries, which permitted the development of monopolies in exports. By 1934, when the Diet passed the Law for Con- trol of Important Industries, Japan had entered the stage of sangyo tose (planned or controlled economy), and the cartelization or concentration of Jap- anese industry had reached an advanced stage. In 1936 the Hirota Cabinet launched upon the junsenji-keizai, or preparedness-for-war economy, in line with which the Hayashi Cabinet in 1937 created the Kikaku Cho, or Planning Board. Immediately after the outbreak of the China Affair in July 1937, the Diet in special session passed a number of bills that initiated senji-keizai, or full war- time economy. In 1938 the enactment of the General Mobilization Law gave the government vast powers to divert the industries of the nation to the war machine. As the conquest of China has proved slow and difficult, the govern- ment has exercised all of the new pow- ers with the result that a far-reaching regimentation of industry, commerce, and agriculture has been achieved.*° The economy of the empire has been geared into the production of war equip- ment. Raw materials and power have been allocated in restricted amounts to 2° Compare Zenichi Itani, Nippon Keisai oyobi Keisai-Seisaku, or Japanese National Economy and Economie Policies (Tokyo, 1937), pp. 212-50. 2©Compare “Japan's Economy under the Mobilization Law,” Nippon Keisai Nempo, or Economic Annals of Japan, Vol, XXXIV (Dec. 1938), pp. 59-202. See also “Japan's Politics and Economics under Pressure of the World Powers,” itid., Vol. XXXVIII (Aug. 1939), pp. 117-90, all industries save the munitions fac- tories, which enjoy every preference. Imports of consumers’ goods have been rigidly reduced in order to save foreign credits for the purchase of oil, scrap iron, and other commodities required in the conquest of China. All this has been accomplished through an alliance of the militarists, the capi- talists, and the bureaucrats. Immedi- ately after the invasion of Manchuria the army, highly sensitive to the Young Officers and inclining toward social re- forms, sought to develop Manchuria without the aid of the capitalists.*" This attempt failed, and by 1934 the mili- tarists were eager for the co-operation of the capitalists. On their part, lured by huge profits in the armament manu- factures, capitalists have accepted col- laboration with the Chuken-gumi. The bureaucrats have joined this unholy al- liance, perhaps from fear that the con- quest of China must be secured at all costs, inasmuch as their own economic security would be jeopardized by a rev- olution brought on by the collapse of the state following a defeat on the battlefield. Tue New Porrricat anp Economic STRUCTURES In the summer of 1940 Japan moved farther toward the European type of totalitarianism by the inauguration of the Shin Seiji Taisei (New Political Structure) and the Shin Keisai Taiset (New Economic Structure). Both sys- tems were created for the purpose, as explained by Prince Konoye, of com- pleting the pacification of China and maintaining the recently announced New Order for Greater East Asia. For the past decade, various fascist societies, the Young Officers and other 2 Compare “The Manchukuo Construction Policy and the Economy of Japan,” Nippon Keizai Nempo, or Economic Annals of Japan, Vol. XVII (1934), pp. 1-52.Murrarisa iN Jaran’s Forercn Pouicy 15 groups in the army, have loudly called for the abolition of political parties, and, indeed, for the alteration of the repre- sentative system. The army was weary of hearing members of the House of Representatives remind it of the rescript of Emperor Meiji of 1882 in which he admonished soldiers not to interfere in politics. Impatient militarists also re- sented the criticism of the military items in the budget by civilians in the Diet. As early as 1937, Premier General Ha- yashi was ready to abolish political par- ties. He bungled his attack on the rep- resentative system, and as a result it required three more years of bootless battle on the continent of Asia before the annihilation of political parties was finally accomplished. ‘The origin of the movement to abolish political parties is shrouded in some mystery. For several years fascist ele- ments in the parties themselves talked of the creation of a single patriotic party. Prince Konoye became the cen- ter of numerous conferences on this sub- ject. The signal for action was given in June 1940, when Prince Konoye re- signed as president of the Privy Council. ‘The army provided the final push-over. General Shunroku Hata (Minister of War in Admiral Yonai’s Cabinet) held a series of secret meetings with Generals Terauchi, Sugiyama, Okamura, Muto, Sawada, and Anami. The Chuken-gumi had two ends in view. It was annoyed with the cabinet of an admiral who had failed to take advantage of the Nazi conquest of France and the Netherlands to seize their colonial possessions in the Orient. A ministerial crisis would pave the way both for the adoption of an aggressive policy toward Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies and for the crea- tion of the New Political Structure. On July 16 the resignation of Gen- eral Hata as War Minister and his re- fusal to name his successor precipitated the fall of the Yonai Cabinet. Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the army’s choice, was immediately summoned to form the new ministry. A timetable of succeed- ing events includes the following. On July 16 the Kuhara faction of the Seiyu- kai, meeting at the Sanen Tei restau- rant, voted to dissolve, while on July 31 the Nakojima faction dissolved. On July 26 the Kokumin Domei (National League) and on August 15 the Minseito voted dissolution? On August 1 the Konoye Cabinet announced: (1) the policy that the New Order for East Asia now embraced a Greater East Asia in- cluding Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies as well as Japan, Manchukuo, and China; and (2) the proposed crea- tion of the New Political and Economic Structures. Elaborate deliberations by a commis- sion under the presidency of Count Arima resulted in the establishment of the Taisei Yokuson Kai, or Imperial Rule Assistance Association, to take the place of the political parties in the pol- ity of Japan. Organized with branches throughout the prefectures, the Taisei Yokusan Kai held its first national con- ference on December 16 in Tokyo. Since a large portion of the members are appointees of Prince Konoye, it is suggested that the new association will become a powerful weapon in the hands of the Premier. Whether the Taisei Yo- kusan Kai will dominate the House of Representatives and completely sup- plant the representative system remains to be seen. ‘The Shin Keisai Taisei, or New Eco- nomic Structure, aims at creating the kodo kokubo kokka, or advanced na- 22 For newspaper accounts of these dissolu- tions, see the Tokyo Asahi, July 15, 16, 17, 25, 27, and 31; Aug. 16, 1940. Compare Saburo Myohoji, “Genesis of the Shin Seiji Taisei,” Kaito, Vol. XXII, no. 16 (Sept. 1940), pp. 280-88. 29 For the texts of these statements, see the Kwampo, Aug. 2, 1940, and the Tokyo Asahi, Aug. 2, 1940.16 Tue AnNats oF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY tional defense state, in order to con- centrate the total power of the empire on the pacification of China and the creation of the New Order in Greater East Asia. Undoubtedly, inasmuch as economic regimentation under the senji keizai, or wartime economy, has been drastic, any further extension of state authority entails nothing less than the imposition of totalitarian control over manufacture, commerce, and agricul- ture. The adoption of the New Eco- nomic Structure has had far-reaching psychological effect. It has brought forcibly to the attention of the disci- plined nation the koeki yusen-shugi, or principle of priority of the public in- terest.?# Mutirary Oricis or Foretcn Poricy With the militarist influence almost dominant in Japan, it is to be expected that foreign policy should be largely controlled by the army and navy. From the coup d’état that launched the in- vasion of Manchuria in 1931 to the de- mands upon Indo-China and Thailand for naval bases in 1941, the aggressive phases of the foreign policy of Nippon have been originated and dictated by the army and navy. This is true of the military occupation of China south of the Great Wall in 1932, the creation of the puppet government in Manchukuo, the bloody Shanghai Incident, the with- drawal from the League of Nations, the 24 Compare “Demand for a New Economic Structure,” Nippon Keizai Nempo, or Eco- nomic Annals of Japan, Vol. XLII, pt. ii (Sept. 1940), pp. 65-93. Kenneth Wallace Colegrove, Ph.D., abrogation of the London Naval Pact, the cruel bombardment of Chinese cities after the outbreak of the China Incident in 1937, the sack of Nanking, the at- tempt to drive Western interests out of China, the support of the renegade Wang Ching-wei, the creation of the puppet regimes in China, and the an- nouncement of the New Order in East Asia in 1938 and of the New Order in Greater East Asia in 1940. Diplomatic strategy is also dictated by the mi tarists. After the astonishing news of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939, it was the army that led the volte-face in relations with Soviet Russia and negotiated the Nomonhan Truce. Again, it was the army that led Japan to sign the Axis Pact of September 1940, Largely at the bidding of the mili- tarists, Japan has assumed the New Po- litical and Economic Structures and has become a totalitarian state for the de- clared purposes of completing the con- quest of China and of maintaining a Japanese hegemony in Greater East Asia. Both these policies require mili- tary operations that entail vast expendi- tures of man power and resources. The new imperialism is dependent upon a gigantic war machine. In the past dec- ade, war indeed has been the chief in- strument of Japanese national policy. At present it promises to continue to be the chief instrument of Japanese policy as long as resistance remains in China or as long as the United States, Great Brit- ain, and the Dutch East Indies refuse to acquiesce in the New Order. is professor of political science at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois. He is a director of the Immigrants Protective League and secretary-treasurer of the American Politi- cal Science Association. He is author of “Militarism in Jopan” (1936) ond earlier works; editor of “Euro- pean Economic and Political Survey” (Paris, 1929); and member of the board of editors of Amerasia.