Dignāga

Dignāga (also known as Diṅnāga, c. 480 – c. 540 CE) was an Indian

Buddhist scholar and one of the Buddhist founders of Indian logic (hetu
vidyā). Dignāga's work laid the groundwork for the development of
deductive logic in India and created the first system of Buddhist logic and
epistemology (Pramana).[1]

According to Georges B. Dreyfus, his philosophical school brought about

an Indian "epistemological turn" and became the "standard formulation of
Buddhist logic and epistemology in India and Tibet." [2] Dignāga's thought
influenced later Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakirti and also Hindu
thinkers of the Nyaya school. Dignāga's epistemology accepted only
"perception" (pratyaksa) and "inference" (anumāṇa) as valid instruments
of knowledge and introduced the widely influential theory of "exclusion"
(apoha) to explain linguistic meaning.[3] His work on language, Dignaga. A statue in Elista,
inferential reasoning and perception were also widely influential among Russia.
later Indian philosophers.[4] According to Richard P. Hayes "some
familiarity with Dinnaga's arguments and conclusions is indispensable for
anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought."[5]

Dignāga was born in Simhavakta near Kanchipuram and very little is known of his early years, except that
he took Nagadatta of the Pudgalavada school as his spiritual preceptor, before being expelled and becoming
a student of Vasubandhu.[6]

Philosophy
Dignāga mature philosophy is expounded in his magnum opus, the Pramāṇa-samuccaya. In chapter one,
Dignāga explains his epistemology which holds that there are only two 'instruments of knowledge' or 'valid
cognitions' (pramāṇa); "perception" or "sensation" (pratyakṣa) and "inference" or "reasoning"
(anumāṇa). In chapter one, Dignāga writes:

Sensation and reasoning are the only two means of acquiring knowledge, because two
attributes are knowable; there is no knowable object other than the peculiar and the general
attribute. I shall show that sensation has the peculiar attribute as its subject matter, while
reasoning has the general attribute as its subject matter.[7]
Perception is a non-conceptual knowing of particulars which is
bound by causality, while inference is reasonable, linguistic and
conceptual.[8] This conservative epistemic theory was in contrast to
the Nyaya school who accepted other means of knowledge such as
upamāṇa (comparison and analogy).

Pratyakṣa

Pratyakṣa is a kind of awareness that acquires information about

particulars, and is immediately present to one of the senses. This is
the topic of the first chapter of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya.[9] For
Dignāga, perception is pre-verbal, pre-conceptual and unstructured
sense data. In chapter two of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya he writes:

Sensation is devoid of structure. That cognition in

which there is no structure is sensation. What kind of
thing is this so-called structure? Attaching a name, a
universal and so forth.[10] Buddhist epistemology holds that
perception and inference are the
means to correct knowledge.
According to Dignāga our mind always takes raw sense data or
particulars and interprets them or groups them together in more
complex ways, compares them to past experiences, gives them
names to classify them based on general attributes (samanyalaksana) and so forth. This process he terms
kalpana (arranging, structuring).[11] This cognitive process is already different from sensation, which is a
simple cognition based only on the immediately present. Thus pratyakṣa is only awareness of particular
sense data such as a patch of green color and the sensation of hardness, never awareness of a macroscopic
object such an apple which is always a higher level synthesis.[12] For Dignāga, sensation is also inerrant, it
cannot "stray" because it is the most basic and simple phenomenon of experience or as he puts it:

"it is impossible too for the object of awareness itself to be errant, for errancy is only the
content of misinterpretation by the mind."[13]

Also, for Dignaga, pratyakṣa is mostly phenomenalist and is not dependent on the existence of an external
world. It is also inexpressible and private.[14]

Anumāṇa

Anumāṇa (inference or reasoning) for Dignāga is a type of cognition which is only aware of general
attributes, and is constructed out of simpler sensations. Inference can also be communicated through
linguistic conventions.[15]

A central issue which concerned Dignāga was the interpretation of signs (linga) or the evidence (hetu)
which led one to an inference about states of affairs; such as how smoke can lead one to infer that there is a
fire.[16] This topic of svārthānumāna (reasoning, literally "inference for oneself") is the subject of chapter
two of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya while the topic of the third chapter is about demonstration
(parārthānumāna, literally "inference for others"), that is, how one communicates one's inferences through
proper argument.[17]
According to Richard Hayes, in Dignāga's system, to obtain knowledge that a property (the "inferable
property", sadhya) is inherent in a "subject of inference" (paksa) it must be derived through an inferential
sign (linga). For this to occur, the following must be true:[18]

1. The inferential sign must be a property of the subject of the inference. That is, there exists in
the subject of inference a property, which is different from the inferable property and which is
furthermore evident to the person drawing the inference; this second property may serve as
an inferential sign in case it has two further characteristics.
2. The inferential sign must be known to occur in at least one locus, other than the subject of
inference, in which the inferable property occurs.
3. The inferential sign must not be known to occur in any other loci in which the inferable
property is absent.

Richard Hayes interprets these criteria as overly strict and this is because he sees Dignāga's system as one of
rational skepticism. Dignāga's epistemology, argues Hayes, is a way to express and practice the traditional
Buddhist injunction to not become attached to views and opinions.[19] According to Hayes, for Dignāga,
the role of logic is:

to counter dogmatism and prejudice. As a weapon in the battle against prejudice that rages in
every mind that seeks wisdom--in minds of the vast majority of people who do not seek
wisdom, prejudice simply takes full control without a contest-there is nothing as powerful as
the kind of reason that lies at the heart of Dignaga's system of logic. For it should be clear that
very few of our judgments in ordinary life pass the standards set by the three characteristics of
legitimate' evidence. Taken in its strictest interpretation, none of the judgments of any but a
fully omniscient being passes. And, since there is no evidence that there exist any fully
omniscient beings, the best available working hypothesis is that no one's thinking is immune
from errors that require revision in the face of newly discovered realities.[20]

Apohavada and language

Dignāga considered the interpretation of conventional and symbolic signs such as the words and sentences
of human language to be no more than special or conventional instances of the general principles of
inference or anumana.[21] He takes up several issues relating to language and its relationship to inference in
the fifth chapter of his Pramāṇa-samuccaya.[22]

During Dignāga's time, the orthodox Indian Nyaya school and also Hindu Sanskrit grammarians (such as
Bhartṛhari) had discussed issues of epistemology and language respectively, but their theories generally
accepted the concept of universals which was rejected by most Buddhist philosophers. Influenced by the
work of these thinkers as well as by Buddhist philosophers of the Sautrantika school who rejected Hindu
theories of universals in favor of nominalism (prajñapti), Dignāga developed his own Buddhist theory of
language and meaning based on the concept of "apoha" (exclusion).[23] Hattori Masaaki explains the
doctrine thus:
 a word indicates an object merely through the exclusion of other objects (anyapoha, -vyavrtti).
For example, the word "cow" simply means that the object is not a non-cow. As such, a word
cannot denote anything real, whether it be an individual (vyakti), a universal (jati), or any other
thing. The apprehension of an object by means of the exclusion of other objects is nothing but
an inference.[24]

Works
As noted by Hayes, the difficulty in studying the highly terse works of Dignāga is considerable, because
none of them have survived in the original Sanskrit and the Tibetan and Chinese translations which do
survive show signs of having been done by translators who were not completely certain of the meaning of
the work.[25] This difficulty has also led scholars to read Dignaga through the lens of later authors such as
Dharmakirti and their Indian and Tibetan interpreters as well as their Hindu Nyaya opponents. Because of
this tendency in scholarship, ideas which are actually innovations of Dharmakirti and later authors have
often been associated with Dignaga by scholars such as Fyodor Shcherbatskoy and S. Mookerjee, even
though these thinkers often differ.[26]

Dignāga's magnum opus, the Pramāṇa-samuccaya (Compendium of Valid Cognition), examined

perception, language and inferential reasoning. It presents perception as a bare cognition, devoid of
conceptualization and sees language as useful fictions created through a process of exclusion (Apoha).[27]

Other works include:

Hetucakra (The wheel of reason), considered his first work on formal logic. It may be
regarded as a bridge between the older doctrine of trairūpya and Dignāga's own later theory
of vyapti which is a concept related to the Western notion of implication.

Alambana-parīkṣā, (The Treatise on the Objects of Cognition) and its auto commentary (vrtti).
Abhidharmakośa-marma-pradīpa – a condensed summary of Vasubandhu's seminal work
the Abhidharmakosha
A summary of the Mahayana Aṣṭasāhasrika-prajñāpāramitā sūtra

Trikāla-parikṣa, (Treatise on the tri-temporality)

Nyāya-mukha (Introduction to logic).

Tradition and influence

Dignāga founded a tradition of Buddhist epistemology and reasoning, and this school is sometimes called
the "School of Dignāga" or "The school of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti" (due to the strong influence of
Dharmakīrti as well).[28] In Tibetan it is often called "those who follow reasoning" (Tibetan: rigs pa rjes su
‘brang ba); in modern literature it is sometimes known by the Sanskrit 'pramāṇavāda', often translated as
"the Epistemological School." [29] Many of the figures in these were commentators on the works of
Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, but some of them also wrote original works and developed the tradition in new
directions.[28][30][31]

The work of this tradition also went on to influence the Buddhist Madhyamaka school, through the work of
figures like Bhāvaviveka (c. 500 – c. 578), Jñanagarbha (700-760), and Śāntarakṣita (725–788). These
thinkers attempted to adopt the logical and epistemological insights of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti to defend
the tenets of the Madhyamaka school.
Dignāga's tradition of logic and epistemology continued in Tibet, where it was expanded by thinkers such
as Cha-ba (1182–1251) and Sakya Pandita (1182–1251).

Dignāga also influenced non-Buddhist Sanskrit thinkers. According to Lawrence J. McCrea, and Parimal
G. Patil, Dignāga set in motion an "epistemic turn" in Indian philosophy. After Dignāga, most Indian
philosophers were now expected to defend their views by using a fully developed epistemological theory
(which they also had to defend).[32]

See also
Hetucakra
Trairūpya
Buddhist logic
Critical Buddhism

References
1. Zheng Wei-hong; Dignāga and Dharmakīrti: Two Summits of Indian Buddhist Logic.
Research Institute of Chinese Classics; Fudan University; Shanghai, China
2. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations, (Suny: 1997),
page 15-16.
3. Arnold, Dan. The Philosophical Works and Influence of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti,
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195393521/obo-
9780195393521-0085.xml
4. Dunne, John. "Dignaga" in Buswell (ed.) ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUDDHISM. Volume One A-
L
5. Hayes (1982), p. ix.
6. Karr, Andy (2007). Contemplating Reality: A Practitioner's Guide to the View in Indo-Tibetan
Buddhism (https://books.google.com/books?id=qTd_fbuERdEC). Shambhala Publications.
p. 212. ISBN 9781590304297.
7. Hayes (1982), p 133.
8. Tom Tillemans (2011), Dharmakirti (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dharmakiirti/), Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
9. Hayes (1982), p 132.
10. Hayes (1982), p 134.
11. Hayes (1982), p 135.
12. Hayes (1982), p 138.
13. Hayes (1982), p 139.
14. Hayes (1982), p 143.
15. Hayes (1982), p 143.
16. Hayes (1982), p 1.
17. Hayes (1982), p 132-33.
18. Hayes (1982), p 146, 153.
19. Hayes (1982), p 146, 167.
20. Hayes (1982), p 167.
21. Hayes (1982), p 1.
22. Hayes (1982), p 132.
23. Hayes (1982), p 27-28.
24. Hayes (1982), p 26.
25. Hayes, (1982), p. 6.
26. Hayes, (1982), p. 15.
27. Arnold, Dan. The Philosophical Works and Influence of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti,
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195393521/obo-
9780195393521-0085.xml
28. Westerhoff, Jan (2018). The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy, p. 217. Oxford
University Press.
29. Tillemans, Tom, "Dharmakīrti", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dharmakiirti/>.
30. Garfield, Jay L; Edelglass, William (editors). The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy, p.
234.
31. Cluster of Excellence "Asia and Europe in a Global Context" of the University of Heidelberg,
http://east.uni-hd.de/buddh/ind/7/16/ Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2017070801520
5/http://east.uni-hd.de/buddh/ind/7/16/) 8 July 2017 at the Wayback Machine
32. Lawrence J. McCrea, and Parimal G. Patil. Buddhist Philosophy of Language in India:
Jnanasrimitra on Exclusion. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. p 5.

Further reading
Chu, Junjie (2006).On Dignāga's theory of the object of cognition as presented in PS (V) 1 (h
ttps://web.archive.org/web/20140324120140/http://journals.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/index.php/ji
abs/article/viewFile/8978/2871), Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
29 (2), 211–254
Frauwallner, Erich, Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung. (Wiener Zeitschrift für die
Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 2:83–164, 1959)
Hattori Masaaki, Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's
Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan Versions (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968)
Hayes, Richard, Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing
Company, 1982)
Katsura Shoryu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on apoha in E. Steinkellner (ed.), Studies in the
Buddhist Epistemological Tradition (Vienna, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften,
1991), pp. 129–146
Mookerjee, S. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, an Exposition of the Philosophy
of Critical Realism as expounded by the School of Dignāga (Calcutta, 1935)
Sastri, N. Aiyaswami, Diṅnāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā and Vṛtti. Restored with the commentary
of Dharmapāla into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese versions and edited with English
translations and notes with extracts from Vinītadeva's commentary. (Madras: The Adyar
Library. 1942)[1] (https://web.archive.org/web/20130730214136/http://www.scribd.com/doc/1
3992589/Acarya-DinnagaAlambanapariksaSanskritEnglish)
Tucci, Giuseppe, The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga, the oldest Buddhist Text on Logic after
Chinese and Tibetan Materials (Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 15 Heft,
Heidelberg, 1930)
 Vidyabhusana, S.C. A History of Indian Logic – Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools
(Calcutta, 1921)

External links
Dignaga's Logic of Invention, by Volker Peckhaus (https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/24c1/a11
da07fd81f34f4c6964e8f6272c78ad41e.pdf)
Vidhabhusana, Satis Chandra (1907). History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic.
Calcutta University. (https://archive.org/details/historyofthemedi031568mbp)

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