Japanese Army Factionalism in the Early 1930’s JAMES B, CROWLEY 'N recent years, the influence of the military on modern Japanese history has been the subject of several excellent analyses." Since these studies have sought to explain the major events of the prewar period, they concentrated more on the significance of army factionalism vis « vie political developments, than. on the nature of this factionalism. The purpose of this article is to explore the tangled web of factionalism within the Imperial Army in the 1932-36 period. Since this topic presents many com- plex problems, it may help to review briefly the sources of information on army factions that appeared immediately ater the end of the Pacific War. Sources on army factionalism Unquestionably, the basic source of information on army factions has been the material collected for the Tokyo International Military Tribunal.? It is important to remember that a primary aim of the prosecution was to prove that military cliques had been responsible for the tragic course of prewar Japanese history. However, the prosecution’s brief on the nature of army factionalism was not based upon primary source material. In fact, most of the information on this subject at the proceedings was supplied by the voluntary testimony of General Tanaka Ryakichi According to his recollections, (1) the Imperial Army was plagued by a bitter rivalry between two factions, the Tései-ha (Control Group) and the Kadé-ha (Imperial Way Faction); Dr. Crowley is Aasitant Profeuor of History at Ambent College. Reach for this arte wat accom plished under a felownbip from the Ford Foundation. "For example, Richard Story, The Doudle Ptrate (London, 1957); Yale Max Foreign Policy (Dekel, 1957); and Robert Butow, Topo and the Coming of the War (Psace, 1961); ami, in Japanese, Rb Mawaor, Cunbatn Aobé1h? (Rise nd Fall of Muliary Cliqct) 3 wale. (Tokyo {957-38)s Nalamra Kiko, Shows sisi (Plea Hino of the Showa Period) (Tokyo, 1938)s Ku hats Ken, Tenad: howe-sh oboegati [The Emperor: d Note on Shows Hinory] (Tokyo, 1955), Mar yauna Maso, Gendal vino slid to RidS (Though and Movement of Moder Japenete Polit] 2 vot, (Tokyo, 1957)—epecaly, "Nihon famhizum no G" ["henlogy and Movement of paar Bason"] pp. 25-80; tod Shigemio Mamoru, Shows no déen (Upheavals of Show (Tokyo, 1952). Am abridged English tanltion of Shigemit's volumes hae appeared a2 Deniny (New York, 1938) imernaonal Miltary ‘Teibual, Far East IMTFE), Tokyo, 1946-1048, Record of Precedings, Ex hibit, lndgment, Dieting Indgmets, Preliminary Interrogation, Minellaneons Documents (in tte For exatiple, the Chief Proeewtordecards "Mitariecliqus, and lt resorted ele by Son, and thereby exerted. great influence ia favour of mitary aggresion, INTE, Procedin SIMTRE, Pr 29030-29064 Defeat (Tokyo, 1948). ua asfsrasgst; aaris-aa7ss: s2p43-22068;, ‘General Tanaka Rykich, Havin o tube (Probing the Caste of 309310 JAMES B. CROWLEY (2) Generals Araki and Mazaki headed the Kéd6 group, and Generals Nagata, TOj and Umezu dominated the Tasei faction; (3) the Kéd6 officers religiously espoused the principles of Kokutai, while the Tései officers were intrigued by ideas similar to those prevalent in Nazi Germany; (4) when the views of the Tései-ha prevailed under War Minister Hayashi in 1934-35, the younger members of the Kédé-ha started the abortive rebellion of February 26, 1936; and (5) the crushing of this uprising disgraced the Kéd6 generals, thereby compelling them to resign from the army. Within this analysis, all of the various intrigues and assassinations carried out by army officers in the 1930s were linked with the overriding rivalry between the Kédo-ha and the Tései-ha. In particular, General Tanaka claimed that the radical young officers, especially those responsible for the February 26 Incident, were an integral part of the Kédé faction. The prosecution readily accepted this premise and relied heavily upon Tanaka's testimony in its indictment of General Araki Sadao. This fact prompted Araki’s counsel, in defense summation, to emphasize the type of evidence offered by the prosecution witness. “Tanaka,” declared Araki's lawyer, “merely said that the radical young officers looked up to Araki, Mazaki . . . [this] means nothing more than that the young radical officers respected them.”® In different circumstances, this style of defense might have secured an acquital. However, sitice Araki also failed to produce any documentary evidence that he, or the other Kadé generals, had not been a leader of the young officers, the testimony of the prosecution witness, rather than the denial of the defendant, was accepted. Araki was convicted as a Class A war criminal. Although the question of Araki’s guilt or innocence is not our basic concern, it is apparent that much of the evidence about army factionalism presented at the Tribunal was not of a primary nature. Other popular sources of information on army factions that emerged during the course of the trials included Muranaka Kdji and Isobe Tokuichi, Shukugun ni kansuru ikensho [Views on the Housecleaning of the Army] (Tokyo, 1935); Iwabuchi Tatsuo, “Gunbatsu no keifu” [“A Genealogy of Military Cliques”), Chit Karon (July, 1946); and Majima Ken, Gunbatsu anto hishi [Secret History of the Feuds between the Military Cliques] (Tokyo, 1946). Muranaka and Isobe’s pamphlet was a polemic directed against those opposing the ArakiMazaki groups in the army. Since the authors revealed various details about the March and October Incidents of 1931, this document is indispensable to the historian; but it is also suspect because of its polemical nature. Attention will be given subsequently to this source. Here it is sufficient to note two things: it i tainly partial to Araki and Mazaki; and, unlike General Tanaka's testimony, army cliques into four categories—the Araki-ha, the Seigun-ha (Purification Group), the Tései-ha, and the seinen shok6 (young officers). Iwabuchi’s article in Chiid Kéron was one of the first public disclosures of the March and October Incidents of r93r and was included among the Tribunal material as Document 1417. Accordingly, it has been used by historians as a basic source of information about these incidents, A casual reading of this article indicates Iwabuchi’s distinctly pro-Mazaki bias. This is not surprising if one compares it with General Mazaki’s “Special Memoir Regarding the Present Situation,” dated June 18, 1936.7 SIMTFE, Defense Document 3107, D. 234. ©The pamphlet is included in the Tribunal material as Document 3167. TIMTFE, Document 1534.JAPANESE ARMY FACTIONALISM 31l Mazaki’s memoir was located by the prosecution in the residence of Prince Konoe Fumimaro and contained marginal notes by one Iwabuchi Tatsuo. Although Iwabu- chi's 1946 article surveyed army factionalism in terms of two factions—Kédé-ha and Tései-ha—it is interesting to observe that two 1935 articles of his on “The Problems of the Modern Military Cliques” suggested a factionalism of a much more complex nature.* Specifically, Iwabuchi discounted the existence of an Araki-Mazaki faction and instead postulated a Tosa group and a Saga group; he identified two other factions, the Seigun-ha and the Tasei-ha; and he declared that the Tasei group was constituted by officers “worried about the recent tendency in the army to make factions.”* Majima’s volume contains a wealth of information about army factions and about the various incidents involving army officers in the 1930's” Significantly, his account was based upon some “seventeen long hours” of conversation with General Mazaki, plus the “reports of an anonymous informer (spy).”#4 Hence, it is understandable that his explanations of the March and October incidents closely resemble those expressed in the 1946 article of Iwabuchi, Nevertheless, Majima was careful to dis- tinguish four major groupings within the army: the Seigun-ha, the Kédé-ha, the Toscicha and the Kokutai genri-ha [National Principle Group]. These brief remarks should highlight a few of the limitations on the popular sources of information about army factionalism—viz., (1) General Tanaka's oral testimony was given as part of the prosecution's case against the military leaders of Imperial Japan, especially Araki Sadao; (2) the indicated written sources were written with a definite bias; and (3) save for the 1946 article by Iwabuchi, the written sources contain consistent references to at least four major cliques within the Japanese army. Accordingly, it would scem that information on the nature of army factionalism is still somewhat fragmentary and often contradictory over the type and number of cliques. Anatomy of army factionalism ‘The nature of army factionalism can best be studied in terms of the following themes: (1) the structure of the officer corps; (2) the heritage of a Chéshii clique as the dominant leadership group in the army; (3) the growing professionalization of the officer corps dictated by rapid technological change and the mechanization of the army; and (4) the controversies engendered by formulation of new strategic concepts designed to meet the problems associated with the changing nature of war- fare, particularly the tasks posed by an emerging Soviet Union equipped with modern weapons and supported by a growing industrial capacity. A study of these themes will enable one to encompass the four types of cliques mentioned in the previously cited sources of information: namely, the radical young officers, the Seigun-ha, the Tosei-ha and the Kédé-ha, as well as to clarify the relationship of these factions to the socalled Saga, Tosa and Araki groups discussed in Iwabuchi’s pre-war article. One of the most outstanding characteristics of the regular officer corps was its bifurcation into two major groups: those who terminated their education at the SIMTFE, Document 517. SIMTFE, Document 517, p. 4 19 Because Japanese historians rarely indicate the exact source of their information, it is dificult to cstimate how many have relied upon this volume. In English, Maxon, has carefully utilized Majima's vol tume in his Control of Jepancre Foreign Policy. Majima, Gunbutne anté hishi, p. 11.312 JAMES B. CROWLEY Military Academy, and those who graduated from the War College? This cleavage had serious consequences, as seen, for example, in the fact that the assassinations of the 1930's were invariably executed by officers in the former group, while the policy- makers of the army were, without exception, products of the War College. A broad professional gulf existed between these two groups of officers. Graduates of the academy received a basic education in tactics, mathematics, the command and organizational structure of the army, plus an intensive indoctrination in the principles of kokwtai and in absolute loyalty to the emperor. By training and custom these officers were barred from positions of staff responsibilities and, as a group, their power and status were limited. Nevertheless, a small number of these officers did organize a Kokwtai genri faction for the purpose of realizing, by terror if necessary, the mystical Showa renovation demanded by many patriotic organizations which emerged throughout Japan in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Members of this group were responsible for the assassinations of 1932 and of the February 26, 1936 incident.* There is no evidence, however, that links the young men of the Kokutai genri-ha, prior to the summer of 1935, with senior members of the Kédé-ha. The importance of this association will be discussed later. Presently, it is essential only to recognize the cleavage separating officers who terminated their edu- cation at the Academy from those who had graduated from the War College. Al- though the actions of the young officers had profound historic consequences, they constituted a different phenomenon from the factionalism within Central Head- quarters. The behavior of the leaders of the Kokutai genri-ha will be included, there- fore, only as it directly influenced factionalism within Central Headquarters, that is, within the important positions of the War Ministry and the General Staff. Since advancement to staff and command responsiblities was contingent upon graduation from the War College, competition for admission to the college was extremely keen. Officers were selected on the basis of their academic record compiled at the academy, the recommendations of commanding officers, and the passing of a difficult entrance examination, These factors, of necessity, made performance and ability, not social or clan origin, the major criteria for career advancement. Due to the role played by Chashii officers in the formation of the army, however, officers from this region had maintained a long-term hegemony in Central Headquarters.* 12 The information on the educational system, customs and traditions of the Imperial Army is a synthesis ‘of data provided in oral interviews with Generals Katakura Chi, Wachi Takagi and Imamura Hitoshi; Golone! Nishiura Susumu, Head of the Historical Section of Japan's Self Defease Agency; Mitarai Tatsuo, the official biographer of General Minami ir; and Mr. Hata Tkuhito, a diligent student of army factional- ism, The emphasis and organization is entirely the responsibilty of the author. 28 Storry, Double Patriots, pp. 9-25 is a lucid summary of the prewar nationalistic movement; in Jap2- nese, the most comprehensive study is Kinoshita Hanji, Nihon Aokke-shugi wndé-shi [4 History of the Movement of Japanese Nationalism) (Tokyo, 1952). The best documentary source on the Kokuéai genrivhe is Gun kankei johd (Intelligence Reports on Army Matters] compiled by the General Staff of the Im- perial Navy, The author is deeply indebted to Mr. Hata Tkuhito for calling his attention to the records of the Imperial Navy available at the Zaidan Hojin Shiryé Chésakai (Documentary Research Organization); and to Vice Admiral Tomioka Sadatoshi for granting free access to the source material at this organiza~ tion, Hereafter, Gun Ranked johd will be cited, GKT. 14 For example, GX], “Kokka kakushin und3 ni okera nidai chéry6” [Two Main Streams in the National Renovation Movement], p. 15 specifically identifies leading member of this group as the chief theorist behind the May 15 Incident of 1932. This document was a booklet privately printed for circulation among the Kokutai genri-ha. 28 Matsushita Yoshio, Meiji guncei shiron [Historical Esray on the Meiji Military Organieation) TI, 468- 510. (Tokyo, 1956).JAPANESE ARMY FACTIONALISM 313 This situation could not have continued without impairing the morale and quality of the officer corps. During the 1920's, for example, the most distinguished graduates of the War College, including Tojs Hideki, Nagata Tetsuzan, and Yamashita Tomo- yuki, had banded together to oppose the partiality shown officers from the Choshi region2® General Uguki was not from Chashi and under his leadership many non-ChéshG officers were given positions in the War Ministry commensurate with their abilities, but because he had been the protégé of Tanaka Giichi he was regarded, particularly by his contemporaries, Generals Araki and Mazaki, as part of the tradi- tional Chashi hegemony. While these bitter feelings between the senior Choshii generals (Shirakawa, Tatckawa, and Koiso) and the non-Chashii generals (Araki, Mazaki, Hata, and Hayashi Senjiré) were inherent in the traditional advantages available to the Chdshd officers, the sweeping reorganization of the educational system implemented in 1887 had firmly established the principle of promotion by ability and performance, rather than by clan or regional origin, Essentially, the appointment of Ugaki as War Minister symbolized the demise of the Chésha domination of this post. By 1930, the War Ministry and the General Staff at the departmental and sec- tional levels were occupied by officers selected primarily on the basis of their academic records at the War College and the recommendations of their commanding officers."* Parallel with the growth of this staff in Central Headquarters was the incor- poration of new ideas into the long-range planning of the Imperial Army. In June 1024, War Minister Ugaki deactivated the 14th, 15th, 17th, and 18th divisions.® Although hailed in the press as part of the government's disarmament policy, this measure served also as the opening phase of an astute program of mechanization. Indeed, the savings incurred by this action were diverted to establish a tank regiment, an anti-aircraft regiment, two regiments in the Army Air Force, and several technical schools for the signal corps? Behind this new emphasis on tanks, airplanes, and communications, lay a concept of warfare which had crystallized during the 1920's. In particular, Ugaki had reorganized the War Ministry in 1927 to include a new Bureau of Equipment and Supplies (Seibi Kyoku) under General Matsumoto Nao- suke? This bureau contained a Mobilization Department (Déinka) headed by Colonel Nagata Tetsuzan. Basing most of his ideas on his studies of the German General Staff, Nagata believed that any future war would necessitate the total mobili- zation of men and resources in Japan. Under his supervision, the first draft of a “general mobilization plan” (kokka-an sdddin) was prepared in 1928, along with a plan for “national defense” (kokubd kokka)* ‘The emphasis on equipment and economic planning fostered by the “German schoo!” within the War Ministry owed its inception to the fertile mind of Colonel Nagata and the support of War Minister Ugaki. However, their plans aroused the 1 Nakamura Kikuo, Showa seijishi, pp. 35-38. 37 Statements of this type ate dificult to document but all of the former generals interviewed by the author during the fall and spring of 1957-58 scemed to agree upon this point. [Also Ito Masanori, Gun- bateu Rébé-shi, 231-234.) 18 Matsushita Yoshio, Nihon guenjé hatttsw-shi (History of the Development of the Japanese Army] Recipe 1937), P- 200. Mitarai Tatsuo, Minami Jiré denki [Biography of General Minami Jiré] (Tokyo, 1957), p. 183. bs tabeometon of ls deqerenatal seopecocden ‘us aciginiy engi hy Ms Han ca eer ask fel by several ofthe general interviewed by the author. 21 See general information on these mobilization plans in Itb Masanori, Gunbateu Aabé-chi Il, 229-231.314 JAMES B, CROWLEY opposition of officers devoted to a concept of “mass tactics”—ie, a large body of soldiers inspired by the “spiritual power” (seishinshugi) of Japanese culture. The ideas of these opposition officers received a classic presentation in Colonel Kobayashi Junichiro’s pamphlet, The Reformation of the Japanese Army (Nihon rikugun haizéron)2* Emphasizing the necessity of relying upon Kédé (The Imperial Way), seishin-shugi, and Yamato damashii, Kobayashi warned that an excessive reliance on “material goods” would corrupt the soul of the Japanese army. This criticism of the new stress on mechanization and economic planning became entangled with the lingering anti-Chéshi animosity among the senior generals from Tosa and Saga. The leader of this senior group, General Araki, quickly perceived the resentment of Ugaki’s ‘manpower policy,’ which suggested a willingness to sub- stitute firepower for manpower and to reduce the active duty strength of the army, and he publicly expounded upon the wonders of Kédé and the evils of economic planning —an alien concept which he charged had been pilfered from communism. In the process, Araki earned a nationwide reputation as the defender of traditional values, and captured the admiration of junior officers. However, Araki was no simpleton. As the best student in his class at the War College, and with a distinguished record in the General Staff, he commanded the professional respect of the Central Headquarters staff, To what extent his public identification with Kéd@ ideals was dictated by sincere convictions, by a shrewd sense of army politics, or by regional loyalty is im- possible to ascertain, There is no question, however, that by 1931 Araki held a unique position within the army. He alone retained the respect and loyalty of the young officers and of the staff of Central Headquarters. It was this fact which prompted the Supreme War Council, in December 1931, to designate Araki as War Minister. General Araki as War Minister Since Araki was the first War Minister without Chashii affiliation, his personnel policy was closely watched by the staff of Central Headquarters. Although an anti- Chosha bias was expected, the extent of Araki’s rancor caught most officers by surprise, Within eight months, every senior Chéshii general in Central Headquarters was reassigned to the field. Thus, Ninomiya Harushige, the Vice-Chief of the Gen- eral Staff; Sugiyama Gen, the Vice-Minister of War; Koiso Kuniaki, Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs; and General Honjo Shigeru of the Kwantung Army were replaced by Mazaki Jinzaburé, Yanagawa Heisuke, Yamaoka Juko, and Muto Nobuyoshi* This sweeping purge of Choshii men naturally produced some dismay within the army, at least among Chéshii partisans. It also generated a great deal of unrest within Central Headquarters, because the new appointees were all officers from Tosa and Saga. Araki’s partiality to Yanagawa and Yamaoka was particularly vex- atious since neither had a distinguished academic record nor prior experience in im- portant staff assignments, Their clevation was due solely to a close personal friendship with the new War Minister. ‘As might be anticipated, General Araki’s patronage of Tosa-Saga men fomented bitter feelings among Chéshi officers. A number of Chéshii officers, including Generals Koiso and Tatekawa, along with a small politically-minded clique in the General 2 Mitarai Tatsuo, Minami Jiré denki, p. 183 23 Takamiya Tahei, Guakoku taiheihi [Taihei the Military] (Tokyo, 1951) pp. 140-1443 157-158.JAPANESE ARMY FACTIONALISM. 315 Staff headed by Colonel Hashimoto Kingord, indignantly pointed to the Tosa-Saga hanbatsu of War Minister Araki and urged that the officer corps of the Imperial Army should, once and for all, be cleansed of this element. Consequently, this new faction was dubbed the Seigun-ha, or Purification Group.* This noble demand that the army be purified of all Aan cliques, however, was received with skepticism by non- Choshit senior officers and the majority of the staff of Central Headquarters. As a result, the initial criticism of Araki's personnel policy was confined to some Chashii officers under the euphemistic guise of the Seigun-ha. During 1932 and 1933, Araki, nevertheless, continued to be a vigorous spokesman ‘on the wonders of the Imperial Way, and he carefully nurtured the concept of the “Crisis of 1936,” by which he implied a war with the Soviet Union2® His close friend, Kobayashi Junichird, organized the °36 Club [sanroku kurabu] which through its publications dwelled monotonously on the inevitability of a war with the Soviet Union. The public image of Araki as a fiery patriot eager to defend Kédé values and crush the Soviet Union created a dual problem within Central Headquarters. Araki’s Kédé pronouncements kept the younger officers in constant ferment, and his “Crisis of °36” made it difficult for his staff to formulate and implement economic and reorganizational plans, Inherent in the premise of “total war” was the conviction that Japan must avoid any war, above all one with the Soviet Union, until her army and her industrial base had been integrated into a first-class military machine, ‘The views of the majority of staff officers in Central Headquarters differed from those of the War Minister regarding the ‘1936 Crisis” and Kédd values. This became evident in 1933, shortly after the conquest of Jehol province in North China, At that time also, a small group of officers, dominated by General Obata, specifi cally suggested that the Imperial Army prepare for an immediate war with the Soviet Union2® Since General Obata was the protégé of General Mazaki, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, the recommendation precipitated a major crisis within Central Headquarters where the majority opposed this proposal? In particular, Generals Umezu, Nagata, and Tojo pooled their abilities and influence in order to squash what they considered to be a foolish and reckless suggestion. These men were the architects of the plans designed to create a mechanized army. They insisted that Japan needed several years before the army could crush the colossus to the north, While they were able to win the support of the majority of department heads within Central Headquarters and secure the rejection of Obata’s policy, they did not escape the wrath of the War Minister.°* In August 1933, Umezu and Tojo were removed from 24 GK], “Rikugun fuashiyo undé-shi gaikan [“A General View of the Fascist Movement in the Army"], Top Secret, February 21, 1934. Mens, Double Parise, pp. 167-168. . 137; and Saionji-Harada Memoirs, August, 3 1933. Sle Novanod, Gunbure (@bo rie Me pp, oy, 88 That the majority of offcers in Central Headquarters agreed with Umezu, Tojé, and Nagata that the Soviet Union constituted the major threat is clearly substantiated in the proposals submitted by the War Ministry at the Five Ministers Conference of October 20, 1933. Records of the Japanese Forcign Ministry, Teikoku no saigai ceisaku kankei no ken [Concerning the Foreign Policy of the Imperial Government] 1, “Jugatsu nifanichi goshd kaigi ni okeru rikugun-gawa teiji” (“Army's Presentation at the October 20th Five Ministers Conference”] undated, Top Secret. This is not to suggest the army favored a weak China policy, Indeed, the War Ministry insisted, “Of course, the Chinese Central Government must be prevented, by appropriate means, from advancing into North China.” Teikoku no taigai ..., 1 “Rikugunshé shisei-an™ (‘Amendments of the War Ministry to the October 20th Decision of the Five Ministers Conference"), November 30, 1933, Top Secret.316 JAMES B. CROWLEY the General Staff and “the army's most precious being,"*® Nagata Tetsuzan, was transferred to the command of an infantry regiment. This personnel shift, clearly dictated by petty revenge, enraged the staff of Central Headquarters and shocked the senior generals who had been responsible for the selection of Araki as War Minister. Araki's cavalier treatment of General Nagata, his vendetta against Chésh gen- erals, and his public utterances which hampered the comprehensive economic and reorganization programs initiated under General Ugaki convinced all but his most loyal followers that a new Aanbatsu had emerged, As a naval intelligence report phrased it, “While chanting effortlessly that he must promptly invest the Emperor's army with integrity and abolish all cliques from the army, War Minister Araki, in fact, built up his own large faction. The Imperial Army is not so generous as to permit this deed. . ..”® Indeed, during the fall of 1933, the outstanding neutral generals— Ueda Kenchi, Abe Nobuyuki and Hayashi Senjiiré—exerted intense pressure against the War Minister. Their criticism could not be attributed to devious motives, and they certainly were not part of the Purification movement. Nevertheless, they agreed with the Chésha leaders of the Seigun-ha that the Araki clique should be broken, that the emphasis on the “Crisis of ’36” and on Kadd ideals should be minimized; and, finally, that the army needed a fundamental policy that could not be sabotaged by any one War Minister. United by these aims, both groups attacked the War Minister until he resigned in January 1934 to become a member of the Supreme War Council. Developments under War Minister Hayashi Prior to 1933, the new War Minister, Hayashi Senjiiré, had been a strong sup- porter of his predecessor. When offered the War Ministership following the murder of Inukai Ki in May 1932, he had insisted that Araki continue in office" Moreover, the complaints of the Chéshi generals failed to evoke his sympathy because he him- self had been shabbily treated under the Ugaki regime.*? It is imperative to dis- tinguish between the first critics of Araki, who were dubbed with the “purification” label, and the staff of Central Headquarters and the senior generals, including the Supreme War Council, who became disenchanted with Araki’s policies of 1933. That a crucial shift had occurred in the outlook of General Hayashi was evident in his first acts as War Minister: he refused to meet with Araki in a private session; he cancelled the “Crisis of '36” slogan; he ordered the abandonment of the theory of an immediate Soviet war; and he approved the resumption of diplomatic negotiation with the Soviet Union.** Most dramatically, Hayashi summarily transferred General Yamaoka to the Bureau of Equipment and Supply and designated Nagata Tetsuzan as his Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs. “In order to establish a fundamental army policy that could not be affected by a cabinet change,” Hayashi ordered Nagata “to prepare an encompassing program for the exploitation of Manchuria and Mongolia and for the general mobilization of agricultural districts during wartime.”"** The 29 The description of Nagata is taken from GK], “Seigun und6 no jissai.” Part II. 20 Ibid. 8 Aritake Shuji, Okada Keisuke denki [Biography of Admiral Okada Keisuke) (Tokyo, 1956), p. 210. “Araki—the Man of the Crises,” Contemporary Jepan (December, 1932), p. 388. 82 GK], “Seigun und6 no jissai,” [Truth of the Purification Movement"] Part II. 82 fbid, (Parts IV and VI). “Ibid.JAPANESE ARMY FACTIONALISM 317 purpose of this program was to integrate the resources of Manchuria into the Japanese economy in order that Japan could build a powerful military establishment. The implementation of this policy required that many of Araki’s protégés be replaced and that Hayashi and Nagata organize a staff capable of devising a basic, long-range program. This was accomplished by appointing officers who, for the most part, had not been closely associated with the Chéshii group. Hence, in the General Staff, the talented Imai Kiyoshi became Head of the Operations Division, Ushiroku Jun assumed charge of the Third (Transportation) Division, and Isogai Rensuke remained in command of the Intelligence Division. In the War Ministry, Hashimoto Gun replaced Yamashita Tomoyuki as Head of the Military Affairs Section, Nemoto Hiroshi supplanted Suzuki Teiichi in the Newspaper Section, and Hashimoto Torano- suke relieved Yanagawa as Vice-War Minister. Nagata, in turn, assembled a group of “economic” experts to assist him in his planning, namely, Ikeda Sumihisa, Tanaka Kiyoshi, Katakura Cha, and Shimizu Moriaki* These reassignments and the complete break with the Kédé orientation of General Araki marked the inception of the Control (Tései) movement. Although the policies of Hayashi and Nagata drew accolades from the Purifi- cation faction, the two movements were far from identical. The Purification group was essentially a han clique, whereas the Tasei movement was not a regional faction. In many respects it was less a faction than a concensus among the most outstanding products of the War College who were being groomed for major staff positions, that Araki’s policies had seriously undermined the plans designed to mechanize the army and had reintroduced clan politics into Central Headquarters. Certainly, Umezu, Tojo, and Nagata were not part of a Chéshii group. Indeed, parallel with Araki’s decisive purge of Chéshi officers in 1932, these men had been promoted into more important assignments in Central Headquarters. Moreover, many of the bright staff officers favored by Araki because of their Saga-Tosa background originally had been associated with Nagata’s “German group” in Central Headquarters—for example, Yamashita, Okamura, and Suzuki Teiichi. By the summer of 1933, a peculiarly sensitive situation existed within Central Headquarters, Araki’s policies were hindering the implementation of the long-range reorganization plans desired by the majority of younger staff officers. The Purification faction, despite its Chéshit orientation, also shared this anxiety about long-range planning and the necessity of avoiding a premature war with the Soviet Union, In addition, Araki’s partiality to Tosa-Saga officers had directly contributed to the unrest within Central Headquarters, In December 1931, for example, Araki had pro- moted Obata Tokushiro to Colonel and placed him in charge of the Operations Section of the General Staff; four months lacer, Obata was promoted to Major Gen- eral and given command of the Third Division of the General Staff” When Obata sought to utilize his favored position to secure the adoption of a decision calling for an immediate war with the Soviet Union, the majority of the staff in Central Headquarters, as has been indicated, vehemently opposed his recommendation. Still, Obata’s actions presented a threat to the long-range planning being developed by the staff of Central Headquarters. This fact, plus Araki’s punishment of Nagata, ‘8° Takamiya Tahei, Gunkokw taiheiki, p. 182. Personal interview with General Katakura Chi. 8? Takamiya Tahei, Gunkokw taiheiki, pp. 142-143-318 JAMES B. CROWLEY Tojo, and Umezu for their stringent criticism of Obata’s ideas, convinced the members of the Supreme War Council that Araki was acting out of sentiments rooted in a Aanbatsu and was endangering the welfare of the Imperial Army. This concensus among the senior generals and the staff of Central Headquarters bred the Tse? movement which sought to terminate han cliques and to develop a comprehensive program for the reorganization of the army. Primarily because Nagata ‘Tetsuzan was recognized as the army's most gifted officer, War Minister Hayashi vir- tually gave him a free hand in the selection of personnel for Central Headquarters and in drafting policy proposals covering economic planning and the reorganization of the Imperial Army. The significance of the Hayashi-Nagata leadership was publicly displayed in October 1934 when the War Ministry published the Kokubd no hongi 10 sono kydka no teishd [Basic Theory of National Defense and Suggestions for its Strengthening].* Opening with the memorable pronouncement, “War is the father of creation and the mother of culture” this pamphlet, as one of its framers acknow!- edged, included everything in the universe under the concept of National Defense?” However, it was not a slap-dash product of irresponsible officers. Prior to publication, the proofs were checked by every bureau chief in Central Headquarters. In addition, each pamphlet contained a return post card so that public reaction could be gauged accurately. ‘The War Ministry issued this pamphlet in order to replace, in the public image, the “Crisis of ’36” with the concept of National Defense. Nagata hoped it would also marshal publie opinion behind the army's program and convince the leaders of the political parties that national economic planning would meet with public approval. Although the role of the army in this program would be prominent, on October 10, 1934 War Minister Hayashi pointedly informed a gathering of leading figures of many notable nationalistic societies: “The fundamental direction indicated in the pamphlet must be carried out gradually, according to legal procedures, Moreover, I personally shall do my best to realize the plan within legal means.”* Essentially, the Kokubs no hongi was the opening move of the army to bring direct pressure on the Diet by propagandizing the concepts of general mobilization and economic planning. ‘The October publication also had the intent of placating the restless young officers who resented the political and economic policies of the government. Since the apparent animosity of these younger officers stemmed from a passionate concern for the “‘peas- antry” of Japan, Hayashi and Nagata believed the Kokubd no hongi would allay much of their discontent because it committed the army to improve the lot of the ordinary Japanese, particularly in the impoverished rural regions. ‘The emphasis which the War Ministry placed on legal means and economic planning, however, failed to overcome the pathological convictions of the radical young officers that Japan must be reconstructed according to the program contained in Kita Ikki’s Dai 88 IMTFE, Document 3089. 3 Ikeda Sumihisa, “Seinen shOkd to kakushin shis6" [“The Young Officers and Revolutionary e"]y Himerareta shéwa-shi (Secret History of the Shéwa Period] (Tokyo, 1956), p- 110. This is a special eltion of Chisei Intelligence] magazine. © GK], ‘Rei no panfuretto ni tsuki Hayashi sh3 bikéshiki no sonno jitsugen 0 gemmei’ to dai sura #" [A Document on an ‘Informal Explanation by War Minister Hayashi of the Way to Realize the Pamphlet (Kokubs no hongi)'"], Secret, November 4, 1934.JAPANESE ARMY FACTIONALISM 319 Nikon kaixd hoan (Outline for the Reconstruction of Japan). Among other things, this plan called for a National Reconstruction Cabinet which would employ the Imperial Army to crush the zaibatsu and remove the special privileges of the nobility.** Incidents of 1934-35 In November 1934, two leaders of the young officers, Captain Muranaka and Lieutenant Isobe, conspired to murder Premier Okada and the advisors of the Emperor in order that a “Shéwa Restoration” could be accomplished by the army." After the Pacific War, this conspiracy became known as the November incident, or the Military Academy incident. It failed, however, when Muranaka and Isobe confided in Captain ‘Tsuji Masanobu, an instructor at the Military Academy, who, in turn, notified Major Katakura Chii of the War Ministry. Unable to dissuade the conspirators from their plans, Tsuji and Katakura informed the Military Police and the prompt suspension of Muranaka and Isobe ended this conspiracy. Ordinarily, events of this type would not have had serious repercussions among the senior generals, However, the thorough- ness of the Hayashi-Nagata program had all but eliminated the Kdd6-ha from Central Headquarters and, by the fall of 1934, only General Mazaki, the Inspector General of Military Education, still retained an important position, With some justification, Mazaki was apprehensive about his own future. The exposure of the Military Acad- emy incident further jeopardized his tenuous position because, as Inspector General, he was nominally responsible for everything that occurred in the academy. Perhaps because of an acute sense of insecurity, Mazaki rashly accused Nagata of trying to disgrace him by engineering the incident at the Military Academy. By this reckless charge Mazaki also hoped to absolve himself of any connection with the radical young officers. But the net result was quite the contrary. In the eyes of Muranaka and Isobe, General Nagata was not only guilty of introducing communistic ideas (economic planning) into the Imperial Army but was now also personally responsible for their plight. Hence, the leaders of the young officers and General Mazaki openly shared a common hatred of Nagata, and the youthful officers now identified their hopes with the senior Kod6 generals. Mazaki’s accusation against Nagata strengthened the emotional ties between himself and the young officers and, in turn, convinced Hayashi and Nagata that Mazaki, in reality, had some type of relationship with the radical young officers. Soon after the November incident, General Mazaki apparently conspired with Kuhara Fusanosuke of the Sciyikai to force the general resignation of the Okada Cabinet by bringing charges of corruption against the Ministers of War, Finance, and 4: Kita Ikki, Nihon kaizd héan taiké [Outline for the Reconstruction of Japan] (Tokyo, 1924). A de- tailed synopsis of Kita’s thought is Tanaka Ségoro, Nihon fuashisumu no genryii: Kita IKki no shis6 t0 shokai [Origin of Japanse Fascism: The Life and Thought of Kita Ikki] (Tokyo, 1949). In English, A. Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Moversent in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 1953). P. 354 &f Seq. 42 As indicated previously, a popular source of information on this incident is IMTFE, Document 1417, 1 magazine article written after the defeat of Japan by Iwabuchi Tatsuo, a friend of General Mazaki. #2 1In a postwar interview, Mazaki declared, “. . . their (tOsci-ha) aim was to make it seem as though there was a seditious plan atthe Military Academy, question the responsibilty of the Inspector General of Education, . . . and so have me removed from my position.” Richard Storry, Double Patriots, p. 160. How- ever, torry notes, this is a clearly ingequous interpretation, General Katakura, in a talk with the author stipulated that General Nagata had been instrumental in having Tsuji and himself reprimanded because they had not promptly reported their knowledge of the plot to the Military Police.320 JAMES B. CROWLEY Railways. Although this flank attack failed, another issue arose to augment their prestige among the young officers. On February 28, 1935, Baron Kikuchi Takeo delivered a vitriolic indictment of a respected professor of law, Minobe Tatsukichi<® Specifically, Professor Minobe suddenly found his concept that the Emperor of Japan, in exercising sovereign powers, was an organ of the state attacked as a theory of law which was disloyal to the Throne, Overnight the “Emperor as an organ” theory was transformed into a national crisis with the Seiyakai, the Minseitd, the Hiranuma faction in the House of Peers, and the nationalistic societies vying for the prestige of denouncing the theory of a venerable law professor. Within the army, Generals Araki and Mazaki publicly reaffirmed their loyalty to Kéd@ principles and the In- spector General of Military Education even issued a pamphlet criticizing the theory of Professor Minobe. While the popular press, the leaders of the major political parties, and the Kado generals were up in arms over this affair, the Emperor and the entire Okada Cabinet calmly defended the writings of Minobe. War Minister Hayashi, for example, declared in the House of Peers, “Dr. Minobe's doctrine has been set forth for many years and there has been no instance when his doctrine has had an undesirable influence on the army." Moreover, in April, Home Minister Goté Fumio personally rebuked his subordinates for requesting that he remove Professor Minobe from the faculty of Tokyo University. Gots replied: Personally, I am not adverse to forcing Dr. Minobe to resign his public position, or to punishing other teachers who champion his theory. Still, the question is less a matter of re- moving him from Tokyo University than the pervasive influence which the concept of Kokusai exerts on the masses. Thus, it would be desirable first to prepare a clear theoretical exposition of the idea of Kokutai among legal scholars. (And, the securing of scholars capable of performing this task seems a bafiling problem) . . . Since the Cabinet is considering this point prudently, it is avoiding a clarification of the National Polity.‘ ‘The abuse of Professor Minobe, however, continued unabated throughout the spring and summer, and on August 3 the Okada Cabinet finally mollified public opinion by issuing a mild censure of Minobe’s writings. As a consequence of Mazaki’s behavior during the Military Academy incident, his intrigues with the Seiyiikai, and his efforts to embarrass Hayashi in the Minobe controversy, the Chief of the General Staff, Prince Kan‘in, demanded that Mazaki be removed from his position” Mazaki naturally resisted this recommendation, and ‘Araki vainly tried to marshall support for his close friend. The Cabinet, on the other hand, rallied to the side of Kan‘in and Hayashi, “The main objective,” insisted Pre- 44 Saionji-Harada Memoirs, February 15, 1935- 48"The most concise analysis of this controversy is Aritake Shuji, Okada Keisuke denki, pp. 274-283; in English, Storry, Double Patriots, pp. 163-166. 48 As cited by Maruyama Masao, Gendai seiji no shisd to Rad6,1, p. 62. “'GKY, “Kikan setsu mondai ni kan sura gunbu oyobi seifu no naibu jij" (“The State of Affairs in the government and the Army concerning the Emperor Organ Problem”], April 9, 1935, Top Secret. 48 Aritake Shuji, Okada Keisuke denki, p. 280. In October, 1935, the government compelled Minabe to resign his public positions. It is interesting to note that this action was dictated in large measure by pressure from the new War Minister, Kuwajima, who replaced Hayashi in August. Considering the image ‘of Hayashi and Nagata as the architects of the fascist movement in the military, it is ironie that both men had exerted 2 moderating influence during the Minobe crisis, 4 Storry, Double Patriots, pp. 281-282.JAPANESE ARMY FACTIONALISM 321 mier Okada, “is to remove Mazaki who is at the root of all this mess.”®° ‘The pres- sure to oust Mazaki should not be attributed to the handiwork of Nagata Tetsuzan because, by the summer of 1935, Mazaki had alienated all of the responsible leaders of the Cabinet and the Imperial Army. ‘Thus the removal of Mazaki was less the product of a “conspiracy” organized by Nagata than the combination of Mazaki’s bizarre be- havior, the complaints of the Okada Cabinet, and the stringent criticism levelled by the senior generals. Consequences of General Mazaki’s transfer Considering his opposition, Mazaki was unable to prevent his transfer to the Su- preme War Council. Still, he declined the opportunity of graciously withdrawing from his post and, instead, vindicated his own actions by impugning the motives of his critics. He argued that if he were being punished for corrupting discipline in 1935 then many other officers on active duty should also be reprimanded for their be- havior in the incident of March 1931.5 Without attempting to evaluate the validity of this complaint, it is pertinent to note that the leaders of the March incident (Generals Tatekawa and Koiso) were associated with the Purification movement rather than the Control group (Hayashi and Nagata).'* However, at the July 18 meeting of the Su- preme War Council, Generals Araki and Mazaki accused Nagata Tetsuzan of insti- gating the March Incident.** No one had previously linked Nagata with this episode. Recognizing this accusation as a tactic designed mainly to disgrace Nagata, General Watanabe, a member of the Supreme War Council, caustically pointed out that ‘Nagata’s alleged role in the March Incident was well concealed until the War Min- istry proposed the transfer of General Mazaki. General Hishikari, a lifelong friend of Araki, was also visibly distressed. He pointedly refrained from lending any support to Araki’s accusation throughout the meeting." Thus, despite the diversionary tactics of the Kéd6 generals, the Supreme War Council sanctioned the August transfers sub- mitted by the War Minister. On July 18, Mazaki became a disgruntled member of the Supreme War Council and the Kad@ faction was all but banished from Central Head- juarters. seth the midst of this development appeared the strange pamphlet Shukugun ni kan- suru ikensho (Views on the Housecleaning of the Army). The authors of this political tract were Muranaka and Isobe, the culprits of the November incident. 50 Saionji-Harada Memoirs, July 22, 1935. 51 GK], “Hayashi Rikush3 no jinji shidanko i niyo no kansoku" [Two Observations on the Decisive Action of War Minister Hayashi"], Top Secret, July 17, 1935, Also, Takamiya Tahei, Gunkoku taihciki, 216-222. PP ca This distinction is imporant because the oral wetimony and secondary documents produced at the Tribunal included Nagata, and others of the so-called Tasei group, as leaders in the March Incident. As sug- gested, the Tései movement and the Seigun faction were not identical and were not even in existence in 1931. Secondly, the documents compiled by naval intelligence and available at the Documentary Research Organization do not mention Nagata as an instigator of the March Incident. Thirdly, the most careful study of this Incident and of the members of the Sckurakai who planned it, pointedly describes Nagata as playing decisive role in aborting the conspiracy. Hata Tkuhito, ‘‘Sakurakai shui-sho” [“Documents on the Pur- ove of the Sakurakai"], Rekishi Aydiku, VI (1958), 2, pp. 81-89. 8 Storry, Double Patriots, pp. 172-174, is a recapitulation of this stormy session based upon a memo- randum of General Matsuura, a friend of General Mazaki, ‘4Takamiya Tahei, Gunkokw taiheiki, pp. 223-226, SS IMTFE, Document 3166322 JAMES B. CROWLEY ‘Writing from the standpoint of the young officers, they identified three factions in Central Headquarters—the Tsei-ha, the Seigun-ha and the Araki-ha—and charged the first two with obstructing the “national reconstruction” by virtue of their attacks upon the Araki group" Muranaka and Isobe’s views of the March incident of 193t portrayed Nagata as a leading conspirator in this episode. It is conceivable that Mazaki pilfered his accusation against Nagata from this pamphlet. At any rate, it was a re- markable coincidence that Muranaka and Isobe’s polemic and Mazaki’s personal abuse of Nagata both appeared in conjunction with the removal of Mazaki from his post as Inspector General of Military Education. Te would seem that the Shukugen ni kansuru ikensho and Mazaki’s diatribes against Nagata were designed to disgrace a gifted officer who was molding the army along new lines. Although their explosive charges were temporarily ineffective, the notion that Nagata was an “evil man” was successfully implanted in the minds of the young officers. One of these young and emotional officers, Lt. Colonel Aizawa, stormed into Nagata’s office at the War Ministry the afternoon of July 16 and pas- sionately set forth his objections to the impending removal of General Mazaki." His reward for this unsolicited opinion was a transfer to Formosa to take effect in Aug- ust. In the meantime, with encouragement from Mazaki, Aizawa’s hatred of Nagata was intensified.* ‘On August 12, 1935, Aizawa returned to the War Ministry and engaged in an extended conversation with General Yamaoka, the Chief of the Bureau of Military Supplies” In the course of this chat, Aizawa dispatched a messenger to ascertain if Nagata were in his office. Upon receiving an affirmative reply, Aizawa hastened to Nagata’s office. There he plunged his sword into Nagata’s back. After this brutal act, Aizawa was arrested. The apparent inability of Mazaki and Yamaoka to fathom the deadly thoughts of Aizawa was unfortunate; that neither man had bothered to dis- suade Aizawa before his fateful act may be deemed criminal. Ordinarily, Aizawa’s crime would not be expected to produce one of the most melodramatic moments in recent Japanese history. ‘The circumstances surrounding Nakamura Kikuo, Shdwa seijishi, pp 51-53 is an unusually accurate digest of this pamphlet, 81 Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination (New York, 1940), pp. 95-118 is a masterful description of the Aizawa affair. 88 Mazaki, of course, denied most adamantly that he had prompted Aizawa to attack Nagata. Richard Storry, Double Patriots, p. 176. Still, it would be expecting too much to believe that an Aizawa-Mazaki talk in July 1935 would not have included caustic remarks about Nagata, In addition, “A Strange Document Slander ing Generals Mazaki and Araki,” states that Aizawa had lived in the Mazaki household during his youth; that Mazaki had been Aizawa's sponsor (hosh6nin) at the Military Academy; and that Aizawa referred to Mazaki as oygji, a term of familiar respect. GK], "Araki Mazaki ry6 taishd 0 hiki seru kaibunsho,” No- vember 11, 1935. The other details of this slanderous document are consistently accurate and these assertions deserve some consideration. For example, they furnish a reasonable explanation of why Mazaki, a member of the Supreme War Council, would chat with an obscure Lt, Colone! stationed in Fukuyama on the Inland Sea. '® 1f Aizawa, in fact, had been a personal friend of Mazaki, this would also help to explain why the of the Bureau of Military Equipment and Supply would have time for a protracted conversation with Aizawa. Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination, p. 96, attributes the Aizawa-Yamaoka talk to the fact that Yamaoka had been commandant of the Military Academy during Aizawa's student days. In a lever to the biographer of Yamashita, General Yamaoka recently has stated that Aizawa, in fact, told him dur- ing the conversation that “he came to kill Nagata and that he would also like to murder the War Minister (Hayashi]." Oki Osamuji, Ninmen Yamashita Hobun: higeki no shogun (The Life of Yamashica Hobun; the Tragedy of a General] (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 112-113.JAPANESE ARMY FACTIONALISM. 323 Aizawa’s trial were, however, far from pedestrian. Defended in a public hearing by Lt. Colonel Mitsui and Dr. Uzawa, the President of Meiji University, the Aizawa trial was magically transformed into a public rostrum for the young officers who cherished the ideal of a “national restoration.” Permitted by the presiding judge, General Sato, to develop the “motives” which had inspired the slaying of General Nagata, Mitsui and Uzawa advanced familiar themes: the Emperor was surrounded by men who were frustrating a “national restoration,” the Minobe theory enabled the plutocrats and the Okada Cabinet to misuse Imperial prerogatives, and a “military clique,” closely allied with bureaucrats and financial magnates, had driven General Mazaki from his post as Inspector General. “I marked out Nagata,” testified Aizawa, “because he, together with the senior statesmen and financiers and members of the old army clique like General Minami and General Ugaki, was responsible for the corruption of the army. . . . He was the headquarters of all the evil.”°' In the process of the trial, the murder of Nagata was reduced to an insignificant act and Aizawa was projected as a simple soldier who sought only to reform the army and the nation according to the true National Principle. It was in the midst of this farcical trial that fourteen hundred men of General Yanagawa’s First Division staged the famous rebellion of February 26, 1936, The de- gree of influence exerted by the Aizawa trial on the leaders of the rebellious troops will probably never be known. Still, it cannot be denied that the pyrotechnics of Aizawa’s counsels had created a most propitious moment for launching a “national restoration.” Moreover, when one considers the various ties of the Kd@ group with the Aizawa trial and with the leaders of the February 26 rebellion, some responsibility for the tragic uprising must be attributed to the Kadé-ha. Why, for example, was the court martial permitted to degenerate into a public tirade against the responsible leaders of the government and army? Since the man who designated the procurator and the judges was General Yanagawa, a prominent member of the Kédé faction, some responsibility for the nature of the trial rests with him. Secondly, the affidavit which Lt. Isobe, one of the ringleaders of the February 26 rebellion, wrote shortly before his execution in July 1936 indicates the the young officers had had definite contact with senior Kad officers.®* According to his recol- lections, in late October and early November 1935 the leaders of the young officers sounded out the views of the Kédé generals through the medium of Colonel Mura- kami, Head of the Army Affairs Section of the War Ministry." During December a representative of the young officers actually conferred with Generals Mazaki, Yama- shita, and Furushé about the need for a “national reconstruction.” Finally, shortly after the inception of the Aizawa trial, the young officers carried to General Mazaki © Hugh Byas! description Government by Assassination (pp. 119-128) remains the classic account of the tial. © bid, p. 114 €2 Igobe's last statement, along with those of most of the officers involved in the February 26 Incident, is ‘eoined Jn Kio Toke, Ni-sivae [Pebrary a6 Incident) (Tohzo, 1952), pp. 24-92. . 31 Murakami became Gunjika-chd in October 1935. Ordinarily transfers of this importance ‘August. There is some evidence that his appointment was part of a strenuous effort of the hhaigeki no shins6” ['Truth of the Case Denouncing War Minister Kuwashima”"] Top Secret, December 18, 1935. 84 Kéno Tsukasa, Ni-ni-roku, pp. 31-32.324 JAMES B, CROWLEY the idea of an “incident” to promote this political reform; and, without doubt, re- ceived a delphic reply. Nevertheless, in late January, Muranaka and Isobe “received word of a confer- ence among Generals Mazaki, Furush®, Yamashita, and Colonel Murakami” and concluded that these men would support a “national restoration” in the event of a sudden emergency.® How much of this misplaced faith was the product of Isobe’s imagination may never be known, As General Terauchi informed Baron Harada, “In connection with this Incident there are those not directly involved but who knew that such plans were afoot. Yet they kept silent.” This was a transparent reference to the aforementioned Kédé generals. General Mazaki, however, stoutly maintained the incredulous view that his enemies in the T@sei faction had engineered the Feb- ruary 26 rebellion simply to disgrace him.” What saved Mazaki from a court martial was not his innocence but the influence of his friends and the delicate nature of army politics. Mazaki was held in custody for his part in the February uprising for over fifteen months. During this time Araki labored diligently on his behalf, winning the powerful support of the President of the House of Peers, Prince Konoe Fumimaro. Of equal assistance in preventing a courtmartial for Mazaki was the March incident of 193t. Mazaki’s threat to equate his role in the February 26 rebellion with those of Generals Ugaki, Tatekawa, and Koiso during the spring of 193r raised the distinct possibility of again throwing the army into a political turmoil, Hence, General Minami, certainly no friend of Mazaki, informed Prince Konoe, “If Mazaki is found guilty, then Ugaki and Mazaki are from some points of view equally guilty.”® The desire of the senior generals to avoid any new factional strife was instrumental in the failure of the army to bring Mazaki to trial, Once the China “incident” began in 1937, the public memory of the February uprising dimmed appreciably, and in November 1937 Premier Konoe quietly se- cured the release of General Mazaki.” ‘This was the final act in one of the most tragic and bitter factional struggles within the Imperial Army. Because the February 26 incident was a dramatic breach of army discipline, eight- cen of the highest ranking generals were compelled to atone for this action by accept- ing responsibility for the rebellion and by retiring from active duty. These officers in- cluded five of the seven members of the Supreme War Council—Araki, Mazaki, Abe, Hishikari, and Nishi—as well as Generals Honja, Minami, Matsui and Hayashi.” Furthermore, under the new War Minister, Terauchi Juichi, staff officers clearly identified with either the Kéd8 or Seigun groups were quietly transferred to the in- active lists or barred from future assignments in Central Headquarters. Included within this category were Koiso Kuniaki, Tatckawa Yoshitsugu, Hashimoto Kingord and Tanaka Kiyoshi of the Seigun-ha, and Suzuki Teiichi, Obata Tokushiro, Oka- mura Neiji, Yamashita Tomoyuki, Yamaoka Shigeatsu, Yanagawa Heisuke, and © Ibid., p. 38. General Yamashita also conferred with the leaders of the rebellion on February 15th about the possibility of assassinating Premier Okada. Oki Osamuji, Ninmen Yamashita Hobun, pp. 121-122. ©6 Saionji-Harada Memoirs, July 8, 1936. © Storry, Double Patriots, p. 191. #8 somehow,” noted Prince Saionji, “Konoe seems to defend Mazaki and Araki. . . . It is indeed re- grettable for a man of such noble birth and character.” Saionji-Harada Memoirs, August 13, 1936. © Ibid, July 5, 1937- T0Ibid., October 13, 1937- ‘1 Takamiya Tahei, Gunkoku taiheiki, pp. 293-296.JAPANESE ARMY FACTIONALISM 325 Murakami Keisaku of the Kéd@-ha,"* In brief, the immediate aftermath of the Feb- ruary 26 Incident was the thorough cleansing of the Seigun and Kado cliques from Central Headquarters, and the quick promotion of staff officers not associated with cither of these groups into the highest positions of the Imperial Army. Conclusions On the basis of the preceding narrative, it is possible to venture some tentative conclusions on the nature of army factionalism in the 1932-1936 period. Certainly, the explanation provided by General Tanaka at the Tokyo Military Tribunal would scem inadequate. Factions were far more complex than the simple dichotomy suggested by his testimony. Secondly, the radical young officers were not part of the Kédo-ha, but constituted a separate faction, the Kokutai genri-ha. Thirdly, although some Kadé generals, including Mazaki, unquestionably had ties with these radical young officers during the fall of 1935, the statements of the organizers of the February 26 incident indicate that General Araki was not associated with their plans or activities. Fourthly, the primary cause of the factional strife described in this article was Araki's policy as War Minister which (1) created a Kéd6 group composed of officers with a Tosa-Saga background; (2) precipitated the organization of the Seigun faction by Chashii of ficers; and (3) hampered, if not endangered, the formulation and implementation of the type of long-range planning desired by the majority of staff officers in Central Headquarters. The combination of these developments occasioned a movement within the Supreme War Council and Central Headquarters (Tasei movement) de- signed to end the dissension generated by Araki’s clique and to produce a program capable of modernizing the Imperial Army so that it could successfully defeat the strategic enemy, the Soviet Union. The man selected to implement these objectives was Nagata ‘Tetsuzan, Under War Minister Hayashi, Nagata endeavored to organize a staff selected from the most talented graduates of the War College, However, he was forced to by-pass or to re- move several capable officers simply because they had been too closely associated with Araki's patronage of Tosa and Saga officers—e.g., Suzuki Teiichi and Yamashita Tomoyuki. In turn, this personnel policy generated a hatred of Nagata among Kado officers. Bitter feelings against Nagata were also rampant among the young officers who considered him the evil genius behind the “corruption” of the army—that is, be- hind the new emphasis on economic planning and military technology. Two tragic consequences of this acrimonious feeling shared by senior Kéd6 officers and the radi- cal young officers were the assassination of Nagata and the rebellion of February 26, 1936. By way of a final conclusion, I should like to set forth an hypothesis which might be helpful in further studies of army factionalism during the nineteen thirties: that the policies initially implemented by Nagata Tetsuzan reflected a basic change in the Japanese military establishment brought about by the introduction of new ideas on the nature of modern warfare. In particular, the first World War had demonstrated 72 This is not to say that these officers were consigned to oblivion. Prince Konoe, for example, secured important cabinet and administrative positions for Yanagawa, Yamaoka, Suzuki and, of course, Araki. Yamashita later became famous as the Tiger of Malaya. Hayashi Senjird, Abe Nobuyuki, and Koiso Kuniaki subsequently served as premiers of the Imperial Government.326 JAMES B. CROWLEY that war had become “total,” with military power ultimately being determined by the industrial capacity of a nation to produce the weapons and supplies required by a mechanized army. The responsibilities inherent in a reorganization of the army into a mobile fighting instrument produced a professionalization of the officer corps which rewarded traits and skills somewhat at variance with those idealized by traditional kad8 values." In addition, the creation of the War College, and the principle of pro- motion by ability, undermined the tendency to form cliques on the basis of regional affiliation (hanbatsu). Thus, there were really two distinct developments which wn- derlay factional strife in the early 1930"s: the emergence of a staff in Central Head- quarters committed to the modernization of the army; and the demise of hanbatsu as an important characteristic of politics at the highest levels of the officer corps. "This article has concentrated on the second development in order to clarify the four groups (Kokutai genri-ha, the Seigun-ha, the Kédé-ha and the Tései-ha) which are often mentioned in secondary writings on army factionalism. Nevertheless, there were other types of factions which appeared along with the professionalization of the officer corps. In particular, the important ones were gakubatsu [school factions] based upon the year of graduation from the Military Academy, heikabatsu [departmental factions] and shokumubatsu [duty factions]."* Thus, within the general Tdsei movement there existed several contending viewpoints about what policies should be adopted. But this type of dissension reflected the professional judgment of officers entrusted with differ- ent responsibilities in Central Headquarters, rather than originating in a han-centered clique such as the Kédé or Seigun-ha. In other words, the Tései movement was not a unity, a single faction, but contained within it competing and dissenting groups similar to those evident in all large professional bureaucratic organizations. In a more complete study of army factionalism throughout the nineteen thirties, it would seem that the categories of Kadé-ha and Tései-ha would prove inadequate guides to the problem, A more rewarding approach might be to appraise the Japa- nese military establishment as a separate analytical entity, a “social system.""® Within this perspective, special attention could be given to the shifting staff and com- mand responsibilities generated by the changing nature of modern warfare, by the complex problems posed by the growth of nationalism on the Asiatic mainland, by the nature of the threat presented by the emergence of a powerful Soviet army in East Asia, and by the relocation of the Chinese Red Army to Northwest China. Hence, in place of the popular Kéd¢-ha-Tései-ha approach to army factions, one would substi- tute an analysis of the changing bureaucratic system of the Imperial Army, parti larly as it was decisively affected by the aforementioned developments, as a way to ascertain additional information on the nature of army factionalism, as well as on the increasingly pervasive power and influence of the military in the nineteen thirties. 13 A most succinct analysis of the implications of technological change within the military is Morris Jano- wita's, “Military Elites and the Study of War,” Conflict Resolution, I (March, 1957), 9-18. 14GK], “Seigun undé no jissai” [“Real Conditions of the Purification Movement"), Top Secret, Feb- ruary 8, 1934, Part 1 is the only primary source known to the writer indicating the existence of factions in accordance with these classifications. 18-The advantages of this approach are set forth by Mottis Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Estab- lishment (New York, 1959); and his The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, 1960).