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Grounded Theory Method in Management Research: Users' Perspectives

Jacqueline Fendt and Wladimir Sachs
Organizational Research Methods 2008 11: 430 originally published online 8 August 2007
DOI: 10.1177/1094428106297812
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Organizational
Research Methods
Volume 11 Number 3
July 2008 430-455
Ó 2008 Sage Publications
Grounded Theory Method 10.1177/1094428106297812
http://orm.sagepub.com
in Management Research hosted at

http://online.sagepub.com
Users’ Perspectives
Jacqueline Fendt
ESCP-EAP European School of Management
Wladimir Sachs
ESC Rennes School of Business
The authors discuss the determination of quality in studies using grounded theory method
(GTM). They concretely describe some misunderstandings associated with GTM and some
malaises experienced with its orthodox application, drawing primarily on their own research
experience and supporting their discussion with evidence from other researchers. They then
confront their experience with current critical GTM literature and offer some observations of
their own. The authors describe how the very strengths of GTM run the risk of being under-
mined—and thus the quality of such research impaired—by an overly orthodox application
of its rigorous objectification procedures. Therefore, they offer some pragmatic remedial sug-
gestions. The authors conclude by calling for the continuing use of GTM in some of its
newer forms and by reflecting on the importance of the process surrounding the use of the
method, particularly in doctoral research.
Keywords: grounded theory method; qualitative inquiry; constructionism; pragmatism;

doctoral research
T his article is a critical appraisal of the grounded theory method (GTM), as applied to
management and organizational research, or at least some versions of that method. It
is based on an in-depth analysis of one very personal case and a summary cross-checking
with other management scholars using the method in similar conditions (‘‘triangulation
with secondary data’’ in GTM terms). As for any results based on a single case, the con-
clusions presented here are not necessarily applicable in general. With Yin (1984), we gen-
eralize ‘‘theoretically, rather than empirically,’’ as we share a unique experience and raise
red flags that we believe to be useful to other unique experiences of researchers engaging
in GTM in somewhat similar settings, especially as part of their doctoral processes. We
suggest that the considerable cost associated with applying some of the more canonical ver-
sions of GTM be weighed against less onerous options, and we argue that such action need
not deteriorate—but can, on the contrary, improve—the quality of GTM research. Further-
more, we discuss that the process surrounding such interpretative research, particularly
doctoral research, is critically important to assuring ‘‘good quality at reasonable cost.’’ We
also suggest that the intrinsic qualities of the researcher are an important determinant of
overall research quality, and we call for making personal factors explicit.
Developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss some 40 years ago (Glaser & Strauss,
1967), GTM claims to be a qualitative methodology to inductively generate theory. Glaser
(1992a) defines grounded theory as ‘‘a general methodology of analysis linked with data
430

Fendt, Sachs / Grounded Theory Method 431
collection that uses a systematically applied set of methods to generate an inductive theory
about a substantive area’’ (p. 16). Grounded theory was developed at a point in the history
of science when the prevalent opinion was that only quantitative or deductive studies
could provide systematic scientific research, with linear regression and structural function-
alism going strong (Alvesson & Skldberg, 2000). It emerged as a response to rigid positi-
vism (Suddaby, 2006) from methodological challenges faced in collaboration on a study of
dying in California hospitals between Glaser, versed in then-popular quantitative techni-
ques of sociology, with the much older Strauss, schooled in symbolic interactionism and
involved with medical sociology. We consider GTM no less than an essential research
method for the development of new insights into social phenomena. Both its key concepts,
that of ‘‘constant comparison,’’ in which data collection and analysis are an iterative pro-
cess, and that of ‘‘theoretical sampling,’’ in which data collection decisions are progres-
sional and subject to the theory in construction, are invaluable to the determination of
quality in research on how individuals construct meaning from intersubjective experiences.
Suddaby (2006) points to a considerable confusion about definition of GTM. In particu-
lar, he detects
a growing fundamentalism in grounded theory research. That is, there seems to be a growing
gap between those who actually engage in grounded theory and those who write about it.
The latter group, unsurprisingly, tends toward purist idealism and, as a result, they repeat
and reinforce many [myths]: rigid rules about saturation, mechanical application of technique
to data, and clear demarcation between theory and data. The gap between pragmatics and
purists has become exacerbated by a proliferation of how-to manuals and textbooks about
simplifying and streamlining grounded theory research. (p. 638)
This orthodox version of GTM is recommended for application primarily where complex
social interaction is insufficiently understood and little or no theory exists. Its methodolo-
gical emphasis is to let interpretations emerge from the actors in the field with minimal
intervention by the researcher and then compare them with academic concepts on the topic
(Pike, 1987). Theory is said to lay grounded in the data from the field and to emerge by
constantly comparing, fractioning, coding, and analyzing observational and interview data
until saturation is reached. Context (e.g., the organization, the actors, and their interrela-
tion; culture and temporality) is of great importance and is ‘‘expected to convey a concep-
tual understanding of issues that make up the naturalistic world’’ (Van Maanen, 1979),
that is, permit theoretical generalization. GTM suggests simultaneous, iterative involve-
ment in data collection and analysis; the construction of analytical codes and concepts
from data and not from preconceived logically deducted hypotheses; constant comparison
at each stage of the analysis; advancement of theory development during each step of data
collection and analysis; elaboration of categories, specification of their properties, and
definition of relationships between categories; sampling aimed at theory construction and
not representativeness of a population; and conducting a literature review after developing
an independent analysis. Interview and observational data are subjected to a highly struc-
tured and time-consuming process in which transcripts and notes are broken into lines,
each representing an item that can be captured with a keyword. From this are extracted
several factors that summarize the data, which are then further grouped into clusters which
in turn are built categories that form the basis for the theory emerging from the study.

432 Organizational Research Methods
Thus, data are treated through several successive reduction steps, usually verified by an
independent third party. The study is then expected to propose further research to test the
proposed theory across a broader sample of participants.
Qualitative inquiry, although essential to management and organizational research, is also
difficult to do: It is about listening, watching, and asking, and about observation and sense-
making of situations, language, concepts, practices, beliefs, and relationships. Scholars
invariably find themselves gathering large amounts of exciting but unstructured data, and
the choice of a method to analyze and synthesize these data can be difficult. No wonder that
GTM has a certain success, as it offers direction and reassurance by means of a concrete set
of procedures that, if scrupulously applied, promises validity and the generation—or rather,
to use the exact term, the emergence—of theory. GTM was selected for the research
recounted here because it appeared to be both compliant with the research question and logi-
cally consistent with the researcher’s epistemology. The aim was to make knowledge claims
not about an objective reality but about how individuals interpret that reality, that is, to ana-
lyze and conceptualize the ‘‘actual production of meanings and concepts used by social
actors in real settings’’ (Gephart, 2004, p. 457). Other than phenomenology, which would
also have been an option in the research described here, GTM not only permitted recording
and interpreting individuals’ subjective experiences but also, through its unique features of
theoretical sampling and constant comparison, offered a means of abstraction of such sub-
jective experience into theoretical statements. This plausible and structured approach was
expected to be helpful in dealing with a mass of qualitative data and help draw attention to
and possibly some useful lessons from interesting occurrences and interactions among the
researched leaders ‘‘out there in the real business world.’’ Its application did deliver many
of the expected results. However, at the same time it proved to be an obstacle in taking full
advantage of the material available and a source of some major malaises. These malaises
may well have a multitude of causes, such as
• actual inconsistencies in the method itself;

• semantic inconsistencies in the method, for example, because of epoque vocabulary;
• inconsistencies because of the fact that, ever since the ontological bifurcation of the
GTM founding fathers, several versions of GTM exist, some similar and some
conflicting;
• misconceptions because of ‘‘misreadings of seminal texts’’ (Suddaby, 2006, p. 634) and
probably subsequent ‘‘miswritings’’ and ‘‘misteachings’’;
• a lack of methodological training by the researchers (especially doctoral students) regard-
ing qualitative research in general and GTM in particular;
• insufficient attention to process, especially coaching of the researchers (again, especially
young researchers);
• an inapt fit between research question, researcher, and (type of) GTM; and/or
• a combination of the above.
Because qualitative research is strongly context related and because—as Suddaby (2006)
reminds us to constantly remind ourselves—we ‘‘are only human and that what [we]
observe is a function of both who [we] are and what [we] hope to see’’ (p. 635), we chose
to identify and discuss these malaises using a concrete and very personal experience, on
the one hand, and a walkabout through published GTM critiques, on the other. In the

concluding appreciation, we make some suggestions, both for the practice of GTM in
business research and for further research on the subject.
GTM Quality Malaises in Practice: An Example
The example study used here (Fendt, 2005) deals with the question of how chief
executive officers (CEOs) cope with the multiple and often conflicting demands placed
on them in postmerger situations. Such a study is complex because it concerns situations
with a large number of interrelated variables and events that are unique and irreproduci-
ble and that take place in a fast-changing context (Remenyi, Williams, Money, & Swartz,
1998).
Both authors of this article are in their 50s. The first (‘‘Jackie’’) undertook the project
as a doctoral candidate. Before taking a sabbatical to write a dissertation, she was a rare
female CEO of an important Swiss company and later of Swiss Expo, a fair-cum-
exhibition that every quarter of a century mobilizes the entire society to reflect on itself
and look into the future. In these capacities, she became a media personality and had
extensive contacts with the business elite of her region. During the later years as an
executive, she kept a detailed professional diary, interspersing accounts of her dealings
with reflections of both artistic and intellectual nature, complementing her search for
increased understanding of the human and organizational nature with copious but dis-
persed readings. The dissertation was, in her mind, a time to order, systematize, and make
sense of her experience. As is much too often the case, especially in continental Europe,
Jackie was pretty much left alone during the first phase of her research, which involved
the choice of methodology and details of the study design. She took methodology semi-
nars, and she did consult sporadically with several prominent scholars, receiving much
valuable guidance and encouragement. But at no point did anybody other than Jackie
focus on the whole picture. The second author of this article (‘‘Wlad’’) joined the process
as a dissertation adviser at a later stage, when the extensive fieldwork was all but com-
pleted, as was most of the enormously time-consuming process of data coding and reduc-
tion. Jackie had also covered a prodigious amount of academic literature, including
literature in fields not hitherto associated with her subject. In the first and as yet tentative
meeting to discuss eventual collaboration, it was clear to Wlad that some broad conclu-
sions from the study had already formed in Jackie’s mind, although much work was
needed to produce a coherent manuscript that would be an authentic contribution to the
advancement of the field. We tell the story of this research in two voices: that of Wlad,
the adviser, and that of Jackie, the candidate.
The Adviser
I was looking forward to working with Jackie. Because of her former membership in
the ‘‘Swiss CEO tribe’’ she got extensive and privileged access to CEOs and other top
managers of some of the largest and most emblematic companies in Switzerland and
Germany. With her good reputation for honesty and discretion, and as a female, Jackie
managed in her conversations to approach some fairly sensitive and intimate issues. She is

a good observer and derived considerable information from tacit or intangible elements in
her interactions with interview respondents. She also gained abundant access to confiden-
tial information. I quickly sensed that I was dealing with exceptional empirical material,
especially in that Swiss and German companies are not as well studied as those in some
other countries. I was curious to have a peek at the material and was looking forward to
learning more about the subject. Jackie herself is interesting and articulate, and as a man-
agement scholar I appreciated the opportunity for in-depth interaction with somebody with
so much managerial experience. In retrospect, I had a small grounded inquiry of my own,
with Jackie as ‘‘the field.’’
I decided that under the circumstances I must adopt the posture of someone ‘‘jumping
on a train in motion’’ and that I should concentrate on assisting Jackie to get the most out
of work already done, resisting my natural tendency of going back to the drawing board.
We both decided to spend a lot of time working together, partly because much of the case
material was in German—a language unknown to me—and therefore it had to be talked
out rather than read. For more than a year we met once a month, usually for the better part
of the day, sometimes longer when I went and visited Jackie at her winery. We exchanged
drafts and had phone conversations, and I sometimes had a hard time keeping up with the
pace of work. The amount of interaction was much higher than in typical doctoral
research. It also allowed for a great deal of unstructured, unfocused interaction, and this
chatter included many broader methodological or philosophical discussions, which led to
this article.
I was very relaxed about my responsibility, having no doubt that the outcome would be
positive, given the nature of the empirical material, the amount of literature covered,
Jackie’s work ethic, and her ability to express herself in a cogent and attractive manner. I
saw, however, considerable anxiety in Jackie, a tendency to self-limitation, being too care-
ful, weighing her words, and being a lot more tentative about her conclusions than she
should have been, in my opinion. Later, when we developed trust in each other and friend-
ship, it became apparent that Jackie had a mental image of the doctoral examining com-
mittee as some sort of a positivist ‘‘orthodoxy board’’ and therefore was extremely
reluctant to depart from what she perceived as the prescribed research methodology, as
idealized in numerous treaties on the subject. She perceived me at first as part of that
orthodoxy, and only with time did she open up, and I discovered that she had thought criti-
cally about many relevant methodological issues, read extensively on them, and reached
conclusions that I often shared, but she suppressed her doubts in the belief that this was
required of people in her position.
I had general sympathy toward GTM for three philosophical and personal reasons. First,
I came of intellectual and political age at a time and in places that were permeated with
aprioristic, frequently dogmatic, theories that were too simple to account for the complex-
ity of the world as I experienced or observed it, and in extreme cases were enforced with
brutality that did a lot of harm to organizations or entire societies. GTM offered a nice
contrast, with its pragmatic invitation to ‘‘listen to the situation’’ or ‘‘let the data speak’’
and avoid excessive generalizations. Second, I found attractive the notion of a broad inter-
disciplinary intellectual exploration. I knew that subordinating such an exploration to the
goal of understanding a specific empirical situation sharpens the focus and increases moti-
vation that one may lack in an otherwise pleasurable, ordinary browsing of the literature.

Third, I did believe that when focusing on a concrete and limited situation it is more plau-
sible to synthesize multiple understandings into a meaningful stance than when pursuing
an overly ambitious goal of developing a general theory.
I was initially trained in continental Europe as a mathematician and a scientist, becom-
ing without knowing a positivist par excellence. For my doctoral studies in management,
I then went to the United States, where greater consciousness of philosophy of science
made a pragmatist out of me. I spent my career moving back and forth between academia
and practice, including management. I maintain a healthy respect for the positivist insis-
tence on rigorously structuring and carefully controlling data collection, including inter-
views with human subjects, and on separating opinion from fact, but I see them as only
one of the elements of a dialectical process in which truth and objectivity are arrived at
by confronting pluralistic views and, most important, by practical testing of ideas and
their consequences. I therefore tend to evaluate a single piece of research in terms of its
honesty and its usefulness as a contribution to the scientific dialogue. Furthermore, I sim-
ply do not believe that impartiality in the kind of research conducted by Jackie can go
too far. Her material was unique because it was she that did the study, and it was of great
interest to see how a former CEO deals with the stories of other CEOs, albeit with great
rigor and honesty, clearly separating unassailable facts from opinions and emotions. I
therefore appreciated GTM for providing tools that would allow pushing impartiality rea-
sonably far, but I was skeptical of their orthodox application. I was concerned about
unrealistic expectations of objectivity, worrying that they would take Jackie out of the
loop to the extent that the study would loose much of its value. I also thought that some
of the procedures for coding and reducing interview data were too time consuming and
that one could trust Jackie to have heard what was said, without going through this excru-
ciatingly painful process. I believed—and still do—that GTM is a sensible method that
should not be treated as a positivist fig leaf and that one should boldly assume one’s phi-
losophical stance. I also thought that the stance assumed should be Jackie’s, not mine,
being fully prepared, as I often am, to enjoy and appreciate work that goes against my
notions of philosophy of science. Looking at bright, sensible, erudite, and sensitive
Jackie, I would ask her, ‘‘Did you really need to go through all of that to know what the
interview was about? Were you just recording a transcript, or were you also listening,
having a conversation? And then, to have another person go over all of this for a second
time . . . to what purpose?’’
I got passionate about the subject and started to systematically broach it with colleagues
and acquaintances—all engaged in active academic research—who used in their doctoral
research some form of GTM with data-coding and data-reduction techniques. I favored
informal settings and loosely structured conversations, bringing out ‘‘war memories’’
types of narratives. Although all contacts were positive about their research, and generally
appreciated GTM, they all had nightmarish memories of the time spent on formal data
analysis, some telling all kinds of humorous horror stories, for example, about various
forms of ‘‘favors trading’’ in which they had to engage in order to recruit a ‘‘victim’’ to do
the ‘‘interrater checking’’ (Schwandt, 1997). All respondents admitted that they had
reached their conclusions before engaging the procedure, although some defended the
need for a formulistic approach to achieve ‘‘scientific rigor’’ and ‘‘objectivity.’’ The
advantage of this kind of informal survey of people that one knows is that I had enough

information about each respondent to project in my own mind a rich image of how he or
she would behave in an interview. I observed that the more the respondent had a natural
ease in interpersonal relations and/or the more life experience under his or her belt (not
necessarily related to age but rather to accumulated human experience) the less he or she
felt dependent on tools to reach conclusions. Not wanting to rely exclusively on subjective
accounts and my mental projections, I asked the respondents if they had ever used such
methods again since completion of their doctoral research (at least 3 years). The answer
was always negative, although some indicated (unconvincingly, to me) that they might
consider using it in the future.
These results may even be part of the plan of one of the inventors, since a repeated
argument by Glaser is that novice researchers are best suited to doing GTM because their
observation processes are not yet formed (Gibson, Gregory, & Robinson, 2005). At times
of scholarly passion, I would tell Jackie cruel and crude things, such as ‘‘this method is a
crutch for people who can’t stand on their own’’ or ‘‘this is for babes, and you are not a
babe any more.’’ These were fortunately fleeting moments, and we settled for a more
rational and systematic exploration after all.
Another impasse was the use of Jackie’s diary. She wanted to tell part of her story based
on her observations during the years spent as member of the CEO tribe. She thought of
producing some ethnographic tales to complement the more systematic and structured
interviews with company executives conducted under GTM guidelines for the specific
purpose of her doctoral research. But she was worried about not meeting (positivist)
requirements of rigor and objectivity, especially that as a member of the tribe she could
hardly pretend to be an ethnographer at the same time. Because of the language barrier, I
could not peek directly into the diary, so I asked Jackie to develop one tale as a test. Upon
seeing the results, I energetically undertook to convince Jackie to follow her intuition and
to include the ethnographic loop in her thesis. I argued quite passionately, with statements
such as, ‘‘Malinowski would not turn down one of his Argonauts of the Western Pacific if
he found one capable of writing an academic self-reflective account of his experience’’
and that ‘‘it would be a crime against knowledge to withhold this material.’’ I perceived
Jackie as an honest researcher, giving her data a chance to contradict as well as affirm her
beliefs, and thought that any jury would find her credible based on the way in which she
presented her material. This is the simple criterion I use in assessing historical or anthro-
pological work that I read from time to time: ‘‘Is the author giving a balanced and critical
account of the subject, or is she advancing a particular agenda, selecting facts in support
of her argument?’’ As an experienced reader I could usually tell rather easily, and that is
what I would do as a member of a doctoral examining board. Furthermore, I thought that
the inclusion of a more rigorous loop based on GTM would give Jackie, in the eyes of any
positivist members of the jury, license to engage in more tentative work. This point is not
uninteresting: Scholars with a positivist stance (some of whom may still dismiss qualita-
tive research as ‘‘just talking to people’’) may indeed be more comfortable on dissertation
panels if and when confronted with GTM, rather than other interpretive methods, due to
GTM’s effusive rigor and objectification. This is for now not much more than speculation,
although somewhat substantiated by coffee break and other postdefense discussions
between panelists and advisers. Obviously, supporters of qualitative research would like
to see doctoral defense panelists embrace GTM research for other reasons than GTM’s

positivist characteristics, but given the relative shortage of qualitative researchers (com-
pared with quantitative) this advantage of GTM, if ratified, is not minor.
All these observations, experiences, and discussions led to an intensive methodological
inquiry into GTM that went well beyond what would be the usual case in dissertation
research. Toward the end of the process, Jackie identified and researched most of the
sources of methodological malaise within her work. The story is taken over in her voice.
The Candidate
Eventually the dissertation included material from the diary I had kept as a CEO. In
a first research loop, I distilled this ethnographic data into seven ‘‘impressionist tales’’
(Van Maanen, 1988) illustrating various facets of the merger-and-acquisition game and its
principal actors. These tales and their moral—a subsequent in-depth discussion of the
major issues at hand in the form of a conversation between data and literature—allowed
me to focus on the rites, practices, power relationships, kinship patterns, and, simply, ways
of life of CEOs. Based on this ethnographic excursion, I pursued the research journey by
interviewing a number of CEOs directly. For this second research loop, I chose GTM,
combined with the case study approach, with the following justification:
• ‘‘A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon

within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not
clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’’ (Yin, 1984, p. 23).
• Eisenhardt (1989), too, recommends the case study method for explorative, descriptive,
and explanatory questions, especially for new subject areas in which theory is scarce and
new content and a fresh perspective are sought. This described exactly the status and
object of my inquiry.
• GTM’s central objective is stated to be theory building rather than theory testing. This
seemed appropriate, given the lack of a theoretical body on executive leadership and
learning in transitional organizations. I appreciated an inductive approach by which theory
would emerge from the experiential accounts of the executives themselves.
• In this interpretive method of inquiry, discourses, gestures, and actions are all considered
primary to the experience. This was important, as I expected that executives would not
necessarily articulate all their experiences, thoughts, and feelings. I chose GTM, which
promised to allow for a wider range of evidence, over research methods that rely solely
on descriptive accounts (e.g., phenomenology).
• GTM gave clear guidelines both for the conduct of the research and for interpretation of
evidence, which offered me some comfort.
The strengths of this approach are said to lie in its depth of inquiry and its unimpaired
interplay between theory and empirical data. It permits an understanding of the dynamics of
particular situations and is claimed to lead to new theoretical approaches that represent, as a
rule, empirically valid hypotheses or theories (Eisenhardt, 1989). Because of the abundance
of data, weaknesses include the difficulty to generalize results (McClintock, Brannon, &
Maynard-Moody, 1979) and the risk of overly complex theories. Furthermore, because the
results are usually very specific, there is a risk of much analytical depth but little synthetic
height, which can lead to an ‘‘atheoretical, status-quo-analytical [empiricism]’’ (Backhaus
& Plinke, 1977).

To avoid these pitfalls, I chose a longitudinal, exploratory, multiple-case study design

with triangulation, and I observed the criteria of reliability and validity in a systematic
and documented approach throughout all phases: preparation, evidence collection, evi-
dence analysis, and evaluation. This study is longitudinal because the temporality permits
observation of phenomena throughout a variety of contextual situations and permits a
more solid confirmation of their existence and a clearer understanding of their nature;
exploratory because situations are explored in which the studied phenomena have ‘‘no
clear, single set of outcomes’’ (Yin, 1982); and multiple-case because it adds confidence
to findings if a replication logic is followed (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I tested both lit-
eral replication logic (similar results to previous cases) and theoretical replication (con-
trasting results but for predictable reasons). I addressed reliability by a systematic
documentation of the research process and by a longitudinal approach over a period of
more than 2 years. I addressed communicative validity by carefully constructing chains of
proof and by having my constructs checked by an independent researcher (interrater
checking) and by respondents (respondent checking). I mirrored back to the interviewees
my ‘‘proposals of reality’’ derived from analysis, and I incorporated their feedbacks in the
results. Furthermore, all analysis and interpretation data were given to a fellow doctoral
student to ensure consistency of interpretation and to reduce subjectivity. I did not seek
total coherence between my viewpoint and those of the interviewees, but the differences
in interpretation were made visible to the reader. I addressed internal validity with suitable
analytical instruments and careful documentation of the process, and I sought external
validity with replication (several case studies) and triangulation with the ethnographic
observation.
I chose 10 postmerger cases by theoretical sampling and described them in terms of their
nature, location, merger-and-acquisition motives, postmerger status, and the fieldwork con-
ducted. The main research focus was on the CEO. I interviewed each executive twice, with a
time interval of no less than 6 months between the two formal narrative interviews. To
reduce subjectivity, another member of each CEO’s management team was also interviewed,
also twice, with a time interval of no less than 6 months. The two-interview approach gave
the study a longitudinal dimension, permitting verification of emerging concepts against
possible changes in behavior over time due to learning, context, or mood. It also allowed me
to break the ice and get very candid self-assessments from the interviewees, including a
glimpse into highly personal matters.
This process resulted in a Herculean mountain of data: transcripts from 40 very long
interviews in three languages; detailed notes from 117 formal meetings and several hun-
dred informal encounters with leading executives of the 10 case companies; and notes
from observational and documentary evidence because I gained good access to confiden-
tial corporate material. These data were then coded and iteratively abstracted. Any theore-
tical significance was explored and contrasted with available theoretical frameworks. The
data were subsequently developed into concepts and higher order categories and their
respective characteristics and dimensions. These findings were in turn related to other fac-
tors that had been identified as being important and that had been recorded throughout the
process, such as a number of sociocultural conditions, personal backgrounds, and current
contextual conditions. Finally, the concepts and categories were incorporated into a theo-
retical framework.

At the onset of work a number of problems arose. The first had to do with the GTM
recommendation to bring no extant literature to the project before the fieldwork so as not
to start the field research with preconceived ideas and bias, but only in a second step, as
additional data, once the primary theoretical framework had emerged from rigorous data
collection and analysis (Glaser, 1978, 1992a). This was simply impossible because it was
my extensive search for answers in both practice and theory that had given rise to the
research intent in the first place. Fortunately, other writers on GTM allow for work to begin
with a literature overview, which, to avoid bias, is to be performed very widely, covering
several academic disciplines (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2003; Strauss, 1987;
Strauss & Corbin, 1990). I settled for this approach, and this resulted in a huge theoretical
assessment condensed into some 150 tightly written pages on the state of the art, drawing
from eight major fields of management theory and a dozen subfields. It is unclear if and
how much this wide literature search did directly serve the study, but it certainly provided
me with a solid knowledge base when ping-ponging iteratively between data and literature
in the later stages of the project. It also lengthened the study process by about 1 year.
A second malaise was the severe admonition for neutrality, impartiality, and dispassion
(Clarke, 2003; Glaser, 1978). How could I possibly be dispassionate when it was passion
that had brought me to inquire into the subject in the first place? And how could I be neu-
tral? I had just spent more than 10 years living with the tribe of CEOs and observing them.
And, if by some extraordinary effort I achieved such a state of neutrality, what good
would it be since it would come at the price of abjuring to the rich experience I could
bring to the table? Obviously, in any inquiry the sheer statement of the nature of the pro-
blem under investigation is a choice, and so are the cases, the methods, the respondents,
the interview questions, and so on. To write anything is inevitably to include or exclude,
that is, to be partial no matter how much one wishes to address or close off possibilities.
What’s more, it seemed that the credibility of social inquiry itself was challenged by this
demand of self-effacement. Is not social constructionist inquiry about the interpretation of
meanings that we read into the encounters and observations made?
I understood that the call for neutrality, impartiality, and dispassion was a statement of
an ideal, not a realistic expectation. I tried to approximate this ideal by explaining in great
detail the epistemological and ontological stance from which I would work and laying out
my prior experience and knowledge. I made an effort to give the reader the possibility to
follow my reasoning process and adopt it or not. In the same vein, I distrusted a priori my
own reasoning process by subjecting any conclusions that emerged to a rigorous argument
of the converse. Also, I carefully documented the complete methodological procedure and
provided bountiful procedural examples—so much so, that such explanation finally made
up some 80 tightly written pages of the 500-page volume.
Still, some discomfort with the question of determining quality in the research remained.
In the encounters and interviews, some interpretations were inevitably shaped, and inter-
mediary conclusions came to the foreground. I suppressed such early sense-making
moments as I subordinated myself scrupulously to the imposed coding and fracturing
process. In retrospect, this was a more-rigorous-than-thou effort to strictly adhere to the
methodological prescription, probably typical of scholars that are new to academic research
and want to make sure to do it the ‘‘right’’ way. As is suggested by Glaser and Strauss
(1967) in their original work, I ‘‘memoed’’ observational data and many of my early ideas

and interpretations and consulted them at later stages, but much was also lost in a some-
times superhuman (one is tempted to say ‘‘unhuman’’) self-effacing disciplinary effort to
go through the motions of the data-coding and fracturing procedure that was meant to ‘‘free
the researcher from description . . . forcing interpretation to higher levels of abstraction’’
(Strauss, 1987, p. 55). The excruciatingly long and mind-deafening exercise did allow me
to eventually come up with concepts, clusters of concepts, relationships between them, and
a cogent theory.
Yet, the feeling of comfort that the choice of GTM had somehow promised did not
install itself. On the contrary, certain questions would not go away, namely, if by opting
for apparent epistemic rigor some essential findings had not been sacrificed. What if in an
excessive preoccupation for procedure some of the value of the interview data had been
displaced from the ends to the means? What would have been the understanding and inter-
pretation of the data at hand had a clear and plain narrative been chosen without the detour
via some objectifying procedural alchemy? By subjecting to the unemotional fracturing
and coding process, I had denied myself the opportunity of simple understanding and
interpretation, of direct validation, and I had abandoned the original voice of both the
respondents and myself. Despite intensive note taking, doubts remained as to whether I
captured the enormous richness of the interview situations, with their long pauses, their
embarrassed laughs, their irritated insistence, their intonations, the various language
games, the mess or order on the desks, and so on. Did I loose valuable information
through the radical fragmentation and coding procedures? What if the best had been lost?
I was haunted by a futile wish to ‘‘go back and do it all over again, differently, and com-
pare’’ although I was fully aware that ‘‘it’’ would not be comparable because neither the
respondents nor I had been left unchanged by the experience, nor did the situation remain
unchanged. Eventually, with encouragement from Wlad, I addressed this problem with
inclusion of extensive verbatim quotes from the interviews, thus lengthening the manu-
script, but hopefully making it more valuable to a reader. I lost, however, the belief that
the ideal of neutrality, impartiality, and dispassion was truly part of my value system.
In the same vein, I had problems with the validation process that called for data codifica-
tion logic and coherence to be reviewed by a second noninvolved academic (interrater
checking) and with the interview partners themselves (respondent checking). How could
somebody who was not there when the words were spoken make a reasonable judgment
about whether a transcribed interview line was correctly summarized in a particular code?
How had that line been spoken, how had it been meant: in the first degree or ironically; hesi-
tantly or with determination? What about the fact that the respondent turned away from me
while he spoke these words—or smiled meaningfully? Furthermore, what could a respon-
dent verify? He had said something, which was then transcribed and coded, but what about
what he did not say, and how he did not say it, and perhaps said later, in other words? I
sometimes felt reluctant to forsake the control over the situational understanding and inter-
pretation, to delegate it to some methodological procedure. To say the least, these validation
sessions provided me and my dialogue partners with some lively and inspiring debates.
I also had a certain philosophical malaise with the terminology of GTM. A ‘‘theory’’
that was ‘‘grounded’’ in the data would ‘‘emerge’’ or be ‘‘discovered.’’ All these terms
implied that there was an objective, underpinning truth lying somewhere in this mountain
of data. This again contradicted my own constructionist epistemological stance. It also, as

I understood it, contradicted the very raison d’être of the authors of GTM, namely, to offer
an alternative to the testing of some ‘‘objective grand theory.’’ This became irritating to
me, given that the method also promised to make qualitative inquiry legitimate, to stand
and speak up for the validity of phenomenological, interpretative, and hermeneutic
research. The results that emerged from my research were clearly constructed by me, how-
ever carefully I documented the process and however much I checked the original data
and the different abstraction levels with members and respondents. There was no doubt
in my mind that the constructed truth was idiosyncratic and that any other researcher
going on the same journey was bound to discover another truth. And, if so, what was
wrong with that? Were these formulas and scientific-sounding, objectifying terms simply
remnants of a time when qualitative inquiry needed justification in a positivist-dominated
environment—or did they stand for an epistemic inconsistency in the method itself?
Similarly, I had some doubts as to whether the results emerging from my research quali-
fied as theory. However, I decided that they did, given the wide plurality of definitions of
theory in qualitative research that include explanation, argument, reflection, orienting prin-
ciples, crafted knowledge, epistemological presuppositions, and more (e.g., Cicourel, 1979;
Martindale, 1979; Thomas & James, 2006). Wlad and I had more serious doubts about the
GTM claim that such theory would be built on by others, that it represented a building
block to some grand unified theory of management. The state of management literature
does not support such a claim: Many articles based on limited empirical evidence end with
invitations to other researchers to further test emerged theories in other circumstances, but
far fewer articles result from authors’ having taken up such an invitation from others.
In summary, the major malaises with determining quality in GTM research that were
encountered (summarized in Table 1) were plentiful, and honest efforts to find satisfactory
answers were not always fruitful. In the next step, answers from critical GTM literature
are sought.
GTM Quality Malaises in the Literature

A tour d’horizon through qualitative inquiry literature showed that such malaises with
the concept of quality in GTM are not uncommon. Some scholars have to a greater or les-
ser extent moved away from the original Glaser-Strauss and Corbin versions of the
method and suggested modifications toward more constructivism (Charmaz, 1995a, 2000,
2006; Clarke, 2003; Seale, 1999) or critical realism (Downward, Finch, & Ramsay, 2002;
Yeung, 1997); others argue with various degrees of exasperation for more positivism
(Kock, McQueen, & Scott, 1997) or for more ‘‘regrounding’’ (Bryant, 2002, 2003), or
they contest the raison d’être of GTM altogether (Thomas & James, 2006).
Others argue that GTM fails to address such issues as the theory-laden nature of observa-
tion and the nature of categorization in science (Dey, 1999, 2004). Some regret that the
method oversimplifies complex meanings and interrelationships in data (Thomas & James,
2006) and that it favors the immediately apparent at the cost of the tissue of structural fea-
tures of social situations (Layder, 1993), and some recommend that GTM be taken as a ‘‘set
of general principles and heuristic devices rather than formulaic rules’’ (Atkinson, Coffey,
& Delamont, 2003). Layder (1993) regrets that GTM constrains analysis by focusing too

Table 1
Key Malaises With Grounded Theory Method (GTM)
GTM Claims/Malaises Critical Questions/Comments
Quality Is GTM really a qualitative inquiry method? Or do the very procedures that are
meant to provide epistemic security risk, distort, or even block qualitative
reflection and interpretation? How can quality be brought forward in GTM?
How to deal with Memoing is the GTM technique that is meant to take care of observational data
nonverbal and ideas as they strike. In the original Glaser and Strauss (1967) approach,
communication, the intensive use of memos is highly recommended, but the bringing together
environmental of memos and coded data to generate a whole is not solved satisfactorily.
observations, and so on The fact is, observational data and first ideas often remain unconsidered.
Support issues: Doctoral students, at least in continental Europe, are often left quite alone
researcher’s isolation, during the conceptual phases of their research work. What is meant as a help,
dangers of namely, the rigid procedural guidelines of GTM, can turn into a hindrance,
overobjectification, and namely, when such researchers grasp at them wanting to do it right, tend
drift to positivism toward self-limitation, and suppress interpretations, ideas, and conclusions.
Neutral, dispassionate role If the very validity of qualitative inquiry is interpretation and understanding of
of researcher, tabula the social world, why should the researcher neutralize himself or herself and
rasa approach, blank be reduced to the role of an accountant of a mechanistic procedure?
slate Similarly, if the validity of qualitative inquiry is interpretation and
understanding, why should the researcher suppress his or her knowledge
and experience?
Cost-benefit view Does the end really justify the enormous means deployed, both in the wide
literature search (to avoid bias) and, especially, in the detailed and
highly repetitive, more-rigorous-than-thou data-coding procedure?
Grounded, emergence, Are the terms grounded and emergence, which imply that GTM will bring to
discovery, theory the surface an objective truth at the bottom of the data, really appropriate
in relation to an interpretive phenomenological method informed by a
social constructionist epistemology? Similarly, how can a method that
claims to be interpretative pretend at discovering theory, implying that
an objectively imputable, stable theory is waiting to be discovered?
Validation, generalization Could it be that certain validation efforts, especially respondent checking,
could falsify data instead of validating them? Qualitative inquiry is
concerned with what actors say but also with how they say it, and last
but not least, with what they do not say.
Theory pretense, grand Does GTM really yield theory, or does it offer a narrative, that is,
unified theory pretense understanding and interpretation? And if it yields theory, what kind of
theory? Do studies of this kind really build on each other? Or is the idea
of contributing building blocks to a grand unified theory of management
no more than a meaningless ritual, a remnant from grand positivistic
scientific visions of a hundred years?
GTM best suited for The fathers of GTM suggest that GTM best fits inexperienced researchers who
inexperienced need and welcome rigid procedural guidelines. Could it be that the very
researcher (Glaser) strengths of GTM, namely, its excellent explanatory capacity of behavioral
issues and its applicability in practice, could remain insufficiently exploited
if more experienced (regarding research practice and life itself) scholars shy
away from it due to the very same rigid procedural guidelines?
If you ‘‘just do’’ GTM We regret the Glaserian reluctance to allow scholars to develop GTM further
(and stop criticizing it), and such suggestions as that GTM should be left ‘‘unpolluted.’’ We believe
it will work best that critical appraisal is a form of appreciation and a means for authors
(Glaser, 1998) and the community to advance personally and scientifically.

much on procedure and too little on interpretation and suggests that it be guided by data
rather than limited by it. For Robrecht (1995), too, the proposed sampling procedures push
researchers ‘‘to look for data, rather than look at data’’ (p. 171) and deflect attention from
the data toward tools and procedures. All these scholars, as well as Schatzman (1991), pro-
pose alternative approaches recommending a natural analytic process. Charmaz (2000), who
generally speaks of GTMs in the plural and particularly distinguishes between objectivist
and constructivist concepts of GTM, attributes to the former a use of ‘‘awkward scientist
terms and clumsy categories’’ and points out that this may lead to ‘‘an overly complex archi-
tecture that obscures experience’’ (p. 525). Locke (2001) reflects on the usefulness or not of
GTM in modernist, interpretative, and postmodernist research paradigms of management
studies. Urquhart (2002) also distinguishes different GTMs, labeling them positivist and
interpretivist. It seems that the apparent comfort of applying scientific method and thereby
hoping to achieve epistemic solidity is bought at the price of forsaking some of the finest
assets a researcher has to offer: the unfiltered capacity of reflection. Many scholars describe
the difficulty of grasping everyday understanding and emphasize the active and honest inter-
pretative role this requires the researcher to assume. Geertz (1973), in his seminal essay
‘‘Thick Description,’’ presents analysis as the sorting out of
structures of signification—what Ryle called established codes, a somewhat misleading expres-
sion, for it makes the enterprise sound too much like that of the cipher clerk when it is much
more like that of the literary critic—and determining their social ground and import. (p. 9)
Berlin (1998) seconds when he calls ‘‘magical divination’’ the act of understanding others
and describes it as a kind of automatic integration of a very large number of highly fugi-
tive and pluralist data, difficult to catch by language. By wanting to ‘‘go beyond’’ good
narrative and offering more than sound ideography—the very legitimacy of hermeneutics
(Gadamer, 1972)—the narrative is thus subjected to an ‘‘unhermeneutical approach to her-
meneutics’’ (Sherman, 1988, p. 395) as data are pushed through a set of fractioning and
objectifying procedures that are supposed to transform the data into some kind of induc-
tive theory. These neutralizing procedures seem to be an attempt to duplicate the neutral
controls in natural sciences in the hope that they would yield the same objectivity. But
procedural objectivity does not yield ontological objectivity because ‘‘consensus achieved
through procedural objectivity provides no purchase on reality. It merely demonstrates
that people can agree’’ (Eisner, 1993, p. 53). The claims of disinterestedness and objectiv-
ity of the researcher are increasingly criticized, and some profiled exponents of GTM have
turned away from it and encourage researchers to be ‘‘active agents and not ‘passive reci-
pients of larger social forces’’’ (Charmaz, 2006). Fish (1994) calls it ‘‘zany’’ to pretend
that one can ‘‘in some way step back from, rise above, get to the side of your beliefs and
convictions,’’ and for Charmaz and Mitchell (1996) the ‘‘myth of silent authorship is false
but reassuring.’’
Conflicting Approaches to GTM

In fairness, it must be noted that in their original program for GTM, Glaser and Strauss
(1967) called for a flexible and undogmatic application of the method.

Our principal aim is to stimulate other theorists to codify and publish their own methods for
generating theory . . . . In our own attempt to discuss methods and processes for discovering
grounded theory, we shall, for the most part, keep the discussion open minded, to stimulate
rather than freeze thinking about the topic. (pp. 8-9)
Strauss and Corbin (1998) later reaffirmed this view, pointing out that grounded theory is
‘‘both a science and an art’’ and that ‘‘these procedures were designed not to be followed
dogmatically but rather to be used creatively and flexibly by researchers as they deem
appropriate’’ (p. 14). What renders the discussion of GTM even more difficult is that, as
described by Locke (2001), there has been a conflict over this issue between the two
fathers of GTM, leading to a split, basically on the grounds of theory forcing versus theory
emergence. Essentially, Glaser (1998) persists in demanding the researcher’s uncondi-
tional submersion in the data so as to let theory emerge and insists on keeping tabs on all
preconceptions and/or avoid them in the first place. Strauss and Corbin have developed
the coding system further so as to take the researcher systematically through every stage
of the research. Both stances are not unproblematic: Glaser’s approach allows for more
creativity but bears the risk of lack of coherence and focus, whereas Strauss and Corbin’s
approach bears the risk of formulism and inflexibility. Many scholars in various disci-
plines have a habit of refining their original ideas through a series of subsequent publica-
tions and welcome contributions by other scholars that help develop their ideas further.
Locke (2001), Goulding (2002), and Charmaz (e.g., 2006) are just three scholars who have
studied the above controversy and made comprehensive propositions to advance the GTM
discussion. Despite this evidence of a lively debate on the subject of GTM, Glaser’s
repeated public polemics with critics contributed to the candidate’s impression of a well-
entrenched orthodoxy. The reaction of Glaser is difficult to understand both in the light of
his explicit invitation to ‘‘keep the discussion open minded’’ and also because it is a fine
tribute to the original fathers that 40 years later their ideas stimulate so much discussion
and influence the development of methods in organizational science. As pointed out by
Locke (2001), most researchers today do not apply GTM in its pure or orthodox form.
What is important is that the stated differences are understood early in the research pro-
cess so that informed choices can be made. Such choices can and must then be described
so as to avoid confusion over terminology and procedures.
Cost-Benefit View
Scholars rarely directly address the problem of the enormous workload that GTM repre-
sents in its orthodox form, but they generally regret the complicated, procedural, and
somewhat mechanistic approach. Charmaz (2000) suggests a ‘‘simplified, constructivist
version of grounded theory . . . [with] emphases on action and process and, from [a] con-
structivist point of view, meaning and emergence within symbolic interactionism’’
(p. 514). Many suggest the method should move away from its all-too-positivist proce-
dures. Dey (1999) proposes to take a ‘‘middle way,’’ an ‘‘amended . . . realist approach’’
(Layder, 1993), an ‘‘adaptive theory’’ (Haig, 1996; Layder, 1998), a ‘‘middle ground
between postmodernism and positivism’’ (Charmaz, 2000, p. 510).

In his classic treatise on scientific method, Ackoff (1962) points out that that ‘‘common
sense’’ and ‘‘scientific’’ inquiries are extreme poles of a continuum defined by the degree
of control that goes into the inquiry. How much control is worth putting into an inquiry?
The answer depends on the comparison of costs and benefits derived from more control.
And that, we posit, depends on who the inquirer is and what the issue is. To determine if a
comatose victim of an accident is dead or alive, we tend to value the opinion of an experi-
enced medical doctor over results achieved by a chimpanzee trained to use a pulse meter.
On the other hand, the use of a monkey rather than a veterinarian to remove dead birds in a
chicken farm may be a perfectly judicious choice. The numerous benefits of GTM have
been outlined above. With the cost-benefit view, we suggest careful weighing of resources
required to implement some of the more burdensome techniques and considering as an
alternative more simplified approaches (e.g., Charmaz, 2000). We posit, in line with our set
of arguments about the role of the researcher, that the issues of when saturation is reached
during the iterative data collection and analysis process, how coding should be done, how
much interrater checking is important for quality, when it is useful to count, and so on,
should be approached and settled with pragmatism. It seems to us that indeterminate, rigor-
ous techniques of data coding and reduction are justified only when there is doubt as to
what the data say and if what they say is important. This is compatible with pragmatism,
which the inventors of GTM claim as their philosophical underpinning (Locke, 2001).
Researchers must weigh whether their conclusions are likely to be useful and credible to
readers. If the respondent says that something is black, if it matters, if the researcher asked
the question in various ways and always got the same answer, if there is nothing in other
data to indicate that the respondent may act as if the thing were not black, let alone if there
is no objective evidence of ‘‘unblackness,’’ then it is safe for the researcher to conclude
without any further ado that the respondent believes that the thing is black. In any event, as
Suddaby (2006) points out, GTM ‘‘should not be used to test hypotheses about reality, but,
rather, to make statements about how actors interpret reality’’ (p. 635).
Grounded and Discovery

Such terms as grounded and discovery of theory irritate in relation to an interpretivist-
phenomenological method informed by a social constructionist epistemology. These
terms, and to a lesser extent the term emerging, imply that there is an objective truth
grounded in the data, an objective theory waiting to be discovered, that GTM will bring to
the surface. These terms reveal some tacit assumptions and expectations that disclose
grounded theory ‘‘to be merely part of another foundationalist enterprise’’ while at the
same time wanting the ‘‘comfortable feeling which comes from denial of the arrogance of
foundationalism and essentialism’’ (Thomas & James, 2006). Gadamer rejects the idea of
pure induction. For him, interpretation is to a certain extent deduced from those disdained
‘‘a priori assumptions’’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 6).
After all, the researcher has made a decision that the research project is worth his or her
while. Meaning exists: . . . at the beginning of any . . . research as well as at the end: as the
choice of the theme to be investigated, the awakening of the desire to investigate, as the gain-
ing of the new problematic. (Gadamer, 1972, p. 97)

Theory Pretense
Similarly, many scholars decline to accept the methods claim of induction: Haig (1996)
regrets its naive Baconian inductivism. Thomas and James (2006) state that GTM
‘‘depends upon inappropriate models of induction and asserts from them equally inap-
propriate claims to explanation and prediction’’ and suggest, citing Peirce, that everyday
induction be called ‘‘abduction’’ and expand on this critique and in particular on the dis-
tinction drawn between ‘‘looser and tighter kinds of induction.’’ Suddaby also cites Peirce
to argue with him that both induction and deduction become necessarily sterile in their
purest application and that a combined, hypothesis-explanatory approach seemed more
likely ‘‘the logical operation which introduces any idea’’ (Peirce, 1903, p. 216, cited in
Suddaby, 2006, p. 639). Does GTM really yield theory or does it offer interpretation? And
if it is theory, then of what kind is it? Many scholars have dwelled on the theoretical
notion in grounded theory in some detail. Miller and Fredericks (1999) suggest that GTM
can be seen as a ‘‘logic of discovery’’ or as ‘‘accomodationist or predictivist’’ or, finally,
as a version of ‘‘inference to the best explanation’’ (p. 539) and state that GTM is ‘‘basi-
cally a way of making an inductive argument dressed up in a new label’’ (p. 548).
Thomas and James (2006) state that theory can be seen as either positivist ‘‘explanation
and prediction’’ or ‘‘inspiration involving patterning or accommodation,’’ that is, about
bringing ideas together. Nadel (1957) distinguishes between theories that ‘‘serve to map
out the problem area’’ and theory as a set of statements that tell something new and (dis)-
provable about the social world, in sense of theory as a provisional end product (Althus-
ser, 1969). These scholars criticize GTM for confusing the vernacular ‘‘spark to
inspiration,’’ which involves tacit patterning, interpretation, and inspiration, and the ‘‘pre-
dictive function of theory in the natural sciences and functionalism’’ (Thomas & James,
2006) that is about generalization following systematic data collection and the testing of
the generalization for the purposes of verification or falsification. Mouzelis (1995) joins
this argument and states that failure to make the distinction between these two kinds of
theory has ‘‘social scientists talking at cross purposes.’’ They also question the legitimacy
of the former to be called theory, stating with Schatzman (1991) that for theory to be
‘‘worth something’’ it has to involve more than ‘‘common interpretive acts’’ or some
‘‘everyday patterning and tacit heuristic exercises.’’
Grand Theory Pretense

Another misconception identified is that of grand theory pretense. Although GTM does
not claim to test grand theory deductively, it suggests that grand theory is implicit in the
data and needs to be discovered, that is, to emerge and grow by means of building blocks.
Although GTM studies do occasionally build on each other (one example being the work
by Strauss and some of the scholars he had supervised, such as A. Clarke, J. Fujimura, and
S. Leigh Star) toward theories that thus densify and/or diverge, they do not, so we argue,
contribute building blocks to a grand theory of management. This frequent claim in GTM
research is often a meaningless ritual, a remnant from grand scientific programs of a hun-
dred years ago (Principia Mathematica). Indeed, Glaser and Strauss (1967) themselves

contested in their original work the prevalent assumptions of a unified grand theory as an
independent external reality, suggesting that scientific truth was better to be understood as
a continuous interpretation of meaning resulting in constant, evolving compromises by
observers engaged in the observed and sharing it. However, the vocabulary deployed
(building blocks, discovery, emergence) invites epistemological and ontological discords
about the assumption of an external reality (Charmaz, 2000, p. 513). Both Charmaz and
Annells (1996) reject such notions of emergence and objectivity and suggest the applica-
tion of GTM within a constructionist paradigm.
Concluding Appreciation
Glaser and Strauss deserve and have our gratitude for having advanced the discussion
about the validity of qualitative research, be it ethnographic, phenomenological, herme-
neutic, or interpretative, and having offered procedures to legitimize this type of
inquiry—all this in a time when qualitative inquiry was in dire need of justification. Far
from wanting to spit into the soup that nourished us, we propose to proceed to what is
common to all good scientific method, namely, to allow it to evolve and mature with its
time, perhaps to drop some of the language and rationality of its epoque, and integrate
some of the rich experiences and knowledge that scholars have accumulated with it over
nearly four decades now. Ever since he first objected to Strauss in 1992, Glaser (1992a,
1998, 2002, 2004) rejected such an evolution and continues to argue that GTM should
remain pure, ‘‘unpolluted,’’ and free from any ‘‘preconception’’ and ‘‘ontological vitia-
tion’’ (Glaser, 1992b, 1998). His suggestion is, and continues to be, that one should ‘‘just
do’’ grounded theory. Fair enough.
Still, at many moments, while engaged in ‘‘just doing,’’ we (candidate and adviser)
could not help but wonder if some of the insistence on the rigidity of fractioning and cod-
ing does not result from a kind of false pride or inferiority complex of GTM proponents,
an attempt to justify an essentially interpretivist method vis-á-vis a research world still
prejudiced in favor of positivism. It is not uncommon that adherents to the status quo dis-
play a certain methodological ethnocentrism, believing that their methodology is the most
developed, the most natural, and that ‘‘they share a kind of ‘end of history’ assumption
that their epistemology is the high point of cumulative wisdom and experience’’ (Tinker
& Lowe, 1982). What we can claim is that we ‘‘just did it’’ and lived to see—and
combat—some interesting moments of ‘‘epistemological tyranny’’ (Feyerabend, 1978).
Based on our own experience, we do not believe that much of the endless rigid line-by-
line coding brought the various consulted scholars any further than a less rigid form of
abstraction would have. On the contrary, the time spent by this exercise deadened their
sharpness of perception, may have suppressed the use of their natural talents in the con-
duct of the study, and regular personal calls to reason were necessary to ensure the
advancement of some dissertations. Although originally conceived as a response to positi-
vism, GTM, at least in its most orthodox form, assumes an unbiased and passive observer
that collects data but does not participate in creating it, the separation of facts and values,
and the existence of an external world separate from scholars and their methods of knowl-
edge accumulation about the world. The price to pay for this distance is high, as the

researcher is required to ‘‘break through [personal biases] or move beyond them’’ (Strauss
& Corbin, 1998). We regret this reduction of the interpreter to a mere accountant of frac-
tured data and claim that meaning is likely to be lost in this self-afflicted call to neutrality.
The candidate found herself blocked in her critical thinking by the rigidity of GTM and its
innumerable warnings to not have preconceived ideas.
A walkabout of current critical literature shows that some serious confusion reigns with
GTM (Suddaby, 2006). So why bother with it at all? Because the method, in some of its
more flexible forms, such as proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985), Locke (2001), Gould-
ing (2002)—and especially in its constructionist interpretation as Charmaz (e.g., 1988,
1995a, 2006) has developed it over nearly two decades—serves a need. It is a method that
is genuinely engaged with the world and helps, especially with the constant comparison
and theoretical sampling techniques, to come skin close to the lived experience and inci-
dents of the management world and make sense of them. These procedures offer a useful
systematic approach to handling and analyzing data that, if applied with courage and crea-
tivity, may lead to innovative perspectives. GTM can and mostly does produce more than
narrative. Indeed, it offers processual theory in the Strauss and Corbin sense: It produces
plausible propositions of relationships among concepts and clusters of concepts that can
be traced back to the data. Furthermore, it is conceptually dense. It includes provisional
conceptual relationships presented in discursive form, and it outlines patterns of action
and interaction between and among social entities and/or actors, developed from complex
and constant iterative interplay among the data and between data, memos, and the litera-
ture. Still, in the light of some of the points on theory and grand theory pretense made ear-
lier, we propose to tone down its promise of theory generation. Perhaps grounded inquiry
may have been a more appropriate label for the method than grounded theory is.
Our personal experience suggests two further important recommendations dealing not
so much with the method of grounded theory (or the methods of grounded theory, for that
matter) as with the management of the research process in which GTM is used. It is often
recommended that the research question should by and large determine the research
method. We argue that the decision of whether to use a method and, in the case of GTM,
how to use it should be shaped in important ways by the personality and experience of the
researcher. This fit between person and method, between personality and working style, is
seldom discussed (Knafl, 1994). Stern (1994) suggests that methods are personal and that
people have individualized ways of getting at a kind of truth. Goulding (1998) suggests
that ‘‘researcher introspection and the philosophical basis of a given methodology should
form the starting-point for enquiry’’ (p. 869). The fathers of GTM seem to themselves sug-
gest that their method is best suited for researchers with little experience, not only in
research but in life itself, and that they may need rigid procedural guidelines both for pro-
tection from stress and to compensate for their inexperience. A researcher with more
experience, or simply with a personality that is more intuitive and better suited for conver-
sational exploration, is better served by a less rigorist version of GTM. In the doctoral
research example stated in this article, it was Glaser’s approach that had brought the can-
didate (Jackie) to GTM in the first place; it was then Strauss and Corbin’s procedural
rigidity that helped her overcome her first moments of solitude and doubt. As she pro-
ceeded and matured both in her work and regarding GTM, Locke’s understatement on the
one hand and methodological clarity on the other and Goulding’s detailed examples,

especially regarding the integration of memos, were much appreciated. Later still, some
ideas from the constructivist GTM as purported by Charmaz were adopted and allowed
for more creativity. Charmaz (1995b) had in fact been most explicit about the link
between the researcher’s personality and the choice and application of the research
method as she pulled out the researcher from his or her position of ‘‘distant expert’’ to pro-
pose a position of ‘‘coproducer’’ and encourage him or her to ‘‘add . . . a description of the
situation, the interaction, the person’s affect and [his or her] perception of how the inter-
view went’’ (p. 33). The recent editorial by Suddaby (2006) would have been very helpful
had it existed at the time. Following, some modest pragmatic suggestions of our own are
proposed.
We claim that the fit between the method and the researcher is essential in striving for
quality in GTM. To choose a method necessitates a thorough and honest self-assessment
in terms of beliefs, interests, and values but also of experiences and competencies. The
researcher is an important part of the inquiry, and he or she can be an asset with unique
contributions rather than just a resource that can be easily substituted by any other
resource of a similar nature. Like any asset, the researcher should be used to produce ben-
efits that exceed costs. Good research design increases the chances of taking the best pos-
sible advantage of such unique assets. At the least, the researcher must be comfortable
with the research approach, both intellectually and in terms of personality fit, because vio-
lating personal comfort levels over prolonged periods of time is detrimental to the quality
of life of the researcher and ultimately counterproductive for the inquiry itself. In other
words, the relationship between the researcher’s paradigm, ontology, epistemology, and
chosen method must be coherent.
Second, an inquiry, especially when leading to a doctoral dissertation, is a project and
as such should be subject to good project management practices. One such practice, which
was cruelly missing from the personal experience discussed in this article, is that of thor-
ough and contradictory review of the project plan and justification before launching the
execution phase. It is well understood that a careful review at that stage reduces unneces-
sary commitment of resources, reduces risks of major errors and blind alleys, and creates
for the researcher a ‘‘referent social system’’ to which he or she can turn for assistance in
case of difficulties. Some companies make a project review into a fairly gruesome and
rough experience, giving it evocative names like ‘‘the murder board,’’ but they believe
that ultimately these reviews contribute to more effective and efficient processes. Many
doctoral programs, but by far not all, require the candidate to develop a comprehensive
research proposal and to defend it to a faculty panel. For researchers past their doctoral
stage, or simply for those too solitary in their home environments, international academic
meetings could organize panels to review research designs in addition to the staple review
of research results. In any event, we are convinced that solitary pursuit of inquiry is not
what works best for most people. Needless to say, an adviser, a mentor, or simply sympa-
thetic colleagues have a crucial role to play in any sustained inquiry.
Doctoral methodological seminars deserve particular attention. Too often methods such
as GTM are taught as a set of procedural guidelines and tools, without enough attention to
the broader philosophical issues surrounding them. Their indeterminate, unselective appli-
cation ‘‘invites a fundamentalist drift towards positivism’’ (Suddaby, 2006, p. 639). It runs
the risk of leading to orthodox positions because without some skill at philosophizing, the

researchers are deprived of intellectual tools to acquire the explicit and tacit knowledge
that allows them to make pragmatic judgments about modifying the procedures handed to
them and to suitably adapt them to their specific needs. To engage in qualitative research
is to venture into a maelstrom of realities and contradictions. This is especially so in
GTM, considering the strong divergence in how the method is conceptualized between
Glaser’s interpretive, contextual, and emergent type of theory development; Strauss’s
highly complex and systematic coding techniques; and Charmaz’s constructionism, to
name just a few. It is therefore helpful to position these different stances historically, phi-
losophically, ontologically and, subsequently, to make it clear in the research which stance
is deployed and on what grounds.
Also, candidates’ fear of examination boards is part and parcel of the rite through which
the ‘‘academic tribe’’ co-opts members and contributes to the high social value of its
membership. But members of examining panels should avoid creating the impression of
orthodoxy. In our opinion, the question in front of them is not ‘‘do I approve of this
research and its results?’’ but rather ‘‘did the research follow the general principles of
scientific inquiry?’’ and ‘‘did the candidate demonstrate the high intellectual and ethical
standards required of members of the profession?’’
In sum, we consider GTM in its more recent forms a valid and useful method for man-
agement studies and would like to see it applied more than just once in any scholar’s life-
time. We further point out that noble disciplines such as history and anthropology are
perfectly satisfied with less formalism though just as much rigor and more reliance on the
innate intelligence and integrity of the researcher. We question whether we in manage-
ment science engage in unnecessary work because of false pride or an unjustified inferior-
ity complex vis-á-vis ‘‘hard’’ disciplines. Further propositions to enhance GTM quality
include a more open discussion of GTM and its stated problems even at the early teaching
level of qualitative methods in management studies so as to ensure that the method, in this
case GTM, serves the researcher and the quality of research, and not inversely. With
Atkinson and Hammersley (1995) we argue that in the midst of the reigning confusion
and controversy of genres, it may be helpful to remember that the first requirement of qua-
litative research is faithfulness to the phenomena under study and not to any set of metho-
dological tools and rules. Furthermore, with Sandelowski (1994) we purport that ‘‘we
refute the art in our science when we forget that rules of method serve us, but only to a
certain point, after which they may enslave us’’ (p. 56).
In consequence of the repositioning of the role of the researcher argued above, we also
propose an acknowledgement and disclosure of the researcher’s previous practical and
theoretical experiences and knowledge. Such experiences should be viewed as an asset
and not a liability, and we recommend in this context that the researcher should explain
early and clearly from which philosophical stance he or she is working and disclose in
some detail what prior experience and knowledge he or she brings to the study. We have
summarized these pragmatic appraisals and ideas in Table 2.
We end for now with a question, again inspired by Churchman (1961) and Ackoff
(1979): What if objectivity is not what matters? Can a single study of a single or a handful
of cases be objective? What does it mean for such a study to be objective? There is some
attractiveness to the notion that objectivity is a property not of any particular inquiry but
rather of science seen as a whole. If we accept the Hegelian (or Marxian, for that matter)

Table 2
Pragmatic Suggestions Regarding Grounded Theory Method (GTM)
GTM Claims/Malaises Suggestions
Quality Discuss and understand GTM and its versions, and make an
informed and conscious choice for a version/type/form of GTM
(Locke, 2001) with adviser.
Define a procedural stance that fits the research topic and the
researcher’s personality and prior experience so as to take the
best possible advantage of these assets.
For postdoctoral researchers: Organize research design panels
at international conferences that could offer such support
(as suggested in above item).
Doctoral seminars should go beyond procedural guidelines and
tools into broader philosophical issues.
Simplify the fracturing and coding strategies and procedures.
Maintain the constant comparison; extend it to include (a) data,
(b) memos, and (c) literature.
Maintain the broad, interdisciplinary literature exploration.
Put quality and usefulness before procedure.
Keep working at GTM to improve it and compare notes; set it
free to evolve over time (as was the original intention).
How to deal with nonverbal Extend GTM memoing function to allow for direct interpretation,
communication, conclusions from interviews, observation (especially of
environmental nonverbal communication); give these interpretations and
observations, and so on conclusions a prominent place in the constant comparison
and core category development process (equal to the
coding results).
Support conclusions generously with verbatim quotes in final
manuscript.
Researcher’s isolation, dangers Introduce GTM early in management studies and discuss—
of overobjectification and especially its various forms and their implications and
positivism, support issues possibilities (Charmaz, 2006; Locke, 2001).
Adviser and candidate agree on a form of GTM relative to
scholar’s maturity and experience.
Researcher sets up detailed research plan and thoroughly reviews
it with an adviser (or peer) before launching into execution.
Research design panels at conferences, rather than just research
results panels, could be useful.
Doctoral student support (adviser, seminars, meetings) should go
beyond procedural guidelines and tools into broader
philosophical issues.
Neutral, dispassionate role of Understand and accept this idea as an ideal, not as dogma. Keep
researcher, tabula rasa an open mind and a willingness to trust in data. Disclose in
approach, blank slate detail the researcher’s philosophical stance, prior experience,
and so on.
Use this experience to the full in the interpretation process.
Make the study reflect a point of view, as long as it is
clearly demarcated as such—and interesting and useful.
Cost-benefit view Reduce the coding procedure, redefine data saturation. Reduce
formalism—make sure the method serves the researcher,
not that the researcher serves the method.
(Continued)

Table 2
(Continued)
GTM Claims/Malaises Suggestions
Grounded, emergence, Consider redefining GTM’s positivist vocabulary and dropping

discovery, theory some of its époque rationality.
Validation, generalization To check for unwanted bias with limited effort, use interrater
and respondent checking but not blindly, more as a resource
for personal interpellation and interpolation, probably
limited to a sample of data and respondents.
Theory pretense Moderate the theory pretense; drop the grand unified theory
pretense altogether.
GTM best suited for This need not be. If suggestions of this table are adopted:
inexperienced researcher (a) Prior experience (life and research) can be an asset
(Glaser) in the use of GTM (or GIM), and (b) the cost-benefit ratio
will be such that even an experienced researcher will choose
to embark on another GTM journey.
If you ‘‘just do’’ GTM (and stop Stick with Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) original wish that scholars
criticizing it), it will work best would ‘‘codify and publish their own methods for generating
(Glaser, 1998) theory . . . keep the discussion open-minded . . . [and] stimulate
rather than freeze thinking about the topic’’ (pp. 8-9).
Adopt Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) recommendation that ‘‘these
procedures were designed not to be followed dogmatically
but rather to be used creatively and flexibly by researchers
as they deem appropriate’’ (p. 14).
notion that objectivity arises from a dialectic interplay of varying points of view, then the
value of a particular inquiry arises not from its approximation of ultimate truth but from
its usefulness as an instrument in the social debate leading to such truth. This might lead
one to attempt formulating criteria of usefulness, distinguishing between primitive and
annoying ‘‘contrarian’’ argumentation and useful ‘‘contradictory’’ views that bring about
new data or new ways of looking at old data in a scholarly and constructive way. Such an
approach would be ‘‘value-full, not value-free’’ (Ackoff, 1979, p. 103). It may put the
researcher, his or her erudition, experience, intuition, cleverness, and even genius, at the
center of the question of how to evaluate qualitative research and will undoubtedly raise a
whole new set of valid questions. But such is the epistemological journey and also the
purpose of this article.
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Grounded Theory Method in Management Research: Users' Perspectives

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OnlineFirst Version of Record - Aug 8, 2007

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in Management Research hosted at

Keywords: grounded theory method; qualitative inquiry; constructionism; pragmatism;

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• actual inconsistencies in the method itself;

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GTM Quality Malaises in Practice: An Example

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• ‘‘A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon

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To avoid these pitfalls, I chose a longitudinal, exploratory, multiple-case study design

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GTM Quality Malaises in the Literature

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Conﬂicting Approaches to GTM

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Grounded and Discovery

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Grand Theory Pretense

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Grounded, emergence, Consider redefining GTM’s positivist vocabulary and dropping

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